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The Stalin Line: Home of the USSR’s Western Border By Ivan Volkov & Evgeny Khitryak

5,000 men and was to have a length of about 62 miles (100 km). In the autumn of 1918, then, with the forming of special construction organizations for the emplacement of , the Special Committee of the Revolutionary War Council of the USSR (Revvoensovet, RVS) approved the construction of continuous fortified lines on the north- ern, western and southern borders. At that time the only military per- sonnel who had the necessary skills and experience for such projects were the engineering officers of the old tsarist army. The Soviet government therefore put out an appeal to all civilians in the A group of Mina bunkers in the Kiev Fortified Region (modern-day photo). country who had the required technical and military knowledge to join the Red Army (Raboche-Krestianskaya Krasnaya Armia, RKKA). Many eminent Russian civilian engineers responded to the call. At the same time, however, the ongoing military operations of the civil war made it clear that continuous fortified lines didn’t conform to the character of that war. The total length of the combat fronts—about 5,300 miles (8,500 km)—and their relatively The sections of a large light coverage by troops on both sides, machinegun bunker. worked to prevent the kind of positional 1 - embrasures warfare seen in the First World War. 2 - casemates The Russian Civil War was one of 3 - command post maneuver without continuous fronts. 4 - anti-gas vestibule That’s why the principle of continuous 5 - inner defense loophole fortifications was almost immediately 6 - cranked corridor door abandoned in favor of a new one. That 7 - storage room new system of border defense was 8 - niche for additional air filters to be based on “fortified regions” (ukreplennye rayony), and was initially The structures employed in those 1925 the strength of the Red Army was in the most threatened areas of the The “Gornostalev System” casemate machinegun mount (model 1931) with 7.62mm developed under the primary direction fortified regions were mostly ad hoc reduced to 600,000. That depleted force western border. Their primary purpose Maxim machine-gun installed in the embrasure of a standard bunker. The flexible tubes of engineer K.I. Velichko. The three field works. Only in those cases where wasn’t able to provide the border secu- would be to allow the scarce border removed noxious gas that escaped from the machinegun during firing. Initially a full- main tasks he envisioned for fortifica- a fortified region was set up near rity required for such a huge country. At units to hold back the enemy while metal mount had been intended for installation, but its production was too difficult for Soviet industry and its installation too complicated for unskilled labor. tions in his new system were: 1) to cover an industrial center that featured the same time, though, the reduction full mobilization was underway. the principal operational approaches cement production (for example, St. in troop strength was unavoidable, as His proposition was supported by Ed’s Note: all photos and drawings in early as 1918 it was proposed within along the border; 2) the maintenance Petersburg), did they actually include the simply wasn’t able another Red Army specialist, Georgi this article are courtesy of the authors. the new Soviet government to defend of cross-river bridgeheads from which concrete and ferroconcrete pillboxes. to maintain a larger army because G. Nevski, who later became head the borders with the help of defensive counteroffensives could be launched; Due to that cement shortage, often only of its poor economic condition. The of all engineer troops of the USSR. Rush to Fortify zones referred to then as Zavesa and 3) the protection of politically or the front wall of a position was made country therefore needed a simple and In 1920 Nevski’s book, The Question (curtains). Those zones were to include strategically important inhabited and of concrete with the rest built of wood. inexpensive means of border defense. of the Advanced Preparation of the What some military historians have strongpoints and outposts on the roads industrial areas. Approved by the RVS After the end of the civil war the In 1920 the first chief of the Military Country in the Military Engineering termed a “rush to fortify” seized all of and defiles, along with fortified camps in November 1918, the new defense question of border defense continued Engineering Academy, Feodor I. Aspect, was published, and in 1922 Europe, including the Soviet Union, and bridges. Each of them was to be system was then begun to be put into because the geo-strategic environment Golenkin, proposed constructing another, The Experience of the Study after the end of the World War I. As manned by a detachment of 3,000 to practice even as the civil war still raged. around the USSR remained hostile. In new and improved fortified regions of the Modern Forms of Advanced

30 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 31 Artillery Observation Post #55 of the Polotsk Fortified Region. This bunker has the complex version of the “hill type” of camouflage scheme. It was determined to be the most effective of all the patterns examined.

Fortified Regions at the end of 1938

Length of Front Total of Total of Artillery of the Fortified Machinegun Casemates Region, miles/km Bunkers Military District Fortified Region or Position

Karelian FR 40/65 180 5

Leningrad Kingisepp FP 25/40 35 0

Pskov FP 28/45 50 0

Polotsk FR 35/56 263 10

Belorussian FR 87/140 242 26

Mozyr FR 84/135 176 2

Korosten FR 113/182 433 5

Novograd-Volynskiy FR 75/120 182 17

Letichev FR 78/126 340 7 Kiev Mogilev-Yampol FR 134/215 240 18

Kiev FR 53/85 190 3

Rybnitsa FR 84/135 199 11

Tiraspol FR 80/129 254 15

Totals 915/1,473 2,784 119

32 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 33 An anti-tank bunker with T-26 tank turret.

study of World War I. As a result, the places impassable to troops. of the growing menace of a new war conclusions drawn by Soviet fortifiers Another concept examined in the launched against the Soviet Union by were different from the postulates late 1920s was termed the “fortress- the main capitalist nations of Europe: that came to be accepted in France fortified forest.” The woodlands Great Britain and France. He predicted and elsewhere in the West. Venedict of the northwestern USSR were they would start by having another An MS machinegun bunker. Shperk, in his book The History of to be heavily laced with bunkers, country, probably , actually initi- Long-Term Fortification, summarized transforming them into a vast and ate the war of aggression. In addition, those Soviet conclusions as follows. unassailable geographic area. he cautioned that Poland would be Fortification,followed. Both works system of long-term and field-fortified time. An attempt to outflank a fortified Some proposed ideas showed too joined by the Baltic States and Finland. proposed significantly reinforced and constructions in combination with region would not only cost the enemy World War I made it clear that large much imagination to be taken seriously. The collective Soviet leadership modernized fortified regions as the different artificial obstacles and more time, but also allow defending permanent fortifications like One of the most unusual propositions considered that scenario dangerous, main form of the nation’s preliminary prepared for long-term defense by troops to counterattack the aggressor’s forts—those with large quantities of called for creating dense linear fortifica- but not one that would result in a border defense. Those books laid the specially trained fortress troops in close exposed flanks. The fortified regions constructions of complex purpose tions similar to those used in the West truly desperate situation. The USSR theoretical foundation of the early cooperation with infantry units.” were (ideally) to include the following: concentrated in a small area— in the First World War, only not along could reckon on victory, went Stalin’s Soviet fortification school. The “Land The main task of a fortified region weren’t suitable for modern warfare the border. Instead, the heavy defensive reasoning, once the Red Army had Fortification Fronts” (Dolgovremennyi was to require an attacking enemy to a forward defense area of six to in and around the Soviet Union. lines were to be set up running gained a numerical superiority of two Sukhoputnyi Front) constructed concentrate a substantial number of his 7.5 miles (10-12 km), which Field fortifications—those dispersed perpendicular to the border, allowing to three times that of the invading force. from 1928 to 1934 were attempts divisions, including heavy artillery, in was a zone of natural obstacles over a wide area with small the enemy to advance far beyond it, So sufficient time had to be gained to put those views into practice. order to be able to take them by storm. and observation posts; constructions of various only to then find himself threatened to allow the nation to mobilize its The new fortified regions were Such an assault was intended to tie up an outpost line, intended to meet types —would be more effective by flank attacks from those positions. population and resources to that extent. defined as zones “equipped with a the enemy for some lengthy amount of the initial assault and channel than that older method. The lines were to increase in strength That, in turn, would only be possible the enemy force toward the main as they ran deeper into Soviet territory, with the proper military engineering line or perhaps cause it to split; Thus, from the time of its founda- making it ever more difficult for the preparations made in the border areas. the main defense line of 1.25 to tion, the Soviet fortification school enemy’s forces to attack into them Stalin’s declaration ended what 2.5 miles depth (2-4 km); maintained that in a future war the even as they overextending themselves might be described as a period optionally, a rear line with field use of strongpoints within dispersed moving into the country’s interior. of Soviet military debate—even fortifications and obstacles with positions was best. Soviet military engi- All agreed, however, that the near-hysteria—on the topic. His a depth of 1.25 to two miles (2-3 neers often used the term “dispersed fortified region concept served as the initial plan called for the priority km) and situated six to 7.5 miles fortifications” (fortifikacionnaya pyl), only acceptable solution to prepare construction of four fortified regions behind the main defense line; which precisely describes the essence future theaters of military operations along the most threatened sectors of a fortified base near a railway of the fortified regions they set up. for meeting an initial enemy attack. the Soviet western border with Poland junction, which was to serve as The fortified regions were far In 1928 the construction of the first and the Baltic States, as follows: the supply distribution point from being the only defense concept one—the Karelian—was begun. for the entire fortified region. proposed by Soviet military theorists the Karelian Fortified Region, along at that time. The difficult economic Theory into Practice the Finnish sector of the border to A particular feature of the Soviet situation made the theorists examine protect Leningrad (St. Petersburg); fortification school came from the unexpected solutions for border Stalin’s September 1927 declaration the Polotsk Fortified Region, covering fact its theoretical basis developed defense, for example, planting dense on the topic provided the final impetus the section of the border with An anti-tank bunker (#143) made from a T-26 tank turret in from the combat experience of the thorny shrubbery in chosen sites for the beginning of the construction Poland and Lithuania to protect the Minsk Fortified Region (modern-day photo. civil war melded with a retrospective that would supposedly make those of the fortified regions. In it, he warned Polotsk (then the key railway

34 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 35 of construction workers. That had a negative impact on the overall quality of the construction produced. The first four fortified regions of the program were also used by the engineers to try to develop the most efficient construction methods, the best types of bunkers and the best types of weapons and equipment for use in them. In 1931 the decision came down to create seven new fortified regions: Letichev, Mogilev-Yampol, Korosten, Rybnitsa, Tiraspol, Kingisepp and Pskov. The first five of them were in the . Their mission was to cover the direct avenues of approach from Poland and Romania into the USSR. The Pskov and Kingisepp regions, located where the threat was perceived as being more limited, were made less complex with fewer An artillery half-caponier near Guta Mezhigorskaya village in the Kiev Fortified Region (modern-day photo). bunkers and a smaller infrastructure. With construction well underway junction in ), and the The Military Construction Directorate, established prototypes in 1931, the control and supervision main crossing point on the Directorate of the Supply Directorate and specifications for the various of the works on the fortified regions Dvina River (Daugava); of the Red Army (Voenno Stroitelnoe manufacturing plants. Many factories was handed over from the VSU to the Mozyr (Polesski) Fortified Region, Upravlenie Upravlenia Snabjenia, VSU contributed to the production of the the recently formed Directorate of along the sector of border with RKKA) prepared fortification designs, components and equipment needed for Engineers (Upravlenie Ingenerov). The Poland in the Polessie region supervised the construction work and the bunkers, including: embrasure cov- official explanation was the staff of the (Pripet River basin within the gave technical support. In the autumn ers, machinegun mounts, machinegun VSU had proved too small; however, Pripet Marshes), to block access of 1927 the preliminary work began. cooling systems, ventilators, and mate- the real reason was the desire to push to Gomel and Zhlobin; Half the bunkers were supposed to be rials to make the embrasures gas-proof. aside the last of the remaining “military the Kiev Fortified Region, to protect two-storied, with a troop shelter in the Other military directorates participated specialists” (former engineers of the Kiev (the crucial Ukrainian underground floor, while the others in the elaboration of the requirements tsarist army). In 1931 the tide of arrests The changing out of a machinegun for a range finder. economic and political center) would each have only a single level. for the fortified regions’ electrification, of those military specialists—who were and the nearby crossing The price of one machinegun bunker camouflage, etc. The planners wanted declared “political dissidents”—rose. points of the Dnieper; was fixed at 30,000 to 40,000 rubles, to start the main construction of the In 1932 the Directorate of Engineers a reconnaissance for the Lepel and that of an observation bunker was set fortifications in 1928; however, out of and the remnants of the VSU were Pskov “Fortified Positions” was at 15,000 rubles. (In comparison, at that the 40 million rubles the Red Army united into the new Chief Engineering also to be done, with the intention time a typical single-family farmhouse asked for only 24 million were allocated. Directorate of the Red Army. That orga- of rapidly constructing those was valued at 2,000 to 2,500 rubles.) A problem then arose when nization began to supervise all aspects defenses entirely of field works once One VSU publication, The Scientific it was discovered the theoretical of fortification construction. That same mobilization for war was declared. Proving Ground of the Artillery calculations to set the specifications year the erection of the Minsk and for the shell-proof bunkers hadn’t Novograd-Volynskiy Fortified Regions been field tested, and there was no was begun. It was also decided to go time or funding available to have that back and reinforce and modernize the done. It wasn’t until 1930 the budget by then almost completed Karelian, included allocation for such testing. Polotsk, Mozyr and Kiev regions. Special military construction units From that time on the construction were formed—“military labor director- of permanent fortifications along the ates”—each with staffs of 32 men, and border became more intensive. The the construction areas of the fortified growth of mechanization, both within regions were divided into separate and outside militaries—was one of the sites. Those sites formed independent defining features of the era. During administrative and economic units. construction of the first four fortified The work in each site was directed regions, most of the work had been by a superintendent who was in done by manual labor. As overall mech- charge of from 400 to 500 workers. anization increased in the Soviet Union, At first each site was to carry the result was the implementation of out the construction of seven to 10 more modern methods of construction. bunkers, but soon a revised plan By early 1933 the concrete structures Machinegun Bunker 292 of the Minsk Fortified Region (modern-day photo). This bunker was restored was introduced calling for doubling in all 13 fortified regions had been to its original condition several years ago and is now part of large open-air historical complex near the number of bunkers in each area, completed. During the following Minsk. The “amoeba” style of camouflage wasn’t in widespread use for Soviet bunkers in 1939. but without increasing the number year the bunkers were equipped and

36 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 37 the first stage of their development. The diversity of the ferroconcrete command bunkers and observation Artillery casemates constituted only 12 structures in the regions can be posts, they were made to appear from percent of the total number of bunkers divided into the following main the outside as standard machinegun built. The construction of anti-tank types: heavy and light machinegun bunkers. They were larger than gun bunkers was also limited, and bunkers, command bunkers, artillery machinegun bunkers and frequently they were found almost exclusively at observation posts, artillery bunkers, included an underground level. The points covering main roads. None of anti-tank bunkers (mounted with command bunkers were equipped the bunkers had anti-aircraft artillery. T-26 tank turrets), and complex with supplementary sets of periscopes, The strength of the concrete structures underground constructions of the telephones and radios, and they had in terms of resisting enemy weapons Mina type (see description below). their own electric generators. In the fire was calculated on the type of Concerns about comfort for the command bunkers and observation artillery then available to the Poles. garrisons of the bunkers received posts only light machinegun mounts At the same time, the still limited low priority. A bunker normally was were installed, which could be economic potential of the USSR forced no more comfortable for the troops quickly replaced by range finders. the planners to adjust the designs, than was life in a field trench, Light machinegun bunkers, each numbers and types of fortifications except the bunker offered more with just one embrasure, served as to what was practical and not what security during bombardment. independent posts. They were simple was most desirable. As a result, the Each bunker’s power supply was structures consisting only a firing fortified regions had total defensive generally through an underground chamber for a machinegun. The walls areas only one to 1.85 miles (1.5 to 3 cable from an electrical substation. of such bunkers were merely splinter km) deep. The fields of fire from the To protect against poison gas, the proof, and they could only protect bunkers didn’t sufficiently overlap, entrances were built so as to hermeti- their garrisons from small arms fire and full mutual supporting fire from cally seal when closed. Weapon embra- and shrapnel. Those “MS” machinegun adjacent bunkers was seldom achieved. sures could also be hermetically sealed, posts (called MoSkit, the Russian word and a manually operated air pump for mosquito) were built in the second- tion complexes of the Maginot Line. Tactical Layouts ensured the creation of overpressure in ary sectors of the fortified regions. They The equipment and general design the bunker to prevent the penetration were intended to protect the areas for the fortified regions during their first The Battalion Defense Area of poison gas. The bunker garrisons not covered by the fields of fire of the A drawing of Mina 232 in the Mozyr Fortified Region. stage of construction met requirements (bata’onnyi raion oborony, BRO) normally lived in wooden dugouts larger bunkers, to block hollows, etc. based on the operational and strategic was the principal tactical element of connected to them by communication Sometimes the MS positions were armed, but the process needed to bring the Soviet documents of that time even abilities of the most probable enemy each fortified region. Each took up trenches. A similar dugout served as also set up to serve as decoys to draw them to full combat readiness was the term “line” was avoided, and the at that time: the Polish Army. Those a sector 3.75 to 6.2 miles long (six to ammunition depot and storehouse. enemy fire. They were intentionally never finished because the invasion title of “Stalin Line” was a product of forces consisted of about 2 million 10 km). Each BRO was occupied by Model 1910 Maxim water-cooled kept poorly camouflaged in order to of Poland and the Winter War with later Nazi propaganda. Together all men, organized into some 60 infantry one machinegun battalion dispersed machineguns were the main weapon. In divert the enemy’s attention from other Finland led to fortifications being the fortified regions along the borders divisions, several cavalry brigades, a into company defense areas. addition, every bunker had one or two bunkers of the BRO. Those decoy bun- started along those new borders. of the USSR were officially referred to small amount of heavy artillery, and There was no universal system of light Degtyarev Model 1927 machine- kers were the first to open fire, again The headline “Stalin Creates a as the “Permanent Land Fortification weak aviation and tank units. In view division of fortified regions into BRO. guns. The bunkers were also equipped with the intention of drawing the ene- Maginot Line in the USSR” appeared in Front.” Admittedly, along the southern of the characteristics inherent in that The number in a region depended on with periscopes, telephone and radio my’s fire. The MS garrisons would then December 1936 in the Latvian newspa- sector of the western border the force, machineguns served as the main specific local conditions. There was communication equipment, a ventila- abandon their positions and make their per Sevodnya (Today). The headline and fortified regions formed an almost firepower in the fortified regions. also no uniform system for designating tion and air filter system, equipment way to the nearby large bunkers. When accompanying article were inaccurate unbroken line. Even there, however, Correspondingly, the machinegun the BRO. In some regions they were for water-cooling the Maxims, and a the enemy began an assault with his in that the Soviets never intended to the tactical scheme of the fortifications bunker was the predominant type designated by Arabic or Roman num- water well operated with a hand pump. main force through the decoy positions, construct their own Maginot Line. In never equated with that of the fortifica- employed in the fortified regions during bers, and in others with Cyrillic letters. In order to disguise the critical the main line of bunkers opened fire.

A two-story machinegun bunker (#131) in the Kiev A two-story command bunker of the Fifth Battalion Defense Area One of two embrasures of Machinegun Caponier 129 near Khodoseevka Artillery Half-Caponier 134 in the Minsk Fortified Region Fortified Region (modern-day photo). in the Minsk Fortified Region (modern-day photo). Originally the village in the Kiev Fortified Region (modern-day photo). (modern-day view). This restored bunker is part of a bunker was covered with soil to the level of the embrasures. large open-air historical complex near Minsk.

38 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 39 Buy Now! making plans for a future offensive war. even if doing so obviously created German 11th and Romanian 4th Armies The USSR, unlike France, didn’t problems. If plans were impractical, until outflanked by other forces moving Home seek permanent shelter behind a wall it was better to simply lie instead of down from the north. The battles along of fortifications. As early as 1926, Soviet questioning their rationality and risk and within the Kiev Fortified Region military specialist A. Svechin, in his being labeled a “subversive.” The veil of lasted 70 days. The Karelian Fortified book Strategy, defined the fortified secrecy that covered the construction Region was never fully broken through. regions not only as “barriers” across an of the fortified regions also played a It could therefore be argued it was the invader’s path, but also as “gateways” in negative role in terms of quality control. stubborn resistance enabled by key which Soviet forces could be safely mar- All that resulted in what turned out portions of the fortified regions—not shaled before striking into enemy terri- to be an overall low state of combat “General Mud” or “General Winter”— tory. Soviet fortified regions were built readiness in the fortified regions when which first broke the momentum of with both those intentions in mind. war came. The inspection reports in 1941. ✪ The main reason for the inability of of 1938 and 1939 gave (suppressed) the fortified regions to withstand the evidence of that sad fact. With the PRIMARY SOURCES temporary closing in early 1940 of the German attack in 1941 wasn’t because Russian State Military Archive of faults in the theory of their use. The greater part of the fortified regions Fond 22, Opis 32, Delo 16, 20, 22, 33, 123, 186, 235, 294, built along the pre-1939 Soviet borders, 1525, 1526, 2586, 2590, 2595, broader Soviet system itself was the 2602, 2795, 3610, 3933 Achilles heel of fortification construc- the process of getting the “Stalin Fond 23, Opis 1, Delo 140, 148, 163, 211, 256 Line” to full operational readiness Fond 31983, Opis 2, Delo 434, 489 tion in the USSR. Rigid economic plan- Fond 36967, Opis 1, Delo 45, 54, 80, 149, 150, 152, 273, 410 ning caused divergence from accepted became even more complicated. technological principles of construc- Even so, those few fortified regions tion. Premature removal of the tsarist- of the “Stalin Line” that were fully SELECTED SECONDARY SOURCES equipped with weapons and troops put era military specialists also contributed V.Yakovlev. Istoriya krepostey. St. Petersburg: Izdatelstvo A standard three-embrasure machinegun bunker: Bunker 213 of the Minsk Fortified Region. to the failure. Further, at the time con- up stiff resistance against the Germans ACT Poligon, 2000. in the early summer of 1941. The J.E. Kaufmann & R.M. Jurga. Twierdza Europa. Europejskie struction was nearing completion in the fortyfikacje drugej wojny swiatowej. Warczawa: Dom 1930s, all such efforts were fraught with Polotsk Fortified Region held the enemy Wydawniczy Bellona, 2002. for five days. The garrisons of the Denkschrift über die russische Landesbefestigung. Berlin: The artillery casemates were larger in the Mogilev-Yampol region, was to the aspects of the general defense the danger of accusations of “sabotage.” Oberkommando des Heers, 1942. constructions than machinegun bun- the largest of such complexes erected strategy of the country, indicates their That purge era saw the suppression Mogilev-Yampol, Rybnitsa and Tiraspol S. Polyakov & S. Kopyl. Liniya Stalina: Polotski Ukreprayon, Fortified Regions, in conjunction with 1919-41. Polotskoye knizhnoye kers, but the quota of artillery bunkers on the western border of the USSR. It concept was as modern as that of the of initiative by individuals and supervi- izdatelstvo, 2009. within the total was always small. The consisted of two double-embrasure German scheme used in the West Wall. sors, and all found it best to try to operations by field troops, actually casemates had more interior rooms, artillery half-caponiers, two double- The Soviet fortification theorists blindly implement and carry out orders, brought a halt to the offensive of the including ones for electrical generators embrasure machinegun bunkers, developed a great number of different that supplied them as well as nearby two entrance blocks, underground projects, including the Mina, which machinegun bunkers (via underground galleries, a command post, quarters were potentially comparable to some of cables). They were armed with 76.2mm for the garrison, a power-plant and an the French ouvrages in their scale and guns. The “half-caponier” positions had ammunition magazine. The length of power. Those large-scale projects were two such guns while the full “caponiers” the underground communication tun- rejected, however, by the Red Army had four. As with the machinegun nels totaled 986 yards (901 meters), and high command, mostly because they bunkers, the main reserves of they were located six to 10 yards below would’ve absorbed almost the entire ammunition and other equipment the surface. The concrete thickness of defense budget. In addition the con- were stored in nearby wooden dugouts. the front wall was 59 inches while that struction of huge fortified ensembles Some of the larger structures had an of the roof was 54 inches. The garrison required time, while the Red Army underground level that served as a numbered 150. Some Mina also served needed ready-to-use defenses as soon garrison caserne, but the general rule as shelters for regular infantry. as possible. Moreover, the most likely was to quarter the men outside the The majority of the Mina were enemies of the USSR in the initial peri- bunkers when not engaged in combat. built in the Ukraine, where the od of construction didn’t have super- Anti-tank bunkers with T-26 tank lower water table allowed for the easier powerful military forces; so there was turrets were an unusual type of artillery creation of subterranean facilities. no need to construct “super-fortresses.” bunker. Their design was simple. The Only two were built in Belarus, both concrete bunker held a minimal ammu- in the Mozyr Fortified Region. Conclusions nition stock and was almost completely Even just the superficial descrip- below ground level. Atop the bunker tions given above of the main types of It should be remembered that was a roof position mounting a bunkers in the fortified regions exposes exporting communist revolution—not standard T-26 tank turret armed with a their deficiencies relative to western securing its borders—had been the 45mm gun and Degtyarev machinegun. European standards. In comparison first of the guiding principles of the with such grandiose structures as the Soviet Union. During the period of Mina Maginot ouvrages, Belgian Fort Eben political debate between the followers Emael, or the Czech border fortifica- of Stalin and Trotsky in the 1920s, that Some complexes consisted of tions, the Soviet works appear primitive. principle temporarily receded into several bunkers and auxiliary construc- Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to the background, but it nevertheless tions connected with underground conclude the general concept of the remained a fundamental goal. Thus tunnels. They were termed “Mina” Soviet fortified regions was unworkable. the concern about defense of the (mines), and only some of the fortified An examination of the technical charac- borders never hindered the Red Army regions had them. The Serebrya Mina, teristics of their construction, as related high command from simultaneously

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