Organising the South American Space Regionalism in Times of Transnationalisation
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Organising the South American Space Regionalism in times of transnationalisation Stefano Palestini Céspedes Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Florence, 13 October 2015 (thesis defence) European University Institute Department of Political and Social Sciences Organising the South American Space Regionalism in times of transnationalisation Stefano Palestini Céspedes Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Examining Board Prof. László Bruszt, EUI (Supervisor) Prof. Carlos Closa Montero, EUI Prof. Olivier Dabène, Sciences Po Prof. Juan Gabriel Valdés Soublette, Government of Chile - Universidad Austral ©Stefano Palestini Céspedes, 2015 No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author To Amanda and Mario. Abstract What makes governments decide to engage in cooperation with their neighbours to deliver regional public goods? Under which conditions do they decide to keep this cooperation informal, and when do they instead prefer to formalise it through an international treaty? Why do government seem to be more capable to produce regional public goods in some policy-areas than in others? The present research addresses these questions by analysing the contemporary South American-wide regionalism from 2000 to 2014, the period in which the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) was created and later formalised into the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). First, the analysis of the intergovernmental negotiations shows that an informal institution such as IIRSA better accommodated the preferences of governments that were searching for and experimenting with a collective response to an external challenge, whereas a formal institution such as UNASUR better accommodated the preferences of governments that wanted to avoid the emergence of competitive regional projects and the defection of some states. Second, the thesis examines the interactions between governments and transnational actors and shows that regional public goods are more likely to be produced in policy-areas in which governments were able to broker non-state transnational actors to implement basic intergovernmental consensus. In answering these questions, the thesis offers an empirically informed assessment of contemporary South American regionalism without following either the over-optimistic or over-pessimistic viewpoints that dominate the current academic debate. Keywords: regionalism – South America – UNASUR – institutional design – regional development banks – regional policies and public goods I II Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................ 1 PART I Explaining institutional design and outcomes in South American Regionalism ....................................... 9 CHAPTER 1 Regionalism in Latin and South America ........................................................................................... 11 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 11 1.1. Regions and regionalism ...................................................................................................................................... 12 1.2 Latin and South American Regionalism in an historic perspective ............................................................... 15 1.3 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................. 26 CHAPTER 2 Institutional Design and Outcomes in South American Regionalism .......................................... 29 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 29 2.1. Operationalizing Institutional design and Outcomes ..................................................................................... 30 2.2. Change in institutional design: from IIRSA to UNASUR ............................................................................. 33 2.3. Variation in outcomes: RPG in the areas of energy and transport connectivity ........................................ 36 2.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................. 39 CHAPTER 3 Explaining institutional design and outcomes: an intergovernmental-transnational approach . 41 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 41 3.1 Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................................................................... 42 3.2 Methodological Framework ................................................................................................................................. 52 3.3 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................. 55 PART II The Intergovernmental level: designing institutions ................................................................................ 57 CHAPTER 4 Explaining the institutional design of IIRSA ..................................................................................... 59 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 59 4.1 The cooperation problem: the FTAA and the MERCOSUR Crisis (1998-2000) ....................................... 59 4.2. Preferences converge............................................................................................................................................ 69 4.3 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................. 77 CHAPTER 5 Explaining the institutional design of UNASUR ............................................................................. 79 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 79 5.1 The Cooperation Problem: the rise of Venezuelan regionalism (2006-2008) .............................................. 80 5.2 Preference convergence ........................................................................................................................................ 92 5.3 Formalisation without delegation ........................................................................................................................ 99 5.4 Conclusions and alternative explanations ........................................................................................................ 106 PART III The transnational level: delivering outcomes .......................................................................................... 111 CHAPTER 6 Transport: Development and Integration Hubs.............................................................................. 113 III Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 113 6.1 Intergovernmental Consensus ........................................................................................................................... 114 6.2 Brokering: Regional Development Banks and the private sector ................................................................ 116 6.3 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................... 136 CHAPTER 7 Energy: Big-Nationals .......................................................................................................................... 139 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 139 7.1 The Intergovernmental consensus .................................................................................................................... 140 7.2 Brokering: National Energy Companies .......................................................................................................... 145 7.3 Conclusions and alternative explanations ........................................................................................................ 154 CHAPTER 8 Discussion and future research avenues ........................................................................................... 159 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 159 8.1 Responding to the research questions .............................................................................................................