Post-war reconstruction in : Lessons from El Salvador, , and

Patricia Ardon

Translated and adapted by Deborah Eade

An Oxfam Working Paper This work was first published in in May 1998, on behalf of Oxfam GB, as Lapazy los conflictos en Centroamerica, © CIDECA (Consejo de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo de Centroamerica).

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This book converted to digital file in 2010 Contents

Acknowledgements 4

Preface 5

Introduction 6

Chapter One: The importance of analysing conflicts and peace-building processes 8

Chapter Two: The peace negotiation processes in Central America 15 Nicaragua 18 El Salvador 27 Guatemala 36

Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America 48

Chapter Four: Conflicts and peace in Central America — some reflections 60

Appendix 1 70

Appendix 2 72

Notes 75

Select bibliography 75 Acknowledgements

I learned a great deal during my years with and Central America regional team, for Oxfam GB, and had many remarkable the patience and support they gave me in experiences. I hope also to have made my own preparing this paper. contribution. I was privileged to know some This work is dedicated to all those who lived extraordinary people; not only did we share through the conflicts in Mexico and Central many things, we also suffered and laughed America, and who still hope for a better future; together even in the midst of situations that and especially to those who shared with me their were often difficult and dangerous. But above sufferings and their joys. And to Patricia Miller, all, as someone who was and remains part of the Adolfo Herrera, Luisa Maria Rivera, Martha process of change for the people of Central Thompson, Pauline Martin, Deborah Eade, America, I have had the chance to learn. My Morna MacLeod, and Guadalupe Salinas: for thanks to Oxfam GB, and particularly to the everything we experienced together. Preface

This study originated as a proposal to reflect on without reason, given how seldom it is of any the experience of Oxfam GB ' in Central practical use). Thus I did not fully appreciate America during the 1980s, both to contribute to that the problem was not just one of time, but its 'institutional memory' of working in situations also one of having a sound research of armed conflict, and to trace the relationship methodology. It was also clear that it was not between its previous and current work in the feasible to produce something that would be of region. Oxfam's wider interest coincided with equal use to all the interested parties, for even if that of its Central American counterparts2 in we share a common purpose, our agendas, reaching a deeper understanding of conflict- priorities, and dynamics are all very different. resolution as a basis for their own work. This led As a result, this study draws on various to the idea of analysing the formal peace- different concerns, not all of which have an negotiation processes in the region and seeing obvious connection with each other. I trust, how civil-society organisations (CSOs) had nevertheless, that it serves as a basis upon which participated in them, particularly in Guatemala, to reflect more deeply on issues relating to El Salvador and Nicaragua. humanitarian endeavour in situations of armed During the course of undertaking this study, conflict, such as conflict-resolution, partic- I conducted more than 40 interviews with ipation, international co-operation and forms of members of NGOs, popular organisations:i, intervention, and the dilemmas associated with churches, grassroots organisations, women's the transition from war to peace. All these are groups, and ex-combatants. Sadly, much of this central to the work of Oxfam as well as to that of rich material was lost in a burglary. Therefore the organisations it supports around the world. the study draws heavily on other documents, as More importantly, these issues directly affect the well as on my own notes and recollections, and lives of the poor majority in Central America. on the limited amount of bibliographic research But the reality I present is itself part of a that I was able to conduct. history that is in so many ways still fragmented; It soon became obvious, however, that the both at a personal and at an institutional level, terms of reference were too wide and the study since so much experience remains locked in the proposal over-ambitious. In addition, having memories of those with whom we worked long been compelled to respond to events in during the 1980s. Let us hope that one day, Central America, 1 had rather under-estimated there will be a chance to bring together all these the value of 'academic' work (not entirely fragments within one institutional memory. Introduction

Today, conflict and conflict-resolution have But with globalisation, those who are already become 'buzz words' — not only among marginalised will become even less visible, and international agencies, but also among the local have even less access to the resources that they and regional actors who are now facing serious need. In other words, what is taking place is the challenges on the difficult road towards very opposite of what experience tells us needs to transition. Transition to what, of course, remains happen. Unless, perhaps, this trend makes sense to be seen. One hopes that it will be a transition to those who are willing to let the weakest go to the towards societies that are just, in which people wall? Or, rather, who want to 'stabilise' the trend, are free to think and to make a real contribution given that without the 'small' people, the big ones towards building a new future, unhindered by cannot survive? If stability and the absence of war empty stomachs, by constraints on our right to have become a mechanism by which the world's participate, by repression, or by injustice. On the poor are reduced to becoming the slaves of the one hand, it is fascinating to see the way in which rich few, then we non-government organisations a growing number of people and organisations (NGOs) must ask ourselves very seriously what are internalising these issues, and finding ways to our role is: are we working to change the situation interpret and practise them in their lives and of people living in poverty and suffering as a result their work. On the other, I fear that we may be of conflict - or are we merely alleviating the worst preoccupied with the topic of conflict-resolution of their pain without addressing its causes? We for the wrong reasons — to demonstrate that we must therefore ask ourselves why, and how, we are not mired in the past, that we are capable of should help to resolve conflicts. putting forward realistic proposals, that we are not armchair radicals but know what we are International co-operation played an talking about. Most importantly, we talk the important part in supporting Central American language of conflict resolution in order to show NGOs, popular organisations, and grassroots that we know what we want to say in relation to groups, both during the wars and during the international co-operation. If this seems over- peace processes. One of the harshest criticisms anxious, it is because I believe we must always be today, however, is of the agencies' lack of on our guard to ensure that we are genuinely analysis of the implications and problems contributing to those processes of change that associated with the transition from armed both derive from, and support, the people — conflict to peace-building. Many Central and not just focus on the needs of institutions. Americans believe that international aid agencies are today developing their strategies Like many other parts of the world, Central on the basis of their own assumptions, rather America has recently emerged from a painful than on the capacities of those concerned, or on period of its history, though one which was also what is really achievable. tremendously creative and constructive even in the face of adversity. Mexico, the 'older sibling' None of the negotiation processes in Central who is on the point of joining the First World, America could have proceeded until the root offers a warning against the false idea that the causes were recognised as lying in the unequal beginning or end of the between the power structures characterising the region, and former super-powers is what defines the the chronic and comprehensive exclusion of the beginning or the end of the conflicts in Central poor from participating in shaping their America. Ideologies may infuse and influence societies. However, as this paper will show, the conflicts, but they do not determine them: in formal processes (all of which were conducted in Central America, these conflicts are linked to the a highly secretive manner) responded more to lack of access to resources, to participation, to external pressure for stabilisation than to creative channels for people's frustrations, to qualitative changes in the underlying causes. technologies, and to the basic standard of living Civil-society organisations did gain the chance that every citizen of the world should enjoy, as to participate in political life, and to put forward we stand on the threshold of the 21st century. their own proposals. However, the various Introduction accords failed to address the economic, social, building. In Central America, most of the and structural problems in any depth. On the conflict-resolution efforts were focused on key contrary, the neo-liberal economic model will actors or on the formal leadership structures. tend to deepen the gulf between the rich and the Experience shows, however, that the greatest poor, and deprive most people of access to basic capacity to facilitate peace-building processes is services. Increasing poverty and the failure to at the middle or intermediary level, if there is comply with certain accords is already sufficient trust and mutual respect among the generating conflicts, and these are in turn various parties. Chapter two outlines the peace- impeding the reconstruction of the material negotiation processes in Nicaragua, El Salvador, infrastructure and of the social fabric which the and Guatemala, focusing on how different wars destroyed. In addition, repression and war sectors of society participated in, or were have left significant psycho-social scars. Women, excluded from, these. Chapter three explores children, and ex-combatants face particular the role of international co-operation in difficulty in channelling their problems — prolonged political and armed conflicts such as problems which go beyond individual those in Central America. The final chapter experiences alone, and affect entire communities analyses the insights gleaned from various and societies. interlocutors in the region and draws out some The opening chapter of this paper reflects on general conclusions on the role of international the nature of conflict and identifies various aid agencies both during a period of armed approaches to conflict-resolution and peace- conflict, and in the post-conflict phase. Chapter One: The importance of analysing conflicts and peace-building processes

International co-operation and The result is that we fall into the trap of conflict assuming that no news means no conflicts, and become victims of disinformation. Such factors Governments, multilateral agencies (MLAs), played a role in the Central American conflicts of donors, and various international events have all the 1980s, and particularly in the case of helped to make conflict and conflict-resolution a Guatemala, where they resulted in a lack of major concern in many parts of the world. This information about what was happening not only interest has been stimulated both by the need to internationally, but also within the country itself. find new ways of approaching conflict, and by During the cold war, many armed conflicts in the need of various organisations to re-define the South were seen (and treated) by most their roles and structures in the face of contem- Northern governments and MLAs in ideological porary conflicts in a post-cold war world. The terms. Relatively little attention was paid to the role of the (UN) is particularly underlying structural conditions (for example, affected by processes of internal restructuring patterns of economic or cultural marginalisation), and reviews of working methods. although these were central both to the cause and Why has the theme become so important at to the possible resolution of these conflicts in the the present time? It is not because the number of long term. Instead, armed conflict tended to be major armed conflicts has increased — although, seen as a form of confrontation between the if we include 'minor' armed conflicts (defined as super-powers, reflecting the ideological differ- those in which at least 25 people are killed in any ences at the 'centre', played out on the territory of one year and in which the state is one of the their Southern 'satellites'. warring parties), there was a rise from 13 in 1989 Between 1989 and 1992, however, some 82 to 22 in 1992.4 But the increase in the level of armed conflicts were registered in 60 locations general violence world-wide is not mirrored by a around the world.5 Most of these occurred in rising incidence of major armed conflicts involv- areas where the majority of the population were ing entire populations. economically vulnerable, with little access to Setting these facts about violence and armed political power, and precious little access to any conflict against the widespread perception of a form of social service. Ideology was used to significant rise in armed conflicts, we must take explain the existence of most of these conflicts, into account the massive changes in information and in turn influenced the ways in which the technology over the same period. We can now be warring parties behaved. It also served to justify swiftly informed not only about the eruption of the massive arms industry in the North. During armed conflict anywhere in the world, but also the cold war, five Northern countries supplied witness its crudest expression and effects. This 95 per cent of arms exported to the so-called may well shape our view of the number and .6 nature of today's armed conflicts, compared with The false understanding of the nature of so those in years gone by. Moreover, several factors many conflicts also translated into mechanisms determine what we get to know about a given and approaches to diplomatic relations that have conflict. Apart from the commercial media since become redundant. This, along with the interests, which define the importance of infor- serious criticisms of the UN and other agencies mation on the basis of whether it is 'topical' or over their handling, for example, of emergencies 'spectacular', there are political interests at stake in Somalia and Rwanda, underlines the need to which can ensure that a curtain of silence is drawn redefine our understanding of the nature of over a major conflict. Further, international contemporary conflicts, and to re-conceptualise coverage of armed conflicts is often biased because conflict-resolution. The very complexity of of the risks faced by reporters and journalists in modern conflict calls for an analysis that will situations where their safety and ability to function enable us to understand and engage with the professionally are not guaranteed. multiple causes of the growing number of

8 Chapter One: The importance of analysing conflicts and peace-building processes internal conflicts, including their often religious This has become a critical issue in Central and ethnic dimensions. America, because many of the NGOs which, The absorption of an increasing proportion of while the movements were active, official development assistance (ODA) by believed in the possibility of structural trans- conflict-related emergencies is also a matter of formation, now find themselves having to adapt concern. Clearly, the reduction or re-orientation their policies to the reality of globalisation and of the resources available for international co- the new international political order. But many operation affects those intended to benefit from are doing so without sharing responsibility with it, especially since the financial aid necessary to local counterpart organisations, which will face support post-conflict reconstruction is being the challenges of transition in the long term. diverted to new emergencies. But development assistance is (or should be) part of a strategy to reduce the incidence of emergencies, especially in the context of the widening gap between rich Conflict theories and poor, which itself constitutes a risk of A fashionable theme, conflict has become the renewed outbreaks of conflict. (In 1960, the subject of many studies and different approaches. income of the richest 20 per cent of the world's There is growing concern that it is vital, before population was 30 times higher than that of the intervening in a conflict, to understand its many poorest 20 per cent. By 1990, this gap had contributory factors. The various theories and doubled, and is still widening.) concepts of conflict provide useful analytical Some analysts argue that ODA has now tools, some of which offer valuable insights into effectively become a new way of managing approaches to conflict-resolution. conflict, given the failure of traditional diplomatic The British NGO Responding to Conflict approaches to mediate or resolve such crises. In a identifies three main schools of thought. post-cold war context of globalisation, the lang- uage of 'convergence' is giving way to that of Power. This describes an ancient theory which cultural pluralism, which in many cases has holds that human beings and social groups are brought with it with cultural, ethnic, or political intrinsically engaged in a power struggle, and exclusion. In other words, those who hold the seek to dominate others. The term 'balance of greatest concentration of resources and power power' refers to the minimum force required to can no longer rely on an ideological framework ensure coexistence. that explained all conflicts in terms of East versus Structuralism. This approach looks at the various West. Instead, they are seeking an explanation in social institutions and structures which are terms of culture. The structural dimensions of based on exploitation and therefore generate conflict are increasingly ignored, as it is easier to conflict. It holds that people become trapped in explain conflicts in cultural terms, rather than as certain structures, in which there are winners an outcome of North-South contradictions, or of and losers. unequal access to resources or political exclusion within countries. Liberal pluralism. This considers the fact that human beings become involved in conflicts on a Given their close involvement in situations of range of levels, in which concepts of 'human conflict, NC.Os have the potential to present an needs', communication, and perception are alternative view of its causes and how to resolve important. Efforts to co-operate may, therefore, them. However, most NGOs lack the capacity to either alleviate or aggravate a given situation. engage in sustained analysis, and even this limited capacity is subject to pressure from funders to Wehr (1979) described seven different theories demonstrate impact and efficiency, in competing of conflict, although he generally recognises for the ever-dwindling resources available for that real conflicts are the result of many inter- post-war reconstruction and development. This linking and interdependent factors: all too easily leads to situations in which NGOs have a highly influential role within conflict 1. Conflict and aggressiveness are innate in all settings, but lack direction due to the absence of social animals, including human beings, and are analysis and strategic thinking. These deficiencies part of their biological make-up. also mean that NGOs may fail to take into account 2. Social conflict originates in certain social the real needs arising from the transition from forms, and in the ways in which societies are war to peace-building, a risk which is heightened structured (for example, where control is by their need to demonstrate short-term impact. imposed by some classes or groups over others).

9 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

3. Conflict is a deviation from what is normal, see the dynamic of conflict as a historical usual, or expected behaviour. 'continuum' - a dynamic which precedes armed hostilities and usually survives the formal peace 4. Conflicts arise because they serve to strength- negotiations in some form. en social systems (for example, by reinforcing certain social relations or by relieving social pressure through conflict). Concepts of conflict-resolution 5. Societal conflict arises because the nation-state has national interests that are mutually incom- It is important at this point to define how I use patible (for instance, in relation to security, some of the concepts adopted in this paper, power, and prestige). many of which are now common currency among MLAs, NGOs, and other organisations. 6. Conflict is the result of a breakdown of communication, of false perceptions, of social- Sustainable peace. This is a peace based on a solid isation, and other psychological processes of agreement, with certain guarantees of which we are largely unaware — a view which irreversibility, in a dynamic post-war period. holds that conflict is based on perceptions rather The various stages in building such a peace are than on material realities. not necessarily sequential in terms of time; they range from the emergency phase through to 7. Conflict is a natural process common to all efforts to consolidate the possibility of develop- societies, and is somewhat predictable. Thus, it ment, from disarmament and detente to the can be handled in a constructive and non- building of harmonious and consensus-based violent way. social relations. The term implies efforts to build The last of these theories — that conflict can be a society in which every citizen has access to handled constructively and non-violently — resources and to power. underpins most thinking and practice in the Peace is a complex social construct, a fabric field of conflict-resolution. woven with the many threads that make up a society, such as the material, cultural, psycho- symbolic, and political dimension. Thus, work- What do we mean by conflict and conflict- ing for sustainable peace entails focusing on the resolution? immediate goals, while also maintaining a Conflicts manifest themselves on many levels, medium- and long-term perspective. individual and collective, personal as well as public: therein lies their diversity. Conflict is a Civil society. This term refers to all institutions part of life itself, and is expressed in our and groups that are not part of the formal everyday activities. Thus, it is an integral and structures of the state. However, this paper dialectical feature of individual and social focuses on the organised participation of the dynamics. If handled appropriately, it can give poor majority in shaping the society they live in. rise to creative ways to bring about change; In this way, the term 'civil society' allows us to otherwise it remains a destructive force. understand how, and in which circumstances, We see conflict as a dynamic and changing processes within a society affects its political process that is rooted in various structures (in processes. This contrasts with approaches which social, economic, political, gender-related and look exclusively at the state, political parties, and other aspects of identity). However, it may also be social elites. It also contrasts with those aggravated, 're-cycled', or sustained on the basis approaches which only consider social move- of either mutual perceptions or accumulated ments (Pearce 1996). hatreds and hostilities. This may happen over a Reconciliation. This approach must concentrate prolonged period, or in contexts in which the on the construction or reconstruction of new conflicting parties have been involved in violent relations between previously antagonistic confrontation, with the consequent costs in terms individuals or social groups. It involves not only of human life, and material and emotional well- the tangible aspects, but also the emotional and being. Thus, conflict-resolution is intimately psychological dimensions of the conflict, in linked to peace-building through processes which order to deal with the past and to identify new address the multi-layered complexity of conflict. forms of coexistence and future inter- Here, 1 refer principally to armed conflicts relationships. According to Lederach (Lederach with a nationwide dimension, which are collective 1994), the basic aim of reconciliation is to seek and organised in character. At the same time, we new 'spaces' among the affected population,

10 Chapter One: The importance of analysing conflicts and peace-building processes where they can confront and assimilate the approaches and actions needed to transform the painful past and the necessarily shared future, conflict into relationships and results that are as a means of addressing the present. both sustainable and peaceful (Lederach, op.cit.). Thus, peace-building is not merely the Participation. This process creates the conditions concrete outcome of a formal negotiation process for every sector of society (particularly those or cease-fire but also implies the building of a hitherto excluded) to exercise decision-making social dynamic, which requires social trans- power, by formulating policies and shaping formation in order to sustain it. In other words, it actions that affect them and their country. is a process of building and sustaining peace. This It is also useful to define certain roles in the process requires us to address both the processes of negotiating peace and resolving substantive problems underlying the conflict, conflict: and the dynamics of relations and perceptions that Mediation. Mediation can take place over a limited evolve throughout such conflicts, and which (as period, or it can be part of a long-term process to noted above) may be 're-cycled' and perpetuated. identify any points of agreement between the Conflict-resolution must be based on a parties involved in the conflict, in order to recognition of the need for, and the wish to seek, achieve a common goal. Mediators analyse, peaceful solutions. It must be a deliberate effort interpret, and identify points of agreement in to know and understand the other's logic, not in such a way as to facilitate dialogue between the order to surrender to it, but rather in order to adversaries, and sometimes to develop specific identify and proceed on the basis of those points proposals for each to consider. of agreement which may exist in spite of past perceptions. This also means identifying those Monitoring. By following up the process and the problems and dynamics where there are no such observance of a peace accord or agreement, points of agreement, so that a resolution may be monitoring is a means to ensure that the former sought in the context of a shared vision of the adversaries are aware of progress made, or of future. the reasons for non-fulfilment. This represents an enormous challenge, Facilitation. This term covers a wide range of especially in the case of prolonged conflicts. It functions in enabling adversaries to meet, such requires all parties to change their mind-set in as assisting the various parties to come together, relation to the violence, and the negative per- providing the necessary time and space, ceptions that armed conflict generates. Conflict- interpreting the parties' aims to each other, and resolution must work within the context of so on. power relations which are highly resistant to change, and which will ultimately determine Moderation. Individuals or groups moderating whether a sustainable peace can be achieved. conflict resolution must ensure that the fighting Often, there is a 'natural' resistance to change, parties enjoy equal opportunities to make simply because it is easier to deal with what is known their positions, and that the process is familiar. Change is a highly complex matter for conducted in conditions favourable to dialogue anyone who has been directly involved in armed and negotiation. conflict: it calls into question an identity that has been constructed or reinforced within the framework of war, an identity which provides a What do we mean by peace- certain security among those who share its logic. Building a different attitude thus demands building? change and transformation in an individual's Lederach considers that peace-building emotional and cultural identity, as well as in essentially represents the challenge of creating those structures and dynamics which govern and sustaining transformed social relations in a social and political relations, and access to power movement towards a peace that is thus and resources. sustainable. The dynamic nature both of conflicts Clearly, such a comprehensive process also and of efforts to resolve them requires us to depends on dedicated human resources, both analyse the many contributory factors, which short-term and permanent. Apart from the interact in generating and transforming them. formal negotiation processes, experience in Peace-building also implies the interaction of Central America shows how important it is to diverse national and international actors, in a draw on individuals who not only understand the process which involves a whole range of problem, but whose credibility and legitimacy

11 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua allows them to be a real resource in the longer poverty that sparked off the conflicts, but also the term. It is equally important to establish meeting exclusion of the vast majority of citizens from any spaces (both actual locations and symbolic real participation in the decisions affecting their opportunities for expression) and groups where, country. Of course, some social groups will try to and among which, debates, experimentation, maintain the status quo at all costs. Thus, peace- and change can flourish. building has to challenge the structural underpinning of the status quo, as well as the daily exercise of power, in order that this become The complexity of transition a force for social transformation, for peaceful-co- existence, and part of the process of establishing Transition from armed conflict to peace is new social relations between individuals, and necessarily complex, and usually full of ambi- among groups. guities. One major problem in formal peace Often, large elements of the population have negotiations is that people's expectations are so never experienced the positive (active) exercise of high that the process can seem extremely slow, power. They have been unable to choose and to do while at the same time events may move more as they please, because in times of acute conflict, quickly than people can easily handle. It is not there is merely the power to protect oneself and unusual for parties to feel that a great deal has to survive (the negative exercise of power). The been given away in return for very little, while the positive exercise of power depends on people's rapid pace at which the process evolves can make capacity to transform both themselves and the it hard for ordinary people to participate. world around them. Peace-building, therefore, A central but largely overlooked issue is that entails strengthening this capacity, or empowering of identity. In war-time, one's identity is often the marginalised, so that they can become defined in opposition to that of the enemy. protagonists in the process. People form very strong group identities, and This long-term view of transition does not tend to cling to what is familiar, even when merely look at the passage of time between war change might actually benefit them. In addition, and peace, but also implies (re)training indi- the ambiguities of a transition period, and the viduals in activities unconnected to the war; lack of a setting in which people can feel a sense enabling people to reclaim their human dignity; of security and belonging, pose enormous seeing the past as a tool with which to rebuild the challenges. The situation facing ex-combatants present and the future; and making the society as is particularly difficult: their identity as fighters a whole aware of how deeply some of its members is not merely questioned, but actually wiped out have suffered as a result of the war. It includes in the post-conflict period. (In addition, they attending to the specific needs of ex-combatants, have to deal with the emotional effects of having of women, and of children. These arejust a few of fought in the conflict.) the factors that help a society not only to come to Open warfare or acute conflict imposes terms with what it has lived through, and enable certain ground-rules. People's very survival each individual to recognise that she or he has a depends whose side they are on, whether or not vital role to play in building something new. they are directly involved in the fighting. The The issue of psycho-social trauma also needs to peace-building process depends on people being be addressed, not only for the main protagonists, able to form new alliances. People naturally fear but also for those who suffered the impact of the that they will be co-opted, so it is hard for them to conflict. People throughout Central America, be open to new ideas or discussions. Such fears and in Guatemala in particular, have lived are not merely subjective, nor will they through intensely painful experiences: the loss of automatically be resolved in the process of estab- human life and of material possessions, constant lishing a 'culture of peace'. Paradoxically, the and widespread violence, torture, repression, strong feelings of belonging, of a secure identity, rape, abuse, and discrimination. The long-term which people often develop as a response to the consequences of such traumatic experiences can real conditions of the war, may translate into scarcely be imagined. violent behaviour once those conditions are no Thus, building a sustainable peace starts in the longer present. context of a transition which may be vague in Peace-negotiation processes must lead to direction or not based on a broad social consensus genuine changes in the situations that initially — a transition towards what? It must work gave rise to the conflicts, but this may pose a simultaneously on several levels (technical and dilemma. In Central America, it was not only political) and at different paces (immediate and

12 Chapter One: The importance of analysing conflicts and peace-building processes longer-term), while also responding to people's simply in terms of a non-return to war. This diverse needs and capacities, and addressing the makes it all the more important to invest in other expressions of conflict both at the structural level social processes which can take forward the kinds and in everday life. Indeed, some analysts of changes necessary to guarantee a lasting peace. (Lederach 1994, Galtung 1995) argue that people and their social relations are the real vehicle for Negotiation transition and are just as important as the either the technical or the underlying concerns. This If we have in mind a more integrated vision of contrasts with the conventional top-down peace-building, then we must encourage approach to negotiation and conflict-resolution, processes which will bring together people from which tends to ignore the many actors and layers across the social spectrum, at all different levels, of social relations which will in the long run but with a sense of shared responsibility. Such a determine to what extent the peace will be vision would mean letting go of the notion that sustainable. Formal negotiation is only one anyone has a monopoly on the truth, since element in peace-building. It tends to emphasise genuine dialogue cannot take place without the need for changes in the combatants' doing so. The creativity thus released would behaviour, either because of the cessation of enable us to move away from traditional patterns hostilities is a precondition for progress, or of thought, while at the same time grounding because it is clear that the war will not have a ourselves in reality, and seeing all the elements decisive outcome. Because of this narrow range of that contribute to conflict. Rather than motivations, the need for change within society as concentrating solely on the leaders, we would a whole is often disregarded. come to see the full participation of people from A society emerging from armed conflict will the grassroots and intermediate levels of society naturally expect that the negotiations will also as critical to achieving peace. The inter-related provide a long-term solution to its problems, nature of all these elements is illustrated in the whereas the international community may following diagram prepared by the NGO, measure the success of the negotiation process Responding to Conflict:

Figure 1: Chris Mitchell's Triangle (based on Responding to Conflict)

CONTEXT Justice/ injustice Rights Legal discrimination 'olitical and economic structures Distribution of resources

/

BEHAVIOUR ATTITUDE Social discrimination A Prejudice Attacks Fear Segregation Withdrawal/ alienation Marginalisation Rejection of commitment Population displacement

13 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

This triangle shows how important it is to to the conflict and the various actors involved, focus not only on the material aspects of any they also need institutional backing. This given context, but also on the social dimensions, combination has proven a key factor in enabling such as discrimination and lack of access to such 'resource people' to mediate or facilitate in decision-making fora, which in turn generate conflict-resolution. A good example is that of an attitudes that must change in order to achieve international NGO in El Salvador which lent its broad-based participation. Equally important reputation, and that of certain individual staff- are the various perceptions of reality, since these members, to efforts to establish a dialogue and often govern the behaviour and attitudes of eventually reach a consensus between the individuals and groups towards the 'enemy'. To opposing parties. Similarly, in the Atlantic Coast take all these factors into account means, as we of Nicaragua, the Moravian Church played a have said, combining short-term actions with an crucial role in achieving peaceful outcomes to awareness of the wider political, economic, the armed conflict. Obviously, such efforts are social, psychological, and cultural dimensions; enhanced when the various individuals and and at the same time developing a clear vision of institutions know and are willing to co-operate what would constitute a desirable future. with each other. I have already noted that formal peace processes tend to proceed in a hierarchical rather than an organic fashion. The importance of Conclusion: From conflict to involving those sectors which are not part of the peace political elite, so that the process is widely 'owned', is often ignored. It is also vital to look Conflict-resolution efforts must, therefore, be critically at how far the assumed leaders are truly based on approaches which address the strategic representative of and in full dialogue with people dimensions of the problems, and theobjectives at the grassroots. It is often assumed, wrongly, that each side views as important, not merely on that the views of leaders will automatically be the conceptual differences. The methods and adopted by those they represent. Such leaders tools employed should aim to empower those may come to symbolise wider hopes, but prove social actors with least access to power and unable to respond to people's more immediate resources, while also helping them to see the needs. They may be obliged to assume a public or potential for a peaceful solution to their prob- official role which places certain constraints upon lems, and equipping them with specific skills such them. They may be under pressure to bow to the as negotiating and lobbying techniques. 'strategic need' to bring about an end to the The basic dilemma is how to create a form of armed conflict, especially if this has been very peace which can transform the negative prolonged. Such factors can make it hard for conditions that gave rise to, or perpetuated, the these leaders to maintain close contact with conflict into positive forces with which to build people at the grassroots. In some cases, they may something new. Such transformation does not even feel a greater need than before for their own happen in a vacuum, but in a context riddled personal and private space. with contradictions, and one in which many So the political elite cannot determine actors do not participate actively. The task is whether or not society will feel the need to get thus to transform society, and to build new ways involved in the peace process, or that it will of relating to each other and of handling power develop the necessary skills to do so. In El which are based on inclusion, rather than Salvador and Guatemala, for instance, where the exclusion, and which can guarantee the fullest peace negotiations went on almost in secret, it possible participation. became extremely difficult to ensure any form of Finally, it is important to be aware of the communication between the leaders involved various agendas at play in peace-building and and the population. This is one reason why it is so conflict-resolution. Methodologies may show us important to have individuals and groups acting how to handle conflict, but not necessarily how as facilitators and developing plans of action. to resolve it. Similarly, no one system is in itself Irrespective of whether they will themselves the answer: finding a way to deal with the many ultimately benefit from the process, such people complex issues at stake can only be based on are invaluable resources in encouraging new what the people involved actually want — social relations. particularly those who are relatively powerful. While such individuals are likely to have This can only happen if all social sectors established their personal legitimacy in relation participate.

14 Chapter Two: The peace negotiation processes in Central America

A brief overview of the political background to by major regional and external actors. The role the conflict situations in Nicaragua, El Salvador, played by the USA deserves special mention, and Guatemala is followed by accounts of the because the nature of its intervention in the negotiation processes and peace accords in each region turned it into one of the main actors. of these countries. The 1979 Nicaraguan , which brought to power the Sandinista liberation move- ment had a major impact on Central America. Background The US Administration embarked on an undeclared war against the Sandinista govern- The 1980s saw the fiercest conflict in the region ment, significantly increasing its direct political this century, with enormous costs in terms of loss and military intervention in the Salvadoran of life, infrastructure, human development, and conflict from bases in , as well as its psycho-social well-being. Although the warring provision of military advice and intelligence to parties in each country discussed here have Guatemala. Within , some signed peace accords (Guatemala was the last to countries defended the position of the US, but do so in December 1996), peace as such, as well as most expressed concern that the 'international- the democratisation processes, are still fragile. In isation' of the conflict might endanger the peace the context of economic globalisation, it is and security of the entire continent. unlikely that the conflicts will disappear Against this backdrop, in January 1983 the altogether, especially given the ever-diminishing governments of , Mexico, , opportunities for most Central Americans to and Venezuela formed the . attain a reasonable standard of living. That said, (In 1985, other Latin American countries it is also clear that new political openings in the formed a Contadora support group, known as region may allow for peaceful solutions to the the Group.) Contadora's aim was to crises facing it. achieve peace in Central America by holding For centuries, Central America has oscillated free and ensuring respect for social, between armed conflict on the one hand, and political, and civil rights, particularly in efforts to harmonise and integrate the region, on Nicaragua and El Salvador. These initiatives, the other. This background becomes even more and particularly the Contadora process, con- relevant in the face of globalisation, because tributed to a favourable climate for peace opportunities for economic advancement are following the first meeting of the warring parties seriously limited by the region's unequal relations in Esquipulas, Guatemala, on 25 May 1986. On with industrialised nations. As Central America 7 August 1987, the presidents of the region seeks to compete in the international market, this signed a peace accord, known as Esquipulas II. in turn generates greater inequalities within each This accord was based on the peace plan country. Both the conflicts and efforts to create a proposed by President Oscar Arias of Costa regional identity (at least at the economic level) are Rica, which drew on certain elements from the rooted in history. In the 1950s, various intra- Contadora initiative but also sought to bring regional projects aimed to establish regional unity about peace and reconciliation through a through economic integration. In the 1960s, the process of national dialogue. Esquipulas II thus Central American Common Market was quite provided the 'means for establishing firm and successful. However, these attempts have been lasting peace' — but without interference from repeatedly thwarted by the cycles of internal various external actors which had previously conflict, and by the competition among neigh- tried to mediate in the regional conflict. For the bouring countries to gain access to international first time, it created an instrument that markets. acknowledged the internal roots of the conflicts The process of 'pacification' was part of a (as opposed to an analysis which saw them in series of initiatives put forward from the 1970s terms of a cold-war confrontation), that focused

15 Posi-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua on the region's own development problems, knowledge, was the source of growing tensions and that highlighted the urgent need for in the border area. international economic aid, particularly in The Esquipulas II accord was a futher step in relation to foreign debt. establishing mechanisms to guarantee the The Esquipulas II negotiations also political democratisation process, setting dia- introduced concepts and mechanisms which logue and verification as the starting points for represented a qualitative leap forward, through reconciliation. It was assumed that this would establishing communication among the region's incorporate all sectors of civil society. As governments, and by generating the trust described below, this process took on different necessary for the various actors to enter into characteristics in each country. dialogue with each other. Building on what had Extraordinary events took place during been developed through the Contadora Group, 1989-90: the FMLN offensive in El Salvador in Esquipulas II included a timetable for meeting November 1989 demonstrated that it had not and evaluating each party's commitments; the been defeated militarily; the US invaded Panama so-called 'symmetrical' definition of the causes in December 1989; in February 1990, elections in of the crisis (which meant that they were no Nicaragua ushered in a centre-right coalition; longer seen as based only in one country, or right-wing governments were returned to power reduced to one focal point); and the agreement in elections in and Honduras; the UN that implementation would be simultaneous initiated a mediation process in El Salvador; and throughout the region, which helped to reduce the URNG and various political parties and the levels of mistrust among the parties others began discussions in Guatemala. All this concerned. At the same time, a presidential contributed to a new regional dynamic and made summit ensured that these matters would be peace seem achievable. A major factor was the dealt with at the highest decision-making level. electoral defeat of the FSLN in Nicaragua, which The 1987 Esquipulas II peace accord opened greatly altered US policy towards the region. the way for negotiated settlements. It also With the disappearance of the supposed demonstrated that the specific mechanisms for Communist threat in Nicaragua, Costa Rica and peace must be accepted unanimously through- Honduras ceased to be favoured recipients of US out the region, and based on consensus among economic aid. each of the national governments. It also At the same time, amnesty laws opened up the underlined the need for national reconciliation, space for dialogue with the opposition forces in stressing that dialogue should be the main each country, provided these disarmed. (This was instrument to promote '... actions directed at part of the Esquipulas accord: paragraph 15 of the national reconciliation that allowed for popular 1989 Costa del Sol Declaration made the first call participation, and exercise of civil and political for all irregular forces throughout the region to rights on the part of the citizens of Central disarm.) In terms of the participation of civil- America'. society groups in the peace processes, Esquipulas However, the negotiations did not yield fruit II called for the establishment of National immediately. In Guatemala, little progress was Reconciliation Commissions, in order'... to verify made between the Guatemalan National adherence to the commitments undertaken by Revolutionary Unit (URNG) and Vinicio the five Central American governments in signing Cerezo's Christian Democrat government. In El this document with regard to amnesty, cease-fire, Salvador, the dialogue between the government democratisation and free elections ... and to and the Democratic Revolutionary Front/ monitor the national reconciliation process, as Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FDR- well as the unrestricted respect and full guar- FMLN) stalled after the president of the non- antees for all citizens within any genuinely government Commission was democratic political processes'. murdered. In Nicaragua, the government The events of the late 1980s thus marked a unexpectedly decided to hold direct discussions new phase in the regional conflict. This period with the right-wing contra leaders, and agreed a also saw a grave deterioration in the living partial cease-fire. This caused profound rifts conditions of the vast majority of Central within the contra leadership, raising major Americans. The acute economic crisis could no questions about the role of the US government. longer be ignored — nor could the role of US The Honduran government's continued denial economic aid, which had been critical during of the presence of permanent contra bases on its the armed conflicts, especially in El Salvador territory, even though their existence was public and Nicaragua. Between 1980 and 1990, the US

16 Chapter Two: The peace negotiation processes in Central America government had increased its bilateral aid from in the political processes, and had little access to US$185 million to US$1,092 million. The ever scarcer resources. dependence on trade with the USA also At the end of 1991, the Salvadoran Peace increased dramatically, and remittances from Accords were signed; while in Guatemala, family members in the USA had become an dialogue continued for several years, until the important element of the region's economies, Arzu government and the URNG eventually particularly of El Salvador's. However, although signed the an accord in December 1996. A the presidents of Central America had fragile peace had also been achieved in calculated that some US$10 billion in aid would Nicaragua, although this was undermined by be needed over the next five years to support the the unwillingness of certain elements of the peace processes, the US government cut its contra forces to lay down their arms — a problem bilateral aid by 20 per cent, arguing that trade, that lasted until 1997. not aid, was the answer. This posed a great Despite the overall achievements of the peace challenge. In 1970, Central America accounted process, even today there are still isolated cases for about 1.9 per cent of 'Third World' of people resorting to arms in order to resolve international trade. By 1988, this had fallen to political problems. And Central America is 0.6 per cent, coffee being the only significant immersed in an economic crisis in which the product for the world market. poor are getting poorer, and in which it is ever A degree of political stability had begun to harder to halt, much less reverse, the increase of emerge, and the UN started to play an violence and social disintegration. Drug traffick- important role in the peace processes, from ing is a major problem, and in some countries demobilising the contra forces, supervising the involves high-ranking government officials — Esquipulas II accords on intra-regional arms especially among the military. For many trade, to mediating in the Salvadoran peace Mexicans and Central Americans, migration to talks, and facilitating the dialogue between the the North remains the only option, given that URNG and the government of Guatemala. But neither the armed struggle nor the possibility of despite these encouraging signs, most Central meaningful political participation oiler any real Americans still enjoyed very little participation hope of a better life.

17 NICARAGUA

Background geographical area that had historically been marginalised from the country's 'development'. 'Here, our main conflict is grinding poverty.' This made the war on the Atlantic Coast very This wry comment was made by someone from different from the conflicts in the rest of the the Northern Autonomous Region of the region, and eventually led to the Regional Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast, and the situation is process. set to worsen throughout the country. Today, Despite detractors within — but mostly outside Nicaragua not only faces the same structural — Nicaragua, there is no doubt that during its problems that confront the region as a whole. early years, the Sandinista Government Within the process of reconciliation, it also faces galvanised the desire of most Nicaraguans for a great economic and social challenges in the democratic society. There was an unprecedented aftermath of a conflict which, in the 1980s alone, level of popular organisation and political killed some 30,000 people and directly affected participation. For instance, during Somoza's about 900,000 people. The war caused US$17 dictatorship, there had been only 133 registered billion's worth of damage, and destroyed the unions nationwide, with 27,000 members. After farming economy and agricultural productive 1979, this number grew to 207,000 members, capacity. It caused profound social divisions and organised in more than 1,200 trade unions. did serious damage to community and family Organisations of peasant farmers, women, structures, as well as leaving deep emotional and educators, and so on flourished; and the govern- cultural wounds. To make matters worse, in ment's mass adult- and health campaigns October 1988 Hurricane Joan almost completely depended on the voluntary involvement of destroyed some settlements on the Atlantic thousands of Nicaraguan citizens. The Coast, and badly affected production in other Sandinistas believed that popular democracy areas of the country. implied the organisational development of civil The war in Nicaragua was unusual: the country society, and wanted to reinforce this by had already lived through an armed conflict establishing a broad alliance between industrial which began in the 1960s, when the FSLN was workers and peasant farmers, within a predom- founded. Their armed struggle against the inantly rural economy. (The agricultural sector Somoza dictatorship lasted almost 20 years and then represented about 50 per cent of the ended with the overthrow of the Somoza regime economically active population in Nicaragua.) on 19 ) uly 1979. It is important to remember that Thus, the popular organisations on the Pacific the burden of fighting to bring down Somoza was Coast expanded enormously. However, their carried mainly by the poorer sectors of society. qualitative development was more modest, The dictatorship had repressed any form of because the war had a major impact on their opposition and presided over a decline in general fledgling organisational processes. The conflict living standards. The prevailing ideological thwarted concepts such as popular democracy climate, and the then fashionable concept of and affected popular organisations' participation political vanguards, gave a somewhat military in civil society. In addition, most of the leadership flavour to the way in which ordinary Nicaraguans of the most powerful economic sectors, who were participated in the opposition movements. opposed to what the Sandinistas represented, Furthermore, the struggle to overthrow Somoza had left the country. Thus they did not fully was rooted mainly in the Spanish-speaking Pacific engage in the political debates within Nicaragua Coast, where the capital, , is situated. until the late 1980s. Indeed, most of the The FSLN simply assumed that the revolutionary opposition to the Sandinista government was in process would be understood and shared by fact conceived and organised from outside the indigenous and ethnic minority groups on the country. This background not only is key to Atlantic Coast. However, these groups came from understanding the economic impact of the war, quite distinct cultural backgrounds, and from a but also explains the remarkable level of

18 NICARAGUA awareness among ordinary Nicaraguans of their on imports or specific projects. Only US$11.5 political and social rights, and reveals the longer- million of the US$614.3 million donated by the term repercussions of the conflict in shaping US government during this period was people's identities. earmarked for social programmes. Ironically, The revolutionary process, and the FSLN the various international allies whose support government in particular, became the targets in was so strategic during the war— whether to the a waged by sympathisers of the Sandinistas or to the National Resistance or Somocista regime, and by those who began to contra — are now either unable or unwilling to question the Sandinistas' policies, especially in provide assistance. relation to , and to the compulsory As for non-government aid, the international military service introduced as a result of the war. agencies have also undergone budget cuts and Throughout the ten years that the FSLN was in are under pressure to re-focus their power, the armed conflict was fuelled by the US programmes. Those still working in Nicaragua government's unswerving support for the have had to re-define their role in a rapidly contra forces. Its fiercely anti-communist changing context, and review their objectives and ideology, which saw everything in cold-war strategies vis-a-vis their local counterparts and terms, effectively cast Nicaragua as a leading towards the government's neo-liberal policies. actor in the regional conflict. Many Nicaraguan NGOs, most of which emerged Most analysts believe that the 1989 electoral during the war and were strongly influenced by defeat of the FSLN was due largely to the the state, are now immersed in a transition that human and social exhaustion caused by the war, calls for capacities and resources that far outstrip to the distancing of the leadership from its own their real potential. This has constrained their supporters, and to an acute economic crisis ability either to make proposals or to respond to arising both from the war and from the US demands, in spite of their wealth of innovative blockade. Today, supporters of both sides and experiences in the fields of organisation and middle-level popular leaders alike are production. disenchanted with the lack of solutions to their The situation is worsened by the culture of shared problems. These were not resolved by dependency which was the outcome both of the the war and have, if anything, become more war-time state and of the enormous, and complex since then. unconditional, international financial support At the same time, the disarmament process given to the Sandinistas during the 1980s - a has been far from perfect. The rapid decline in culture very hard to overcome within a transition most Nicaraguans' economic situation has led to process. Paradoxically, most observers agree that an increasing level of social disintegration and a Nicaraguans retain a strong awareness of their worsening of living conditions, especially rights, and a deep desire for peace. These among women and children. Although the characteristics may constitute their main strength political conflict continues to be part of national in building alternatives for the future. life, the extent to which violence has become simply a way of ensuring physical survival has pushed politics far from the hearts and minds of The formal post-war many Nicaraguans. reconciliation process The economic crisis can be measured in terms of the unprecedented level of foreign debt — In Nicaragua, the Esquipulas Accord the worst in the Western hemisphere. It can also encouraged civil-society organisations to be seen in the effects of structural adjustment become more involved in the post-war policies, resulting in cuts to government reconciliation process. When, in 1985, the US spending which have further limited people's Administration openly declared its intention to access to public services. In addition, the offers bring down the Sandinista government — of international co-operation, on which so many intensifying its support for military actions as hopes had been pinned with the signing of the well as introducing a trade embargo which was Accords, have largely failed to materialise. to generate the most severe economic crisis in Official aid to the new the country's history - it justified its actions by amounted to only US$3 billion between 1990 painting the Sandinistas as a dictatorship which and 1993, and has been declining since 1991. Of supressed all independent associational life. In the total received up to 1995, 40 per cent was fact, the Sandinistas had initiated a daring used to service the foreign debt, and 57 per cent project discussing autonomy for ethnic groups

19 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in the Atlantic Coast region as far back as 1984, reached between the military leaders of both which showed a remarkable grasp of issues of camps. The Sapoa Agreement had brought them diversity. Similarly, the 1984 elections — together for the first time, although no advance through which the Sandinistas sought to gain was made on the demobilisation front, largely national and international legitimacy — sent a because of the political conditions laid down. clear signal that Nicaraguans had a part to play Some of the military leaders had begun to in the democratic process. The elections were in establish informal (and unofficial) channels of essence an attempt to put an end to the US- communication even before political agreements sponsored armed aggression. had been formalised. In 1988, the Sandinistas participated actively At the same time, there were renewed in the Esquipulas II process. They sought to reconciliation initiatives within civil society. The engage politically with their neighbours, in order National Reconciliation Commission was to consolidate their legitimacy and establish headed by the Catholic hierarchy, but the local relationships that would at least hold back others Peace Commissions also made concrete efforts from undermining their own efforts to establish a to facilitate dialogue and to undertake certain negotiated and lasting peace. In this spirit, the mediation activities. Many of these initiatives National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) was were almost spontaneous in character. More set up under the leadership of the Catholic often than not, they were based on the support church. Local and regional Peace Commissions of individuals and groups who were seen to have were also formed, drawing together various civil some authority within the communities and the society representatives, and aiming to facilitate warring parties, rather than on formal or meetings and dialogue between the waning permanent structures. factions. The Nicaraguan opposition also called The war officially finished two months after for national dialogue, seeking to gather support the of the UNO government, with the lor what would eventually become the electoral signing of a cease-fire agreement on 18 April alliance known as the National Opposition Union 1990. However, in spite of the official pro- (UNO). nouncements and meetings, it was not for The conflict-resolution process made concrete another eight months, under US pressure, that progress in the August 1989 Tela Summit. This the contra began to demobilise. While the saw the establishment of the 'Joint Plan for the elections were intended to reduce the tensions demobilisation and repatriation or voluntary between the warring parties, they actually relocation within Nicaragua and third countries intensified polarisation within Nicaragua. The of members of the National Resistance (contra) elections had brought to power a very and their families ...'. The document set down heterogeneous alliance, supported by the US conditions for the demobilised fighters which government and led by (a were to be supported by various international former member of the first SandinistajMMta, and organisations. Implicit in this was the offer of widow of a renowned journalist who had amnesty to anyone who applied for it. opposed the Somocista regime). No sooner had The Esquipulas II Accords went further still, the elections been held than a Transition Accord and included the commitment to hold democratic was signed which aimed to ensure an orderly and elections and embark on bilateral negotiations peaceful transition. This was described both by between the Sandinistas and the National the left and by the extreme right as a co- Resistance. This marked an effort to take the government, and was to be based on reconciliation debate out of the military sphere and into the at the highest levels. The document itself called political arena, and to reintegrate the combatants for social reconciliation: '... the firm bases must into civilian life. However, it was the electoral be laid down for reconciliation, national process which defined the end of the war, taking harmony and stability in every sense, in order to place as it did in the context of a government create an environment of trust and security for all weakened by the war, the US economic blockade, Nicaraguans ...' (Protocol of the proceedings of and externally-supported aggression. the transfer of the presidency of the Republic of The offer of amnesty was opposed by some Nicaragua, 27 March 1990). However, no firm high-level Sandinistas as well as by the contra commitments to provide social assistance or leaders. Irrespective of any formal agreements, economic opportunities were made, which neither group was psychologically or politically meant that the Accord offered no security either ready to make a transition. However, a growing for working people or for the demobilised number of small agreements were gradually fighters.

20 NICARAGUA

This policy vacuum contributed to isolated repatriated family members of the ex- cases of re-armament and also led to widespread combatants at a later date. Its mandate was strikes between April and November 1990 which frequently extended for short periods in order endangered the entire reconciliation process and to protect the rights and security of the ex- threatened the country's institutional fabric. In combatants, including verifying and pursuing response to this instability, the government set up any claims that these had been violated. Thus a Economic and Social Conciliation Forum, in an CIAV was in practice involved in conflict- effort to bring the government and various social mediation and in facilitating dialogue between forces together, 'to identify many areas in which the conflicting parties. we coincide in practice', and to agree social and For the ex-amtra, the Nicaraguan economic programmes. A major reason why government established 'development poles', these efforts did not prosper was the lack of any designating specific areas for their resettlement. real mechanisms to promote social and political For the Sandinista Armed Forces, the reconciliation. Such mechanisms would have government planned to offer benefits and helped to depolarise the situation, by providing allowances according to seniority, as well as more equitable access to and distribution of training opportunities and certain subsidies. resources throughout Nicaraguan society. Their Overall, some 350,000 ex-combatants and their absence only generated new forms of political families were eligible for these schemes. polarisation. According to CIAV, 21,392 members of the ex- National Resistance had been demobilised by July 1991; while by September 1990, 40,000 After disarmament: the members of the Sandinista Aimed Forces had already been demobilised, and almost 70,000 implementation of the accords within the first two years. Ex-contra fighters According to figures provided by members of claimed in interviews that their numbers also the former contra, over 80 per cent of their included their long-term collaborators, civilian demobilised soldiers were campesinos (peasant supply structures, and others who were keen to farmers), and over 90 per cent of them were get access to the benefits package. The number was almost illiterate. Within the Sandinista Armed Forces, of registered demobilised twice the initial estimate, which affected CIAV's some 2,000 people were relieved of their duties financial and logistic capacity. Most of these in the Ministry of the Interior, while the people remained in the designated 'develop- reduced its troops ment poles'. However, conflicts over property, from 80,000 to about 15,000 in under a year. On the shortage of funds, and the lack of any specific both sides, many of these combatants had signed government commitment to them, meant that up as adolescents. these settlements became somewhat unstable. The demobilisation process was slow and This generated frustration, and led to their problematic. Not until 1993, over three years continued dependence on CIAV. Among the after the elections, did the government demobilised Sandinista Armed Forces, the announce that it would no longer negotiate favouritism shown towards higher-ranking with, nor concede amnesty to, any irregular officers, and the fact that most regulars lacked forces still under arms. The International the skills necessary to return to civilian life, Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) meant that many of these and their families felt set up by the UN and the Organisation of frustrated and had little prospect of employ- American States (OAS) to co-ordinate the ment. According to the Association of Retired demobilisation process and the Tela Soldiers (AMIR), those who had no kind of Repatriation Plan, shared responsibility with support or protection were later to form the bulk the office of the UN High Commissioner for of the recompa movement, to which we refer (UNHCR). The latter assumed again below. responsibility for the refugees in neighbouring countries, while the CIAV and OAS took on the In this situation, the Nicaraguan government demobilisation of members of the National marginalised the Peace Plan, rather than Resistance and their families, provided that focusing on the host of difficulties as a strategic these were covered by UNHCR. (The UN problem. It paid little attention to the organism ONUCA was in charge of recalling commitments already made with the demobilised and disposing of arms.) CIAV offered a similar combatants, or to the efforts of those who were assistance package to that of UNHCR, and trying to take forward the CIREFCA process, a

21 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

UN-sponsored attempt to deal with the problems nation-wide reality. Despite the general war- of refugees and ex-combatants in close weariness and desire for peace, the rapid collaboration with Nicaraguans themselves. demobilisation process left little or no time to However, by contrast with El Salvador, the prepare the rank and file, either politically or Nicaraguan demobilisation process happened psychologically, for what it implied. Given such very rapidly, and none of the parties involved was uncertainty, many ex-combatants and supporters truly ready for it. The result was a lack of overall on both sides decided not to turn in their co-ordination which affected both the initial and weapons, although there is no means of knowing subsequent phases of the process. the exact number who didn't. Up to 95 per cent of the Nicaraguan families The economic crisis was exacerbated by displaced by the fighting had for years been living policies that denied most people access to basic in settlements which were supported by the services (while allowing some to gain greatly), and regional governments of their places of origin; a the failure to find ways of reintegrating the ex- factor which lent them a certain stability. A 1991 combatants into society. The resulting tensions survey showed that about 900,000 campesinos were culminated in 1994 with unexpectedly high still living in 220 such rural settlements. The new numbers of people taking up arms once again government basically ignored the needs of this and, in some areas of Nicaragua, embarking on a population and cut subsidised services to them. As military offensive. These isolated cases of a return part of its new economic policy, the banks reduced to armed struggle have occasionally taken a the credit available to small producers, which left bizarre turn, as in the case of the revueltos [in the co-operatives in these settlements (most of Spanish, this play on words means both which also had land-titling problems) with no 'returned' and 'scrambled' — translator's note]. access to credit. The lack of any policies to assist These were rural people from both sides who women was particularly striking, given that most took up arms again in order to back certain displaced and households were female- economic demands, but who then demobilised headed. According to the Association of once more. Interestingly, those who were Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE), 45 per cent of previously enemies joined in attacking the Nicaraguan households were already headed by government for failing to address their needs. As women back in 1979, a phenomenon that was late as 1991, some ex-conlras in the north of the greatly accentuated by the war. country had resorted to arms in support of their The ex-combatants had high expectations of demand for land; and there were cases of being reintegrated into the rural economy. In Sandinistas responding in like manner. By 1993, addition to the litany of broken promises, the there had been 713 armed confrontations, with a lack of credit and other inputs began to give rise total of 1,023 casualties — fairly significant, given to widespread discontent on both sides. that the disarmament process had been Government statistics show that 1 million acres completed long before. In response, a National had been set aside for 15,691 families of the ex- Disarmament Brigade (BED) was formed, National Resistance; a further 144,000 acres of though this did not include the various gangs of state-owned land was privatised and allocated to armed criminals within its scope. these ex-conlras, and another 128,000 acres to This phenomenon can be explained only by members of the Sandinista Armed Forces. Yet in understanding the background and motives of practice the allocation of land did not resolve the combatants and their civilian supporters people's survival needs, because legal problems during the war. It is true that the National concerning land-titles (which were either non- Resistance was led by Somicista sympathisers. existent or contested) disqualified them from However, during the 1980s, it also attracted access to credit and hence denied them the support from the peasantry — for instance from opportunity to earn a living. farmers who were dissatisfied with the Sandinista When added to the discontent about the agrarian reform policy or who feared that their government's unkept promises, these practical land might be expropriated. In addition, problems served to encourage the formation of members of various ethnic minority populations splinter groups. People viewed the high-level also joined the contra. In particular, the Miskito agreements as having failed to satisfy the indian population on the Atlantic Coast had been expectations of the campesinos who had taken up involved in the conflict since they had been arms. The high-level negotiations could not — forcibly displaced from their homes along the and still cannnot — ensure that reconciliation and border between Nicaragua and Honduras 'for demobilisation in the rural areas would become a national security reasons'. The Miskitos had

22 NICARAGUA always been marginalised on the political and Civil-society participation in ideological fringes of national life. Hence, they conflict-resolution did not initially identify with the war. For the demobilised troops and their families and Conflict-mediation and resolution initiatives supporters, a return to normal civilian life began, as we have already seen, while the war was depended on access to the means of production still raging. As part of its own national policy, the (not merely to land) and work, as well as on Sandinista government embarked on the maintaining the social and collective achieve- Esquipulas process in the hope of finding ments following the overthrow of Somoza. peaceful solutions, while the internal opposition To summarise, while the government did in Nicaragua began to encourage consensus- promote some policies to assist ex-combatants, building processes which would eventually these were largely focused on the military elite provide the basis for transition. At the grassroots, and on men, and were not part of any integrated people's desire for peace drove many local development policy. This 'favouritism' caused initiatives to mediate between conflicting parties. considerable feelings of resentment towards the Although the Peace Commissions were leadership, which was perceived as becoming officiallyconstituted within the framework of the ever more distant from the needs of ordinary National Reconciliation Commission (CNR), people. The government's economic adjust- in practice their dynamic and composition ment policy with cutbacks in social programmes depended on the local context. Gradually, they and credit schemes, imposed in order to qualify lost their formal function. Many argue that the for World Bank loans, and the failure of many Commision's efforts were constrained by the foreign governments to come up with the unrelenting opposition of the Catholic hierarchy promised assistance packages, dashed the towards the Sandinistas, which tainted its expectations of the Armed Forces. The ex- impartiality. Nevertheless, local political leaders contras were similarly disappointed by the fact and members of the church joined the Peace that the development strategies that they had Commissions in an effort to reproduce the CNR assumed would shape the 'development poles', initiative. Sometimes these local commissions never materialised. Only now are large-scale succeeded in encouraging people to come programmes being implemented in certain forward and seek amnesty. Such occasions were parts of Nicaragua, with support from the the only experience of active civil-society multilateral agencies. Currently, neither the participation in the entire reconciliation process. government nor the political parties have addressed the question of economic In the final years of the Sandinista government, reintegration — or the largely unfulfilled agree- the UN-sponsored CIREFCA process attempted ments to consider the needs of the ex- to focus attention on the population directly combatants. affected by the conflicts, and to channel resources to them. CIREFCA also served to bring together A decade after the war formally ended, the efforts of national and international NGOs. politicians still have to agree on the nature of the Nicaraguan NGOs seized the opportunity to play transition, perhaps assuming that this has already an active part in resettling and reintegrating happened without ever having been addressed. refugees and enabled people to talk with the Increasingly, many sectors of Nicaraguan society international actors who were supporting them. feel that political leaders have tended to polarise This creative and energetic engagement by the country rather than contributing to a national national NGOs in high-level political dialogue is climate of peace. This in turn is creating problems considered a unique achievement. However, for local and regional governments, and leaves a although these efforts still continue, the absence of serious credibility (and, therefore, legitimacy) any clear government policy towards the gap at the national level. The state's inability to displaced, the lack of resources, and the problems provide a regulatory framework for its citizens, faced by NGOs in the transition period, have combined with the lack of resources for meant that the response has fallen far short of investment in the social sector, constitute a real meeting the need. threat to peace. Many people are losing faith in After 1990, only a few organisations in the possibility that their basic problems can be Nicaragua have deliberately worked in conflict- resolved by peaceful means. On the contrary, resolution and mediation. However, ex- there is the growing perception that benefits for combatants themselves have set up spontaneous the poor majority can be gained only through projects, sometimes in connection with Church- pressure and confrontation. based initiatives. In addition — while these have

23 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua not necessarily been described as conflict- The Nueva Guinea co-operative resolution programmes — NGOs such as CEPAD Clearly, the reconciliation efforts at the national (a church-based agency), the Augusto Cesar level, which depended more on formal structures, Sandino Foundation (FACS), and others have were quite different from those that have been so acted as facilitators in conflicts which arose in significant at the grassroots level.The experiences their areas of work. However, these activities of FACS and CEPAD in the Nueva Guinea region have generally responded to a specific problem of the Atlantic Coast have been quite unique, rather than being as part of a planned strategy. largely because both institutions had worked Other programmes have aimed to address the there prior to efforts to re-integrate the ex- needs of certain groups (women and young combatants. For instance, a co-operative was people in particular) within an overall framework made up of local families who had returned from of consensus-building. refugee camps in Honduras and Costa Rica. They The local Peace Commissions were — and still were later joined by ex-combatants from both are in some areas — particularly important, sides, as well as by people who had fled the because they offer innovative ways for citizens to violence in the north of the country. In 1990, the participate in conflict-resolution. Their efforts at year in which the contras in the area were the grassroots level have proven more effective demobilised, various national and international than more formal mechanisms, and the com- NGOs were supporting this work. At present, misions have played a key role in facilitating there are some 56 families in the co-operative. dialogue. For example, in Waslala and Esteli, They coexist peacefully and farm the land local people appealed to both sides in the conflict together — perhaps the only such experience in to negotiate, putting themselves forward as the country. In addition, about 420 war-maimed mediators. ex-combatants from both sides work together in Given the lack of response to their demands, the same area, alongside other families who were some ex-combatants formed mixed commissions displaced by the fighting. to manage particular projects and negotiate on Nueva Guinea was the first experience of a their behalf, both with the international aid reconciliation process which actually worked in agencies and with the government. Again, these practice, and where the armed conflicts came to a have worked mainly at the local level. The national complete halt as a result. Admittedly, some ex- organisations of ex-combatants have have largely contras tried to re-arm in 1992 (probably at the maintained their war-time identity or political instigation of one of the political parties), and the affiliation, but even so, they have collaborated in community suffered some fatalities, as well as putting forward certain demands. Here, the conflicts over land, and cases of dispossession of experience of the Peasant Alliance is interesting, some co-operative members. However, the since it represents a cautious alliance between the people and the organisations living alongside the Union of Farmers and Cattle-ranchers (UNAG), fighting parties worked energetically to convince which had always been seen as a Sandinista everyone of the need for peace, and succeeded in stronghold, and the Association of Resistance ensuring that the conflicts went no futher. Commandos (ACOR). While modest, this alliance The relative success of this co-operative has represents a real advance in building a basis of obviously given a great boost to an area that in common interest between former adversaries. other respects suffers the same poverty as the rest The International Studies Centre (CEI) is of the country. The reasons for its success are quite one of the few Nicaraguan organisations which complex, and must be set in the context of the has worked directly with demobilised fighters community's own organisational history. First, and soldiers, offering leadership training in the ex-combatants who settled in Nueva Guinea particular. Founded in 1991, the CEI acts as a had not fought there during the war. This facilitation centre, where ex-combatants from perhaps defused the resentment that local people both sides can meet, and receive training and might otherwise have felt towards them, as well as follow-up in conflict-resolution. While the CEI tensions among themselves. Moreover, when the does not believe in the concept of neutrality (its co-operative was established, ex-combatants from directors were once senior members of the both sides were deliberately included in its Sandinista government), it sets its work within leadership. People say that in the first meeting, the ethical framework of recovering one's identity the ex-fighters were so distrustful that they as a key factor in returning to civilian life. It has remained armed, even though they had formally succeeded in bringing together former military demobilised. Another important factor was the leaders, and mainly works at the leadership level effort of die various NGOs and grassroots organ- via the ex-combatants' own organisations. isations in the area (UNAG, CEPAD, FACS, the

24 NICARAGUA

Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs, AMNLAE, the But at least it showed that collective effort could chuch, and the communal movement) to work in yield results, and also reduced the additional a co-ordinated fashion, despite the fact that the pressure on resources. It was equally important existence of such diverse organisations in one to reach a consensus on what people felt were place often creates problems for the beneficiaries. their most pressing needs, and to engage in Unfortunately, the international aid agencies peace-building activities which involved the aid working there did not make similar efforts to agencies, the local people, community leaders work together. As a result, it was difficult for them from the FSLN and the National Resistance, effectively to set priorities and to target their and from the evangelical church. Another factor assistance. which defused conflicts and also facilitated co- The government did not initially promote ordination was that no one tried to force any reconciliation projects such as the one in changes in people's own organisational struc- Nueva Guinea. But with NGO assistance, an tures, even including the military structures. agricultural and technical aid programme was This created a climate of respect, based on started. The successful detente probably owed acknowledging the characteristics and identity much to the fact that there was a good harvest. of each individual.

Table 1: Chronology of the peace process in Nicaragua

Year Event Consequences Civil-society participation

1983 Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela form Contaclora Group to discuss peace plans

1984 Talks on Atlantic Coast autonomy Elections Sandinista government wins 67% of the vote

1985 US president Reagan declares trade embargo

1987 Esquipulas meetings with UN and OAS involvement to reach peace accord

1988 Government participates in Regional and local Peace National Reconciliation Esquipulas II accord Commissions set up Commission established by the Catholic church; civil-society participation in Peace Commissions Internal opposition calls for National Opposition Union (UNO), national dialogue a 14-party coalition, formed

1989 Tela Summit and signing of Material and security conditions 'Joint Plan for the Demobilisation, agreed for demobilised soldiers Voluntary Repatriation or and fighters, with international Relocation in Nicaragua or in collaboration; amnesty for ex- Third Countries of Members of the combatants implicit; no advances National Resistance and their in demobilisation Families' Sapoa Accord Informal channnels of Civil-society reconciliation communication set up between initiatives contra and Sandinista military leaders, in advance of Institutional Policy Accords

25 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

Table 1: Chronology of the peace process in Nicaragua continued

Year Event Consequences Civil-society participation

1990 Transition Accord signed No clear social or economic commitments Elections UNO win elections Demobilisation of RN commences Government announces that it will no longer grant amnesty to irregular lighters still under arms UNHCR responsible for refugees UNHCR and C1AV mandates in neighbouring countries; C1AV extended to protect rights and responsible for demoblisation of security of ex-combatants RN and their families ONUCA charged with recalling Violations of accords verified and disposing of arms C1AV responsible for subsequent C1AV involved in conflict- repatriation of disarmed contras mediation and facilitation of dialogue 'Development poles' established lor ex-RN Sandinista Armed Forces base CIAV lacks logistical and financial benefits package on seniority resources to meet demands Association of Retired Soldiers Impossible to ascertain extent of (AMIR) formsrecompa movement involvement of AMIR in recompa movement Frustration with broken Co-government established commitments leads to local outbreaks of fighting Protocol for the transfer of Government sets up forum for presidential power Economic and Social Concertation, but no mechanisms established for Social Reconciliation

1991 Mass strikes -92 Isolated cases of return to arms Revueltos take to arms

1993 713 military actions 1,023 casualties National Disarmament Brigade formed Government designs policies to boost leadership, but without a vision of integrated development Lack of agreement on nature of transition required at institutional level

1994 Amnesty granted to all rebels in order to encourage disarmament

26 EL SALVADOR

Background Successive military governments, as well as the elected governments of Duarte and Cristiani, Many Salvadorans believe that the armed conflict used political repression as a means to discourage which came to a head in the 1980s originated in the opposition — which greatly affected the the insurrection of 1932. This had culminated in population at large. Political repression — part of the slaughter of hundreds of campesinos and the so-called 'low-intensity' conflict — was some- shaped the policies of successive military govern- times combined with social and economic reforms ments thereafter, repressing all political dissent. (such as the Agrarian Reform), which were In 1980 the Christian Democrat Party (PCD), intended to neutralise the armed opposition and which represented private business, and high- its sympathisers. ranking military officers formed a new On 10 January 1980, the guerrilla government, at a time when popular opposition organisations went public with their first joint to the government was gaining strength both in manifesto, announcing a political alliance with the the form of a mass movement and in the guerrilla Revolutionary Co-ordination of the Masses forces that had emerged in the 1970s. A strong (CRM) and calling for revolutionary struggle. alliance between them was forged in response to Later, the CRM was joined by the unions, the the US and Salvadoran governments' representatives of small and medium-sized handling of the conflict and to the kind of society businesses, various political parties, the University they envisaged. of El Salvador, and the Association of Transport Two factors were to characterise the nature of Workers, among others. Together, they formed the war and its negotiated solution. First, the US the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), was an active protagonist in the counter- acknowledging the guerrilla organisations' effort, providing significant eco- Unified Direction (DU) group as 'the vanguard', nomic and political support for the Salvadoran and accepting its direction of the Salvadoran government, and being directly involved in revolution. This broad-based alliance between the defining military strategy. From the late 1970s, in FMLN and the FDR enjoyed immense popular the face of growing opposition, the PCD began support in El Salvador, and also opened up the talks with the military and with the US possibility of significant diplomatic backing on the government, with a view to getting their support international stage. In January 1981, the Political for a new civilian-military Junta from which other Commission of the FDR-FMLN was formed, a groups, including civil-society organisations, body which was to play a key role in peace would be excluded. negotiations in El Salvador. 'Thus, the US attempted to instal a flexible In the same month, the FMLN launched a government in El Salvador, that would serve its military offensive which was intended to lead to own geo-political and geo-strategic interests in a popular insurrection. Although it did not Central America. This buried the possibility of a coup d'etat by the hard-liners in the military, succeed in this aim, the offensive nevertheless beyond the Pentagon's control. Equally, the marked a new phase in the war. By then, the military could stop the Salvadoran guerrillas from government's repression was directed not only becoming the new Sandinistas, and El Salvador against the armed opposition but against the the next Nicaragua in Central America.' (Oscar entire popular movement, especially with the Martinez Penate, El Salvador: Del Conflicto Amiado emergence of para-military groups known as a la Negotiation 1979-1989) 'death squads'. According to Americas Watch, The US policy was geared to goal of eradicating 38,000 of the 50,000 people killed during the any opposition, armed or peaceful. According to war were non-combatants. Many of them were the Reagan Administration's own statistics, 800 tortured by the security forces. Some 70,000 politically motivated murders were commited people were killed between 1980 and 1989, each month during 1980; between 1980 and 1981 while more than 1 million Salvadorans left the alone, about 8,200 trade unionists were killed. country, and hundreds more became displaced.

27 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

The peace negotiation process country's internal problems had to be resolved by the Salvadorans themselves 'without external intervention'. The Canadian government also offered its mediation services, with the same The first mediation efforts results. From the early 1980s, the negotiated solution to By then, various Latin American govern- the liberation war in Zimbabwe was cited as a ments were also voicing concern about the model for ending the conflict in El Salvador. Salvadoran conflict. Several communiques and However, negotiation would have depended on mediation proposals expressed their fear that the willingness of the Junta, the FMLN-FDR, the the war might assume international propor- US government, and the UN to participate tions. In February 1981, the president of Costa actively, based on an agreement on the central Rica, Rodrigo Carazo, proposed that the issues and problems to be addressed. Had this Organisation of American States (OAS) offer to happened, the process would have been facilitate dialogue between the FMLN-FDR and guaranteed by international observers, and by the the Junta; to which the Salvadoran government threat of sanctions if the commitments were responded that it did not consider that the OAS flouted. However, at the time the FMLN-FDR was legally equipped for this role. In April, the were less interested in elections than in governments of Mexico and Venezuela again negotiating the conditions for their full offered to mediate; an offer that was once again participation in the Junta, while the PDC and the turned down by the Salvadoran Junta, along Armed Forces insisted that they disarm as a pre- with two further offers from the Costa Rican condition for negotiation. The UN was 'convinced president made before the UN General ... that at the present time the conditions for Assembly, and another offer from the govern- holding genuinely democratic elections did not ment of Ecuador. exist in El Salvador' (UN Resolution for the First The Catholic church played an active part Quarter of 1981). So, repeated attempts at throughout the entire process. In September international mediation stalled, and were even 1980, months after the assassination of viewed by the Salvadoran government, the Archbishop Romero, it, too, offered to mediate military, and other sectors as interference in the through the Episcopal Conference. However, the country's internal affairs. military insisted that the FMLN-FDR must lay In early 1981, the Latin America and down arms before dialogue could commence, and Caribbean Committee of the Socialist the latter rejected the proposal, arguing that the International met in Panama, at the invitation of Catholic hierarchy was aligned with the Junta. General . The Committee Other international efforts to achieve peace reiterated its willingness to mediate between the included that of the US National Council of FMLN-FDR and the PDC-military Junta. The Churches, which recommended a negotiated former responded positively, but the Junta and solution after a delegation had visited El Salvador. the US Administration rejected the proposal, In October 1981, Mexico and Venezuela arguing that the pre-condition for dialogue was issued a joint declaration which was supported that the FMLN disarm. In April the Vice- by 43 parties within the Socialist International. President of the Socialist International, Edward Their recognition of the FMLN-FDR as a Broadbent, led a peace mission to seek, a representative political force represented an negotiated solution. In his final report, he immense support, and marked the political concluded that peace would be possible only if the distance between the US government's position US government were prepared to change its and international opinion. The Franco-Mexican policy — an idea rejected by the Reagan Declaration advocated a negotiated solution, Administration. The government of the German while the Reagan Administration favoured an Federal Republic offered to mediate, but was also electoral one. Duarte viewed this Declaration as turned down by the USA. In response to the an external interference in internal affairs. The deadlock, the Christian Democrat group within US government made no direct response, but the European Union Parliament invited members supported the Caracas Declaration of various of the Socialist International to analyse the military and right-wing Latin American govern- possiblities for a negotiated peace settlement in El ments, which expressed their support for the Salvador. The then president of the Junta, Salvadoran Junta. Duarte, reiterated his rejection of any form of The FMLN-FDR repeatedly affirmed their international mediation, insisting that the wish to open a dialogue with the Junta, provided

28 EL SALVADOR that this was mediated internationally, and that On 2 May 1982, Magana became President; there were no preconditions concerning the and various agreements were ratified, including laying down of arms. At the October 1981 the Apaneca Pact, in which the political parties meeting of the UN General Assembly the FMLN- within the Junta agreed to refrain from FDR proposed an agenda for opening peace attacking each other, and to form a common negotiations, through Nicaragua's Comandante front against the FMLN-FDR — who were again . This too was rejected by the called on to lay down arms. This Pact proposed Sal vadoran Junta. setting up a Peace Commission, the main aim of In the USA, certain sectors which had been which would be to propose solutions for social influenced by the Carter Administration's earlier stability. It also proposed establishing a Human policies, proposed that the FMLN-FDR be Rights Commission, whose members would recognised, and that the US government include the head of the National Police — an abandon confrontation in favour of negotiation, institution accused of being one of the worst and reduce its direct involvement in the war. violators of human rights. This Commission The FMLN-FDR had announced their wish to passed an Amnesty Law in May 1983, which negotiate with the US government as early as meant that no criminal proceedings could be December 1980, even before the outbreak of the taken against those responsible for the war. The Carter Administration had put forward assassination of Archbishop Romero, or for certain negotiating points, but these were killing four American nuns, among many rejected by the left — both because they expected others. The Pact further included the creation the 1981 offensive to unleash a popular insur- of a Political Commission under the co- rection, and because they were convinced that ordination of Magana, the Armed Forces, and the Reagan Administration would not honour the united right-wing parties. This Commission any undertakings. Following the military was to govern El Salvador until the next offensive, the FMLN-FDR again called for presidential elections. By then, the war had negotiations, but this time Washington refused. already claimed over 40,000 lives. The Episcopal Conference reiterated its call for That same month, the FMLN-FDR proposed dialogue, to which the FMLN-FDR responded holding direct negotiations in the USA to seek a favourably; but the proposal received no official solution to the armed conflict. While there was response from the government or the military. some American interest, the initiative was On 28 March 1982, elections were held for aborted because of what the FMLN-FDR the Constituent Assembly that was to draft the referred to as disagreements over 'procedures' new Constitution. Only right-wing and centre (10 July 1983 FMLN-FDR communique). Other parties participated in these elections, which initiatives followed, such as that of Colombian were held during a state of siege. The PDC won President Betancur, which resulted in an initial a relative majority. The leader of the extreme meeting between delegates from the US right-wing ARENA party, Major Roberto government and the FMLN-FDR, in which they D'Aubuisson, brought together like-minded agreed to meet once more. This took place in parties in an opposition alliance. August 1983, but failed because neither side was The Socialist International recognised that prepared to compromise. the 1982 elections had not resolved the conflict. On 5 June 1983, the FMLN-FDR published a However, they showed that the US government five-point proposal in which it reiterated its would not allow a right-wing government which willingness to seek a negotiated solution, but excluded the PDC, since its policy towards El questioned the legitimacy and representative Salvador would lose credibility if political forces nature of the Peace Commission. Both the US associated with the death squads were to become and the Salvadoran governments ignored this, too powerful. In a meeting with Salvadoran since both wanted to pursue indirect dialogue political leaders, the US government offered to through the Peace Commission. The FMLN- suspend economic and military aid if Major FDR were thus forced to communicate with the D'Aubuisson were made provisional president. Commission, and a first meeting was held in In response, the Armed Forces chose Alvaro Bogota in August 1983, with a follow-up Magana, a member of the right-wing PCN. The meeting scheduled in Panama. political right wing in El Salvador accepted this, However, the Peace Commission did not on condition that the US government accept attend the second meeting, but unilaterally fixed D'Aubuisson as President of the Constituent the next meeting for September 1983, again in Assembly. Bogota. Here, the FMLN-FDR repeated their

29 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua five-point proposal for open dialogue with Electoral processes and proposals for various sectors of society, and the formation of a dialogue transition government (in which it would Once elected, Duarte embarked on a major participate) to create the conditions for free and international tour during which he stressed his democratic elections. The Commission asked the willingness to enter into peace negotiations, but FMLN-FDR to participate in the 1984 elections, not to share power with the FMLN-FDR. He also as long as it acknowledged the government in insisted that external mediation was unnecessary, power. The FMLN-FDR rejected this proposal saying that 'Contadora is an organism made up of and ended the dialogue. four countries which believe they have the right In January 1984, the FMLN-FDR set out a to intervene in the area' (El Dia, 4 July 1984). He detailed proposal for general elections and the won major economic and diplomatic support formation of a provisional government made up from the UK and the German Federal Republic; of a Junta, a ministerial cabinet, and a supreme and, in a joint communique, Reagan and Duarte court of justice. The proposal included the stated their support for democracies and derogation of the 1983 Constitution; recog- electoral processes in the region. nition of the legitimacy of popular power in the Before Duarte took up office, the FMLN had areas under FMLN military control; a purge of underlined its wish to negotiate, calling for him to the Armed Forces with an investigation of stop American involvement in the war, to halt accusations of human-rights violations; the bombings of civilians, and to bring an end to exclusion of representatives of the oligarchy political detention, murders, and disappearances from the government; and the dissolution of the (May 1984 FMLN proposal). However, the FDR ARENA party. Once again, there was no official saw Duarte as a potential interlocutor, and stated response, while the US government and the its willingness to begin an open-ended dialogue. united right-wing front insisted that the FMLN- Duarte reiterated that he would not contemplate FDR participate in the elections to be held on 25 any power-sharing arrangement, and called for March 1984. the FMLN to disarm. The PDC fielded Napoleon Duarte as their Over the next four years, four formal presidential candidate, in a campaign which dialogues took place between the FMLN-FDR, stressed that to vote for him was to vote for the PDC, and the Salvadoran Armed Forces, dialogue. The ARENA candidate was Roberto only two of which achieved any concrete results. D'Aubuisson. The FMLN-FDR declined to Essentially, the FMLN-FDR sought access to participate. Duarte and the PDC were standing political power through negotiation, while their for a project that had been conceived by and interlocutors (and the US government) saw enjoyed the support of the US government dialogue as complementing their counter- (it is claimed that the USA invested some insurgency strategy. US$10 million in Duarte's campaign), while The first of these meetings took place at La D'Aubuisson and ARENA represented the Palma in FMLN-held territory in the north of the country in October 1984, following an invitation interests of the Salvadoran oligarchy. Both tried to the FMLN (not the FDR) by President Duarte to discredit the FMLN-FDR as a political force. issued the previous week before during a speech However, the widespread national and at the UN General Assembly. The Reagan international contempt felt for D'Aubuisson, Administration felt that this showed Duarte as because of his involvement with the 'death favouring a negotiated solution, and would squads', entailed a high political cost for the US therefore reduce the growing opposition to its government and threatened to discredit its policy on El Salvador and allay the American Central American policy. public's fear of 'another Vietnam'. Archbishop Duarte was returned as president for the Rivera y Damas would moderate, and other 1984-89 period, in elections that were held in bishops were to act as witnesses. 173 of the country's 262 municipalities, The meeting took place in the church, behind excluding those under FMLN military control. closed doors. Both sides reiterated their existing ARENA condemned the USA's involvement in positions, and the FMLN was again asked to supporting the PDC, and D'Aubuisson claimed hand over their arms in return for a general that the elections were not legitimate since they amnesty and the possibility of becoming a had been won by the CIA. His position caused political party. However, Duarte's suggestion of further clashes with the US Administration, and establishing a mixed commission to examine the marked the beginning of the latter's gradual various peace proposals, to be moderated by the shift towards a negotiated solution. Episcopal Conference, was accepted.

30 EL SALVADOR

This dialogue appeared to guarantee the groups of being responsible for lack of progress future of the FMLN-FDR and showed the in the dialogue. After this, the Church could no government's willingness to negotiate. However, longer mediate because it was viewed as only three days later, the Aimed Forces launched . Nonetheless, the FMLN repeated its the largest ever military offensive against the Ayagualo dialogue proposal, albeit with no FMLN. The 'death squads', which had always outcome. been opposed to dialogue, condemned the In September 1985, the situation reached a meeting as a farce. But the La Palma dialogue did critical point when the FMLN kidnapped one of nevertheless give ordinary people the oppor- Duarte's daughters, Guadalupe Duarte (although tunity to express their support for dialogue and they initially denied responsibility). Eventually, peace, without fearing that repression would the FMLN agreed to release her as well as 23 automatically follow, and to legitimise their mayors and municipal functionaries kidnapped opinions both within El Salvador and on an inter- earlier. The PDC agreed to free 22 political national stage. prisoners, including the FMLN Comandante Even before La Palma, both sides had agreed Nidia Diaz. But the kidnapping of Duarte's to a second meeting, during a televised debate in daughter put a severe strain on relations, and the USA. This took place in Ayagualo in effectively paralysed the negotiation process for November 1984, with representatives of the the next two years. Salvadoran Episcopal Conference, headed by In March 1986, the PDC government said that Mons. Rivera y Damas, once again acting as it would hold a dialogue with the FDR-FMLN if witnesses and intermediaries. This time the the Sandinista government in Nicaragua FMLN-FDR proposed a three-step process for simultaneously met with the irregular forces or resolving the armed conflict: the first referred to contra; this coincided with the Reagan international humanitarian law; the second to the Administration's request to Congress to approve suspension of hostilities in order to allow for US$100 million for the contra. The FDR-FMLN peace and for disarmament; and the third to held various private meetings with the PDC, creating the institutional framework for mediated by President Alan Garcia of , to democracy, as the outcome of dialogue and plan a meeting between the PDC leadership and negotiation. The government delegation reject- the parties belonging to the FDR. The ed this, arguing that this would violate the representatives of two of these, the MNR and the Constitution. Instead, directing its proposal MPSC, discussed the possibility of a meeting with exclusively at the FMLN, it called for them to lay the PDC and the Armed Forces. The govern- down their arms, return to democratic society in ment's responded by calling on these to abandon El Salvador, participate in the next round of the FMLN and participate in the elections slated legislative and municipal elections, and respect forlatel988. the political Constitution. The FMLN-FDR Throughout 1986, the FDR-FMLN made rejected this, arguing that it amounted to various fruitless proposals, as did Duarte, all of surrender, and that it did not address the which were mediated by Mons. Rivera y Damas. problem of human-rights violations. Never- By August, a third meeting appeared possible, theless, it was agreed to establish the Mixed because both sides had shown increased Commission, to permit the evacuation of FMLN flexibility on certain issues: the FMLN in relation casualties, and to continue the dialogue. But to the punishment of military officers, and the Duarte never fulfilled these commitments, government in relation to a meeting on arguing that Legislative Assembly did not Salvadoran territory. Both parties agreed to support them. The FMLN, however, handed proceed with preparatory meetings, the first of over to the Church 42 soldiers it had been which took place in Mexico and ratified the holding prisoner since 1984. agreements reached in La Palma and Ayagualo. The FMLN-FDR's call for a third meeting in The third meeting was to be held in Sesori to Perquin came to nothing, although Duarte did discuss the FDR-FMLN's latest proposals. express his willingness to hold private and However, the town was full of government public meetings outside El Salvador. By then, forces, and the FDR-FMLN refused to the Episcopal Conference had also released its participate under such conditions. The Pastoral Letter calling for peace and rec- government delegation, accompanied by guests onciliation in which it expressed public support from the US Embassy, claimed that this showed for the PDC, the Armed Forces, and the USA, the FMLN's lack of political will to reach a accusing the FMLN and left-wing opposition negotiated settlement.

31 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

In May 1987, the FDR-FMLN presented an 18- The final offensive and the start point proposal which was ignored by the of negotiation Salvadoran government. In October 1987, four days after the signing of the Esquipulas II Alfredo Cristiani took office on 1 June 1989. Accords, the FDR-FMLN again proposed a During the first few months he showed some dialogue. This time, Duarte responded willingness to enter into dialogue with the favourably and a meeting was held that same FMLN, but failed to take any concrete steps. month, mediated by Mons. Rivera y Damas and The FMLN likewise showed some willingness to witnessed by the Papal Nuncio. The items on the take up dialogue, although it had previously agenda included: the Esquipulas II accords, and a argued that the ARENA government was not political solution to the conflict; the position on legitimate, and that it would not negotiate with non-violence; 'forgiving and forgetting' as part of the Salvadoran oligarchy. the political solution; specific agreements In May 1989, the FMLN proposed resuming concerning a political solution; and the establish- the dialogue, but received no official response. ment of a process of dialogue and joint communi- However, it unilaterally suspended its acts of cations. The new element was that both sides were economic sabotage, and called on the government by this time making these proposals in the context to play its part in creating a climate that would of Esquipulas II. In accordance with the favour dialogue and negotiation. Eventually, it Esquipulas framework, two commissions were was agreed that both sides would meet in Mexico established, each made up of four representatives in September 1989. Under pressure from the from both sides, to prepare cease-fire agreements most conservative parts of ARENA, the Catholic and other points relating to the Accords. Church did not mediate as it had done under The two commissions met in August 1987 in Duarte, but acted only as witness. Venezuela, but without reaching significant In Mexico, the FMLN again wanted to agreements. Days later, the president of the negotiate the question of UN and OAS Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, Herbert verification, punishment for those guilty of Anaya, was assassinated. In response, the FDR- human-rights violations, and constitutional FMLN unilaterally called off any dialogue with reforms. The ARENA delegation wanted to the government. Six months later, the FDR- discuss the procedures for pushing ahead with FMLN sought to re-open dialogue via the two dialogue and negotiation. Eventually it was commissions, but the government refused. The agreed that there would be a negotiated cease- situation became more complicated for the fire, and that ordinary meetings would be held FMLN when the FDR decided to become a one month later in order to allow for consultation political party, just as Duarte was rejecting any and the formulation of concrete proposals. It was dialogue. It thus embarked on a diplomatic also agreed to invite two members of the offensive, particularly in Europe, and launched a Salvadoran Episcopal Conference as witnesses, major offensive on the military front. as well as representatives of international By 1988, peace was already one of the main organisations; and to establish ways of commu- political campaign themes. The extreme right- nicating with and consulting the political parties wing party ARENA, which had always opposed and social forces. It was further agreed that there dialogue or negotiation with the FDR-FMLN, would be no unilateral suspension of the dialogue suddenly declared itself in favour of a negotiated process; and that the next meeting would solution. A new element in the electoral campaign concentrate on the cease-fire, with the OAS and was the Democratic Convergence, a coalition of UN as witnesses. the former FDR and the Social Democrats. On 11 October 1989, the FMLN proposed that The FMLN proposed to meet the government, peace negotiations should take place in El as long as this was postponed from March to Salvador. The government and military dele- September 1989. When an FMLN proposal that gation responded five days later, just as the three- would allow for communication with all political day meeting in San Jose was about to begin. The parties (except ARENA) did not prosper, the response was largely positive, except for points FMLN urged Salvadorans to reject the elections. relating to the investigation and punishment of With an abstention rate of about 65 per cent, those responsible for the assassination of Alfredo Cristiani of the ARENA party was brought Archbishop Romero, the 'death squads', and the to power. For the second time, a civilian president purging of the Armed Forces. A programme for a was returned against a backdrop of acute armed cease-fire and for international verification of conflict and violent political repression. compliance with the Accords were both agreed.

32 EL SALVADOR

The next meeting was scheduled to take place in The international revulsion generated by this Caracas in November 1989, to be attended by assassination and by the fierce repression, as well respresentatives of the UN and the OAS. Thus, as the results of the offensive itself, convinced the the ARENA government was on the one hand US government, ARENA, and the Armed Forces showing greater flexibility towards the possibility that it was useless to continue the war. These of dialogue, while on the other intensifying its factors were also to determine the FMLN's attacks on the opposition — these were directed negotiation strategy. The determination of the not only against the Democratic Convergence US solidarity movement, which had undertaken and popular organisations, but also at grassroots advocay work in the US Congress for many organisations and civilian settlements in the years, also began to bear fruit; and those who had conflict zones. most strongly supported the idea of a military On 11 November 1989, the FMLN launched solution came under increasing pressure. The another military offensive which sought to impact this had on many US politicians, provoke a popular insurrection in order to give particularly the Democrats, meant that the rise to a transition government in which it would strategy followed by Reagan and later Bush also participate. This offensive, which was largely gradually began to include the idea of dialogue, concentrated in San Salvador, did not gain as and to draw back from seeing a military solution much popular support as expected. In addition, as the only option. the social and political cost was very high: more than 1,000 civilians died and, according to official figures, some 30,000 homes were Negotiation damaged or destroyed. However, the offensive showed the Salvadoran and international public During the September and December 1989 that the FMLN was not a militarily spent force, as negotiating rounds, the Bush Administration the US government and the Salvadoran Armed approached the Group of Friends of the UN Forces had believed. It also demonstrated that Secretary-General. This helped to overcome the the ARENA government and the Armed Forces resistance to a negotiated solution that still were guilty of systematic human-rights violations existed within the upper echelons of the military against the civilian population. (Some were also and the ARENA party. committed by the FMLN, but on a far lesser In a meeting of the Central American scale.) The offensive also served to put El presidents that took place after the FMLN Salvador back on the international agenda, offensive, Cristiani accepted the good offices role which was then dominated by events in the of a representative of the UN Secretary-General Middle East. in intervening to open up negotiations. On 4 April The government and Armed Forces then 1990, the Framework Agreement was signed at embarked on a campaign of ferocious the UN headquarters in New York. The persecution of the leaders of the political parties Salvadoran government asked the FMLN to put that had been in the FDR. As a result, many of forward substantive proposals, to which it would these either went into exile or underground. The then respond. This helped to deflect the authorities also attacked leaders and rank-and- likelihood of serious conflicts within ARENA, in lile members of the popular organisations — for view of the potential resistance even to the process example, bombing and ransacking their offices, of agreeing the topics for negotiation. It also killing ten people in one such raid — as well as allowed the FMLN to define the main content of those of NGOs. They pursued church leaders the negotiations, and to shape the resulting and congregations, as well as international aid accords. For the FMLN, the main objective was'... workers and representatives, whom they accused to open the path towards democracy', while it of supporting the FMLN. However, the greatest remained their priority to abolish the military national and international outrage was caused by dictatorship and reform the Armed Forces (The the assassination, in cold blood, of six Jesuits, all long process leading to war and negotiation in El highly respected intellectuals, along with two of Salvador,Sdxzhk Jorge Handal, 1996). their assistants. The decision to murder them was In Geneva, Switzerland, the two parties agreed taken by a group of soldiers, and it later emerged an agenda with four central negotiating US advisers were complicit in the plan. While the objectives: a political solution to the armed Salvadoran government committed itself to conflict; democracy in El Salvador; assurances investigating the crime, those responsible were guaranteeing respect for human rights; and the never officially identified. re-uniting of Salvadoran society. In three further

33 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

meetings between July 1990 and September combatants and de facto land-holders in the 1991, agreements were reached which eventually former conflict zones is still in progress, the led to the signing of the Peace Accords in Mexico peace process has been a constant struggle for in January 1992. (The contents of the Accord are local people and grassroots organisations. summarised in Appendix 1.) Similarly, any degree of government compli- Today, most observers agree that these ance with the Peace Accords has been the result Accords opened up a space for political of constant pressure. The real vacuum, how- participation by the opposition forces within El ever, is in the social and economic spheres. As a Salvador, and therefore represented a huge result of the way in which the Peace Accords step forward in terms of democratisation. But were implemented, in practice they have while the Land Transfer Programme to ex- achieved relatively little for most Salvadorans.

Table 2: Chronology of peace negotiations in El Salvador

Year Event Results Civil-society participation

1981 FMLN-FDR propose dialogue with No response; Duarte refuses to Dunne via Mons. Rivera y Damns negotiate until FMLN lays down arms FMLN-FDR ask US Senatorjesse Jackson for a reply Duarte calls the FMLN-FDR to a FMLN agrees and proposes President La Palma meeting opens space meeting in La Palma; USA approves Betancur of Colombia to intervene; for Salvadorans to express of proposed meeting, which is Duarte accepts themselves openly on peace moderated by Mons. Rivera y Danias proposals with other religious authorities as witnesses Duarte proposes mixed commission to FMLN-FDR accept Mixed study the peace proposals, to be Commission moderated by Mons. Rivera y Danias Ayagualo meeting Mixed commission formed; FMLN casualties evacuated; dialogue resumes FMLN-FDR propose third meeting in Perquin meeting does not take place Perquin

1985 Duarte's daughter kidnapped and then Peace process paralysed for two years released with 2'i local mayors. PDC promises to release 22 political prisoners

1986 Lima: Meetings in which FDR is asked to leave the FMLN and participate in elections PDC shows intention to meet with FMLN-FDR Preparatory meetings held Mexico: La Palma and Ayagualo Accords ratified

1987 FDR-FMLN make 18-point proposal No response Esquipulas II signed Proposals made in Esquipulas II context to support peace process and setting up of National Reconciliation Commissions, with proposed cease- fire agreement

34 EL SALVADOR

Table 2: Chronology of peace negotiations in £1 Salvador continued

Year Event Results Civil-society participation

1987 FDR-FMLN proposes dialogue: Duarte accepts Two commissions meet in Venezuela: No major agreements days later, FDR-FMLN break oil' dialogue following the assassination of Herbert Anaya, president of non- government human rights commission

1988 FDR-FMLN request government to Government rejects proposal resume dialogue Political parties in FDR join in Democratic Convergence party elections in coalition with PSD (social formed democrats) FMLN proposes meetings, without FMLN asks the population to reject success the elections

1989 FMLN proposes resumption of dialogue No response FMLN suspends economic sabotage Agreement to meet in Mexico in and calls on government to create September climate of dialogue and negotiation Meeting in Mexico Both delegations accept UN and OAS verification; Episcopal Conference called as witness; consultation process set up wit.li political parties; agreement reached to meet in San Jose FMLN propose peace negotiations to Response to FMLN proposal agreed resume in El Salvador San Jose meeting Cease-fire agreed, with international Persecution of political opposition, verification of observance of accords; members of popular organisations, meeting in Venezuela with UN and churches, unions etc. intensifies, as OAS officials invited does thai of civilians in conflict zones FMLN launches military oflensive Cost of military offensive: 1000 dead, 30 000 homes lost or damaged Bloodshed demonstrates uselessness Six Jesuit priests and their of armed conflict and shapes the assistants killed in cold blood future negotiation process

1989 President Crisliani accepts UN Framework Accord signed at UN Permanent Committee for /90 mediation headquarters to cover end of armed National Dialogue (CPDN), made conflict, democratisation process, up of broad range of social respect for human rights, groupings, makes statements on reunification of Salvadoran society peace process and national crisis while negotiations are in progress

1990 Three meetings held in San |ose, Nine Accords reached concerning: CPDN not recognised as /91 Mexico, New York Armed Forces; civil police; judicial representing civil society by system; electoral System; economic government, although FMLN and social issues; political participation adopts some of the CPDN's of FMLN; cease-fire; UN verification proposals, all of which were of accords; transition schedule published in paid newspaper ads

1992 Peace Accord signed in Mexico Signing of Peace Accords marks the beginning of the demobilisation process and implementation of Accords. Operational agreements were made over the next two years to agree various necessary re-schedulings

35 GUATEMALA

Background In addition, society had lived through over SO years of armed conflict, and had established many The war in Guatemala was the longest-standing in defence-mechanisms. These very mechanisms fed Latin America. The first attempt to establish a the culture of terror which in turn closed off all guerrilla army was in March 1962, and Guatemala outlets for frustration, or opportunities to develop was the last Central American country to reach a consensus-based proposals for change. It is peace accord — a decade after the idea of a impossible to conceive of the true consequences of negotiated settlement had begun to take shape. the war in Guatemala. The very nature of the The formal negotiation process between the four government's counter-insurgency effort meant organisations which formed the Guatemalan that the war was waged not only against the armed National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the opposition, but was largely focused on people who government of Guatemala reached its final phase were poor, on indigenous indian communities, on in December 1996, after unprecedently rapid intellectuals and opposition leaders. The human advances in the months leading up to this. These injury was immense: some 100,000 people killed advances were made possible by the new between 1954 and 1983, about 90,000 people government's approach, as well as by the URNG's 'disappeared', over 50,000 widows, 250,000 wish finally to participate in the political arena. orphans, and over 440 villages obliterated from Although formal negotiations took place between the face of the earth. The forms of torture and the two parties seated at the negotiating table, cruelty that many people experienced defy various sectors of civil society also exerted description. It was against this background that considerable influence. The global context, and the two sides agreed to negotiate; and it is with this international pressure on both sides to put an end experience behind them that the more moderate to the armed conflict, were decisive. and democratic elements of Guatemalan society Why was this armed conflict so particularly now hope to build a new nation. complex? As elsewhere in Central America, its Why armed conflict? Essentially, Guatemala's origins lay in conditions of profound inequality social and economic structures had provoked and social and economic exclusion. But apart repeated conflicts over the years, while also closing from the concentration of wealth in a few down any space for political participation. The hands, while most people lacked access to basic resulting widespread discontent was the seed for resources, the indigenous indian majority armed conflict. Some analysts maintain that the suffered enormous discrimination. Successive frustrated democratic process marking the governments had resorted to force rather than 1944—54 period, which ended with the coup d'etat negotiation as a means of containing social that ousted President Arbenz, tipped the balance conflicts. By consolidating a predominantly in terms of social discontent. As democratic ladino [mixed blood, Spanish-speaking and often claiming Spanish descent — translator's expression through peaceful means was denied, note] culture that denied the country's ethnic some social sectors grew increasingly radical. The diversity, successive regimes had essentially key role of the US government in engineering the imposed a sense of national unity which was coup d'etat gave the whole process a marked based upon an authoritarian and exclusive ideological character: both the internal opposition state. Thus, profound social and political to President Arbenz and the US government contradictions had evolved over generations, presented his overthrow as part of the crusade mainly concerning the question of access to against within the cold-war context. resources. Guatemala's social divisions were Hence, Guatemala also became the launching-pad also marked by deeply entrenched forms of for attacks on Communism elsewhere in Latin which permeated every aspect of society, America after had taken power in and which are only now beginning to be ; another factor which marked the debated more openly. Guatemalan revolutionary movement.

36 GUATEMALA

Today, like other countries in Central government's commitment. The URNG then America, Guatemala faces a strategic dilemma in proposed a dialogue, to which the Cerezo terms of how to address the needs of the poor government and the military responded by majority in the process of transition towards arguing that the guerrillas should first lay down peace. Economic globalisation tends to hold back their arms, claiming that the establishment of a the poorest countries from realising the benefits civilian government inherently invalidated the of wealth and production. Yet recent govern- armed struggle. Indeed, they even called for the ments have adopted the neo-liberal model along guerrilla organisations to disband, a demand with economic structural adjustment, believing which the latter rejected on the grounds that the that this is consistent with democratisation and resolution of the conflict had to be based on dialogue. Central to this is the government's negotiations on how to address its underlying clear wish to subordinate the military to civilian causes. This issue repeatedly proved to be the authority (in a country in which military stumbling block to any dialogue. Face-to-face impunity remains a critical problem) while at the meetings between both sides did not take place same time deepening its alliances with the more until 1987 — almost two years after the initial modernising tendencies within the military. efforts had been made. However, the talks simply underlined their differences. In reality, the The negotiation process must be seen within much-vaunted democracy of the Cerezo this context. The impact of the neo-liberal Administration was never more than a formal economic model, which inherently tends to exercise. No steps were ever taken to demilitarise exclude the majority, can be softened only if the the country, or to dismantle the apparatus of state government is clearly committed to adopting repression; nor were there any serious proposals redistributive policies. Moreover, if peace is to to transform the unequal economic or social work, the more powerful sectors of Guatemalan structures. society must be prepared to share some of the benefits that they enjoy with a population for The Esquipulas II Accords which led to the whom the negotiated settlement will mean very establishment of National Reconciliation little unless it is accompanied by improvements Commissions (CNRs) were fundamental in in material well-being and by increased oppor- guaranteeing that Guatemalan civil society tunities to express and release their long- would in future be able to participate more contained energies. The real resolution of the actively. However, neither the Amnesty Decree conflict and the construction of a sustainable 71-87 nor the formal establishment of the peace in Guatemala need more than a general Commission were enough in themselves to willingness to support the transition process. ensure such participation at this stage. Rather, These developments will depend on they served to expose the divergence between Guatemalans' willingness to transform their those who favoured negotiation (including the popular organisations) and those who opposed attitudes, in a country which is perhaps the most it (particularly the private sector and certain politically and socially polarised in the region. political parties). The Armed Forces were also divided over whether the government should negotiate with the URNG, so that it became still The peace negotiation process more difficult for civil-society organisations to reach a broad-based consensus and to put forward concrete proposals. Fear also served to Creating the conditions for talks limit wider participation. Two events created the conditions for promoting The CNR comprised representatives from peace negotiations with the URNG: the four social sectors: the government (the Vice- Esquipulas II process and the international President and one other), the Catholic Church pressure that accompanied it, and the election in (the President of the Episcopal Conference, 1986 of the first civilian president in 15 years, Mons. Quezada Toruno and Mons. Juan leader of the Christian Democrat party, Vinicio Gerardi7), 'respected citizens' (Teresa de Zarco Cerezo. At the start of the Cerezo government, and Licendiado Mario Permuth), and political the URNG announced its willingness not to stand parties (represented by Jorge Serrano, who in the way of any genuine democratic process and would later become president of Guatemala, suspended its military offensives for several and Col Francisco Luis Gordillo). In 1987 and months, at the same time putting forward 1988, there were two exploratory meetings demands, meeting which would demonstrate the between the CNR and the URNG to set down

37 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua the framework for subsequent negotiation. The to prepare the conditions for direct dialogue. This CNR then embarked on dialogue with the marked the start of a dynamic that went beyond URNG, with the support of the government the framework of the Esquipulas II Accord. The (which asked to be informed of the outcomes). resulting Oslo Accord marked the first concrete In early 1988, the Episcopal Conference had achievement in the peace process, although published a letter entitled 'The Cry for Land' in neither side was represented by its top which it stated that the need for peace must be negotiators. It was agreed to establish a series of linked with the much-needed resolution of the meetings and dialogues between the URNG and country's social problems. Along with other various civil-society organisations (academics and initiatives, this served to generate greater business-people were also involved at a later interest and participation in the nascent peace stage); to commence meetings between the process within certain sectors. And although the government and the URNG, to be witnessed by URNG had received no response to its own call the CNR; and to request the UN to observe and for National Dialogue, the two bishops who guarantee compliance with what was agreed. were members of the CNR decided to try to get It still appears paradoxical that this Accord this idea off the ground. should have been signed by the URNG and Thus, in November 1988, the CNR called on the representatives of Guatemalan civil society who government and civil-society organisations to enjoyed 'the government's complete support'. participate in the National Dialogue that was to This can only be explained by the level of distrust open the doors to broader social participation in and polarisation between the two opposing sides, subsequent debates. The Dialogue was which meant that civil society — especially the inaugurated in February 1989 and continued until Catholic Church — came to be both mediator and November 1990. Some 47 organisations partic- signatory to an Accord that in turn helped to ipated — popular organisations, journalists, propel forward the entire negotiation process. co-operatives, church and lay workers, the private Indeed, it led to real dialogue and civil-society sector, and the government. From the outset, participation, because, with the government's full the most significant absences were those of the knowledge and agreement, a series of talks and Co-ordinating Committee of Agricultural, meetings then started between the URNG and Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations various sectors of society. These resulted in the (CAC1F) and the National Agricultural Union 1990 El Escorial Accord, which outlined the (UNAGRO). These two bodies — the country's conditions for the URNG to participate in the economic power-houses — argued that the process leading to the 1991 Constituent Assembly National Debate was subject to political manip- on the undertaking that it would not interfere ulation and questioned whether it was with the elections. Another agreement reached in representative of Guatemalan society. In fact, they 1990, the Quito Declaration, wasjointly signed by were unwilling to discuss changing any aspect of religious leaders and the URNG, the former Guatemala's socio-economic structure that might negatively affect their interests. stressing the importance of broad-based social participation and constitutional reform. The The Dialogue did not deliver any concrete 1990 Metepec (Puebla) Declaration, signed with proposals to take to the negotiating table, but it representatives of popular organisations and did facilitate a series of social agreements which trade unions, raised the issue of human rights, illustrated a broad consensus on the country's and the rights of indigenous indians. The 1990 essential problems. These agreements established Atlixco Declaration, signed with representatives the framework for subsequent stages in the of civil society and the business sector (with process. The government and the URNG did not, the exception of CACIF, which refused to however, achieve significant progress in their participate), emphasised the need for peaceful negotiations: both sides continued to publish solutions to the conflict and the need for separate communiques restating their respective comprehensive participation in this process. positions. Only the bilateral meeting with CACIF, held in Ottawa, did not yield positive results. Instead, Structuring the agenda and finding each side issued its own communique: the mechanisms for negotiation URNG stressed the importance of having met, In February 1990, President Cerezo created the and CACIF emphasised the damage caused by post of Conciliator, who was the government's the conflict and its differences with the URNG, representative in the CNR, and called for a but also stated its willingness to seek legally meeting in Oslo between the CNR and the URNG acceptable solutions.

38 GUATEMALA

This round of meetings with the URNG was insisted on distinguishing between substantive to lay the foundations for the subsequent issues for negotiation and the operational involvement of civil-society organisations in the aspects, such as demobilisation, which could peace process. While this did not become a only be defined once agreement had been nationwide participation — either in terms of reached on the fundamental points. the scope of the discussion nor in terms of The latter part of 1990 saw a rise in the representation — it was nevertheless important incidence of kidnappings, 'disappearances', or in opening the space for discussion on the politically motivated killings. The year ended process itself, and also in encouraging an with a massacre ofcainpesinos in Santiago Atitlan, expression of public opinion, in a society that which happened in the middle of the electoral had until then been marginalised in the campaign which brought to power Jorge political debate. Although the meetings failed Serrano Elias. Over the next few months, to produce concrete agreements (hardly to be President Serrano spoke of the need to reach a expected in the circumstances), they did mark total peace agreement, but failed to respond to the proposals for direct meetings which the the beginning of efforts to build a consensus UNRG was making. around peace and democracy. Marked ideological differences existed between those Initially, Serrano said that he would be who were hostile to, and those who sympa- willing in principle to negotiate directly with the thised with, the URNG, and parties disagreed URNG. These talks would have to be private on whether there was a need for structural and brief. The URNG also expressed its desire transformation, but everyone recognised the for peace, but insisted on the need for political agreements as well as practical arrangements, need for institutional and constitutional including verification. This period was marked changes, respect for human rights, a genuine by a constant 'stretching and shrinking', as each and participatory democracy, and for direct side in turn hardened and softened its position, dialogue between the URNG, the government, depending on how much national and and the military. international support they felt they had at any The indigenous indian (or Mayan) sector was given time. The URNG stepped up its military conspicuous by its absence from these meetings, activities, while the Serrano government which participated along with the other popular announced on 8 April 1991 its 'Initiative for sectors rather than as a separate group. Given Total Peace'. This initiative, however, ignored that people of Mayan descent represent the the advances that had already been made in the majority of the Guatemalan population, their Oslo Accord, focusing solely on the question of specific demands clearly needed to be expressed dismantling the guerrilla forces. While the and addressed in their own right. The URNG rejected this proposal, it finallyagree d to negotiation process and the initiatives of certain its first direct meeting with the government and leaders did later open up important spaces for the Army. the Mayan Indians, unprecendented in On 26 April 1991, this encounter finally took Guatemala's recent history. Women too were place in Mexico City. The government later to participate as a social sector within the delegation included five high-ranking military Civil Society Assembly. officials, and the URNG was represented by its High Command. The 'Accord on Procedures for the Search for Peace through Political The political struggle and the Means' was signed, in which each side start of negotiations committed itself to 'achieving a negotiation process that would, within the shortest time During the following months, the Army possible, lead to the signing of a firm and lasting reiterated that the guerrillas must lay down peace, based on political accords and their arms and return to public life before agreeements on their implementation, and negotiations could progress. In October 1990, outlining the terms on which compliance would the Minister of Defence stressed that the Army be verified by the National Reconciliation was 'inflexible' in its view that the government Commission (CNR), the United Nations should only enter into dialogue with the URNG Organisation (UN), and other international if it first disarmed, regardless of any other bodies by mutual agreement'. The agenda items dialogues underway between the URNG and for subsequent meetings were also agreed, and other social sectors. The URNG, however, included the following points:

39 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

• democratisation and human rights; the private sector. At the same time, there was a • strengthening civil power and defining the role rise in the incidence of human-rights violations of the military within a democractic society; by the government and the Army. The URNG • the identity and rights of indigenous peoples; consequently received greater international • constitutional reform and the electoral support for its position, which in turn led to a system; hardening in the government's line, and an • socio-economic aspects; emphasis on military issues. • the agrarian situation, In May 1992, the URNG launched its • resettlement of populations displaced by the proposal 'Guatemala: a Just and Democratic armed conflict; Peace — The Contents of Negotiation', in which • preparations for the URNG to enter national it pronounced on the 'substantive issues' - political life; points which it considered indispensable — of • arrangements for a definitive cease-fire; the Mexico Accord. In a U-turn on its earlier • a timetable for implementing and verifying insistence that the URNG guerrillas demobilise compliance with the Accords, as a pre-condition for negotiations, the govern- • signing an Accord for Firm and Lasting ment now proposed resuming discussions on Peace, and demobilisation. human rights. Against this backdrop, CACIF and the AGA This was significant not only because it set out the publicly accused the URNG of being responsible negotiation agenda, but also because it dealt with for Guatemala's problems, calling on it to all the substantive issues that had arisen in the surrender, and expressing their disagreement course of the process of National Dialogue. Yet even with the idea of discussing the substantive although this Accord opened up new oppor- issues. In contrast, the organisations which tunities for discussion and showed greater had participated in the National Dialogue flexibility than had been the case, the negotiations demanded that they should also participate in became deadlocked on the first issue: democrati- the negotiation process, and reiterated the sation. It took the two parties two meetings, held importance of the substantive issues. in the Mexican cities of Cuernavaca and However, in January 1993 President Serrano Queretaro in J une and J uly 1991, for both parties proposed a 'Peace Plan' that called for a URNG to agree on what democratisation meant. The so- cease-fire without having even reached called Queretaro Accord provided a general agreement on the substantive issues. Simul- framework for establishing a shared concept of taneously, the Army began a major military what democratisation should entail within the offensive. The URNG maintained that it would political, economic, social, and cultural spheres, negotiate only on the substantive issues. Thus, with a focus on the rights of every Guatemalan negotiations had virtually broken down by May citizen. In formal terms at least, this Accord 1993; and neither side had achieved its goals. marked an historic advance in the democrati- While there had been some partial pre-accords, sation process. The document recognised the the attempts to address the substantive issues preeminence of civil society, and accepted that the had demonstrated deep divisions, especially Armed Forces should be subject to civil authority over the establishment of a Truth Commission in order to establish a state of law. to investigate past human-rights violations, and over international verfication of compliance with the Accords. The negotiation process stumbles After almost two years, and several rounds of negotiations since the first Accord was supposed The question of human rights was the next item to have been formalised, the Accord on Human on the agenda. Given the country's history and, Rights had still not been signed when Serrano in particular, the role of the Armed Forces, this engineered a coup d'etat on 25 May 1993. was to be one of the most difficult and complex Various social groupings had mobilised during issues. The serious differences between the the negotiation process, particularly in the various parties, reflecting Guatemala's pro- capital, where important student, teacher, and foundly polarised society, meant that the process popular organisations protested against the stalled. The publication of the 'Accord on the worsening socio-economic situation. Many of Civil Defence Patrols' in August 1991, which their demands were more radical than those of included certain points on the democratisation the URNG. The dynamic that had been process, was roundly criticised by the military and generated by the negotiations, and the need for

40 GUATEMALA the government to hold this in check, were Peace Forum comprising representatives of probably the main reasons behind the decision various social sectors, including the URNG of Serrano and the Army to fabricate a coup (with Mons. Quezada y Toruno as its president). d'etat (although the Army was at first opposed to 1st main aim would be to foster agreement in the idea). relation to the Substantive Issues. However, This attempt failed, and opposition within these agreements would not represent govern- Guatemala was in fact backed up by strong ment commitments; and the URNG could international condemnation and even by the participate in the Forum only if it first laid down Guatemalan business sector. The Army then arms. The second point was that negotiations retracted and brought down Serrano. Amid between the government and the URNG would widespread popular support, Ramiro de Leon be mediated by a commission made up of Carpio (then the Human Rights Procurator) representatives of the UN and the OAS. This was installed as president on 6 June 1993. would discuss operational matters concerning De Leon's candidature was proposed to the demobilisation of the guerrilla forces. Congress by the National Consensus Body Simultaneously, the CNR was dissolved, and a created in the wake of the Serrano affair. Government Peace Commission (COPAZ) was Although it existed for only a few months, it set up, headed by Rosada. In essence, this became an unprecedented forum for reaching proposal would marginalise Mons. Quezada y broad-based consensus (including CACIF). This Toruno from moderating the negotiations. experience proved significant in encouraging The URNG stated that it would participate in the subsequent participation of civil-society the Forum if its security were guaranteed, but organisations in the peace-negotiation process, pointed out serious gaps and flaws in the and also influenced the eventual proposals to proposal: it wiped out three years of nego- purge the state apparatus. tiations which had already gained some Expectations were high that de Leon's achievements and failed to recognise all the government would actively resume the peace parties in the process. Third, it changed the negotiation process. The response of demo- orginal role of the conciliator. The URNG cratic and civil-society organisations to the fake insisted on holding a preliminary meeting with a coup had also shown the extent of people's wish government-Army delegation, to be presided to break with the governing powers' traditional over by Mons. Quezada y Toruno, in order to intransigence and to create new forms of agree on the points on which negotiations could participation. However, the affair also allowed resume. the Army to turn around its international image Civil-society organisations regarded the to take on the role of guarantor of democracy. government proposal as inadquate, arguing This had further repercussions, because certain that to separate the substantive issues from sectors within the Army realised that it was operational matters was a backwards step. They possible to confront the national crisis in a also stressed the need to take existing accords relatively open way. into account, to respect the agenda items Immediately after de Leon became president, already been agreed, and to recognise the the URNG proposed to meet with him. Various progress made during the National Dialogue parts of civil society also urged him to resume meetings in 1990. However, the private sector negotiations, based on what exisiting agree- opposed URNG participation in the Forum, ments, and to make them as participatory as and its leading representatives rejected even the possible. To the surprise of many, de Leon idea of negotiating with the URNG, arguing claimed that the peace discussions were not his that it was unconstitutional to enter into immediate priority, and that before resuming discussion with an outlawed body. The Minister negotiations his government would review what of Defence openly opposed any possible Truth had gone before. From the outset, however, the Commission. The result was that de Leon's focus was on questions concerning the moderni- proposal achieved no concrete results; in sation and restructuring of the state apparatus, August 1993 the URNG expressed disap- the democratisation of political parties, and pointment that the government had failed to other substantive issues. make any progress because of the recalcitrance In July 1993, the president and his adviser, of the private sector and the Army. Hector Rosada, presented a 'Proposal to At the same time, international pressure Resume the Peace Process'. This revolved (from UN, the OAS, and certain governments) around two focal points. First, a Permanent regarding the human-rights situation and the

41 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua need to reach a Peace Accord increased. Some and impeded the negotiation process, and in individuals within the IMF and the World Bank fact denied the URNG's status as a party within also made declarations to the same effect, this process. However, it agreed to meet with motivated in part by their concern to ensure that COPAZ, in the presence of the conciliator and the Guatemalan government comply with its the UN observer, in order to agree the basic financial commitments and create a stable conditions for resuming negotiations. Its point climate which would encourage investment. of departure would be the proposals put In September 1993, the government appoint- forward by the conciliator, with a view to signing ed a new peace commission made up of three the Global Accord on Human Rights. The Army military officers and three civilians, under the — with the President's backing - responded by leadership of Hector Rosada. Earlier that month, threatening to by-pass the URNG leadership the Minister of Defence also announced a major and negotiate directly with the rank-and-file military offensive against the guerrilla forces, and combatants. This threat never materialised. Mom. Quezada y Toruno released the 'pre- Rather, the URNG reiterated that it would project for the resumption of peace talks' that had remain faithful to the Oslo Accord by first already been presented to the parties concerned. negotiating and reaching political agreement on This was widely judged a considered and the substantive issues, and only then proceeding impartial document, and was generally accepted to negotiate operational questions such as the by popular groups. The URNG also pronounced cease-fire, demobilisation, and a return to itself in favour, though this was questioned by the political life. government. On 24 September, the government's Many civil-society organisations and local peace commission, COPAZ, also announced people regarded the Rosada plan as a re-hashed its peace plan, which was presented to the version of what the previous government had President and the Military High Command. The proposed, and argued that it did not reflect the Minister of Defence declared that he was satisfied hopes of the Guatemalan people. Their with this plan, which de Leon then presented first rejection was based on the fact that the plan to the diplomatic community and then to the back-tracked on negotiated agreements; that it Guatemalan public. It had three main failed to address the country's problems since it components: separated the causes of the conflict from the peace process; that it negated the Human Rights • The Permanent Peace Forum would be Accord and eliminated the role of international developed nation-wide, as a means of analysing verification, for instance through the Truth the country's problems and finding solutions. Commission; and that the functioning of the The Forum would be convened by the CNR. Permanent Peace Forum remained unclear, as The URNG would not participate directly, but did the decision-making capacity of civil-society could submit its views through the CNR. organisations, especially since the role of • The government promised to respond to conciliator no longer existed. They also social demands and to strengthen respect for underlined that peace meant more than a cease- human rights. fire, and claimed that the Rosada plan was unviable. Instead, they supported the proposals • The government and Army would negotiate of Mons. Quezada y Toruno. The Episcopal with the URNG about a definitive cease-fire and Conference likewise insisted on honouring the the latter's return to legality by means of an Oslo and Mexico Accords in relation to the amnesty, after which it would be permitted to procedures and agenda for negotiations, participate in the Permanent Forum. A repre- describing the government plan as 'infeasible'. sentative of the UN Secretary-General would convene, advise, and moderate the negotiations, In spite of the government's real efforts to and verify certain operational aspects. gather international backing for its plan, very few countries offered explicit support, although In addition, the government made an 'Official many declared that they favoured peace Declaration on Human Rights', committing itself negotiations. The UN Secretary-General to guarantee these in a way that implicitly concurred with this position, while the EU went replaced the Global Accord on Human Rights, further and suggested that the government which had been under negotiation for almost revise its plan to accommodate those areas of two years. consensus within Guatemalan society. The URNG leadership rejected the Rosada Yet despite this widespread rejection, the plan, arguing that it both altered the spirit of COPAZ co-ordinator announced that in January

42 GUATEMALA

1994 the Forum would begin its work. As a first the negotiation process would be resumed'. The step, the former CNR would re-convene, and Framework Accord for the Resumption of the steps would be taken to enable Guatemalan Negotiation Process of January 1994 outlined the society to participate. But it was widely considered following steps: that the re-convening of a new CN R both ignored and displaced the role of Mons. Quezada y • The parties in conflict would negotiate on all Toruno as conciliator. Having now been excluded the items outlined in the 1991 Mexico Accord, from any role in the negotiation process, the and compliance with all the undertakings would Episcopal Conference, and Mons. Quezada y be subject to verification. Toruno in particular, opted to stay out of the • The UN Secretary-General would be asked to CNR. Certain government officials spoke in appoint a moderator, who would propose similar tones, arguing that peace was more than initiatives to foster the signing of an agreement the absence of war, and that the resolution of the for firm and lasting peace. conflict needed to go hand-in-hand with a solution to the underlying causes. By mid- • An Assembly would be set up which would be December 1993, the Procurator for Human open to participation by all non-government Rights was accusing the de Leon government of sectors, who would discuss the substantive issues, being responsible for the breakdown in make recommendations to the negotiators, and negotiations. support the agreements reached in order to ensure that these became nation-wide under- In November 1993, the first of a series of takings. Ecumenical Conferences for Peace in Guatemala, organised by the Lutheran World Federation • The Guatemalan Episcopal Conference (LWF) and the World Council of Churches would be asked to delegate one of its members as (WCC), was held in Washington DC. The president of this Assembly; the Accord suggested conflicting parties and various representatives of that Mons. Quezada y Toruno was well qualified Guatemalan civil society were invited, as well as for this role. The president would be supported members of the international community. by an organising committee made up of Although they were subsequently sto change their representatives from a cross-section of society, position, neither the government, the Army, nor and would be responsible for convening and the Guatemalan private sector agreed to managing the Assembly's deliberations, acting as participate, claiming that they were not prepared a bridge between this and the parties at the to be treated on equal terms with the URNG. The negotiating table, and being allowed to Conference called for a resumption of direct talks participate in special sessions. between the government and the URNG. • The governments of Colombia, Mexico, After this, the URNG High Command and its Norway, Spain, the USA, and Venezuela would political and diplomatic team were invited to New be asked to form a Group of Friends of the peace York by the UN Secretary-General. The URNG process, in order to support the UN's role and stated its willingness to participate in a preliminary strengthen the commitments undertaken by the meeting, to be convened by the UN Secretary- parties in conflict, acting as witnesses of honour General and attended by Mons. Quezada y to the accords reached. Toruna, which would establish the framework for a negotiation process. This whole phase was This Framework Accord represented a return to embarked upon against a backdrop of growing the earlier course of negotiation, and guaranteed international pressure for peace which was broad-based participation through the Assembly. eventually to open up new channels of negotiation The conciliator would be replaced by a UN- and allow for greater popular participation. appointed Moderator, Jean Arnaud. The Global Accord on Human Rights was signed in Mexico City on 29 March 1994. It was the The peace-negotiation process first Accord which acknowledged the significance resumes of the substantive issues in achieving an end to armed conflict. It came into immediate effect. The In December 1993, a UN spokesperson UN Verification Mission (MINUGUA) was to be in announced that the Guatemalan government and charge of verification, aldiough this body was not the URNG had agreed to meet in Mexico City on established for some time. MINUGUA was also 9 January 1994. This meeting was aimed at mandated to receive denunciations of human- 'reaching a joint definition of the terms on which rights violations and ensure that these were

43 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua adequately handled by the judicial system, as well international aid agencies. The commission's as making any recommendations deemed mandate was to draw up projects that responded necessary. A further role was to make efforts to to the needs and interests of the displaced. In strengthen the capacity of any government and addition, both signatories asked UNESCO to non-government organisations concerned with assist in designing a plan to support educational protecting human rights. activities among this population, and requested The 1994 Accord established the govern- that any funds for projects arising from this ment's responsibility for ensuring full respect Accord be administered by UNDP. for human rights, challenging impunity for The strategy was to focus on fighting poverty offences committed, offering guarantees for and to guarantee the rights of the displaced, civil protection, dismantling clandestine or assuring their political, social, and economic illegal structures, and ensuring freedom of reintegration, in the wider context of seeking association and movement. The government sustainable and equitable development in also agreed to offer special support to the Guatemala, and promoting reconciliation efforts victims of human-rights violations, and to within the resettlement areas. The Accord strengthen human-rights organisations. The emphasised the need to protect the rights of the URNG undertook to respect human rights; and Mayan population in general, and of women- both sides made special reference to the rights of headed households in particular. It also casualties and prisoners of war. addressed the need to clear the main areas of A new negotiating timetable was also agreed. fighting of mines and explosives. The govern- While this was not followed to the letter (a ment committed itself to recognising formal and contingency provided for within the Accord on informal studies of this population, and the Timetable of Negotiations for a Firm and facilitating access to legal documents for the Lasting Peace in Guatemala), it nevertheless displaced and any children born outside the offered a framework for the Assembly to put country, as well as guaranteeing their land rights forward proposals. Although such proposals (including possession and use). were not binding, they offered civil-society The Accord on Establishing a Commission for organisations a way of making their views known the Historic Clarification of Human Rights to both parties. The intention was to reach Violations and Acts of Violence that had caused agreement within eight months on all the Suffering to the Guatemalan Population was substantive issues already identified, with the signed in Oslo in June 1994. This provided fora definitive Peace Accord and demobilisation Commission to be set up by the UN Moderator, scheduled for December 1994. The Moderator who would nominate a person of irreproachable would fix the dates for each round of reputation, acceptable to both parties; and select negotiation, as well as the Special Sessions which a scholar from candidates put forward by the would permit any 'recommendations or universities. This Commission would become orientations' to be transmitted from the effective six months from the date of signing the Assembly to the negotiators. In practice, the Firm and Lasting Peace Accord (with the combination of political interests and attempts to possibility of a six-month extension). The reach alliances, both inside Guatemala and internationally, all prolonged the process, to the Commission would act discreetly and not extent that negotiations were not concluded disclose its sources of information, in order to until the end of 1996. guarantee witnesses' security. Its mandate was to clarify human-rights violations and acts of violence committed from the start of the armed Steps forward: various Accords conflict until the final Accord, and to make The Accord on the Resettlement of Populations recommendations for strengthening the Displaced by the Armed Conflict was signed in democratisation process and preserving the June 1994, representing an attempt to solve the memory of the victims, to move towards a problems faced by the civilian population most culture of peace and respect. The Accord did affected by the armed conflict. It set out a strategy not contemplate identifying individual respon- for resettling the displaced in which the sibility for any such acts; it left this decision to the government agreed to consult fully with the citizens of Guatemala. Given the history of affected population. It was proposed to establish a impunity for human-rights violations, this was six-person joint commission, to be made up of two highly controversial. representatives each from the government and The Accord on the Identity and Rights of the the displaced population, and two advisers from Indigenous Peoples signed in Mexico in March

44 GUATEMALA

1995 was singularly important, given Guatemala's Democratic Society was signed in Mexico City in history and the fact that its population is mostly September 1996 and concluded the negotiations Mayan. The Accord (summarised in Appendix 2) on the substantive issues. It dealt with aspects acknowledged that Guatemala is a multi-ethnic, ranging from the definition and reform of public multi-cultural, and multi-lingual nation, and that institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary the indigenous indian population had suffered and justice system, the role of the executive and particularly from discrimination, exploitation, the subordination of the military and state security and injustice. The Accord covered matters forces to civilian rule; the participation of women including constitutional reforms, ethnic discrim- and other marginalised parts of society; and the ination, sexual harassment, cultural rights and question of disarmament, demilitarisation of the spiritual values (including ), amd the social fabric, and massive demobilisation. It also necessary legal and institutional reforms to provided for the disbanding of the so-called guarantee the full civil, political, social, and Voluntary Civil Defence Committees (or Civil economic rights of the indigenous peoples. It Patrols), which were set up by the Armed Forces in recognised the Co-ordinating Body of the the 1980s as a means of making rural Organisations of the Guatemalan Mayan People communities in the indian highlands responsible (COPMAGUA) as the representative body of the for 'policing' the counter-insurgency effort. (See Mayan, Garifuna, and Xinca communities, and Appendix 2.) established five commissions charged with taking With these accords, the negotiation round on forward relevant proposals. Of these, three were the substantive issues was concluded, and a rapid to be joint — the Commissions on Educational round of negotiations on the 'operational issues' Reform, on Reform and Political Participation, began. The Accord on the Definitive Cease-fire and on Land-related Rights of the Indian Peoples. was signed in Oslo on 4 December 1996, which The remaining two — on the Official Status of related to the gathering of the URNG forces, Indigenous Languages and on Defining and their disarmament and subsequent demobil- Preserving Sacred Places — were not designed as isation. The Accord on Constitutional and joint commissions. Electoral Reforms was signed in Stockholm on 7 Although talks had begun with the de Leon December 1996, and requested Congress to government on the question of socio-economic detail and enact the consititutional reforms development and the agrarian situation, required to implement each of the substantive concrete progress was only made with the accords. The Accord on Legalising the incoming government of Alvaro Arzu in May Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity 1996. The new government heralded changes in (URNG) was signed in Madrid five days later, the tone and dynamic of the negotiations: both covering the conditions and formal provisions parties expressed themselves satisfied with 'the which would allow the URNG to become a legal climate of trust' between them. The Accord on entity. Finally, the Accord on the Timetable for Socio-Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Implementing, Fulfilling, and Verifying the Situation (see Appendix 2) stressed that social Peace Accords was signed in Guatemala on 29 justice was the basis for the socio-economic December 1996, on the same day as the Accord development and national unity of Guatemala. on Firm and Lasting Peace was finalised. This It covered issues concerning democratisation outlined the timetable to guide the implemen- and participatory development, through the tation of all the commitments and undertakings establishment of rural development councils; contained in the various Peace Accords, social development and changes in public- including a schedule for those aspects that did spending priorities, and programmes to favour not include general or permanent provisions. health and education; agrarian reform, which This accord also established an Accompaniment covered land use and tenure as well as credit, Commission to act as a political and technical technical assistance, and protection of natural reference point for the Technical Secretariat of resources; and the modernisation of the fiscal the Peace Process. This would be formed in system in order to increase tax revenue and January 1997 with representatives from both clamp down on fraud and evasion. It was to come sides, four citizens of their choice, one member into effect as soon as the final Accord was signed, of Congress, and the head of the UN although the government committed itself to international verification mission (with observer start the necessary planning immediately. status only). The Accord on the Strengthening of Civil The Accord on Firm and Lasting Peace was Power and the Role of the Army within a signed in Guatemala City on 29 December 1996

45 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in a ceremony conducted at the National Palace of friendly countries. The moment was also and attended by members of the URNG, the marked by celebrations throughout the country, government, the Army, and special guests from and a mass demonstration in the central square Guatemala and the international community, as attended by hundreds of Guatemalan organ- well as the UN Moderators and representatives isations and individuals.

Table 3: Chronology of peace negotiations in Guatemala

Year Event Results Civil-society participation

First phase

1986 Declaration of I ntent Publication of respective positions in media

1987 Esquipulas 11 Declaration of Accord signed at Presidential Procedures to establish Firm and Summit; National Reconciliation Lasting Peace in Central America Commissions established

Second phase

1987 1st meeting (low-level) between No agreement CNR formed government and URNG

1988 First and second meeting between No accord, but possibility of meeting CNR-URNG between URNG and government CNR calls for National Dialogue Sounding out of URNG intentions on between government and civil-society peace; no result. organisations

1989/ National Dialogue commences March Social agreements show wide consensus. 90 and concludes in November 1990 Mons. Quezada named as Conciliator and government representative

Oslo Accord

Basic Accord to seek peace between Oslo Accord and first concrete CNR (with government backing) and achievement. Mechanisms to meet with URNG various social and economic sectors established as part of National Dialogue. Direct talks between government and Escorial, Quito, Metepec and Atlixco URNG high command Declarations signed. Two communiques from Otlanar (meetings with CACIF)

First sub-phase

Government peace initiative rejected Mexico Accord signed International community with by URNG, but first meeting agreed. reduced influence Accord on proceedings for peace Mons. Quezada plays leading role negotiations Various pronouncements by civil Accord on Democratisation Queretaro Accord signed society (popular sector, parties, and private sector) Agreements on Human Rights

1991/ URNG issues peace proposal Government proposes to return to 92 human-rights issue Partial Accords published

1993 Government Peace Plan (for cease-fire) URNG insists on dealing with substantive issues Other meetings No progress

46 GUATEMALA

Table 3: Chronology of peace negotiations in Guatemala continued

Year Event Results Civil-society participation Second sub-phase

New government proposes Proposal widely rejected, no resumption of peace process advances in negotiation Mous. Quezada presides over efforts Quezada plan accepted by URNG and to gel process started popular sectors, rejected by government Government Peace Plan and Official Rejected by URNG and civil-society Declaration on Human Rights organisations

1994 Accord on resumption ofpeace talks Accord on resumption of peace talks Civil Society Assemby established signed by government, URNG and signed CNR

Third phase

Global Accord on Human Rights Accords signed Accord on schedule lor talks Accord on Persons and Populations Displaced by Armed Conflict Accord on Commission lor Historical Human Rights Commission set up Clarification of human-rights violations and other forms of violence

1995 Mexico Accord on Identity and Accord signed recognising multi-ethic, Rights of Indigenous Peoples pluri-cultural, and multi-lingual nature of Guatemalan nation, and acknowledging the particular suffering inflicted on the indigenous peoples COPMAGUA accepted as respresenlative body of indian peoples

1996 Accord on Socio-economic Aspects Negotiations speed up. Accord and Agrarian Situation underlines social justice as basis for socio-economic development and national unity Mexico Accord on Strengthening Mexico Accord marks conclusion of Civil Power and Function of Army in substantive issues Democratic Society Operational Accords for Firm and Lasting Peace

Oslo: Definitive cease-fire All Accords signed Stockholm: Constitutional and Electoral Reform Legalisation of URNG Agreement on schedule for implementation and verification Firm and Lasting Peace Accord

47 Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America

Introduction • The series of emergencies in the region — major natural disasters in addition to the armed If 'the original sin' that underlies conflict is conflicts — were not addressed through opera- unequal access to resources and participation tional programmes (which provide physical both between the North and the South, and infrastructure) in the way that relief and within countries, it follows that the growing gap development agencies traditionally work in other between rich and poor sustains and may even parts of the world. In Mexico and Central aggravate such conflicts. America, the immediate emergencies tended to In Central America, economic structural be set in the context of the prevailing structural adjustment policies (SAPs) have inflicted on the conditions, and linked with development already poor majority the burden of rising support. Thus, with one or two exceptions [such unemployment, and reduced access to basic as that of the 1985 earthquakes in Mexico or services (heightened by the growing privatisation Hurricane Joan in Nicaragua two years later — of social welfare provision). Obviously, there is no translator's note] there was relatively little mechanistic cause-and-elfect connection between opportunity to bring the experience from the this and the possibility of renewed armed conflict region to the head offices of the various aid in the region. However, the lack of perspectives agencies and NGOs. and opportunities for the vast majority of the • The institutional culture in many population — especially those elements of society international aid agencies stresses 'rapid who were most directly involved in the war and response' and immediate impact: thus there is who thus became at least partly unsuited for relatively little investment in systematisation, civilian life — is leading to isolated cases of reflection, and analysis of their own experience. violence and to widespread social breakdown. This is aggravated by the pressure to raise This chapter reflects on the complex problems funds, which is now increasingly defining the and challenges which international aid agencies choice of programmes; and by the absence of faced in working for peaceful solutions to the any systems to develop an institutional memory armed conflicts that ravaged Mexico and Central or capture institutional history. America in the 1980s. The aim is to identify elements that might be helpful in developing • Staff changes, which in general were not strategies for dealing with conflict and accompanied by appropriate handover periods, democratisation in this region and elsewhere. left major gaps in the institutional memory of The international co-operation that occurred certain agencies. These gaps were filled only in the region during the war years has not been partially and unsystematically, and the effort well documented, especially during the worst has meant considerable extra work for the periods of the conflicts. Various factors incoming staff. contributed to this: • The complex nature of the conflicts in Mexico • Conditions of insecurity in the region placed and Central America, and the very language and real constraints on what could be put in writing style of communication used, posed huge about the work that NGOs were supporting, challenges for those institutions and agencies and the ways in which they were doing so. Aid whose background and history have tended to agency personnel and their local counterpart make it easier for them to interpret and engage organisations faced real, and felt threatened by with events in Africa or Asia than in Latin America. perceived, dangers. This may have been reinforced by the fact that the • For the same reasons, many written reports protagonists of the armed conflicts of Central went into great detail about what was happening America were struggling to make dieir own voices at a global level, with far fewer specifics about heard, using language that was relatively individual country programmes. politicised and articulate. The challenge for the

48 Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America local offices of international agencies was to the potential to shape and influence social change. communicate with (como instituciones interlocutoras) This meant that their programmes would not their counterparts, not speak on their behalf. focus directly on 'the poorest of the poor', for although the kind of social transformation they • Many of the larger international agencies envisaged would clearly benefit the poor majority, have for several years been absorbed in endless they sought to address the basic causes of poverty changes and re-structuring processes, but without by strengthening the capacity of those who could the financial security to allow them to make best influence and change the structures which medium- or long-term commitments. These re- maintained poverty and injustice. Development structurings have made ever more demands on assistance in this sense is based on strengthening staff time, and distracted them from thinking people's organisational cacacity, to enable them to about their programmes on the ground. become agents of their own development. This chapter focuses on the most relevant aspects of the work of and the dilemmas faced by various Major events affecting NGO assistance in international aid agencies in Mexico and Central Central America America during the 1980s and early 1990s. While the conflicts were at their height at that time, The 1979 overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship many of the underlying problems remain; and in Nicaragua created a climate of optimism conflicts continue today, although they are among the revolutionary movements and expressed in other ways and are finding new popular groups in both Guatemala and El outlets. Salvador. Increases in their membership were countered with intense military repression, directed not only against the guerrilla organisations, but also against the popular Global picture of international movement — indeed, aginst any form of social aid in the region organisation regarded as part of the opposition. In El Salvador and Guatemala, murders, By the late 1970s, several major aid agencies 'disappearances', threats, and harassment of recognised that their support was principally leaders of communities and organisations, and directed towards assisting the victims of political violence and repression, and strengthening the against the NGOs that supported them, became capacity of social organisations to get their commonplace. Staff safety was in jeopardy. As a demands on to the national agenda. An increas- result, most of the international NGOs in the ing number of their counterparts were the region moved their regional offices from the victims of systematic threats or direct attacks on countries in which their programmes were their work in promoting popular organisation, or largely based, to nearby countries such as Mexico activities which defended and educated people or Costa Rica. This decision was the first major about human rights. This meant that the dilemma that these agencies were to face in the agencies' work was gradually shifting towards early 1980s. emergency programmes, even before the wide- This decision meant that support for spread outbreak of armed conflicts. emergency and development work had to be Throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, any channeled through intermediary organisations, development work had to take place against the without actually having staff on the ground to background of the region-wide conflict, within monitor these projects first-hand. Gradually, it which each country had its own dynamics and became possible to make short visits, although characteristics. In response to the armed conflict, still at high personal risk. (Throughout most of certain agencies had to modify their strategies and the 1980s, the only country without such organisational structures, according to their problems was Nicaragua, notwithstanding a few existing knowledge and understanding of Central isolated problems there.) America, as well as existing relationships with their counterparts. All these factors influenced the evolution of their work. What was the focus of NGO Two basic criteria guided agencies' decisions support? about what work to support, and how to support it: first, the idea of supporting processes, and 'If we had known what was going to happen in evaluating specific projects within this wider Rwanda, perhaps we wouldn't have supported context; second, that of supporting groups with social organisation and group empowerment

49 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua work in the same way'. The author's initial Although international NGOs often worked response to this comment by an international aid with organisations that had emerged in response worker, was dissent. But this gave way to deeper to the conflict, a common thread ran through reflections on the responsibility of international their programmes in terms of how local assistance in conflicts and potential conflicts, and counterparts were chosen. Essentially, they gave about their particular understanding of power priority to those with whom they had worked and its implications. before the conflicts became so acute. Personal International aid agencies can be tremen- trust necessarily plays a critical role in deter- dously arrogant. What the comment on Rwanda mining how an international aid agency seems to imply is that events there might have functions in a context of political polarisation followed a different path had the agency in and armed conflict. In Central America, this question not 'empowered' groups who, thanks to level of trust with both individuals and groups this support, took to violence in order to achieve took many years to build, and developed not their objectives. But the observation does have a only through a funding relationship, but also certain validity. While international agencies through a process of accompaniment and sys- cannot determine the direction in which a tematic discussions about their various problems people proceeds, agencies' actions (or inaction) and their strategies. This investment in the nevertheless affect the context within which such gradual process of trust-building eventually processes evolve; and this responsibility needs to expanded the scope for contact with local be properly assumed. people. It may also have reduced the high risk of In Central America, and more recently in errors that might have been politically costly for Mexico, many international NGOs made a these agencies — always a real danger in the conscious commitment to stand by the poor and context of an armed conflict. the marginalised, and to support those groups International NGO support was largely that could potentially bring about positive social concentrated in two areas: change. In such highly polarised settings, this meant getting involved in the struggle to • 'Accompaniment' (direct physical accompani- by agency staff or by third parties) from the transform (or at least modify) the power relations ment onset of the emergency; and intensive lobbying to between those with resources and those who had encourage inter-agency co-ordination in order to historically been denied them. This was evidently 'legitimise' the right of non-combatant civilians to a political choice, even if support was given to receive humanitarian aid, irrespective of their non-combatant civilians who could develop political affinities. organisational structures, and who were working to change the status quo. Empowerment was • Provision of humanitarian aid through the viewed, then, as the vehicle for transforming the churches, NGOs, and popular organisations, poverty and exclusion in which most Central especially for civilian settlements in the conflict Americans were living; and organisations areas, both in order to help civilians survive and representing the poor would be the best way to to strengthen their capacity to formulate their bring about the kind of social transformation that own demands and to become social actors and would address the causes of poverty. political protagonists in shaping the process of Thus, such agencies gave priority to sup- transformation. porting the establishment and consolidation of organisational structures which were able not only to channel resources and 'give voice' to the Civil society in armed conflict problems faced by poor people, but which could also become real actors in bringing about social The armed conflicts in Central America were transformation. This presupposed that they seen by all the major protagonists as more than would mainly support intermediary or simply the result of social and political grassroots organisations, rather than assisting contradictions, but as a means to bring about indviduals or groups who were not in some way change. In the 1970s and 1980s, the linked into an organisational structure, or war- governments and Armed Forces of Central victims. It also meant that while their aim was to America viewed war as part of their cold-war address poverty, the agencies did not work 'counter-insurgency' policies. For the armed directly with the poorest of the poor, but with opposition and their supporters, war was a their leaders and intermediary organisations form of struggle which would eventually bring working alongside them. to power a vanguard to represent the interests

50 Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America of the poor majority (a view strengthed by the by the churches and certain state-connected Sandinistas' successful overthrow of the NGOs. This constrained their development as Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio Somoza). It communities, and encouraged a high level of is thus hardly surprising to find that civil- dependence on foreign aid (this also happened society organisations, especially the popular elsewhere, to varying degrees). The CPR in movements and those who worked alongside Guatemala were constantly on the move, and them, themselves underwent a huge range of had for many years depended on international experiences. aid and the little that they were able to produce It is widely agreed that in cases of acute armed for themselves. Although they did manage to conflict, the civilian population depends on produce a little and to develop their own social external aid only to a small degree (between 10 services, it was not until the peace negotiations and 15 per cent). In Central America, the levels began that they could develop openly as of international assistance were far higher than communities. this, particularly in Nicaragua, and this However, large sectors of the population did undoubtedly had a major impact. However, it is not fall into any of these three categories. People questionable to what extent such co-operation who had been in the thick of the fighting, and directly guaranteed the survival of those most who then lost their social connections as they affected. First, every community responds to dispersed throughout the urban areas, had to crisis differently, depending on its composition, survive as best they could. As the effects of the its history, and its culture. But since the very SAPs began to be felt, the displaced population poorest communities live in a permanent contributed to the growth of the informal sector emergency (especially in relation to food — a sector whose potential of development falls security and health-care), they have a stronger outside any of the published economic data. tradition of solidarity than other communities. In Nicaragua, popular organisations grew in In order to survive, people rely on each other number and strength on an unprecedented for meeting material or emotional needs. scale during the war, mobilising around their In terms of the conflict-related emergency, own demands and claims. However, these civilian populations in Central America found organisations were fairly muted in relation to themselves in three basic types of situation: the state since, as one leader put it, communities that lived in areas under guerrilla 'we weren't going to attack something we were control, who were either active supporters, or at part of. This ambivalence reflects very clearly least were not openly opposed to the guerillas the contradictions in which a revolutionary (such as the settlements in the former conflict movement becomes entangled in trying to meet zones in El Salvador); communities that had the expecations of the poor — on whose direct experience of attacks by either side (for suppport it depends — when it comes to power example, some communities in Nicaragua's in such precarious conditions. Nevertheless, it is border areas); and communities that, whatever also true that the levels of social cohesion and their own political sympathies, happened to live organisation were gradually eroded by the in disputed areas and therefore suffered almost economic crisis and the fact that military service constant persecution (such as the Communities was obligatory for so long. in Resistance or CPR and others in Guatemala, In El Salvador, the popular organisations — which fled to the mountains where they especially in the rural areas and in the principal survived clandestinely for years). conflict zones — were very 'belligerent'. The The Salvadoran communities were highly civilian population managed to survive under organised, having developed and consolidated fire, in the later years largely thanks to their skills and capacities while they lived in international support, but in incredibly difficult refugee camps in Honduras. Initially, these conditions and in almost total isolation from the communities survived thanks to emergency rest of the country. As long as access to these assistance in the form of food aid, basic housing, areas was so heavily restricted and controlled by and medicine. This was channelled through the military, the civilian communities also faced community-based organisations, the churches, huge difficulties in moving around. However, and various NGOs set up for this purpose. they began gradually to organise not only to Gradually, these communities began to produce address their survival needs but also to protect their own food, and to develop their own health- their communities: it was not uncommon, for care and education services. The displaced in instance, to see groups of women trecking to the Nicaragua were also given emergency assistance army barracks to demand the release of

51 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua community members who had been detained. Throughout the region, international NGOs These people also mobilised in order to get basic supported (and continue to support) a wide services in areas of the country where the state range of civil-society actors in their provided virtually nothing; and to demand organisation; but they did so with the aim of training for health promoters, education increasing these actors' capacity to bring about workers, and so on. Initially, this work was policy changes in favour of the poor majority. supported by Salvadoran NGOs and the During the war, humanitarian aid for civilians in churches, but eventually the local population the conflict zones was channelled mainly began to take over their management. through intermediary NGOs and church-based In Guatemala, there had been a strong co- organisations. These were seen to have unique operative movement and thriving NGO access to civilians in these areas, and have their community since the 1960s, often working with trust. Their analytical capacity and ability to put the indigenous indian authorities in the rural forward constructive options were also areas. With the conflict, almost all forms of important — especially during the early 1980s popular organisation were dismantled, and the when, for reasons already described, few leaders suffered badly. Thus, most humanitarian international NGOs had access to the regions of work had to be carried out clandestinely, El Salvador and Guatemala where this especially if it aimed to help those who were most humanitarian work was being carried out. severely affected by political repression and At the same time, organisations dedicated to violence. Even so, many NGOs did manage to analysing and disseminating information were survive in the conflict zones, albeit in extremely also supported, in order to allow expression of difficult conditions. alternatives to the official versions of events, In each of the above examples, the civilian which were generally either part of the counter- population took advantage of any opportunity insurgency effort, or which simply concealed to improve their own capacities and managed to what was actually happening, especially in the survive with a minimum of foreign aid, even as rural areas where the conflict was most intense. they were suffering the worst effects of the war. Support for popular organisations focused Undoubtedly, the constant risks and insecurity on strengthening their organisational capacity also created a profound sense of group identity. (sometimes from their establishment through to This in turn gave civilian populations the their emergence as fully-fledged bodies) and strength to deal with the situation — and to their role in distributing humanitarian aid. make demands of their own. Initially, particularly in El Salvador and In Central America, 'civil society' was for Guatemala, this was delivered to them through many years seen simply as existing in contrast to intermediary NGOs. Later, support for popular the state, the concept has seen a revival in the organisations began to shift towards training and post-cold war context. While popular and implementing development projects. In Central grassroots organisations invoke it in terms of America, the respective roles of NGOs and achieving or expanding citizens' participation in popular organisations have been the subject of decisions at a political level, the state and MLAs fierce debate: the former have generally been are also interested in such participation from a seen as offering technical assistance, or serving as neo-liberal perspective, seeing this as a means to intermediaries of the main political protagonists. reduce public services (Pearce, 1994). However, local NGOs increasingly claim a role as It is important to stress, however, that during civil-society actors in their own right, with their the worst years of the armed conflict, the term own proposals and ideas to put forward. 'civil society' was seldom used, and was generally seen by NGOs and popular organisations as a political construct used to create an apparently Institutional relations with local homogeneous society out of an economically and national actors and socially polarised one. International NGOs instead used criteria which were guided by their Experience in Central America makes it difficult own analysis of the extent to which their to imagine a community, country, or region in counterparts clearly represented the poor and which there are no 'appropriate' counterparts excluded, and of the capacity of these through which international aid agencies can counterparts to influence the wider process of work. Even in the most remote and isolated social and political change, and to channel locations, there are forms of community assistance to those affected. organisation that can receive supported and/ or

52 Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America act as channels through which to assist others. What about planning, evaluation, Where these were relatively weak, external and impact assessment? support focused on strengthening their organisational capacity. The churches in Central In its formal sense, planning was virtually America were also a vehicle through which to impossible during most of the war years, promote local organisational capacity, and to especially when the conflicts were at their height. support projects to provide training and First, the nature of the emergency meant that the community infrastructure. Since there has always situations were highly volatile: one always had to been a strong organisational tradition in the be ready to adapt rapidly to the demands, risks, region, many international NGOs tried as far as limitations, and possibilities arising from each possible to support local capacity-building efforts, situation. Matters were further complicated by and to minimise dependence on financial or the various natural disasters that came on top of technical assistance. In the areas where the the conflict [for example, the 1985 earthquakes conflict was most intense, and which agency staff in Mexico; the 1986 earthquake in San Salvador; could therefore not visit, it was often still possible the 1987 hurricane in Nicaragua; as well as many to channel assistance through networks of people less dramatic cases of floods, droughts, volcanic from the affected countries, some of whom were eruptions, and major industrial accidents — based abroad. Essentially, this meant being translator's note]. Second, the institutional prepared to accept the risks involved in not being culture prevailing in many of the international able to monitor these relief efforts directly. NGOs did not allow any time for proper In discussions about the kind of relationship planning; instead, they either planned in an ad- an international NGO had — or would have hoc fashion, or constant changes and domestic liked to have — with its counterparts, there were restructurings created new demands and new always two major questions: the role of such priorities for their regional offices. Finally, the agencies in 'accompanying' the processes and highly polarised political context also affected their local counterparts, especially in high-risk both the international and local NGOs who situations of armed conflict; and the concept of assumed that 'flexibility' was synonymous with a 'partners', a term generally used in aid agencies, lack of planning. In other words, they felt that rather than 'counterparts'. they had to respond to demands as and when In general, both counterparts and inter- they arose. national aid agencies valued 'accompaniment' As far as evaluation is concerned, few if any as highly as the grant-funding, in some cases international NGOs succeeded in defining a more so. I n some ways, the mere presence of the concept and methodology that matched their international organisations provided some kind own institutional expectations and demands. of guarantee of safety — in extreme cases, it Many counterpart organisations in Central ensured people's physical survival, especially in America also resisted the idea of evaluation, El Salvador and Guatemala. For the most part, both on grounds of security and because of their the agencies who took on this kind of role were relative lack of technical capacity. Hence, like-minded and shared other characteristics; during the worst of the conflict, international and in El Salvador, this accompaniment was assistance had to be 'evaluated' in undertaken in a highly co-ordinated way. unconventional ways, but sometimes without a As for 'partnership', discussions revolved clear approach and sense of direction. around the recognition that there are unequal However, most of the international NGOs power relations between an international aid underwent an abrupt change as soon as the agency, which has its own resources and agenda, peace negotiations began to take shape or and local counterparts who have no resources and accords were signed. The peace processes are in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis national coincided with the end of the cold war, and with and international decision-making fora. Some new challenges to Northern NGOs in terms agency workers argued that recognising this both of fund-raising and of new frameworks for inequality was the only basis for a frank and direct official co-operation. In response, the aid relationship with its counterparts; and that one agencies began to insist on standards of 'partner' having the money should not determine professionalism as well as planning and the basis of the relationship. Today, most evaluation capacities, for which there had been international NGOs acknowledge this underlying absolutely no preparation during the war. inequality, although many seek to establish more There was a huge gulf between these new 'horizontal' relationships with their counterparts. requirements — which must be met if NGOs are

53 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua to survive in the new global political climate — • The political conflict in Central America was and the reality of trying to develop the necessary expressed mainly between the warring parties, skills in the midst of a transition from war to and far less in the dynamics within the popular peace. This is a major issue, but one that has yet and progressive movements themselves. Their to be adequately addressed by NGOs in North identities were linked with their political and South, as well as by other actors involved in allegiances, and the various ways in which these international aid. were expressed were often very closely tied up During the 1980s, particularly when the with the physical and political survival of these conflicts were at their height, many NGOs and groups and individuals. Thus, attempts to others in Central America resisted the measure the impact of supporting specific traditional Northern approach to measuring projects and groups were often thwarted by the impact. Some reasons for this emerged from difficulty of grasping the various motivations interviews with Central American NGOs, and and political complexities that might be grassroots and popular organisations: governing their actions. • In situations of intense armed conflict, and In spite of these limitations, it was possible to certainly in Central America, impact was judged establish certain mechanisms for establishing in terms of people's expectations of structural how projects and programmes were developing. change. Thus, it was not the impact of projects, [The term 'seguimiento' or 'follow-up' is used here, programmes, or specific activities that was as opposed to monitoreo or 'monitoring'. This measured, but rather the relationship between implies a process of accompaniment, rather than these and the overall 'situation, with a view to top-down checking — translator's note]. For bringing about structural changes at the macro instance, since it was very dangerous to visit level. projects in the conflict areas of Guatemala, the • While it is not unusual for international NGOs representative of an aid agency who visited once and national actors to enter some kind of alliance, a year would share information with other the question of power (in terms of material relevant organisations. Thus, some first-hand, resources or access to information) is ever albeit not detailed, information about projects present. Anything perceived as external inter- was available. But in extreme situations such as ference in national affairs is therefore resented. these, the clearest indicator of impact is that the Here, the role of international co-operation has population survives at all. not always been clearly and explicitly denned by In some cases, for instance in El Salvador, both parties. Any such ambiguity is heightened NGOs gradually gained access to the conflict by a concept of evaluation that assumes that one zones, to provide humanitarian aid to the civilian party is going to be analysed and 'sentenced' by population. This access was the result of the other. In other words, the power that is systematic lobbying and pressure exerted on the implicit in the aid relationship becomes explicit in Salvadoran government by national and a one-way fashion and not within the framework international agencies, in close co-ordination of mutual co-operation. with the churches and representative • The nature of the work being supported organisations. Bit by bit it became possible to visit during the acute conflicts throughout the these areas, although this meant negotiating region meant that most efforts were directed many military checkpoints — always a security towards ensuring survival, with little or no risk, given that the armed forces still regarded opportunity either to reflect on and anyone who wanted to enter the conflict zones as 'systematise' this experience, or to consider 'suspicious' (Thompson, 1996; 1997). Since most other kinds of intervention. The dynamic of of the assistance at this stage was for emergency constantly responding to urgent demands not infrastructure such as basic housing, the only limited any existing capacity to measure the immediate impact was visible while the technical impact of what they were doing, but also served support was continuing. However, it was only to disempower many actors who were thus possible to evaluate the social impact years later, unable to put all their capacities to best use. once the situation had normalised. By contrast, in While this phenomenon is most dramatically Nicaragua it was easier to form technical seen in the case of national organisations and evaluations of the impact of contra attacks on actors — who were necessarily part of the water supplies, agricultural production, the process itself — the same dynamics affected situation of co-operatives, and other projects most of the international aid agencies. based in the war zones.

54 Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America

Involuntary migration and Among the various actors which took on responsibility for populations displaced by the displacement conflicts, NGOs played and continue to play a There were massive levels of both cross-border critical part, first in channelling humanitarian and internal displacement during the conflicts in aid and then in giving technical advice. Central America, especially in El Salvador, However, this has not been an easy process for Guatemala, and Nicaragua; and to a lesser extent them. There is a real debate about the role that in the other countries. Thousands of refugees NGOs should play vis-a-vis the affected (unofficially estimated to be over 1 million) left population: many popular organisations believe their countries of origin as the conflicts that NGOs should 'serve' them and their intensified. These people either sought asylum in interests, while a growing number of NGOs neighbouring countries, or tried to make their believe that they are civil-society actors in their way to the USA. Many hundreds were forced from own right, particularly in terms of their their homes and became internally displaced. engagement with political processes. Many local Overall, the international NGOs' position on NGOs argue that they have the right to define repatriation was clear: they would respect the and defend their own positions within civil refugees' own decisions concerning their return society, in support of popular groups rather than to their countries of origin. However, once they being uncritically at their sendee,. This is a region- had decided to go back, it was a priority to support wide debate at present. them in every possible way. Nevertheless, this In Nicaragua, NGOs which were very closely support always happened within the framework linked to the state in the 1980s when the major of the refugees' insistence on some guarantee for population displacements took place, helped to their security and dignity. The question of organise and orient the internally displaced whether the international NGOs would help to populations, but had little direct influence prolong the period of exile or encourage the among the Nicaraguan refugees, especially those refugees to return was simply answered by in Costa Rica. In El Salvador the church played reference to what the refugee population and its the major role in opening up access to the war representatives actually wanted. At the time, few if zones, setting up an ecumencical NGO (Diaconia) any NGOs discussed this issue in more depth. which for some years was the main point of With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps more reference for humanitarian work in these areas. thought should have been given to what kind of Later, new NGOs were able to get involved in broader capacity-building activities were needed capacity-building, channelling assistance to the to equip the refugees to deal with the realities to conflict areas, and getting actively involved in which they would be returning. Yet, given that specific lobbying, as well as influencing the vast majority were peasant farmers, the single international opinion on the question of refugees priority was and continues to be agriculture. and their repatriation. Gradually, the refugee Indeed, the refugees were sometimes more and displaced populations themselves began to experienced and capable than the small-scale deal directly with the aid agencies and to farmers in the host countries. For instance, in the participate in national and international debate. Soconusco area of Chiapas, Guatemalan refugees Throughout El Salvador, they formed their own were very much sought after as efficient—and, of organisations, prioritising their own organi- course, cheap — farm labourers. sational capacity and assigning the NGOs either a In the case of the Guatemalan refugees in merely technical role, or one of mediation and co- various parts of Mexico, international assistance ordination. In Guatemala, the refugees nom- arguably served to encourage their return. inated their own representatives to negotiate with However, many opted to remain in Mexico not the government on how their return should be only because the overall conditions are better than organised. The NGOs were the main channel for those they would find in Guatemala (although the non-government assistance to the refugees in assistance they were receiving in Mexico has now Mexico, together with the Catholic church. been sharply curtailed); but mainly because they have been discouraged by the continuing On the international stage, UNHCR was a insecurity in their own country. At the same time, central player, because of its role as protector and prolonged exile (over ten years in most cases) also its physical proximity to the refugee population. has implications for young people's identity, who In El Salvador, under an ad-hoc agreement with often prefer to stay where they are. Indeed, some the government, UNHCR was able to extend this of the Guatemalans in Mexico who were role to cover the internally displaced population. repatriated later returned to Mexico. This was critical in terms of guaranteeing their

55 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua security and organisational capacity. Unfortun- impact in terms of the trust established with the ately, it was not possible to do the same in refugees and their representatives. This provided Guatemala, where the UN had no previous access to information that was valuable for the presence in the country; as part of the peace work of the international aid agencies, and also process, it was given the task of verifying the helped to reduce the margins for error, which, in human-rights situation. The UNHCR's knowl- highly polarised settings, might have had a high edge of each of the countries in which it was based cost either for them or for their counterparts. — as well as its direct communication with the refugees, the intermediary agencies, political The experience of women refugees and actors, and national governments — funda- internally displaced mentally shaped its future role in the region. The UN Missions that have been established in the Experience in Mexico and Central America context of the Peace Accords are different. In sheds some light on ways in which displacement their role in the field of human rights, it is affects women and men differently, although precisely the level of trust they can establish which such variations are also profoundly affected by will give them access to the information that social class, ethnic identity, and the place of should shape their analysis and decision-making. refuge, as well as the circumstances and International NGO support for the refugee relationships peculiar to each context. That said, and displaced population was offered at various we would identify the following common issues: levels: • Women are, are perceived to be, or may become (even before the experience of displace- • Training in productive and other skills, with a view also to enhancing people's capacities on ment) the 'emotional pillar' that guarantees the their return home. family's ability to hold together. In Guatemala, for instance, many men in the rural areas and • Dissemination of information about events in among indian communities were either involved their respective countries and the host in the war, had been killed, or were 'disap- countries, in order to enable them as far as peared'. This meant that the women very possible to take well-informed decisions. In El suddenly had to take on responsibilities for which Salvador and Guatemala, this role was they were not prepared. Often, these women undertaken largely by the churches and by the spoke no Spanish, and had never set foot outside refugees' own organisations. their own communities. In every one of the • Lobbying activities, usually in co-ordination interviews conducted in the course of this study with other agencies. These were focused on (as well as in other testimonies), the top priorities governments, multilateral agencies, and the for most women were physical survival and the UN, with a view to helping to resolve specific well-being of their children. problems, facilitating assistance to the civilian • Women often took on an informal mediation populations, or pressing for policies that were in role in handling local and family conflicts. In accordance with humanitarian law. Siuna on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, for • Participation in regional fora. Here, the instance, women have tried to mediate in the old CIREFCA experience played a key role in conflicts that have arisen again between ex- stimulating international co-operation, perhaps Sandinistas and ex-contras, feuds that are often a unique experience both in terms of the overall fuelled by alcohol. One women's organisation has process in Central America, and because of what tried to bring together and analyse its experience, it ultimately achieved. (CIREFCA was convened and to reflect on the implications of women's by the region's presidents under the auspices of unrecognised role in post-war reconstruction. the UN to analyse and seek solutions to the • In situations of heavy armed conflict, when lives problems of refugee and displaced populations. are in real danger, many women not only had to Representatives from multilateral and bilateral maintain their families alone, but also had to agencies also attended, and national and protect their children from the possible risks by international NGOs gradually began to 'inventing' stories about where their husbands participate in and shape the process.) were. This was certainly an issue for die wives of • Physically accompanying the refugees both in men who had joined the guerrilla organisations, the camps, and sometimes also during the actual but also affected those whose husbands had been return. While such accompaniment was not killed or 'disappeared', who feared that they would permanent, this occasional presence had a crucial be subject to revenge attacks if their situation

56 Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America became common knowledge. As one Salvadoran Women's rights were rarely regarded as a refugee in Mexico put it, 'we all had to go through separate issue during the war years, but were seen a kind of death, to make sure they didn't kill us for instead in terms of the rights of poor people in real' (from a testimony taken by the Mexico City general. In Nicaragua, however, the revolution Support Committee for Refugees). served to promote a greater social awareness of women's issues, and also encouraged women to form an organisation of their own (though not Human-rights work without major debates over the question of whether this organisation should be politically Much human-rights work in Central America autonomous). In El Salvador and Guatemala, it was focused on education and promoting the was not until the peace-negotiation processes recognition of human rights as something far began that organisations emerged to defend and more than the right to life. Although this wider raise public awareness of women's rights. definition was broadly accepted in the region, as the violence became more intense throughout the 1970s, the right to life had become the main The role of international NGOs focus and driving force for all human rights- related work. As people began to win certain in mediation and reconciliation guarantees for the light to life, especially after Opportunities for mediation and reconciliation Esquipulas II, the concept of human-rights during the armed conflicts in Central America work began to expand. Even so, the right to life arose at different times and at various levels. On continues to be one of the most important the one hand, the UN's role par excellence, is that of human-rights claims, especially in Guatemala. mediator in peace negotiations. However, other In this setting, human-rights commissions individuals and institutions also played a began to emerge throughout the region, often significant part—though not publicised or widely with international NC'.O support. The commis- known — in terms of facilitating 'spaces' or loci sions later formed a region-wide co-ordination within which to stimulate dialogue between actors structure, although each commission maintained on opposite sides of the conflict. Such spaces its autonomous identity. During the 1980s, these for exchange and dialogue were opened up commissions and other bodies played a critical between, for example, business entrepreneurs role in denouncing human-rights violations, and workers, between entrepreneurs and especially in El Salvador and Guatemala. They members of the armed opposition, between also created opportunities for publicising people belonging to political parties and members information, lobbying, and exerting international of popular organisations. This facilitation was pressure, which in turn made it more difficult for generally characterised by an absence of a pre- abuses to continue to be committed with defined agenda, allowing for a trust-building impunity. Educating people about human rights process to take place, rather than pushing either was often an uphill struggle, especially given the side to make advance commitments. The fact that levels of repression and fear prevailing in most of these efforts were handled in such a low-profile Central America. Interestingly, the Honduran Human Rights Committee (CODEH) made an manner helped in this respect. At the same time, important contribution in this area. Although the involvement of certain individuals (often with Honduras was a key player in the regional conflict some institutional backing) inspired mutual trust — as a base for the Nicaraguan contra, and a and conferred a sense of legitimacy. channel of US support to them — the fact that it International NGOs did fund some of these did not have an armed conflict in its own territory efforts in Nicaragua and El Salvador, although it perhaps meant that, in spite of intense political was not always possible to document their repression, human-rights education work could involvement, given that these efforts remained address the wider social, economic, and political highly discreet. In Guatemala, various agencies dimensions. Another important inititative was the helped to introduce the concept of humanitarian training of human-rights promoters. In aid to those unfamiliar with it, and to link up Guatemala, many of these were trained by national NGOs with popular organisations which Mexican church-based agencies when they were had sprung up and developed among the refugees. This enabled them to present human- refugees and exiles in Mexico, solidarity-based rights education as central to the life and organisations, international NGOs, national development of their communities. actors, and so on.

57 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

It is this kind of'accompaniment' — often not popular organisations in some of the apparent in formal, written information, and international NGOs. In the end, it is this kind of sometimes hard to articulate in the context of trust that allows an international agency to the war or to translate into the institutional understand what is going on within any given language of the aid agencies — that underpins context, and so become a reference point for the trust placed by Central American NGOs and other international actors.

Table 4: Shifting trends in international NGO programmes durnig the armed conflicts in Central America

Period Main events and Main external events Main programme Typical counterparts processes in the region and processes focus

Up to Triumph of Sandinista USA withdraws from Support for Trades unions co- 1979 Revolution Somocista dictatorship organisational work and ordinating bodies strengthening of Rise of popular and Mexico gives active Micro-regional NGOs community and popular revolutionary movements support to Central organisations Church (micro-level) in the region American popular movement Emergency support for Human-rights Selective repression against victims of repression organisations linked to popular leaders and International support to the church intellectuals; deterioration Nicaragua following Analysis and in the human-rights Sandinista triumph dissemination of Co-operatives situation in El Salvador, information Guatemala, and Honduras Military governments in most of the region; militarisation of Central American societies

Massive and generalised US government policy Emergency support for Ecumenical co-ordintaing repression aginst popular under Reagan hardens victims of repression bodies organisations, especially towards Sandinista Support for productuion in El Salvador and government, and the NGOs working from exile and infrastructure in Guatemala; more perceived Communist Nicaragua Local church-based selectively in Honduras threat in Central America, organisations within a cold-war Start-up and ongoing Social organisation and framework support for human-rights National NGOs humanitarian assistance organisations undertaken by or for Mexico recognises and Popular organisations (peasant farmers, trades popular organisations and 'legitimises' Salvadoran Emergency assistance and unions) other groups forced armed opposition, and support for producition to underground actively supports ensure survival of refugee Co-operatives and Sandinista government and displaced populations Massive internal and federations of co-operatives cross-border displacement International isolation of Support for Guatemala because of organisational Armed conflict affects the 'Alternative' information human-rights record development and training entire region, with the agencies for popular organisations exception of Costa Rica US government supports and co-ordinating bodies Human-rights Nicaraguan contras Economic crisis and organisations Participation in CIREFCA capital flight process and support for Coups d'etat co-ordination between national and international Changes in the Sandinista NGOs government in Nicaragua Development of analysis Intensification of the war and reduction in in Nicaragua, and the role information work of Honduras as a contra base Outbreak of war at a national level in EL Salvador; fierce attacks against the revolutionary

58 Chapter Three: International NGOs in Central America

Table 4: Shifting trends in international NGO programmes durnig the armed conflicts in Central America continued

Period Main events and Main external events Main programme Typical counterparts processes in the region and processes focus

1985-90 Aimed conflicts in El Consolidation ofneo- Support for returned NGOs connected with Salvador and Guatemala liberal economic model populations support structures Esqiiipulas process World-wide detente, and Instituional stregthening elsewhere in the region acknowledges structural political changes in Support for regional co- Church groups roots of the conflicts Eastern Europe ordinating bodies Trades unions Elections and/ or civilian US government slowly co-ordinating bodies Training for and governments in several recognises need for development of lobbying Research centres countries negotiated solutions in Central America sti aiegies Women's groups Process of dialogue, with obstacles and Increasing US Production activities Co-operative movement interruptions, between intrervention to halt drug Analysis and information Human-rights governments and armed trafficking Economic alternatives organisations opposition Global economy restructured into regional Conflict resolution Refugees and displaced Human-rights abuses trading blocs persons Gradual realisation that Gender-related work no military solution to the New right-wing Popular organisations regional conflicts would governments in Latin Regional government and be possible America other structures in Return of Salvadoran Atlantic Coast of refugees from Honduras Nicaragua Rise of drug trafficking Urban-beasd groups in Mexico US invasion of Panama Regional co-ordinating KSLN loses Nicaraguan bodies elections

1990-96 UNO coalition Bi-partisan US policy tips Regional co-ordinating government installed in balance in favour of bodies Nicaragua; demobilisation negotiation of lhefr)H/ra and National NGOs International support for reduction of Army peace in the region Micro-regional NGOs commences Consolidation of new Peasant farmer Peace Accords signed in economic blocs; economic organisations El Salvador (1992) and globalisation Guatemala (1996) Women's organisations Transition and Rise in the fight against Popular organisations redefinition of roles for drugs trafficking Indian organisations civil-society institutiones Restrictions on migration and actors to the North Civilian governments throughout the region Outbreak of armed conflict in Mexico Worsening poverty for most Central Americans Regrouping of political parties both left and right Rise in common crime and drug trafficking

59 Chapter four: Conflicts and peace in Central America — some reflections

This chapter draws on over 40 interviews and and on reforming the military, in the context of meetings with a wide range of organisations: elections which also served to defuse the conflict. NGOs, grassroots and popular organisations, Thus, the peace negotiations in El Salvador, women's groups, indigenous people's associ- Guatemala, and Nicaragua were not the ations, and with ex-combatants, and individuals. outcome of any open discussion or consensus The interviews dealt with the following topics: involving civil society. While there was a general desire for peace — coupled with the belief that • the participation of civil society in the peace the armed struggle would not succeed in negotiations; achieving structural change — the negotiation • the most important continuing or new processes came about largely as the result of conflicts; pressure on both sides. From within, there were • the role of international co-operation during the social, economic, and political factors and after the armed conflicts; weighing on each party. External pressures • the psycho-social consequences of armed included the major changes brought about by conflict on those directly affected by it. the end of the cold war, the need for stability as a precondition for economic globalisation and market-led growth, and the fact that the USA Civil society in the negotiation was turning its attention — and its foreign aid — processes from Central America to other areas of the world. 'Formally speaking, civil society did not participate in Interestingly, despite the lack of formal the negotiations. These were between the USA, the participation, most of those interviewed felt that contra, and the Sandinista government.' (Nicaraguan they had in fact been involved in some way. For NGO spokesperson) example, some had joined in initiatives which had begun in the midst of the conflict, to define 7/ wasn't easy to have to see. the enemy as simply a and eventually present specific proposals to the political opponent. At the end of the day, our loved ones negotiating parties — for example, the Civil were still dead, and nothing much had changed.' (Ex- Society Assembly in Guatemala and the FMLN fighter in El Salvador) Permanent Committee of National Debate in El Salvador. In other cases, such as that of the They haven't seriously taken us into account. We Peace Commissions in Nicaragua, efforts were ought to have been at the negotiating table too ... Most focused more on facilitating and mediating in of us don't even know what the Peace Accords say. discussions between the various parties. Parts of the document are being translated into our More subjectively, however, many Central languages, but most of us can't read anyway.' (Mayan Americans feel that they made an important indian in Guatemala) contribution not so much in determining the In none of the three countries examined was outcomes of the negotiations, but in putting an there any formal participation by civil-society end to the war and bringing about peace. Civil- organisations in the peace-negotiation processes. society organisations believe that their own desire Essentially, the opposing parties became engaged for peace had a decisive effect in bringing the in processes which did not allow for any such fighting to a close. Ex-combatants expressed this direct involvement. This was despite of the fact most clearly in their willingness to lay down arms. that the respective negotiations were concerned However, rather than necessarily seeing this as a not only with bringing about a formal cessation of deliberate decision to seek reconciliation, many hostilities, but also with addressing the underlying argued that every possibility of finding a solution problems that lay at the heart of the conflicts. To through war had by then been exhausted, and some extent, Nicaragua is an exception: here, that there was a certain 'inevitability' about negotiations focused largely on demobilisation bringing this phase to a close: 'It wasn't that we

60 Chapter four: Conflicts and peace in Central America — some reflections became neutral, it was simply that the war wasn't Across the board, poverty is seen as the basic resolving anything', said one ex-contm. problem, particularly so in rural communities. Women in Central America have tended to Even when people tried to use the word 'conflict' see peace as a necessity rather than a choice. In to talk about social, political, and economic issues, armed conflicts, women usually have to take on in fact they were often describing poverty as the the responsibility of sustaining their families and greatest 'conflict' or the major 'problem'. communities, because the men are away fighting 'The main problem is that we're extremely poor. How or are in other ways affected by the conflict. In are we going lo live in peace with all this poverty, and. the words of one Nicaraguan woman: while we watch our children dying of hunger?' There were many widows and women who didn't know (Guatemalan woman) whether their husbands were dead or alive. So our major concern was for our children. But yes, we wanted peace. Other issues included the general lack of trust in politicians and political leaders; the lack of unified For women, then, peace is intimately bound up and effective organisation among the poor; the with their own security and that of their families, way in which some communities feel that they and with their children's survival. In Guatemala, have been exploited, especially in relation to women who may never before have set foot 'reconstruction'. In general, there is a strong sense outside their own communities, and who did not that most people expected the end of the war to speak Spanish (the official language), found bring with it major social and economic changes, themselves suddenly as heads of household in a both for individuals and the cmomunity. Yet such socio-economic environment which offers few changes have either not been achieved at all, or enough job openings for men, and fewer still for are considered to have been very slight. This women. Further, the absence of their husbands frustration is seen, more or less openly, as a failure made these women and their families doubly of the leaders to keep their promises. vulnerable, both to suspicion and to the general Higher up in the leadership, there tends to be insecurity facing women who are 'alone', facing a greater sense of achievement as people weigh sexual harassment or are social rejection. Some up 'what is possible versus what is feasible'. To a women were protected by their communities, large extent, such attitudes reflect the roles while others went into exile. But some women which people played both during the war and in did come to participate actively in community the negotiation and reconstruction processes. life — often for the very first time. As one The greater the direct high-level involvement, widowed Guatemalan indian put it, the greater the tendency to 'rationalise' the relationship between what is possible and what is / would, never have imagined that I would, speak in desirable, depending on the circumstances. front of so many people. I scarcely dared even lo speak However, this ability to rationalise also depends Spanish. But my predicament meant that I had to do it, on how much people knew about the negotiation and. now I am glad, to talk about my situation and. and 'reconstruction' process. For instance, some about our rights ... though I do sometimes get tired. grassroots organisations in Guatemala are unaware both of the terms of the Peace Accords, and of the negotiation and implementation The most important conflicts processes. So while they know that these today processes will affect them, they feel marginalised from them, and sceptical about any possible 'The politicians lack any clear programmes for how to benefits: 'Yet another political process that has get out of the economic crisis, and. the country is taken place in the capital city rather than in the becoming politically ungovernable for the same reason.' rural areas [where most of us live].' (Nicaraguan NGO spokesperson) In the context of this sometimes profound frustration, alcoholism has tended to generate or The political transition made so many demands on us perpetuate conflict. On the Atlantic Coast of that we could not systematise our experiences as we Nicaragua, many communities complain that would have liked, and. this has not helped, us to put alcohol makes people 'revive' their old right our mistakes.' (Member of Salvadoran resentments, and leads to frequently fatal brawls grassroots organisation) between old enemies. Others see alcohol as an 'We are poor, and tliat's our main problem. Peace is escape route and a channel for their frustrations: fine, but we want to see real changes.' (Member of a 'free psycho-analyst', as one Guatemalan put it. Guatemalan grassroots organisation) What is clear is that the level of crime is rising,

61 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua often associated with alcoholism and drug- individual defence mechanisms. However, addiction. Given that drug trafficking is now people sometimes feel stronger, more able to fairly widespread in Central America, partic- express themselves, and to speak out about the ularly in Guatemala, the picture is grim. past with the emergence of new political spaces. In Guatemala, the lack of punishment for Where this has happened, it has been a collective crimes committed during the conflict is still seen experience, in which an individual or agency has as a fundamental problem, notwithstanding the deliberately acted as a catalyst. peace process. During the war, repression and The indigenous indian population tends to feel impunity were seen as profoundly linked with that quite a lot has been gained in terms of their politics, as symptoms of a climate of political opportunity to participate. While their poverty violence. The situation becomes more compli- may have intensified, and their access to basic cated, and vulnerability takes on a different feel, services may not have improved, at least the when political repression is overlaid also with negotiation processes placed firmly on the table common crime (such as kidnapping individuals the issues of inter-ethnic relations, discrimination, in order to get the ransom money) and drug and racism. In contrast, at certain stages of the trafficking. In a way, the war provided some war, such issues were seen even within progressive sectors of the population with a sort of protection, and revolutionary sectors as merely 'secondary as long as they followed the rules of the game. contradictions'. This does not imply that anyone thinks that the The same is true of women, though in this war was a good thing. Rather, it is a question of case far more coloured by questions such as recognising that for some, the post-war period social class and levels of participation in the war. has been associated with a kind of breakdown or Issues of gender-based oppression did not chaos which makes them feel more vulnerable necessarily bring women together during the than they did when they somehow 'belonged' to war, at least not at a nation-wide level. However, something, or had a form of group identity. On the current political opening, along with their several occasions, for instance, in a Salvadoran own accumulated experience, has opened up community in one of the former war zones, I spaces in which to debate and discuss women's heard people say that they 'missed' how things concerns for the first time, as well as making were during the war. Then, everyone looked possible their greater participation in the social after each other; whereas now, everyone is out for and political life of each country. themselves: 'Some of our organisations have no resources to keep International co-operation themselves going or even to get around. This is very during the conflict sad. Many people have got tired of the whole thing and have just ended up looking after Number One.' 'During the war, there were a lot of foreigners here: co- On the other hand, war and terror have also left operants, aid, agency people, solidarity workers, and so mistrust between individuals and within on. A lot of them came for the experience', and when communities. This is especially so where com- they became disillusioned, they just left.' (Member of munity members were responsible for human- Nicaraguan popular organisation) rights violations, or denounced relatives or neighbours, or used terror as a means of 'Co-operation can liave a major influence. The right exercising authority over others. Formally, the person in the right place at the right time can make all Peace Accords call for a clean-up of the military the difference.' (Salvadoran NGO spokesperson) forces and their spy networks, but in practice On both sides of the political divides, these are very hard to eradicate. This is in part international co-operation played a very active because they are so firmly rooted not only in the role in Central America, both during the armed way people are organised, but also in the minds conflicts and in the transition period. While US and mentalities both of the victims and of those aid was clearly directed towards government accustomed to relying on terror tactics as a counter-insurgency programmes throughout means of getting what they want. At the same the region, and in support of the counter- time, peace (in the limited sense of the cessation revolution (the contras) in Nicaragua, of armed hostilities) 'legitimises' any existing European bilateral and multilateral aid forms of power, provided these are not based on (through what is now the European Union) was physical violence; denouncing these becomes generally more impartial and always justified as harder with the move from collective to being in support of negotiated solutions.

62 Chapter four: Conflicts and peace in Central America — some reflections

International NGOs were similarly marked 'The international aid agencies, particularly the by the polarised nature of the war, and showed NGOs, 'lived, through the process with us' and, often themselves to be for or against the revolutionary identified deeply with it. Suddenly, it was all change. processes either as a declared option; or because The new emphasis was on technical issues, efficiency, their humanitarian aid was channelled to efficacy, and so on — but without recognising and. populations that were — or were perceived to be taking into account the more subjective elements.' — politically and ideologically committed to one This is echoed in the experience of a Nicaraguan side or the other. NGO leader: The interviews reveal major differences between official and non-government co- 'In Nicaragua, the international aid agencies never operation, particularly in the case of those assumed their shared responsibility for having fostered, international NGOs which had a long history of paternalism. And yet now these same agencies are supporting the efforts of popular sectors to expecting us to change our ways of working from one achieve social change. One significant day to the next.' (Nicaguan NGO spokesperson) difference is in the kind of sums involved. In the view of one Guatemalan NGO repre- Compared with official aid, NGO funding sentative, the wider shift in international aid counted for very little. However, Central priorities has been exacerbated by the fact that Americans who had some experience of '[m]any aid agency people seem to be international assistance are clear that there were disillusioned with what happened in Nicaragua other, equally important, issues of quality. and El Salvador' with the result that 'we are now During the war, bilateral and multilateral aid paying the price'. went mostly to governments, with little or no Overall, the UN's role in the regional conflicts participation by national or international NGOs is viewed positively, in particular that of UN HCR or civil society organisations. While this is now in terms of the return and reintegration of changing in order to bring in greater non- refugees and displaced persons. Similarly, governmental participation, organisations that ONUSAL has a good reputation, with criticism have been on the receiving end of international focused largely on its huge expenditure and co-operation consistently identify two elements infrastructure; this was viewed as somewhat that 'make the difference'. The first is that NGOs extravagant in the context of extreme poverty in are more flexible, both because they are not El Salvador, and especially in the immediate post- entirely subject to government policies, and war period. Opinions about UNDP are far more because they often have a background and mixed. But the basic concern is that since its depth of experience that allow them to focus on mandate means that it must work with national processes of social transformation rather than governments, this limits its flexibility and often on 'quick impact projects'. The second concerns generates mistrust. In addition, the bureaucracy of the UN and other multilateral agencies 'has their capacity to 'accompany' these processes, to placed huge limitations on what they can do'. develop a different level of communication with their local counterparts, and so strengthen still Local NGOs and popular organisations in all further their focus on long-term processes. three countries made similar comments on international NGOs. In particular: 'International NGO support was vital for us popular organisations, especially when we were suffering • The importance of accompaniment — financial, brutal repression. We really appreciate the people and moral, and often even physical — at times when organisations who stood by us through thick and thin.' local counterparts were highly vulnerable. (Member of Guatemalan popular organisation) Without exaggeration, there were occasions on which this accompaniment averted, or at least However, these positive qualities are today the reduced, the loss of life. The presence of source of the most frequent criticism directed by international NGOs in the war zones of El local counterparts and others at the international Salvador served as a warning to the warring NGOs. They maintain that many of these parties not to commit human rights abuses increasingly resemble the multilateral agencies: against the civilian population (for to do would starting to adopt the same criteria, leaving social have a high political cost in terms of international processes to one side, and focusing instead on public opinion). It also helped to 'legitimise' this quick impact projects, especially in the area of population, which had hitherto been seen as economic production. As one Salvadoran NGO subversive for having chosen to return to areas spokesperson put it: under FMLN control. National NGOs value very

63 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua highly the role played by certain international argument ignores the fact that many NGOs in this respect, as well as the level of inter- Guatemalan NGOs had themselves to observe a agency co-ordination these achieved in low profile about their work and sources of supporting their own efforts and strategies. funding during these years, precisely in order to minimise the risk of a clamp-down. • In El Salvador and Nicaragua, some national NGOs believe that the co-ordination among the • Most NGOs speak of having slowly established international NGOs during the period of armed a level of trust with the international NGOs conflict facilitated progress towards a shared which enabled them to communicate during the global strategy with them, and also served to war, and to achieve some impact in the midst of encourage national and regional co-ordination armed conflict in spite of all the limitations. Some efforts among themselves. But one Guatemalan distinguish between the international NGOs that NGO representative pointed out that 'there is a sought to build such a level of trust, and those lot of talk about our lack of co-ordination, but that were operational — a way of working that From our point of view the lack of co-ordination was perceived as a lack of trust in the among the international aid agencies is a real implementing capacity of local NGOs. problem. We have to spend a lot of time trying to satisfy the individual needs of each one.' • Many NGOs hold in very high regard the advocacy work undertaken by some international • In El Salvador, some international NGOs NGOs throughout the war years, attributing this were said to have given unequivocal and effective success to their focus on detailed facts about support to the peace negotiation process. This humanitarian work. Although some feel that the was done indirectly, by supporting the capacities NGOs were not political or radical enough, the of their local counterparts to influence the general opinion in El Salvador and Nicaragua is process. In Nicaragua, their support may have that advocacy work was a success. This is dwindled after the Sandinistas' electoral defeat especially so of the repatriation and return in 1990. However, this was a gradual withdrawal, programmes (an opinion shared by the and slightly different from the rest of the region grassroots and popular organisations), partic- in that much NGO assistance had been ularly in the wake of the CIREFCA process. channelled through government or semi- autonomous structures, such as the regional • The importance of individual staff members of the international NGOs, especially during governments in the Atlantic Coast. and immediately after the war, was repeatedly • In Guatemala, the role of the international stressed. People from local NGOs and popular NGOs in supporting the peace negotiation organisations emphasise that it is not merely the process was less marked. Even so, some assisted institutions, but also the individuals who work the Civil Society Assembly, and others helped within them, who make it possible to build their various counterparts to put forward their relationships of trust which determine the views on what was happening. The complex shifts quality of support, and so make it possible to in the case of the Guatemalan peace negotiations have free and open discussions and mutual probably made NGOs think twice before trusting communication. One Salvadoran NGO worker and investing in the outcome. It should be went so far as to say that the role played by a underlined, however, that while these opinions certain international NGO in facilitating are fairly widespread, they have not been backed dialogue and discussion was qualitatively more with quantitative data (the gathering of which lies important, and had greater long-term impact, beyond the scope of this work). than everything done by UNDP during the same period. • Throughout the armed conflict, and especially during the worst phases, there were • In Nicaragua, it was frequently underlined hardly any international NGOs based in that many of the large contingent of foreigners Guatemala. Nevertheless, many continued to within the international co-operation effort, and fund or help in other ways the few local NGOs even more so in the international solidarity and popular organisations that managed to movement, came in order to 'experience' a survive. Some Guatemalan NGOs consider that revolutionary process for themselves. However, the international NGOs could, and should, have once the Sandinistas lost the elections in 1990, played a more active role in legitimising and everything became far more difficult, many humanitarian and human rights work through then left. There is a palpable level of frustration having an in-country presence. However, this and a sensation of having been abandoned just as

64 Chapter four: Conflicts and peace in Central America — some reflections things were hardest. This sense of abandonment begun to demand and apply the business appears still to rankle, since Nicaraguan NGOs management criteria of efficiency and efficacy. and other organisations are now rather reserved This was assumed to be in part due to domestic in their welcome towards foreigners. pressures on these agencies but also, as Central Americans perceive it, because their positions • Certain organisations are now self-critical of had 'hardened' in the wake of the failure to their inability to maintain a clear medium and achieve structural change in the region. long-term vision throughout the armed conflict. They explain this as having been a result of the • These criteria are not necessarily seen as demands and pace imposed by the emergency negative in and of themselves. The problem is and by the very need to survive; a dynamic in that many local actors feel that they are being which international NGOs also became 'imposed', without the necessary support and completely engulfed. As a Guatemalan popular time being given to assimilate them, and without organisation put it: 'We need to develop our the aid agencies concerned having analysed the capacities and our strategic vision. But this needs challenges represented by transition. As one time—as transition needs time—and we haven't popular leader put it, 'you can't have a strategic received much in the way of support for this.' vision if you don't even know where you stand right now'. Another said that 'strengthening In Guatemala, the ink is still wet on the Peace institutions should be seen not just as improving Accords, and while people do have opinions the administration, but also training human about the way in which the war ended, and the resources. But most co-operation agencies are immediate transition phase, it is as yet only in talking only about administrative efficiency.' A Nicaragua and El Salvador that enough time has Guatemalan NGO further stressed the impor- passed for it to be possible to gain an all-round analysis of the role played by international tance of knowing how to distinguish between NGOs in this period. That said, many administrative efficiency and helping to promote Guatemalan organisations think that the degree processes of social change. of disenchantment with the Nicaraguan and • Some Salvadoran popular leaders com- Salvadoran peace and reconstruction processes mented that after the Peace Accords had been has had negative repercussions on the signed, even 'friendly' international NGOs willingness of international actors to support the 'imposed' on them a strategic planning process Guatemalan process. which lasted almost two years. They added that In terms of the immediate post-Accord phase, although they were not obliged to go along with the following concerns stand out most: this, doing so was implicitly a condition for • For the popular organisations and NGOs, the further funding. They added that some NGOs transition to peace meant more than just re- had spent thousands of dollars on the strategic adjusting their working methods and priorities. planning process. It entailed also reviewing their entire raison d'etre, • While they saw the need for long-term and their role in the process. This was planning, they felt that the methodology was not particularly so for those organisations that were useful since it was not based on the realities and born within the armed conflict, and had focused practices of the local organisations concerned — mainly on the emergency. In El Salvador and it wasn't 'workable'. However, they regret that Nicaragua in particular, the process called for the most serious consequence was that getting reflection and debate about political autonomy, involved in these agency-dictated processes and their role as political elements within civil meant that they could not attend to their own society. It also meant addressing many internal grassroots membership, and began to focus conflicts about individual and institutional almost exclusively on brokering projects. They identity in a new context; a context in which regard this as a 'decapitalisation process in structural transformation was no longer a shared terms of our role and experience as social goal around which everyone could rally, but one organisations'. in which the various sectors were reverting to • As part of this dynamic, popular defending their own individual ground. organisations were also asked about their need • Most of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran for technical personnel who could take up the NGOs and popular organisations agreed that new challenges being posed by the international representatives of international co-operation — aid agencies. However, such personnel could and especially the international NGOs — had not always accommodate the dynamics of the

65 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua social movement within their planning to understand what is going on. Essentially, frameworks. Such organisations have come to either their minds are already made up, or they the conclusion that what they need are reject the local leadership out of hand. 'politically committed technical personnel, and • Every popular and grassroots organisation technically competent political leaders': the two that was interviewed in the course of this study are inseparable and mutually reinforcing. regarded the reduction or cessation of support • The leaders of some popular organisations still for organisational work, and the priority given reject anything that smacks of being 'technical', to production, as a major problem. As one because they associate this with bureaucracy or Nicaraguan leader put it: 'If we don't have any with losing touch with the grassroots. However, organisational structure, then we might just as these attitudes are changing, and there is a well go it alone. We don't need to work on growing recognition of the need to be skilled in a projects together — what we do need is to unite in number of areas, particularly among the local- order to seek alternatives'. For the social level leadership. organisations, support for their organisational capacity means the chance to define their own • There is a general awareness in the region that priorities, and to revive the popular movement. the war also set up patterns of dependency and paternalism, especially where aid programmes • For local NGOs, these trends translate into a were in operation. However, local organisations reduced capacity to 'accompany the process'. complain that the shared responsibility for these One Nicaraguan NGO commented that the negative effects has not been accepted by the international NGOs that are supporting them international agencies. Further, the aid agencies will now allow only 8 per cent of the budget to be imagine that such dependence can be rapidly spent on administration. This has limited their turned around — something that is simply not ability to monitor projects on the Atlantic Coast, realistic in situations in which there has been a since the transport and daily costs both for their long history of welfarism. own personnel and for the local communities would absorb almost the entire administrative • Some local organisations, NGOs in particular, budget. However, there have been limitations flagged up the role that certain international on both sides: international agencies have in NGOs played during the armed conflicts, in some cases not taken full responsibility for the terms of providing information and analysis for commitments they have taken on, and local key players in the North who otherwise would organisations have not made their needs not have had this access. This was especially true explicit. of El Salvador and Guatemala, and was closely linked with the lobbying work mentioned above. • The lack of'accompaniment' is most acutely felt within the social movement. During the war, As regards the perception of international co- many social organisations believed in the operation and the involvement of international possibility of a major change, and focused their relief and development agencies today, inter- efforts on achieving this. Today, not only have viewees stressed the following points: their political reference points disappeared or • Many of the international aid agency workers changed, but they only have a very limited role are new. They did not live through the war with respect to formal democracy. It was revealing years, and do not have a detailed knowledge of to hear a Salvadoran trade union leader say that, the context. This has made working with them paradoxically, peace had 'neutralised' their far harder, since it is like having to start all over struggle, since the formal structures could not again — which takes up a lot of time. While staff guarantee their rights, while any form of changes are normal, many local observers demonstration or pressure on their part was consider that a good prior knowledge of the interpreted as 'provocation'. Faced with this, the working environment is indispensable. little support that such organisations now receive for their work limits their chance to consolidate • The level of personal disenchantment with and establish broad-based consensus. what has happened in the region is an issue not only with Central Americans, but also among aid • Along with the new emphasis on agency workers. This has had negative effects administrative efficiency and on measurable not only on the level of support offered, but also impact, many local organisations feel that the in terms of the amount of time and trouble that international aid agencies have become far these people are prepared to spend on getting more project-focused and short-termist. One

66 Chapter four: Conflicts and peace in Central America — some reflections

Guatemalan NGO spokesperson put this There are various views on the shift towards particularly forcefully: 'We need a qualitative operational projects, and the new tendency of change in how we see international co- international aid agencies to go direct to local operation. If they [the aid agencies] want to talk communities, by-passing popular organisations about being "partners", they have to get or NGOs. In general, both NGOs and involved in the whole process, they have to be community-based organisations are critical of flexible in order to make any kind of progress, these trends, arguing that operational projects accepting that there will be partial failures along set up social and organisational dynamics that the way, but still maintaining a long-term vision. create something of a vacuum and also interfere To support processes as opposed to a few with the community's own structures. At the projects here and there means making at the same time, it is appreciated that if (but only if) an very least a medium-term commitment.' outside agency is well trusted, it can sometimes act as a facilitator in local conflict management. • A key element in the view of local actors, Certainly in Guatemala, this new dynamic has which is often under-estimated by the created real conflict: international aid agencies, is the exchange of experience both within and among the 'From the people's point of view, the foreigners arrive countries of the region. There were very few with lots of dollars, and we simply can't compete since opportunities for this during the war, both all, we offer is accompaniment ... so we lose our because of logistical difficulties, but also because legitimacy with our own people.' (Guatemalan NGO people were very cautious about sharing representative) information about their work for security Finally, some people remain sceptical about the reasons. With the advent of peace came the involvement of the aid agencies and other chance to work together. However, it seems that international organisations in the processes of support for such initiatives was falling, since reconciliation and conflict-resolution. They feel such exchanges can seldom demonstrate a that some of them became involved without short-term or measurable impact. taking into account the real conditions and need • Many community-based organisations know for structural change. They also felt that this very little about the whole aid industry, and form of intervention has encouraged some local even the beneficiaries are unaware of where the organisations to see reconciliation and conflict- money conies from, or how much is earmarked resolution as a source of fluids rather than as a for them. This sometimes generates a certain vital part of social transformation. To avoid this distrust, but also seriously limits the risk, it is crucial that any such efforts have the right focus and are also based upon real trust. communities' scope to participate in and monitor the very processes of which they are meant to be a part. The psycho-social consequences Finally, across the board, it was emphasised that of armed conflict international aid agencies should see development as a set of inter-linked processes including people's survival needs (especially in a 'Let them sign, the Accords by all, means, but all. I'm war context), but also their dignity as human interested in is making sure that the killers are beings, their capacities and opportunities to punished.' (Member of the public in Guatemala) have access to resources, as well as to participate 'I've not felt comfortable as a civilian. I'm always seen in social and political processes. as an odd-ball—I felt better before, ami, I also belonged, For many Central American organisations, to a group then.' (Ex-combatant in El Salvador) peace has brought with it a reduction in the amount of international support for their work. 'I feel strange, as if I really don't know who I am any They find this very contradictory, and have more. I used, to be a fighter and. now no-one will mien reached the conclusion that at least some of the give me a job. I used to feel that I was respected by aid agencies were simply attracted by the others. I'll get over it somehow — there are lots of us in spectacular nature of the war. A worker with one the same boat, and, we'll just have to see how we deal, NGO on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua put it with it.' (Ex-combatant in Nicagua) thus: 'It seems as if we need another armed Many years ago, Martin Baro, one of the Jesuits conflict if we want to attract any international who was assassinated by the Salvadoran attention, or get any aid'. military, commented that we perhaps must

67 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua assume that the entire generation who were terms, and consider this to be an illness. Among protagonists and victims of the armed conflicts the elderly in particular, the feeling of in Central America have been emotionally vulnerability is often heightened by their being damaged. He added that while it might be dependent and unable to do anything about the possible to repair some of this damage at a social situation; though in some cases, older people are and collective level, we must face up to the highly respected authorities in the community, possibility that the kind of repair that will allow and serve as a kind of'guide' or support in times us to build 'healthy' societies would be the task of of conflict. future generations, since our own had suffered When terror actually becomes a state policy, so profoundly. Time is proving him right. the collective social wounds transcend individual In Central America as elsewhere, the conse- suffering. In societies which place a high cultural quences of armed conflict include a psycho-social value on interaction at the community level, dimension that is still hard to define or predict, even individual trauma is assimilated as though there is certainly today a level of gener- something social rather than personal. For the alised aggressiveness and related behaviour that Mayan peoples of Guatemala, the obliteration of has itself created major problems at the local and their communities did not just mean thousands national level. For many people, the conse- of deaths, but also the violation and destruction quences are largely negative. However, it is also of their environment, their crops, of 'our soul true that individuals and groups have found and our identity', in the words of a member of constructive ways in which to channel their grief, the widows' organisation CONAV1GUA. Even their anger, and other feelings arising from the for those who survived, or who did not live in the loss of their loved ones, their identity, their hopes. areas most affected by the fighting, The process of preparing this paper highlighted four distinct types of trauma or emotional 'Suffering is normal for us... but there were many who conflicts that had been caused by the war, and suffered more than we, but they are still part of us ... as differences in the ways in which people were Indians, and although they didn't kill us, we witnessed, trying to overcome these. These differences how they killed our brothers, and. that's just as depended largely on the person's own social important to us.' (Indian community leader). background, and the role they had played during Many people consider that suffering is 'normal' the conflict itself. because it is part of their social reality. Suffering In Central America, and especially in El relates mainly to discrimination, to poverty, and Salvador and Guatemala, the military campaigns to the death or sickness of malnourished were not only directed against the rebel move- children. But when an entire way of life is ments, but also against the civilians who were destroyed, this suffering is intensified by the considered their support base. In Nicaragua, confusion and chaos caused by the fact that while the National Resistance did not focus its society has no means of managing the crisis main attacks on civilians, it did target the social- coherently, nor of offering any way out of the service and organisational infrastructure. For situation. In Guatemala, the terror was lived and example, during the years when thecontras waged acknowledged, but never mentioned by name — war on the Sandinista government, some 300,000 even to talk about community organisation or Nicaraguan citizens were left without any access to development projects could be construed as health services due to the number of clinics that 'subversive'. This silence was part of what allowed were destroyed by the contra. In El Salvador, and the atrocities to go on with impunity, and it made even more so in Guatemala, civilians became the it impossible for people even to begin to process main target of military operations in which psycho-social trauma at any level. murders, disappearances, torture, and threats In Guatemala, the question of punishing those were the 'daily bread' of thousands of ordinary who committed human-rights violations is still people, who were thus forced to live with fear, and the subject of debate, and the likelihood is that it to develop the defence mechanisms that would will never happen. While there are widespread enable them to survive. calls for the guilty to be called to account, for Asking the survivors how they felt at the point many rural communities the very minimum is when things became most difficult (for example, that what happened to them should be publicly when one of their family was disappeared), they acknowledged, in proper recognition of their usually mentioned various somatic symptoms dead and disappeared. Hence the various efforts such as fatigue, giddiness, and nausea. to make 'symbolic reparation', such as putting up Guatemalans talk about susio (fright) in similar plaques and building local monuments to

68 Chapter four: Conflicts and peace in Central America — some reflections commemorate those who lost their lives, have Among the ex-combatants, there has been real assumed real importance in reconstructing the difficulty in re-integrating and finding a new role collective memory and reweaving the social for themselves. The situation is complicated by fabric. These symbols allow people to begin to the fact that they experience social rejection process their grief; and as they begin to express (whether real or as a result of political manip- their feelings, so they can start to find outlets for ulation), being seen as a potential risk or as their individual and collective concerns. These delinquents. Individuals who only a short time efforts have mainly been encouraged by the ago were heroes now find themselves cast as Catholic church, but also by NGOs and other killers; on top of their own loss of identity they groups who are keen to reconstruct a shared suffer anguish and severe depression, and may memory. Creating a space that can stimulate begin to engage in self-destructive behaviour. public recognition of what took place (vital in Yet it is of strategic importance to analyse and contexts where high levels of repression have support this sector in the post-war period. First, always been denied), and being able to embrace because the reintegration of ex-combatants is the difficult emotions this will release, is a huge vital in achieving and maintaining peace; and responsibility. What is needed is not just a second, because reintegration requires a society catharsis, but also a capacity to accompany those to come to terms with its past and its present, and who have suffered and help them to process and to recognise the need to build a different future channel their feelings in a constructive way. — one that is based on respect for diversity, and Children, especially the ones who actually on a recognition of all the political actors. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, the ex-combatants witnessed the killings or saw family members are one of the most important groups to have tortured, are themselves tortured by dreams shown their displeasure with the failure to and flash-backs. Their parents say that they are comply with promises and agreements made generally withdrawn and frightened of loud concerning their social re-insertion. It would noises. Women seem to suffer more than men hardly be surprising, then, to find that much of from depression. One Guatemalan psychologist the rise in common crime is connected with ex- maintains that combatants who were brought up and trained as 'about 20 per cent of Guatemalan women show signs of fighters, and have not found any viable depression, which is owing to the fad tiud they are alternatives to this way of life in peacetime. involved in a constant struggle for survival, and are also Of course, many people did develop mech- hiving to play a great many roles. During the war, or in anisms to protect themselves and survive the face of terror tactics, women often succumb to being throughout the war, as well as to channel their victims of abuse either because of their family situation, or grief and anguish. But aggression can also be their religious upbringing. They feel the moral burden as seen as a response to the problems that people well as the fears, and the feelings of guilt.' now face in meeting even their basic needs. Thus, There have been lew initiatives focusing on the in addition to any strategies that they or others mental health needs of women or children are able to come up with in the area of mental throughout the region, although an increasing health, local communities urgently need to have number of women's organisations are now positive signals that things are really changing for paying attention to this in their programmes. At the better in terms of their day-to-day lives. the community level, people are developing their For almost everyone who was involved in the own strategies, which are generally based on co- armed conflicts, then, the situation has become operation and mutual solidarity. During the more, not less, complicated with the advent of armed conflict, many such communities 'took on' peace. During the war, people had clear roles to the widows and even more so the orphans, play, and a deeply rooted sense of their personal preferring to look after them themselves than to and group identity. Peace-time has meant for hand them to the government authorities or them the need to confront all the uncertainties other institutions. of adapting to a new way of life.

69 Appendix 1: Summary of the 1992 Peace Accords in El Salvador

The Peace Accords consist of nine chapters, the Chapter 4: Electoral system principal contents of which are summarised This refers to plans to reform the electoral system. below. Chapter 5: Economic and social issues Chapter 1: The Armed Forces This argues that sustainable social and economic This concerns aspects relating to the Principles of development in El Salvador is one of the pre- Doctrine of the Aimed Forces, in accordance with requisites for re-uniting the population. It covers the Constitution and within the framework of issues such as Agrarian Reform, guaranteeing the principles of a state of law. It includes the transfer of land in accordance with the establishment of an education system for the Constitution and the Agrarian Reform, and an Aimed Forces, their professionalisation, the Agrarian Code to fill the gaps and address the purging of corrupt elements, a reduction in their various contradictions within existing legislation. size, the lifting of impunity (referring this matter This Chapter also addresses the issue of to the Truth Commission), the creation of a regularising land property rights within the National Civil Police Force, and the abolition of former conflict zones, attending to the demand some of the institutions concerned with public for agricultural credit, and credit for micro- and security. It also refers to the abolition of existing small enterprises, and taking steps to alleviate the military intelligence bodies, and the subor- social cost of Economic Structural Adjustment. dination of any future such bodies, as well as the The Accord makes general observations on Ministry of Defence, to the civil authorities, to the mechanisms for international assistance. overhaul of the Infantry and the Immediate The Chapter introduces plans to establish a Reaction Batallions, the outlawing of para- Forum for Economic and Social Concertation military organs (and regulations governing the with the equal participation of government, reservists as well as any private security services), labour, and private enterprise, in order to an end to conscription, and preventive measures achieve broad-based agreements on how to foster to encourage the Armed Forces to comply fully economic and social development in El Salvador, with these provisions, including the relocation that would benefit all citizens...'. The Accord also and demobilisation of those who belonged to refers to the Salvadoran government's National military structures that were due to be suspended Reconstruction Plan, which stressed the or dissolved. integrated development of those areas of the country that had been most affected by the war, to be assisted by UNDP. Chapter 2: National civil police force This refers to the creation of a National Civil Chapter 6: Political participation by the Police Force, and addresses issues such as doctrine, functional and territorial structures, FMLN personnel qualifications, and its internal This refers to guarantees for the civil and management. It also covers the establishment of a political rights of former FMLN combatants; the Public Security Academy, as well as the judicial freeing of political prisoners; guarantees and regime covering both bodies, and the transitional security for returning exiles, casualties, and arrangements. others; the granting of mass media licences to the FMLN; the participation of the FMLN and its legalisation as a political party; and the right Chapter 3: Judicial system to spaces within which it could conduct its This concerns the integration of the National activities in a normal way. It address the FMLN's Council and Judiciary, and the establishment participation in the Peace Commission and organisation of a National Procurator for (COPAZ), and various security measures for the the Defence of Human Rights. FMLN leadership, to be verified by ONUSAL.

70 Appendix 1: Summary oflhe 1992 Peace Accords in El Salvador

Chapter 7: Cessation of armed hostilities Annexes and additions to the Peace The formal cessation of armed hostilities dates Accords from 1 February 1992, and comprises four Finally, the signed Accords contain three Annexes: elements: cease-fire, separation of forces, the • the Bases for Formulating a Law for incorporation of the FMLN into civilian life, and Authorising, Registering, and Controlling the UN verification programme. The Accord Groups or Organs to Protect the Security of contains six annexes outlining how to put its the State, Businesses, Individuals, and Private provisions into practice. Security Personnel; Chapter 8: UN verification • the Outline of a Law Governing the National Civil Police Force; Through ONUSAL, and through a specific mandate from the UN Secretary General, the • the Outline of a Law on the National UN would verify compliance with the Peace Academy of Public Security. Accords'... with the co-operation of both Parties A series of Complementary Accords dealt with and of the competent authorities'. outstanding matters which either could not have been foreseen during the principal negotiations, Chapter 9: Implementation schedule or which needed to be altered in the light of This defines the schedule and mechanisms for experience. {Execution of the Peace Accords in El making progress towards compliance with the Salvador. Re-scheduling, Complementary Accords, and, Peace Accords. Other Important Documents, United Nations, 1997).

71 Appendix 2: Summary of the main Peace Accords in Guatemala

The Accord on the Identity and Code would also address issues relating to the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples community's own authorities and respect for customary law, provided that these were This Accord, signed in March 1995, contains the compatible with the national judicial system. The following four chapters. government would propose legal dispensations to set up mechanisms for defining the scope of the indian authorities'jurisdiction; and also consider Chapter 1: The identity of the indian ways in which to commit public resources to peoples community development. This chapter of the This chapter deals with relevant constitutional Accord also set out undertakings to promote the reforms. necessary legal and institutional reforms to establish appropriate consultation mechanisms Chapter 2: The fight against discrimination with the indigenous indian populations, and guarantee them access to public positions. This section defines ethnic discrimination and sexual harassment as crimes, and establishes the government's responsibility for setting up a The Accord on Socio-Economic defence council for indigenous indian women. Aspects and the Agrarian Situation The Accord further determines that discrim- inatory laws would be derogated, that information This Accord was signed with the government of on the rights of indigenous indian peoples would Alvaro Arzii on 6 May 1996 and comprised the be disseminated, and that the approval and following four chapters. fulfilment of Agreement 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples would be guaranteed. Chapter 1: Democratisation and participatory development Chapter 3: Cultural rights This chapter deals with the government's Cultural rights would be furthered by, for commitment to enact measures designed to example, giving official recognition to indigenous guarantee popular participation in public-sector languages within the Constitution, and under- management, both through various mechanisms taking educational reform that would respect at community, municipal, departmental, and cultural diversity, while also guaranteeing regional level; and through the Urban and Rural indigenous indians access to all educational levels. Development Councils, which would in turn Respect for indigenous spiritual values and serve to promote the Local Development practices would be assured, and the government Councils. The government also undertook to would undertake to adopt anti-discriminatory restructure its development plans and reform measures and to make the necessary judicial and public bodies in such a way that these would bureaucratic changes in order to allow the ensure special attention to the socio-economic indigenous indian peoples full access to the means situation of women, particularly in relation to of communication, and to scientific, artistic, and health, housing, work, and skills training. educational information. Chapter 2: Social development Chapter 4: Civil, political, social, and This chapter includes topics such as die economic rights government's commitment to restructure the These rights would be promoted through national budget in favour of social spending and government-supported reforms of the Municipal public administration, and to guarantee that its Code in order to allow the indian communities to management would be efficient, efficient, and determine their own priorities and also shape the accountable. Spending on health and education relevant decision-making processes. The new were to be stepped up by 50 per cent of 1995 levels

72 Appendix 2: Summary of the main Peace Accords in Guatemala by the year 2000. Similarly, infant mortality was to Chapter 2: The legislature be reduced by one half, while health services were This chapter proposes that Congress set up a to be decentralised and directed towards the multi-party body to work alongside the poorest. The social security system would be legislative commissions charged with reformed, and 1.7 per cent of the tax revenue addressing the issues arising from the Peace would be invested in housing. The government further committed itself to professional training Accords, strengthening and modernising the programmes for at least 200,000 workers, while Congress itself, on the basis of a clear agenda. setting a target of 6 per cent annual growth in GDP. This body was to be formed no later than three months after the final Accords were signed, and its recommendations brought before the full Chapter 3: Agrarian situation and rural Congress within one year at the latest. development This part of the Accord focuses mainly on Chapter 3: The system of justice mechanisms through which to implement the government's undertaking to promote an In this chapter, the government agrees to reform integrated development strategy that would and modernise the system of justice. It also address issues such as land use and tenure, proposes reforms in the Political Constitution natural resources, credit, legal and technical with regard to the legal profession, public service, assistance, and guarantees of sustainability. The penal defence, and the penal code. It suggests that chapter's nine sections include participation, thejudicial system in general, and the Ministry of access to land and productive resources, the Public Affairs in particular, would be better structure of support, the productive organisation resourced with a view to establishing a Public of the rural population, the legal framework and Penal Defence Service by 1998. With assistance juridical security, an official land and property from MINUGUA, the President of Guatemala register, workers' protection, and protection of would also set up a commission made up of public the environment and natural resources. and private professionals to prepare a report and recommendations on the justice system, with Chapter 4: Modernisation of public special emphasis on modernisation, access to administration and fiscal policy justice, efficiency, professional excellence, and the role of non-government actors. In this section, the government proposes to raise tax revenue by the equivalent of 50 per cent of the 1995 GDP levels by the year 2000. It also Chapter 4: The executive commits itself to strengthening the administration In this chapter, the parties agree on setting up and recovery of taxes, and to reform the tax code an Advisory Council on Security made up of in order to make the fiscal system more efficient distinguished personalities and representatives and accountable, as well as punishing tax evasion of Guatemalan society, to be nominated by the and fraud. President. The government agrees to restructure the police forces and to establish a single National Civil Police Force to be charged The Accord on Strengthening with public order and internal security, and to Civil Power and the Role of the be fully operational by the end of 1999 under Army within a Democratic Society the auspices of the Home Office. To this end, the government agrees to adopt and to put forward This Accord was signed on 19 September 1996, to the Congress further measures relating to and signalled the end of the negotiations on the constitutional and legal reforms, the substantive issues. The provisions of its eight organisation of the police force, and the chapters were as follows: establishment of a recognised professional career through the Police Academy. Chapter 1: The state and the form of The government also commits itself to government; the agrarian situation and presenting to Congress a law to regulate private rural development security firms, and to limit the right to hold arms, This part of the Accord underlines the need to also under the aegis of the Home Office. The role improve and strengthen the state apparatus in of the Army would be restricted to defending order to further the democratisation process national sovereignty and the integrity of national and support civil power. territory. No civilian would be tried by a military

73 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua tribunal. The Accord also establishes that the represent the people, supporting their Minister of Defence could be a civilian or a participation through education and information military officer, and that a new military doctrine about human rights, and reviving the political is to be developed in accordance with the Political culture and the capacity to resolve conflicts in a Constitution, human rights, and the spirit of the peaceful manner'. Peace Accords. There would be reforms in the system of military education, while the size of and Chapter 6: Women's participation in resources available to the Army would be 'in strengthening civil power accordance with what it needed in order to comply with its role in defending national Women's participation would be achieved sovereignty and territorial integrity, and with the through the government's commitment to country's economic possibilities'. With regard to promote campaigns to disseminate information military and social service, the government as well as educational programmes to raise agrees to push for a Civil Service law which is public awareness of women's rights, support currently being developed by a joint team. women's organisations, and ensure that women were represented in all power and decision- The Accord also accepts that the Army might making structures. Both parties urge women's fulfil certain public security functions in organisations to join forces in putting the exceptional cases, but only as a temporary Accords into practice, especially in those aspects measure and at the President's discretion. that particularly affect women. Similarly, the President would establish a body to replace the Presidential High Command that would protect his own security and that of the Chapter 7: Operational aspects Vice-President and their respective families. concerning the cessation of armed conflict As far as the state intelligence services are This chapter addresses the demobilisation and concerned, the Accord proposes the setting up of disarmament of the Voluntary Civil Defence a Department of Civil Intelligence and Analysis Committees (known as Civil Defence Patrols), to under the aegis of the Home Office; its role would be completed within 30 days of the derogation be to gather information in order to combat both of the Decree governing these. Further, these organised and common crime. In addition, a Committees would not be able to reorganise in civilian-based Secretariat for Strategic Analysis order to re-establish their relationship with the would be set up, with links to the Intelligence Army. The Accord also covers the disbanding of Department and the Intelligence Section of the the Ambulatory Military Police within one year Army's High Command, with the purpose of of signing the final agreements. providing advice and information to the The redeployment of Army troops would be President. The government would aim to completed during 1997: there would be a one- prevent the existence of other intelligence groups third reduction in the number of men under or networks, and would formulate laws to that arms, and the budget would be re-oriented so as effect. The Accord also provides for the transfer to permit a 33 per cent reduction in spending by of any existing files to the Home Office. 1999 in relation to 1995 GDP figures. Military With regard to the right of ordinary training courses would be transformed in order Guatemalan citizens to seek public office, the to reflect the new military education system, and government commits itself to modernising the would thus abandon any content relating to the public administration, to encouraging training doctrine and practice of counter-insurgency. and greater professionalism among public The government would develop programmes servants, and to ensuring that corruption was to enable demobilised soldiers to re-integrate punishable by law. into society once the Accord for Firm and Lasting Peace had been signed. Chapter 5: Social participation Social participation would be addressed via the Chapter 8: Final dispositions government's commitment to decentralise public The final dispositions concern the request that administration by strengthening municipal the UN verify compliance with the Accords, government and the running of the Development which would come into effect as soon as the final Councils, setting up Local Development Councils, agreement was signed; they also include the and by creating the conditions for the commitment to disseminate the terms of the development of'... local organisations that could Accord as widely as possible.

74 Notes Select Bibliography

Oxliim GB was known as Oxfam United This paper has drawn on a great many internal Kingdom & Ireland during the period in and published documents of the Frente question, but is abbreviated to Oxfam Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) in throughout this paper. Nicaragua, the Frente Farabundo Marti de In Central America, the word 'counterpart' Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, is preferred to 'partner', for reasons and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de described in Chapter 3. For further Guatemala (URNG) in Guatemala; and on discussion on this issue, see Eade and government documents. Since most of these Williams, pp. 127-8. not readily available and are published only in 'Popular organisation' is a term commonly Spanish, they are not listed here. Likewise, the used in Latin America to describe organ- occasional publications of the Asamblea de la isations which are formed by, and represent, Sociedad Civil (ASC) in Guatemala and of the people who are in some way marginalised Comite Permanente del Debate Nacional from social, economic, and political power. (CPDN) in El Salvador are not included. The Examples of such organisations are respective Peace Accords and principle related women's groups, unions, or associations of documents are available in English from the small farmers. They differ from community- UN. based organisations in that they tend to have Information has also been taken from a wider constituency (often nationwide), and various internal Oxfam documents over the seek to influence public policy in favour of period 1979-96, including Annual Reports and their membership. For further discussion, Strategic Plans produced by the Regional Office see Eade and Williams, pp. 336-53. for Mexico and Central America, and a survey Wallenstein and Axell, 1993 4 of conflict-related work over the period by ibid. 5 Oxfam's Emergencies Department. Since these 6 Ives, 1987 are not public documents, bibliographic details 7 Bishop Gerardi was brutally assassinated in have not been included [Translator's note]. 1998 days after his report on human-rights violations in Guatemala, entitled 'Never Agerbak, Linda (1991) 'Breaking the cycle of Again', had been published (translator's violence: doing development in situations of note). conflict', Development in Practice Vol. 1 No. 3. Reprinted in Eade (ed.) 1996. Buell, Rebecca et al. (1996) Oxfam's work in conflict situations, unpublished mimeo, Oxford: Oxfam. Choucri, Nazli (1983) 'Population and Conflict: New Dimensions of Population Dynamics', New York: UNFPA. Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo de Centroamerica (1996) Guatemala: Situation Actual y Perspectives - una aproximacion para el. debate, Guatemala City: CIDECA. Comite Co-ordinator de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (1994) Guatemala: Reflexiones del pasado, consideraciones del presente y recomendaciones para elfuturo, Guatemala City: CACIF.

75 Notes Select Bibliography

Oxliim GB was known as Oxfam United This paper has drawn on a great many internal Kingdom & Ireland during the period in and published documents of the Frente question, but is abbreviated to Oxfam Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) in throughout this paper. Nicaragua, the Frente Farabundo Marti de In Central America, the word 'counterpart' Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, is preferred to 'partner', for reasons and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de described in Chapter 3. For further Guatemala (URNG) in Guatemala; and on discussion on this issue, see Eade and government documents. Since most of these Williams, pp. 127-8. not readily available and are published only in 'Popular organisation' is a term commonly Spanish, they are not listed here. Likewise, the used in Latin America to describe organ- occasional publications of the Asamblea de la isations which are formed by, and represent, Sociedad Civil (ASC) in Guatemala and of the people who are in some way marginalised Comite Permanente del Debate Nacional from social, economic, and political power. (CPDN) in El Salvador are not included. The Examples of such organisations are respective Peace Accords and principle related women's groups, unions, or associations of documents are available in English from the small farmers. They differ from community- UN. based organisations in that they tend to have Information has also been taken from a wider constituency (often nationwide), and various internal Oxfam documents over the seek to influence public policy in favour of period 1979-96, including Annual Reports and their membership. For further discussion, Strategic Plans produced by the Regional Office see Eade and Williams, pp. 336-53. for Mexico and Central America, and a survey Wallenstein and Axell, 1993 4 of conflict-related work over the period by ibid. 5 Oxfam's Emergencies Department. Since these 6 Ives, 1987 are not public documents, bibliographic details 7 Bishop Gerardi was brutally assassinated in have not been included [Translator's note]. 1998 days after his report on human-rights violations in Guatemala, entitled 'Never Agerbak, Linda (1991) 'Breaking the cycle of Again', had been published (translator's violence: doing development in situations of note). conflict', Development in Practice Vol. 1 No. 3. Reprinted in Eade (ed.) 1996. Buell, Rebecca et al. (1996) Oxfam's work in conflict situations, unpublished mimeo, Oxford: Oxfam. Choucri, Nazli (1983) 'Population and Conflict: New Dimensions of Population Dynamics', New York: UNFPA. Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo de Centroamerica (1996) Guatemala: Situation Actual y Perspectives - una aproximacion para el. debate, Guatemala City: CIDECA. Comite Co-ordinator de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (1994) Guatemala: Reflexiones del pasado, consideraciones del presente y recomendaciones para elfuturo, Guatemala City: CACIF.

75 Post-war reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua

Dye, David, Judy Butler, Deena Abu-Lughod, Keune, Lou (1995) Sobrexiivimos la Guerra, San and Jack Spence, with George Vickers (1995) Salvador: Adelina Editores. Contesting Everything, Winning Nothing: The search Lederach, Paul (1994) Building Peace: Sustainable for consensus in Nicaragua 1990-1995, Cambridge, Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Tokyo: UN Mass.: Hemisphere Initiatives. University. Eade, Deborah (ed.) (1996) Development in States Oberschall, Anthony (n.d.), Las Teorias sobre el. of War, Oxford: Oxfam. Conflicto Social, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt Eade, Deborah and Suzanne Williams (1995) University'. The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief, Ortega, Zoilamerica (1994), Los desmovilizados Oxford: Oxfam. nic.araguenses en la construccion de la paz, El Bushra, Judy and Eugenia Piza-Lopez (1993) Managua: CEI. Development in Conflict: the gender dimension, Pearce, Jenny (1996) 'Civil Society in Latin Oxford: Oxfam. America' (in draft), Department of Peace Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberation Nacional Studies, University of Bradford, UK. (1996) Los Acuerdos de Paz en El Salvador: Proceso Spence, Jack and George Vickers (1994) Una de Transicion 1992-1996, San Salvador: FMLN Revoluci and George Vickers (1994) Latin America' Publications. (in draft), Department of Peace Studies, Univer, Cambridge, Mass.: Hemisphere Initiatives. Fundacion Augusto Cesar Sandino (1995) Experiencia de la FACS en el proceso de concertacion Thompson, Martha (1996 and 1997) y reconciliacion en Nicaragua, Managua: FACS. 'Empowerment and survival: humanitarian work in civil conflict', Development in Practice Vol. Galtung, Johan (1995) 'Transformation de 6 No. 4 (part I) and Vol 7. No 1 (part II). Conflictos — una vision integral', paper delivered at the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) in Voutira, Eftihia, and Shaun Whishaw Brown Managua. (1995) Conflict resolution: A review of some non- governmental practices, Oxford: Refugee Studies Inforpress (1995) Guatemala 1986-1994: compendio Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, University del proceso de paz, Guatemala: Inforpress of Oxford. Centroamericana. Williams, Suzanne (1995) Basic Rights: Kellnia, Alexander (1995) 'Cultura de Paz', Understanding the concept and practice of basic rights paper delivered at the Primer Congreso in Oxfam's programme — a resource for staff, Latinoamericano de Relaciones Internacionales unpublished mimeo, Oxford: Oxfam. e Investigaciones para la Paz [no further details provided - translator].

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