The Stalin Line: Home Fortification of the USSR’S Western Border by Ivan Volkov & Evgeny Khitryak
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Buy Now! The Stalin Line: Home Fortification of the USSR’s Western Border By Ivan Volkov & Evgeny Khitryak 5,000 men and was to have a length of about 62 miles (100 km). In the autumn of 1918, then, with the forming of special construction organizations for the emplacement of fortifications, the Special Committee of the Revolutionary War Council of the USSR (Revvoensovet, RVS) approved the construction of continuous fortified lines on the north- ern, western and southern borders. At that time the only military per- sonnel who had the necessary skills and experience for such projects were the engineering officers of the old tsarist army. The Soviet government therefore put out an appeal to all civilians in the A group of Mina bunkers in the Kiev Fortified Region (modern-day photo). country who had the required technical and military knowledge to join the Red Army (Raboche-Krestianskaya Krasnaya Armia, RKKA). Many eminent Russian civilian engineers responded to the call. At the same time, however, the ongoing military operations of the civil war made it clear that continuous fortified lines didn’t conform to the character of that war. The total length of the combat fronts—about 5,300 miles (8,500 km)—and their relatively The sections of a large light coverage by troops on both sides, machinegun bunker. worked to prevent the kind of positional 1 - embrasures warfare seen in the First World War. 2 - casemates The Russian Civil War was one of 3 - command post maneuver without continuous fronts. 4 - anti-gas vestibule That’s why the principle of continuous 5 - inner defense loophole fortifications was almost immediately 6 - cranked corridor door abandoned in favor of a new one. That 7 - storage room new system of border defense was 8 - niche for additional air filters to be based on “fortified regions” (ukreplennye rayony), and was initially The structures employed in those 1925 the strength of the Red Army was in the most threatened areas of the The “Gornostalev System” casemate machinegun mount (model 1931) with 7.62mm developed under the primary direction fortified regions were mostly ad hoc reduced to 600,000. That depleted force western border. Their primary purpose Maxim machine-gun installed in the embrasure of a standard bunker. The flexible tubes of engineer K.I. Velichko. The three field works. Only in those cases where wasn’t able to provide the border secu- would be to allow the scarce border removed noxious gas that escaped from the machinegun during firing. Initially a full- main tasks he envisioned for fortifica- a fortified region was set up near rity required for such a huge country. At units to hold back the enemy while metal mount had been intended for installation, but its production was too difficult for Soviet industry and its installation too complicated for unskilled labor. tions in his new system were: 1) to cover an industrial center that featured the same time, though, the reduction full mobilization was underway. the principal operational approaches cement production (for example, St. in troop strength was unavoidable, as His proposition was supported by Ed’s Note: all photos and drawings in early as 1918 it was proposed within along the border; 2) the maintenance Petersburg), did they actually include the Soviet Union simply wasn’t able another Red Army specialist, Georgi this article are courtesy of the authors. the new Soviet government to defend of cross-river bridgeheads from which concrete and ferroconcrete pillboxes. to maintain a larger army because G. Nevski, who later became head the borders with the help of defensive counteroffensives could be launched; Due to that cement shortage, often only of its poor economic condition. The of all engineer troops of the USSR. Rush to Fortify zones referred to then as Zavesa and 3) the protection of politically or the front wall of a position was made country therefore needed a simple and In 1920 Nevski’s book, The Question (curtains). Those zones were to include strategically important inhabited and of concrete with the rest built of wood. inexpensive means of border defense. of the Advanced Preparation of the What some military historians have strongpoints and outposts on the roads industrial areas. Approved by the RVS After the end of the civil war the In 1920 the first chief of the Military Country in the Military Engineering termed a “rush to fortify” seized all of and defiles, along with fortified camps in November 1918, the new defense question of border defense continued Engineering Academy, Feodor I. Aspect, was published, and in 1922 Europe, including the Soviet Union, and bridges. Each of them was to be system was then begun to be put into because the geo-strategic environment Golenkin, proposed constructing another, The Experience of the Study after the end of the World War I. As manned by a detachment of 3,000 to practice even as the civil war still raged. around the USSR remained hostile. In new and improved fortified regions of the Modern Forms of Advanced 30 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 31 Artillery Observation Post #55 of the Polotsk Fortified Region. This bunker has the complex version of the “hill type” of camouflage scheme. It was determined to be the most effective of all the patterns examined. Fortified Regions at the end of 1938 Length of Front Total of Total of Artillery of the Fortified Machinegun Casemates Region, miles/km Bunkers Military District Fortified Region or Position Karelian FR 40/65 180 5 Leningrad Kingisepp FP 25/40 35 0 Pskov FP 28/45 50 0 Polotsk FR 35/56 263 10 Belorussian Minsk FR 87/140 242 26 Mozyr FR 84/135 176 2 Korosten FR 113/182 433 5 Novograd-Volynskiy FR 75/120 182 17 Letichev FR 78/126 340 7 Kiev Mogilev-Yampol FR 134/215 240 18 Kiev FR 53/85 190 3 Rybnitsa FR 84/135 199 11 Tiraspol FR 80/129 254 15 Totals 915/1,473 2,784 119 32 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 WORLD at WAR 23 | APR–MAY 2012 33 An anti-tank bunker with T-26 tank turret. study of World War I. As a result, the places impassable to troops. of the growing menace of a new war conclusions drawn by Soviet fortifiers Another concept examined in the launched against the Soviet Union by were different from the postulates late 1920s was termed the “fortress- the main capitalist nations of Europe: that came to be accepted in France fortified forest.” The woodlands Great Britain and France. He predicted and elsewhere in the West. Venedict of the northwestern USSR were they would start by having another An MS machinegun bunker. Shperk, in his book The History of to be heavily laced with bunkers, country, probably Poland, actually initi- Long-Term Fortification, summarized transforming them into a vast and ate the war of aggression. In addition, those Soviet conclusions as follows. unassailable geographic area. he cautioned that Poland would be Fortification,followed. Both works system of long-term and field-fortified time. An attempt to outflank a fortified Some proposed ideas showed too joined by the Baltic States and Finland. proposed significantly reinforced and constructions in combination with region would not only cost the enemy World War I made it clear that large much imagination to be taken seriously. The collective Soviet leadership modernized fortified regions as the different artificial obstacles and more time, but also allow defending permanent fortifications like One of the most unusual propositions considered that scenario dangerous, main form of the nation’s preliminary prepared for long-term defense by troops to counterattack the aggressor’s forts—those with large quantities of called for creating dense linear fortifica- but not one that would result in a border defense. Those books laid the specially trained fortress troops in close exposed flanks. The fortified regions constructions of complex purpose tions similar to those used in the West truly desperate situation. The USSR theoretical foundation of the early cooperation with infantry units.” were (ideally) to include the following: concentrated in a small area— in the First World War, only not along could reckon on victory, went Stalin’s Soviet fortification school. The “Land The main task of a fortified region weren’t suitable for modern warfare the border. Instead, the heavy defensive reasoning, once the Red Army had Fortification Fronts” (Dolgovremennyi was to require an attacking enemy to a forward defense area of six to in and around the Soviet Union. lines were to be set up running gained a numerical superiority of two Sukhoputnyi Front) constructed concentrate a substantial number of his 7.5 miles (10-12 km), which Field fortifications—those dispersed perpendicular to the border, allowing to three times that of the invading force. from 1928 to 1934 were attempts divisions, including heavy artillery, in was a zone of natural obstacles over a wide area with small the enemy to advance far beyond it, So sufficient time had to be gained to put those views into practice. order to be able to take them by storm. and observation posts; constructions of various only to then find himself threatened to allow the nation to mobilize its The new fortified regions were Such an assault was intended to tie up an outpost line, intended to meet types —would be more effective by flank attacks from those positions. population and resources to that extent. defined as zones “equipped with a the enemy for some lengthy amount of the initial assault and channel than that older method. The lines were to increase in strength That, in turn, would only be possible the enemy force toward the main as they ran deeper into Soviet territory, with the proper military engineering line or perhaps cause it to split; Thus, from the time of its founda- making it ever more difficult for the preparations made in the border areas.