HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN -SOVIET WAR By O. PRINCIPINI

The Genllo71·S0-vjct tUt'lr is being lough.t on Sitch It tre1tlendous seate 01 ?/len and miles that it will lor a wng time be impossible to obtain a. clear lJieture of the actual course of events. Yet 80me general outlines are discernible. It is al?'eady obvious that the battle between Germany and the USSR differs from th~ previous campaigns of the prcsent war. Here a'/'e the views of a competent obsertler on the Ii-rst twelve weeks 01 hostilitics.-K.M. The Russo-German conflict, in the actual p;ovision of adequate, timely "first twelve weeks of war, has had two and effiCIent material aid to the Soviet essential phases-the "battle of the Union by Britain and America. frontier" and the "battle of the Stalin Line": battles of giants, the struggle of colossa" armies, along frontiers and NO BLITZKRIEG IN RUSSIA? in war-zones practically unlimited. During the first week of the war While it is still too early thoroughly there was real fear in London and to examine the various phases of the Washington, perhaps more than in fighting, certain conclusions are already Moscow, of seeing Russia "blitzed" in clearly enough revealed. However, an a few weeks, as had been the case first objective military or political observer, in Pola.nd. then France, and most re­ before reaching definite conclusions, cently in Yugoslavia and Greece. And must proceed cautiously. limiting him­ as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev are self to a rational examination of the today still in Russian hands, the Anglo­ 'first fundamental aspects of the tre­ American press speaks of a victorious mendous struggle and deducting from Russian resistance. them the basic elements for a logical The truth may very soon turn out to and well-based judgment. be quite different. It seems that in the Out of the fog of military secrecy the Russian campaign the German Com­ first lights and shadows of the new mand has again taken the enemy by war have begun to appear. surprise, not only in the choice of time but also in the choice of tactical Russia, upon entering this war, could methods. It should be remembered rely on two sources of strength: the that the real military purpose of a war tremendous distances, and the huge is the defeat of the enemy forces, not reserves of man-power and materials; the occupation of enemy territories. we shall later see how these have been Victory is very often manifested, it is utilized by the Red High Command. true, by the occupation of enemy ter­ Initiative and surprise-two fun­ ritories, but not unless the occupation damental elements of success in war­ of the strategic territorial objectives seem t.o have disappeared immediately, presupposes the destruction of the de­ and perhaps forever, from the hands fending forces by depriving the enemy of the Red Headquarters. Three other of the very sources of his war-power elements, however, seem still uncertain and by striking directly at the heart to the distant observer: the moral and will of enemy resistance. All this c!)hesion of the Red troops; the leader­ is only true if, after the objectives ship of the Red Command; and the have been reached, there are no more HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 25 enemy forces left capable of annulling The "hattIe of the frontier" has fully the success already obtained. confirmed what the German High Com­ mand suspected, namely, that Russia From reports known to us up to now was for a long time secretly preparing -reports that are necessarily frag­ for war, massing her forces to strike mentary and incomplete - we are at Germany while the latter was en­ prompted to conclude that the German gaged on other fronts. The tenacious Command is applying in Russia a new resistance met by the German troops tactical method which is perhaps most since the first day of this campaign appropriate to the particular situation has been possible only because there on the Russian front. There has been were already Russian troops and mate­ no spectacular drive, none of those rial at the Russo-German frontier prac­ audacious, impressive, arrow-like tically ready to start the offensive thrusts, as that on Lemberg in 1939 to themselves. cut any possible junction of Poland with Rumania, or as in France in 1940 Perha.ps history will later record the thrust on Amiens, Abbeville, and that it is just this which has been the Dunkirk, or that on Athens through fatal self-condemnation of Soviet Rus­ Salonika and Larissa. In the Russian ~a. The timely move of the German campaign, the day-to-day situation of Army compelled the Soviet Command the opposing fronts has on Borne days to employ a great quantity of its forces shown wide and deep indentations to­ when the Red Army was not yet com­ ward the east; but generally the fronts pletely ready to fight. And moreover, have kept, and are continuing to keep, to fight not only at a time but also in an almost unbroken line. a territory and in a manner less favor­ able to the Soviet forces. Perhaps the German Command, tak­ In a defensive struggle such as the ing into consideration the vastness of one now imposed on the Soviet forces, the Red provinces and the great nume­ the Russian High Command had prob­ rical strength of the Soviet armies, ably intended to exploit to the maxi­ preferred to thrust directly into sepa· mum the vastness and depth of the rate enemy armies instead of at great endless Soviet territory: in other words, territorial objectives. In other words, to give up space in order to gain time; "blitzkrieg" localized against the de­ to gain time in order to prepare a fight fending forces, as at Bialystok and under the most favorable conditions, Minsk, at Vitebsk and Smolensk, as re­ namely, where, when, and in which­ cently between the lower Bug and lowt;r ever way the grouping of her own Dniepr and as in many other locali­ forces and the general situation ties all along the wide Russian front. makes It advisable to fight, that is, to maintain the bulk of her own STALIN LOSES ADVANTAGE OF forces at a great distance from the enemy with a view to keeping fully her SPACE own freedom of action and of maneu­ Another of the main conclusions it ver; to withdraw as far as possible has been possible to draw immediately from the starting-bases of the German after the "battle of the frontier" is forces in order to compel the German that Stalin has been compelled to give Command to lose time by searching for up his advantage of space. Enormous the enemy, to build new advance-bases Russian land and aerial forces have for its land and air forces, and to re­ been compelled to fight and have been open long ways of communication or defeated, all along the frontier, since to bring into use new ones. the first day of the campaign without We all know today that exactly the being able to withdraw to the main opposite happened. The Red High Russian defense line. Command had deployed towards the 26 THE XXth CENTURY west all the bulk, and perhaps the best more to its natural advantages than its part. of its mammoth war-machine: its defensive preparations. Of great value headquarters, its mechanized units, its are the supporting wings at the two imposing land troops, its airfields, its opposite ends of the line, facing re­ deposits of supplies. These Russian spectively the Baltic and the Black forces, arrayed for an attack, were now Seas. suddenly forced to fight a defensive battle in a mo t critical situation. Since In the north, the system seems to it was impo..sible to take up in time have consisted of an advanced line of positions further back-as would have defense along the lower river Dvina, a been advisable in a defensive battle-­ line which is completed in the rear by the Russian Command had to accept an excellent defense in depth, linked up open battle from the first day of the with the Lake Peipus region and sup­ war, under conditions of great dis­ ported at a convenient distance by the advantage to its own forces. Indeed naval base of Kronstadt and the great the German Army was able, from the sUpply base of Leningrad. beginning of the campaign, to develop In the south. on the Black Sea front, to the full its unfa.iling ability for the there was another multiple system of offensive, operating at short distances defense lines. First, an advanced line of from its own starting-bases. fortifications along the lower Dniestr, For the Russian High Command the well supported by the central supply surprise was complete. Not until after base of Odessa and by the naval base of the first week of war was it reorganiz­ Niko}ayev. The main defense line was ed and the front divided into the perhaps constructed along the lower three known sectors: northern, central, river Bug. Still further to the east is and southern (Voroshilov, Timoshenko, a defense line curving back onto the Budenny). lower Dniepr, whose course at this point turns in again towards the east, THE STALIN LINE which is not very favorable for the The Stalin Line has already given economical defense of that territory. its name to the second phas'e of the In the centre, the Stalin Line was war. The fate of the great fortified probably based on the rivers Dvina and lines in this war has been unfortunate. Dniepr. Toward its centre the courses Mannerheim, Maginot, and Metaxas of these two rivers (flowing in opposite were really ill-advised to give their directions) do not meet but turn off at names to the principal defensive or­ an abrupt right.angle to the east, ganizations of Finland, France, and forming in that sector a wide corridor, Greece. Will the name of Stalin be long known as the "CQrridor of Smo­ any more fortunate? The results so lensk." The cities of Vitebsk and far achieved by the Germans justify Smolensk are both within this corridor. us in seriously doubting this. This is precisely the most dangerous We do not as yet precisely know point of the whole front, for through either the actual course or the con­ here passes the shortest route to Mos­ structive details of the "Stalin Line." cow, that is to the heart of the whole It would seem likely that such a line Russian defense system. SmCllensk has for its main object the defense of really deserves the name of the Western Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov; for Gate of Moscow. Napoleon used this it more immediate object the defense route for his advance on Moscow. In of the line of great advance centres: this ~ar. Smolensk has already given Reval-Smolensk-Kiev-Odessa. A sum­ its name to what is perhaps so far mary glance at the map of Russia is the bloodiest battle of the war. Both sufficient to mnke clear that this line Vitebsk and Smolensk are entirely in is undoubtedly powerful, due perhaps the hands of German troops. HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 2'1

THE BATTLE OF THE STALIN planes, tanks, in tens upon tens of LINE thousands, soldiers in tens of millions; and other practically inexhaustible war This battle appears so far to be the resources in general. Truly impressive decisive battle of the whole Russian figures, even in comparison with the campaign. War communiques confirm colossal war machines of the most mo­ with daily increasing clarity that the dern and most powerful countries in Russian High Command has decided to the world. throw into the Stalin Line the greater Today, after over two months of war, part of its fighting forces. The battle Stalin has apparently sent out desper­ is still in full swing, but the outlines ~re ate S.O.S. messages to his friends in visible. London and Washington. We do not For many weeks the German High know yet whether he has asked for aid Command has been hammering at the in the form of man-power; but he has Stalin Line at various points, alternat­ certainly made urgent requests for help ing its blows between the centre and in the form of war machinery and the north and the centre and the munitions, and perhaps of fo?d; and south; with feints to the right and real it seems he even needs gasolme and blows to the left; with feints towards other fuels and lubricants. the Baltic and a terrific blow towards Supposing that all these things were the Black Sea. The Soviet Command available. how are they going to reach has tried to parry these blows as best Russia? There is the painful ques­ it could, and to stop up with all pos­ tion of ships already sunk in huge sible haste the most threatening gaps numbers on all the Seven Seas. This in the system, thereby undoubtedly problem of transport was of most using up tremendous quantities of its pressing urgency even before the Ger­ land and air forces. man-Soviet war created new demands. In the south, large Axis forces have got around the Dniestr and Bug from THE SOVIET COMMAND AND THE above, so 'that these two rivers have quickly lost all defensive value. The RUSSIAN SOLDIER conquest of Nikolayev has effectively The capacity for leadership of the -sealed the fate of Odessa, if not the Russian High Command cannot yet be potential fate of the whole rich coastal definitely judged, but it can already be region facing the Black Sea. In the subjected to severe criticism. The Red centre, large German forces have cross­ Army has long been called a "giant ed the Dniepr, and turning to the with a head of clay:' Years of "Red south. already menace the rear of the purges" have wrought havoc in the whole defense system hinging on the Army, particularly in the upper com­ great population centre of Kiev. In mand, causing a grave crisis in quantity the northern sector, Leningrad is and quality, which has most certainly gripped in a vice, from the south and had an unfavorable influence on the from the north. The fall of Leningrad conduct of the war. Up till now the would entail that of Kronstadt, where­ Russian High Command has had to by the Soviet forces lose their last submit almost entirely to the initiative remaining communications with the of the enemy. Baltic. Commanders and general staffs are THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS MORE not to be found in a hurry. To prepare good military leaders, just as to pre­ ARMS pare good scientists, years of intensive, At the beginnin~ of the war the world patient, and conscientious work are was stunned by information published necessary; above all today, when tech­ ,about the Soviet Army: officers, air- nical science pervades and often pre- 28 THE XXth CENTURY dominates in nearly all fields of war In conBidering the Soviet perfor­ activity. The use of large modern mances so far one must recognize that armies, provided with complex and de­ "planes and tanks" are primarily used licate instruments of war, requires in for offensive and counter-offensive. the commanders a capacity for organi­ Russia, forced suddenly to fight on the zation which can only be acquired after defensive, has not been able to make long and assiduous experience of com­ much use of her gIl'eat numeric'a! mand. strength in airplanes and tanks; more­ Anti-Soviet propaganda, especially over many were quickly destroyed by that of England and America, has the German forces. . The overrated always represented Russia as a herd Soviet parachute troops never put in of cattle, held together by the whip a serious appearance. of the herdsman Stalin with the aid of The Red Army does not seem to his faithful horde of vicious watchdogs, have succeeded in contriving an "armor the OGPU. With or without a whip, of defense" capable of halting effective­ the fact remains that the Red soldiers ly the attacking might of modern have certainly put up a good fight these technical and aerial forces. But it has first two months of war. The German learned from the French defeat to fight Command has not failed to point this in a very deep front and always to out. The younger generation in Rus­ keep sufficient reserves to deal with sia, having grown up in the atmo­ enemy forces that have succeeded in sphere of the Soviet regime, has learned breaking through. to obey, to march and to die. REPERCUSSIONS THE RED ARMY AND THE LES­ In the general fielg of the European SONS OF PREVIOUS CAMPAIGNS conflict, the beginning of the Russo­ German campaign had tremendous re­ Russia entered the war nearly two percussions; it was immediately hailed years after the outbreak of the present by the Anglo-American press. London European war. By now the Red Army heaved a sigh of relief. The specter has had the benefit of utilizing to its of a German invasion vanished once own advantage the lessons learned by again. At Suez and at Gibraltar others through experience. In this anxiety diminished. Traditional British war, absolute supremacy in land war­ policy could really boast of a genuine fare has until now been held con­ success. At last a new ally had joined tinuously by the airplane and the tank. the British Forces. Stalin was prepar­ The binomial term of attack, "planes ing to fight to the last RusBian. In and tanks," has suddenly altogether the heart of every EnglishQlan was ousted the old binomial term of defense, kindled the hope of seeing Germany "trenches and machine-guns," which hopelessly bogged in the Pripet largely predominated in aU sectors of marshes, crushed in the embrace of the the last World War. Russian giant. Up till the beginning of the present But apparently Stalin was more war, the Red Army seemed to be realistic, directly attacking the vital among the best equipped in the world, part of the problem: the active and especially in the fields of aviation and effective co-operation of England and mechanized forces; at least in quantity America. He would not be satisfied if not in quality. It was therefore in with empty guarantees like those given a position to carry out a rapid adapta­ to Poland and others. He wanted not tion to new methods of land warfare, fine words but deeds: airplanes, can­ based precisely on the intelligent use of nons, munitions; not bombardments by airplanes and tanks. Reuter but genuine and effective- HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 29

bombardments against the common embark on the Continent would mean enemy; fewer hymns of praise in honor ships, thousands of ships. of the Soviet soldiers but effective co­ Perhaps the possibility could be operation of British soldiers. examined of another enterprise where This new problem soon became a the going was easy, such as the offen­ major anxiety for London as well as sive in Cyrenaica against Italian troops Washington. Were they to make who were without mechanized equip­ British troops march on the heels of ment; or the offensive in East Africa the Axis? This was without doubt the against Italian forces who had been most propitious moment to date, with isolated from their own country for a the greater part of the Axis troops year; or the most recent campaigns engaged on the eastern front. against Iraq and the French in Syria? But where were they to march We know now that the answer was British troops to? The European con­ Iran. This occupation of a neutral tinent? The High Command in London country brings British soldiers to the is still nursing the wounds received by Persian oilfields and to the gates of British forces in Norway, at D~nkirk, those of Baku. How much the Russians and in the Balkans. Moreover, to dis- will benefit by it, remains to be seen.

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