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Japan's Colonization of Korea Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies Volume 12 Article 5 1-1-1994 Unhealed Wounds: Japan's Colonization of Korea Aaron H. Skabelund Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma Recommended Citation Skabelund, Aaron H. (1994) "Unhealed Wounds: Japan's Colonization of Korea," Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol. 12 , Article 5. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol12/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Unhealed Wounds: Japan's Colonization of Korea Aaron Skabelund Introduction had to endure at the hands of their former colonizers. Was there something unique Second only to English, Japanese is about the colonization of Korea by Japan? If the language most studied by Korean so, what? Also, why have the political students. Cultural and intellectual exchanges wounds been so slow to heal between South between South Korea and Japan, separated Korea and Japan? Will these bitter wounds by only the narrow Korean Strait, are wide undermine the security alliance against the and varied. Business is brisk between Japan, rising nuclear threat of North Korea? the world's second largest economy, and This paper will seek to answer these South Korea, a rising industrial power. In questions. It will also examine how the fact, Japan is South Korea's largest source change of power in Japan from the Liberal of imports with 29% of all imports in 1990, Democratic Party (LDP) to the coalition and the South's second largest export market government led by Morihiro Hosokawa has with 21 % of all exports in 1990 (Bridges affected Japan's political relationship with 1992, 155). Despite the existence of the South Korea. usual trade imbalance in Japan's favor, When examining the history and business and trade relations are healthy. The current situation, the significant role of two nations are also linked in a security Japan is evident in causing the original relationship via the United States, and both problems and not taking the necessary steps have urged the United States to stay in Asia since then to lessen the level of distrust. as a stabilizing influence to balance China's Although South Korea is not free from rising power, and especially to temper North criticism, this paper will concentrate on Korea's new nuclear threat. Looking at these Japan's role in the development of the cultural, geographical, economic, and political relationship with South Korea. A security relationships between South Korea detailed examination of Japan-North Korean and Japan, one might be led to think that relations will be bypassed here except for its these two countries have a cozy and solid current influence on the Japan-South Korean relationship. However, history haunts Korea political relationship, because North Korea's and Japan. relations with Japan have been plagued by Japan's colonization of Korea from 1910 to communism's influence as well as the 1945 is the primary cause of this historical colonial legacy. legacy. Despite the tight cultural and economic links, deep distrust is the still the History rule, not the exception, between the two countries. For example, "[O]n the South Japan's efforts to invade Korea were Korean side, Japan is usually placed as the not isolated to the modem era. In the late next most disliked country after North 15OOs, Japan's ruler, Hideyoshi, led an Korea" (153). invasion to take Korea, but he was Many other former colonies of unsuccessful. Even today, this "invasion has European imperialist powers have long since been emphasized in the historic memories of forgiven, if not forgotten, the wrongs they the Koreans and still contributes to the -47- Pi Sigma Alpha Review - 1994 bitterness between them and the Japanese" emperor, Kojong, was tricked into (Rei schauer 1990,65). However, during the relinquishing the throne to his son, and by Tokugawa period from the early 1600s to 1910 the Japanese had enough power to the mid-1800s, Japan maintained good coerce the son to resign and allow Japan to relations with the "hermit kingdom," as annex Korea. Thus, the sovereignty of Korea was sometimes called. Also, Japan Korea was gradually weakened by the continued trading with Korea despite the imperialist rivalries among the surrounding Tokugawa policy of isolationism that meant countries, and then it was systematically a ban on almost all trade and contact. demolished by Japan. Soon after the Meiji restoration in There are three distinct factors that 1868, Japan contemplated an invasion of were unique about the colonization of Korea Korea, but it was rejected in favor of by Japan, as compared with other colonial strengthening the new government and the situations. First, Korea was an established nation. The chief proponent of the invasion state with a monarchy that had reigned for was Saigo Takamori, a samurai of samurais, hundreds of years before its unquestioned who was so enthusiastic about the invasion sovereignty was destroyed by Japan. that he offered himself to be assassinated in Second, Japan and its colony were closely order to provide an excuse for the related by geography and culture. Third, the aggression. Although the Meiji oligarchs colonization was marked by the usual were hesitant about an immediate invasion intensity and harshness politically, but there of Korea, they were confident enough to was also an effort made to destroy Korea force Korea out of isolation and into an culturally through forced assimilation. unequal treaty in the same manner that had Although each of these may not be entirely been dealt to them by Matthew C. Perry. unique as compared with other colonial This action caused the beginning of a series situations, the combination of the three made of showdowns between Japan and China, the colonial experience especially severe for and then Japan and Russia for control of the the Korean people and is part of the reason "hermit kingdom. " why it remains an issue even today. Japan came out the winner in 1905, after defeating Russia to secure international Demolition of a Longtime Sovereign State recognition of its supremacy in Korea. Korea's fate was then completely sealed by In contrast to many Western imperial the Taft-Katsura Agreement with the United powers, Japan began its colonizing late. States. It gave the United States free reign Thus, when it took over Korea in 1910, the in Philippines while "acknowledg[ing] Japanese: Japan's right to take appropriate measures for the 'guidance, control, and protection' of did not have the luxury of carving out an Korea" (Eckert, 238-39). artificial state entity in a political vacuum. They had to establish their control over an Japan immediately began to take ancient state and society with a long historical control of Korea that year. It forced Korea experience and high degree of racial, ethnic, to sign the Protectorate Treaty, which gave cultural, and linguistic homogeneity. More­ Japan absolute authority to take "control and over, responding to external pressures, Korea direct the foreign relations and affairs of had already begun the process of transforming its traditional institutions, and in consequence Korea" by placing a Japanese resident­ the annexation disrupted the indigenous polit­ general just below the Korean emperor ical movement to create a modern Korean (McKenzie 1969, 309). In 1907 the nation-state. (Eckert 1990, 256) -48- Skabelund -- Japan's Colonization of Korea Because of these well-established institutions By "the land owned by the Japanese ... and traditions, Korea's opposition to the amounted to . about 60 percent of the takeover was stiff for the entire occupation. arable land" (Chan 1977, 54). Hundreds of This gave Japan the option to either try to thousands of Japanese moved across the crush the resistance or assimilate the Korea Strait to administer the colony, and Koreans. They tried both approaches, and "as many as 4,000,000 people, an both produced frightening results for the astonishing 16 percent of the Korean Koreans. population was living" either in Japan or in other parts of the Japanese empire (such as Geographic Proximity and Cultural Manchuria and Sakhalin) by 1944 (Eckert Contiguity 1990, 322). These four million Koreans were mostly laborers, but they also included Japan was able to take over not via a "comfort women," young women who were bloody invasion in a distant land but through forced by the Japanese Imperial Army a series of quietly coercive treaties with a through kidnapping or trickery to become neighbor. Unlike most colonized countries prostitutes. that are thousands of miles from the Cultural contiguity combined with imperial power, Korea is located only about geographic proximity to deepen the wounds. one hundred miles from the Japanese island Japan and Korea, both recipients of Chinese of Kyushu. This geographic proximity cultural influences, had many cultural prompted Japan, which saw outside similarities. There is something uniquely dominance of Korea as "a dagger pointing at unsettling about being conquered by your Japan's heart," to take over its neighbor neighbor and then being ruthlessly exploited (Bridges 1993, 8); and because of this by that nation. proximity, Japan was able to completely dominate and integrate Korea into its Political and cultural repression economic and political system. The Japanese colonization of Korea Japan's exploitation of Korea was is also unique because it is one of the rare complete. It extended from economic to examples of non-European colonialism in political and cultural repression. Traditional modem times. Not only was Japan a non­ government in Korea had been somewhat European country, it was a close neighbor decentralized, but with Japanese rule came and was still a developing country.
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