Why Do Armed Groups Sometimes Switch from Voluntary to Forced Recruitment of Children? a Case Study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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WHY DO ARMED GROUPS SOMETIMES SWITCH FROM VOLUNTARY TO FORCED RECRUITMENT OF CHILDREN? A CASE STUDY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations Author: Jessica Besch Student Number: 11254114 Supervisor: Dr. Abbey Steele Second Reader: Dr. Jana Krause Date: 23 June 2017 Abstract Why do armed groups sometimes switch from voluntary to forced recruitment of children? By extending Beber and Blattman’s (2013) theory about the costliness of punishment I argue that an increase in economic resources, being natural resources and foreign government support, leads to a change from voluntary to forced recruitment of children. My within and cross-case analysis about the RCD-Goma and the Mai-Mai, two competing armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, should test the causal effect between my independent and dependent variable. The observable implications suggest that there is some sort of correlation, but due to a lack of fine-grained data I can only partially confirm my hypotheses. This paper highlights the importance of variation when studying the recruitment of children and calls upon scholars to guide future research on this topic in order to protect children in conflict areas. © Marcus Bleasdale, 2003 Word count: 16.557 Abbreviations Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Forces Démocratiques Alliées, Uganda (ADF) Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, Burundi (FDD) Large-N analysis (LNA) Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda (LRA) Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-ML) Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) Small-N analysis (SNA) Société minière des Grands Lacs (SOMIGL) Société minière et industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI) United Nations (UN) Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................... Contents ............................................................................................................................................ I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 6 II. Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 9 III. Theory ....................................................................................................................................... 14 IV. Research Design...................................................................................................................... 16 i. Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 16 ii. Case Selection ....................................................................................................................... 17 iii. Data ....................................................................................................................................... 21 iv. Historical overview .............................................................................................................. 23 a. Background of the conflict .......................................................................................................... 24 b. International involvement ........................................................................................................... 27 c. Natural resources ............................................................................................................................ 28 d. Ethnicity ............................................................................................................................................. 29 e. Child soldiers .................................................................................................................................... 30 v. Background of the armed groups ............................................................................................. 30 a. RCD and RCD-Goma...................................................................................................................... 31 b. Mai-Mai .............................................................................................................................................. 32 vi. Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 33 a. Data collection ................................................................................................................................. 35 vii. Results .................................................................................................................................. 47 viii. Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 53 V. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 56 VI. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 58 VII. Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 66 I. Introduction The recruitment and use of children as soldiers during conflict is condemned by the UN Security Council and is in violation of international law (United Nations, 1999). The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2002) should conduce states not to recruit children under the age of 18 and to prevent such recruitment (United Nations, 2002). However, even if agreements with governments and armed groups are being reached, they do not necessarily provide a safeguard. The “Children, Not Soldiers” campaign is advocated in order to further protect the rights of children in conflict zones (United Nations). Using children in regular and irregular armed groups can prolong negotiated settlements and harm post-conflict reconstruction (Haer and Boehmelt, 2017, p. 5). Studying the mechanisms behind the recruitment of children is therefore an important aspect to peacebuilding. The exact number of child soldiers in the world today is not known, but it is estimated at being around 10.000 and up to more than 100.000 (Child Soldiers International). The use of children as soldiers has gained more and more attention among scholars. The literature focuses primarily on the reasons of child recruitment and their consequences (Andivg, 2006; Haer and Boehmelt, 2016; McBride, 2014; Singer, 2005). Another wave of literature tries to explain why children voluntarily join an armed group. Possible explanations include escaping poverty, taking revenge and seeking protection (Brett and Specht, 2004; Guichaoua, 2007). The reintegration process of former child soldiers is also widely studied and should push policymakers to address the importance of education and constructing rehabilitation centers (Bracken et al., 1996; Wessells, 2005; Derluyn et al., 2013). Little however is known about the forced recruitment mechanisms of armed groups. Why do they recruit children by force as opposed to voluntarily? Recruiting tactics 6 are often referred to as static, producing a gap in the literature about the recruitment of adults and children as soldiers. Eck (2014) points out the importance of variation when analyzing the recruitment of armed groups: “[…] groups are likely to shift recruitment strategies depending on the exigencies of the conflict” (Eck, 2014, p. 374). Consequently, my research question will focus on the change in the recruitment method of armed groups. In this paper I am trying to explain why armed groups sometimes change from voluntary to forced recruitment of children. I will base my argument on Faulkner (2016) and Beber and Blattman (2013) by claiming that an armed group’s economic endowments influence their recruitment strategies. The latter suggest that a group with initial low level of civilian support and a resource base that is unresponsive to human rights abuses is more likely to recruit children by force. Thus, when an armed group relies primarily on natural resources or foreign donors to finance its organization, it does not have to be dependent on civilian support and can more easily adopt forced recruitment tactics (Beber and Blattman, 2013, p. 95). Faulkner also argues that the decision to recruit children by force relies on whether a group has enough resources to finance warfare. Those who lack economic endowments at the beginning of their mobilization will appeal to the civilian population for support. Groups who were successful in gaining civilian support will consequently refrain from forced recruitment practices. The second part of his theory targets the variation in recruitment practices as a consequence of changes in an armed group’s access to economic resources. Here Faulkner goes a step further than Beber and Blattman by claiming that the level of forcible recruitment of children will increase when