HIGH LIGHTS of the GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 25 Enemy Forces Left Capable of Annulling the "Hattie of the Frontier" Has Fully the Success Already Obtained
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HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN -SOVIET WAR By O. PRINCIPINI The Genllo71·S0-vjct tUt'lr is being lough.t on Sitch It tre1tlendous seate 01 ?/len and miles that it will lor a wng time be impossible to obtain a. clear lJieture of the actual course of events. Yet 80me general outlines are discernible. It is al?'eady obvious that the battle between Germany and the USSR differs from th~ previous campaigns of the prcsent war. Here a'/'e the views of a competent obsertler on the Ii-rst twelve weeks 01 hostilitics.-K.M. The Russo-German conflict, in the actual p;ovision of adequate, timely "first twelve weeks of war, has had two and effiCIent material aid to the Soviet essential phases-the "battle of the Union by Britain and America. frontier" and the "battle of the Stalin Line": battles of giants, the struggle of colossa" armies, along frontiers and NO BLITZKRIEG IN RUSSIA? in war-zones practically unlimited. During the first week of the war While it is still too early thoroughly there was real fear in London and to examine the various phases of the Washington, perhaps more than in fighting, certain conclusions are already Moscow, of seeing Russia "blitzed" in clearly enough revealed. However, an a few weeks, as had been the case first objective military or political observer, in Pola.nd. then France, and most re before reaching definite conclusions, cently in Yugoslavia and Greece. And must proceed cautiously. limiting him as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev are self to a rational examination of the today still in Russian hands, the Anglo 'first fundamental aspects of the tre American press speaks of a victorious mendous struggle and deducting from Russian resistance. them the basic elements for a logical The truth may very soon turn out to and well-based judgment. be quite different. It seems that in the Out of the fog of military secrecy the Russian campaign the German Com first lights and shadows of the new mand has again taken the enemy by war have begun to appear. surprise, not only in the choice of time but also in the choice of tactical Russia, upon entering this war, could methods. It should be remembered rely on two sources of strength: the that the real military purpose of a war tremendous distances, and the huge is the defeat of the enemy forces, not reserves of man-power and materials; the occupation of enemy territories. we shall later see how these have been Victory is very often manifested, it is utilized by the Red High Command. true, by the occupation of enemy ter Initiative and surprise-two fun ritories, but not unless the occupation damental elements of success in war of the strategic territorial objectives seem t.o have disappeared immediately, presupposes the destruction of the de and perhaps forever, from the hands fending forces by depriving the enemy of the Red Headquarters. Three other of the very sources of his war-power elements, however, seem still uncertain and by striking directly at the heart to the distant observer: the moral and will of enemy resistance. All this c!)hesion of the Red troops; the leader is only true if, after the objectives ship of the Red Command; and the have been reached, there are no more HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 25 enemy forces left capable of annulling The "hattIe of the frontier" has fully the success already obtained. confirmed what the German High Com mand suspected, namely, that Russia From reports known to us up to now was for a long time secretly preparing -reports that are necessarily frag for war, massing her forces to strike mentary and incomplete - we are at Germany while the latter was en prompted to conclude that the German gaged on other fronts. The tenacious Command is applying in Russia a new resistance met by the German troops tactical method which is perhaps most since the first day of this campaign appropriate to the particular situation has been possible only because there on the Russian front. There has been were already Russian troops and mate no spectacular drive, none of those rial at the Russo-German frontier prac audacious, impressive, arrow-like tically ready to start the offensive thrusts, as that on Lemberg in 1939 to themselves. cut any possible junction of Poland with Rumania, or as in France in 1940 Perha.ps history will later record the thrust on Amiens, Abbeville, and that it is just this which has been the Dunkirk, or that on Athens through fatal self-condemnation of Soviet Rus Salonika and Larissa. In the Russian ~a. The timely move of the German campaign, the day-to-day situation of Army compelled the Soviet Command the opposing fronts has on Borne days to employ a great quantity of its forces shown wide and deep indentations to when the Red Army was not yet com ward the east; but generally the fronts pletely ready to fight. And moreover, have kept, and are continuing to keep, to fight not only at a time but also in an almost unbroken line. a territory and in a manner less favor able to the Soviet forces. Perhaps the German Command, tak In a defensive struggle such as the ing into consideration the vastness of one now imposed on the Soviet forces, the Red provinces and the great nume the Russian High Command had prob rical strength of the Soviet armies, ably intended to exploit to the maxi preferred to thrust directly into sepa· mum the vastness and depth of the rate enemy armies instead of at great endless Soviet territory: in other words, territorial objectives. In other words, to give up space in order to gain time; "blitzkrieg" localized against the de to gain time in order to prepare a fight fending forces, as at Bialystok and under the most favorable conditions, Minsk, at Vitebsk and Smolensk, as re namely, where, when, and in which cently between the lower Bug and lowt;r ever way the grouping of her own Dniepr and as in many other locali forces and the general situation ties all along the wide Russian front. makes It advisable to fight, that is, to maintain the bulk of her own STALIN LOSES ADVANTAGE OF forces at a great distance from the enemy with a view to keeping fully her SPACE own freedom of action and of maneu Another of the main conclusions it ver; to withdraw as far as possible has been possible to draw immediately from the starting-bases of the German after the "battle of the frontier" is forces in order to compel the German that Stalin has been compelled to give Command to lose time by searching for up his advantage of space. Enormous the enemy, to build new advance-bases Russian land and aerial forces have for its land and air forces, and to re been compelled to fight and have been open long ways of communication or defeated, all along the frontier, since to bring into use new ones. the first day of the campaign without We all know today that exactly the being able to withdraw to the main opposite happened. The Red High Russian defense line. Command had deployed towards the 26 THE XXth CENTURY west all the bulk, and perhaps the best more to its natural advantages than its part. of its mammoth war-machine: its defensive preparations. Of great value headquarters, its mechanized units, its are the supporting wings at the two imposing land troops, its airfields, its opposite ends of the line, facing re deposits of supplies. These Russian spectively the Baltic and the Black forces, arrayed for an attack, were now Seas. suddenly forced to fight a defensive battle in a mo t critical situation. Since In the north, the system seems to it was impo..sible to take up in time have consisted of an advanced line of positions further back-as would have defense along the lower river Dvina, a been advisable in a defensive battle- line which is completed in the rear by the Russian Command had to accept an excellent defense in depth, linked up open battle from the first day of the with the Lake Peipus region and sup war, under conditions of great dis ported at a convenient distance by the advantage to its own forces. Indeed naval base of Kronstadt and the great the German Army was able, from the sUpply base of Leningrad. beginning of the campaign, to develop In the south. on the Black Sea front, to the full its unfa.iling ability for the there was another multiple system of offensive, operating at short distances defense lines. First, an advanced line of from its own starting-bases. fortifications along the lower Dniestr, For the Russian High Command the well supported by the central supply surprise was complete. Not until after base of Odessa and by the naval base of the first week of war was it reorganiz Niko}ayev. The main defense line was ed and the front divided into the perhaps constructed along the lower three known sectors: northern, central, river Bug. Still further to the east is and southern (Voroshilov, Timoshenko, a defense line curving back onto the Budenny). lower Dniepr, whose course at this point turns in again towards the east, THE STALIN LINE which is not very favorable for the The Stalin Line has already given economical defense of that territory. its name to the second phas'e of the In the centre, the Stalin Line was war.