Stalin's Surprise
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PROFILES IN POWER STALIN AS WAR LEADER Clive Pearson assesses the Soviet dictator's war record. N Right: The marriage took place on 23 August 1939; divorce came on 22 June 1941, mucb to Stalin's surprise. WONDER. How LOHG THE HÛNÊYKÏIÛÎJ WU. LAST? s leader of a highly centralised more recently such as Thunder in the tiative. In addition. Soviet forces were dictatorship Josef Stalin East by Evan Mawdseley and biogra- hardly prepared for modern warfare. Ainevitably played a pivotal part in phies by Simon Sebag Montefiore and They lacked radios in tbeir tanks and air- every area of the Soviet war eflort during Robert Service give us a greater under- craft to co-ordinate any attack and there the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). standing of Stalin's real thought process- were very few transport vehicles to ferry Hence he bore direct responsibility for es and enable us to appreciate more the troops around quickly. Time was the course of the war and its outcome. clearly u'hy certain decisions were made. therefore needed before Soviet forces At the end of the titanic struggle he would be ready. paraded himself as Generalissimus and By tbe Nazi*So\iet Pact of August war hero. Yet the truth is rather mixed. The Pre-war Period 1939 Stalin believed he had bought pre- Why. for example, did Stalin allow him- cious space jnd time. He ratbcr rasbly self to be 'surprised' by Hitler in June The Soviet elite was imbued witb tbe pronounced, 'I know wbat Hitler's up to. 1941 when it was clear what German idea tbat war with the capitalist powers He thinks be bas outsmarted me. But plans were? Why did the Soviet leader was inevitable. Partly for this reason. actually it is 1 wbo bave outsmarted continue with failed military policies for Stalin had embarked on a course of rapid him,' He tbus took advantage of tbis so long? On the other hand, what were industrialisation, tbrougb his Five Year agreement to extend Soviet frontiers the decisions taken by Stalin, particular- Plans, so that by 1941 Russia's economy westward. The old defensive line, the ly after 1941. that steered Russia away easily rivalled tbe otber great powers of Stalin line, which had run along the pre- from catastrophe to triumphant victory? Europe. Unfortunately, the same could vious Soviet frontier was abandoned [\n 1 he collapse of the old Soviet Union not be said witb regard to military pre- line with the idea of'offensive strategy) in 1991 has allowed historians to gain paredness. The responsibility for tbis lies iind mo\'ed up to ¿i new frontier. But ibr access to archives and to better answer witb the suspicious and vindictive Soviet plan soon began to unravel wben I litler these questions. Richard Overy's Russia's dictator. His purges of army and air force made short shrift of bis opponents in the War, published in the 1990s, v;as commanders in 1957-8 had the effect of west and was quickly able to point bis ground-breaking. Other books written undermining morale and paralysing ini- armies eastward. By 1941 Soviet forward DECEMBER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW PROFILES I^ POWER Right: A map showing the distribution of German and Soviet forces in July 1941. At this stage Stalin denied his military commanders any flexibility. He only changed his tactics in August 1942. positions were still not ready and there was no second line to fall back to, as the Stalin line had been left in a state of dis- repair. Yet Statin still boped that Hitler would delay. The Soviet Union was vast. Surely the Wehrmacht, too. would need more time to huild up its forces. And, after all, Germany was still at war with Great Britain. But attack Hitler did. As sugjj,ested by Marshall G.K. Zhukov. the greatest of the Soviet war Commanders, Stalin's military leadershiji tan be divided into three phases. The first phase begins with the outbreak ot war and ends with the preparation for Stalingrad in Septenitier t942. The sec- ond phase goes up untit the end of the Baute of Kurstv in July 1943. The final phase covers up to the end of the war in May t945. By this time Stalin had emerged as a 'real mitítary commander'. Through these phases we can under- stand how he evolved as war leader. Phase One - Disaster Statin's first, atmost fatal, error was not to atlow his own forces to mobilise in time hefore the impending Nazi attack. In the West it was tong believed that the main reason for this was the Soviet dic- tator's unwillingness to accept that he had been outmanoeuvred by Hitler. To moment. Hence, when nothing hap- to react and were completely overrun. admit that the Germans were launching pened, Stalin was sceptical about their Nazi forces using their Blitzkrieg tactics an offensive now would mean that his usefulness. In any case the end of June were soon able to puneh huge boles in whole strategy of buying time with ihe seemed far too late For an attack on Rus the Soviet front line. It was easier going Nazi-Soviet Pact had failed. In addition, sia. Furthermore, for the Germans in he no doubt realised thai his armies Statin helieved that ttie centre and were still not ready for an all-out conflict the Nazi leadership • • I know what northern sector as with the Führer. was divided and that Hitler's up to. He Stalin had mistaken- However, other information from the to mobilise Soviet ty deployed the butk sources has recentty come to tight. Per- forces pre-emptively thinks he has of his forces in the haps another faetor influencing Stalin's eould trigger eonfliet. outsmarted me. south. As a result decision-making was the Nazi timing. Sueh thoughts German torces were Stalin received intettigence from Britain, undoubtedly But actually it is abte to reach Minsk japan and inside the German Air Min- weighed heavily in I who have (300 miles inside istry regarding the date of a likely attack. his mind. Soviet territory) All three suggested the offensive would iTie Nazi onslauglit outsmarted him within a week. In come in the tast half of June. Yet previ- began on the morning ttiiit area atone ously these sources had suggested May of 22 June 1941. Stalin's tardy orders to 340.000 So\iet troops wore tost in a cou- was the month ot" the attack. They were mobilise spelled disaster for Soviet ple of weeks. In addition, the Soviet air rigtii t)ut Hitler had detayed at the last forces. Many army units had no chance force was almost completely wiped out, HISTORY RFVIEW OECEMBI-H 2008 37 PROFILES IN POWER with about 4Ü0Ü combat aircraft lost in were blamed for the catastrophe at new Siberian forces, the Soviet comman- the initial days. Minsk and shot. Unfortunately all this der counter-attacked and sent the Ger- Stalin's reaction was not psychological had a stifling effect on initiative. In addi- mans reeling back a hundred miles. Il collapse. On the contrary he stayed in tion, in August, decree 270 ordered that showed just what Soviet generals could charge with a full diary. Only for a cou- the families of those who surrendered do if they were allowed some flexibility. ple of days at the end of June did he would be arrested and imprisoned. No This victory before Moscow, however, retreat in despair to his dacha. But he one was exempt. The surrender of Stal- did not herald a general turning of the soon pulled himself together and took in's son, Yakov, meant that the dictator's tide. Stalin determinedly kept overall charge of the situation. He made an own daughter-in-law spent two years in a control and his ambitious attempt to important rallying speech to the nation Soviet prison camp. Fear, if nothing else, push back the Germans all along the line on 1 July. On 12 July he re-established would keep his forces fighting. led to Further defeats. In the spring of Stavka (headquarters) and made himself Stalin arrogantly continued with his 1942 the Germans launched another Supreme Commander. At a critical all-out ilttacking strategy. In August major offensive. It was not on Moscow, moment he showed himself resolute and Hitler ordered his Army Group Centre to as expected, but in the south and determined. veer south and ensnare tbe bulk of Rus- towards the Caucasus. Again the Soviet sian forces in the south. Zhukov, a leader rushed in forces without giving member of Stavkii, then advised a their commanders enough flexibility to Stalin's strategic withdrawal and the abandon- meet the demands of the situation. A ment of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, but further concern was that Soviet troops heavy-handed Stalin instead poured in further reserve had become dangerously demoralised by control of all army forces. The result was a disaster on an constant defeat and were no longer epic scale. In one short campaign the putting up much oF a Fight. Despite Stal- movements denied Soviet government now lost around in s decree of 'Not one step backwards!' his commanders any 500,000 troops. in July the German advance seemed unstoppable. The result vv-as that by The situation in the north was no bet- flexibility. Disasters September 1942 Hitler's Forées had ter as Leningrad was surrounded and reached the Caucasus Mountains and were almost besieged in September. Soon it would were in the suburbs of Stalingrad. inevitable * A be Moscow's turn.