PROFILES IN POWER STALIN AS WAR LEADER

Clive Pearson assesses the Soviet dictator's war record.

N

Right: The marriage took place on 23 August 1939; divorce came on 22 June 1941, mucb to Stalin's surprise. WONDER. How LOHG THE HÛNÊYKÏIÛÎJ WU. LAST?

s leader of a highly centralised more recently such as Thunder in the tiative. In addition. Soviet forces were dictatorship Josef Stalin East by Evan Mawdseley and biogra- hardly prepared for modern warfare. Ainevitably played a pivotal part in phies by Simon Sebag Montefiore and They lacked radios in tbeir tanks and air- every area of the Soviet war eflort during Robert Service give us a greater under- craft to co-ordinate any attack and there the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). standing of Stalin's real thought process- were very few transport vehicles to ferry Hence he bore direct responsibility for es and enable us to appreciate more the troops around quickly. Time was the course of the war and its outcome. clearly u'hy certain decisions were made. therefore needed before Soviet forces At the end of the titanic struggle he would be ready. paraded himself as Generalissimus and By tbe Nazi*So\iet Pact of August war hero. Yet the truth is rather mixed. The Pre-war Period 1939 Stalin believed he had bought pre- Why. for example, did Stalin allow him- cious space jnd time. He ratbcr rasbly self to be 'surprised' by Hitler in June The Soviet elite was imbued witb tbe pronounced, 'I know wbat Hitler's up to. 1941 when it was clear what German idea tbat war with the capitalist powers He thinks be bas outsmarted me. But plans were? Why did the Soviet leader was inevitable. Partly for this reason. actually it is 1 wbo bave outsmarted continue with failed military policies for Stalin had embarked on a course of rapid him,' He tbus took advantage of tbis so long? On the other hand, what were industrialisation, tbrougb his Five Year agreement to extend Soviet frontiers the decisions taken by Stalin, particular- Plans, so that by 1941 's economy westward. The old defensive line, the ly after 1941. that steered Russia away easily rivalled tbe otber great powers of Stalin line, which had run along the pre- from catastrophe to triumphant victory? Europe. Unfortunately, the same could vious Soviet frontier was abandoned [\n 1 he collapse of the old not be said witb regard to military pre- line with the idea of'offensive strategy) in 1991 has allowed historians to gain paredness. The responsibility for tbis lies iind mo\'ed up to ¿i new frontier. But ibr access to archives and to better answer witb the suspicious and vindictive Soviet plan soon began to unravel wben I litler these questions. Richard Overy's Russia's dictator. His purges of army and air force made short shrift of bis opponents in the War, published in the 1990s, v;as commanders in 1957-8 had the effect of west and was quickly able to point bis ground-breaking. Other books written undermining morale and paralysing ini- armies eastward. By 1941 Soviet forward

DECEMBER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW PROFILES I^ POWER

Right: A map showing the distribution of German and Soviet forces in July 1941. At this stage Stalin denied his military commanders any flexibility. He only changed his tactics in August 1942.

positions were still not ready and there was no second line to fall back to, as the Stalin line had been left in a state of dis- repair. Yet Statin still boped that Hitler would delay. The Soviet Union was vast. Surely the Wehrmacht, too. would need more time to huild up its forces. And, after all, Germany was still at war with Great Britain. But attack Hitler did. As sugjj,ested by Marshall G.K. Zhukov. the greatest of the Soviet war Commanders, Stalin's military leadershiji tan be divided into three phases. The first phase begins with the outbreak ot war and ends with the preparation for Stalingrad in Septenitier t942. The sec- ond phase goes up untit the end of the Baute of Kurstv in July 1943. The final phase covers up to the end of the war in May t945. By this time Stalin had emerged as a 'real mitítary commander'. Through these phases we can under- stand how he evolved as war leader.

Phase One - Disaster

Statin's first, atmost fatal, error was not to atlow his own forces to mobilise in time hefore the impending Nazi attack. In the West it was tong believed that the main reason for this was the Soviet dic- tator's unwillingness to accept that he had been outmanoeuvred by Hitler. To moment. Hence, when nothing hap- to react and were completely overrun. admit that the Germans were launching pened, Stalin was sceptical about their Nazi forces using their Blitzkrieg tactics an offensive now would mean that his usefulness. In any case the end of June were soon able to puneh huge boles in whole strategy of buying time with ihe seemed far too late For an attack on Rus the Soviet front line. It was easier going Nazi-Soviet Pact had failed. In addition, sia. Furthermore, for the Germans in he no doubt realised thai his armies Statin helieved that ttie centre and were still not ready for an all-out conflict the Nazi leadership • • I know what northern sector as with the Führer. was divided and that Hitler's up to. He Stalin had mistaken- However, other information from the to mobilise Soviet ty deployed the butk sources has recentty come to tight. Per- forces pre-emptively thinks he has of his forces in the haps another faetor influencing Stalin's eould trigger eonfliet. outsmarted me. south. As a result decision-making was the Nazi timing. Sueh thoughts German torces were Stalin received intettigence from Britain, undoubtedly But actually it is abte to reach japan and inside the German Air Min- weighed heavily in I who have (300 miles inside istry regarding the date of a likely attack. his mind. Soviet territory) All three suggested the offensive would iTie Nazi onslauglit outsmarted him within a week. In come in the tast half of June. Yet previ- began on the morning ttiiit area atone ously these sources had suggested May of 22 June 1941. Stalin's tardy orders to 340.000 So\iet troops wore tost in a cou- was the month ot" the attack. They were mobilise spelled disaster for Soviet ple of weeks. In addition, the Soviet air rigtii t)ut Hitler had detayed at the last forces. Many army units had no chance force was almost completely wiped out,

HISTORY RFVIEW OECEMBI-H 2008 37 PROFILES IN POWER

with about 4Ü0Ü combat aircraft lost in were blamed for the catastrophe at new Siberian forces, the Soviet comman- the initial days. Minsk and shot. Unfortunately all this der counter-attacked and sent the Ger- Stalin's reaction was not psychological had a stifling effect on initiative. In addi- mans reeling back a hundred miles. Il collapse. On the contrary he stayed in tion, in August, decree 270 ordered that showed just what Soviet generals could charge with a full diary. Only for a cou- the families of those who surrendered do if they were allowed some flexibility. ple of days at the end of June did he would be arrested and imprisoned. No This victory before Moscow, however, retreat in despair to his dacha. But he one was exempt. The surrender of Stal- did not herald a general turning of the soon pulled himself together and took in's son, Yakov, meant that the dictator's tide. Stalin determinedly kept overall charge of the situation. He made an own daughter-in-law spent two years in a control and his ambitious attempt to important rallying speech to the nation Soviet prison camp. Fear, if nothing else, push back the Germans all along the line on 1 July. On 12 July he re-established would keep his forces fighting. led to Further defeats. In the spring of Stavka (headquarters) and made himself Stalin arrogantly continued with his 1942 the Germans launched another Supreme Commander. At a critical all-out ilttacking strategy. In August major offensive. It was not on Moscow, moment he showed himself resolute and Hitler ordered his Army Group Centre to as expected, but in the south and determined. veer south and ensnare tbe bulk of Rus- towards the Caucasus. Again the Soviet sian forces in the south. Zhukov, a leader rushed in forces without giving member of Stavkii, then advised a their commanders enough flexibility to Stalin's strategic withdrawal and the abandon- meet the demands of the situation. A ment of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, but further concern was that Soviet troops heavy-handed Stalin instead poured in further reserve had become dangerously demoralised by control of all army forces. The result was a disaster on an constant defeat and were no longer epic scale. In one short campaign the putting up much oF a Fight. Despite Stal- movements denied Soviet government now lost around in s decree of 'Not one step backwards!' his commanders any 500,000 troops. in July the German advance seemed unstoppable. The result vv-as that by The situation in the north was no bet- flexibility. Disasters September 1942 Hitler's Forées had ter as Leningrad was surrounded and reached the Caucasus Mountains and were almost besieged in September. Soon it would were in the suburbs of Stalingrad. inevitable * A be Moscow's turn. Stalin called on his last reserve armies and the opolchenie (peoples militia) to make a last-ditch Unfortunately Stalin's ideas on how to defence in front of the capital. However, Phase Two — Soviet prosecute the war were based on those further soviet defeats Followed. The way Counter-Attack he had experienced in the Russian Civil to Moscow seemed open. But the Rus- War of 1918-21 and which had proved sian winter had set in early and by the By the end of August 1942 Stalin at last successful at the time. This meant that end of November the Nazi advance had realised that to continue with his pre- there would he fierce discipline, tight ground to a halt on the outskirts of the sent command system was courting dis- political control, and a constant offen- capital. After some vacillation Stalin aster. So he appointed Zhukov as his sive strategy Bred up by supposed revo- showed his courage by staying in deputy and conceded that Siarka, of lutionär)' zeal. Alongside this there devel- Moscow rather which the dicta- oped a 'no retreat' or 'stand fast' policy. than fleeing. The • • New Soviet tor remained a Yet this proved to be a flawed strateg\- in situation had for part, would the face of the Nazi Blitzkrieg, which the moment been armies would be agree on strategy involved vast encircling movements deep stabilised. Indeed built up, thoroughly together. I If behind enemy lines. According to Mar- this was a deci- soon appointed shal Zhukov, the dictator had little sive turning point trained and prepared two other gener- understanding of the requirements of in the war. but kept in reserve als of exception- modern warfare. Stalin's heavy-handed Hitler's inability al ability to control of all army movements denied to take Moscow until the propitious Stavka. Fhey meant that his commanders any flexibility. Disasters moment came for were Aleksandr were almost inevitable. Blitzkrieg had Vasiievsky as his It soon became clear how the Soviet failed: the war a mighty counter^ chief of staff and leader intended to keep control and dis- was now to be punch. It was to be Aleksei Antonov cipline. In July the political commissars, one of attrition. as his chief oF or politruki, were reinstated in every mil- For Stalin Blitzkrieg In reverse f y operations. itary unit with the task of keeping a these months Decision-making watchful eye on all commanding officers were critical. In desperation in Novem- would be made on a more collegiate and their men. Commanders who were ber 1941 he had sent Zhukov first to basis and disagreement with the dictator deemed to have failed faced the forbid- Leningrad to shore up the defence there would be tolerated. This new method ding wrath of the dictator. For example. and then in December had ordered him would soon bear fruit in a dramatic General D. Pavlov and most of his stalf to save Moscow. Soon afterwards, with turnabout in the war.

38 DECEMBER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW PROFILES IN POWER

Left: A German tank rolls over a Russian trench, during the Nazi invasion in 1941.

ing. his new team decided to let the Ger- mans continue their advance. New Sovi- et iirmies would be built up. thoroughly trained ;ind prepared but kepi in reser\'e unlil iho propitious moment came Fora niljihly counter-punch. It was to be in reverse. The resulting defeüt of German forces al Slalingrad was ii decisive turning point in ihe war. Zhukov prepared his Forces for 45 days before launching two pouer- fiil pincer movements, whiih trapped 330.ÜÜO Cjcrniiin lorces inside the city. In January 1943 the hapless German commander, von Paulus, finally surren- dered. Il was a catastrophic blow lor the Third Reich. Stalin celebrated by making himiielf Marshal of the Soviet Union. He wore his new tunic until the end oF the war. The new strategy was working. Further Stavka attempts Hi ensnare more German armies nüv\ largely failed. There was no significant breakthrough. So by April Stalin sought counsel with his team to decide the way Forward. Tbe Stavka knew tbat tbe Germans would next launch a concerted attack towards the Russian salient around Kursk. Stalin wanted to launch a pre-emptive offen- sive immediately. Zhukov and the other generals disagreed. Tbey came up witb a diFFerenl approach. Tbere was to be no offensive but Soviet forces would wait and adopi a policy oF 'defence in deptb', Tbe Russian army would absorb tbe attack and, witb forces beld in reser\'e, launch a massive counter-atlack. Tbe new Stalin accepted tbe advice. Tbe result was tbat ihe Soviet leader avoided another probable defeat. Tbe long expected German attack came in July 1943. Waiting for tbem were eighi lines oF elaborate defence networks stretching lïack for 150 miles. Wliy had Slalin continued with his win. Perhaps he was right in this Ililler launched his forces against the failed strategy for so long? The main rea- assumption, though it was a dangerous neck of ibe salient attacking From nortb son was undoubtedly that ht' was out of viewpoint given the sheer scale of Soviet and south. Despite employing his very tmich with inociorn warfare, but his for- losses so far. best SS troops, as well as tbe new heavy- im-r stance had also suited his system of In September 1942 Stahn proposed weight Tiger tanks, the assault was soon rule. Pride and arrogance were also fun- his usual immediate offensive with fresh blunted. Within a fortnight the huge bat- damental reasons: to change policy reserve troops ¡it Stalingrad. Zhukov and tle was over and Nazi Forces were forced mt-ant loss of face and the necessity of Vasilevsky muttered something about the to withdraw; For Stalin this further victo- sharing power with his generals. Stalin need for "another solution, whereat Stal- ry meant ihat in just over six months be also believed that constant attack would in famously turned round and asked bad achieved a decisive turnaround in wear down the Nazi Forces in a war ot 'what other solution?" This change in the war. All ibis was undoubtedly due to iitirition which only the Soviets could style was Fundamental. Instead of attack- the new decision-making strategy.

HisTORï REVIEW DECEMBEII 2006 39 PROFILES IN POWER

Left: Sergei Merkurov's statue of Stalin. Did his record from 1939 to 1945 really justify such an heroic and glorious image?

completely changed. In imitation of the Germans, the army was now hased on the idea of fast moving tank corps along with new mechanised eorps containing sclf-propelled artillery. The airfiirce. too, was reorganised to allow it to concen- traLe its units for close support of major offensives. The result was that Soviet forces were now able to tnatch the Wehrmachi in the field.

Phase Three — Soviet Victory

In this final phase from July 1943 to final victory in May 1945, Stalin matured and evolved into something approaching a real military commander'. according to Zhukov. Although in general he still shared in strategic policy deci- sions, his personal understanding of comhined arms operations and modern military technology had grown and meant that he had truly emerged as n 'worthy Supreme C-in-C. Stai'ka's planned counter-attack after I litter's withdrawal at Kursk punched a huge hole in the German central from Other co-ordinated attacks followed. By September 1943 the Soviet leader was gleefully hinting that the war might be over in months. But the Germans again managed to stabilise their front, and to allow them to dig in could have serious consequences. Better-equipped and organised Soviet armies were now able to launch a series of further well-pre- pared offensives and wrong-foot the Ger- mans. By Novemher 1943 Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, had been liberated and soon other great victories followed. •fhe start of 1944 saw the first of Stal- in's 'ten crushing blows' of that year. First of all, in Januar\' Leningrad was liherated from its Nazi stranglehold. In May Zhukov launched the spectacular Opera- tion Bagration. German Army Group Gentre was taken completely hy surprise Changes, however, were not only hap- at last understood the need for greater when Soviet armoured units were pening at the top. At Stalin's insistence self-reliance and flexibility in his com- unleashed through the Pripet Marshes. the hated politruki ipolitical commis- manding officers. The advance became swift and by the sars) had their powers reduced in the Stalin caiised wholesale changes to be end of September Soviet troops had autumn of 1942. Commanders, too. made throughout the Soviet armed entered the Baltic States. and were no longer executed for failure. He forces after 1941. Army organisation was Rumania. Stalin's role in all this had

40 DECEMBER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW PROFILES IN POWER

been pivotal. According to Vasilevsky, he to utilise the whole of urban society for early years of Soviet power under Lenin. was in his prime and had become an the war effort. All men aged from 16 to American diplomat Averill Harriman effective military co-ordinator'. 55 were enrolled. Women were second- thought Stalin the most effective of the Tbe Soviet dictator now felt so confi- ed to war factories and into agriculture. war leaders'. dent of bis military abilities that he took Gulag (prison camp) labourers, of whom As supreme military commander he control of the central theatre of opera- there were at least two million, made an was flexible and able to adapt to circum- tions bimself. Stalin may also bave important contribution towards production. stances. Me built up a team of remark- feared that, as Soviet forces neared The Soviet able quality in Berlin, one of his military commanders dictator was Stavka and used might steal all the glory. He egged on his astute in exploit- ••A relieved Stalin them to help win commanders to go ever faster towards ing his new West- might savour his tbe war. He their final goal of the German capital. ern Allies for the learned from Perhaps concerned tbat tbe Western war effort. Under victory celebrations - tbcm and devel- Alhcs might get there first, he turned tbe tbe Lend-Lease but 27 million Soviet oped as com- capture of Berlin into a race between scheme, America mander bimself. Generals Zhukov and Konev. The whole and Britain war dead could not y y At Teberan tbe campaign was rushed and improvised agreed to provide British chief of and resulted in heavy loss of lif^e - but vast quantities of vital supplies. Most the Imperial General Staff, CJeneral Sir this bad never been a concern of tbe important of these were communications Alan Brooke, was impressed and tbougbt Soviet dictator On May 2 1945 German equipment (350.000 radio sets were sent Stalin bad a 'brain of the highest military forces in tbe Nazi capital surrendered. to Russia), fuel, vehicles (200,000 calibre'. An exhausted Stalin revelled in his Studebaker army trucks) and railway Vet for all tbis Stalin's legacy was far role as victorious warlord and had him- requisites. All these made a vital differ- from heroic. His setf-deception with self appointed Generalissimus - ence and allowed Soviet armies to co- regard to the timing of tbe Nazi attack although he complained that his new ordinate their efforts and carr)' out their nearty resutted in catastrophic defeat. white uniform made bim look tike 'a constant deep offensive' strategy from His incompetent handling of Soviet hotel waiter'! Yet the truth behind victory Stalingrad onwards. forces in the first 14 months of the war lay not just w ith military As war leader Stalin also had to be a had tragic consequences. All this meant diplomat working with these new allies. that losses were far heavier than they At Teheran in November 1943 and at need have been. A relieved Stalin might Total War Yalta in February 1945 he opportunisti- savour bis victory celebrations - but 27 cally exploited the divisions between niiltion Soviet war dead could not. For Stalin the economic forces bad Churchill and Roosevelt, and the latter's always been as important as tbe military. naive idealism. He thus avoided an open During tbe Givil War he had seen bow breach when Soviet forces occupied the whole of society bad been mobilised Eastern Europe and secured his main Issues to Debate for the conflict and how the means of aim of Soviet security. In tbe end he • What is tbe most important factor production had been completely sub- conceded very little hut gained a great tbat explains Stalin's victory in tbe sumed to that end. Two days after the deal. In tbis area the Soviet dictator was Great Patriotic War? German attack in June 1941 the order mightity successful. • Do you agrt'f th;it Slalin was the for the transportation of targe numbers 'most effective of the Wiir leaders'? of factories, macbines and manpower to • What was it ahout tbe Soviet sys- beyond tbe Ural Mountains was given. Conclusion tem that dllowed Stalin to quickly E\entuatly as many as 25 million work- mobilise the country for total war? ers and tbeir families were moved east. Statin was indeed crucial in winning tbe As a result, in tbe second half of 1942. war for the Soviet Union. He had a deci- 1- It r t h c r Heading the rump Soviet economy was ahle to sive role in the centre co-ordinating mili- out-produce the Germans in artillery, tary and economic strategy. Through bis R. Overy, Russia's War (Penguin, 1999) tanks and air- secure grip on E. Mawdsley, Thunder in the íastThe craft hy a factor tbe government, Nazi-SovierWar 1941-45 (Hodder of two or even • • Eventually as many party apparatus Arnold. 2005) three to one. The as 25 million workers and tbe economy S. Sebag-Moncefiore, Stalin The Court Iof USSR bad be was able to the Russian Tsar (Phoenix. 2003) become a suc- and their families avoid cotlapse R. Service. Statin.A Biography cessful war econ- were moved east and turn defeat (Macmillan, 2004). omy. Ihis. then, into triumpb. He explains in good was under no part the turnaround in Soviet fortunes. delusions as to wba( would be required Cllve Pearson is Lecturer in History at Stalin left no stone unturned in order to survive in modern warfare. Total wai Gloucestershire College near Cheltenham and to mobilise the population. He was able was a concept be bad learned in tht Course Leader for the History Department

REME^W DECEMBER 2008 41