Descartes and Pascal on the Eucharist
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Descartes and Pascal on the Eucharist Vlad Alexandrescu University of Bucharest Within Descartes’ philosophy, the problem of the Eucharist provides scholars the occasion to investigate a nexus of questions belonging to different domains of his thought. In taking up this problem, about which there has been much written in the past few decades (see the bibliography below), I hope ªrst of all to discern some order in the texts themselves, as well also as in their various interpretations, and then, from there, to propose a new perspective. Historians of ideas have seen in the explanation of the Eucharist a problem that preoccupied Descartes as early as 1630 and that continued to be treated by him until very late in his correspondence, as the last mention of the question dates from 1648. I will start by giving here a brief historical sketch of the places in the Cartesian corpus that take up this question di- rectly or that are related to it in some way or another. 1) A ªrst mention of the Eucharist, in the context of developing a the- ory of colors; a) a letter to Marin Mersenne, 25 novembre 1630, AT I, 179 2) A “dossier” in Descartes’ correspondence at the time of the debate that followed the publication of the Discourse on Method and of the Essays, where one can ªnd a rather general and allusive concern with the fact that Cartesian philosophy is in fact capable of “supporting” faith and of “explaining” Transubstantiation, and therefore capable of furnishing arguments against the Calvinists. I would like to express my gratitude to Justin E. H. Smith and to Lucian Petrescu for hav- ing translated this paper from the French. Perspectives on Science 2007, vol. 15, no. 4 ©2007 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 434 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.434 by guest on 03 October 2021 Perspectives on Science 435 a) a letter to François Fournet, October 1636, AT I, 456 b) a letter to Antoine Vatier, February 1638, AT I, 564 3) A few records of ongoing work, after the publication of the Medita- tions and during the writing of the Principles of philosophy, in 1641 a) a letter to Mersenne, January 1641, AT III, 296 4) The “dossier” of the Replies, 1641–1642 a) a letter to Mersenne of 18 March 1641, AT III, 340 b) a letter to Mersenne of 31 March 1641, AT III, 349 c) the Fourth Replies, entirely published only by the Latin edition of 1642 and by Claude Clerselier’s translation into French from 1647 d) the Sixth Replies, starting with the edition of 1641 5) The “Mesland ªle,” that is, the correspondence of Descartes with the Jesuit Father Denis Mesland in 1644–1646 a) to Mesland, 2 May 1644, AT IV, 119–120 b) to Mesland, 8 (9?) February 1645, letter not sent, AT IV, 169 c) to Mesland, May 1645?, AT IV, 216 6) A subsequent ªle, composed of some other letters dated from 1646– 1648: a) to Clerselier, 2 March 1646, AT IV, 372–373 b) to an unknown correspondent, AT IV, 374–375 c) to Clerselier? AT IV, 741–747, see Pierre Costabel’s note, pp. 744–747 d) to Arnauld, 1648, AT V, 184. Some scholars have suggested that Descartes’ returning to the problem at various times is an indication of variability in Descartes’ treatment of the Eucharist (Watson 1987). For my part, it seems that we may take for granted that Descartes formulated early enough a theory of the Eucharist that would be in simultaneous agreement with both his physics and his metaphysics.1 It has often been said that in the seventeenth century the ex- planation of the Eucharist was a validation test of the metaphysics of an author.2 However, it also seems clear to me that Descartes used this theory at three different and distinct points in the elaboration of his philosophy. 1. Ariew (1999b, 153) thinks Descartes would have elaborated this theory prior to the Replies to Arnauld. 2. Redondi 1985. In Descartes’ case: “The only point to which I must reply concerns the publication of my Physics and Metaphysics. I can tell you brieºy that I desire it as much or more than anyone, but only under certain conditions, without which I would be foolish to desire it. I will say also that I do not fear at all, basically, that they contain anything against faith. On the contrary, I am vain enough to think that faith has never been so strongly supported by human arguments as it may be if my principles are adopted. Tran- Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.434 by guest on 03 October 2021 436 Descartes and Pascal on the Eucharist The ªrst point, connected with the theory of colors, is the conclusion that consists in saying that secondary qualities do not have their basis in the physical body, but rather in human perception of this body. Color, in particular, no longer belongs to bodies as a secondary quality, but is rather produced by the various ways in which bodies receive light and reºect it through the medium of subtle matter towards our eyes (Dioptrique, I, AT VI, 85, Météores, AT VI, 233). From this point of view, the persistence of “the whiteness of the bread in the Blessed Sacrament,” seems to be used as an argument in support of Descartes’ new theory of colors (Descartes to Mersenne, 25 November 1630, AT I, 179). The second point is a theory of the perception that we have of physical bodies, whether the body in question is an inanimate body or the body of a man is considered as an external body. It is here that Descartes develops his distinction between the body and the surface of the body, a distinction that permits him to develop a theory of the individuation and the identity of physical bodies. Surfaces are the forms through which bodies can be separated the one from the other, but they do not in any way guarantee the identity of any one body through time. At the moment of consecration, the host becomes the body of Christ; at the moment of death, the body of a human individual becomes a simple inanimate body. In the two cases, the surface remains the same, but the identity of the body changes. To the question of identity—which we might formulate as follows: what is it that makes one body the same from one moment to the next?—we might offer the two following responses: from an ontological point of view, it is God who sees to the body’s conservation, but from the point of view of knowledge of this body, it is the perception of the body as the same body by the thinking subject.3 In this connection, the explanation of the Eucha- rist, like the explanation of the piece of wax, serves as a tool by means of which Descartes relativizes knowledge of the world through the senses, and proposes a sort of metaphysical ‘insurance’ for physics, as well as a mo- dus operandi that is geometrical.4 The third point is what I have elsewhere called as a theory of the union of the soul and the body in general (Alexandrescu 2003a). Formulated in substantiation, in particular, which the Calvinists regard as impossible to explain by the ordinary philosophy, is very easily explained by mine,” Descartes to Vatier, 22 February 1638, AT I, 564; “. but if there is ever any question of that, I am conªdent I can show that none of the tenets of their philosophy accords with the Faith so well as my doctrines,” Descartes to Mersenne, 31 March 1641, AT III, 349, etc. 3. Besides the well known exemple of the wax from the Meditatio II, see also the end of Descartes’ letter to Xxxx, AT IV, 375. 4. For my account of individuation in Descartes, see Alexandrescu 2003b. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.434 by guest on 03 October 2021 Perspectives on Science 437 the most comprehensive way, this theory would take into account the manner in which the thinking substance is united to the extended sub- stance. The union of the soul and the body in general depends on one of the attributes of mind, namely the power that makes the mind exercises its functions5 in matter. We easily recognize in this exercise a form of ac- tion that ºows from the fundamentally active character of the mind. This operation of the mind in matter can take forms as different the one from the other as creation, conservation (for God), the motion of bodies accord- ing to the laws of nature, the motion of the soul communicated to the body itself according to the speciªcally human faculty of sensation or pas- sions (which is different from the faculty of animals), according to the fac- ulty of memory or of imagination, or, ªnally, according to the faculty of the intellect, which, through will, dictates to the body itself the manner of its motion in the course of its quest for the sovereign good. But nothing prevents us from thinking, in certain cases, of the action of the mind upon matter in a still broader sense, as a union, without the pineal gland, and thus without sensation, passions, even without memory or imagination, according as the pure understanding requires, which in a very strict way imposes its rule for the motion of any body to which it is united.