Young People and Armed Groups in the Central African Republic
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YOUNG PEOPLE AND ARMED GROUPS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: VOICES FROM BOSSANGOA Report YOUNG PEOPLE AND ARMED GROUPS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: VOICES FROM BOSSANGOA (OUHAM) OCTOBER 2020 AcKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DISCLAIMER: This report was written by Ben Shepherd and Lisa Heinzel for Conciliation Resources with guidance and support from Kennedy Tumutegyereize, Theophane Ngbaba and Basile Semba. It was produced by Conciliation Resources in partnership with Association pour l’Action Humanitaire en Centrafrique (AAHC). Conciliation Resources is grateful to the lead researcher Pierre-Marie Kporon and the research team, including staff members of AAHC, who supported the development of the final methodology, conducted the Listening Exercise in the field and contributed to the analysis of the findings. This publication has been produced with generous financial support from the UN Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and UK aid from the UK government. The contents of the publication are the sole responsibility of Conciliation Resources and the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the position of the Peacebuilding Fund or the UK government. The Listening Exercise was conducted as part of the ‘Alternatives to Violence: Strengthening youth-led peacebuilding in the Central African Republic’ and ‘ Smart Peace’ projects. The Alternatives to Violence project was funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund’s Gender and Youth Peace Initiative (GYPI) and was implemented by Conciliation Resources, War Child UK, Femme Homme Action Plus (FHAP) and AAHC between December 2018 and September 2020. It worked with 600 young people in Bossangoa and Paoua sub-prefectures with the aim of strengthening young people’s role in peacebuilding at the local, prefectural and national level, while also increasing their resilience through increased economic opportunities and psychosocial coping skills. Smart Peace is a four-year programme (2018-2022) funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). The project promotes strategic conflict resolution in the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Myanmar. Smart Peace is implemented by Conciliation Resources, in partnership with International Crisis Group, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Asia Foundation, ETH Zürich, Behavioural Insights Team and Chatham House. In the Central African Republic, the project seeks to strengthen the link between local and national peace processes. Published by: Conciliation Resources Burghley Yard, 106 Burghley Road London NW5 1AL Design & layout: www.revangeldesigns.co.uk Proof reading: Asha Pond Cover photo: Young Anti-balaka fighters on the road. © Marcus Bleasdale. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Conciliation Resources carried out a Employing a Listening approach, the research also Listening Exercise with young people sought to empower young people, providing them with a space in which they felt comfortable to reflect associated with Anti-balaka in Bossangoa openly on their own situation (see more details in (Ouham prefecture) in the Central African the Methodology section below). By sharing the Republic (CAR). The aim of the Listening experiences, views and concerns of young people with a wider audience, this report seeks to amplify the voices Exercise was to understand young people’s of young people, while also providing analysis for the reasons for joining the Anti-balaka, development of policies and programmes aimed at their life in the group, pathways for supporting the reintegration of young people returning demobilisation and challenges they face from armed groups in northwestern CAR. when returning to their communities. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SUDAN Vakaga CHAD Bamingui-Bangoran SOUTH SUDAN Haute-Kotto Nana-Grébizi Ouham Ouham- Ouaka Pendé Kémo Haut-Mbomou Nana-Mambéré Mbomou Ombella-M’Poko Basse- Mambéré-Kadéï Bangui Kotto Lobaye Sangha-Mbaéré DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AMEROON om C 150km CONGO 100 miles © d-maps.c Conciliation RESOURCES • YOUNg PEOPLE AND ARMED gROUPS IN THE CENTRAL African REPUBLIC: VOICES FROM Bossangoa 3 BOSSANGOA SUB-PREFECTURE Gbangayanga Gpt Bouansouma Nana-Bakassa Ndoromboli Bongeure Bozali Gbadé Bodouk Benzambé Dadoukota Bogouna Dadou Kota 2 Boue Ouham Bac Bossangoa Gbaziangassa Gbatong Wikamo Gassa Lougba Gpt Zere Soungbe OUHAM Soumbé PENDÉ Koro Mpoko Tchoungoutchou Bouca Prefecture boundary Gbakaba Sub-prefecture boundary Commune boundary Main road 0 12.5 Road Ndow-Kotta km Map sourced from OCHA The main findings that emerged from the research are: • The Anti-balaka, as understood by former young members, emerged as an organic and largely • Nearly all young people listened to joined the spontaneous expression of community needs for Anti-balaka to defend their community against Séléka self-defence and revenge. It had a loose hierarchy attacks, for protection – for themselves, their parents, and flat command structure, with volunteers being or communities – or revenge. In addition, though much indoctrinated and coalescing around individual less prevalent, some perceived the alleged complicity commanders. The Anti-balaka was a syncretic mix of local Muslim populations with Séléka as a betrayal of armed group and spiritual movement, with ritual of the community and of them personally; a few, ‘vaccination’ commonplace and ritual power acting as perhaps under the influence of political leaders, an important defining status within the group. referred to it as ‘treason’ against the state. Those who joined tended to be younger and poorer than those who didn’t, with poverty being identified by community members as making young people more vulnerable to approaches or manipulation by armed group leaders. 4 Conciliation RESOURCES • YOUNg PEOPLE AND ARMED gROUPS IN THE CENTRAL African REPUBLIC: VOICES FROM Bossangoa • Leaders were reported as exclusively male, and • Former Anti-balaka members reported a warm rank-and-file fighters extensively so. The majority welcome from their families, who were in some cases of women took up non-combatant support roles. proud of what they had done. Most went through a The youngest women we listened to had a ritual role ritual purification rite before being allowed back to in preparing food or ‘fetishes’ (combat ‘equipment’ the family home. This rite was not to apologise for which included amulets, clothing and ways of their conduct, or for reconciliation – it was instead to styling their hair). However, a minority of female safeguard their future health and that of their family. respondents were involved in combat, suggesting This mirrored the ritual indoctrination that they that gender roles were not absolute. Women spent underwent on recruitment, and implies a commonly significantly shorter times in the armed group – six understood cycle of moving from peaceful family months on average, as compared to 18 months for life into ritually sanctioned violence in response to men – for reasons including pregnancy, perceived threats to the community. This, by implication, is a threat from fellow armed group members, and the cycle that could be repeated. need to return to look after children. • Relations between young former Anti-balaka • The majority of former Anti-balaka members left members and the wider community are a complex the group once they felt that their ‘work’ had been and difficult mix of sympathy, respect and fear. completed and they had achieved what they set out Most community members appreciate what Anti- to accomplish – this was disconnected from the balaka members did to protect the community, and dynamics of national politics and few respondents have sympathy for them. At the same time, they are stayed in the Anti-balaka beyond the period of local frightened and resentful of their conduct. conflict. For some, local ‘peace’ was synonymous • There are indications that the Anti-balaka had settled with the removal of all Muslims from the region – this back into a latent community defence network, and suggests an acute risk of a resumption of tensions in some cases were appreciated as such by some and possible remobilisation in the event of poorly community members, particularly in areas with low managed returns of Muslim internally displaced state presence. Former members remain in touch people (IDPs) and refugees. with each other and with their commanders, and • Many former Anti-balaka members remained in were significantly more willing to rejoin in the event contact with their families; some reported that their of future threats than former armed group members return was at least in part due to pressure from listened to in Paoua. family members, though it is likely that others felt • The needs of young former Anti-balaka were broadly pressure to continue fighting from the same source. understood by both combatants and community Hard conditions within the group, concerns over members to be employment, finance and training, weakening group discipline, and abuses against particularly in agriculture, animal husbandry, civilians were also important factors in some returns. commerce and trades. Many respondents – including • Very few young former Anti-balaka members reported many former Anti-balaka themselves – also having gone through any process or taken any formal identified the need for psychosocial support and steps in leaving the group – their departure was as counselling. The structural challenges – employment, organic as the process for joining. In most cases, they infrastructure and community development – impact returned unaided to their home communities