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The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Administration of William J. Clinton, 1994 / Feb. 11 The President. That's what he said. He said go play golf today, but the weather won't permit we have to make sure it never happened again. that either. He said, ``What if we really had to talk about Q. Mr. President, do you think that the rela- an emergency?'' That's what he said, too. tionship between the U.S. and Japan is now [At this point, one group of reporters left the in rough water? room, and another group entered.] The President. No, I think it's very strong. I feel very strongly about what the Prime Min- Japan ister is trying to do. I supported strongly his Q. Mr. President, is there any possibility for political reform package, and I support the eco- you to have another meeting with Prime Min- nomic efforts I think he is trying to make. So ister Hosokawa this afternoon or evening or to- I think we have a good relationship. Just be- morrow morning? cause we have some disagreements doesn't mean The President. I don't know. We haven't start- we don't have a good relationship. ed this one yet. I would like to spend a lot Q. So youÐÐ of time with him. The President. More later. We'll have more Q. Because you decided not to leave for Ar- later. We'll answer your questions at the end kansas this evening. We heard that you decided of theÐat the press conference. not to leave for Arkansas this evening. The President. The weather is bad there and here. NOTE: The exchange began at 11:35 a.m. in the Q. Was it only the weather? Oval Office at the White House. A tape was not The President. Yes. But I mean, I'm always available for verification of the content of this ex- glad to see the Prime Minister. I wish we could change. The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan February 11, 1994 The President. Good afternoon. It's a pleasure discussed our shared interest in the Asian Pacific to welcome Prime Minister Hosokawa to the and its stability, including developments in Rus- White House. The Prime Minister and I met sia, China, and elsewhere. And I look forward last in Seattle at the APEC conference. Our to continuing this discussion this summer at the dialog there was based on a new honesty and G±7 summit in Naples. respect that continued in our talks today. Our shared interests are nowhere clearer than Both of us were elected on a mandate for on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's nuclear change, and the Prime Minister has shown real program poses a serious threat to regional sta- courage and commitment to making change bility and to international nonproliferation ef- occur by advocating and securing political re- forts. We agreed to continue our close coopera- forms, by opening Japan's construction and rice tion in pursuing a nonnuclear Korean Peninsula. markets, and by seeking to deregulate Japan's Our nations today have also embraced a com- economy. He also ushered through a tax cut mon agenda for cooperation on global issues that is a step towards spurring growth. And I such as population, transportation technology, know the Prime Minister proposed an even larg- and the environment. It includes a $12 billion er budget stimulus. I commend all these steps joint initiative to address population and AIDS which can move Japan toward greater openness. in developing nations and new environmental The United States and Japan have a long, assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. deep, and rich relationship. No relationship in Our discussions today focused chiefly on eco- the world is more important today. Our security nomics. The central concern of my administra- alliance, which is stronger than ever, is essential tion has been preparing our country for the to the Asian Pacific and elsewhere. Today we new global economy in the 21st century. That 229 Feb. 11 / Administration of William J. Clinton, 1994 is why we've invested in our people, cut our committed to improving our economic ties not deficits, and pursued more open markets only because doing so will mean more jobs and through NAFTA, through the Uruguay round better standards of living in both nations but of GATT, through APEC. because it will strengthen every aspect of our As the world's second largest market, Japan relationship. I remain confident that we can must be our strategic partner in efforts to spur work together to provide leadership in this new global growth. That is why I've attached as much global economy. I have enormous confidence importance to our economic alliance as to our in the sincerity and the capacity and the vision political and security alliance. For our relation- of Prime Minister Hosokawa. And I am abso- ship to be strong, we must have a more mutually lutely convinced that the relationship between beneficial economic partnership. Such a partner- the United States and Japan, founded on mutual ship will benefit all our citizens with more jobs respect and responsibility, ever growing in its and opportunities for American workers and maturity, will, as it must, remain vibrant and more choices and lower prices for Japanese con- strong. sumers. Indeed, we seek to open Japan's econ- Mr. Prime Minister. omy not only for our own products but for those Prime Minister Hosokawa. Thank you, Mr. from the rest of the world as well. President. Today, President Clinton and I dis- Even though we have negotiated over 30 cussed wide-ranging issues from trade and eco- trade agreements with Japan since 1980, Japan nomic matters, the current international situa- still remains less open to imports than any other tion, and to the future of the Asian-Pacific re- G±7 nation. Its regulations and practices screen gion and our cooperation on global issues. The out many of our products, even our most com- list of these extensive issues reflects the matured petitive products. To take one example, when relationship between Japan and the United our medical technology firms sell in Europe, States. And to be very candid, I think we had they earn 40 percent of the market there. In a very good meeting. Japan, they earn just 15 percent. The same As to the framework talks, we have not yet holds in many other sectors. come to agree on all the important issues, de- Last July, our two Governments agreed on spite our intensive negotiations over the past a framework to address a wide range of macro- 6 months. We are, however, in agreement that economic structural and sectoral trade issues. we should in no way allow this result to under- We focused on opening markets. We agreed mine the strong and friendly relationship be- to seek agreements containing, and I quote, ``ob- tween our two countries. jective criteria'' that would result in, quote, ``tan- Since I assumed office, my administration has gible progress''. We agreed to hold two summits launched a series of measures for macro- each year to evaluate that progress. Today was economic management in Japan. The other day the first such meeting. Unfortunately, we've not I announced a comprehensive package of eco- been able to reach agreement in any of the nomic measures, the total amount of which is four areas we identified last July. Japan's offers the largest scale ever. I am convinced that made in these negotiations simply did not meet through these measures, reinforced by appro- the standards agreed to in Tokyo. priate economic policies by other governments, Today we could have disguised our dif- we'll be able to achieve over the medium term ferences with cosmetic agreements. But the a highly significant decrease in our current ac- issues between us are so important for our own count surplus. nations and for the rest of the world that it As to the sectoral issues of the framework is better to have reached no agreement than talks, our respective positions regarding the rela- to have reached an empty agreement. Of course, tionship between the objective criteria and the if Japan has further proposals, our door remains numerical targets did not converge. As part of open. But ultimately, Japan's market must be my inner-driven reform, I am determined to open. take initiatives on our government procurement. Over the past 40 years, the relationship be- To this end, for example, the Government of tween the United States and Japan has been Japan has already announced such measures as the strongest when all three of its components, the action program on government procurement, security, political, and economic, were seen by and concrete efforts are being made in line with both our peoples as mutually beneficial. I am this program. 230 Administration of William J. Clinton, 1994 / Feb. 11 In addition, as to the insurance issue, I place like-minded colleague trying to bring about re- particular emphasis on achieving greater trans- forms in the social and political processes, I parency in administrative procedures and pro- highly appreciate and respect the leadership ex- moting deregulation, which will create a better ercised by President Clinton and his administra- business climate for foreign insurance companies tion on both the domestic and international in Japan. In the areas of autos and auto parts, front, including budget deficit reduction and on positive effects of industrial cooperation between bringing NAFTA to a successful conclusion and Japan and the U.S. are not steadily becoming in opening a new frontier for APEC.
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