FEBRUARY 2006 Tom Kent
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THE PEARSON DECADE: HOW DEFEAT FORETOLD VICTORY Tom Kent The Pearson agenda for five years of two remarkably productive minority governments was actually born out of the Liberal Party’s devastating defeat in the Diefenbaker landslide of 1958 and the Grits’ disappointing score in the 1962 election, before they were finally returned to government in 1963. In opposition, the reform caucus of the Liberal Party obtained the upper hand over its managerial wing, as Pearson was determined that when called upon to govern again, they would be ready. Tom Kent, who held the pen on the Liberal reform agenda of the 1960s, recalls how his friend “Mike” eventually gained victory from a once-crushing defeat. Le programme de Lester B. Pearson pour les cinq années qu’auront duré ses deux gouvernements minoritaires d’une remarquable productivité a été conçu en réaction à la rude défaite du Parti libéral aux mains de John Diefenbaker en 1958, puis au décevant résultat obtenu au scrutin de 1962. Avant de finalement renouer avec le pouvoir l’année suivante, tandis qu’il était dans l’opposition, Lester B. Pearson avait tout mis en œuvre pour que son caucus réformiste l’emporte sur celui des gestionnaires. Tom Kent, qui rédigea le programme des réformes libérales des années 1960, rappelle comment son ami « Mike » a su transformer une écrasante défaite en victoire. attling for political power is, to men and women of lessons in how to win elections. We were not good at it. In 10 a certain temperament, a higher kind of professional years we fought four elections. The first, in 1958, was a disas- B hockey: it gives broader scope both for out-witting ter. The second, in 1962, produced big gains but fell short of and for roughing-up opponents. victory. The third was against a Diefenbaker government that Elections are indeed battles of parties for power. It is had fallen apart; anything near an effective campaign would not for nothing that they are called campaigns. The eight- have produced a clear win, not the minority government of week winter campaign that concluded on January 23 was 1963. The fourth election, in 1965, should not have been the longest and most gruelling since 1984. The public inter- called at all. Canadians responded appropriately: the minority est, however, lies in what quality of government follows. Of government continued. that the attack electioneering of the warriors tells little. Their necessary but slight indications of positive intent are ot only did the Liberals under Pearson fail to gain any deci- muddied. What the politicians propose, with varying N sive advantage over other parties, they also had few allies degrees of realism and sincerity, has scant relation to what among provincial governments. Quebec, the only substantial they dispose in office. one, was an awkward friend. Even more difficult to handle was The history offered in this article tells, in contrast, of the deep ideological divide within the federal Liberal Party itself. ineffective campaigning leading to promised, purposeful Yet, as is widely agreed, the 1963-68 government was government. It concludes, happily, with a two-year period one of the best Canada has ever had. Certainly it did more, when the governing was particularly better than the elec- to more public benefit, than any other, Liberal or tioneering had foreshadowed. It may therefore provide Conservative, since the end of the Second World War. And some counter to the despair engendered by the miserable a Policy Options survey of 30 public policy experts in 2003 hostilities of the election recently ended. assessed Pearson, who never won a majority government, as My direct experience of the varying connections between the best prime minister of the previous half century. campaigning and governing comes from the years for which The achievement was made possible chiefly by the cir- Lester B. Pearson led the federal Liberal Party. They provide no cumstances of the times, but also by the consistent POLICY OPTIONS 13 FEBRUARY 2006 Tom Kent substance of the three campaigns that powerful of his ministers, C.D. Howe a few weeks, to setting the Liberal Party Pearson fought as leader of the opposi- and Walter Harris most notably, had on a determined course that held tion. It was substance that expressed gone down to personal defeat in the through both five years of opposition his personality. But that alone would election. “So,” as Mike ruefully put it and five years of constructive govern- not have secured the firmness of party to me and no doubt other friends, “I’ll ment. Ironically, the immediacy of the purpose that held through the adversi- have to stay here and work to rebuild determination was the unintended con- ties of opposition and government. It the party; even Maryon [his wife, who sequence of the machinations of two held because Pearson had embedded despised politics] accepts that.” political warriors par excellence, Jack it, in a party being reborn, during the Pickersgill, and John Diefenbaker, who first few weeks of his leadership, dur- o stay was to become leader. True, had been the master tactician of the St- ing the most searing adversities of all: T there was an aspirant, Paul Martin Laurent government. An incidental side- those of the 1958 election. Sr., with far more political experience. effect was to move me into close In 1957 Liberals had been in office For some, that was what mattered. association with Pearson. for 22 years. For 12 years Canadians had One eminent friend protested that by iefenbaker had The achievement was made possible chiefly by the circumstances D arranged that the first of the times, but also by the consistent substance of the three business of Parliament after campaigns that Pearson fought as leader of the opposition. It the Liberal convention would be an occasion for the oppo- was substance that expressed his personality. But that alone sition to move no-confidence would not have secured the firmness of party purpose that held in the government. That such through the adversities of opposition and government. It held a motion should pass, forcing because Pearson had embedded it, in a party being reborn, an election, was the last thing the Liberals or the smaller during the first few weeks of his leadership, during the most parties (then CCF and searing adversities of all: those of the 1958 election. Social Credit) wanted. The public mood was to give enjoyed improving prosperity as never supporting Pearson I was helping to Diefenbaker the chance to show what before. The cabinet grew to feel com- take an innocent to slaughter: he could do; an early election would placently entitled to power. The opposi- Diefenbaker would slice him to pieces. move his minority government to a tion grew so desperate that it called on There were times when that assess- good majority. But the new Liberal the “Progressive” in its Conservative ment came to look correct. Mike could leader, fresh from the brave rhetoric designation, took a Prairie maverick as seem mesmerized by Diefenbaker, of the party convention, would be its leader, and jumped briefly to the left unable to cope with his disregard for seen in the media as a cowardly weak- of the government of contentment. fact and logic. Martin would have ling if he threw aside parliamentary In his first round Diefenbaker only competed on more level ground. convention by failing to move no- narrowly defeated “Uncle Louis” St- As a contestant for the leadership, confidence. Laurent. But he shattered the Liberal however, he was suddenly last year’s Pearson, worried about what to do, Party. It had been so long the govern- man. Too openly for too long, he had first did what was natural to him. The ment that the exercise of power had been driven by ambition to be prime evening before the convention began, become its engine. Out of office, it was minister, to lead the party as it had he discussed the problem with some hollow at the centre. It had to be been. That was not the party after friends: Walter Gordon, Bob Fowler, restored by new people, most of them defeat. The spirit of the party that was Maurice Lamontagne and me. None of political amateurs with their way to find. to be reborn was epitomized in the us had parliamentary or even party “Mike” Pearson — as he was then amateurish modesty of Pearson’s lead- experience, but our opinion was strong known to his friends and associates — ership campaign: it cost $3,000. No and unanimous. An initial appearance had always been in government, as Liberal could then have imagined that of weakness would be far less damaging official or minister, never in opposi- there would be, under the next Paul than a plainly phony pretence of forc- tion and only peripherally in political Martin, a convention where millions ing an election. Pearson concurred, combat. In 1957 he would have liked of dollars diverted from corporate prof- and I agreed to put a summary of the to leave it, for the UN or some other its had killed leadership competition argument on paper for him. place in the international arena where and the only strong advocacy of policy In essence, it was that the middle his great prestige was cemented by the was provided by an imported rock star. of a winter of rising unemployment Nobel Peace prize. But St-Laurent was The 1958 convention was followed was not the time to plunge the coun- exhausted, and the most politically by crushing defeat. But it also led, within try into an election. The immediate 14 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2006 The Pearson decade: how defeat foretold victory public interest was government action, not talk.