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Philosophical Methodology and Its Implications for Experimental Philosophy Philosophical Methodology and its Implications for Experimental Philosophy by Benjamin A. Keil Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy _______________________ Chairperson Ben Eggleston _______________________ John Bricke _______________________ Erin Frykholm _______________________ Dan Hirmas _______________________ Tom Tuozzo Date Defended: April 27, 2015 The Dissertation Committee for Benjamin A. Keil certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Philosophical Methodology and its Implications for Experimental Philosophy _______________________ Chairperson Ben Eggleston Date approved: April 27, 2015 ii Abstract Since most philosophers accord some role to intuitions in the practice of philosophy, my dissertation’s first paper addresses an important subsidiary question: Whose intuitions should be allowed to play a role in proper philosophical practice? My paper critiques Steven Hales’ view when he argues that the intuitions of philosophical laymen lack philosophical significance. I rebut the main arguments he gives in support of the “expertise defense” and then provide an Aristotelian-style argument in favor of the significance of lay philosophical intuitions. My second paper extends John Norton’s work into the realm of experimental philosophy. Norton argues that scientific thought experiments are arguments; I develop his work and show that his position entails that philosophical thought experiments are also arguments. I consider Thomson’s “Trolley Problem” and demonstrate that it contains an implicit argument, even if the argument’s conclusion is often omitted when presented in a classroom setting. Since my position entails that philosophical thought experiments are non-neutral devices for eliciting intuitions, I suggest two key implications for practitioners of experimental philosophy. Conflicting ethical intuitions are nothing new to philosophers, but a new way of resolving some of those intuitional conflicts is my third paper’s topic. AJ Ayer famously argues that unless some criterion for deciding between conflicting intuitions exists, appeals to intuition are worthless. I partially answer Ayer’s challenge by drawing on Steven Hales’ defense of foundationalism. Hales argues that at least one self-justifying proposition exists. If true, and if one self-justifying ethical proposition exists, I argue that this provides us a partial way towards answering Ayer’s challenge. Since self-justifying propositions must be justified a priori, where a iii conflict exists between an ethical intuition ultimately justified a priori and another ethical intuition ultimately justified a posteriori, the latter intuition should be rejected. iv Acknowledgments To list all my debts (both intellectual and personal) which resulted in this dissertation’s completion would be a hopeless task. But first among those on such a list would be my wife Elizabeth. Without her patience, love, and support I could not have completed graduate school. My children James, Joy, Gabriel, and Hope helped remind me that a dissertation is not the most important component of a good life. My parents Steve and Carole Keil provided the formative home-educational environment which enabled me to arrive at this educational summit – I could not be where I am without their significant efforts. Concerning my academic mentors, I am proud to recognize the roles played by Drs. Ben Eggleston, James Stephens, and Donald Turner. Whatever academic success I accrue is, I hope, an honor to their efforts spent improving my philosophical abilities. Finally, I wish to thank my friends and officemates Brian Clarke and Andrew McFarland. Their conversations throughout the years of graduate school have made me a better philosopher and a wiser person – I could not ask for better academic companions than them. Virtus tentamine gaudet. v Table of Contents Experimental Philosophy and Lay Intuitions ........................................................................................... 1 I: Preliminary Observations .................................................................................................................. 2 II: The Debate in the Literature ............................................................................................................ 3 III: Hales’ Argument & Response ......................................................................................................... 6 IV: An Aristotelian-style Argument in Favor of Lay Intuitions ....................................................... 13 V: Objections and Replies .................................................................................................................... 19 Works Cited ........................................................................................................................................... 24 Philosophical Thought Experiments are Arguments – and What This Means for Experimental Philosophy .................................................................................................................................................. 25 I: Scientific Thought Experiments are Arguments ............................................................................ 26 II: Philosophical Thought Experiments are like Scientific Thought Experiments ......................... 30 III: Demonstration ................................................................................................................................ 37 IV: Replies to Objections ...................................................................................................................... 40 V: Implications ...................................................................................................................................... 46 Works Cited ........................................................................................................................................... 49 Sorting Through Our Ethical Intuitions ................................................................................................. 50 I: The Problem ...................................................................................................................................... 51 II: Hales on Foundationalism .............................................................................................................. 52 III: Answering Ayer .............................................................................................................................. 55 IV: Objection Concerning First Principles ......................................................................................... 65 V: Objection Concerning Reflective Equilibrium .............................................................................. 67 Works Cited ........................................................................................................................................... 73 vi Experimental Philosophy and Lay Intuitions I begin with the assumption that intuitions have some role to play in the practice of philosophy. This, obviously, is not wholly uncontroversial. Still, it is an assumption shared by a sufficient number of philosophers that it may function as this paper’s “first principle”. But it immediately suggests two further queries: First, what role should intuitions play in philosophical practice and, second, whose intuitions should play that role? Although both topics are important, this paper shall only address the second: Whose intuitions have a role to play in the practice of philosophy? Some philosophers have argued that the intuitions of philosophical experts should play little (or no) role in our discipline’s practice. In reply, others have gone to the opposite extreme and argued that only the intuitions of philosophical experts have a role to play; they thereby significantly minimize or exclude entirely the intuitions of philosophical laymen. In contrast, I will defend the middle ground between these two extremes: I shall argue that the intuitions of both philosophical experts and philosophical laymen have an important role to play in the practice of philosophy, although it may well be the case that the experts’ intuitions are ultimately more valuable. To demonstrate this thesis my arguments will be as follows. First, I shall examine some preliminary matters. Second, I will situate this paper within an ongoing philosophical debate concerning the topic. Third, I will consider the strongest argument for excluding lay intuitions and demonstrate its falsity. Fourth, I will develop a positive Aristotelian-style argument in favor of including lay intuitions. Fifth and finally, I shall consider and refute certain objections against the positions I develop. 1 I: Preliminary Observations I begin with two preliminary concerns. The first involves my paper’s scope and the second involves the purpose of experimental philosophy surveys. My first preliminary concern is a limitation of this paper’s scope: I shall explicitly limit my work to methods of experimental philosophy involving surveys. For example, a researcher might conduct surveys dealing with areas of ethical inquiry (such as trying to discover which philosophical arguments against abortion are viewed as being strongest) or areas within the history of philosophy (which interpretation of a particular Platonic claim is most compelling), etc. Of course, while
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