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HANDBOOK for Foreign (International) Observers During the Election of the President of the Russian Federation

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HANDBOOK for Foreign (International) Observers During the Election of the President of the Russian Federation Election of the President of the Russian Federation HANDBOOK for Foreign (International) Observers during the election of the President of the Russian Federation Published by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation Moscow 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS Decision of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation № 528-SF of 15 December 2017 “on Scheduling the Election of the President of the Russian Federation” ........................................5 Extract from the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (OSCE) dated 29 June, 1990 ...........................................................................................................6 Extract from the Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States: Article 7, paragraph 5 and article 15 paragraphs 1 and 2. ...........................................................7 Major Amendments and Additions to the Electoral Legislation Made in 2016-2017 .......................................................................................8 System of electoral authorities responsible for preparation and conduct of the Election of the President of the Russian Federation ..........11 Transparency of the activities of election commissions (extract from Article 23 of Federal Law on the Election of the President of the Russian Federation of 10 January 2003 №19-FZ) .........................................................................................12 Guarantees of free expression of the voters’ will at the Election of the President of the Russian Federation ...................................14 Information support of the election: general conditions of pre-election campaign ..............................................................15 Organization and procedure of voting .........................................................................16 Procedure of determination of vote returns and election results by election commissions .....................................................................................17 Information on the candidates, addresses and contact telephone numbers of their campaign headquarters .........................19 Number of voters in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation ............29 Schedule for the preparation and the conduct of the election of the President of the Russian Federation ....................................32 Guidance for the Activities of Foreign (International) Observers Present at the Election of the President of the Russian Federation ...............................................................................................67 3 List of members of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation ......................................................79 List of executive heads and governing bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, chief executives of election commissions, their addresses and contact telephone numbers .....................................................................................82 On establishment of territorial election commission to coordinate the activities of precinct election commissions established in the electoral precincts outside the Russian Federation (except for Baikonur city) ........................................................................................... 110 List of national TV and radio broadcasting companies, news agencies, newspapers and magazines............................................................... 112 Information and Reference Center of the CEC of Russia ................................... 118 Members of the Department of International Cooperation and Public Information of the CEC of Russia and their contact telephone numbers ....................................................................... 119 Telephone numbers of emergency services and other necessary facilities (institutions) ............................................................................... 120 4 DECISION OF THE FEDERATION COUNCIL OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON SCHEDULING THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION In accordance with Article 81, subparagraph “d” of paragraph 1 of Article 102 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, paragraphs 2 and 7 of Article 5 of the Federal Law on the Election of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation decides: 1. To schedule the election of the President of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2018. 2. This Decision comes into force after its official publication. Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation V.I. Matvienko Moscow 15 December 2017 No. 528-SF 5 DOCUMENT OF THE COPENHAGEN MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE CSCE (Copenhagen, 1990) (extract) The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, met in Copenhagen from 5 to 29 June 1990, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE contained in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE. <…> In order to strengthen respect for, and enjoyment of, human rights and fundamental freedoms, to develop human contacts and to resolve issues of a related humanitarian character, the participating States agree on the following: <…> (8) The participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and national, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavour to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings. <…> 6 CONVENTION ON THE STANDARDS OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (Kishinev, 7 October 2002) (extract) States party to this Convention (hereinafter referred to as Parties), <…> proceeding from the goals and principles of the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, <…> have agreed upon the following: <…> Article 7 Open and Transparent Elections <…> 5. Observance of the principle of openness and publicity of elections should provide for establishment of conditions for execution of election monitoring by public and international bodies. <…> Article 15 Status and Powers of International Observers 1. The Parties hereto proceed from the assumption that the presence of international observers promotes openness and transparency of elections and ensures the observance of international commitments of the states. They will strive to facilitate the access of international observers to election processes being conducted on a lower level than the national one, including the municipal (local) level. 2. Activities of international observers are regulated by the laws of the country of presence, by this Convention and other international documents. <…> 7 MAjOR AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO THE ELECTORAL Legislation MADE IN 2016–2017 2016 saw the revised rules for the conduct of the election campaign come into force. In particular, one of the major amendments is aimed at ensuring that no “fake” journalist infiltrates polling stations and that no one interferes with the work of election commissions. From now on, in order to work at an electoral station, journalists have to be accredited in a period of time from 55 to 3 days before the election day. Moreover, only a journalist who was hired by a publishing house earlier than 2 months before the official announcement of the date of the election day cab be accredited. Any interference with the work of election commission or with the voting process will be punished by a fine if no criminal basis is found. This fine will amount to 2,000–5,000 roubles for individuals and 20,000– 50,000 for officials. 1 June 2017 has saw the publication and coming into force of Federal Laws “on Amendments to the Federal Law on Presidential Election in the Russian Federation”, No. 103-FZ and “on Amendments to Particular Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” No. 104-FZ. Federal Law No. 104-FZ introduces amendments to several laws, in- cluding the Federal Law “on basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to participate in a referendum”. Amendments Introduced by Federal Law No. 104-FZ: Early and absentee voting was replaced by a new voting mecha- nism – voting on the basis of an application for enrollment on the voters’ list at the place of temporary stay. Those voters away from their registration place on the election day have a right to submit an application
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