Asian Americans: Collateral Damage in the New Cold War with China? Increasingly, the Media Has Reported on Warnings by Top U.S

NAPABA Conference - Chicago

November 10, 2018

Moderator:

Asian Aryani Ong

Americans: Panelists:  Collateral Mara Hvistendahl

Damage in the Andrew Kim new Cold War Patrick Toomey with China? Sean Vitka

Chinese American Scientists, Not Spies

Dr. Wen Ho Lee Guoqing Cao (left front), Xiaorong Wang (left back), Sherry Chen (middle), Shuyi Li (right front), Xiaoxing Xi (right back) U.S. views on Chinese intelligence

Thousand Grains of Sand Distributed View

Multiple Chinese China targets government agencies, Chinese Americans actors. Independent actors incentivized by financial gain.

1990’s Present Day CLE Materials Compiled by Mara Hvistendahl

. Changing views of Chinese intelligence

. Paul Moore, “Chinese Culture and the Practice of ‘Actuarial’ Intelligence,” conference presentation from 1996

. Peter Mattis, “Beyond Spy vs. Spy: The Analytical Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services,” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) Economic Espionage Act cases,1996-2015

Study by Andrew Kim Published by Committee of 100

• # of EEA defendants with Chinese names tripled between 2009-2015, from 1996 to 2008

• 50% of EEA cases alleged theft of secrets for a US entity, 33% for China, none for Russia

• Convicted defendants of Asian heritage received sentences twice as severe

• 1 in 5 accused ”spies” of Asian heritage may be innocent CLE Materials Compiled by Andrew Kim

. Prosecuting Chinese “Spies:” An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act, Executive Summary

Presented by Committee of 100, May 17, 2018, Washington, D.C. Authored by Andrew Kim

. Economic Espionage and Trade Secrets: Asian Americans in the Crosshairs – Power point Presentation by Andrew Kim  Xiaoxing Xi et al. v. United States et al. Civil Rights Lawsuit

Constitutional Claims FTCA Claims

• Malicious Prosecution and • Malicious Prosecution Fabrication of Evidence • Invasion of Privacy • Equal Protection and Due (Intrusion on Seclusion Process and False Light) • Unlawful Search and Seizure • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress • Return and Expungement of Information and Property • Negligent Infliction of Unlawfully Searched and Emotional Distress Seized • Negligence

By Patrick Toomey CLE Materials Compiled by Patrick Toomey

. Powerpoint slide (previous slide) summarizing constitutional and Federal Torts Claim Act claims in Xiaoxing Xi, et al. v U.S. et al.

. Second amended complaint by Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, et al., filed on November 1, 2017 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

. Powerful government tool to surveil the public . Lack of transparency makes oversight challenging . Watchdogs have documented government abuses . Cited as authority to issue orders to intercept Dr. Xiaoxing Xi’s communications in his civil rights complaint against the U.S. government . Without safeguards for privacy and civil rights, how will FISA be used be used to surveil Chinese Americans in the future? CLE Material Compiled by Sean Vitka

. Disproportionate Impacts of Mass Surveillance, Powerpoint Presentation Disproportionate Impacts of Mass Surveillance Terms and authorities:

• S e c t i o n 215 • Commonly known as the ‘business records’ provision of the USA PATRIOT Act • Legal basis for bulk telephone metadata collection program

• Section 702 • Legal basis for PRISM, Upstream, and the “backdoor search loophole” • Modified and reauthorized in 2018

• Inherent executive authority • Executive Order 12333 puts in place some limits, though is often referred to as a grant of authority Terms and authorities:

• 50 USC 1801(e): “Foreign intelligence information” means— • (2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to— • (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or • (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. U.S. secretly tracked billions of calls for decades

Brad Heath, USA TODAY Published 4:34 p.m. ET April 7, 2015 | Updated 10:36 a.m. ET April 8, 2015

WASHINGTON — The U.S. government • Started in 1992 started keeping secret records of Americans' international telephone calls nearly a decade • Approved by AG Janet Reno and DAG before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, harvesting Eric Holder billions of calls in a program that provided a blueprint for the far broader National Security • Billions of call records Agency surveillance that followed. • In effect for two decades For more than two decades, the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement • Not public until after it was shut down Administration amassed logs of virtually all telephone calls from the USA to as many as 116 countries linked to drug trafficking, current and former officials involved with the operation said. The targeted countries changed over time but included Canada, Mexico and most of Central and South America.”

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephone-surveillance-operation/70808616/ Exclusive: IRS manual detailed DEA's use of hidden intel evidence John Shiffman, David Ingram August 7, 2013

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-irs/exclusive-irs-manual-detailed-deas-use-of-hidden-intel- evidence-idUSBRE9761AZ20130807 Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program used to investigate Americans John Shiffman, Kristina Cooke August 5, 2013

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A secretive The undated documents show that federal U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents are trained to “recreate” the unit is funneling information from investigative trail to effectively cover up intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants where the information originated, a practice and a massive database of telephone records that some experts say violates a defendant’s to authorities across the nation to help Constitutional right to a fair trial. If them launch criminal investigations of defendants don’t know how an investigation Americans. began, they cannot know to ask to review potential sources of exculpatory evidence - Although these cases rarely involve information that could reveal entrapment, national security issues, documents mistakes or biased witnesses. reviewed by Reuters show that law enforcement agents have been directed to “I have never heard of anything like this at conceal how such investigations truly begin all,” said Nancy Gertner, a Harvard Law - not only from defense lawyers but also School professor who served as a federal sometimes from prosecutors and judges. j u d g e f r o m 19 9 4 t o 20 11.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sod/exclusive-u-s-directs-agents-to-cover-up-program-used-to- investigate-americans-idUSBRE97409R20130805 Courts defer

• Clapper v. Amnesty International:

“In sum, respondents’ speculative chain of possibilities does not establish that injury based on potential future surveillance is certainly impending or is fairly traceable to §18 8 1a . ” Since Snowden

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/2018-ASTR----CY2017----FINAL-for-Release-5.4.18.pdf U.S. v. Hailong Summary by Faiza Patel, Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice • Mo Hailong, a Chinese national and • In March 2014, Mo was notified, permanent US resident employed by a pursuant to 50 U.S.C . sections 1806(c) Chinese agricultural conglomerate, and 1825(d), of the government’s asked a farmer what he was growing. intention to use information The farmer was under contract with a “obtained or derived from electronic company called Pioneer to cultivate its surveillance or physical search” proprietary inbred test seeds. The pursuant to FISA. next day, Mo was found by a company • Mo asked the government to specify field manager, on his knees in the the legal authority for each piece of same field while one of his evidence obtained by search and compatriots waited in a car. All this seizure— i.e., whether it was obtained was reported to the FBI during “a pursuant to a regular search warrant routine liaison visit” to the company. or an order from the FISA Court or • In December 2013, six persons were other covert methods. charged with one count of conspiracy • The judge denied the motion. to steal trade secrets. (A seventh defendant was subsequently charged i n Ju l y 20 14 . )

https://www.justsecurity.org/21709/stolen-corn-seeds-problem-fisa-court/ U.S. v. Hailong Summary by Faiza Patel, Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice

• If Hailong goes the way of all of the other FISA criminal cases, we’re not likely to find out too much more. The only district court to order the government to turn over FISA documentation was overturned by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Rovner of that court recognized in her concurring opinion that: “Thirty-six years after the enactment of FISA, it is well past time to recognize that it is virtually impossible for a FISA defendant to make the showing [required] in order to convene an evidentiary hearing.” https://www.justsecurity.org/21709/stolen-corn-seeds-problem-fisa-court/ FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017

(2)United States persons (A)In general Any information concerning a United States person acquired under section 702 shall not be used in evidence against that United States person pursuant to paragraph (1) in any criminal proceeding unless— (i)the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained an order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to access such information pursuant to section 702(f)(2); or (ii)the Attorney General determines that— (I)the criminal proceeding affects, involves, or is related to the national security of the United States;or (II)the criminal proceeding involves— (aa)death; (bb)kidnapping; (cc)serious bodily injury, as defined in section 1365 of title 18, United States Code; (dd)conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor, as defined in section 111 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (34 U.S.C. 20911); (ee)incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure, as defined in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)); (ff)cybersecurity, including conduct described in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)) or section 1029, 1030, or 2511 of title 18, United States Code; (gg)transnational crime, including transnational narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime; or (hh)human trafficking. Economic Espionage and Trade Secrets: Asian Americans in the Crosshairs Andrew Chongseh Kim Of Counsel, Beck Redden LLP Visiting Scholar, South Texas College of Law Houston Economic Espionage Act prosecutions 1996-2015 Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) • 136 cases • 187 defendants Nationality of Benefitting Entity

Average Sentences

• Western name defendants: 11 months • Chinese name defendants: 25 months • All Asian name defendants: 22 months Collateral Damage? Not proven guilty of espionage • Western name defendants: 10.7% • Chinese name defendants: 21.3% • All Asian name defendants: 22.2%

Others • Acquitted, all charges dropped, pled to false statements and received probation only. Forced to Plead Wen Ho Lee • Charged under Federal Atomic Energy Act: Life in prison • Pled to mishandling data: Time served

Others • Charged with serious offenses • Allowed to plead to minor offenses with minor punishment

Explanations • Actual spies, but no proof • Seeking punishment even though initial suspicions were false Probation Only

• Western name defendants: 48% • Chinese name defendants: 21% • All Asian name defendants: 22%

WHITE PAPER PROSECUTING CHINESE “SPIES:” AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PRESENTED BY COMMITTEE OF 100 AUTHOR: ANDREW KIM | MAY 2017 | WASHINGTON DC The Committee of 100 is a leadership organization of prominent Chinese Americans in business, government, academia, and the arts. C100 members are leading U.S. citizens of Chinese descent who leverage their collective inﬂuence and resources to strengthen U.S.-China relations and promote the full participation of Chinese Americans. In 1999, the Committee led a coalition to raise national awareness of the denial of due process in the Wen Ho Lee case of alleged espionage, which later resulted in a public apology from the presiding judge. For over a quarter century, the Committee has monitored issues affecting Chinese Americans and served as a high- level bridge in the U.S.-China dialogue fostering regular exchanges with the leadership of Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. Learn more: www.committee100.org.!

CONTACT

COMMITTEE OF 100 257 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, 19TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10010 T 212.371.6565 | F 212.371.9009 WWW.COMMITTEE100.ORG TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 16 FOREWORD ABOUT THE AUTHORS by Frank H. Wu, Chairman, Commiee of 100

6 18 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PROMOTIONAL PARTNERS Prosecung Chinese “Spies:” An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act by Andrew Kim, Of Counsel, Beck Redden LLP

12 COMMENTARY I by David A. Harris, Professor at University of Pisburgh School of Law

14 COMMENTARY II by JaneAnne Murray, Professor of Pracce at University of Minnesota Law School FRANK H. WU Chairman, Commiee of 100 Disnguished Professor, UC Hasngs College of Law

The Commiee of 100 (C100) is pleased to present this In 2000, Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a scienst who had dedicated his important White Paper, “Prosecung Chinese Spies: An career to the American government, faced charges of Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act” by legal disclosing secrets about the naon’s nuclear weapons and scholar Andrew C. Kim of South Texas College of Law, was held without bail in solitary confinement for over a Houston. The study, which Kim developed over the course year. In the end, the Jusce Department dropped all of the of a full year of research, offers an empirical analysis of charges against him except for one count to which he pled recent U.S. government espionage claims brought against guilty to end his traumazing ordeal. Many others who had people of Asian heritage. C100 is publishing an execuve commied the same acts were not similarly held summary of Kim’s report, along with two independent accountable. Then-President Bill Clinton declared he was commentaries, to bring aenon to the study’s findings, “troubled” by the maer. The federal judge who presided in prior to its appearance in an academic version. the case publicly apologized for his mistreatment.

The study provides empirical indicaons that Asian Today, there are more such cases similar to Dr. Lee’s in Americans, whether immigrant or nave-born, may be which racial profiling and ethnic hoslity seem to have facing unfair and increasing racial prejudice in this era of colored the judgment of government officials and tainted geopolical compeon. C100 recognizes that these new the criminal process. People such as Sherry Chen, a risks are underscored by a legacy of almost two centuries hydrologist with the Naonal Oceanographic and of racial stereotyping as perpetual “foreigners,” where the Atmospheric Administraon, and Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, a physicist loyalty of Asian Americans to the United States has been at Temple University, are essenally “Wen Ho Lee 2.0.” repeatedly challenged with similar themes. Chen and Xi have been exonerated in full. There was no During World War II, despite evidence known at the me basis for any suspicion of them — other than, apparently, that there was no genuine threat, 120,000 Japanese the color of their skin. The sheer number and factual Americans — 2/3 of them U.S. cizens — were sent to similaries among these prosecuons have created an internment camps and incarcerated based solely on the apparent paern and pracce of selecve and suspicions that their ethnic heritage made them "enemy discriminatory treatment that demands greater aliens." Despite such imprisonment of their own families, transparency and accountability. Monitoring, oversight, and thousands of young Japanese American men served in safeguards are needed. segregated Army units as the 442nd Regimental Combat Team fighng across Europe. Their infantry became the The history of Asian Americans dates back to the early most decorated for their size and length of service in U.S. nineteenth century, with numerous contribuons Army history. extraordinary and ordinary, in fields ranging from the sciences to the arts to technology and business. These

Page 4 Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act, Execuve Summary Foreword | Frank H. Wu, Chairman, Commiee of 100 FOREWORD

contribuons have been made possible in a naon that and Brian Sun have led educaonal workshops around the welcomes everyone. The rule of law promises equality naon presenng background on some of the issues without regard to race, color, or creed. discussed here.

Yet from me to me, we fail to live up to our own ideals. Recently, the Commiee of 100 formed a Legal Defense & We have found evidence of deprivaons of due process that Educaon Fund, through which financial support has been affect innocent individuals. These prevent society from offered to vicms of racial profiling. The Fund has also paid realizing the benefit of the full potenal of Asian American for the prinng and distribuon of this White Paper. C100 contribuons. expresses its gratude for all donors to the Fund. C100 Member Jeremy Wu has provided invaluable input as a No doubt there have been instances of Asian Americans, like stascian, which has helped to inform the findings other Americans, who have violated the law and who have presented in the following pages. then faced jusfiable invesgaon and prosecuon. A definite line can be drawn between appropriate prosecuon that is based on actual evidence and free of bias and overreaching persecuon that is triggered by unfounded suspicions and tainted by racial prejudice. All Americans, regardless of ethnicity, depend on that line.

It is in this defense of constuonal rights for everyone, and the spirit of public service, that the Commiee of 100 FRANK H. WU supports and releases the ﬁndings of Professor Kim's CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE OF 100 independent study.

The Commiee of 100 is a non-parsan leadership organizaon of prominent Chinese Americans in business, government, academia, entertainment, and the arts. Established in 1990, the Commiee has a long history of contribuon to twin missions promong the full parcipaon and inclusion of Chinese Americans in all ﬁelds of American life, and encouraging construcve relaons between the peoples of the United States and Greater China. For the past ﬁve years, C100 members such as Nelson Dong, George Koo,

Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act, Execuve Summary Page 5 Foreword | Frank H. Wu, Chairman, Commiee of 100 INTRODUCTION

Recent prosecuons of innocent Chinese Russia was not idenfied as the alleged Americans for espionage have raised concerns beneficiary in any cases in the sample; 3) that Department of Jusce (DOJ) invesgaons Defendants of Asian heritage convicted of of suspected espionage have been infected by espionage received sentences over twice as racial biases. Although not conclusive, this severe as those of other ethnicies; 4) 22% of study finds evidence consistent with those people of Asian heritage charged with concerns. It finds: 1) The percentage of people economic espionage were never convicted of of Chinese heritage charged under the espionage. In other words, as many as 1 in 5 Economic Espionage Act (EEA) has tripled since Asian people prosecuted as spies may be 2009, to 52%. Including people of non-Chinese innocent, a rate twice as large as for other Asian descent, 62% of EEA defendants charged races. since 2009 have been people of Asian heritage; 2) In half (48%) of cases, the alleged beneficiary of espionage was an American As many as 1 in 5 Asian people enty while a third (34%) of cases involved a “ Chinese beneficiary. prosecuted as spies may be innocent, a rate twice as large as for other races.”

62% 22% of EEA defendants charged since 2009 of people of Asian heritage charged with have been people of Asian heritage. economic espionage were never convicted of espionage.

Page 6 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Execuve Summary | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

136 EEA CASES 187 DEFENDANTS TO TEST FOR RACIAL DISPARITIES, THIS STUDY USED DEFENDANTS’ NAMES AS PROXIES FOR THEIR RACE!

4 107 59 17 DEFENDANTS WITH DEFENDANTS WITH DEFENDANTS WITH DEFENDANTS WITH ARABIC NAMES “WESTERN” NAMES CHINESE NAMES NON-CHINESE ASIAN NAMES

DATA

This Study analyzes a random sample of cases charged Tesng for racial disparies requires an indicator of the under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) from 1997 to defendant’s race, a variable that is absent from most PACER 2015, (136 cases involving 187 individual defendants), records. To work around this otherwise fatal complicaon, using publicly available court documents drawn from the this study used the defendant’s name as a proxy for race. Public Access to Court Electronic Records system (PACER). The sample includes 107 defendants with “Western” Not all suspected economic espionage spies are names, (deﬁned to include those with Eastern European, prosecuted under the EEA. For example, Dr. Xi Xiaoxing, Hispanic, and Lano names), 59 defendants with Chinese who was falsely accused of stealing superconductor names, 17 defendants with other Asian names (including technology for China, was charged with wire fraud, a crime Indian names), and 4 defendants with Arabic names. that usually does not involve espionage-type acvity. By Searches on Google and Facebook were used to focusing on EEA cases, however, this study was able to disambiguate any names with unclear naonal origins. produce an unbiased sample of federal cases all of which Because this study could not idenfy defendants’ include allegaons of the the of secret informaon. cizenship statuses, it cannot disnguish between the treatment of Asian-American cizens and naonals of Asian countries.

Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Page 7 Execuve Summary | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 FINDINGS

(1) Since 2009, the majority of defendants charged under the EEA have been people of Asian heritage.

From 1996 to 2008, 17% of EEA defendants were Chinese while 8% were other Asians. Between 2009 and 2015, however, the rate of Chinese defendants tripled, to 52%. The rate for other Asians increased only slightly over the same me period, to 10%. In sum, 62% of EEA defendants prosecuted under the Obama administraon were people of Asian heritage.

EEA DEFENDANTS BY RACE

1996-2008 2009-2015

72% 52%

37% 17%

3% 8% 10% 1%

Western Chinese Western Chinese Other Asian Arabic Other Asian Arabic

Page 8 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Execuve Summary | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NUMBER OF EEA CASES FILED BY YEAR 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

FINDINGS NATION OF BENEFITING ENTITY

48% (2) Half of EEA cases alleged the of secrets for a USA enty, one third for China, and none for Russia 34%

The intended beneficiary of the alleged espionage could be 7% 2% 2% idenfied in 118 out of the 136 cases in the sample. In half 2% 2% 3% (48%) of cases, trade secrets were allegedly stolen to benefit an American enty. In one third (34%) of cases, the alleged thes were intended to benefit Chinese enes. The remaining cases involved naons as diverse as South USA China India Africa, India, Iran, and the Czech Republic. None of the Japan South Korea Australia cases in which an alleged beneficiary could be idenfied Israel Other involved Russia.

Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Page 9 Execuve Summary | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 % CHINESE AND ASIAN EEA DEFENDANTS BY YEAR

90%

80%

15% 70% 0% 10% 60%

50% 18% 0% Other Asian 0% 28% Chinese 40%

29% 0% 30% 0% 15% 50% 20% 5%

10% 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

FINDINGS

(3) Convicted defendants of (4) One in ﬁve accused “spies” Asian heritage received of Asian heritage may be sentences twice as severe innocent

The average sentence for Chinese and all Asian defendants Twenty-one percent of Chinese and 22% of all Asian defendants convicted of espionage was 25 months and 22 months charged under the EEA are never proven guilty of spying or any respecvely, twice as long as the 11 month average other serious crime, a rate twice as large as for defendants with sentence for defendants with Western names. Where Western names. Instead, these defendants were acquied at trial, almost half (48%) of defendants with Western names pled guilty only to “false statements” and released on probaon, received sentences of probaon only, only 21% of Chinese or, most oen, had all charges against them dropped. The fact that defendants and 22% of all Asian defendants received these defendants were never proven guilty of espionage does not probaon only. These figures include only defendants who necessarily mean they were innocent. Aer all, there are reasons were convicted of any offense other than false statements. other than innocence, such as suppression of key evidence, for why a prosecutor might drop all charges or allow a defendant to plead guilty to a minor offense like false statements. Nonetheless, these findings raise the possibility that as many as one in five accused Asian “spies” might actually be innocent, a rate that is twice as large as that for defendants with Western names.

Page 10 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Execuve Summary | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CONCLUSIONS: MORE QUESTIONS

These findings are consistent with concerns that the DOJ defendants with Asian names twice as harmful as those has improperly targeted, engaged in racial profiling of, and stolen by defendants with Western names? Alternavely, used biased judgment with respect to Asian Americans could it be that subconscious racial biases cause judges and and Asian naonals suspected of espionage. Without prosecutors to perceive the crimes commied by Asian further informaon, however, this study cannot rule out defendants as more severe than objecvely similar crimes innocent explanaons for these racial disparies. Rather commied by non-Asian defendants? than conclusions, this study raises a number of troubling quesons that can only be answered through an Fourth, why does it appear that the DOJ accuses innocent independent and transparent invesgaon of DOJ people of Asian descent far more oen than others? Could it espionage invesgaons. be that preexisng images of Asian people as spies cause prosecutors to misinterpret ambiguous evidence as First, why are so many EEA defendants of Asian descent, conclusive evidence of guilt? Might fears that a suspect will and how much, if any, of these disparies can be explained flee the country if pped off jusfy filing charges early in the by the higher rates at which Asian-Americans work in invesgaon, when the evidence is lile more than technical fields? Why did the percentage of Chinese innuendo? Although such concerns would be irrelevant in defendants triple under the Obama administraon? Is it cases like Sherry Chen and Wen Ho Lee, where the suspect possible that three mes as many Chinese-Americans was aware of and cooperang with the invesgaon prior to began stealing secrets around 2009, or did the DOJ under filing charges, there were four defendants in the sample, all Obama simply devote more resources to idenfying and of Chinese descent, whose cases were never resolved prosecung espionage related to China? If the laer is because the defendant remains a fugive from jusce. Or, is true, does this reflect a legimate priorizaon of DOJ it possible that, as has been argued in the war against terror, resources, or is it a case of unfair racial profiling and the are the harms of some crimes so great that it is worth start of a “New Red Scare”? prosecung some innocent Americans to avoid allowing the guilty to go free? Second, why do none of the cases involve allegaons of espionage to benefit Russia? Is it possible that in spite of Fih, why do prosecutors allow some defendants who were recent allegaons of state-sponsored hacking and decades originally charged with espionage to plead guilty to minor of post-cold war espionage, Russia is actually not crimes like false statements? Are these cases in which cray interested in obtaining American trade secrets? Are there spies cut a deal to avoid convicon on more serious charges? diplomac reasons for why the DOJ might avoid Or, could these be cases in which prosecutors accused an prosecung Russian spies, or charge them under statutes innocent defendant of espionage and insisted on obtaining a other than the EEA? Has the DOJ focused so much energy convicon for any crime rather than admit their mistake? on invesgang Asia related spying that they have missed the Russian spies in our midst? Finally, if these findings do reflect problems in the DOJ, what can be done to address those problems and reduce the Third, why are guilty defendants of Asian descent number of innocent Americans whose lives are shaered by punished more than twice as harshly as guilty defendants false accusaons of betraying their own country? with Western names? Are the trade secrets stolen by

Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Page 11 Execuve Summary | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 DAVID A. HARRIS Disnguished Faculty Scholar/Professor University of Pisburgh School of Law

With his study Prosecung Chinese “Spies,” Professor and not to espionage offenses, or had charges dropped Andrew C. Kim raises an important queson. In light of the against them enrely. “In other words,” Professor Kim says, fact that prosecuons of Chinese and other Asian persons “one in five accused Asian ‘spies’ might actually be under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) have increased innocent.” since 2009, Professor Kim asks whether the we are witnessing ethnic targeng of Chinese sciensts and It is important, up front, to recognize the limitaons of researchers. In other words, are we seeing racial profiling these data. First, the number of cases in the sample is directed at a new group, for a new purpose, in much the relavely small, and a small sample size limits any analysis. same way we witnessed targeng of African Americans (By way of comparison, the first studies of racial profiling of through “driving while black” in the past? The answer is that African Americans on highways in New Jersey and Maryland we simply don’t know yet; the data presented in the study in the 1990s, conducted by Dr. John Lamberth, involved a do not prove the existence of “researching while Asian,” to vastly larger amount of data -- many thousands of vehicles borrow Professor Kim’s phrase. But we can see enough that, observed, in addion to those vehicles stopped and going forward, we must remain vigilant, watch the data, and searched.) We also cannot tell how many invesgaons follow up with further study. under the EEA (as opposed to cases charged) took place during the study period, what ethnic groups the targets of Professor Kim begins by laying out the data he has, a sample those invesgaons came from (Chinese or Asian or other), of 136 cases brought under the Economic Espionage Act, and the rate at which those invesgaons actually between 1997 and 2015. From 1997 unl 2008, Chinese blossomed into charged cases. We also do not know how persons made up 17 percent of the cases brought; between many espionage related cases were charged under statutes 2009 and 2015, that percentage tripled, to 52 percent. other than the EEA (Professor Kim cites a number of other Convicted defendants in EEA cases of “Asian federal statutes prosecutors could use and have used in heritage” (including ethnicies other than Chinese) received other cases.) Moreover, as Professor Kim himself sentences over twice as long, on average, as non-Asian acknowledges, there are “many reasons other than defendants. Further, 21 percent of all Chinese EEA innocence” that could explain why defendants were defendants were not proven guilty of spying or other acquied, had charges dropped, or plead guilty to reduced serious crimes – about twice the rate of members of other charges.. Overall, as he says, his study “cannot rule out ethnic groups; instead, they were acquied, plead guilty innocent explanaons for the findings.” only to making false statements

Page 12 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Commentary I | David A. Harris, Professor at University of Pisburgh School of Law COMMENTARY I

First, Professor Kim says the data indicate that the average This seeming contradicon laid bare a hidden operaonal sentence for Chinese defendants “convicted of espionage” standard – perhaps hidden even from officers themselves: in these cases was 25 months (22 months for all Asian while the legal standard for stopping any person was the defendants combined), twice the average sentence for same – reasonable, fact-based suspicion of involvement in defendants from other ethnic groups. This troubling criminal acvity, according to the U.S. Supreme Court – the finding raises a red flag; the federal sentencing system is actual standard in use on the street seemed to be lower for designed to ensure that defendants who commit similar African Americans and Lanos than for whites. In other crimes receive similar sentences, regardless of race, words, African Americans and Lanos were seen as gender, or religion. This sentencing disparity is an obvious suspicious on much less evidence than were whites, target for further study; if the finding of disparity holds up resulng in stops that were “hits” – that is, they resulted in aer controlling for the Federal Guidelines factors that an arrest or a summons – much less oen than stops of were unavailable to Professor Kim, this would mean that whites, because officers did not stop whites unl they had we might indeed be seeing not just unexplained disparity, more, and more solid, evidence of criminality. The same but discriminaon. kind of process may be at work here: while there may be innocent explanaons for the disparity, it may be that Second, consider the data indicang that twice as many invesgators and prosecutors are more willing to go cases against Chinese defendants result in acquials, guilty forward with cases against Chinese and Asian defendants pleas to reduced charges, or dropped charges as is true of on less evidence than they are in invesgaons of whites. cases against non-Chinese defendants. Though these data Because we have seen precedent for this in very different are consistent with both innocent and troubling kinds of law enforcement acvity, this is something to explanaons, they deserve further scruny. This is invesgate more deeply in exisng cases in the data, and to because of the striking parallel with stop and frisk data track carefully going forward. gathered in New York over the last decade. In the Floyd v. New York City case, which resulted in a federal court order For all these reasons, Professor Kim’s study does a real to reform the use of stop and frisk pracces by the New service. He points to an issue many perceive to exist in the York Police Department, an astonishing 88 percent of all real world, and marshals the data to examine it. While that stops yielded nothing – not an arrest, not a recovery of a data remains too scarce to draw definive conclusions, he gun or other contraband – not even a summons. Buried correctly points out that the data do raise serious quesons. deeper in the data was this: police were more likely by far As we transion into a new presidenal administraon, to stop African American and Lanos than whites, but with a new team atop the Department of Jusce, these much more likely to find contraband on, and make arrests quesons cannot – they must not be – ignored. of, whites than African Americans or Lanos.

Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Page 13 Commentary I | David A. Harris, Professor at University of Pisburgh School of Law JANEANNE MURRAY Professor of Pracce University of Minnesota Law School

Our federal criminal jusce system is relentlessly efficient. It’s not that Chinese and Asian espionage is increasing, but Of the cases adjudicated each year, more than 97% are rather that prosecutors believe it to be, and therefore, they resolved by guilty plea, and 90% of the remainder end in may disproporonately and precipitously target individuals guilty verdicts at trial. Less than 7% of charged cases are of Chinese and other Asian descent as spies, leading dismissed or deferred annually, and most of those through inevitably to a high rate of false posives. diversionary programs for low-level offenders. These stascs are due mainly to federal prosecutors’ careful There is a growing empirical literature examining how selecon process (they decline as much as 63% of cases implicit bias pervades our criminal jusce system, from the brought to them annually). With trials all but disappearing decision to stop and queson an individual, to the decision as an adjudicave mechanism, we trust these prosecutors – to arrest, to the decision to charge, to the type of charge to some say too much – to leverage their considerable be levied, to the degree of leniency offered in plea charging, bargaining and sentencing power with bargaining, to the severity of sentencing. Most of this proporonality and precision. research – driven by the disparies in our convicted and incarcerated populaons, as well as studies of DNA Against that backdrop, Andrew Kim’s meculous research exoneraon cases – focuses on differences in the on economic espionage cases raises many troubling experiences and outcomes of whites and African Americans. quesons. Not only are these cases out of whack with Kim’s research is a major contribuon to this scholarship for naonal averages (producing double the dismissals, five two reasons. First, relavely lile is known about implicit mes more trials, and almost twice as many acquials), but bias in our criminal jusce system beyond the studies as Kim outlines, individuals of Chinese or other Asian relang to biases against African Americans. By focusing on descent are disproporonately charged with espionage, an ethnicity that is rarely the subject of such research – receive higher sentences, and are twice as likely as non- indeed, a group that is oen viewed as having overcome Asian defendants to have their charges dropped. Perhaps, historical prejudices – Kim corroborates and deepens the as Kim evenhandedly suggests, individuals of Chinese or exisng insights about implicit bias in the criminal jusce Asian descent are engaging in more (and more serious) acts context, demonstrang the potenal for bias in a range of of economic espionage, or perhaps prosecutors are forced less tradional cases (beyond drugs and terrorism, for to arrest before they have fully analyzed their case to avoid example) and among groups outside the tradional black- evidence destrucon or flight. But another, simpler white paradigm of racial jusce. In other words, implicit bias explanaon is that these stascs reflect an implicit bias in a jusce system that prizes accuracy but against Asians.

Page 14 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Commentary II | JaneAnne Murray, Professor of Pracce at University of Minnesota Law School COMMENTARY II

essenally delegates the accuracy judgment to all-too- what, where and why. As the stascs cited at the human prosecutors is likely far more pervasive than we are beginning of this commentary establish, a charge is prepared to admit. tantamount to a convicon in most federal cases. Even without a convicon, a charge alone is certainly personally Second, Kim’s work is an impressive example of how this devastang to the individual involved. But apart from research can and should be done. His analysis does not occasional high-profile examinaons (the Ted Stevens case, simply crunch disembodied numbers. It is based on a for example), the operaon of prosecutorial discreon is painstaking search of the electronic database of all but largely a black box. Kim’s project in fact grew out of three of the 94 federal districts and an individual unheeded calls to the DOJ for an independent invesgaon examinaon of the court filings or other publicly available into its espionage prosecuons to address concerns about informaon related to all 170 cases in his sample. As a racial disparity. Were the prosecutors, however, required to result, his analysis of the data is especially nuanced and rich. explain publicly why they dismissed espionage charges, we He uncovered several cases where, for example, it was clear would get a window into the factors that lead both to a that charges were dismissed on innocence grounds, cases prosecutorial rush to a judgment and the more painful but where risk of flight and destrucon of evidence could not necessary process of redressing inial errors. By illustrang have been legimate concerns, and cases where there was both the dangers of relying too heavily on the inial a strong inference that a convicon to a count of making a judgments of police and prosecutors and the mechanisms false statement did not indicate culpability for espionage. by which prosecutors can reassess these judgments, this All of these findings strengthen the inevitable takeaway data reveals the prosecutor as the minister for jusce that from the paper: it is likely that the charging, convicon and she must be (and is, for the most part), rather than just an sentencing disparies in economic espionage cases are advocate for convicon at all cost. Moreover, the fact that driven by bias against Asians. any later decision to dismiss espionage charges –among the most challenging for anyone to face – will be scrunized Kim concludes with some praccal calls for addional closely may promote greater prosecutorial accountability acon, including implicit bias training for prosecutors, throughout the life of the case. suggesons to slow the rush to indict, and, most notably, a requirement of transparent explanaons for decisions to drop or significantly reduce charges. Prosecutorial discreon powers the efficiency of our criminal jusce system, which, in the end, to borrow from Harold Lasswell, is all about who gets charged

Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Page 15 Commentary II | JaneAnne Murray, Professor of Pracce at University of Minnesota Law School ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ANDREW KIM Vising Scholar, South Texas College of Law Of Counsel, Beck Redden LLP!

Andrew Chongseh Kim is an aorney at Beck Redden LLP and Vising Scholar at South Texas College of Law Houston. Kim received his undergraduate degree from the University of Chicago with triple majors in Economics, Physics, and Anthropology. He graduated cum laude from Harvard Law School, where he was honored as a Dean’s Scholar, and clerked at the Supreme Court of Conneccut. As a scholar, Kim applies sophiscated stascal techniques to the study of the American criminal jusce system. His research has been peer reviewed and published in top 100 law reviews. Kim’s private pracce work focuses on commercial ligaon.

DAVID A. HARRIS Disnguished Faculty Scholar/Professor University of Pisburgh School of Law!

David A. Harris is the John E Murray Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of Pisburgh. His book "Profiles in Injusce: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work" is the standard work on the subject, and his research has led to statutes, regulaons, and proposed laws against profiling in half the states and hundreds of police departments. He is also the creator and host of the "Criminal Injusce" podcast.

Page 16 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act About the Authors | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JANEANNE MURRAY Professor of Pracce University of Minnesota Law School

JaneAnne Murray is Professor of Pracce at the University of Minnesota Law School, where she teaches criminal procedure and runs a program in which students represent federal inmates seeking clemency. She is also a praccing federal criminal defense lawyer, and has represented clients in many high-proﬁle criminal cases in Minneapolis and New York City. She is co-chair of the Sentencing Commiee of the Naonal Associaon of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and was a member of the Steering Commiee of Clemency Project 2014 and of the ABA Task Force on the Reform of Federal Sentencing of Economic Crimes. She obtained her Bachelor in Civil Law from University College Cork and her Master in Laws from the University of Cambridge. From 1990 to 2000, she was the Internaonal Advisor for the Oﬃce of the United Naons High Commission for Human Rights in Kampot, Cambodia.

Page 17 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act About the Authors | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 PROMOTIONAL PARTNERS

Special Thanks to Adrian and Monica Arima

Page 18 Execuve Summary | Prosecung Chinese "Spies:" An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act Promoonal Partners | Andrew Kim, Commiee of 100 www.committee100.org!

Changing views of Chinese intelligence

Theories about how China spies – both with national-security espionage and economic espionage – have shifted over time. This evolving understanding of Chinese spycraft has powerful implications for Chinese-Americans accused of economic espionage. It means that past theories are not only racist, they are also incorrect. The shift is summarized in Chapter 8 of Chinese Industrial Espionage, by William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi. (Note: much of the rest of the book deals with open-source collection efforts, not criminal cases.)

Thousand grains of sand/vacuum cleaner approach

First proposed in the late 1990s, this theory holds that Chinese intelligence services break all the molds. Instead of relying on traditional spycraft, China collects small bits of information from large numbers of sources, most of whom are Chinese or Chinese-American. The theory received prominent media coverage at the time of the Wen Ho Lee case. It still persists in some corners of the intelligence bureaucracy. But a number of scholars and intelligence analysts have lately challenged its key contentions.

• 2004 Intelligence Threat Handbook maintained that the Ministry of State Security focused 98 percent of its recruitment efforts in the United States on Chinese-Americans and overseas Chinese • A 2010 report from the intelligence firm Stratfor read: “China has the largest population in the world, at 1.3 billion, which means that it has a vast pool of people from which to recruit for any kind of national endeavor, from domestic road-building projects to international espionage.” In a follow-up report, Stratfor explained, “The Chinese intelligence services rely on ethnic Chinese agents because the services do not generally trust outsiders.”

Further reading:

Peter Mattis, “Beyond Spy vs. Spy: The Analytical Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services,” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012)

Peter Mattis, “A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations,” https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/a-guide-to-chinese-intelligence-operations/

Jon R. Lindsay and Tai Ming Cheung, “From Exploitation to Innovation: Acquisition, Absorption, and Application,” in China and Cybersecurity, Oxford University Press (2015)

2 REVISED DESCRIPTION (revised as of 8/29)

Asian Americans: Collateral Damage in the new Cold War with China? Increasingly, the media has reported on warnings by top U.S. government officials on the economic and military threats posted by China. Responding to its concerns of Chinese espionage, the federal government has increased scrutiny of scientists, engineers and technical professionals for leaks of trade or state secrets. Espionage is real, as is the harm. China leads in the theft of U.S. intellectual property, responsible for upwards of $100 billion in harm. But some in the Asian American community worry that innocent parties - primarily first-generation immigrants who "look like the enemy" - are getting swept up in the rush to target, investigate and prosecute suspects. In recent years, four Asian-American scientists - all naturalized U.S. citizens - were arrested and prosecuted under the specter of espionage only to later see those cases dropped as inexplicably as they were charged. Reminiscent of the debacle of the Dr. Wen Ho Lee case in the early 2000’s, the cases portend a new Red Scare. The panelists will cover the following topics: the way in which American perceptions of Chinese intelligence affect Chinese Americans; the U.S. government's use of laws such as Economic Espionage Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to bring prosecutions; and defendants' countersuits in reliance on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Federal Torts Claim Act.

Beyond Spy vs. Spy The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services

Peter Mattis

Introduction an important task for the US Intelli- gence Community, but clear under- Scholars of intelligence and com- standing of Chinese intelligence parative politics have tended to serves more than the CI mission. At overlook intelligence services as the core, analysis of Beijing’s intelli- bureaucratic organizations and as gence institutions is about trying to components of government informa- understand systematically how the tion-processing systems. As a conse- Chinese government uses informa- quence, conventionally trained Clear understanding of tion to inform its policy formula- “ analysts and most journalists tend to tion, guidance to diplomats and Chinese intelligence overlook the role of intelligence and security officials, and the execution serves more than the CI security services in extending and of its policies. mission. maintaining state power and international policy goals. Just as importantly, China’s civilian intelligence and security agen- In the case of China, the intense cies are empowered to arrest and to focus of writers on the ups and ” operate inside and outside China. downs of US-Chinese relations sel- The distinction between intelligence dom leads to efforts to more deeply and internal security policy is mini- understand China and the sources of mal, institutionally speaking. This its government’s behavior, and, in makes these services not just part of particular, the effects that Chinese a policy staff process but an integral intelligence services might have on tool for the preservation of the that behavior. Even when journal- power of the Chinese Communist ists and other commentators address Party (CCP).a 1 Yet, very little is the seemingly monthly appearance known about the organizations of new details of Chinese human themselves and their importance to and technical espionage, analysts China and its future.2 tend to focus on each incident as a bellwether of the US-Chinese rela- tionship or as a straightforward The Analytical Questions counterintelligence (CI) issue. The Chinese intelligence services Protecting the integrity of US (CIS) present three distinct analytic intelligence and policy processes is challenges critical to understanding

a Beijing has consistently identified this goal as a “core interest” of China, indicating a willingness to use force if necessary.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 47 Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

As Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call upon the intelligence services. Fundamentals of Chinese Approaches Before addressing the analytic the future of China and US-Chinese Chinese foreign interests widen, Bei- questions, I will briefly address some relations. jing increasingly will call upon the misunderstandings of the nature of intelligence services to provide Chinese intelligence operations. The CIS and Domestic Political inputs to assessments of the inten- Many, perhaps most, US observers of Activists tions of states capable of harming Chinese intelligence have argued that First, insights into China’s politi- China’s interests abroad. cal future require analysis of the the Chinese think about and collect competition between domestic polit- Information Processing Systems intelligence in ways fundamentally ical activists and the security ser- The final challenge is evaluation of different from Western or even Rus- vices. A decade ago, China’s the Chinese intelligence commu- sian intelligence. security state appeared to be erod- nity’s information processing sys- In large measure this perception ing as modern communications tech- tems. The civilian ministries include stems from Chinese attempts to nology swept across the country. national, provincial, and local ele- acquire, legally and otherwise, West- Today, domestic intelligence agen- ments, which operate under compet- ern technology information to sup- cies have adapted to the Internet and ing horizontal and vertical lines of port Chinese modernization and mobile communications and are authority. The military intelligence economic priorities. These efforts capable of following electronic services under the General Staff have been equated with Chinese breadcrumbs left behind as people Department compose China’s only intelligence collection and have been move through China’s “informa- all-source intelligence capability, but labeled the “mosaic” or “grains of tized” (xinxihua) society. Whether the mechanics of intelligence fusion sand” approach. Chinese intelli- the current regime stays in power or in the People’s Liberation Army gence, it has been argued in this con- a political movement generates (PLA) are opaque. text, has four basic tenets: enough momentum for political How these agencies collect, pro- reform will depend on how effec- • Chinese intelligence focuses cess, and disseminate intelligence tively China’s internal security on ethnic Chinese as sources; forces perform their work. affects Chinese behavior, and, with the rise of cyberspace issues, the • It relies on amateur collectors Evolution of Chinese Intelligence volumes of information are poten- rather than professional intel- The second issue to be watched is tially staggering and difficult to ligence officers; the evolution of the Chinese intelli- manage. Knowing how this system gence community, particularly on works is a prerequisite to ensuring • It does not use intelligence the civilian side. Internally oriented US leaders can be certain US state- tradecraft familiar to West- security services tend to reinforce ments and acts are interpreted as ern services; the leadership’s worst fears about they were intended. potential adversaries, the United • It pursues high volumes of States in particular, 3 and China’s In this essay I will outline a low-grade (if not entirely civilian intelligence organizations research agenda on the Chinese unclassified) information. 4 both focus on internal security. intelligence services built around these three challenges, and I will This view falls down on both con- The degree to which Beijing suggest some of the factors that ceptual and empirical grounds. Con- resolves the issues of overlapping should underpin future analysis. ceptually, both US and Chinese jurisdictions—or, at least, insulates analysts describe intelligence in sim- ❖ ❖ ❖ the foreign intelligence function ilar terms—a specialized form of from internal security—will help knowledge for reducing uncertainty determine the tone and relative during decision making. Empiri- objectivity of foreign intelligence cally, the cases linked to the Chi- products reaching the leadership. As nese intelligence services—not

48 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals. simply the illegal activities of Chi- nese nationals or companies—dem- onstrate that professional Chinese intelligence officers use familiar with vulnerabilities familiar to any- nology collection are impor- tradecraft in formalized intelligence one who follows the subject. The use tant, whether the collection is relationships with their sources. of such tradecraft goes back to the linked to Chinese intelligence Additionally, cases are not limited to most famous early known cases, services or not. If “Chinese ethnic-Chinese whatever their Larry Wu-Tai Chin and Bernard intelligence” includes every- nationality.a 5 Boursicot (M. Butterfly). The for- thing from the intelligence mer began in the 1940s and latter in services to a corporation to a Chinese Doctrine the 1960s. criminal entrepreneur, then Chinese writings on intelligence the term becomes almost bear remarkable similarity to famil- Similar techniques have been meaningless.b iar US definitions of intelligence applied in more recent cases—Gregg functions and goals. Sun Tzu taught Bergersen, Chi Mak, James Fon- • A belief that the Chinese rely on that “foreknowledge” (xianzhi) dren, and Tai-Shen Kuo. These amateur operatives risks leading allowed commanders to outmaneu- revolved around a single Chinese CI professionals to dismiss or be ver opponents. More modern defini- intelligence officer, and possibly a inattentive to the threat posed by tions range from “activating second. 8 Each of these sources was China’s professional services.9 [catalytic] knowledge” (jihuo zhi- paid for sensitive information and all shi) to information to protect were aware of an intelligence rela- • When economic espionage national security, domestic stability, tionship. with no connection to the Chi- or corporate interests in a competi- nese intelligence services is tive environment. 6 Consequences of the Conventional interpreted as “Chinese intel- View ligence,” less attention will be Chinese military scholars today Misapprehension of Chinese intel- paid to what those organiza- frame intelligence as a distinct sub- ligence practices has consequences. tions actually do. The Chinese set of knowledge, defined by its rele- Most basically, the “mosaic” or intelligence services and the vance to decision makers and a “grains of sand” concepts fail to Chinese defense industries are competitive environment. Specifi- guide the organization, prioritiza- distinct entities, although they cally, intelligence is transmittable tion, and execution of CI efforts may sometimes work for (chuandi xing) and is knowledge that against Chinese national and corpo- mutual benefit. satisfactorily (manzu xing) resolves rate intelligence threats because the a specific decision-making concepts do not differentiate • The “grains of sand” concept problem. 7 between the varied Chinese collec- focuses analytic attention on tors and their motivations as well as the CI risk individuals pose Empirically, Chinese intelligence their varied signatures and risks to rather than on government officers consistently have demon- the United States: intelligence services. strated the use of widely practiced professional tradecraft, having suc- • The “mosaic” concept does not Still, it should be borne in mind cessfully exploited for political and help clarify what aspects of that while the evidence shows that military intelligence purposes agents Chinese information and tech- Chinese and US intelligence con-

a The Chinese intelligence services have balanced finding targets with access and sources able to travel back-and-forth to China. That many of these individuals were ethnically Chinese is a function more of opportunity than intent, because China-based case officers have run most known Chinese operations. More- over, many of Beijing’s intelligence targets are, in fact, ethnically Chinese, such as Taiwan and overseas dissident groups—where foreigners are targeted, the results are cases like Boursicot’s and Glenn Shriver’s. b After the Congressional investigation into the Chinese espionage scandals of the 1990s, the committee tried to warn future analysts to be clear in their dis- tinctions. The Cox Committee’s final report admonished that “those unfamiliar with Chinese intelligence practices often conclude that, because intelligence services conduct clandestine operations, all clandestine operations are directed by intelligence agencies. In the case of [China], this is not always the rule.”

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 49 Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

What Beijing really appears to be aiming for is creation of the outpaced the cost of China’s dra- capacity to create a panoptic state. matic military modernization, com- ing in at $95 billion compared to $92 billion in 2010 and up to $111 cepts and methods may not be too 1. Assessing China’s Internal billion for 2012.13 far apart, intelligence organizations Security Apparatus operate in the service of national Following several years of local- policy. The needs and priorities of Informed assessments of the capa- level experimentation with intelli- decision makers guide the activities bilities and performance of China’s gence-led policing, State Councillor of intelligence services and their internal security system may not and Minister of Public Security operations. have direct payoffs in terms of imme- (MPS) Meng Jianzhu announced the diate US policy goals, but they are nation-wide adoption of “public Beijing and Washington are key elements in evaluations of security informatization” (gong’an engaged in dramatically different China’s stability—in turn a key fac- xinxihua) at an MPS conference in competitions that need active intelli- tor in a number of US strategic 2008. “Public security informatiza- gence support. For example, coun- interests in Asia. Analysis of China’s tion” refers to the process of inte- terterrorism in both countries internal security forces is the first grating information more closely focuses on noticeably different prob- step toward a net assessment of the into police operations, including lems. US intelligence agencies pri- competition between China’s politi- both domestic intelligence gathering marily are concerned with terrorists cal reformers and its governing and information management com- abroad and their efforts to go opera- apparatus. While the United States ponents. tional within the United States. may not wish to influence this con- test directly, US policymakers should On the former, the MPS directs its China, by contrast, confronts be aware of its progress and the via- officers to focus on collecting infor- domestic terrorists that apparently bility of Chinese opposition. mation about potential social distur- have relatively fewer foreign links. bances. The most well-known The operational challenges related to For at least the past 15 years, example of the latter is the Golden collecting intelligence on these China has appeared precariously Shield project, which is primarily essentially different terrorist threats unstable; various sources have noted about linking a variety of national- produce different kinds of intelli- mounting unrest—now well over and local-level databases with per- gence activity. Observers should be 100,000 “mass incidents” per year. 11 sonal information collected from careful not to go too far in describ- Reports and photographs of violent hotels, phone companies, and other ing the similarities between the two demonstrations in various places businesses that require true-name systems, especially given the differ- have given rise to analysis that “Bei- registration. This data then can be ing cultures and ways of thinking. 10 jing’s control over the coercive sys- aggregated and used to generate tem, as well as that system’s tasking for police stations automati- capacity to maintain social control, cally when a person-of-interest turns The Challenges appears to be slipping.” 12 up in that jurisdiction.14 Thinking of China’s intelligence services as bureaucratic organiza- Since that assertion was published What Beijing really appears to be tions raises questions of what func- in 2001, Beijing has reinvigorated its aiming for is creation of the capac- tions they serve as part of the state’s coercive apparatus. As the Chinese ity to create a panoptic state, a administrative apparatus and how citizenry gained access to the Inter- capacity that goes beyond what nor- well they perform those functions. net and mobile communications, the mally is thought of as domestic Below, I will outline what I believe authorities have increased their intelligence. In the CCP’s leading are the three principal analytic chal- investment in internal security. journal, China’s senior leader lenges to understanding the Chinese According to press reports, State responsible for security and stabil- intelligence services and their rela- Council budget figures for 2010 and ity, Zhou Yongkang, laid out the tionship to the future of China and 2011—even if not broken out by desired “social management sys- US-Chinese relations. agency—show that the expenditures tem” (shehui guanli tixi), which he on internal security systems have said would include integrating MPS

50 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

intelligence with public opinion The idea of information control has deep roots in Chinese stra- monitoring and propaganda to shape tegic thought. people’s decision making about appropriate actions in the public sphere. 15 how far the MPS and MSS go in gests Meng and his predecessor Zhou attempting to draw out potential dis- Yongkang are largely responsible for Since the publication of Zhou’s sidents—not just identifying already reforming the MPS and raising the article, the MPS has launched two active subversive elements. 20 profile of “social management” and new efforts to change the level of its “preserving stability.” public engagement. On 27 Septem- The MPS rejuvenation fits within a ber 2011, the MPS formally broader strategy of localizing griev- Yet despite the growing impor- approved a nationwide policy for ances while preserving the legiti- tance of the CCP’s efforts to moni- public security elements’ use of macy of the central government in tor and shape an increasingly microblogs to spread a ministry per- Beijing. 21 The visible signs that this contentious Chinese society, 24 spective and inform Chinese citi- strategy is working include exam- nowhere can be a found a public zens about safety concerns. 16 In ples of protestors in Guangdong profile of either of these two men December 2011, the MPS also Province, who, despite their prob- that analyzes their impact on policy pushed police officers out of their lem with corrupt local officials, still or the organizations they oversee. stations as part of a campaign to win appealed to Beijing. 22 over the hearts and minds of the Chi- nese people—and to monitor public The potential ability to track mil- 2. Evolution of the Chinese opinion.17 lions of people and register their Intelligence Community communications would support this While analysts of Chinese intelli- The idea of information control strategy by making it easier to fol- gence activities often invoke China’s has deep roots in Chinese strategic low activists and malcontents wher- long history of espionage, the Chi- thought and may provide insight into ever they go, physically and nese intelligence community as cur- how Beijing is acting on its domes- virtually. People like the lawyers rently constituted is less than 30 tic ambitions. Beginning with Sun Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhish- years old. While culture matters, Tzu, Chinese strategists have envi- eng, artist Ai Weiwei, and authors institutions are affected by much sioned a seamless web of counteres- Chen Wei, Yu Jie, and Liu Xiaobo more—including incentives, leader- pionage, information collection, are dangerous because they draw ship attention, and measurements of agent provocateurs, and propagan- attention to systemwide grievances performance. Assessments of devel- dists—what Sun Tzu called the and directly challenge the CCP’s oping bureaucratic and political 18 23 “divine skein.” role in perpetuating official abuse. relationships may be difficult, even impossible, using only open-source Intelligence as information to sup- The final question about the MPS material, but clearer understanding port decision making is only one and related security offices is what is of them will help US intelligence and part of the overarching idea of their degree of political influence. policymakers understand the con- achieving information superiority. Do the internal security forces flicting interests that will shape the For example, modern PLA strate- merely execute policy or are they Chinese intelligence apparatus and gists divided strategic information intimately involved in its cre- its contribution to Chinese policy- operations into multiple categories ation—and, consequently, in CCP making, especially as Beijing’s inter- including manipulation of adversary policymaking and strategy formula- ests abroad grow and create new decision making, intelligence and tion? Little open-source mate- bureaucratic space and possibly offensive counterintelligence, and rial—other than published career greater influence for the intelli- efforts to erode or destroy an oppo- information and public leadership gence service most able to respond nent’s sensors, both human and functions—help in analyzing this to leadership needs. technical.19 question. Since its creation in 1983, the Min- The question is whether these The largely unchronicled rise of the istry of State Security (MSS) has ideas permeate internal security and MPS during the past decade sug-

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Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing more Understanding is also needed of emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to devel- the role of military intelligence op more capable foreign intelligence capabilities. (especially 2PLA) in any competition for shares of the state budget and for influence within the central fought to carve out its operational tuting from the chaos of the Cultural leadership. Chinese military mod- and policy space from the Ministry Revolution (1966–76). 25 ernization, especially the PLA’s of Public Security. When Beijing development of precision-guided created the MSS, it fused the rem- Recent developments suggest Bei- weaponry, has created a new need nants of the CCP’s Investigation jing may be placing more emphasis for timely tactical intelligence—tar- Department with the intelligence- on the MSS and other intelligence geting and data guidance, as well as and counterintelligence-related com- services to develop stronger foreign information to guide bomb damage ponents of the MPS. intelligence capabilities. The first assessments, for example. 28 While sign was the selection of Geng 2PLA has been known as “China’s The first minister of state security Huichang as the new MSS chief in a CIA,” 29 the military’s need for more had been a senior vice minister of ministerial shakeup in August 2007. intelligence support would have cre- public security. Thus, the MSS Geng became the first minister with ated pressure for 2PLA to focus lacked a distinct identity, drawing as a foreign affairs, rather than internal more on military requirements rather it did from several organizations that security, background. He reportedly than national policymakers. 30 were still in the process of reconsti- served as a professor at the MSS- affiliated Beijing International Rela- Chinese policymakers—with the Chinese Intelligence and Security Services a tions Institute and as a scholar, and exception of two civilian members later director, at the MSS think tank, of the Central Military Commission Civilian the China Institutes of Contempo- —can exercise little direct influence Ministry of State Security (MSS) rary International Relations. 26 over the PLA. Thus the PLA’s intel- Counterespionage and Counterin- ligence needs could lead it to telligence; Foreign Intelligence; A second sign is the emergence monopolize intelligence resources or Domestic Intelligence since 2008 of PRC intelligence oper- underinvest in capabilities that might ations conducted entirely outside of Ministry of Public Security (MPS) otherwise go to meet the require- National Police; Domestic Intelli- China. Until then, no exposed Chi- ments of the central leadership. If gence; nese espionage case occurred with- PLA intelligence resources become out operational activity inside China more internally directed, as sug- Military —that is, no operation occurred gested by senior personnel Second Department of the People's without a physical connection to appointments, 31 then Beijing may Liberation Army (PLA) General China. The Swedish first identified lose an alternative to the internally Staff Department (2PLA) the new approach in 2008, when oriented civilian security and intelli- Foreign Intelligence; Defense Atta- they uncovered Chinese intelligence gence apparatus. ché System; Imagery Intelligence; officers in the Chinese embassy in Tactical Reconnaissance Stockholm who had recruited a A second factor to be understood is Third Department of the PLA Gen- Uyghur émigré to spy on fellow the degree to which bureaucratic eral Staff Department (3PLA) émigrés in Europe and beyond. The inertia and the influence of the inter- Signals Intelligence Germans may have identified the nal security elements of the Chinese second, alleging the existence of a intelligence and security apparatus spy ring run by a Chinese intelli- affect developments. The civilian a Other major intelligence and security gence officer out of the Chinese con- organizations, the MPS and MSS, departments not specifically discussed in this sulate in Munich in 2009. Last year report to the political-legal system essay include the Fourth Department of the a case involved the Taiwan Army’s (zhengfa xitong) overseen by Zhou PLA General Staff Department (4PLA); the Liaison Office of the PLA General Political director of telecommunications and Yongkang, who also sits on Polit- Department; the intelligence departments of electronic information, who was buro Standing Committee. His port- the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and Second recruited in Bangkok. 27 folio emphasizes preserving internal Artillery; and the State Secrecy Bureau. stability (weihu wending gongzuo)

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It is highly likely that whatever reaches the top will have been and, according to the Hong Kong influenced by local procedures and biases. press, Zhou does not sit on any of the foreign policymaking bodies, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading logical and political prisms through been influenced by local procedures Small Group (FALSG). 32 The minis- which Chinese officials at multiple and biases.37 Understanding how ter of state security only gained an levels view the United States. In part each of China’s intelligence organi- FALSG seat in 1998. 33 the answers lie in the institutional zations processes reports, identifies frameworks through which intelli- important issues, and validates infor- Both civilian ministries also have gence about the United States flows mation will be key to understanding substantial portions—probably the and the ways in which the Chinese how Chinese perceptions are majority—of their personnel in pro- manage intelligence derived from shaped.a 38 Even if understanding vincial departments or local bureaus, the new digital world of large data. these processes does not provide the which report to the provincial and insights British signals intelligence local party committees in addition to Institutional Frameworks did into German intentions, it forms their home ministries. Foreign affairs China, like the United States, has the beginnings of serious assess- however are not handled at the subna- separate civilian and military organi- ment and awareness. tional level, encouraging these local zations, but it also has components MPS and MSS units to focus on proof national security and intelligence A related question is to what extent vincial, rather than national, con- distributed throughout provincial are institutional and procedural cerns like internal stability. and, in some cases, lower levels. biases reflected in the public writ- This is true both for civilian minis- ings of Chinese intelligence-affili- tries, which have provincial and ated analysts. Examples are the 3. Understanding the Chinese lower level bureaus, and for PLA works of analysts at the military Intelligence Processing System intelligence organizations. An excel- intelligence–run China Institute of If US policymakers hope to shape lent military example is the Third International and Strategic Studies the way China exercises its growing Department of the PLA’s General and the MSS-run China Institutes of influence in the world, 34 they will Staff Department (3PLA). The Contemporary International require clear understanding of how 3PLA—responsible for signals intel- Relations. 39 Are their writings use- Chinese intelligence interprets offi- ligence, computer network recon- ful in understanding how PLA and cial US statements and intelligence naissance (cyber), and technical MSS intelligence analysts filter and about the United States its services countermeasures—has offices and interpret world events and foreign collect and evaluate. Will informa- technical reconnaissance bureaus in intentions? tion the United States purposefully each of China’s seven military transmits reach China’s senior civil- regions and several major cities, 35 Large Data Processing ian and military decision makers? and it is likely that the Chinese ser- The reported scale of China’s How it is interpreted will depend on vices have their own training and hacking activities suggests terabytes the biases and underlying assump- procurement units in these areas. If of data may be finding their way to tions about the United States that so, it follows that regional differ- Chinese intelligence organizations.40 each of the services have, subjects ences in performance and equip- What happens to the data there we know little about. Without ment will exist throughout the PLA’s remains unknown. The intricacy of answers to such questions the risk intelligence organizations. 36 China’s civilian and military secu- will be high that US statements and rity and intelligence organizations actions will be misinterpreted. With multiple levels between the and the variety of services they are sources of intelligence and China’s presumed to provide to a multitude In part the answers to such ques- leadership, it is highly likely that of government organizations make it tions lie in understanding the ideo- whatever reaches the top will have

a Students of deception basically come to the same conclusions about what makes deception—influencing an adversary to make disadvantageous decisions by denying or supplying information—function well. Would-be deceivers need time, control over their own information, channels through which pass information, and the ability to monitor the adversary’s thinking and behavior.

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Ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes may seem irrelevant to national policy or the daily diplomatic and At the same time, understanding commercial relations, but it is no less important for analysts Chinese intelligence remains crucial and policymakers to understand. to understanding the state of China’s internal stability, although this topic difficult, if not impossible, to exam- Given the complex choices the Chi- cannot be watched solely from an ine solely through open sources. nese face, it is likely that their intel- intelligence perspective—the pace of ligence services will play an even economic development, indications Key questions include how will the greater role than they have in the of the PLA’s loyalty to the CCP, and Chinese take on the challenge of past.41 signs of the party’s cohesion are processing vast amounts of data that other keys. human beings, even in the large The intelligence and intelligence numbers Chinese intelligence pre- analysis challenges the Chinese face Recent Western misconceptions sumably could recruit, are unable to will look familiar to many US ana- about Chinese intelligence opera- process. The challenge goes well lysts: tions and insufficient scholarly beyond simple translation problems attention to intelligence organiza- or conversion of data into search- • Determining sources of energy tions have limited awareness of how able formats by organizations with and maintaining the security these institutions actually function, different bureaucratic practices and of delivery routes. but, as China’s influence grows and jargon. How exploitation of such domestic unrest continues, failure to data adds value to Chinese leaders • Protecting Chinese officials remedy these deficiencies will be to and policymakers is yet another and citizens working abroad. the detriment of the United States question—one which Western ser- • Preserving markets for Chi- and others with similar policy per- vices have probably not even begun nese goods and defense of key spectives. to address, let alone resolve. supply chains, among many Finally, open-source researchers others. are likely only to be able to estab- Conclusion All of these interests will put pres- lish the broad contours and systemic China’s intelligence services have sure on the intelligence services to pressures under which Chinese intel- long been underanalyzed as major be more active abroad against a wide ligence operates. They may also be bureaucratic organizations and com- variety of targets, both official and able to offer the questions in need of ponents of state power. This may not. How intelligence performs mis- research. But much of that research have mattered relatively little during sions in support of these and other involves the ferreting out of inter- China’s inward-looking and under- goals will also serve as indicators of nal, generally secret, processes. That developed years. Today, its leaders Chinese national policy, and possi- work may seem irrelevant to broad are significant players on the world bly in some cases as indicators of national policy or the daily blow-by- stage, and understanding how and independent policymaking in the blow of diplomatic and commercial what they learn about the world and services. relations, but it is no less important how they formulate their policy for analysts and policymakers to choices is more important than ever. understand.

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Endnotes 1. See, China’s Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 6 September 2011. 2. Ely Ratner and Steven Weber, “American Policy toward China: Getting Beyond the Friend-or-Foe Fallacy,” New America Foundation Policy Paper, June 2011. For example, many analysts and commentators focus on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) new equipment and senior most leaders at the expense of analyzing doctrine, internal self-assessments of PLA modernization, and training exercises that are more critical to Beijing’s ability to use force. See, Dennis Blasko, “China in 2012: Shifting Perspectives–Assessing the PLA from the Ground Up,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 12, no. 2 (20 Janu- ary 2012). 3. Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence, International Relations, and Under-Theorisation,” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (2004): 170–84; Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 19–20. 4. For the three most accessible descriptions of the “mosaic,” “grains of sand,” or “human-wave” approach to intelligence collection, see David Wise, Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2011), 5–19; “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics,” StratFor, 24 March 2010; and Howard DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces (Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1999). For a separate analysis of the validity of these propositions for Chinese intelligence related to the Glenn Duffie Shriver case, see, Peter Mat- tis, “Shriver Case Highlights Traditional Chinese Espionage,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 10, no 22 (5 November 2010). 5. The Chinese intelligence services have balanced finding targets with access and sources able to travel to and out of China. That many of these individuals are ethnic Chinese is in part of a function of the fact that most operations have been managed by intelligence officers inside China and in part a reflection of Beijing’s concern for Chinese dissidents abroad and developments in Taiwan. See Peter Mattis, Chinese Intelligence Operations Reconsidered: Toward a New Baseline, M.A. Thesis, Georgetown University (April 2011). 6. Chen Jiugeng, “Guanyu qingbao he xinxi [Regarding Intelligence and Information],” Qingbao Zazhi (Journal of Informa- tion) 19, no. 1 (January 2000): 4–6. 7. Yan Jinzhong, Junshi qingbao xue [The Study of Military Intelligence] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003), 12; Cheng Lei, “Qingbao yuan yu qingbao genyuan [Intelligence Sources and Intelligence’s Roots],” Tushuguan zazhi [Library Journal], No. 3 (1994), 16–18. 8. Wise, Tiger Trap, 221–26, 238. 9. This deficiency shows in the publication record. Of the books and articles written on Chinese intelligence, only three, however minimally, examine the Chinese intelligence services as organizations and a fourth explores public security within the context of governance. For the former, see, Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations; Eftimiades, “China’s Ministry of State Security Comes of Age in the International Arena,” Intelligence and National Security; and Devore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces. For the latter, see, Murray Scot Tanner and Eric Green, “Principals and Secret Agents: Central Versus Local Control over Policing and Obstacles to ‘Rule of Law’ in China,” The China Quarterly no. 191 (September 2007): 644–70. 10. These differences can be explained both psychologically and philosophically, see, respectively, Richard Nisbett, The Geog- raphy of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…And Why, (New York: The Free Press, 2003); Robert Ames and Bruce Hall, Thinking through Confucius (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987). 11. “Mass incidents” presumably refer to riots or other kinds of public demonstrations against local authorities. The last official statistics were released in 2006 and placed the number of mass incidents around 90,000. Leaked figures and Chinese scholars’ estimates range as high 180,000 per year in more recent years. See, Barbara Demick, “Protests in China over Local Grievances Surge, and Get a Hearing,” Los Angeles Times, 8 October 2011; Jeremy Page, “Wave of Unrest Rocks China: Threats to Social Order Increasingly Hit Cities, Bringing Iron-Fist Response,” Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2011.

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12. Murray Scot Tanner, “Cracks in the Wall: China’s Eroding Coercive State,” Current History 100, no. 647 (September 2001): 243. 13. Leslie Hook, “Beijing Raises Spending on Internal Security,” Financial Times, March 6, 2011; “China boosts domestic security spending by 11.5 pct,” Reuters, 5 March 2012. 14. Peter Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 11, no. 10 (3 June 2011). 15. Zhou Yongkang, “Jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui guanli; jianli jianquan zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shehui guanli tixi [Strengthen and Innovate Social Management; Construct a Sound Social Management System under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], Qiushi [Seeking Truth], 1 May 2011. 16. “Gong’an bu: ba gong’an weibo jianshe cheng jingwu gongkai xin pingtai [MPS: Let microblog construction take police openness to a new level],” Xinhua, 27 September 2011; Liu Yang and Wu Min, “Gongkai wei xian fuwu wei ben; zunzhong junzhong shunying minyi; goujian juyou xianming tese de gong’an weibo jun [Place openness first and be service-oriented; respect the masses and heed public opinion; construct a public security microblogging group with distinct characteristics],” China Police Daily, 27 September 2011. See also, Peter Mattis, “Public Security Officially Joins the Blogosphere,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 11, no. 16 (30 September 2011). 17. Liu Xuegang, “Renmin gong’an bao kaizhan ruhe tigao qunzhong gongzuo nengli da taolun [China Police Daily reports a great discussion over how to improve capability for mass work],” Renmin Gong’an Bao [China Police Daily], 31 January 2012. 18. Michael Warner, “The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (August 2006): 483–92. 19. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2005), 340–343; Li Yueli, “Lun junshi qingbao zuozhan [On Military Intelligence Warfare],” Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information] 21, No. 7 (July 2002): 99–100. 20. The idea of infiltrating potentially dissenting sectors of society continues to be present, see, Li Anjin, “Mao Zedong tongyi zhanxian sixiang de dangdai jiazhi [The Contemporary Value of Mao Zedong’s ‘United Front’ Thinking],” Xuexi Shibao [Study Times], 8 August 2011. For a full explanation of “united front” activities during the Chinese revolution, see, Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967). 21. Cheng Li, “Think National, Blame Local: Central-Provincial Dynamics in the Hu Era,” China Leadership Monitor 17 (Winter 2006). 22. Sui-Lee Wee, “Chinese Rebel Villagers Vow March to Press Complaints,” Reuters, 19 December 2011. 23. Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution.” 24. Joseph Fewsmith, “Social Management’ as a Way of Coping with Heightened Social Tension,” China Leadership Monitor 36 (Winter 2012). 25. “Communist China: The Political Security Apparatus—Part II Destruction and Reconstruction 1965–1969,” POLO Paper No. 37, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 28 November 1969 (Declassified May 2007). 26. Peter Mattis, “Assessing the Foreign Policy Influence of the Ministry of State Security,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 11, no. 1 (14 January 2011). 27. Amber Wang, “Sex Lured Taiwan General to Become China Spy,” Agence France Presse, 9 February 2011; “TECRO Repre- sentative: Lo Hsien-che Posted to Thailand, Not United States [zhu mei guan yuan: luo xianzhe zhu tai fei zhu mei],” China Times [zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; “Lo Hsien-che Spies for Mainland; President Demands Thorough Investigation and Strengthening of Protection of Secrets [luo xianzhe she gong die; zongtong yaoqiu che cha, zuo hao mimi baowei],” China Times [zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; Rich Chang, “General Arrested, Accused of Spying,” Taipei Times, 10 February 2011. 28. Luo Tianwen, Liu Ying, Liu Shoushuo, Tan Haifeng, and Wu Di, “Junshi qingbao gongzuozhong mubiao yaohai panding yanjiu,” Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information] 29, no. 6 (June 2010): 107–109.

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29. Kan Zhongguo, “Intelligence Agencies Exist in Great Numbers, Spies Are Present Everywhere; China’s Major Intelli- gence Departments Fully Exposed,” Chien Shao (Hong Kong), 1 January 2006. 30. For a useful analysis of the importance of China’s growing military intelligence needs see, Ian Easton and Mark Stokes, “China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations,” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, 23 February 2011. 31. For an analysis of the PLA intelligence and foreign affairs leadership and the transition from intelligence experts to military operations personnel, see James Mulvenon, “The ‘Dawn of Heaven’—A New Player in Sino-U.S. Mil-Mil,” China Lead- ership Monitor, no. 24 (Spring 2008); James Mulvenon, “Ding, Dong, The Witch is Dead!”—Foreign Policy and Military Intelligence Assessments after the Retirement of General Xiong Guangkai,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 17 (Winter 2006). 32. Jen-kai Liu, “China Data Supplement: The Main National and Provincial Leadership,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 19, no. 5 (2011). 33. Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform 1978–2000, ed. David Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 50, 414. 34. For expression of these views at the highest levels, see, for example, President Obama’s remarks in Australia, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Parliament House, Can- berra, Australia, 17 November 2011; Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011. 35. Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Occasional Paper, Project 2049 Institute, 11 November 2011; John Pomfret, “China Finds Bugs on Jet Equipped in U.S.; Devices Taken Off Presidential Plane Could Become Issue at Summit,” Washington Post, 19 January 2002. 36. Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution.” 37. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), especially pp. 14–28, 158–171; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), especially pp. 78–96. 38. See, Michael Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, New York: Routledge, 1989, 380–95; J.C. Masterman, The Double- Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New York, Ballantine Books, 1972), 1–32; Li Mingyang, ed., Sunzi Bingfa [Sun- Tzu‘s Art of War] (Hefei, Anhui: Huangshan Shushe, 2001), 193. 39. These official linkages with Chinese intelligence are well-known and have been thoroughly traced in the public literature, see, Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions,” The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2002); Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolv- ing Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 599; Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Oper- ations, 19; Intelligence Threat Handbook, 2004 (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff. Alexandria, VA: Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, 2004), 72–73; DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces, Sections 3–10. 40. For example, see, “China-based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War,” Bloomberg, 13 December 2011; Michael Joseph Gross, “Enter the Cyber-dragon,” Vanity Fair, 1 August 2011; Josh Rogin, “The Top 10 Chinese Cyber Attacks (That We Know Of),” Foreign Policy (22 January 2010). 41. Francesco Sisci, “Too Many Cooks Spoil Foreign-Policy Stew,” Asia Times Online, 7 January 2011; Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 26 (September 2010).

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