THE PEARSON DECADE: HOW DEFEAT FORETOLD VICTORY

Tom Kent

The Pearson agenda for five years of two remarkably productive minority governments was actually born out of the Liberal Party’s devastating defeat in the Diefenbaker landslide of 1958 and the Grits’ disappointing score in the 1962 election, before they were finally returned to government in 1963. In opposition, the reform caucus of the Liberal Party obtained the upper hand over its managerial wing, as Pearson was determined that when called upon to govern again, they would be ready. Tom Kent, who held the pen on the Liberal reform agenda of the 1960s, recalls how his friend “Mike” eventually gained victory from a once-crushing defeat.

Le programme de Lester B. Pearson pour les cinq années qu’auront duré ses deux gouvernements minoritaires d’une remarquable productivité a été conçu en réaction à la rude défaite du Parti libéral aux mains de John Diefenbaker en 1958, puis au décevant résultat obtenu au scrutin de 1962. Avant de finalement renouer avec le pouvoir l’année suivante, tandis qu’il était dans l’opposition, Lester B. Pearson avait tout mis en œuvre pour que son caucus réformiste l’emporte sur celui des gestionnaires. Tom Kent, qui rédigea le programme des réformes libérales des années 1960, rappelle comment son ami « Mike » a su transformer une écrasante défaite en victoire.

attling for political power is, to men and women of lessons in how to win elections. We were not good at it. In 10 a certain temperament, a higher kind of professional years we fought four elections. The first, in 1958, was a disas- B hockey: it gives broader scope both for out-witting ter. The second, in 1962, produced big gains but fell short of and for roughing-up opponents. victory. The third was against a Diefenbaker government that Elections are indeed battles of parties for power. It is had fallen apart; anything near an effective campaign would not for nothing that they are called campaigns. The eight- have produced a clear win, not the minority government of week winter campaign that concluded on January 23 was 1963. The fourth election, in 1965, should not have been the longest and most gruelling since 1984. The public inter- called at all. Canadians responded appropriately: the minority est, however, lies in what quality of government follows. Of government continued. that the attack electioneering of the warriors tells little. Their necessary but slight indications of positive intent are ot only did the Liberals under Pearson fail to gain any deci- muddied. What the politicians propose, with varying N sive advantage over other parties, they also had few allies degrees of realism and sincerity, has scant relation to what among provincial governments. Quebec, the only substantial they dispose in office. one, was an awkward friend. Even more difficult to handle was The history offered in this article tells, in contrast, of the deep ideological divide within the federal Liberal Party itself. ineffective campaigning leading to promised, purposeful Yet, as is widely agreed, the 1963-68 government was government. It concludes, happily, with a two-year period one of the best Canada has ever had. Certainly it did more, when the governing was particularly better than the elec- to more public benefit, than any other, Liberal or tioneering had foreshadowed. It may therefore provide Conservative, since the end of the Second World War. And some counter to the despair engendered by the miserable a Policy Options survey of 30 public policy experts in 2003 hostilities of the election recently ended. assessed Pearson, who never won a majority government, as My direct experience of the varying connections between the best prime minister of the previous half century. campaigning and governing comes from the years for which The achievement was made possible chiefly by the cir- Lester B. Pearson led the federal Liberal Party. They provide no cumstances of the times, but also by the consistent

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substance of the three campaigns that powerful of his ministers, C.D. Howe a few weeks, to setting the Liberal Party Pearson fought as leader of the opposi- and Walter Harris most notably, had on a determined course that held tion. It was substance that expressed gone down to personal defeat in the through both five years of opposition his personality. But that alone would election. “So,” as Mike ruefully put it and five years of constructive govern- not have secured the firmness of party to me and no doubt other friends, “I’ll ment. Ironically, the immediacy of the purpose that held through the adversi- have to stay here and work to rebuild determination was the unintended con- ties of opposition and government. It the party; even Maryon [his wife, who sequence of the machinations of two held because Pearson had embedded despised politics] accepts that.” political warriors par excellence, Jack it, in a party being reborn, during the Pickersgill, and John Diefenbaker, who first few weeks of his leadership, dur- o stay was to become leader. True, had been the master tactician of the St- ing the most searing adversities of all: T there was an aspirant, Paul Martin Laurent government. An incidental side- those of the 1958 election. Sr., with far more political experience. effect was to move me into close In 1957 Liberals had been in office For some, that was what mattered. association with Pearson. for 22 years. For 12 years Canadians had One eminent friend protested that by iefenbaker had The achievement was made possible chiefly by the circumstances D arranged that the first of the times, but also by the consistent substance of the three business of Parliament after campaigns that Pearson fought as leader of the opposition. It the Liberal convention would be an occasion for the oppo- was substance that expressed his personality. But that alone sition to move no-confidence would not have secured the firmness of party purpose that held in the government. That such through the adversities of opposition and government. It held a motion should pass, forcing because Pearson had embedded it, in a party being reborn, an election, was the last thing the Liberals or the smaller during the first few weeks of his leadership, during the most parties (then CCF and searing adversities of all: those of the 1958 election. Social Credit) wanted. The public mood was to give enjoyed improving prosperity as never supporting Pearson I was helping to Diefenbaker the chance to show what before. The cabinet grew to feel com- take an innocent to slaughter: he could do; an early election would placently entitled to power. The opposi- Diefenbaker would slice him to pieces. move his minority government to a tion grew so desperate that it called on There were times when that assess- good majority. But the new Liberal the “Progressive” in its Conservative ment came to look correct. Mike could leader, fresh from the brave rhetoric designation, took a Prairie maverick as seem mesmerized by Diefenbaker, of the party convention, would be its leader, and jumped briefly to the left unable to cope with his disregard for seen in the media as a cowardly weak- of the government of contentment. fact and logic. Martin would have ling if he threw aside parliamentary In his first round Diefenbaker only competed on more level ground. convention by failing to move no- narrowly defeated “Uncle Louis” St- As a contestant for the leadership, confidence. Laurent. But he shattered the Liberal however, he was suddenly last year’s Pearson, worried about what to do, Party. It had been so long the govern- man. Too openly for too long, he had first did what was natural to him. The ment that the exercise of power had been driven by ambition to be prime evening before the convention began, become its engine. Out of office, it was minister, to lead the party as it had he discussed the problem with some hollow at the centre. It had to be been. That was not the party after friends: Walter Gordon, Bob Fowler, restored by new people, most of them defeat. The spirit of the party that was Maurice Lamontagne and me. None of political amateurs with their way to find. to be reborn was epitomized in the us had parliamentary or even party “Mike” Pearson — as he was then amateurish modesty of Pearson’s lead- experience, but our opinion was strong known to his friends and associates — ership campaign: it cost $3,000. No and unanimous. An initial appearance had always been in government, as Liberal could then have imagined that of weakness would be far less damaging official or minister, never in opposi- there would be, under the next Paul than a plainly phony pretence of forc- tion and only peripherally in political Martin, a convention where millions ing an election. Pearson concurred, combat. In 1957 he would have liked of dollars diverted from corporate prof- and I agreed to put a summary of the to leave it, for the UN or some other its had killed leadership competition argument on paper for him. place in the international arena where and the only strong advocacy of policy In essence, it was that the middle his great prestige was cemented by the was provided by an imported rock star. of a winter of rising unemployment Nobel Peace prize. But St-Laurent was The 1958 convention was followed was not the time to plunge the coun- exhausted, and the most politically by crushing defeat. But it also led, within try into an election. The immediate

14 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2006 The Pearson decade: how defeat foretold victory public interest was government action, not talk. The spring would be time enough to pass judgment on it. A speech along such lines would have been attacked as feeble. It would have had the simple merit of honesty. Later, however, with the convention in progress, Mike Pearson drew me hur- riedly aside: “Jack (Pickersgill) has come up with a different idea about what to do on Monday. It sounds to me too clever by half. But we’ll have to talk about it.” In the bustle of the con- vention, we did not. I was back at home when I heard in horror that no- confidence had been moved in a novel way. The motion was that the govern- ment should resign forthwith, making way for the lately defeated Liberals to return without an election. It con- trived to be at once preposterously arrogant and a pathetically empty ges- ture, obviously designed not to win the support of other parties necessary for its passage. Diefenbaker poured out the withering contempt it deserved. A few days later Pearson visited me at home in Winnipeg. “I don’t know if I’ll ever be any good as a party leader,” he began, “but certainly no one ever started anything by making a bigger mistake.” After the convention he had felt obliged to consult the party elders, such as St-Laurent and Howe, and they had agreed with Pickersgill’s proposed motion. He had taken the advice of experience over that of his amateur Courtesy Jim Coutts friends. Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson, with a young Jim Coutts, on a campaign stop in The error, he continued, would southern Alberta in the 1962 election. It was the second of three campaigns in certainly be exploited. An election which Pearson squared off against John Diefenbaker. Those three campaigns in would be called almost at once. When opposition laid the groundwork for a Liberal restoration with a reform policy agenda. it was, he would have to take a short holiday to build his strength for the tress could not be refused. And there son that joined Pearson to his close campaign. In that interval would I go would be other elections. A policy plat- associates. We saw democratic politics to Ottawa to prepare, with the help of form irrelevant now might be impor- as the public choice of public policies. Lamontagne and a couple of other tant in pointing future strategy. The electorate should have clear friends if I wished, an election plat- Underlying the Pickersgill folly, as knowledge of what a party intended to form reflecting the spirit of the con- I saw it, was the warrior’s view of poli- do if entrusted with office. vention’s resolutions? tics. It did not suit Pearson. While he The urgent need in February 1958 I was being asked to undertake an could be sharply critical of people in was to stimulate the economy, to exercise in irrelevancy. Liberal policy private, neither by temperament nor combat rising unemployment. The would now get almost no attention. by diplomatic experience was he suit- quickest and fairest way to do it was The only election uncertainty would ed to denunciatory exchanges in pub- to reduce the personal tax on lower be the size of Diefenbaker’s majority. lic. Diefenbaker could indeed slaughter incomes. The proposed campaign But the appeal of a friend in such dis- him. There was, however, a deeper rea- platform detailed appropriate cuts.

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With the help of John Deutsch (who various circumstances, over the five He was not content with the initial had moved from the Finance depart- years of opposition. In form the dis- campaign statement, concentrated on ment to the University of British pute was about tactics. The real issue immediate policy. The convention’s pol- Columbia) it specified the costs to the was deeper. icy resolutions had expressed the spirit Treasury both of the tax cuts and of of a contemporary liberalism. It should other programs, such as encouraging he Liberal Party of Canada held be given definition in an outline of people to complete secondary school T office for most of the 20th century longer-term measures. Such a document by extending family allowances from because it then successfully contained would be both a resource for candidates age 16 to age 18. two parties in one. For many of its in the current campaign and a base for supporters it was the government future policy. I returned to Winnipeg to ike returned from his brief holi- party, capable of undertaking change draft “The Pearson Plan” with the help M day to review the proposals, was when clearly necessary but chiefly particularly of Jean Edmonds, later a dis- well satisfied, and telephoned their motivated to run the public business tinguished public servant, and subse- essence to major candidates. The as it was. Many other Liberals, how- quently flew to Sakatoon to meet Mike response was generally good, but in the ever, were reformers. Mackenzie King on his wearying campaign trail. We evening he called me in some distress. famously characterized CCFers of his reviewed the draft in a long night ses- Senator John Connolly, who was to be day as Liberals in a hurry. It would sion, made some amendments, and campaign chairman, was very much have been equally apposite to say, ordered the result to be reproduced and opposed. The three of us must distributed. Liberal Party head- talk at once. The spirit of the party that was to be quarters were too little organ- The proposed statement ized to do the job well, and the emphasized that the program reborn was epitomized in the document was anyway remark- was “precise and practical,” so amateurish modesty of Pearson’s able at the time only for its that a Liberal government leadership campaign: it cost $3,000. insignificance. The Liberal cam- would be “bound, if the No Liberal could then have imagined paign hardly existed in the hur- Canadian people elected it to ricane of enthusiasm for office on March 31, to do all that there would be, under the next Diefenbaker. that is set out here.” Connolly Paul Martin, a convention where disliked some of the content but millions of dollars diverted from et by fostering such a poli- concentrated his criticism on corporate profits had killed Y cy outline even in his first, the very idea of making such desperate weeks as leader, commitments. It was not how leadership competition and the only Pearson shaped what was to be. government should operate. It strong advocacy of policy was The 1958 “plan” contained, in was not how successful politi- provided by an imported rock star. embryo at least, almost all of cians like Mackenzie King had the measures by which the gov- done things. There were already good ernment of 1963-68 transformed grounds for attacking Diefenbaker. We especially in the 1960s, that many Canada. It was, of course, only a start- should concentrate on those. If we had Liberals were social democrats waiting ing point for all the program develop- to have some new policies, certainly for their moment. They wanted an ment of the next five years. But the they should not be put out as a package activist government pressing toward a direction was set. The Liberal Party that at the beginning of the campaign but more equal society at a pace that had been broken in 1957 was restored suggested one at a time and towards could be fitted in with other public by putting policy first. Its discussion the end, when there would be less requirements. rekindled involvement, attracted new scope for dispute. The relative strengths of these people, and built interest and enthusi- I made the obvious replies, while right-hand and left-hand parties shift- asm. Those were the driving forces. Pearson listened. When he eventually ed with circumstances. In 1958 most Organization, the building of campaign intervened, it was to say that he agreed of the right-handers were in shock or machinery and tactics followed. The with me. He could not have been in hibernation. When they returned in crucial event was the Policy Rally of firmer. The campaign program as writ- force it was too late for counter- January 1961, when 1,800 people came ten would be released the next day. reformation. Throughout the 10 years together for three days to formulate res- Connolly loyally accepted. to 1968, in opposition and in govern- olutions on what a new Liberal govern- At the time I did not appreciate ment, the left-hand party stayed most- ment would do in almost every area of the full significance of the incident. ly on top. Pearson had given it a public affairs. Never before or since has Similar arguments were to be repeated decisive advantage in the darkest days there been such an effectively participa- many times, among various people in of February 1958. tory process in a federal political party.

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In this process the reformers in 1962, certainly to get a majority in hold power. Pearson was far from suc- thrived. While the right-handers 1963. But Diefenbaker was for him an cumbing, but in 1965 he was very revived, they remained at a critical dis- alien with whom he could never cope. tired, not forceful enough to suppress advantage. Progressive policies had been Pearson’s grasp of government, how- the insistent warriors. Expectations of set out with unusual precision from the ever, outweighed his lack of a majority. an election continued to rise to the start of Pearson’s leadership. Unless the The day after the vote in 1963, two weeks point where surrendering to it came to contrarians broke ranks, they could not before the new cabinet was assembled, he seem the lesser evil even to Pearson. declare themselves to be against such had me start work on the detailed order- The consequence was a last cam- policies in principle. Their reservations ing of priorities. Though he charmed his paign, for which he had no heart. The had to be presented as merely tactical. cabinet, though he chaired it with great supposed strategy — emphasizing And as such they rang increasingly hol- skill, he did not have easy colleagues. what the government had done and low, as the Diefenbaker government Walter Gordon, who should have been would go on to do — was drowned in stumbled and the public mood became his strongest supporter, was much attacking Diefenbaker and pleading to increasingly receptive to change. impaired by the rashness of his first be given a majority. The response, in I was never sure how much deliber- budget. Some ministers saw minority sta- most of the country, was reduced ate forethought had gone into Mike’s tus as an excuse for delaying or dropping Liberal support. The government sur- early creation of this decisive advantage contentious items of promised policy. vived, thanks only to gains in Quebec. for the reformers within the party, but Pearson worried, sometimes hesitated, certainly that was the effect. The 1958 but came down for what he had said his t survived, however, not only in debate with Connolly was renewed government would do. All the major I power but in purpose. It would not with Pickersgill, Sharp and others. items in the Liberal program were enact- have done so if there had been no Pearson worried, listened, soothed the ed, sometimes with fumbles on the way commission on bilingualism and critics, sometimes waffled and delayed, but also with significant improvements biculturalism. Strong men in Quebec but did not change direction. and some important additions. were able now to feel confident of Lack of a majority was, however, coming to Ottawa as equals or more in y role, as a friend who spent hard on an activist government. The power. Pearson was therefore able to M some evenings and occasional uncertainties frayed ministerial nerves, recruit for the 1965 election Jean days on policy discussions and program breeding mistakes and confusion, Marchand and his sidekick (initially), development, became easier in 1959, allowing malfeasances to go uncorrect- Trudeau. They fully made up for the after leaving editorship in Winnipeg ed long enough to gain the character weakening otherwise of the cabinet. and moving to business in Montreal. of scandal. By the end of 1964, thanks Without them a government But the thinness of regular personnel particularly to the tumultuous frustra- rebuffed in its claim to a majority, and on the spot in Ottawa became increas- tion of the flag debate, most ministers with a prime minister now tired beyond ingly troublesome as the 1962 election had come to see escape in an election, his 67 years, would not have sustained its approached. Financial sacrifice apart, I convincing themselves that the gov- creativity. In fact, thanks primarily to had doubts about becoming an official ernment’s achievements would be Marchand, it did so. Its achievement in a party that before 1958 I had often rewarded with a majority. through its whole five years, through two criticized. Yet in the fall of 1961 the call In January 1965, I felt driven to Parliaments of minorities, was unique. to full involvement became irresistible. head a memorandum on the coming These reflections may therefore end In the elections of June 1962 and year, “Strategy for Government: NOT as they began. In public affairs the con- April 1963, Liberals said what they would Election Strategy.” It urged the prime nection of causes and consequences is do as a government more definitely and minister to put his foot down, to stop not easily foreseen, least of all by fren- firmly than any party before or since. the swelling talk of calling an election zied polling. None of Pearson’s election Few if any parties have ever fielded such soon. His response was: “I agree with campaigns was strong. The last was not an array of talent among their candi- the ideas and tactics of this memo and only misjudged but discreditable for its dates. But on the other side was will make the position clear…” warring style. But from it, as from the Diefenbaker, the great campaigner. In But not clear enough. Perhaps he 1963 campaign, the outcome was cred- small groups Pearson was a superb per- as well as I were slow to understand the itable indeed. The recent weeks have not suader. On the stump and on television severity of the problem of democratic inspired optimism, but perhaps they he was too uncomfortable to be consis- politics with which this article began. should not engender despair for the tently convincing. Even so, against any It is too fostering of the warrior spirit. unity and good governance of Canada. other Conservative leader since The virus is readily transmitted. Many Macdonald, against Bennett or Drew, people, driven initially by public pur- Tom Kent, Founding Editor of Policy Stanfield or even Mulroney, he would pose, come to want above all to win, to Options, was senior policy adviser to probably have done well enough to win triumph over the enemy, to gain or to Prime Minister Pearson.

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