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NPEC PUBLIC POLICY FELLOWSHIP RETREAT From Strategic Partnership to De facto Military Alliance: Sino-Soviet mil-mil contacts in the age of Hybrid warfare, Washington. DC, 10 March 2018 Jacob kipp, University of kansas 1945-1949, Soviet Support for PLA in Manchuria as part of struggle for control to achieve a Communist China 1950, Deployment of Russian Air Defense Forces to Shanghai to protect from Nationalist air attacks 1950-1953, Sino-Soviet Support for North Korean Bid to unify Peninsula 1950-1961Soviet support for Rearming PLA including aid in nuclear weapons development 1962-1969 End of military-to-military collaboration, Soviet Planning for Nuclear Preemption of PLA acquisition of Atomic Bomb, and increasing hostilities leading to fighting on the Ussuri River (Damansky Island Incident in March 1969. 1969-1988 Armed Confrontation as PRC sides with US to Contain USSR 1986-1991 Perestroika leads to Soviet Reform. Collapse of Soviet Bloc, Sino-Soviet Border Agreement and end of USSR in 1991. 1991-1999, Russia seeks Normalization of relations, renews arms sales to PRC to support Russian Defense industries, Russia attempts to entice PRC into Russian, Indian and Chinese Partnership to balance US as global hegemony in the wake of the end of the Cold War 1999-2014 In Response to NATO Air War in Kosovo Russian and PRC begin joint exercises and declare that they are in Strategic Partnership and members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization to counter US-dominated unipolar order, creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on 15 July 2001, then composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 2008 global economic crisis brought about Russian reappraisal of relations with EU and shift by 2012 to Eurasian Initiative. 2013-2018 Euromaidan Revolution destabilizes Ukraine and brings pro-Western Government to power in Kyiv, which is immediately recognized by Western Powers. Russia responds by seizing Crimea and annexing it to Russia with Russian intervention in civil war in Eastern Ukraine, PRC-Russian ties deepen as international system goes into new Cold War. In 2018 US identifies both Russia and China as peer competitors and military threats to international order. MODERN SINO-RUSSIAN MILITARY RELATIONS THE END OF ANNIHILATION AND THE RUSSIAN SHIFT TO SYSTEMIC DESTRUCTION AND 6TH GENERATION WARFARE SINCE 1991 BEGINNING OF RELOOK AT MILITARY STRATEGY UNDER IMPACT OF “REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS” Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of Marshall Sergei Akhromeev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, 1977-1984 the Soviet General Staff, 1984-1989 SOVIET PROPONENTS OF REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS [RMA] RUSSIAN ARCHITECTS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION TO COUNTER US GLOBAL HEGEMONY -- EVGENY PRIMAKOV AND ANDREI KOKOSHIN IN THE 1990’S -- CHAMPIONING MULTI-POLAR WORLD ORDER, BASED ON MOSCOW, BEIJING, NEW DELHI PARTNERSHIP ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI’S GRAND CHESS BOARD AND THE FATE OF RUSSIA, 1997 Topol-M ICBM, Bulava SSBN on Borei -Class SSBN, Iskander-M SRBM RUSSIAN STRATEGIC REARMAMENT UNDER KOKOSHIN AND MARSHALL SERGEEV, MINISTER OF DEFENSE 1997-2001 RESPONDING TO BRZEZINSKI’S CHESS BOARD? ANDREI KOKOSHIN INITIATED SINO-RUSSIAN MIL-MIL CONTACTS IN THE LATE 1990S: 1ST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE OVERSAW RUSSIAN ARMS SALES TO PRC; DEVELOPMENT OF MOD AND CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION CONTACTS FEB 1998 CHINESE EMBASSY IN BELGRADE AFTER NATO BOMBING IN 1999 FIRST SINO-RUSSIAN JOINT NAVAL EXERCISE IN OCTOBER 1999 IN EAST CHINA SEA WITH THE CRUISER VARIAG AS THE RUSSIAN FLAG SHIP – EXERCISE COMMUNIQUE SPOKE OF “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP” PRESIDENT PUTIN AND GENERAL MAKHMUT GAREEV AS KEY PLAYERS IN SINO-RUSSIAN MIL-MIL CONTACTS, 1999-2018 GENERAL GAREEV, THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF, AND THE CREATION OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES IN 1995: WITH GENERAL VALERY GERASIMOV AT ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF ITS CONFERENCE, WHERE “GERASIMOV DOCTRINE” WAS FIRST STATED IN 2012 WHO IS GENERAL GAREEV? HEAD OF THE ACADEMY, FORMER CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF’S DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY SCIENCES, VETERAN OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, FORECASTING FUTURE WAR IS “A LABOR OF SYSIPHUS , A DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY TASK.” VETERAN OF THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN IN MANCHURIA IN 1945, AUTHOR OF IF WAR COMES TOMORROW? A BOOK ON FUTURE WAR FROM 1995 GENERAL MAKHMUT GAREEV WITH MADAME QI XIN AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMIT TEE OF THE CPC XI JINPING AT 9 MAY 2015 VICTORY DAY PARADE IN RED SQUARE, MOSCOW. 1945 SERVICE WITH REGIMENTAL STAFF IN THE FAR EASTERN FRONT DURING MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN CONTINUES TO WRITE ON THE FAR EASTERN CAMPAIGN: MAKHMUT GAREEV “ZA SOPKI MAN’ZHURII,” VOENNO-PROMYSHLENNYI KUR'ER, NO. 28, 26 JULY 2017, P 1. NEGOTIATED FOR ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES A JOINT RESEARCH PROJECT WITH JILIN UNIVERSITY IN CHANGCHUN ON THE STUDY OF WORLD WAR II AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE, JILIN UNIVERSITY HAS CLOSE TIES TO PLA RESEARCH ON LOGISTICS AND MOBILITY - АNNA POLIAKOVA. “REMEMBER HISTORY, THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE, KEEP THE PEACE,” KRASNAIA ZVEZDA 5 JULY 2017 Gareev’s Far Eastern Military Connections KOKOSHIN’S CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN SINO-RUSSIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY CONTACTS A. KOKOSHIN “ON THE LEGACY OF SUN TZU,” SOTSIOLOGICHESKIE ISLEDOVANIA, NO. 11 (2017 PP 114- 123. B. ANDREI KOKOSHIN , “MILITARY REFORM IN THE CPR MILITARY-STRATEGIC, POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL- COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS,” MEZHDUNARODNAIA ZHIZN’ DECEMBER 2016 18-67. THE RUSSIAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS – WEST, SOUTH, CENTRAL, EAST AND ARCTIC SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION FROM 2001 TO 2015: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCE ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES AND MIL-MIL CONTACTS – TRANSLATIONS INTO CHINESE OF VLADIMIR SLIPCHENKO’S SIXTH GENERATION WARS IN 2003 BOOK PUBLISHED IN RUSSIA IN 1999 Russian Views PLA Views E. G. Shevelev, “Systemology of the National Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and Security of Russia, Current Status and Perspectives System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese on Development, Voennaia mysl’, No. 6, pp. 20-25 People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern and V. Dorogin and Edvard Shevelev, “Questions of Warfare. RAND, 2018 Theory Bases of Theory of Metasystems of Military Significance and its Proposition Relating to Armed Struggle at Sea<” MS April 2002 28 to 35 “Although little noticed by Western scholars, thinking about system of systems and systems warfare has been pervasive in PLA writing for more than two decades. It is a topic that has been examined in hundreds of PLA newspaper and journal articles, discussed in dozens of PLA professional military education textbooks, enshrined in PLA military doctrine, and, more recently, promulgated in official Defense White Papers.” SHARED WORK ON SYSTEM VS. SYSTEM WARFARE CONTINUING FRUITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN MIL- MIL COOPERATION: RECENT SALE OF S-400 TO PLA SINO-RUSSIAN JOINT EXERCISES AGAINST COMMON “HYPOTHETICAL OPPONENT” NUCLEAR DIMENSION OF SINO-RUSSIAN JOINT NAVAL EXERCISE IN THE BALTIC, JULY 2017 PETR VELIKII AND DMITRII DONSKOI FROM NORTHERN FLEET CHINESE AND RUSSIAN WARSHIPS IN THE BALTIC FOR NAVY DAY AND JOINT SINO-RUSSIAN NAVAL EXERCISE, 24-27 JULY 2017 SINO-RUSSIAN NAVAL EXERCISE OFF VLADIVOSTOK IN SEPTEMBER 2017 SINO-RUSSIAN AIR DEFENSE AND SPACE DEFENSE EXERCISE “AERO-SPACE SECURITY, 2017” ON 11-16 DECEMBER RUSSIAN VIEW OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S INNAGURATION AND THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR RIA REGIONS ONLINE 18 JANUARY 2017 LAUNCH OF SARMAT RS-28 ICBM WITH HYPER-SONIC MIRV WARHEADS, ONE OF FOUR WEAPONS SYSTEMS REVEALED BY PRESIDENT PUTIN IN HIS PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS PUTIN’S NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS FROM RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ANDREI KOKOSHIN DEAN OF FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY, FULL MEMBER OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: -“ VLADIMIR PUTIN, BEFORE THE NEW YEAR, APPEALED TO THE US PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP WITH A PROPOSAL TO JOINTLY ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY. TODAY, HE DEMONSTRATED WHAT SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENS OUR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, BECAUSE SOME OF THE WEAPONS SHOWN TODAY, PROBABLY, HAVE NOT BEEN KNOWN SO FAR. PUTIN APPEALED NOT ONLY TO THE RUSSIANS, BUT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY. THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL MEANING OF THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA IS AN INVITATION TO NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A SERIOUS APPROACH. THE US AND NATO CAN NO LONGER UNILATERALLY CHANGE THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC BALANCE, RUSSIA HAS ENOUGH MILITARY, INDUSTRIAL AND INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES, IN DEMAND THAT IT BE LISTENED TO.” Olga Bozh’eva “No one Listened to US, Please Do Now,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 2 March 2018 .
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