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THE CHIEF CULPRIT Icebreaker: Who Icebreaker: HISTORY • WORLD WAR II WAR WORLD • HISTORY the U.S.A

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THE CHIEF CULPRIT Icebreaker: Who Icebreaker: HISTORY • WORLD WAR II WAR WORLD • HISTORY the U.S.A Suvorov THE CHIEF CULPRIT “A provocative study . compelling. A highly controversial study, Suvorov’s book is nevertheless well researched and warrants further examination into this critical period in the history of the war.” — War in History THE CHIEF CULPRIT THE Bestselling author Victor Suvorov probes Soviet documents and reevaluates material to analyze Stalin’s strategic design to conquer Europe and the reasons behind his controversial support for Nazi Germany. A former Soviet army intelligence officer, the author explains that Stalin’s strategy leading up to World War II grew from Vladimir Lenin’s belief that if World War I did not ignite the worldwide Communist revolution, then a second world war would be needed to achieve it. Stalin saw Nazi Germany as the power that would fight and weaken capitalist countries so that Soviet armies could then sweep across Europe. Suvorov reveals how Stalin conspired with German leaders to bypass the Versailles Treaty, which forbade German rearmament, and secretly trained German engineers and officers and provided bases and factories for war. He also calls attention to the 1939 nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany that allowed Hitler to proceed with his plans to invade Poland, fomenting war in Europe. Suvorov debunks the theory that Stalin was duped by Hitler and that the Soviet Union was a victim of Nazi aggression. Instead, he makes the case that Stalin neither feared Hitler nor mistakenly trusted him. Suvorov maintains that after Germany occupied Poland, defeated France, and started to prepare for an invasion of Great Britain, Hitler’s intelligence services detected the Soviet Union’s preparations for a major war against Germany. This detection, he argues, led to Germany’s preemptive war plan and the launch of an invasion of the USSR. Stalin emerges from the pages of this book as a diabolical genius consumed by visions of a worldwide Communist revolution at any cost—a leader who wooed Hitler and Germany in his own effort to conquer the world. In contradicting traditional theories about Soviet planning, the book is certain to provoke debate among historians throughout the world. VIKTOR SUVOROV is the author of eighteen books that have been translated into more than twenty languages, including Inside the Aquarium: The Making of a Top Soviet Spy and Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? A Soviet army officer who served in military intelligence, he defected in 1978 to the United Kingdom, where he worked as an intelligence analyst and lecturer. He lives in England. For more information on this and other great books, visit www.nip.org. eBook edition also available. Cover image: Joseph Stalin in session with central committee. (Photo © Bettmann-Corbis) Naval HISTORY • WORLD WAR II Cover design: Chris Gamboa-Onrubia, Fineline Graphics LLC PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. Institute Press Surovov_PBCover.indd 1 1/9/13 9:47 AM Viktor Suvorov NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS Annapolis, Maryland Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402 © 2008 by Viktor Suvorov All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First Naval Institute Press paperback edition published in 2013. ISBN: 978-1-59114-806-7 The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows: Suvorov, Viktor. The chief culprit : Stalin’s grand design to start World War II / Viktor Suvorov. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59114-838-8 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Soviet Union. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Causes. 3. Stalin, Joseph, 1879–1953—Military leadership. I. Title. II. Title: Stalin’s grand design to start World War II. D742.S58S878 2008 940.53’10947—dc22 2008015592 This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the United States of America. 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 First printing All photos are from the author’s collection. Suvorov Copyright Page.indd 1 10/15/12 7:41 AM To Scarlet Alexandra Contents Preface ix Acknowledgments xiii Introduction xv 1 e Struggle for Peace, and Its Results 1 2 First Attempts to Unleash a Second World War 5 3 e First Contact 10 4 Stalin’s Role in the Rebirth of German War Power 16 5 Why Did Stalin Like Hitler’s Book So Much? 19 6 Industrialization and Collectivization 23 7 Stalin’s Role in Elevating Hitler 28 8 Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation 32 9 Stalin’s Preparations for War: Tanks 41 10 On the “Obsolete” Soviet Tanks 50 11 Winged Genghis Khan 58 12 About “Obsolete” Airplanes 66 13 Soviet Airborne Assault Troops and eir Mission 73 14 About the Brilliant Military Leader Tukhachevski 81 15 e Cleansing 92 16 Spain 98 17 Stalin’s Trap for Hitler 105 18 Results of the Moscow Pact 111 19 Blitzkrieg in Poland and Mongolia 114 20 Mobilization 121 21 Mobilization of the Economy 127 22 e Winter War: Finland 136 23 Germany’s Strategic Resources and Stalin’s Plans 146 24 e Carving Up of Romania, and Its Consequences 153 25 Destruction of the Buffer States between Germany and the Soviet Union 160 26 Destruction of the Security Pale on the Eve of the War 164 27 Partisans or Saboteurs? 168 viii y Contents 28 Destruction of the Stalin Line 171 29 Trotsky Murdered, Molotov in Berlin 178 30 Kremlin Games 184 31 All the Way to Berlin! 190 32 Mountain Divisions on the Steppes of Ukraine 196 33 Stalin in May 202 34 June 13, 1941 207 35 Words and Deeds 218 36 Red Army, Black Gulag Uniforms 222 37 Military Alignment 228 38 Churchill’s Warning and Stalin’s Reaction 233 39 A Blitzkrieg against Russia? 238 40 Intelligence Reports and Stalin’s Reaction 244 41 e War Has Begun 251 42 Stalin’s Panic 260 43 If It Weren’t for Winter! 263 44 A Model War 266 Conclusion: e Aggressor 278 Epilogue: Stalin Was a War Criminal 281 List of Abbreviations 287 Notes 289 Bibliography 313 Index 319 Preface itler had a red flag. And Stalin had a red flag. Hitler ruled in the name of the work- ers’ class, his party was called the workers’ party. Stalin also ruled in the name of the workers’ class; his power system officially bore the title of “dictatorship of the Hproletariat.” Hitler hated democracy and struggled against it. Stalin hated democracy and struggled against it. Hitler was building socialism. And Stalin was building socialism. Under the title of socialism Hitler saw a classless society. And Stalin, under the title of socialism, saw a classless society. In the midst of the classless society built by Hitler, and in that built by Stalin, flourished slavery in the truest sense of the word. Hitler held his road to socialism as the only correct one, and viewed all other paths as distortions. Stalin also held his road to socialism uniquely correct, and saw all other paths as diversions from the principal line. Hitler mercilessly destroyed all his party comrades, such as Roehm and his followers, when they strayed from the correct path. Stalin also mercilessly destroyed all who strayed from the correct path. Hitler had a Four Year Plan. Stalin had Five Year Plans. In Hitler’s Germany, one party was in power, the others in jail. And in Stalin’s Soviet Union, one party was in power, the others in jail. Hitler’s party stood above the nation, and its leaders ruled the country. Stalin’s party also stood above the nation, and its leaders ruled the country. e most important holidays in Stalin’s empire were May 1 and November 7–8. In Hitler’s empire, they were May 1 and November 8–9. Hitler had the Hitler Jugend, young Hitlerists. Stalin had the Comsomol, young Stalinists. Stalin’s official title was Fuehrer; Hitler’s was leader. Pardon, Stalin’s was leader and Hitler’s Fuehrer. In translation, they are identical. Stalin declared that Russians were respon- sible for all outstanding scientific and technological advances: the hot-air balloon, locomo- tive, airplane, radio, etc. Hitler claimed the same for Germans. Hitler loved grandiose structures. He laid in Berlin the foundation to the largest build- ing in the world—the House of Assembly. Its dome spanned 250 meters in diameter, by ix x y Preface some counts. e main hall was to have the capacity to hold 150,000 people. Stalin also loved grandiose structures. He laid in Moscow the foundation for the largest building in the world—the Palace of Soviets. Stalin’s main hall was smaller than Hitler’s, but the entire edifice was much higher. e 400-meter-high building resembled a pedestal for the 100-meter-tall statue of Lenin. Hitler planned to tear down Berlin, and in its place to raise a new city of monstrous structures. Stalin planned to tear down Moscow, and in its place to raise a new city of mons- trous structures. In Germany, Hitler was an outsider. He was born in Austria, and did not have German citizenship almost until the moment he came into power. For Russia, Stalin was an outsider. He was neither Russian, nor even a Slav. He was born in Georgia. Sometimes, on rare occasions, Stalin invited foreign visitors to his Kremlin apartment. ey were shocked by the modesty of the interiors: a plain table, a closet, an iron-post bed, a soldier’s bedcover.
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