S3800 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 29, 1998 the prayer, the routine requests ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT warnings to us not to proceed. I re- through the morning hour be granted Mr. COATS. Mr. President, if there is cently met—with a group of Senators and the Senate then resume consider- no further business to come before the and Members of the House of Rep- ation of the Craig amendment num- Senate, I now ask that the Senate resentatives—with Alexi Arbatov, who bered 2316 to the NATO enlargement stand in adjournment under the pre- is deputy chairman of the Duma’s de- treatment. vious order, following the remarks of fense committee. He told us, ‘‘If you The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Senator CONRAD. proceed with NATO enlargement, you objection, it is so ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without are handing a powerful issue to the Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I further objection, it is so ordered. radicals in Russia. You are energizing ask that the time following the prayer The Senator from North Dakota. the extreme nationalists in Russia, and until 12 noon be equally divided for de- Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair. I you are weakening the forces for de- bate on the Craig amendment; further, thank my colleague from Indiana as mocracy.’’ that at 12 noon the Craig amendment well. Mr. President, we should not lightly be temporarily set aside and the votes f dismiss the warnings of committed on or in relation to the amendment fol- democrats in Russia like Alexi Arbatov low the two stacked rollcall votes pre- EXECUTIVE SESSION and others who have given us similar viously ordered to occur at approxi- warnings. I think it says a great deal mately 3 p.m. PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH AT- that the primary architects of Amer- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without LANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON AC- ican strategy during the cold war, objection, it is so ordered. CESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, have f AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC cautioned the Senate against ratifica- tion and NATO expansion. PROGRAM The Senate continued with the con- Nearly 50 years ago, as successive sideration of the treaty. Mr. COATS. Mr. President, for the in- heads of the State Department’s policy formation of all Senators, tomorrow Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution of ratifica- planning staff during the Truman Ad- morning at 11 a.m. the Senate will re- ministration, Kennan and Nitze under- sume consideration of the Craig tion for NATO enlargement. In my view, there are four questions stood that containment of the Soviet amendment numbered 2316 to the that must be answered in the affirma- Union was critically important to the NATO enlargement treaty. tive in order to support NATO expan- free world. Today, they have told us Under the previous order, at noon sion. that NATO expansion is a mistake. Senator MOYNIHAN will be recognized No. 1, are the risks to relations with I believe the stakes are very high. to offer an amendment under a 1-hour Russia and arms control acceptable? Remilitarization in Russia is a serious time agreement. No. 2, are we sure what NATO expan- threat. Avoiding this outcome should Following the debate on the Moy- sion will cost and who will pay for it? be our priority, not enlarging NATO. nihan amendment, Senator WARNER No. 3, has a compelling argument The first casualty of our expansion of will be recognized to offer an amend- been made as to why expansion is nec- NATO may very well be progress on ment under a 2-hour time agreement. essary? arms control. I know that many of my Following the debate on the Warner No. 4, are we certain that enlarge- colleagues do not like to be in a posi- amendment, at approximately 3 p.m., ment will not have perverse con- tion where it seems the Senate’s deci- at the conclusion of that debate, the sequences, fostering instability in sions about foreign policy are depend- Senate will proceed to three stacked Eastern Europe and perpetuating the ent on reaction in Russia. It smacks of rollcall votes. danger from Russia’s tactical nuclear blackmail. The problem with this The first vote will be on or in rela- arsenal? thinking is that it assumes that some- tion to the Moynihan amendment, fol- I am convinced, after thorough re- thing we need is being held hostage. lowed by a vote on or in relation to the view, that the answers to these ques- As I have discussed, there simply is Warner amendment, followed then by a tions are all no. no compelling argument for why we vote on or in relation to the Craig I start with the observation of Mr. must expand NATO. Therefore, to risk amendment. George Kennan, perhaps the foremost relations with Russia and arms control As a reminder, a unanimous consent observer of U.S.-Russian relations. Mr. are not acceptable. The Duma’s expedi- agreement was reached which limits Kennan, who was, after all, the archi- tious ratification of START II should the amendments to the NATO treaty. tect of the containment policy that be our priority. In pursuing our na- It is hoped that any Senator still in- proved so effective, said in a Newsday tional interest we are in no way giving tending to offer an amendment under editorial on March 15 that, ‘‘Expanding in to Russian blackmail. the consent agreement will do so early NATO would be the most fateful error I might add it is not just a question tomorrow to allow the Senate to com- of American policy in the entire post- of START II ratification, but it is also plete action on this important docu- world war era.’’ clearly in our national interest to ment by early tomorrow evening. Mr. President and colleagues, let me make a priority of reducing the threat Also, if available, the Senate may repeat. George Kennan, the architect of from the tactical nuclear weapons that consider the conference report to ac- containment, said as recently as March are in the Russian arsenal. company the supplemental appropria- 15 that, ‘‘Expanding NATO would be By rejecting NATO enlargement, we tions bill. the most fateful error of American pol- would simply be choosing not to em- Therefore, Senators should expect icy in the entire post-world war era.’’ bark on a dangerous and unjustified rollcall votes throughout the Thursday That is a pretty serious statement by course of enlarging NATO and would session of the Senate. someone who has great credibility avoid making a terrible mistake in the Mr. President, that is an ambitious based on his record. He is not alone in course of U.S.-Russian relations. schedule. Senators are urged to be that assessment. Former Senator The second point I think needs to be timely. Senators are urged, those who Nunn, who enjoyed enormous respect made is that NATO enlargement brings may have additional amendments to on both sides of the aisle in this Cham- unknown costs. The case for enlarge- the NATO enlargement treaty, to make ber, has discussed a dangerous con- ment becomes increasingly suspect those amendments known to leader- tradiction at the center of the argu- when we look at questions related to ship, and hopefully reasonable time re- ment for expansion, saying that while the costs and who will bear them. quests can be entered into. A number enlargement is intended to protect I direct the attention of my col- of Senators are making very important former Soviet satellites, nothing else is leagues to a chart on the various esti- official business commitments for the as likely to remilitarize Russia and en- mates that have been issued with re- weakend, and the more definite the danger those very countries as NATO spect to the cost of NATO enlargement. plans can be about the schedule tomor- enlargement. The Congressional Budget Office issued row, the more expeditiously those com- Senator Nunn is not alone. We are an estimate of $21 billion to $125 bil- mitments can be undertaken. hearing from leaders in Russia their lion. The Rand Corporation said the

VerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Oct 31, 2013 Jkt 081600 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 4624 Sfmt 0634 E:\1998SENATE\S29AP8.REC S29AP8 mmaher on DSKCGSP4G1 with SOCIALSECURITY April 29, 1998 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3801 cost would be $10 billion to $110 billion. Mr. President, concern about possible sive alliance, but why are they putting The first Clinton administration esti- instability in Eastern Europe does not tanks on our border? We don’t know mate was $27 billion to $35 billion. justify expansion of NATO. NATO is what the long-term intentions of NATO NATO itself has put a price tag of $1.5 not the only vehicle for stability in Eu- are,’’ they will argue, ‘‘but we do know billion on expansion. And the second rope. Other options that deserve review NATO’s capability—and that capability Clinton administration estimate was include expansion of the European is to put tanks on our border.’’ $1.5 billion. Union, or reworking the Partnership How will that be used politically in You talk about a wide-ranging esti- for Peace or the Organization for Secu- Russia? How will that be used in a mate. We have anywhere from $1.5 bil- rity and Cooperation in Europe. Expan- post-Yeltsin era? Will it strengthen the lion to $125 billion. I do not know sion of a military alliance is not our hardliners and those who argue for re- where the truth lies. I am a member of only option. In fact, it appears to this militarization? Or will it strengthen the Budget Committee, as is the distin- Senator that it is the worst option. I the forces for democracy and a market guished occupant of the Chair. I think think the New York Times put it very economy? I do not think it takes any it is fair to say that none of us has a well when it stated in a recent edi- great analysis to figure out the result truly credible estimate with respect to torial: ‘‘There is simply no compelling in Russia or how it will be used politi- the cost of NATO enlargement. security justification for NATO en- cally. Those in Russia who argue for This takes me to another key ques- largement.’’ democracy, who argue for arms control tion. Who is going to pay this tab? I Fourth point: NATO expansion may and arms reductions, who argue for a think all of us know these estimates have perverse consequences, increasing market economy, they are warning us are probably far off the mark. They instability in Eastern Europe and per- that we are weakening them, and that probably understate in a very serious petuating the danger from Russia’s we are strengthening the forces for re- way the potential costs of NATO en- tactical nuclear arsenal. The impact of militarization. largement. expansion on Eastern Europe and pro- Mr. President, I also believe NATO The third main point that must be liferation are perhaps the least studied enlargement could perpetuate the dan- made with regard to NATO enlarge- of all aspects of this issue. But these ger from Russia’s tactical nuclear arse- ment is that no compelling argument are some of the most important con- nal. According to General Habiger, the for expansion has been made. What is cerns. After all, stability in Eastern Commander of U.S. Strategic Com- the military threat that we are en- Europe and the safety of our country is mand, Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical countering? After all, NATO is a mili- why we are debating NATO enlarge- nuclear weapons. That bears repeating: tary alliance. What threat are we de- ment on the Senate floor tonight. Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nu- fending against by expanding NATO? I I am very concerned that NATO en- clear weapons. The United States see no immediate Russian threat to the largement could actually increase the today has approximately 1,600. What is Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland. danger in Eastern Europe. As former going to happen with Russia’s tactical We must remember that article V of Senator Nunn has indicated, expansion nuclear stockpile if NATO expansion the North Atlantic Charter states could create the very danger from Rus- goes forward? What will Russia’s deci- clearly that an attack on any one sia that it is intended to prevent. Ex- sionmaking be about their huge advan- member nation is to be considered an panding NATO to foster stability could tage in tactical nuclear weapons? attack on all. The test for extension of have the perverse result of increasing I am concerned that NATO expansion such a guarantee ought to be simple the danger to the former Soviet sat- will hurt the prospect of an agreement and clear. We must be convinced that ellites that we decide not to include. on tactical nuclear arms because it the safety of the American people is di- By not including some countries while will increase Russia’s reliance on those rectly tied to the security of the coun- welcoming others, Russia might well very weapons. Russia already sees try in question, and therefore we must conclude that some countries in East- itself conventionally outmatched by defend that country as we would our ern Europe are less important to us NATO. It has abandoned its nuclear own. That must be the test. than others, and therefore easier to in- policy of no first use. NATO enlarge- Clearly, Western Europe’s freedom timidate. Let us not draw new lines in ment will simply increase their insecu- from Soviet domination was central to Eastern Europe without serious rity, making them less willing to part the survival of our country and of the thought about their consequences. with their tactical nuclear weapons. free world. Article V deterred Moscow NATO expansion may additionally This will mean it will be harder to re- by sending an unmistakable message drive remilitarization and arms build- duce the threat of theft, sale, or unau- that a Soviet move against Bonn, West ups. We are asking Poland, Hungary thorized use of these weapons. Germany, would have been resisted as and the Czech Republic to significantly I will be addressing this issue with an would an attack on Bismarck, North increase their defense budgets. How amendment. But first, let me conclude Dakota. But nearly 10 years after the can we expect their neighbors to re- on the question of NATO enlargement. fall of the Berlin Wall, the Russian spond? How can we expect Russia to re- Mr. President, NATO expansion fails army weakened and greatly reduced, spond? Just as the Russian extreme na- on the four tests that I outlined at the and warning times dramatically ex- tionalists are predicting, it would ap- outset of my remarks, leading me to panded, I fail to understand why it is pear that NATO expansion would have the following conclusions. First, the immediately imperative that we pro- the effect of tipping the conventional risks to relations with Russia and arms vide that same guarantee to Budapest, balance in Europe even further against control are unacceptable. Second, we Hungary. Russia. are not certain what NATO expansion Mr. President, what is our national This is what the Russian forces for will cost or who will pay for it. Third, interest? That is the question before democracy are warning us against. there is no compelling argument for this body. I believe the overarching pri- They are saying: ‘‘Don’t you under- why expanding NATO is necessary, es- ority is to further reduce nuclear weap- stand that if you proceed with NATO pecially when there are other alter- ons that are in the Russian arsenal. enlargement, those who are the most natives. And, fourth, there is ample And the question before the Senate is radical elements in Russia, those who reason to conclude that enlargement whether NATO enlargement will slow are the extreme nationalists, will seize will have perverse consequences, in- down the progress towards arms con- on this and they will look to the capa- creasing instability in Eastern Europe trol or will speed it up. bility of this expanded military alli- and perpetuating the danger from the I don’t think there is any question ance and they will say the capability of Russian tactical nuclear arsenal. that there exists in expanding NATO a NATO is to put tanks on our border?’’ Fortunately, it is not too late. Col- clear risk to this true priority. The We will answer, in the United States: umnist Jim Hoagland in a column in overwhelming likelihood is that the ‘‘But NATO is not an offensive military the Washington Post last month said: U.S. vital interest, which is in reducing alliance; it is defensive in nature.’’ ‘‘The Senate needs an extended debate, the threat from the Russian nuclear ar- And those who are the extreme na- not an immediate vote.’’ senal, will be harmed. Expanding tionalists and the radicals in Russia Jim Hoagland has it right. We do NATO is not in our interest. will respond: ‘‘NATO says it is a defen- need an extended debate. There should

VerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Oct 31, 2013 Jkt 081600 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 4624 Sfmt 0634 E:\1998SENATE\S29AP8.REC S29AP8 mmaher on DSKCGSP4G1 with SOCIALSECURITY S3802 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 29, 1998 not be a rush to judgment. There are Unfortunately, there have been no The lack of a treaty means we have serious questions that should be an- arms control treaties on tactical nu- no guarantee that Russia’s numbers swered. clear weapons. will come down. The 7,000 to 12,000 tac- The Senate, in my judgment, should Mr. President, this chart dem- tical nuclear warheads inside Russia not give in to the Cold War argument onstrates the record on arms control. present the greatest threat of theft or about American credibility being on On conventional forces, the red bar sale of nuclear warheads in the world the line. How many times have we seen shows eastern forces, which during the today. These constitute the greatest that argument called up in this Cham- Cold War were part of the Warsaw so-called ‘‘loose nuke’’ threat. We have ber? When the arguments are weak on Pact. The blue bar shows NATO forces. reason to believe that the danger with behalf of a decision that is already We can see on conventional forces those tactical warheads is greater than moving forward, we have colleagues sharp reductions in the treaty limited with strategic warheads because tac- who rush to the floor and say, ‘‘Oh, it equipment of both the old Warsaw Pact tical weapons are not subject to the might not be such a good idea, but and NATO. The same is true under the START accords. They are largely in America’s credibility is on the line. START accords—dramatic reductions storage, not deployed on missiles, Our President has made this commit- on both sides in strategic systems. bombers, and submarines where they ment, and therefore we must go along But on tactical forces there has been are likely to be better protected. to maintain American credibility.’’ no treaty. We don’t know with any pre- A recent story in the Jerusalem Post I remember that argument being cision what has happened in the former indicated that Iran may have been able made in the Vietnam era. It wasn’t a Soviet Union. We don’t know what to purchase up to four former Soviet good argument then, and it is not a their inventory is. nuclear warheads earlier this decade. good argument now. In 1991 the United States had more This report highlights an important The better course, rather than mov- than 3,500 tactical weapons in Europe. danger. Terrorist use of one of these ing to expand NATO, is to tell the ad- The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have had weapons would be devastating. A nu- ministration we should, first, inves- around 15,000. In 1991, Presidents Bush clear blast would make the Oklahoma tigate alternatives to NATO enlarge- and Gorbachev unilaterally pledged to City fertilizer bomb look like a fire- ment, such as expansion of the Euro- withdraw most tactical nuclear weap- cracker. Today, many tactical nuclear pean Union. Second, we should have a ons from Europe and begin dismantle- warheads have yields that dwarf the new round of hearings when the results ment. device that destroyed Hiroshima in Since that time, this country has of the studies that are required by this 1945. withdrawn all but around 400 tactical resolution are available. That, after Mr. President, this chart tells us nuclear weapons from Europe, and dis- all, was the recommendation of former something about terrorist use of a tac- mantled all but about 1,600 of our tac- Senators Sam Nunn and Howard Baker. tical nuclear warhead. It tells us how tical nuclear weapons in total. And third, we ought to pursue arms devastating it would be. The fertilizer control as our top priority. The story on the Russian side has been very different. With the collapse bomb detonated in Oklahoma City two As Professor Michael Mandelbaum of years ago had a destructive yield in the Johns Hopkins University has advised of the Soviet empire and a 70 percent range of two one-thousandths of a kil- us: NATO expansion is at best a dis- reduction in military spending, weapon oton. The so-called ‘‘fat man’’ atomic traction from, and at worst a hin- dismantlement has slowed to a crawl. bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, drance to, making progress on these All former Soviet tactical nuclear 13 kilotons. Smaller tactical weapons issues. weapons have been withdrawn to Rus- Mr. President, I believe we ought to sia and placed in storage, but today we of today can be in the range of 10 kilo- take Professor Mandelbaum’s sound ad- don’t know how many of those weapons tons. Some tactical nuclear weapons vice. Before we rush headlong into ex- Russia has. have been reported to be as small as a panding NATO, we ought to think care- The excellent Nunn-Lugar Program suitcase. Some larger tactical nuclear fully about what is truly in our coun- has helped the Russians round up and weapons can have a yield of more than try’s interests. account for many of these weapons. 300 kilotons. And remember—Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear war- EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2320 The fact is, however, we don’t know (Purpose: To encourage progress on reducing how many they retain. heads, devices that are not included in the threat posed by Russia’s non-strategic That arsenal of tactical nuclear any arms control regime. We don’t nuclear arsenal) weapons is clearly a threat. Because have an accounting. We don’t have the Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, on a re- there is not any arms control regime accountability that comes with a for- lated matter, I would like to at this covering tactical nuclear weapons, we mal inspection regime. point lay down my amendment, as pro- are not allowed to inspect, to assess The threat from Russia’s tactical nu- vided for in the unanimous consent the security of those tactical warheads, clear arsenal is where we ought to be agreement. and determine their number. directing our attention. This is what Mr. President, as I have considered Let’s go to the second chart to high- ought to be our top priority. We endan- NATO enlargement, it seems to me to light this point. ger progress by moving to enlarge be clear we need to put the Senate on In 1991, it is estimated that the NATO at this time. record during the NATO debate sup- U.S.S.R. had 15,000 tactical nuclear The other threat is one that has been porting cooperative efforts with the weapons—15,000. We had in the range of highlighted by the United States Stra- Russians to reduce the threat from 3,500 deployed in Europe. Today, we tegic Command. Strategic warhead lev- Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal. have just over 400 in Europe. But the els would likely decline to around 2,250 At the outset, allow me to emphasize Russians retain, according to the head under a START III accord. An 8-to-1 that recent years have seen important of the U.S. Strategic Command, Gen- Russian advantage in tactical war- progress on arms control. Reduced ten- eral Habiger, 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nu- heads becomes a major strategic con- sions with Moscow have allowed impor- clear weapons. And yet, arms control cern in this environment. Let me di- tant treaties to be negotiated that agreements do not cover this category rect the Senate’s attention to this have made the world a far safer place. of weapons. chart. One of the great successes has been the On strategic systems, we have come The strategic breakout danger has Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces down on both sides, and have come been referenced by some of our top Treaty. That agreement has eliminated down sharply. The same is true with military leaders. The United States, an entire class of nuclear weapons, in- regard to conventional forces in Eu- under a START III accord, would likely cluding the Pershing missiles that this rope. But regarding tactical nuclear have 2,250 deployed strategic nuclear body debated so intensely. The Conven- weapons, there is an enormous dis- warheads. Russia would presumably tional Forces in Europe treaty has parity. Russia has in the range of 7,000 have the same number. But look what markedly reduced tanks and artillery to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. We happens on the tactical side. With tac- and armored vehicles in Europe. Two are down in the range of 400 tactical tical nuclear weapons, our arsenal START accords have been negotiated, warheads in Europe, and approximately would stand at around 1,500. Russia deeply cutting strategic nuclear forces. 1,600 in all. could still be at 7,000 to 12,000 tactical

VerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Oct 31, 2013 Jkt 081600 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 4624 Sfmt 0634 E:\1998SENATE\S29AP8.REC S29AP8 mmaher on DSKCGSP4G1 with SOCIALSECURITY April 29, 1998 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3803 warheads, an enormous disparity. And Briefly, my amendment expresses the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The that leads to a concern about strategic sense of the Senate that it would be ad- clerk will report the amendment. instability. visable for future nuclear arms control The assistant legislative clerk read This is especially true in light of the agreements with the Russian Federa- as follows: fact that the distinction between tac- tion to address tactical nuclear weap- The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. CON- tical and strategic weapons has been ons in Europe. RAD], for himself and Mr. BINGAMAN, proposes disappearing. During the early years of And second, the administration an executive amendment numbered 2320. the Cold War, large nuclear weapons should work with the Russian Federa- Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask with yields in the tens of megatons tion to increase transparency, ex- unanimous consent that reading of the were needed. At that time, our ICBMs change data, increase warhead security amendment be dispensed with. and other delivery systems were inac- and facilitate weapons dismantlement. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without curate enough that a massive bomb My amendment contains a simple but objection, it is so ordered. was needed to destroy a target. But as important certification. Prior to de- The amendment is as follows: the accuracy of missiles increased, posit of the instruments of ratification, At the appropriate place in section 3 of the many large multimegaton bombs were the administration shall certify to the resolution, insert the following: replaced with strategic weapons with Senate that, one, with regard to tac- () NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS— much smaller yields. Today, for exam- tical nuclear weapons it is the policy of (A) FINDINGS.—The Senate finds that ple, the warheads on the MX—or Peace- the United States to work with the (i) the United States Strategic Command keeper—have a yield of 350 kilotons. Russian Federation to increase trans- has estimated that the Russian Federation As the next chart notes, this is in the parency, exchange data, increase war- has between 7,000 and 12,000 non-strategic nu- range of many tactical nuclear weap- head security and facilitate weapons clear warheads, weapons that—unlike stra- ons today. dismantlement; and that two, discus- tegic systems—are not covered by any arms During the cold war, many strategic control accord; sions toward this end are underway (ii) the thousands of tactical nuclear war- weapons were in the range of 500 kilo- with the Russian Federation. tons to 10 megatons. Today, tactical heads inside Russia present the greatest The administration should be able to threat of sale or theft of a nuclear weapon in weapons can range from 10 kilotons to meet this certification with little dif- the world today; around 400 kilotons or more. Many of ficulty based on current staff level dis- (iii) with the number of deployed strategic today’s strategic weapons are in the cussions. Nevertheless, this provision warheads in the Russian and United States range of 300 kilotons to 1 megaton. puts the Senate on record and the ad- arsenals likely to be reduced to around 2,250 So the difference in yield between ministration on notice that the Senate warheads under a START III accord, Russia’s strategic systems and tactical nuclear vast superiority in tactical nuclear warheads is interested and concerned. systems has been altered dramatically becomes a strategic concern; Finally, my amendment requires a over time. There is much less of a dis- (iv) the Commander in Chief of the United report within 180 days after deposit of tinction between the yield of strategic States Strategic Command has stated that the instruments of ratification on the warheads and tactical warheads than future nuclear arms control agreements status of the Russian tactical nuclear should address tactical nuclear weapons; in the past. (v) statements from Russian officials that The implication is clear and dis- arsenal, the threats associated with it, and plans to continue to work coopera- NATO enlargement would force Russia to turbing. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical rely more heavily on its nuclear arsenal have warheads that General Habiger has tively with the Russian Federation on increasing transparency, exchanging caused concern that NATO expansion could said the Russians could have are tak- be an impediment to progress on tactical nu- ing on a strategic relevance. I think data, increasing warhead security and clear arms control; and, my colleagues would agree that a mas- facilitating weapons dismantlement. (vi) the danger of theft or sale of a tactical sive Russian superiority could be de- These, Mr. President, ought to be our nuclear warhead, and the destabilizing stra- stabilizing. clear goals. tegic implications of Russia’s enormous lead My amendment would send a clear I also believe this amendment is in tactical nuclear weapons creates an ur- signal of Senate support for progress timely and we need this statement gent need for progress on increasing the se- now. curity of Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal on reducing the threat from Russia’s and working toward conclusion of a US-Rus- tactical nuclear arsenal. It supports As Senator MOYNIHAN has discussed, Russian officials have said that in the sian agreement on tactical nuclear arms in the recommendation of General Europe. face of an expanding NATO and dwin- Habiger, the general charged with (B) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the Sense America’s nuclear security, that future dling Russian conventional forces, they of the Senate that arms control initiatives should include will have to place greater reliance on (i) it would be advisable for future nuclear tactical warheads. nuclear weapons. That is a valid con- arms control agreements with the Russian Let’s listen to America’s nuclear cern. Rushing to enlarge NATO could Federation to address non-strategic nuclear commander. He says: ‘‘The Russians reduce Russia’s willingness to cooper- weapons in Europe; and, have anywhere from 7,000 to more than ate on tactical nuclear arms. NATO ex- (ii) the Administration should work with pansion could perpetuate the risk of the Russian Federation to increase trans- 12,000 of these nonstrategic nuclear parency, exchange data, increase warhead se- weapons, and we need to bring them sale or theft of a ‘‘loose nuke’’ and curity, and facilitate weapon dismantle- into the equation.’’ This from General Russia’s massive lead over the United ment. Eugene Habiger, Commander of the States in tactical warheads. (C) CERTIFICATION.—Prior to the deposit of U.S. Strategic Command. Even if the Senate approves NATO the instruments of ratification, the Adminis- My amendment is simple and de- enlargement, we need to keep our eye tration shall certify to the Senate that with serves the support of every Senator. Its on the ball. That ball is arms control. regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons purpose is to put the Senate on record My amendment sends a clear and com- (i) it is the policy of the United States to in the context of the NATO debate as pelling signal to Moscow that we want work with the Russian Federation to in- being concerned about the danger of to continue to work with them to re- crease transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dis- ‘‘loose nukes.’’ The strategic implica- duce the threat in this area. mantlement; and, tions of Russia’s arsenal are also criti- Mr. President, I believe there is noth- (ii) that discussions toward these ends cally important. We should continue to ing in this amendment that is a hazard have been initiated with the Russian Federa- work cooperatively with the Russians to NATO enlargement. Although I per- tion. to reduce this threat. I believe the dan- sonally oppose enlargement, I believe (D) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after gers in this area require an increased it would be a serious mistake for the the deposit of the instruments of ratifica- emphasis if we are to be serious about Senate not to pass this amendment. I tion, the President shall submit a report to arms control. believe it should be approved. the Senate on the Russian Federation’s non- I am pleased to be joined by Senator Mr. President, I thank the Chair and strategic nuclear arsenal. This report shall include BINGAMAN, the ranking member on the I thank the staff for their patience. I (i) current data and estimates regarding Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the thank my colleagues for this oppor- the current numbers, types, yields, and loca- Armed Services Committee, in offering tunity, and I hope they will support tions of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weap- this amendment. this amendment. ons;

VerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Oct 31, 2013 Jkt 081600 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 4624 Sfmt 0634 E:\1998SENATE\S29AP8.REC S29AP8 mmaher on DSKCGSP4G1 with SOCIALSECURITY S3804 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 29, 1998 (ii) an assessment of the extent of the cur- MICHAEL K. BAYLES, 0000 ANTONIO F. REYES, 0000 STEPHEN G. BEARDSLEY III, 0000 JAMES S. RICE, 0000 rent threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized EDWARD B. BERNARD, 0000 SALLY ROBERTSON, 0000 use of such warheads; JOHN A. BIRRER, 0000 FRANKLIN D. ROWLAND, JR., 0000 (iii) a plan to work with the Russian Fed- DOUGLAS A. BOOM, 0000 RODGER J. RUDOLPH, 0000 CYNTHIA F. BROWN, 0000 *MICHAEL L. RUSSELL, 0000 eration to increase transparency, exchange MARK R. BRUINS, 0000 PAULA J. RUTAN, 0000 data, increase warhead security, and facili- SCOTT A. BURGESS, 0000 DIANA L. RUZICKA, 0000 tate weapon dismantlement; and, JOYCE W. BURNS, 0000 *PAUL W. SCHMIDT, 0000 HOWARD L. BURTNETT, 0000 *DEBRA D. SCHNELLE, 0000 (iv) an assessment of the strategic implica- VICKY CAMPBELLHEMMING, 0000 EDWARD R. SCHOWALTER III, 0000 tions of the Russian Federation’s non-stra- JAMES W. CARTWRIGHT, JR., 0000 SUSAN M. SCHRETENTHALER, 0000 tegic arsenal. PATRICE E. CHANDLER, 0000 PETER J. SCHULTHEISS, 0000 *CATHY J. CHESS, 0000 *PATRICK G. SESTO, 0000 Mr. CONRAD. I yield the floor. MARK A. CHIN, 0000 LAWRENCE E. SHAW, 0000 MICHAEL S. CHURCH, 0000 KEITH E. SICKAFOOSE II, 0000 f ALLISON P. CLARK III, 0000 ARLENE SIMMONS, 0000 WAYNE W. CLARK, 0000 JOHN C. SLATTERY, 0000 ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M. BRENDA C. CONWAY, 0000 MARY E. SMITH, 0000 TOMORROW KAYLENE M. CURTIS, 0000 MICHAEL L. SMITH, 0000 *MARK K. DAVIS, 0000 STANLEY E. SMITH, 0000 PATRICK O. DEAN, 0000 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under *JAIME E. SORIA, 0000 JOHN B. DEVITA, 0000 *JEFFERY C. SPRINGER, 0000 the previous order, the Senate will now BRIAN J. DICIANCIA, 0000 FATEMEH T. STRITMATTER, 0000 *HAROLD C. DICKENS, 0000 VICKY L. THOMAS, 0000 stand in adjournment until 11 a.m., DENNIS D. DOYLE, 0000 SHERYL A. TOYER, 0000 THEODORE ECKERT, III, 0000 Thursday, April 30, 1998. DALE G. VANDERHAMM, 0000 JENNIFER M. ECTOR, 0000 DEBBIE J. VASUT, 0000 Thereupon, the Senate, at 7:52 p.m., CAROLYN A. EDDINGS, 0000 *MINNIE R. WALLER, 0000 *CAROL L. EISENHAUER, 0000 adjourned until Thursday, April 30, ROBERT V. WARD, 0000 ELEANOR M. FENNELL, 0000 MARY A. WARREN, 0000 1998, at 11 a.m. HUBERT M. FISCHER, 0000 DIANE M. WEINBAUM, 0000 JOHN B. FOLEY, 0000 RANDY W. WEISHAAR, 0000 ELLEN E. FORSTER, 0000 f DAVID F. WEST, 0000 DAVID E. FULBRIGHT, 0000 NOMINATIONS JOHN A. GIDDENS, 0000 ANDREW C. WHELEN, 0000 PATRICIA L. GOGGINS, 0000 JONI L. WILLIAMS, 0000 Executive nominations received by *DONALD L. GOODE, 0000 PATRICK O. WILSON, 0000 *PATRICIA A. GUSTAFSON, 0000 *JAMES E. YAFFE, 0000 the Senate April 29, 1998: HOGSTON S. HAGA, 0000 CURTIS L. YEAGER, 0000 *JIMAL B. HALES, 0000 IN THE MARINE CORPS DEPARTMENT OF STATE JAMES R. HALLIBURTON, 0000 MICHAEL CRAIG LEMMON, OF FLORIDA, A CAREER RONALD A. HAMILTON, 0000 THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF DAN E. HARMS, 0000 TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES MA- COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND CHRISTOPHER J. HARRINGTON, 0000 RINE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624: PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PATRICIA A. HARRINGTON, 0000 To be major TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA. MARGARET A. HAWTHORNE, 0000 RUDOLF VILEM PERINA, OF CALIFORNIA, A CAREER MARK W. HEGERLE, 0000 GARY F. BAUMANN, 0000 MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF TERRENCE J. HEIDENREITER, 0000 THE FOLLOWING NAMED LIMITED DUTY OFFICERS FOR MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAOR- JAMES R. HICKEY, 0000 APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE DINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES ELIZABETH J. HIGGINS, 0000 UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. MARK D. HINES, 0000 SHEILA A. HOBBS, 0000 SECTION 624: THE JUDICIARY ANN K. HOCHHAUSEN, 0000 To be lieutenant colonel *JOYCE A. HOHNER, 0000 LYNETTE NORTON, OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO BE UNITED RAY E. HORN, JR., 0000 MICHAEL L. ANDREWS, 0000 STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT STEVEN D. HUNTE, 0000 EVERETT J. BOUDREAU, 0000 OF PENNSYLVANIA VICE MAURICE B. COHILL, JR., RE- JEREMY P. HUTTON, 0000 ARNOLD J. COPOSKY, 0000 TIRED. NICHOLAS H. INMAN, 0000 ROY V. DANIELS, 0000 JEFFREY G. STARK, OF NEW YORK, TO BE A JUDGE OF ANNA R. IUNGERICH, 0000 RONALD W. ELLINGER, 0000 THE UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LILLIAN L. JENNINGS, 0000 GARY E. ENGELKING, 0000 VICE R. KENTON MUSGRAVE, RETIRED. CAROLYN J. JOHNSON, 0000 JAMES B. EUSSE, 0000 IN THE AIR FORCE ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, 0000 GEORGE E. FOLTA, 0000 ALAN E. JONES, 0000 WILLIAM H. HAGUE, 0000 THE FOLLOWING AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED TEMPSIE L. JONES, 0000 WILLIAM L. HENSLEE, 0000 STATES OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE RESERVE HYACINTH J. JOSEPH, 0000 SCOTTY W. MONTAGUE, 0000 OF THE AIR FORCE TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER RONALD S. KEEN, 0000 STEPHEN H. NEGAHNQUET, 0000 TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 12203: *DEBORAH J. KENNY, 0000 MILTON L. PETERSON, 0000 JULIA M. KIRK, 0000 RAYMOND O. THOMAS, 0000 To be brigadier general CORNEL L. KITTELL, 0000 ROBERT C. WITTENBERG, 0000 COL. ARCHIE J. BERBERIAN, II, 0000 CAROL A. KORODY, 0000 TIMOTHY E. LAMB, 0000 THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT THE FOLLOWING NAMED RESERVE OFFICER FOR AP- VERGEL C. LAYAO, 0000 TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES MA- POINTMENT AS CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE FRANCINE M. LEDOUX, 0000 RINE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624: UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 8038: *ROBERT J. LEE, 0000 To be major CASSANDRA L. LEWIS, 0000 To be chief of the Air Force Reserve, United VASEAL M. LEWIS, 0000 JAMES N. ADAMS, 0000 States Air Force STEPHEN W. LOMAX, 0000 BRIAN T. ALEXANDER, 0000 ANGEL L. LUGO, 0000 KELLY P. ALEXANDER, 0000 MAJ. GEN. JAMES E. SHERRARD, III, 0000 GEORGE J. MAGNON, 0000 JEFFREY S. ALLEN, 0000 IN THE NAVY ROGER B. MARCIL, 0000 CHRISTOPHER J. ALPERT, 0000 PAMLEA J. MARTIN, 0000 GINO P. AMOROSO, 0000 THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT WENDY L. MARTINSON, 0000 WALTER T. ANDERSON, 0000 IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY TO THE GRADE INDICATED MARK R. MASON, 0000 BRIAN P. ANNICHIARICO, 0000 WHILE ASSIGNED TO A POSITION OF IMPORTANCE AND JILL E. MCCOY, 0000 PAUL E. ANSLOW, 0000 RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 601: *CLEM D. MC DUFFIE, 0000 CHRISTOPHER A. ARANTZ, 0000 JOANNE E. MC GOVERN, 0000 JAMES L. ARMSTRONG, 0000 To be admiral GREGORY A. MC KEE, 0000 THOMAS E. ARNOLD, JR., 0000 VICE ADM. RICHARD W. MIES, 0000 FUJIO MC PHERSON, 0000 SOREN P. ASHMALL, 0000 AWILDA MEEKS, 0000 FINLEY M. ASMUS, 0000 THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT ZIA A. MEHR, 0000 WALTER W. AUDSLEY, 0000 AS CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS AND FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE MARK G. MENSE, 0000 EUGENE M. AUGUSTINE, JR., 0000 GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 5142: WILLIAM J. MIKLOSEY, JR., 0000 MARY A. AUGUSTITUS, 0000 JAMES T. MILLER, 0000 CURTIS D. AVERY, 0000 To be rear admiral SHIRLEY M. MILLER, 0000 DAVID D. BADGER, 0000 REAR ADM. (LH) ANDERSON B. HOLDERBY, JR., 0000 CONSTANCE J. MOORE, 0000 BRIAN F. BAKER, 0000 MICHAEL L. MOORE, 0000 FRANCISCO M. BALL, 0000 IN THE ARMY JOHN H. MORSE, 0000 CRAIG P. BARDEN, 0000 OPHELIA MUNN, 0000 BRUCE W. BARNHILL, 0000 THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS, FOR APPOINTMENT ULMONT C. NANTON, JR., 0000 MICHAEL R. BARRETT, 0000 TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY WILLIAM F. NAUSCHUETZ, 0000 BRIAN S. BARTHOLF, 0000 AND FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN THE ARMY NURSE TIMOTHY A. NEWCOMER, 0000 JAMES G. BARTOLOTTO, 0000 CORPS, MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS, ARMY MEDICAL SPE- DEBORAH M. NEWSOME, 0000 MATTHEW C. BAUGHER, 0000 CIALIST CORPS, AND VETERINARY CORPS (IDENTIFIED RICHARD A. NICHOLS, 0000 PETER B. BAUMGARTEN, 0000 BY AN ASTERISK (*)) UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C. SECTION 624, *RONNIE L. NYE, 0000 TERRANCE A. BEATTY, 0000 531 AND 3064: JEREMY L. OLSON, 0000 JAMES D. BELSON, 0000 To be Lieutenant Colonel MARILYN E. OSBORNE, 0000 JESSE C. BENTON, 0000 MARILOU D. OVERLA, 0000 MICHAEL J. BERGERUD, 0000 EUGENE N. ACOSTA, 0000 *PATTI L. PALMER, 0000 PAUL F. BERTHOLF, 0000 *JULIA A. ADAMS, 0000 WILLIAM R. PARLETT, JR., 0000 LLOYD J. BIGGS, 0000 JAMES R. ALARCON, 0000 *ROSS H. PASTEL, 0000 JOHN A. BINGER, JR., 0000 DONALD T ALBEE, JR., 0000 ANGELA PEREIRA, 0000 MICHAEL W. BINNEY, 0000 WANDA K. ALLENHUBERT, 0000 MARK J. PERRY, 0000 ELIZABETH S. BIRCH, 0000 FRIDA G. ATWOOD, 0000 DOUGLAS S. PHELPS, 0000 DAVID J. BLIGH, 0000 PAUL T. BARTONE, 0000 PEARL R. POPE, 0000 ROY M. BLIZZARD III, 0000 TIMOTHY E. BATEMAN, 0000 MARSHA A. PRINCE, 0000 KERRY J. BLOCK, 0000 GASTON P. BATHALON, 0000 PRISCILLA E. QUACKENBUSH, 0000 HAROLD W BLOT, JR., 0000

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