NEWCOL D WEAR INTERNATIONALVIDENCE HISTORY PROJECT ONBULLETIN 148 THE EMERGING DISPUTES BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW: TEN NEWLY AVAILABLE CHINESE DOCUMENTS, 1956-1958

Translated and Annotated by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian

Translators’ Notes: In February 1950, conversation with the Soviet Ambassador as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong kept silent on the resolution [condemning the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friend- related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to you], although we published articles to criti- ship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, a series of more general questions concern- cize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the ing the overall relationship between the two not have done that; we should have dis- Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two countries, revealing comprehensively (often cussed [this issue] with you: if some of your “brotherly” Communist countries, would in cynical tones) his understanding of the viewpoints were incorrect, [we should have last forever. However, serious problems historical, philosophical, and political ori- let] you conduct self-criticism, and there soon emerged between the Chinese and gins of the problems existing between Beijing was no need to hurry [into the controversy] Soviet parties and governments. Starting in and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: 1960, the two parties became engaged in an emphasized the issue of “equality,” empha- should you disagree with us, you should do increasingly heated polemical debate over sizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow’s the same thing, that is, the adoption of a the nature of true communism and which treatment of the CCP as a junior partner. method of persuasion and consultation. party represented it. By the late 1960s, the The third group includes four Chinese docu- There have not been that many successful relationship between the two countries had ments from Russian Foreign Ministry ar- cases in which one criticizes foreign parties deteriorated to such an extent that a major chives, which demonstrate the extent to which in newspapers. [Your] case offers a pro- border war erupted between them in March China had been dependent upon the military found historical lesson for the international 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union and other material support of the Soviet communist movement. Although you have change from allies to enemies? What prob- Union in the 1950s. These documents make suffered from it, the international commu- lems caused the decline and final collapse it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet rela- nist movement has learned a lesson from this of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to tions from another perspective. mistake. [The international communist answer these questions, scholars need ac- movement] must fully understand [the seri- cess to contemporary documentary sources, Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the ousness of ] this mistake. and these translations of the newly avail- Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences When you offered to recognize new able Chinese documents provide a basis for China, we did not respond, nor did we de- beginning to answer these questions. 1. Minutes, Mao’s Conversation with a cline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have The documents are divided into three Yugoslavian Communist Union Delega- rejected it, because there was no reason for groups. The first group includes two tion, Beijing, [undated] September 19561 us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Se- did not say no to it. How could we find any Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist Chinese Communist view on such important (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical country? questions as Khrushchev’s criticism of Documents, 1993), 251-262 There was, however, another factor Stalin, the general principles underlying which prevented us from responding to you: the relations among “brotherly parties and We welcome you to China. We are very the Soviet friends did not want us to form states,” and their perception of the Soviet pleased at your visit. We have been sup- diplomatic relations with you. If so, was Union’s attitude toward the Chinese revo- ported by you, as well as by other brotherly China an independent state? Of course, yes. lution. Particularly interesting is Mao [Communist] parties. We are invariably If an independent state, why, then, did we Zedong’s repeated reference to the “un- supporting you as much as all the other follow their instructions? [My] comrades, equal” relationship between the Chinese brotherly parties. In today’s world, the Marx- when the Soviet Union requested us to fol- Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet ist and Communist front remains united, low their suit at that time, it was difficult for Union during Stalin’s era. Through these whether in places where success [of Com- us to oppose it. It was because at that time documents one is able to sense some of the munist revolution] is achieved or not yet some people claimed that there were two deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of achieved. However, there were times when Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group we were not so united; there were times when other in China, even if no one passed a includes three documents reflecting the CCP we let you down. We listened to the opinions resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have leadership’s response to the Soviet propos- of the Information Bureau2 in the past. Al- once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that als in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio though we did not take part in the Bureau’s [they] suspected that I was a half-hearted station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet [business], we found it difficult not to sup- Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When submarine flotilla in 1958. In his long port it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito 149S COLDIN WARO INTERNATIONAL-SOVIET HISTORY PROJEC T BULLETINRELATIONS from my head? The tag was removed after tion. [Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us people who had suspected whether China’s [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] correct this mistake: while Wang Ming was a real revolution. and came to [North] Korea’s aid and when “decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang],” You might wonder why [we] still pay a [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow. Jiang Jieshi “slapped his face and kicked tribute to Stalin in China by hanging his The Wang Ming line3 was in fact Stalin’s him out.” Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China’s portrait on the wall. Comrades from Mos- line. It ended up destroying ninety percent best instructor: he had educated the people cow have informed us that they no longer of our strength in our bases, and one hundred of the whole nation as well as all of our Party hang Stalin’s portraits and only display percent of [our strength] in the white areas.4 members. Jiang lectured with his machine Lenin’s and current leaders’ portraits in pub- Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi5 pointed this out in guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with lic parade. They, however, did not ask us to his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.6 his own words. follow their suit. We find it very difficult to Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the The third time was after Japan’s surren- cope. The four mistakes committed by Stalin losses] to the [impact of] Stalin’s line? There der and the end of the Second World War. are yet to be made known to the Chinese is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and people as well as to our whole party. Our could criticize Stalin; but it would be inap- [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give situation is quite different from yours: your propriate for us to criticize him. We should the whole of China to America and Jiang [suffering inflicted by Stalin] is known to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Jieshi. In terms of material and moral sup- the people and to the whole world. Within Union. Maybe [we] could make our criti- port, especially moral support, Stalin hardly our party, the mistakes of the two Wang cism public sometime in the future. It has to gave any to us, the Communist Party, but Ming lines are well known; but our people be that way in today’s world, because facts supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was do not know that these mistakes originated are facts. The Comintern made numerous made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later in Stalin. Only our Central Committee was mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his aware that Stalin blocked our revolution and were not so bad, but its middle stage was not conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in regarded me as a half-hearted Tito. so good: it was all right when Lenin was his autobiography. We had no objection that the Soviet alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in Only after the dissolution of the Union functions as a center [of the world charge.7 The first Wang Ming line domi- Comintern did we start to enjoy more free- revolution] because it benefits the socialist nated [our party] for four years, and the dom. We had already begun to criticize movement. You may disagree [with us] on Chinese revolution suffered the biggest opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and this point. You wholeheartedly support losses.8 Wang Ming is now in Moscow tak- unfolded the rectification movement. The Khrushchev’s campaign to criticize Stalin, ing a sick leave, but still we are going to elect rectification, in fact, was aimed at denounc- but we cannot do the same because our him to be a member of the party’s Central ing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern people would dislike it. In the previous Committee. He indeed is an instructor for had committed in directing the Chinese revo- parades [in China], we held up portraits of our party; he is a professor, an invaluable lution; however, we did not openly mention Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as one who could not be purchased by money. a word about Stalin and the Comintern. those of a few Chinese [leaders]—Mao, Liu He has taught the whole party, so that it Sometime in the near future, [we] may openly [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], and Zhu [De]9 — would not follow his line. do so. There are two explanations of why we and other brotherly parties’ leaders. Now That was the first time when we got the did not openly criticize [Stalin and the we adopt a measure of “overthrowing all”: worst of Stalin. Comintern]: first, as we followed their in- no one’s portrait is handed out. For this The second time was during the anti- structions, we have to take some responsi- year’s “First of May” celebration, Ambassa- Japanese war. Speaking Russian and good bility ourselves. Nobody compelled us to dor Bobkoveshi10 already saw in Beijing at flattering Stalin, Wang Ming could di- follow their instructions! Nobody forced us that no one’s portrait was held in parade. rectly communicate with Stalin. Sent back to be wrongfully deviated to right and left However, the portraits of five dead per- to China by Stalin, he tried to set [us] toward directions! There are two kinds of Chinese: sons—Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin and right deviation this time, instead of follow- one kind is a dogmatist who completely Sun [Yat-sen]—and a not yet dead person— ing the leftist line he had previously advo- accepts Stalin’s line; the other opposes dog- Mao Zedong—are still hanging [on the wall]. cated. Advocating [CCP] collaboration with matism, thus refusing to obey [Stalin’s] in- Let them hang on the wall! You Yugoslavi- the Guomindang [the Nationalist Party or structions. Second, we do not want to dis- ans may comment that the Soviet Union no GMD], he can be described as “decking please [the Soviets], to disrupt our relations longer hangs Stalin’s portrait, but the Chi- himself out and self-inviting [to the GMD];” with the Soviet Union. The Comintern has nese still do. he wanted [us] to obey the GMD whole- never made self-criticism on these mistakes; As of this date some people remain heartedly. The Six-Principle Program he nor has the Soviet Union ever mentioned suspicious of whether our socialism can be put forward was to overturn our Party’s Ten- these mistakes. We would have fallen out successfully constructed and stick to the Principle Policy. [His program] opposed with them had we raised our criticism. assertion that our Communist Party is a establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated The fourth time was when [Moscow] phony one. What can we do? These people giving up our Party’s own armed force, and regarded me as a half-hearted Tito or semi- eat and sleep every day and then propagate preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Titoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but that the Chinese Communist Party is not Kai-shek] was in power, there would be also in other socialist countries and some really a communist party, and that China’s peace [in China]. We redressed this devia- non-socialist countries were there some socialist construction is bound to fail. To COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 150 them, it would be a bewildering thing if remains the most fearsome [for the imperial- ten to twenty years and even more dangerous socialism could be built in China! Look out, ists] whereas China is merely the second. in forty to fifty years. [they warn]. China might become an impe- What they are afraid of is our politics and that My comrades, let me advise you that rialist country—to follow America, Britain, we may have an enormous impact in Asia. you should also watch out for this potential. and France to become the fourth imperialist That is why they keep spreading the words Your industry is much modernized and has country! At present China has little indus- that China will be out of control and will experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin try, thus is in no position [to be an imperial- invade others, so on and so forth. made you suffer and hence, justice is on your ist country]; but [China] will become formi- We have been very cautious and mod- side. All of this, though, may become your dable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan11 est, trying to overcome arrogance but adher- [mental] burden. might be brought to life; consequently Eu- ing to the “Five Principles.”14 We know we The above-mentioned four mistakes rope would suffer again, and Yugoslavia have been bullied in the past; we understand Stalin committed [concerning China] may might be conquered! The “Yellow Peril” how it feels to be bullied. You would have also become our burden. When China be- must be prevented! had the same feeling, wouldn’t you? comes industrialized in later years, it will be There is absolutely no ground for this to China’s future hinges upon socialism. It more likely that we get cocky. Upon your happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist will take fifty or even one hundred years to return to your country, please tell your young- Party. The Chinese people are peace-loving turn China into a wealthy and powerful coun- sters that, should China stick her tail up in people. We believe that aggression is a try. Now no [formidable] blocking force the future, even if the tail becomes ten thou- crime, therefore, we will never seize an inch stands in China’s way. China is a huge sand meters high, still they must criticize of territory or a piece of grass from others. country with a population of one fourth of China. [You] must keep an eye on China, We love peace and we are Marxists. that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribu- and the entire world must keep an eye on We oppose great power politics in in- tion to the world is yet to be compatible with China. At that time, I definitely will not be ternational relations. Although our industry her population size, and this situation will here: I will already be attending a conference is small, all things considered, we can be have to change, although my generation and together with Marx. regarded as a big power. Hence some people even my son’s generation may not see the We are sorry that we hurt you before, [in China] begin to be cocky. We then warn change taking place. How it will change in thus owing you a good deal. Killing must be them: “Lower your heads and act with your the future depends on how [China] develops. compensated by life and debts must be paid tails tucked between your legs.” When I China may make mistakes or become cor- in cash. We have criticized you before, but was little, my mother often taught me to rupt; the current good situation may take a why do we still keep quiet? Before behave “with tails tucked between legs.” bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take [Khrushchev’s] criticism of Stalin, we were This is a correct teaching and now I often a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, not in a position to be as explicit about some mention it to my comrades. that even if [China’s] situation takes a bad issues as we are now. In my previous con- Domestically, we oppose Pan- turn, it may not become as decadent a society versations with [Ambassador] Bobkoveshi, Hanism,12 because this tendency is harmful as that of Jiang Jieshi’s. This anticipation is I could only say that as long as the Soviet to the unity of all ethnic groups. based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, Union did not criticize Stalin, we would be Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sec- and, then, negation of negation. The path in in no position to do so; as long as the Soviet tarianism. Those who have hegemonious the future is bound to be tortuous. Union did not restore [diplomatic] relations tendencies only care about their own inter- Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, with Yugoslavia, we could not establish ests but ignore others’, whereas those Pan- and arrogance all may take effect in China. relations with you.15 Now these issues can Hanists only care about the Han people and However, the Chinese people are inclined to be openly discussed. I have already talked to regard the Han people as superior to others, be modest and willing to learn from others. the Soviet comrades about the four mistakes thus damaging [the interests of] all the mi- One explanation is that we have little “capi- that Stalin had committed [to China]; I talked norities. tal” at our disposal: first, we did not invent to [Soviet Ambassador Pavel] Yudin16 about Some people have asserted in the past Marxism which we learned from others; sec- it, and I shall talk to Khrushchev about it that China has no intention to be friends ond, we did not experience the October Revo- next time when we meet. I talk to you about with other countries, but wants to split with lution and our revolution did not achieve it because you are our comrades. However, the Soviet Union, thus becoming a trouble- victory until 1949, some thirty-two years we still cannot publish this in the newspa- maker. Now, however, this kind of people after the October Revolution; third, we were pers, because the imperialists should not be shrinks to only a handful in the socialist only a branch army, not a main force, during allowed to know about it. We may openly countries; their number has been reduced the Second World War; fourth, with little talk about one or two mistakes of Stalin’s in since the War to Resist America and Assist modern industry, we merely have agriculture the future. Our situation is quite different Korea.13 It is, however, a totally different and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Al- from yours: Tito’s autobiography mentions thing for the imperialists: the stronger China though there are some people among us who Stalin because you have already broken up becomes, the more scared they will be. appear to be cocky, they are in no position to with the Soviet Union. They also understand that China is not that be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] Stalin advocated dialectical material- terrifying as long as China has no advanced their tails one or two meters high. But we ism, but sometimes he lacked materialism industry, and as long as China continues to must prevent this from happening in the and, instead, practiced metaphysics; he wrote rely on human power. The Soviet Union future: it may become dangerous [for us] in about historical materialism, but very often 151 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN suffered from historical idealism. Some of sugar plant while discussing Stalin’s mis- have such a ruler [in your history] who might his behavior, such as going to extremes, takes concerning us, we feel it inappropriate take it well even when people cursed him fostering personal myth, and embarrassing to make them public. There are other issues right in his face. The capitalist society has others, are by no means [forms] of material- involving conflicts and controversies. taken a step ahead of the feudalist society. ism. Generally speaking, the Soviet Union is The Republican and Democratic Parties in Before I met with Stalin, I did not have good. It is good because of four factors: the United States are allowed to quarrel with much good feeling about him. I disliked Marxism-Leninism, the October Revolution, each other. reading his works, and I have read only “On the main force [of the socialist camp], and We socialist countries must find [bet- the Basis of Leninism,” a long article criti- industrialization. They have their negative ter] solutions. Certainly, we need concen- cizing Trotsky, and “Be Carried Away by side, and have made some mistakes. How- tration and unification; otherwise, unifor- Success,” etc. I disliked even more his ever, their achievements constitute the ma- mity cannot be maintained. The uniformity articles on the Chinese revolution. He was jor part [of their past] while their shortcom- of people’s minds is in our favor, enabling us very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his ings are of secondary significance. Now that to achieve industrialization in a short period heart with others and treated others as equals the enemy is taking advantage of the criti- and to deal with the imperialists. It, how- whereas Stalin liked to stand above every cism of Stalin to take the offensive on a ever, embodies some shortcomings, that is, one else and order others around. This style world-wide scale, we ought to support the people are made afraid of speaking out. can be detected from his works. After I met Soviet Union. They will certainly correct Therefore, we must find some ways to en- with him, I became even more disgusted: I their mistakes. Khrushchev already cor- courage people to speak out. Our Politburo’s quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin rected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. comrades have recently been considering was excitable by temperament. When he They are already aware of Wang Ming’s these issues. became agitated, he would spell out nasty mistakes, although in the past they were Few people in China have ever openly things. unhappy with our criticism of Wang Ming. criticized me. The [Chinese] people are I have written altogether three pieces They have also removed the “half-hearted tolerant of my shortcomings and mistakes. praising Stalin. The first was written in Tito” [label from me], thus, eliminating alto- It is because we always want to serve the Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday [21 gether [the labels on] one and a half Titos. people and do good things for the people. December 1939—ed.], the second was the We are pleased to see that Tito’s tag was Although we sometimes also suffer from congratulatory speech [I delivered] in Mos- removed. bossism and bureaucracy, the people believe cow [in December 1949—ed.], and the third Some of our people are still unhappy that we have done more good things than bad was an article requested by Pravda after his with the criticism of Stalin. However, such ones and, as a result, they praise us more than death [March 1953—ed.]. I always dislike criticism has positive effects because it de- criticize us. Consequently, an idol is cre- congratulating others as well as being con- stroys mythologies, and opens [black] boxes. ated: when some people criticize me, others gratulated by others. When I was in Moscow This entails liberation, indeed, a “war of would oppose them and accuse them of to celebrate his birthday, what else could I liberation.” With it, people are becoming so disrespecting the leader. Everyday I and have done if I had chosen not to congratulate courageous that they will speak their minds, other comrades of the central leadership him? Could I have cursed him instead? as well as be able to think about issues. receive some three hundred letters, some of After his death the Soviet Union needed our Liberty, equality, and fraternity are slo- which are critical of us. These letters, how- support and we also wanted to support the gans of the bourgeoisie, but now we have to ever, are either not signed or signed with a Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that fight for them. Is [our relationship with false name. The authors are not afraid that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. Moscow] a father-and-son relationship or we would suppress them, but they are afraid That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the one between brothers? It was between father that others around them would make them Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I and son in the past; now it more or less suffer. did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal resembles a brotherly relationship, but the You mentioned “On Ten Relation- feelings and treat him as the leader of a shadow of the father-and-son relationship is ships.”17 This resulted from one-and-a-half- socialist country. Therefore, that piece was not completely removed. This is under- months of discussions between me and thirty- rather vigorous whereas the other two came standable, because changes can never be four ministers [of the government]. What out of [political] need, not my heart, nor at completed in one day. With certain open- opinions could I myself have put forward my will. Human life is just as contradictory ness, people are now able to think freely and without them? All I did was to put together as this: your emotion tells you not to write independently. Now there is, in a sense, the their suggestions, and I did not create any- these pieces, but your rationality compels atmosphere of anti-feudalism: a father-and- thing. Any creation requires materials and you to do so. son relationship is giving way to a brotherly factories. However, I am no longer a good Now that Moscow has criticized Stalin, relationship, and a patriarchal system is be- factory. All my equipment is out-of-date, I we are free to talk about these issues. Today ing toppled. During [Stalin’s] time people’s need to be improved and re-equipped as I tell you about the four mistakes committed minds were so tightly controlled that even much as do the factories in Britain. I am by Stalin, but, in order to maintain relations the feudalist control had been surpassed. getting old and can no longer play the major with the Soviet Union, [we] cannot publish While some enlightened feudal lords or role but had to assume a minor part. As you them in our newspapers. Since Khrushchev’s emperors would accept criticism, [Stalin] can see, I merely played a minor role during report only mentioned the conflict over the would tolerate none. Yugoslavia might also this Party’s National Congress whereas Liu COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 152

Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping18 and fuses to establish diplomatic relation with us. At present there exist some controversies others assumed the primary functions. The longer you drag on [these issues], the between China and the Soviet Union. Their more debts you will owe us. The longer the ways of thinking, behavior, and historical 2. Speech, Mao Zedong, “On Sino-Ameri- issues linger there, the more unreasonable traditions differ from ours. Therefore, we can and Sino-Soviet Relations,” 27 Janu- you will appear, and the more isolated you must try to persuade them. Persuasion is ary 195719 will become both domestically and in face of what I have always advocated as a way to Source: Mao Zedong Waijaio Wenxuan, international public opinion. I once told an deal with our own comrades. Some may 280-283 American in Yanan that even if you United argue that since we are comrades, we must States refused to recognize us for one hun- be of the same good quality, and why in the [Let me] talk about U.S.-China rela- dred years, I simply did not believe that you world is persuasion needed among com- tions. At this conference we have circulated United States could refuse to recognize us in rades? Moreover, persuasion is often em- a copy of the letter from [Dwight D.] the one hundred and first year. Sooner or ployed for building a common front and Eisenhower to Jiang Jieshi. This letter, in later the U.S. will establish diplomatic rela- always targeted at the democratic figures22 my view, aims largely at dampening the tions with us. When the United States does and, why is it employed toward communist enthusiasm of Jiang Jieshi and, then, cheer- so and when Americans finally come to visit party members? This reasoning is wrong. ing him up a bit. The letter urges [Jiang] to China, they will feel deep regret. It is be- Different opinions and views do exist even keep calm, not to be impetuous, that is, to cause by then, China will become completely within a communist party. Some have joined resolve the problems through the United different [from what it is now]: the house has the party, but have not changed their mindset. Nations, but not through a war. This is to been thoroughly swept and cleaned, “the Some old cadres do not share the same pour cold water [on Jiang]. It is easy for four pests”21 have altogether been elimi- language with us. Therefore, [we] have to Jiang Jieshi to get excited. To cheer [Jiang] nated; and they can hardly find any of their engage in heart-to-heart talks with them: up is to continue the hard, uncompromising “friends.” Even if they spread some germs sometimes individually, sometimes in policy toward the [Chinese] Communist [in China], it will have no use at all. groups. In one meeting after another we will Party, and to hope that internal unrest would Since the end of the Second World War, be able to persuade them. disable us. In his [Eisenhower’s] calcula- every capitalist country has suffered from As far as I can see, circumstances are tion, internal unrest has already occurred instability which has led to disturbance and beyond what persons, even those occupying and it is hard for the Communist Party to disorder. Every country in the world is high positions, can control. Under the pres- suppress it. Well, different people observe disturbed, and China is no exception. How- sure of circumstance, those in the Soviet things differently! ever, we are much less disturbed than they Union who still want to practice big-power I still believe that it is much better to are. I want you to think about this issue: chauvinism will invariably encounter diffi- establish diplomatic relations with the United between the socialist countries and the impe- culties. To persuade them remains our cur- States several years later than sooner. This rialist countries, especially the United States, rent policy and requires us to engage in is in our favor. The Soviet Union did not which side is more afraid of the other after direct dialogue with them. The last time our form diplomatic relations with the United all? In my opinion, both are afraid [of the delegation visited the Soviet Union, [we] States until seventeen years after the Octo- other], but the issue is who is afraid more. I openly talked about some [controversial] ber Revolution. The global economic crisis am inclined to accept such an assessment: the issues.23 I told Comrade Zhou Enlai over the erupted in 1929 and lasted until 1933. In imperialists are more afraid of us. However, phone that, as those people are blinded by that year Hitler came to power in Germany such an assessment entails a danger, that is, lust for gain, the best way to deal with them whereas Roosevelt took office in the United it could put us into a three-day-long sleep. is to give them a tongue-lashing. What is States. Only then was the Soviet-American Therefore, [we] always have to stress two [their] asset? It involves nothing more than diplomatic relationship established. [As far possibilities. Putting the positive possibility 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of as I can anticipate], it will probably wait aside, the negative potential is that the impe- coal, and 80 million tons of oil. How much until when we have completed the Third rialists may become crazy. Imperialists al- does this count? It does not count for a thing. Five-Year Plan20 that we should consider ways harbor malicious intentions and con- With this asset, however, their heads have forming diplomatic relations with the United stantly want to make trouble. Nevertheless, gotten really big. How can they be commu- States. In other words, it will take eighteen it will not be that easy for the imperialists to nists [by being so cocky]? How can they be or even more years [before we do so]. We start a world war; they have to consider the Marxists? Let me stress, even ten times or a are not anxious to enter the United Nations consequences once war starts. hundred times bigger, these things do not either. This is based on exactly the same [Let me] also talk about Sino-Soviet count for a thing. They have achieved noth- reasoning as why we are not anxious to relations. In my view, wrangling [between ing but digging a few things out of the earth, establish diplomatic relations with the United us] will continue. [We shall] never pretend turning them into steel, thereby manufactur- States. The objective of this policy is to that the Communist parties will not wrangle. ing some airplanes and automobiles. This is deprive the U.S. of its political assets as Is there a place in the world where wrangling nothing to be proud of! They, however, turn much as possible, so that the U.S. will be does not exist? Marxism itself is a wran- these [achievements] into huge burdens on placed in an unreasonable and isolated posi- gling-ism, and is about contradiction and their back and hardly care about revolution- tion. It is therefore all right if [the U.S.] struggle. Contradictions are everywhere, ary principles. If this cannot be described as blocks us from the United Nations and re- and contradictions invariably lead to struggle. being blinded by lust for gain, what else 153 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN could this be? Taking the office of the first (1) In my view, the mistakes of the to encourage him. However, in open talks, secretary can also become a source for being Soviet Communist leadership arise from er- they refused to admit this. blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for roneous thinking. They often set the inter- Khrushchev and Bulganin claimed that one to be out of one’s mind. Whenever one ests of the Soviet Communist Party ahead of as members of the third generation [of So- is out of his mind, there must be a way to their brotherly parties; they often set their viet] leadership, they could not do anything bring him back to his senses. This time own interests as the leaders ahead of those of to persuade Stalin or prevent his mistakes. Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained the party. As a result, they often fail to During [my visit] this time, however, I a modest attitude but quarreled with them overcome subjectivity, narrow-mindedness, stressed the ideological and social roots of and, of course, they argued back. This is a and emotion when they think about and Stalin’s mistakes, pointing out that the other correct attitude, because it is always better to resolve problems; they often fail to link leaders had to assume some responsibility make every [controversial] issue clear face together the interests of the above-stated for the gradual development of Stalin’s mis- to face. As much as they intend to influence sides in an objective, far-sighted, and calm takes. I also expressed our Chinese Party’s us, we want to influence them too. However, fashion. Although they may correct one conviction that open self-criticism will do we did not unveil everything this time, be- mistake, they are not free of making others. no harm to, but will enhance, the Party’s cause we must save some magic weapons [in Sometimes they admit that they made mis- credibility and prestige. Before getting out reserve]. Conflict will always exist. All we takes; but it does not mean that they fully of the car at the [Moscow] airport, hope for at present is to avoid major clashes come to grips with their mistakes for they Khrushchev explained to me that they could so as to seek common ground while reserv- merely take a perfunctory attitude toward not conduct the same kind of self-criticism ing differences. Let these differences be these mistakes. as we do; should they do so, their current dealt with in the future. Should they stick to For instance, the dispatch of their troops leadership would be in trouble. the current path, one day, we will have to to Warsaw was clearly interference with the About the Poland question.26 It is crys- expose everything. internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed tal-clear that the Poland incident was a result As for us, our external propaganda must forces, but not an action to suppress counter- of the historical antagonism between the not contain any exaggeration. In the future, revolutionaries. They admitted that they Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of we shall always remain cautious and mod- had committed a serious mistake, and they [the Second World] War, many [outstand- est, and shall tightly tuck our tails between even stated in our meetings this time that no ing and potential] conflicts have yet to be our legs. We still need to learn from the one should be allowed to interfere with other appropriately resolved. The recent [Soviet] Soviet Union. However, we shall learn from brotherly parties’ internal affairs; but in the dispatch of troops to Warsaw caused an even them rather selectively: only accept the good meantime, they denied that [their interven- worse impact [in Poland]. Under these cir- stuff, while at the same avoiding picking up tion in Poland] was a mistake. cumstances the Polish comrades have good the bad stuff. There is a way to deal with the When we had a general assessment of reason not to accept the policy of “following bad stuff, that is, we shall not learn from it. Stalin, analyzing the ideological and social the Soviet leadership.” The Polish com- As long as we are aware of their mistakes, roots of his [mistakes], they kept avoiding rades, however, admitted that they had yet to [we] can avoid committing the same mis- any real discussion. Although they seem- build a whole-hearted trusting relationship take. We, however, must learn from any- ingly have changed [their view] in measur- with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, thing that is useful to us and, at the same ing Stalin’s achievements and mistakes, to [Wladyslaw] Gomulka27 is trying his best to time, we must grasp useful things all over the me, such an alteration was to meet their retrieve the losses and reorient the Polish- world. One ought to seek knowledge in all temporary needs, not the result of profound Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing parts of the world. It would be monotonous contemplation. any anti-Soviet acts [in Poland]. Regard- if one only sticks to one place to receive We immediately sensed this shortly af- less, however, the Soviet comrades remain education. ter our arrival in Moscow. At the dinner unwilling to accept the criticism that [they] party hosted by Liu Xiao25 on the 17th [of practiced big-power politics [in resolving 3. Report, “My Observations on the So- January], Khrushchev again raised the Stalin the Polish crisis]. This kind of attitude does viet Union,” Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong issue. Spelling out a good deal of inappro- not help at all to convince the Polish com- and the Central Leadership, 24 January priate words, however, he made no self- rades. 1957 (Excerpt)24 criticism. We then pushed him by pointing It is safe to say that although every Source: Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de out that, given the development of Stalin’s public communiqué [between the Soviet zhuoyue fengxian [Remarkable Achieve- authoritarianism, ossified way of thinking, Union and] other brotherly states has repeat- ments and Contributions of Zhou Enlai] and arrogant and conceited attitude over edly mentioned what the 30 October [1956] (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, twenty years, how can those comrades, es- declaration28 has announced as the prin- 1993), 302-305 pecially those [Soviet] Politburo members, ciples to guide the relationship among broth- who had worked with Stalin, decline to as- erly parties and governments, [the Soviets] Having already spoken considerably sume any responsibility? They then admit- seem to recoil in fear when dealing with about the achievements of the Soviet Com- ted that Stalin’s errors came about gradu- specific issues and tend to be inured to munist leadership in public, now let [me] ally; had they not been afraid of getting patronizing others and interfering with other illustrate again the major mistakes it has killed, they could have at least done more to brotherly parties’ and governments’ internal made: restrict the growth of Stalin’s mistakes than affairs. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 154

(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Fac- the union among the Soviet Union, China for us not to persuade them [to make changes]; ing a [common] grave enemy, the Soviet and India, as well as [about] possible Sino- it is, however, equally inadvisable for us to comrades have ardent expectations about Soviet collaboration on the production of be impatient in changing them. Therefore, Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opin- atomic and hydrogen bombs. We regarded changes on their part can only be achieved ion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly these statements as swashbuckling, which is through a well-planned, step-by-step, per- convinced by our argument; nor have the not good, and they were finally deleted from sistent, patient, long-term persuasion. differences between us disappeared com- the communiqué. As a result, we did not use pletely. For instance, many leaders of the the Soviet draft. The published communiqué Part II. Disputes over Long-wave Radio Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised was largely based on our draft. Stations and the Joint Submarine our article “Another Comment on the His- (4) In spite of all of the above, however, Flotilla torical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictator- Sino-Soviet relations are far better now than ship.”29 Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, during Stalin’s era. First of all, facing the 4. Report, Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have [common] grave enemy, both sides have and the CCP Central Committee, 5 June never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, realized and accepted the necessity of pro- 1958 (Excerpt)30 when we discussed with them the part of the moting Sino-Soviet unity and mutual sup- Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 634 article concerning criticism of Stalin, they port, which had been taken as the most im- said that this was what made them dis- portant principle. Second, now the Soviet With regard to Soviet Union’s request for pleased (or put them in a difficult position, Union and China can sit down to discuss establishing long-wave radio stations in our I can’t remember the exact words). . . . issues equally. Even if they have different country, the Soviet side insists on the origi- Therefore, I believe that some of the Soviet ideas on certain issues, they must consult nal idea that the construction should be jointly leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude with us. The articles by the Chinese Party are invested by the two sides. They also propose toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, having some impact on the cadres and people to dispatch experts to China in early June to at the last day’s meeting, I decided not to in the Soviet Union, and even on some [So- conduct such activities as selecting the proper raise our requests concerning the abolition viet] leaders. Third, the previous dull situa- location, making investigations and prepar- of the long-term supply and purchase con- tion in which the brotherly parties and states ing for the design work, and drafting an tracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] could hardly discuss or argue with one an- agreement. It seems that the Soviet side will experts, and [Soviet] aid and [Sino-Soviet] other no longer exists. Now, different opin- not quickly accept the opinion of our side. In collaboration on nuclear energy and missile ions can be freely exchanged so that unity order not to hinder the investigation and development. About these issues I didn’t and progress are thereby promoted. Fourth, design work, [we] may permit the Soviet say a word. It was not because there wasn’t the majority of the Soviet people love China experts to come to China to conduct some enough time to do so, but because [I wanted and feel happy for the Chinese people’s technical work, leaving the question con- to] avoid impressing upon them that we achievements and growth in strength. Their cerning investment and operation to be solved were taking advantage of their precarious admiration and friendship with the Chinese as the next step. position by raising these issues. These people are being enhanced on a daily basis. issues can be raised later or simply dropped. However, while [Russian] arrogance and self- 5. Remarks, Mao Zedong, concerning the (3) In assessing the international situa- importance have not been completely elimi- Soviet Request on Establishing a Special tion, I am convinced that they spend more nated, an atmosphere lacking discipline and Long-wave Radio Station in China, 7 June time and effort on coping with specific and order is spreading. This time the [Soviet 195831 isolated events than on evaluating and an- leadership] gave us a splendid and grand Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 316- ticipating the situations thoroughly from reception which indicated its intention to 317 different angles. They explicitly demon- build a good image in front of its own people strate weakness in considering and discuss- and the peoples all over the world. Fifth, on For the eyes of Liu [Shaoqi], Lin Biao, ing strategic and long-term issues. As far as the one hand, extremely conceited, blinded [Deng] Xiaoping, Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], tactics are concerned, on the other hand, by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and Chen [Yun], Peng Zhen, and Chen Yi only;32 lacking clearly defined principles, they tend knowing little the ways of the world, some of return to Comrade Peng Dehuai for file: to be on such a loose ground in handling their leaders have hardly improved them- I specific affairs that they will fail to reach selves even with the several rebuffs they This can be implemented as [you have] satisfactorily the strategic goals through re- have met in the past year. On the other hand, planned. China must come up with the solving each specific conflict. As a result, it however, they appear to lack confidence and money to pay for [the financial cost] which is very likely that some worrisome events suffer from inner fears and thus tend to cannot be covered by the Soviet side. may occur in international affairs. For in- employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in stance, this time they conceded to our con- handling foreign affairs or relations with Mao Zedong viction that in today’s world there existed other brotherly parties. Although they did two camps and three forces (socialist, impe- sometimes speak from the bottom of their 7 June rialist, and nationalist) and agreed to our hearts while talking with us, they neverthe- If they try to put heavy pressure on us, analysis. But the communiqué drafted by less could not get down from their high [we] shall not respond and shall let it drag on them included only vague statements about horse. In short, it is absolutely inadvisable for a while, or [we] may respond after the 155 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN central leadership discusses it. This issue obtain [them] simply by sending a cable [to tion. You [Russians] have often stated that must be settled through an agreement be- Moscow]. the Europeans looked down upon the Rus- tween the two governments. Well, your navy’s nuclear submarines sians. I believe that some Russians look Peng [Dehuai] ought to pay attention to are of a [top] secret advanced technology. down upon the Chinese people. the section about the conversation where The Chinese people are careless in handling At the most critical juncture [of the Mao has added some comments. things. If we are provided with them, we Chinese revolution], Stalin did not allow us II might put you to trouble. to carry out our revolution and opposed our China must shoulder the responsibility The Soviet comrades have won victory carrying out the revolution. He made a huge of capital investment for this radio station; for forty years, and are thus rich in experi- mistake on this issue. So did [Grigory Y.] China is duty-bound in this case. [We] may ence. It has only been eight years since our Zinoviev. have to ask for Soviet comrades’ help with victory and we have little experience. You Neither were we pleased with [Anastas] regard to construction and equipment, but therefore raised the question of joint owner- Mikoyan. He flaunted his seniority and all the costs must be priced and paid in cash ship and operation. The issue of ownership treated us as if [we were] his sons. He put on by us. [We] may share its use after it is has long before been dealt with: Lenin pro- airs and looked very arrogant. He assumed constructed, which ought to be determined posed the system of rent and lease which, the greatest airs when he first visited Xibaipo by an agreement between the two govern- however, was targeted at the capitalists. in 194938 and has been like that every time ments. 33 This is China’s position, not purely China has some remnant capitalists, but he came to China. Every time he came, he the position of mine.34 the state is under the leadership of the Com- would urge me to visit Moscow. I asked him munist Party. You never trust the Chinese! what for. He would then say that there was 6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao You only trust the Russians! [To you] the always something for you to do there. Nev- Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July Russians are the first-class [people] whereas ertheless, only until later when Comrade 195835 the Chinese are among the inferior who are Khrushchev proposed to hold a conference Source: Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 322- dumb and careless. Therefore [you] came to work out a resolution [concerning the 333 up with the joint ownership and operation relationship among all the communist par- proposition. Well, if [you] want joint own- ties and socialist states] did [I go to Mos- After you left yesterday I could not fall ership and operation, how about have them cow].39 asleep, nor did I have dinner. Today I invite all—let us turn into joint ownership and It was our common duty to commemo- you over to talk a bit more so that you can be operation our army, navy, air force, indus- rate the fortieth anniversary of the October [my] doctor: [after talking with you], I might try, agriculture, culture, education. Can we Revolution. Up to that time, as I often be able to eat and sleep this afternoon. You do this? Or, [you] may have all of China’s pointed out, there had existed no such thing are fortunate to have little difficulty in eating more than ten thousand kilometers of coast- as brotherly relations among all the parties and sleeping. line and let us only maintain a guerrilla because, [your leaders] merely paid lip ser- Let us return to the main subject and force. With a few atomic bombs, you think vice and never meant it; as a result, the chat about the issues we discussed yester- you are in a position to control us through relations between [the brotherly] parties can day. We will only talk about these issues asking for the right of rent and lease. Other be described as between father and son or here in this room! There exists no crisis than this, what else [do you have] to justify between cats and mice. I have raised this situation between you and me. Our relation- [your request]? issue in my private meetings with ship can be described as: nine out of ten Lüshun [Port Arthur] and Dalian Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades. fingers of yours and ours are quite the same [Darinse] were under your control before. They all admitted that such a father-son with only one finger differing. I have re- You departed from these places later. Why relationship was not of European but Asian peated this point two or three times. You [were these places] under your control? It is style. Present were Bulganin, Mikoyan, and haven’t forgotten, have you? because then China was under the [M. A.] Suslov. Were you also at the meet- I’ve thought over and again of the issues Guomindang’s rule. Why did you volunteer ing? From the Chinese side, I and Deng that were discussed yesterday. It is likely to leave? It is because the Communist Party Xiaoping were present. that I might have misunderstood you, but it had taken control of China. I was unhappy with Mikoyan’s con- is also possible that I was right. We may Because of Stalin’s pressure, the North- gratulation speech which he delivered at our work out a solution after discussion or de- east and Xinjiang became [a Soviet] sphere Eighth National Congress and I deliberately bate. It appears that [we] will have to with- of influence, and four jointly owned and refused to attend that day’s meeting as a draw [our] navy’s request for [obtaining] operated enterprises were established.37 protest. You did not know that many of our nuclear-powered submarines [from the So- Comrade Khrushchev later proposed to have deputies were not happy with [Mikoyan’s viet Union]. Barely remembering this mat- these [settlements] eliminated, and we were speech]. Acting as if he was the father, he ter, I have acquired some information about grateful for that. regarded China as Russia’s son. it only after asking others.36 There are some You [Russians] have never had faith in China has her own revolutionary tradi- warmhearted people at our navy’s head- the Chinese people, and Stalin was among tions, although China’s revolution could not quarters, namely, the Soviet advisers. They the worst. The Chinese [Communists] were have succeeded without the October Revo- asserted that, now that the Soviet nuclear regarded as Tito the Second; [the Chinese lution, nor without Marxism-Leninism. submarines have been developed, we can people] were considered as a backward na- We must learn from the Soviet experi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 156 ences. We will comply with the commonly but it was mainly Stalin’s responsibility. For God’s sake, we fought wars for twenty- accepted principles, especially the nine prin- [We] have had three grievances [against two years; we fought in Korea for three ciples stated in the “Moscow Manifesto.”40 Stalin]. The first concerns the two Wang years! Let [me ask] the Central Military We ought to learn from all the experiences Ming lines. Wang Ming was Stalin’s fol- Commission to prepare some materials con- whether they are correct or erroneous. The lower. The second was [Stalin’s] discour- cerning [our war experiences] and give them erroneous lessons included Stalin’s meta- agement of and opposition to our revolution. to Comrade Yudin, of course, if he is inter- physics and dogmatism. He was not totally Even after the dissolution of the Third Inter- ested. metaphysical because he had acquired some national, he still issued orders claiming that, We did not speak out on some [contro- dialectics in thinking; but a large part of his if we did not strike a peace deal with Jiang versial] issues because we did not want to [thoughts] focused on metaphysics. What Jieshi, China would risk a grave danger of cause problems in the Sino-Soviet relations. you termed as the cult of personality was national elimination.42 Well, for whatever This was particularly true when the Polish one [example of his metaphysics]. Stalin reason, we are not eliminated. The third was Incident broke out. When Poland demanded loved to assume the greatest airs. during my first visit to Moscow during which that all of your specialists go home, Com- Although we support the Soviet Union, Stalin, [V.M.] Molotov, and [Lavrenti] Beria rade Liu Shaoqi suggested in Moscow that we won’t endorse its mistakes. As for [the personally attacked me. you withdraw some. You accepted [Liu’s] differences over] the issue of peaceful evo- Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar [to suggestion which made the Polish people lution, we have never openly discussed [these China] to read my works?43 Was it because happy because they then tasted some free- differences], nor have we published [them] I so lacked confidence that I would even have dom. At that time we did not raise our in the newspapers. Cautious as we have to have you read my works? Or was it problems with your specialists [in China] been, we choose to exchange different opin- because I had nothing to do myself? Not a because, we believe, it would have caused ions internally. I had discussed them with chance! [My real intention] was to get you you to be suspicious that we took the advan- you before I went to Moscow. While in over to China to see with your own eyes tage [of your crisis situation] to send all the Moscow, [we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to whether China was truly practicing Marxism specialists home. We will not send your raise five [controversial] issues. We won’t or only half-hearted toward Marxism. specialists home; we will not do so even if openly talk about them even in the future, Upon your return [to Moscow] you spoke Poland does so ten more times. We need because our doing so would hurt Comrade highly of us. Your first comment to Stalin Soviet aid. Khrushchev’s [political position]. In order was “the Chinese [comrades] are truly Marx- Once I have persuaded the Polish people to help consolidate his [Khrushchev’s] lead- ists.” Nevertheless Stalin remained doubt- that [we all] should learn from the Soviet ership, we decided not to talk about these ful. Only when [we entered] the Korean War Union, and that after putting the anti-dog- [controversies], although it does not mean did he change his view [about us], and so did matism campaign at rest, [they] ought to that the justice is not on our side. East European and other brotherly parties advocate a “learn from the Soviet Union” With regard to inter-governmental re- drop their doubts [about us]. slogan. Who will benefit in learning from lations, we remain united and unified up to It appears that there are reasons for us to the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union or this date which even our adversaries have be suspect: “First, you opposed Wang Ming; Poland? Of course, it will benefit Poland conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that second, you simply insisted on carrying out more. is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have your revolution regardless of [our] opposi- Although we shall learn from the Soviet objected to all the major criticism that the tion; third, you looked so smart when you Union, we must first of all take into account revisionists and imperialists have massed went all the way to Moscow desiring Stalin our own experiences and mainly rely on our against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union to sign an agreement so that [China] would own experiences. has so far done the same thing [for us]. regain authority over the [Manchurian] rail- There should be some agreed limits on When did the Soviets begin to trust us road.” In Moscow it was [I. V.] Kovalev who the terms of [Soviet] specialists. For in- Chinese? At the time when [we] entered the took care of me with [N. T.] Fedorenko as my stance, there have never been restrictions on Korean War. From then on, the two coun- interpreter. 44 I got so angry that I once your chief advisers in [our] military and tries got closer to one another [than before] pounded on the table. I only had three tasks public security branches, who can come and and as a result, the 156 aid projects came here [in Moscow], I said to them, the first was go without even notifying or consulting with about. When Stalin was alive, the [Soviet] to eat, the second was to sleep, and the third us in advance. Presumably, if you leave aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade was to shit. your post, is it all right that another ambas- Khrushchev later added a few more.41 There was a [Soviet] adviser in [our] sador be sent [to China] without discussing We have held no secrets from you. military academy who, in discussing war it with us? No, absolutely not! How much Because more than one thousand of your cases, would only allow [the Chinese train- information could your advisers to our min- experts are working in our country, you are ees] to talk about those of the Soviet Union, istry of public security obtain if they merely fully aware of the state of our military, not China’s, would only allow them to talk sit there totally uninformed by their Chinese political, economic, and cultural affairs. We about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army, colleagues? trust your people, because you are from a not [ours] in the Korean War. Let me advise you [and your special- socialist country, and you are sons and Please allow us to talk about these cases! ists] to pay more visits to each of our prov- daughters of Lenin. [Can you imagine] he wouldn’t even allow inces so as to get in touch with the people and Problems have existed in our relations, us to talk about [our own war experiences]! obtain first-hand information. This have I 157 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mentioned to Comrade Yudin many times: Indeed, it was [your] proposition for this regard. if not ten thousand times, at least one thou- establishing a “cooperative” on nuclear sub- Certainly [the arrangements] will be sand times! marines which led to these remarks. Now totally different in war time. Your army can With some exceptions, though, most of that we’ve decided not to build our nuclear operate in our [land], and our army can move the [Soviet] specialists are of a good quality. submarines, we are withdrawing our request to your places to fight. If your army operates We have also made mistakes before: we did [for obtaining submarines from the Soviet on our territory, however, it must be com- not take the initiative to pass on information Union]. Otherwise, we would have to let manded by us. When our army fights in your to the Soviet comrades. Now we must cor- you have the entire coast, much larger areas land, as long as it does not outnumber your rect these mistakes by adopting a more ac- than [what you used to control in] Lüshun army, it has to be directed by you. tive attitude [toward the Soviet comrades]. and Dalian. Either way, however, we will These remarks of mine may not sound Next time [we] ought to introduce to them not get mixed up with you: we must be so pleasing to your ear. You may accuse me China’s general line. If the first time [we] independent from one another. Since we of being an nationalist or another Tito. My fail to get the information through, [we] will will in the end build our own flotilla, it is not counter argument is that you have extended try a second time, third time, and so forth. in our interest that [we] play a minor role in Russian nationalism to China’s coast.

MAO ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: viet treaty of 1950—the very text on which printed below) is as difficult to interpret for Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador the relationship between the two Commu- historians today as it must have been for nist states was built. Moscow Center 35 years ago. 1960 was the Introduction by Odd Arne Westad To Mao, more than to most CCP lead- year when the Sino-Soviet split broke into ers, Khrushchev’s speech was a golden op- the open, first with newspaper polemics in Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Re- portunity not only to restate China’s past and the spring, and then the recall of all Soviet public of China Pavel Yudin’s two conver- present relationship with the Soviet Union, advisory personnel from China in July. sations with Mao on 31 March (printed be- but also to sanction his and the party’s turn Meetings between the two sides had been low) and 2 May 19561, form some of the best to more radical policies since the start of increasingly frosty, even if the compromises evidence we have on the Chairman’s reac- 1955. These policies, including the sweep- reached on some issues during the meeting tion to Khrushchev’s secret speech at the ing collectivization of agriculture which had of Communist parties in Moscow in the fall February 1956 CPSU 20th Congress. The just been completed (of which the Soviets momentarily reduced the intensity of the conversations provide a fascinating insight had been rather critical) and the further steps confrontation. into how Mao Zedong manipulated history in speeding up the revolutionary process Mao had not met Chervonenko earlier and the myth of his own role in the Chinese which Mao contemplated (fueled in part by in the year, but in this meeting he seemed to Communist Party (CCP). They also show a nascent concern about the lack of revolu- be eager to depreciate his own role in Chi- that Mao’s concrete views on the “Stalin tionary fervor within the CCP), could now nese policymaking, and thereby in the re- issue” in the spring of 1956 were much be advanced without too much interference sponsibility for the split. Granted, Mao’s different from those to which the Chinese from Moscow. Since the CPSU had, in description of his political status is not to- party later subscribed. effect, repudiated much of its own past, it tally inaccurate; in the wake of his disastrous In his long monologues to Yudin—with could no longer insist on having a monopoly economic experiments in the late 1950s, he whom he was on personally friendly terms— on theoretical guidance. Mao could—in a had—not of his own free will—taken less Mao gave vent to three decades of frustra- dual sense—liberate himself from Stalin’s part in day-to-day governance than before. tions with Stalin’s China policy—frustra- ghost. But here he overstated his case and he did so tions which up to 1956 he could neither It was not until, first, half a year later, to the Soviet ambassador. In addition, when present fully to the Soviets nor share openly after the Polish and Hungarian events in it came to the Sino-Soviet conflict, we know with his Chinese colleagues. In terms of October-November 1956, that Mao’s con- that Mao had been fully in charge, even CCP history, Mao’s spring 1956 version cern with the political effects of de- during this period. was not radically different from what had Stalinization came to the fore. The disinte- So what was Mao’s purpose? To be- been dogmatically accepted in the party since gration of Communist authority in Eastern have civilly to a well-wisher bringing birth- 1945, with the major exception that Stalin’s Europe frightened the Chinese leaders and day greetings? To give away as little as role had been filled in. In this version, the compelled them to adopt a much more cau- possible about how he really felt about Sino- major “mistakes” which almost destroyed tious attitude to the “Stalin issue,” including Soviet relations? Or to position himself so the party before Mao took the helm were an indirect criticism of the Soviets for hav- that in case his game with real or perceived ascribed not only to the CCP leaders who ing gone too far in their revision of the enemies within his own party went against implemented the policies (Li Lisan, Wang Communist past. (For revealing insights him, he could still play the “Soviet card” to Ming and others), but to Stalin, who had into the causes of Mao’s change of heart, see strengthen his hand? As of yet, we still do inspired and abetted “the mistakes.” Like- Bo Yibo’s and Wu Lengxi’s recent mem- not know. wise, the resistance to Mao’s “correct” lead- oirs.) Translations of the two documents fol- ership since the late 1930s could again be Mao’s conversation with the somewhat low below: traced back to Stalin’s errors, which even startled Soviet ambassador S.V. continued on page 164 influenced the negotiating of the Sino-So- Chervonenko on 26 December 1960 (also COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 158

It was Comrade Khrushchev who had military codes were basically to guide opera- encounter considerable problems; the same eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before tions on flatlands, and as Fujian [province] is true with us: if you undermine our [politi- his death, Stalin demanded the right to build had nothing but mountains, the Soviet codes cal] positions, we will be in trouble. a plant to manufacture canned food in our were not entirely applicable [to Fujian’s re- In wartime, you can utilize all our naval country. My response was that [we] would ality]. Very upset at hearing this, ports, military bases, and other [facilities]. accept [the demand] as long as you provide Petroshevskii immediately responded: “You [In return] our [military] can operate in your us equipment, help us build it, and import all have insulted the great military science in- places including your port or bases at the products [from us]. Comrade vented by the great Stalin!” His remarks Vladivostok and shall return home when Khrushchev praised me for giving [Stalin] a made everyone at the meeting very nervous.) war is over. We may sign an agreement on good answer. But why in the world do [you Some of the above-mentioned [contro- wartime cooperation in advance which does Russians] want to build a naval “coopera- versial] issues have been raised [by us] be- not have to wait until war breaks out. Such tive” now? How would you explain to the fore, some have not. You have greatly aided an agreement must contain a stipulation that rest of the world that you propose to build a us but now we are downplaying your [role]; our [forces] can operate on your territory; naval “cooperative”? How would you ex- you may feel very bad about it. Our relation- even if we might not do so, such a stipulation plain to the Chinese people? For the sake of ship, however, resembles that between pro- is required, because it involves the issue of struggling against the imperialists, you may, fessor and student: the professor may make equality. In peacetime, however, such an as advisers, train the Chinese people. Oth- mistakes, do not you agree that the student arrangement cannot be accepted. In peace- erwise, you would have to lease Lüshun and has to point them out? Pointing out mistakes time, you are only to help us construct [mili- other [ports] for ninety-nine years; but your does not mean that the [student] will drive tary] bases and build armed forces. “cooperative” proposal involves the ques- the professor out. After all the professor is a We would not have accepted [your] tion of ownership, as you propose that each good one. proposition for building a naval “coopera- side will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday You are assisting us to build a navy! tive” even it had been during Stalin’s time. I you made me so enraged that I could not Your [people] can serve as advisers. Why quarreled with him in Moscow! sleep at all last night. They (pointing at would you have to have fifty percent of the Comrade Khrushchev has established other CCP leaders present) are not angry. ownership? This is a political issue. We plan his credibility by having the [previous] “co- Only me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my to build two or three hundred submarines of operative” projects eliminated. Now that sole responsibility. this kind. such an issue involving ownership is raised (Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unani- If you insist on attaching political condi- again, we are reminded of Stalin’s positions. mously agreed upon these points.) tions [to our submarine request], we will not I might be mistaken, but I must express my If we fail to get our messages through satisfy you at all, not even give you a tiny opinion. this time, we may have to arrange another [piece of our] finger. You may inform Com- You explained [to me] yesterday that meeting; if not, we may have to meet every rade Khrushchev that, if [he] still [insists on] [your proposition] was based on the consid- day. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to these conditions, there is no point for us to eration that [Russia’s coastal] conditions Comrade Khrushchev; or we can invite Com- talk about this issue. If he accepts our re- were not as good for nuclear submarines to rade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to quirement, he may come [to Beijing]; if not, function fully as China’s, thus hamstringing clarify every issue. he does not have to come, because there is future development of nuclear submarines. (Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet De- nothing for us to talk about. Even one tiny You can reach [the Pacific] Ocean from fense Minister Malinovsky cabled me re- condition is unacceptable [for us]! Vladivostok through the Kurile Islands. The questing to build a long-wave radio station When this issue is involved, we will condition is very good! along China’s coast to direct the [Soviet] refuse to accept your aid for ten thousand What you said [yesterday] made me submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As years. However, it is still possible for us to very uneasy and displeased. Please report the project will cost a total of 110 million cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 mil- that we would break up. We will, from you must tell him exactly what I have said lion and China will pay 40 million.)45 beginning to the end, support the Soviet without any polishing so as to make him This request is of the same nature as the Union, although we may quarrel with each uneasy. He has criticized Stalin’s [policy] naval “cooperative” proposal which [we] other inside the house. lines but now adopts the same policies as cannot explain to the people. [We] will be While I was in Moscow, I once made it Stalin did. put in a politically disadvantageous position clear to Comrade Khrushchev that you did We will still have controversies. You if [we] reveal these requests to the world. not have to satisfy every one of our requests. do not endorse some of our positions; we (Peng Dehuai: Petroshevskii [a Soviet Because if you hold back your aid from us, cannot accept some of your policies. For military adviser] also has a rude attitude and [you] in effect would compel us to work instance, your [leadership] is not pleased at rough style. He is not very pleased because harder [to be self-reliant]; should we get our policy regarding “internal contradic- some of our principles for army building do everything from you, we will end up in an tions among the people,” and the policy of not completely follow the Soviet military disadvantageous position. “letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hun- codes. Once at an enlarged CMC meeting, It is, however, extremely important for dred schools of thought contend.” when Comrade Ye Fei from the Fujian Mili- us to cooperate politically. Because, if we Stalin endorsed the Wang Ming line, tary District46 pointed out that, as the Soviet undermine your political positions, you will causing the losses of our revolutionary 159 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN strength up to more than ninety percent. At him try his method! As a result, his trial fered severe flood this year thus encounter- the critical junctures [of our revolution], he achieved a remarkable success which has ing a shortage of material supplies, however, wanted to hold us back and opposed our become a first-rate, world-class scientific [we] have to reallocate materials that have revolution. Even after [we] achieved vic- invention. originally been designated for export so as to tory, he remained doubtful about us. At the I have never met with Comrade Xining, meet the needs of our domestic supply and, same time, he boasted that it was because of but I have talked to many cadres who partici- therefore, to reduce our export for next year. the direction of his theories that China’s pated in the construction of the Yangtze In order to maintain the balance between our [revolution] succeeded. [We] must do away Bridge. They all told me that Comrade import and export for the year of 1957, we with any superstition about him. Before I Xining was a very good comrade because he have no other alternatives but to reduce die, I am prepared to write an article on what took part in every part of the work, adopted purchases of foreign goods. As we have Stalin had done to China, which is to be a very pleasant working style, and worked calculated, however, we cannot afford to cut published in one thousand years. very closely with the Chinese comrades. down such items as complete sets of equip- (Yudin: The Soviet central leadership’s When the bridge was built, the Chinese ment and general trade items so as to avoid attitude toward the policies of the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from casting an adverse effect on the ongoing central leadership is: it is completely up to him]. Any of you who knows him person- capital construction. Therefore, we have the Chinese comrades how to resolve the ally please convey my regards to him. decided that our original order worth 890 Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese Please do not create any tensions among million rubles of materials from the USSR comrades who understand the situation best. the specialists regarding the relations be- for 1957 be reduced to that of 426 million Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and tween our two parties and two countries. I rubles. arrogant to judge and assess whether or not never advocate that. Our cooperation has We understand that our reduction of the CCP’s policies are correct, for the CCP covered a large ground and is by far very purchase orders of Soviet military materials is a great party.) satisfactory. You ought to make this point will cause the Soviet Government some prob- Well, [we] can only say that we have clear to your embassy staff members and lems. But [our request for the change] is an been basically correct. I myself have com- your experts so that they will not panic when act against our will. [We] wish that the mitted errors before. Because of my mis- they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criti- Soviet Government will accept our request. takes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which cized [Soviet leaders]. Provided that you accept our request, we examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and I have long before wanted to talk about will dispatch Tang Tianji,49 our representa- two other campaigns.47 I will be very con- some of these issues. However, it has not tive with full authority in military material tent if I am refuted as being basically correct, been appropriate to talk about them because orders, to Moscow for the purpose of con- because such an assessment is close to real- the incidents in Poland and Hungary put ducting negotiations with the Soviet Minis- ity. your [leadership] in political trouble. For try of Foreign Trade. We will also submit a Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will instance, we then did not feel it right to talk detailed list of orders which are reduced and be built is a policy issue: only China is in a about the problem concerning the experts [in verified to the Soviet Economic Office to position to decide whether we should build China]. China soon. We look forward to hearing it with your assistance or it should be “jointly Even Stalin did improve himself: he let from you. owned.” Comrade Khrushchev ought to China and the Soviet Union sign the [alli- come to China [to discuss this issue] because ance] treaty, supported [us] during the Ko- 8. Memo, PRC Foreign Ministry to the I have already visited him [in Moscow]. rean War, and provided [us] with a total of USSR Embassy to Beijing, 13 March 1957 [We] should by no means have blind 141 aid projects. Certainly these achieve- Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, faith in [authorities]. For instance, one of ments did not belong to him but to the entire delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, your specialists asserted on the basis of a Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we Moscow book written by one [of your] academy schol- do not want to exaggerate Stalin’s mistakes. ars that our coal from Shanxi [province] The Chinese Government asserts that, cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an Part III. China’s Request for Soviet although generally acceptable, the draft pa- assertion has despaired us: we therefore Military and Material Support48 per on a review of Far Eastern economic would have no coal which can be turned into development, compiled by the [Soviet] Far coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit! 7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. East Economic Committee has made sev- Comrade Xining [transliteration], a So- Bulganin, 12 December 1956 eral errors on China’s economic develop- viet specialist who helped us build the Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, ment. Yangtze River Bridge [in Wuhan], is a very delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, (1) The sentence that “[China’s] agrar- good comrade. His bridge-building method Moscow ian collectivization has encountered peas- has never been utilized in your country: ants’ opposition,” under the section of [you] never allowed him to try his method, On 30 April 1956, our government pro- “Speedy Advance toward Socialism” (page either to build a big or medium or even small posed to the USSR that [China] would order 1), does not correspond with reality. The sized bridge. When he came here, however, a total of 890 million rubles worth of mili- speed of our country’s agricultural collec- his explanation of his method sounded all tary supplies [from the USSR] for the year of tivization, which has been fully explained right. Since we knew little about it, [we] let 1957. As large areas [of China] have suf- by Liu Shaoqi in his report to the [National] COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 160

People’s Congress, completely refutes such year plan only includes the main part of amount—of technical experts and aides; an assertion. In discussing [China’s] price economic and cultural [entertaining and edu- (5) invite and dispatch on a reciprocal problem, the draft paper deliberately dis- cational] construction, whereas the total of basis experts and delegations for the purpose torts and obliterates our basic achievements [China’s] capital construction during 1953- of on-site inspection, participation in con- which are clearly presented in Li 1956 covers much wider grounds. ferences, delivery of research reports, and Xiannian’s50 report [to the People’s Con- 4. The session on “Development Plans” short-term internships; gress], and instead, exaggerates our isolated notes that the Second Five-Year Plan origi- (6) establish frequent contacts on scien- weakness and mistakes. Given this fact, nally set 98.3% as the [overall] increase tific research and production conditions in therefore, the paper could not help but draw objective, but Premier Zhou [Enlai] in his [each side’s] national defense industry; erroneous conclusions (page 20). report on the Second Five-Year Plan reduces (7) discuss the exchange and provision (2) The draft paper has also made errors this objective to 90.3% (page 23). There is of teaching guides, textbooks, or other mate- merely by comparing our published statis- indeed no reduction of the original increase rials on national defense industry training, tics which are, indeed, to serve different objective. Because the former [figure] ex- or materials necessary to enhance national purposes. There are several such errors: cludes the outputs of individual production defense industry personnel’s techniques and 1. The section titled “Speedy Advance whereas the latter includes the outputs of skills; toward Socialism” mentions that “[China] individual production, thus becoming 90.3%. (8) exchange lessons and experiences plans to raise the percentage of handicrafts Since there are detailed explanations and of employing new machinery, new facili- [as an industry] in the nation’s GNP up to illustrations as to exactly what the above ties, and new technology as well as new 15.3 % in 1956, whereas the First Five-Year mentioned figures cover when these reports applications of research results to weaponry Plan has originally planned to have [the are publicized, there exists no excuse why production; handicrafts] reach 9.4% in 1957” (page 4). such errors have been committed. Other than (9) study the issue of warranties for In actuality, the former [figure] refers to a the above listed mistakes, [the draft paper] technical materiel [one side] provides [the combined output of “handicrafts factories” still contains minor errors which are of no other side] for production; and “handicrafts individuals” while the later significant concern [of ours]. (10) discuss other issues concerning [figure] only reflects the percentage of national defense industry that both sides “handicrafts individuals’ outputs” in GNP. 9. Memo, Embassy of the PRC in Moscow deem necessary. 2. The section on “National Income and to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 Decem- During the period when the joint com- Capital Accumulation” asserts that “[China] ber 1957 mission adjourns, the Chinese Government in one way or another exaggerates its [per Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, will authorize the Second Machinery Minis- capita] increase, given the [Chinese] statis- delo 3, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, try and the Commercial Office of the PRC tics on the nation’s per capita increase from Moscow embassy [in Moscow] to take charge of 1953 to 1956, that is, 1953, 127 yuan, 1954, communications and contacts regarding rou- 137 yuan, 1955, 141 yuan, 1956, 154 yuan. In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet coop- tine affairs and issues of national defense This is because, according to Liu Shaoqi’s eration and close links regarding national industry. Whichever agency [of the Soviet report, the increase of industrial production defense industry, the Chinese Government side] will be in charge [during this period] is during 1953-1956 is no higher than 90.3%, proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commis- left to the Soviet Government to decide. whereas the above listed figures seem to sion in charge of national defense industry be Before every meeting of the joint com- assume that the increase would be 104%” established which, consisting of several del- mission, each side is to provide the other side (page 5). The 90.3% increase mentioned in egates from each side, is to meet once or with a memorandum containing the agenda Liu Shaoqi’s report covers all industrial twice annually. [and] schedule as well as supplementary increase including modern [heavy] and fac- The joint commission’s major responsi- materials. tory industries, and individual production, bilities include: All minutes and records of the joint while Bo Yibo’s51 reported 104% increase (1) exchange published and unpublished commission’s meetings are to be prepared only refers to the increase of production by books, journals, handbooks, directories, tech- respectively in Chinese and Russian lan- modern [heavy] and factory [machinery] nical criteria, or other materials both sides guages and co-signed by the representatives industries. deem appropriate; of each side’s delegation to the joint com- 3. The section on “National Income and (2) discuss such issues as standardiza- mission. Capital Accumulation” also points out that tion of weaponry, technical conditions, speci- All results of the joint commission’s the total of [China’s] capital construction fications, and national criteria, and com- discussions are to be references for each during 1953-1956 exceeds the five-year monly acceptable differences of weaponry Government which, if deemed necessary, budget’s 42.74 billion yuan by 1%, but State production; will authorize certain agencies for their imple- Planning Commission Chairman Li (3) discuss standardization of [techni- mentation. Fuchun’s52 report [to the People’s Con- cal] specifications, and provide [each other] All costs of organizing the joint gress] only states that [China] will by 1956 with standard products and measuring appa- commission’s meetings will be charged to complete up to 87.6% of the planned capital ratus; the Government where the meeting is held, construction (page 7). In fact, the amount of (4) discuss invitation and engagement— whereas each Government will be respon- capital construction as designed by the five- including procedures, terms limits, and sible for expenditures of its own delegation 161 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN during the meeting. to their advantage. Therefore, China will nals of the United Nations and its special Please consider our above-stated propo- from now on refuse to participate in any organizations. sitions. The Chinese side wishes to know the international organizations or conferences 3. With regard to those international Soviet Government’s response. involving such a situation. China will also conferences already having certain relations consider withdrawing from those interna- with the United Nations or its special orga- 10. Memo, [PRC] Ministry of Foreign tional organizations, such as the Interna- nizations which China considers participat- Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 4 tional Law Association, at an appropriate ing, our policy is as follows: September 1958 moment. a. China will support any resolutions of Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, For those overseas Chinese individuals the conferences which only generally men- delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, who participate in the international organi- tion the United Nations Charter. China will Moscow zations or conferences which have already not comply with any resolutions of the con- invited Chinese delegates, [we] will decide ferences which have a good deal to do with (1) As China’s influence in the interna- by looking at these [overseas Chinese indi- the United Nations or its special organiza- tional community rises day by day, the US viduals’] attitude toward politics. If they do tions. However, if these resolutions are imperialists’ policy of disregarding the Chi- not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but favorable to world peace and friendly coop- nese people and not recognizing but shutting represent their [residential] countries, [we] eration [among all the nations], China will out the Chinese [Government] from interna- will not treat them as complicating the “two- not oppose. tional life is getting increasingly difficult China” issue. However, [we] must not relax b. China will not attend any sessions [of and losing support of the peoples [all over our vigilance because they might disguise the conferences] which are designated to the world]. In order to extricate itself from their appearance but in effect carry out con- discuss the United Nations or its special such a difficult position as well as to assure spiratorial activities [related to the creation organizations. continuous control of Taiwan, [the US Gov- of “two Chinas”]. c. China will refuse to attend any ses- ernment] has stepped up the realization of its 3. With regard to the situation in which sions where United Nations representatives “two-China” conspiracy. an international organization which has al- speak in the name of conference advisers or (2) The following is the Chinese ready had the Jiang representatives, or its as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese Government’s counter-measure against the branch organization, invites us to attend [delegates] listen to United Nations repre- [US] “two-China” plot: conferences even if Jiang Clique’s delegates sentatives’ report or presentation. However, 1. With regard to the situation in which are not invited. Such a situation definitely Chinese delegates will be allowed to partici- China’s delegation and Jiang [Jieshi] constitutes a “two-China” reality. More- pate in sessions where United Nations repre- Clique’s “delegation” join the same interna- over, it will leave others with a wrong im- sentatives participate in or give speeches as tional organization or attend the same inter- pression that China is anxious to participate ordinary participants. If UN representatives national conference. Facing this situation, in the activities of those international orga- deliver speeches or remarks to insult or the Chinese side will resolutely demand to nizations. Therefore, China will not be part slander China, Chinese delegates will have have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If of these organizations or conferences. to refute them right on the spot and then [our request is] rejected, China will not co- (3) Controlled by the United States, the leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are operate with such an organization or confer- United Nations and its Special Organiza- included in the UN delegation, Chinese del- ence and, thus, will have to withdraw with tions have generally retained Jiang’s repre- egates must point out that this ignored China’s no hesitation. In the past year China has sentatives and kept rejecting the restoration interests and then, protest and refuse to par- already done this many times, including of China’s legitimate positions [in these ticipate. withdrawing from the Nineteenth World international organizations]. The following d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to Convention of the Red Cross. [China] has are our counter-measures. express any opinion on whether China will recently decided not to recognize the Inter- 1. China will not dispatch any represen- establish, in some fashion, a consultative national Olympic Committee. From now tatives (either of the Chinese Government or relationship with the United Nations or its on, China will resolutely refuse to partici- of other organizations) to participate in any special organizations. If any international pate in any international organizations or conferences organized by the United Na- conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese conferences which invite or tolerate the par- tions and its Special Organizations. No delegates cannot but abstain from the vot- ticipation of the Jiang Clique’s representa- individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a ing. tives. representative or a staff member of other (4) China asserts that [its] participation 2. With regard to the situation in which international organizations, is permitted to in international conferences and organiza- China’s delegation or individual and Jiang contact or conduct negotiations with the tions is only one way to establish contacts Clique’s individuals participate in the same United Nations and its special organiza- and relations in the international commu- international organization or international tions. nity, which may bring about some results in conference. Such a situation, although in 2. China will not provide the United terms of enhancing China’s visibility and formality constituting no “two-China,” will Nations or its special organizations with any obtaining some information on how certain in effect impress upon the [international] materials or statistics, nor will China en- specific [international] projects progress. community that “two Chinas” co-exist, and dorse that [our] brother countries publish However, no or minimum participation in is very likely to be used by [our] adversaries any materials concerning China in the jour- the international conferences or organiza- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 162 tions will not keep China from developing 10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia’s first ambassador to to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time 1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from on 30 June 1955. January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five people from getting acquainted or making 11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai friends with other nations; no or minimum born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan. participation in some international confer- still lacked a common name. He became their great After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this ences or organizations does not mean that organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Chinggis report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership, established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese China adopts a negative or protective atti- conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The and Soviet parties. tude toward [international] cultural exchange Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressive- 25. Liu Xiao was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet activities. [In regard to these activities], ness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was Union from February 1955 to October 1962. China may take part in other fashions. On certainly present in Chinggis. 26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland. 12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit the other hand, China’s non-participation China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved may put so much pressure on these confer- population. Zhou’s Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to ences or organizations that they will have 13. The “War to Resist America and Assist Korea” Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a difficulties in organizing activities thus mak- describes China’s participation in the Korean War from formal state visit in India): “The Polish ambassador October 1950 to July 1953. visited us, mentioning that their congress election is ing them discontented with the United States. 14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon. As a result, more and more criticism and Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 There exists the danger that the United Workers’ Party condemnation of the “two-China” policy December 1953. These principles—(1) mutual respect might lose the majority support. He hoped that China may be aroused. In short, China remains for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non- would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Com- willing to cooperate with those international affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful rade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why conferences and organizations which are in coexistence—were later repeatedly claimed by the Chi- it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the China’s interests [and] have no intention to nese government as the foundation of the PRC’s foreign trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already impair China’s sovereignty. policy. invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time 15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip. [We are certain] that, as long as we Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugosla- Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one have the Soviet-led socialist countries’ sup- vian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 between the United Workers’ Party and other parties port, our just cause of smashing America’s October 1949, four days after the PRC’s establishment. (with bourgeoisie character) over attracting votes from “two-China” conspiracy will achieve a com- 16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon. and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet But if the United Workers’ Party loses control, it would plete success. Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet am- be disadvantageous [to the socialist camp]. Therefore, bassador to China from 1953 to 1959. we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to 17. “On Ten Relationships” was one of Mao’s major Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship be- a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the 1. The content of this conversation suggests that it tween industry and agriculture and heavy industry and trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the light industry, between coastal industry and industry in is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should CCP’s Eighth National Congress was in session. the interior, between economic construction and na- visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will 2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist tional defense, between the state, the unit of production, allow you to have four to five days to have the Sino- and Workers’ Parties (Cominform), which was estab- and individual producers, between the center and the Soviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can lished in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet regions, between the Han nationality and the minority travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, nationalities, between party and non-party, between issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help.” Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right (Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de zhuoyeu fengxian, 299- announced that it was ending its activities in April and wrong, and between China and other countries. For 300). 1956. an English translation of one version of the article, see 27. Wladyslaw Gomulka was the leader of the Polish 3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People Communist regime. Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union and a (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83. 28. This refers to the “Declaration on Developing and leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 18. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Coun- Wang Ming committed “ultra-leftist” mistakes in the the Party’s Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and tries” issued by the Soviet government on the evening early 1930s and “ultra-rightist” mistakes in the late Zhou were elected the Party’s vice chairmen, and Deng of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian 1930s. the Party’s general secretary. crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its 4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas. 19. This was part of Mao Zedong’s speech to a confer- relations with other communist countries and promised 5. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of the CCP Central ence attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee secretaries. with them in the future. of the People’s National Congress. He was China’s 20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, 29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP second most important leader. the year of completing the third five-year plan would be Politburo and published in the name of the editorial 6. The Chinese Communist party’s eighth national 1968. board of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) on 29 Decem- congress was held in Beijing on 15-27 September 21. The elimination of the “four pests” (rats, bedbugs, ber 1956. 1956. flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a na- 30. Peng Dehuai, China’s minister of defense, submit- 7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian commu- tional hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and ted this report in the context of the emerging dispute nist, was the Comintern’s secretary general from 1935 late 1950s. between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of estab- to 1943. 22. “Democratic figures” is a term used by Mao and the lishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On 8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935, Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or 18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union’s during which the “international section,” of which communist sympathizers in China. defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai: Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the 23. This refers to Zhou Enlai’s visit to the Soviet Union, In order to command the Soviet Union’s sub- central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Poland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou marines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high 9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Enlai’s report on the visit, see the next document. command urgently hopes that between 1958 Committee and vice chairman of the PRC. 24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will 163 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

jointly construct a high-power long-wave ra- assistance? Or [do you mean] that we should jointly 52. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and dio transmission center and a long-wave radio create [the flotilla], otherwise you will not offer any China’s vice premier, chairman of State Planning Com- receiving station specially designed for long assistance?” Mao emphasized that he was not interested mission. distance communication. In terms of the fund in creating a Sino-Soviet “military cooperative.” that is needed for the construction of the two (Source: Han Nianlong et al. Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger 113-114.) The next day, Mao discussed the proposal portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller with Yudin at length. Zhang Shu Guang is associate professor at portion (30%). 36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who the University of Maryland at College Park The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a were present during this discussion. and author, most recently, of Mao’s Military matter related to China’s sovereignty and integrity. 37. In March 1950 and July 1951, the Chinese and Romanticism: China and the Korean War, Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and to Soviet government signed four agreements, establish- have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: ing a civil aviation company, an oil company, a non- 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Con- ferrous and rare metal company, and a shipbuilding of Kansas, 1995); Chen Jian is associate temporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese So- company jointly owned by the two countries. professor of history at Southern Illinois cial Science Press, 1989), 112-113.) 38. Xibaipo was tiny village in Hebei Province where University at Carbondale and author of 31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai’s the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document. from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Mak- 32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of Mikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo from 31 January to 7 ing of the Sino-American Confrontation the CCP Central Committee and China’s vice premier; February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao (New York: Columbia University Press, Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account 1994). Committee, and China’s vice premier in charge of of Mikoyan’s visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian), financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a mem- “With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese ber of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi Interpreter,” Chinese Historians 5:1 (Spring 1992), 45- was a member of the CCP Politburo, China’s vice 56. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting Ledovsky, “Mikoyan’s Secret Mission to China in in February 1958). January and February 1949,” Far Eastern Affairs (Mos- 33. Words in italics were added by Mao. cow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to 34. Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, Peng Dehuai note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June are in accord. 1958: “The Chinese government agrees to the construc- 39. Mao Zedong attended the Moscow conference of tion of high-power long-wave radio stations, and wel- leaders of communist and workers’ parties from social- comes the technological assistance from the Soviet ist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the 40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet 40. The “Moscow Manifesto” was adopted by the Union after the completion of their construction. There- Moscow conference of leaders of communist and work- fore, it is necessary for the governments of the two ers’ parties from socialist countries in November 1957. countries to sign an agreement on the project.” On 11 41. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement China’s first five-year plan, focusing on energy devel- to construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did opment, heavy industry and defense industry. not understand the nature of Beijing’s concern over 42. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin’s telegrams to the having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which insisted that the stations should be constructed and Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause Chinese responded with several suggestions for revi- “the danger of national elimination.” sion: China would take the responsibility for construct- 43. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to ing the station and its ownership belongs to China; dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao’s China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China help construct the station; after the station’s comple- from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October tion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet 1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao Union. Zedong’s works. 35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in 44. I. V. Kovalev, Stalin’s representative to China from the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950; N. T. submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase in Beijing. new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 45. See note 30. June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting 46. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District. that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance 47. Mao commanded these military operations during for China’s naval buildup, especially the designs for the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934. new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called 48. Documents in this group are found in Russian on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev’s name, Yudin Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chi- told Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made nese. it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type 49. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People’s submarines. Because China had a long coastline and Liberation Army’s General Logistics Department. good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China 50. Li Xiannian was a member of CCP Politburo and and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flo- China’s vice premier and finance minister. tilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: “First, 51. Bo Yibo was then alternate member of CCP Polit- we should make clear the guiding principle.[Do you buro and China’s vice premier, chairman of National mean that] we should create [the flotilla] with your Economic Commission. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 164

MAO’S CONVERSATIONS the orientation to the Guomintang, having ample, a deviation, that in the Soviet regions continued from page 157 viewed it as a united front of the revolution- of China which were blockaded by the ary forces of China. Stalin said that it is Guomintang even the petty trading bour- Document I: necessary to depend on the Guomintang, to geoisie was liquidated and all kinds of inter- Mao’s Conversation with Yudin, follow after that party, i.e. he spoke directly nal trade was stopped. As a result of this 31 March 1956 about the subordination of the Communist policy the Chinese Red Army, which in Party of China to the Guomintang. This was 1929 was comprised of 300,000 fighters, From the Journal of Top Secret a great mistake which had held back the was reduced by 1934-35 to 25,000, and the P.F. Yudin Copy No. 1 independent work of the Communist Party of territory which made up the Soviet regions “5” April 1956 China on the mobilization of the masses and of China was reduced by 99%. CPC organi- No. 289 on attracting them to the side of the Commu- zations in the cities were routed by the nist Party. Guomintang and the number of Commu- Through the Comintern, Mao Zedong nists was reduced from 300,000 to 26,000 RECORD OF CONVERSATION continued, Stalin, having become after the people. The Soviet regions were totally with Comrade Mao Zedong death of V.I. Lenin the de facto leader of the isolated from the remaining part of the coun- Comintern, gave to the CC CPC a great try and remained without any products, even 31 March 1956 number of incorrect directives. These mis- without salt. All this caused serious discon- taken and incorrect directives resulted from tent among the population of the Soviet Today I visited Mao Zedong and gave the fact that Stalin did not take into account regions. him Comrade Khrushchev’s letter about the the opinion of the CPC. At that time Van As a result of the ultra-leftist policy of assistance which the Soviet Union will pro- Minh, being a Comintern worker, met fre- Van Minh, the more or less large regions vide: 1) in the construction of 51 enterprises quently with Stalin and tendentiously had which remained under CPC leadership were and 3 scientific research institutes for mili- informed him about the situation in the CPC. mostly in North China (the provinces of tary industry, 2) in the construction of a Stalin, evidently, considered Van Minh the Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia), to which Van railroad line from Urumqi to the Soviet- single exponent of the opinion of the CC Minh’s power did not extend. Van Minh, Chinese border. Mao Zedong asked me to CPC. backed by the Comintern, essentially man- send his deep gratitude to the CC CPSU and Van Minh and Li Lisan, who repre- aged it so that the 8th and 4th armies re- the Soviet government. sented the CPC in the Comintern, tried to moved themselves from subordination to Further I said that I had wanted to visit concentrate the whole leadership of the CPC the CC CPC. him (Mao Zedong) in the very first days in their own hands. They tried to present all Van Minh and his successors saw the following my return to Beijing and to tell the Communists who criticized the mistakes Guomintang as the “young power,” which about the work of the 20th Congress of the of Van Minh and Li Lisan as opportunists. absorbs all the best and will be able to gain CPSU and, in particular, about Comrade Mao Zedong said, they called me a right a victory over Japan. They spoke against the Khrushchev’s speech at the closed session opportunist and a narrow empiricist. As an independent and autonomous policy of the regarding the cult of personality. Mao example of how the Comintern acted incor- Communist Party in the united front, and Zedong responded that because of his ill- rectly in relation to the Communist Party of against the strengthening of the armed forces ness he had found it necessary to put off the China, Mao Zedong introduced the follow- of the CPC and revolutionary bases, against meeting with me. Mao Zedong said that the ing. the unification of all strata of the population members of the CPC delegation who had Under the pretext that the Third Plenum around the policy of the CPC. Van Minh’s attended the 20th Congress had told him of the CC CPC, while considering the coup- supporters tried to replace the genuinely something about the work of the Congress plotting errors of Li Lisan, had not carried the revolutionary program of the CPC, which and had brought one copy of Comrade successive criticism of these mistakes to its consisted of 10 points, with their own six- Khrushchev’s speech regarding the cult of conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the point program, the author of which was Van personality. That speech has already been mistakes of the Third Plenum of the CC CPC, Minh, although this was, in the essence of translated into Chinese and he had managed the Comintern after 3-4 months had sent to the matter, a capitulationist program. In to become acquainted with it. China two of its own workers - [Pavel] Mif conducting this whole program Van Minh, During a conversation about I.V. and Van Minh - charged with the task of backed by the Comintern and in Stalin’s Stalin’s mistakes Mao Zedong noted that conducting the Fouth Plenum of the CPC. name, spoke as the main authority. Stalin’s line on the China question, though Nonetheless the decisions of the Fourth Ple- Van Minh’s supporters, taking advan- it had basically been correct, in certain peri- num of the CC CPC made under the pressure tage of the fact that they had captured a ods he, Stalin, had made serious mistakes. of Mif and Van Minh, were in fact more majority in the Southern bureau of the CC In his speeches in 1926 Stalin had exagger- ultra-leftist that Li Lisan’s line. In them it CPC in Wuhan, gave incorrect directives to ated the revolutionary capabilities of the was stated that it is necessary to move into the army and to the local authorities. So, for Guomintang, had spoken about the the large cities, to take control of them, and example, once, to our surprise, said Mao Guomintang as the main revolutionary force not to conduct the struggle in rural regions. Zedong, even in Yanan the slogans of the in China. In 1926 Stalin had given the In the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CPC which were posted on the walls of the Chinese Communists an instruction about CC CPC there was permitted such, for ex- houses were replaced, on Van Minh’s order, 165 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN with slogans “about a stable union with the continued to believe more in the power of people asked us whether a treaty of the Guomintang,” etc. the Guomintang than of the Communist USSR with the new China will be signed, As a result of the serious ideological Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with why until now legally there continues to struggle and the great explanatory work fol- Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] support- exist a treaty with the supporters of the lowing the 7th Congress of the Communist ers, on a united front with the Guomintang Guomintang, etc. The issue of the treaty was Party, especially in the last four years, the and the creation in China of a “democratic an extremely important matter for us, which majority of Communists who made left or republic.” In particular, in 1945 the CC CPC determined the possibilities for the further right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van received a secret telegram, for some reason development of the PRC. At the first con- Minh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from versation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I with acknowledgement of his mistakes, how- Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along ever he then once again returned to his old Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations government lines, but Stalin declined to an- positions. All of the former activity of Van with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against swer. During the second conversation I Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried this journey, since a provocation from Jiang returned once again to that issue, showing out under the direct leadership of the Jieshi’s side was expected. However, said Stalin a telegram from the CC CPC with the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious Mao Zedong, I was required to go since same type of proposal about a treaty. I loss to the Chinese revolution. Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow Characterizing the Comintern’s activ- armed struggle against the forces of Jiang to sign the treaty, since he is the Minister of ity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were Foreign Affairs. Stalin used this suggestion Lenin was alive he had played the most on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that as a pretext for refusal and said that “it is prominent role in bringing together the forces peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he inconvenient to act in this way, since the of the Communist movement, in the creation doubted the forces of the Chinese revolu- bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chi- and consolidation of the Communist parties tion. This lack of belief remained in Stalin nese government is located in Moscow.” in various countries, in the fight with the even during the first stages of the formation Subsequently, Stalin refrained from any opportunists from the Second International. of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of meetings with me. From my side there was But that had been a short period in the the revolution. It is possible that Stalin’s an attempt to phone him in his apartment, but activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused they responded to me that Stalin is not home, the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since and recommended that I meet with [A.I.] Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain Mikoyan. All this offended me, Mao Zedong as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh disappointment, many conversations took said, and I decided to undertake nothing more than the CC CPC. In the last period of place to the effect that the Chinese Commu- further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then the Comintern’s work, especially when nist Party was going along the Yugoslav an unpleasant conversation took place with Dimitrov worked there, certain movements path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito.” [I.V.] Kovalev and [N.T.] Fedorenko, who were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on I told Mao Zedong that there were no such proposed that I go on an excursion around us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van moods and conversations in our Party. the country. I sharply rejected this proposal Minh. However, in this period as well, not The bourgeois press around the world, and responded that I prefer “to sleep through just a few mistakes were made by the continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right it at the dacha.” Comintern, for example, the dissolution of socialists, had taken up the version of Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, the Polish Communist Party and others. In “China’s third way,” and extolled it. At that they handed me a draft of my interview for this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, publication which had been signed by Stalin. discern three periods in the activity of the did not believe us, while the bourgoisie and In this document it was reported that nego- Comintern, of which the second, longest laborites sustained the illusion of the tiations are being held in Moscow on con- period, brought the biggest loss to the Chi- “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang cluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This al- nese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, Jieshi alone “defended” Mao Zedong, shriek- ready was a significant step forward. It is precisely in this period the Comintern dealt ing that the capitalist powers should not in possible that in Stalin’s change of position, most of all with the East. We can say any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the “he will not turn from his path,” etc. This Indians and the English, who had recog- defeat of the Chinese revolution at that time behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, nized the PRC in January 1950. Negotia- was, right along with other reasons, also the since he knows us too well, he more than tions began right after this, in which result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of once had to stand in confrontation to us and Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, to fight with us. Kaganovich and Beria took part. During the noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when The distrust of Stalin to the CPC, Mao negotiations, at Stalin’s initiative there was we found out about the dissolution of the Zedong continued further, was apparent also undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union Comintern. during the time of Mao Zedong’s visit to the to assume sole ownership of the Chinese In the last period, continued Mao Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway. Subse- Zedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a quently, however, a decision was made about the situation in China and the possibilities Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, coop- the joint exploitation of the Chinese for the development of the revolution. He eration and mutual assistance. The Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway, besides COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 166 which the PRC gave the USSR the naval complete a trip around the whole country. In to the union of the working class and the base in Port Arthur, and four joint stock relation to this I told Mao Zedong about a peasantry. Mao Zedong observed that this companies were opened in China. At Stalin’s conversation which I had with Stalin, in the group of mistakes, in particular, the incor- initiative, said Mao Zedong, Manchuria and presence of several members of the Polit- rect policy in relation to the peasantry, was Xinjiang were practically turned into spheres buro, upon my return from the trip to China. discussed during Comrade Khrushchev’s of influence of the USSR. Stalin insisted on Stalin at that time asked me whether the conversation with [PRC military leader] Zhu the fact that in these regions only Chinese ruling Chinese comrades are Marxists. Hav- De in Moscow; people and Soviet citizens be permitted to ing heard my affirming response, Stalin said, 4. Mistakes in the nationality question live. Representatives of other foreign states, “That’s good! We can be calm. They’ve connected to the unlawful resettlement of including Czechs, Polish people, and En- grown up themselves, without our help.” certain nationalities and others. However, glishmen who were living permanently in Mao Zedong noted that in the very pos- overall, said Mao Zedong, nationality policy those regions should be evicted from there. ing of this question Stalin’s distrust of the was implemented correctly; The only ones whom Stalin skipped over Chinese Communists was also made appar- 5. Rejection of the principle of collec- through his silence were Koreans, of whom ent. tive leadership, conceit and surrounding him- there are counted one and a half million in Important things which, evidently, to self with toadies; Manchuria. These types of pretensions from some extent strengthened Stalin’s belief in 6. Dictatorial methods and leadership Stalin’s side, said Mao Zedong, were in- the CPC, were your (Yudin’s) report about style; comprehensible to us. All this also was the journey to China and the Korean War- 7. Serious mistakes in foreign policy fodder for the bourgeois press and represen- performance of the Chinese people’s volun- (Yugoslavia, etc.). tatives of capitalist states. In fact, continued teers. Mao Zedong further stressed a thought Mao Zedong, in the course of the negotia- In such a way, said Mao Zedong, if we to the effect that overall in the Communist tions around this treaty, there was the most look historically at the development of the movement great victories were won. The genuine trading going on. It was an unat- Chinese revolution and at Stalin’s attitude to single fact of the growth of the Socialist tractive way to pose the issue, in which it, then it is is possible to see that serious camp from 200 million people to 900 mil- Stalin’s distrust and suspicion of the CPC mistakes were made, which were especially lion people speaks for itself. However, in was brightly expressed. widespread during the time of the the course of successful forward advance in We are glad to note, said Mao Zedong, Comintern’s work. After 1945, during the some certain countries, in some certain par- that the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) period of the struggle with Jiang Jieshi, be- ties these or other mistakes arose. Mistakes Railway and Port Arthur have been returned cause of the overestimation of the forces of similar to these and others, he said, can arise to China, and the joint stock companies the Guomintang and the underestimation of in the future too. I observed that it would be have ceased to exist. In this part of the the forces of the Chinese revolution, Stalin better not to repeat mistakes like Stalin’s. To conversation Mao Zedong stressed that undertook attempts at pacification, at re- this, Mao Zedong answered that, evidently, Khrushchev did not attend these negotia- straining the development of the revolution- there will be these types of mistakes again. tions, and that Bulganin’s participation in ary events. And even after the victory of the The appearance of these mistakes are en- them was minimal. Stalin’s distrust of the revolution Stalin continued to express mis- tirely explicable from the point of view of CPC was apparent in a number of other trust of the Chinese Communists. Despite all dialectical materialism, since it is well known issues, including Kovalev’s notorious docu- that, said Mao Zedong, we have stood firmly that society develops through a struggle of ment about anti-Soviet moods in the leader- behind the revolutionary positions, for if we contradictions, the fight of the old with the ship of the CPC. Stalin, in passing this had permitted vascillations and indecisive- new, the new-born with the obsolete. In our document to the CC CPC, wanted, evi- ness, then, no doubt, long ago we would not consciousness, said Mao Zedong, there are dently, to stress his mistrust and suspicions. have been among the living. still too many vestiges of the past. It lags Over the course of the time I spent in Then Mao Zedong moved on to a gen- behind the constantly developing material Moscow, said Mao Zedong, I felt that dis- eral evaluation of Stalin’s role. He noted that world, behind everyday life. trust of us even more strongly and there I Stalin, without a doubt, is a great Marxist, a In our countries, continued Mao Zedong, asked that a Marxist-representative of the good and honest revolutionary. However, in much has come from the former, capitalist CC CPSU be sent to China in order to his great work in the course of a long period society. Take, for example, the issue of the become acquainted with the true situation in of time he made a number of great and application of corporal punishments to the China and to get to know the works of the serious mistakes, the primary ones of which accused. For China too, this is not a new Chinese theoreticians, and simultaneously were listed in Khrushchev’s speech. These issue. Even in 1930 in the Red Army during to examine the works of Mao Zedong, since fundamental mistakes, said Mao Zedong, interrogations beatings were broadly applied. these works in the Chinese edition were not could be summed up in seven points: I, said Mao Zedong, at that time personally reviewed by the author in advance, while 1. Unlawful repressions; was a witness to how they beat up the ac- the Soviet comrades, counter to the wish of 2. Mistakes made in the course of the cused. Already at that time a corresponding the author, insisted on their publication. war, moreover, in particular in the begin- decision was made regarding a ban on cor- Mao Zedong reminded me that upon ning, rather than in the concluding period of poral punishment. However, this decision my (Yudin’s) arrival in China he had persis- the war; was violated, and in Yanan, it is true, we tently and specially recommended to me to 3. Mistakes which dealt a serious blow tried not to allow unlawful executions. With 167 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the creation of the PRC we undertook a this topic and getting greatly carried away further struggle with this ugly manifesta- briefly touched on a few philosophical ques- AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE tion. It is entirely evident, continued Mao tions (about the struggle of materialism with PRC P. YUDIN Zedong, that according to the logic of things idealism, etc.). In particular he stressed that during a beating the one who is being beaten it is incorrect to imagine to oneself Commu- [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian begins to give false testimony, while the one nist society as a society which is free from Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, who is conducting the interrogation accepts any sort of contradictions, from ideological papka 410, delo 9, listy 87-98; also Center that testimony as truth. This and other ves- struggle, from any sort of vestiges of the for Storage of Contemporary Documenta- tiges which have come to us from the bour- past. In a Communist society too, said Mao tion (TsKhSD), fond 5, opis 30, delo 163, geois past, will still for a long time be pre- Zedong, there will be good and bad people. listy 88-99; see also Problemi Dalnego served in the consciousness of people. A Further he said that the ideological work of Vostok 5 (1994), 101-110. Translation for striving for pomposity, for ostentatiousness, China still to a significant extent suffers CWIHP by Mark Doctoroff, National Secu- for broad anniversary celebrations, this is from a spirit of puffery [nachetnichestva] rity Archive] also a vestige of the psychology of bour- and cliches. The Chinese press, in particu- geois man, since such customs and such lar, still cannot answer to the demands which * * * * * psychology objectively could not arise are presented to it. On the pages of the among the poorest peasantry and the work- newspapers the struggle of opinions is lack- Document II: ing class. The presence of these and other ing, there are no serious theoretical discus- Mao’s Conversation with Chervonenko, circumstances, said Mao Zedong, creates sions. Because of insufficient time Mao 26 December 1960 the conditions for the arising of those or Zedong expressed a wish to meet with me other mistakes with which the Communist again to talk a little specifically about issues From the diary of TOP SECRET parties will have to deal. of philosophy. S. V. CHERVONENKO Copy No.3 I observed that the main reason for At the end of the discussion I inquired of Stalin’s mistakes was the cult of personality, Mao Zedong whether he had become ac- bordering on deification. quainted with the Pravda editorial about the “6” January 1961 Mao Zedong, having agreed with me, harm of the cult of personality, a translation Outgoing No. 9 noted that Stalin’s mistakes accumulated of which was placed in [Renmin Ribao] on gradually, from small ones growing to huge 30 March. He responded that he still had not RECORD OF CONVERSATION ones. To crown all this, he did not acknowl- managed to read through that article, but with comrade Mao Zedong edge his own mistakes, although it is well they had told him that it is a very good known that it is characteristic of a person to article. Now, said Mao Zedong, we are 26 December 1960 make mistakes. Mao Zedong told how, preparing for publication in Renmin Ribao a reviewing Lenin’s manuscripts, he had be- lead article which is dedicated to this issue, According to the instructions of the come convinced of the fact that even Lenin which should appear in the newspapers in Center I visited Mao Zedong today. crossed out and re-wrote some phrases or the coming week. Beginning on 16 March, In the name of the CPSU CC and com- other in his own works. In conclusion to his he noted jokingly, all the newspapers in the rade N.S. Khrushchev personally, I con- characterization of Stalin, Mao Zedong once world raised a ruckus about this issue— gratulated Mao Zedong with his 67th birth- again stressed that Stalin had made mistakes China alone for the time being is silent. day and wished him good health, long life not in everything, but on some certain is- Then I briefly told Mao Zedong about and fruitful work. sues. the arrival in the PRC of 16 prominent So- Mao Zedong was very impressed by this Overall, he stressed that the materials viet scholars and about the beginning of the warm attention from the CPSU CC and from the Congress made a strong impression work of a theoretical conference dedicated comrade N.S. Khrushchev. He was deeply on him. The spirit of criticism and self- to the 20th Congress, which is opening today moved, and, without concealing his emo- criticism and the atmosphere which was in the Club of Soviet specialists. Soviet and tions, he most warmly expressed his thanks created after the Congress will help us, he Chinese scholars will deliver speeches at the for the friendly congratulations and wishes. said, to express our thoughts more freely on conference. Mao Zedong stated that it is a great honor for a range of issues. It is good that the CPSU Mao Zedong listened to these thoughts him to receive these high congratulations on has posed all these issues. For us, said Mao with great interest. his birthday. He asked to give his warmest Zedong, it would be difficult to take the The conversation continued for three thanks to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and initiative on this matter. hours. Mao Zedong was in a good mood, wished him, personally, as well as all the Mao Zedong declared that he proposes and joked often. members of the CPSU CC Presidium, good to continue in the future the exchange of The Deputy Head of the Adminstration health and big fruitful successes in their opinions on these issues during Comrade of Affairs of the CPC Yang Shankun, the work. Mikoyan’s visit, and also at a convenient Chief of the CC CPC Translation Bureau Shi Then, on Mao Zedong’s initiative, we time with Comrades Khrushchev and Zhe and Counselor of the USSR Embassy in had a conversation. He told me that the Bulganin. the PRC Skvortsov, T.F. attended the con- Chinese leaders have to work a lot now. “As Then Mao Zedong got distracted from versation. for myself - he mentioned - I am now work- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 168 ing much less than before. Though - Mao (before they are adopted) of the most impor- instructions on this question to the prov- Zedong went on - I mostly work 8 hours a tant party and state conferences and meet- inces. day (sometimes more), the productivity is ings. Then he told me that the CPC CC Ple- not the same as it used to be. His compre- Mao Zedong agreed with my statement, num will take place in January 1961 (the last hension of the material studied is less effec- that in spite of a certain redistribution of Plenum was in April 1960), where the CPC tive, and the necessity arose [for him] to authority between the CPC CC leaders he CC delegation at the Moscow Conference read documents printed in large charac- (Mao Zedong) still has great responsibilities will present its report. It is planned to adopt ters.” He mentioned in this connection that in the leadership of the party and the country. a short Plenum resolution on this question, “this must be a general rule that people of He said that he still often has to work at night. expressing support of the Moscow advanced age are in an unequal position to “The principal workload is connected with Conference’s decisions. Apart from the the young as regards the efficiency of their the reading of numerous documents and ma- results of the Conference the January Ple- work.” terials.” Twice a day, for instance, he said, num of the CPC CC will also discuss the Mao Zedong then emphasized that his “they bring me two big volumes of routine economic plan of the PRC for 1961. resignation from the post of the Chairman of information on international affairs, which After that Mao Zedong told me that the PRC had lessened the load of state of course it is necessary to look through to there are certain difficulties in the PRC which activities on him. Speaking about this he keep updated, not to lose contact with life.” make it impossible to elaborate a perspec- mentioned that at the time when he had In the course of the conversation I men- tive plan, “and we also lack the experience submitted this proposal he had been sup- tioned that the rapidly developing interna- for this.” At first, he went on, the CPC CC ported only by the Politburo members, while tional affairs demand constant attention and wanted to work out a plan for the three many members of the CPC CC had ob- timely analysis. I stressed the outstanding remaining years of the second five year plan. jected. “There was even more disagreement significance of the Moscow Conference However, 1960 is already over. So it was among the rank and file communists.” By where the recent international developments decided to make separate plans for the two now, he said, everybody was supporting this were submitted to deep Marxist-Leninist remaining years of the five year plan. He decision. analysis. said that the current plan of economic devel- As he continued talking about his work Mao Zedong agreed with this statement opment for the first quarter of 1961 exists and the activities of the leadership of the and quickly responded to the topic, saying: and is practically put into implementation. CPC CC, Mao Zedong said that for several “The Moscow Conference was a success, it For my part I told him about the favor- years, practically from 1953-54 he was not was thoroughly prepared, and the editing able conditions for planning achieved in the chairing the Politbureau meetings any more. commission, which included the representa- Soviet Union, of the adoption of the eco- He said that from 1956 Liu Shaoqi is in tives of 26 parties, worked fruitfully.” For- nomic plan and budget for 1961 by the charge of all the routine activities of the eign representatives, he went on, are often Supreme Council of the USSR. Politbureau, while he is taking part in some puzzled and ask why was the conference so Expressing a critical opinion of the lag of the meetings from time to time. Mao long. Mao Zedong said that they apparently with the adoption of economic plans in the Zedong mentioned that he personally is do not have a full understanding of the real PRC, Mao Zedong said that the plan for usually working and consulting mostly with situation when it took more than 10 days for 1960, for instance, was adopted only in the members of the Permanent Committee each of the representatives of 81 parties to April 1960, and on some occasions plans of the CPC CC Politbureau. Sometimes deliver his speech. Then there were repeated were adopted by the sessions of CAPR [Chi- specially invited persons also take part in speeches, not to mention the work on the nese Assembly of People’s Representatives] the meetings of the Permanent Committee. documents themselves. He stated: “It is very only in June-July. He explained it by the Then Mao Zedong told that on some good that there were arguments and discus- lack of sufficient experience in the PRC. occasions he takes part in the enlargened sions at the conference. This is not bad.” I told Mao Zedong of the forthcoming Politbureau meetings. Leading party ex- Then, agreeing with my statement on Plenum of the CPSU CC, of the serious ecutives from the periphery are usually in- the deep theoretical character of the docu- attention paid by the party and government vited to these meetings, for instance the ments of the Moscow Conference, Mao to the problems of agricultural development secretaries and deputy secretaries of the Zedong added that these documents caused a in the Soviet Union, including some special CPC CC bureaus from certain regions, the great confusion in the Western imperialist features of the forthcoming Plenum, where secretaries of the CPC Provincial Commit- circles, among our common enemies. the most important questions of further in- tees. Mao Zedong said that now he practi- During the conversation I gave a brief crease of agricultural production will be cally never speaks at the CPC CC Plenums, review of the work to popularize the results discussed and resolved. and even at the CPC Congress he just deliv- of the Moscow Conference in the Soviet Mao Zedong said that the CPC CC is ers a short introductory speech. His resigna- Union, to study the Conference’s documents now also “specializing” on agriculture. In- tion from the post of the Chairman of the within the political education network. creasing the attention to this question, he Republic gave him also an opportunity to In his turn Mao Zedong told me that the continued, “we are even thinking about nar- refrain from participating in the work of the study of the Moscow Conference documents rowing the industrial front to some extent.” Supreme State Conference. However, he is also being organized by the CPC. As for Explaining this idea he said that it is about a mentioned in this connection, I systemati- the summarizing of the Conference’s results, certain lowering of the scale of capital in- cally study the documents and materials the CPC CC has not yet sent any precise vestments into the industrial production, in- 169 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN cluding some branches of heavy industry; were however “displeased” that the Chinese came to see us to our car. Bidding us a warm capital investments into the construction of delegation was not able to visit them. He farewell, he once again asked to give his public buildings will also be cut. said, laughing, that this protest should be warm greetings to comrade N.S. Khrushchev In the course of the conversation he addressed to the members of the delegation, and the members of the CPSU CC Presidium briefly mentioned the bottlenecks of the for instance to Yang Shankun, who is present and most sincere thanks for their congratula- PRC’s industry, pointing, for instance, at the here at the conversation, as the Politburo had tions and warm wishes. mining and coal industry, and the transport no objections against prolonging the visit. I Candidate member of the CPC CC Sec- as well, talked about the interconnection of noted in the same tone that the Chinese retariat Yang Shankun, the functionaries of these industries, their influence on the de- friends had disarmed the “displeased” So- the CPC CC apparatus Yan Min Fu and Zhu velopment of many other branches (steel viet comrades, saying that it was not their Jueren, Counsellor Minister of the USSR production etc.). last visit to the Soviet Union. So, Mao Embassy in the PRC Sudarikov N.G. and the Returning to the problem of agriculture, Zedong said, one can maintain that they owe counsellor of the embassy Rakhmanin O.B. he emphasized that the lack of appropriate you. were present at the conversation. attention to this most important field of the When he broadened the topic of the PRC’s economy, as well as to the develop- usefulness of these meetings and visits I told The Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC ment of the light industry, would make it him that during the trip of the Chinese del- impossible to satisfy the requirements of the egation Soviet citizens had repeatedly asked [signature] population for foodstuffs, clothing and con- to give him (Mao Zedong) their best wishes S. CHERVONENKO sumer goods. Our own experience, Mao and expressed their hope that he will also Zedong went on, persuaded us that “orga- come to the Soviet Union when he finds it [Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 55, papka nizing the production of living plants and convenient, visit different cities, enterprises, 454, delo 9, listy 98-105; translation for animals is much more difficult than the collective farms, especially that he had had CWIHP by Maxim Korobochkin.] production of lifeless items - metals, ore, no chance to get better acquainted with the coal etc.” He stated jokingly that “the dead country during his previous visits. He re- will not run away from us and can wait.” acted warmly and stated that he “must cer- 1. Memorandum of conversation, Yudin-Mao Zedong, 2 May 1956, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian In the course of the conversation Mao tainly find the time for such a visit.” Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, Zedong repeatedly stressed that after the Then Mao Zedong told that in China he delo 9, listy 124-130. revolution in the PRC the material require- is criticized by the functionaries from the ments of the Chinese population have been periphery, who are displeased that he has not steadily growing. So the CPC must seri- been able yet to visit a number of cities and ously contemplate these problems, and the regions - Xinjiang, Yanan, Guizhou, Tibet, way to overcome the arising difficulties. Of Taiyuan, Baotou, Xian, Lanzhou etc. These course, it is not the difficulties only that workers, he said, used to call me “the Chair- matter. Even when we have successes, new man for half of the Republic,” and when I problems and tasks are appearing all the resigned from this post in favor of Liu Shaoqi, same. He stated in this connection, that even they started to call me “the Chairman of the in 300-400 years new problems will be still CPC for half of the country.” arising, demanding to be solved, “no devel- In the final part of the conversation Mao opment will be possible without them.” Zedong returned to the notion of his alleged I shared with Mao Zedong some of the retirement from active state and party work, impressions from my trip around the Soviet saying half jokingly that now “he will wait Union together with the Chinese delegation for the moment when he will become an headed by Liu Shaoqi, stressing the signifi- ordinary member of the Politburo.” I have cance of the trip for the strengthening of not consulted anybody in the party on this friendship and solidarity between the USSR matter, he mentioned, even him, Mao Zedong and the PRC. said, pointing at Yang Shankun, you are the Mao Zedong actively supported this first whom I am telling about my “con- part of the conversation. He said that in spiracy.” China they are very happy with this visit, “it I expressed assurance that the members is very good that it took place.” Both our of the CPC will apparently not agree to such peoples, he said with emphasis, demanded a proposal from Mao Zedong. Then, he said such an action to be taken. “By making this jokingly, I will have to wait until everybody decision, the Central Committees of both realizes its necessity; “in several years they parties satisfied the demands of both will have mercy for me.” peoples.” The conversation lasted more than an I told him as if jokingly, that many hour in an exceptionally cordial, friendly republics of the USSR, Ukraine for instance, atmosphere. When it was over Mao Zedong COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 170

THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY’S parts. The first part will discuss the content Moscow’s part between 1950 and 1953 that APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET of the Foreign Ministry’s report, highlight- had “impeded the successful development RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ing items of particular interest as well as of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959 several important lacunae. The second part full equality, mutuality, and trust.”6 will consider how Zimyanin’s assessment His views on this matter, interestingly by Mark Kramer contributed to, and was affected by, changes enough, were very similar to conclusions under way in Soviet policy-making toward reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the In early September 1959, Soviet For- China. Those changes, as explained below, early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and eign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Beijing to project an image of monolithic the head of the Foreign Ministry’s Far East- Ministry and therefore gave increased promi- unity (an image, incidentally, that was not ern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to pre- nence to Zimyanin’s report. far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time pare a detailed background report on China could sense that negotiations leading to the for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will September and early October to take part in In both substance and tone, Zimyanin’s between the two countries. According to a ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary analysis of Soviet relations with China re- secret background report, Mao was “highly of the Communist victory in China. The flected the burgeoning unease among Soviet dissatisfied with [Moscow’s] attempted ex- Soviet leader’s trip, as Gromyko was well officials. Although his view of the relation- actions on China,” and Zhou Enlai said he aware, was also intended to alleviate a grow- ship was still distinctly favorable overall, he “would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] ing rift between Moscow and Beijing—a was quick to point out many areas of incipi- demands as presented.”7 Although Soviet rift that had not yet flared up in public. ent conflict between the two countries. His and Chinese officials did their best to con- Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to report suggested that a full-fledged rift could ceal any further hints of bilateral discord travel to China because he had numerous be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent over the next few years, word continued to other commitments at around the same time; differences were bound to cause growing filter into Washington about “strain and dif- but after discussing the matter with his col- acrimony and recriminations unless appro- ficulties between Communist China and Rus- leagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided priate steps were taken. In citing a litany of sia”—the same strain and difficulties that that face-to-face negotiations with Mao disagreements about key ideological and Zimyanin noted.8 Zedong and other top Chinese officials practical questions, the report drew a causal By tracing the origins of the Sino-So- would be the only way to “clear the atmo- link between internal political conditions in viet conflict back to the Stalin period, sphere” and restore a “sense of friendship China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, Zimyanin’s report was quite different from between our peoples.”1 a theme emphasized by many Western ana- the public statements made later on by offi- Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30- lysts as well.4 Although Zimyanin con- cials in both Moscow and Beijing, who page survey of “The Political, Economic, cluded the document on an upbeat note— averred that the split had begun when the and International Standing of the PRC” (Re- claiming that “relations of fraternal amity two sides disagreed about Khrushchev’s se- port No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the and fruitful cooperation have been estab- cret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress same day that Khrushchev began a highly lished on a lasting basis and are growing in February 1956.9 Until recently, the large publicized visit to the United States. The wider and stronger with every passing year”— majority of Western (and Russian) scholars Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 his analysis left little doubt that existing had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in September, just a day before he was due to tensions between Moscow and Beijing could which to pinpoint the origins of the dis- leave for China. On his way back from the eventually take a sharp turn for the worse. pute.10 It is now clear, both from Zimyanin’s United States, he was given a copy of Four specific points about the document report and from other new evidence (see Zimyanin’s report. That copy is now housed are worth highlighting. below), that tensions actually had begun in the former CPSU Central Committee First, the report acknowledged that fric- emerging much earlier. archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as tion between the two Communist states had This is not to say that the whole Sino- the Center for Storage of Contemporary been present, to some degree, since the very Soviet rift, especially the bitter confronta- Documentation, or TsKhSD).2 The final start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin tion of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. section of Zimyanin’s report, which focuses did not imply that China had been merely a Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the “reluctant and suspicious ally” of Moscow in but the reality is usually more complex. Far most interesting portion of the document, is the early 1950s, he emphasized that the So- from being a “reluctant and suspicious ally” translated here in full except for a few extra- viet Union under Stalin had “violated the of the Soviet Union during the first half of neous passages at the beginning and end.3 sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet Zimyanin’s appraisal of Sino-Soviet People’s Republic” and had “kept the PRC in experience and to forge close, comprehen- relations is intriguing not only because of its a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR.”5 sive ties with Moscow in the name of social- substance, but also because of the light it No doubt, these criticisms were motivated in ist internationalism. Even so, the latest sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. part by the then-prevailing line of de- memoirs and archival revelations, including Both points will be briefly taken up in this Stalinization, but Zimyanin provided con- Zimyanin’s report, leave little doubt that the introduction, which is divided into two main crete examples of “negative” actions on seeds of a conflict between Moscow and 171 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Beijing were present, at least in some fash- omissions in Zimyanin’s assessment, which during all the high-level Sino-Soviet meet- ion, as early as 1950-53. are worth briefly explicating here because ings in 1949-1950.14 Although Fedorenko Second, while giving due emphasis to they provide a better context for understand- and Shi acknowledged that several points of problems that arose during the Stalin era, ing the document: contention had surfaced between Stalin and Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental • Stalin’s relationship with Mao. Al- Mao, they both emphasized that the relation- impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th though Zimyanin discussed problems in ship overall was amicable. Fedorenko spe- Soviet Party Congress and by the “Hundred Sino-Soviet relations that arose during the cifically took issue with Khrushchev’s ac- Flowers” campaign in China. Zimyanin Stalin era, he did not explicitly refer to the count: claimed that the Chinese leadership had “fully way Stalin behaved when Mao visited the supported the CPSU’s measures to elimi- Soviet Union for nearly two-and-a-half Later on it was claimed that Stalin nate the cult of personality and its conse- months beginning in December 1949. This had not received Mao Zedong for quences” after the 20th Party Congress, but omission is unfortunate because even a few nearly a month, and in general had he conceded that Beijing’s assessment of brief comments might have helped clarify not displayed appropriate courtesy Stalin was considerably “different from our what has been a matter of great confusion. toward the Chinese leader. These own” and that the Congress had prompted First-hand accounts of the Stalin-Mao rela- reports created a false impression of “the Chinese friends . . . to express critical tionship by former Soviet and Chinese offi- the host and his guest. In actual fact, comments about Soviet organizations, the cials offer sharply conflicting interpreta- everything happened quite differ- work of Soviet specialists, and other issues tions. One of the most jaundiced descrip- ently. Judging from what I saw in Soviet-Chinese relations.” Even more tions of the way Stalin treated Mao can be first-hand, the behavior of the two damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the found in Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs: leaders and the overall atmosphere effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. were totally different from subse- He cited a wide range of “hostile statements” Stalin would sometimes not lay eyes quent depictions. . . . From the very and “denunciations of the Soviet Union and on [the Chinese leader] for days at a first meeting, Stalin invariably dis- Soviet-Chinese friendship” that had surfaced time—and since Stalin neither saw played the utmost courtesy toward in China. “The airing of these types of Mao nor ordered anyone else to his Chinese counterpart. . . . statements,” he wrote, “can in no way be entertain him, no one dared to go Throughout the talks with Mao justified.” The report expressed particular see him. We began hearing rumors Zedong, Stalin was equable, re- concern about a number of territorial de- that Mao was very unhappy be- strained, and attentive to his guest. mands that had been raised against the So- cause he was being kept under lock His thoughts never wandered and viet Union.11 and key and everyone was ignoring were always completely focused on Third, as one might expect, Zimyanin him. Mao let it be known that if the the conversation. devoted considerable attention to the Sino- situation continued, he would leave. Soviet ideological quarrels that began to . . . In this way, Stalin sowed the Likewise, Shi Zhe noted that “Stalin was surface during the Great Leap Forward. In seeds of hostility and anti-Soviet, visibly moved [when he met the Chinese 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between anti-Russian sentiment in China.12 leader] and continuously dispensed compli- Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the ments to Chairman Mao.” Shi dismissed form of disagreements about the establish- A similar appraisal of Stalin’s demeanor rumors in the West that “Stalin had put ment of “people’s communes,” the role of was offered by Andrei Gromyko, who Chairman Mao under house arrest” during a material versus ideological incentives, the claimed in his memoirs that when Stalin particularly tense stage in the negotiations nature of the transition to socialism and hosted a special dinner for Mao in February leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alli- Communism, and other aspects of Marx- 1950, the atmosphere was “oppressive” and ance. ism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter the two leaders “seemed personally to have Even with the benefit of new evidence, disputes erupted over territorial demands nothing in common that would enable them it is difficult to sort out the discrepancies and questions of global strategy (not to men- to establish the necessary rapport.”13 Be- between these accounts. So far, transcripts tion a clash of personalities between cause Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s obser- of only the first two private meetings be- Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had vations fit so well with everything that is tween Mao and Stalin—on 16 December not yet come to dominate the relationship in known about Stalin’s general behavior, their 1949 and 22 January 1950—are available.15 September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising accounts have been widely accepted in the Both transcripts shed a good deal of light on that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideo- West. the Stalin-Mao relationship (not least by logical differences that were particularly More recently, though, a very different confirming how long the interval was be- salient at the time. His report provides picture of the Stalin-Mao relationship has tween meetings), but they do not, and indeed further evidence that ideological aspects of emerged from testimony by Nikolai cannot, convey a full sense of Stalin’s be- the conflict must be taken seriously on their Fedorenko, a former diplomat at the Soviet havior toward Mao. Gestures, facial expres- own merits, rather than being seen as a mere embassy in China who served as an inter- sions, and even some unflattering comments smokescreen for geopolitical or other con- preter for Stalin, and by Shi Zhe, a former are apt to be omitted from these stenographic cerns. official in the Chinese foreign ministry who reports either deliberately or inadvertently, Finally, there are a few conspicuous interpreted for Mao. Both men were present just as there are crucial gaps in numerous COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 172 other East-bloc documents.16 The two tran- Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military of- nary discussions with Stalin: scripts also do not reveal anything about ficer who served as Stalin’s personal envoy unpleasant incidents that may have occurred to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In From then on, Stalin sought to avoid outside the formal talks. Although retro- a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev re- me. I tried, for my part, to phone spective accounts by aides to Stalin and counted the tribulations and rudeness that Stalin’s apartment, but was told that Mao who took part in the meetings can be Mao had experienced during his visit: he was not home and that I should helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs meet with Mikoyan instead. I was must be used with extreme caution, espe- Mao was met [on 16 December] by offended by all this, and so I de- cially when they are published long after the Bulganin and Molotov, who cided that I would not do anything events they describe. Khrushchev’s recol- brusquely turned down his invita- more and would simply spend my lections were compiled more than 15 years tion to join him for a meal, saying time resting at the dacha. Then I after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko’s, that it would be contrary to proto- had an unpleasant conversation with Fedorenko’s, and Shi’s accounts were writ- col. For the same reason, they de- Kovalev and Fedorenko, who sug- ten nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if clined Mao’s invitation to ride with gested that I go for a trip around the one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the him to his assigned dacha. . . . Mao country. I flatly rejected this pro- memoir-writers relied on notes and docu- was clearly upset by the cool recep- posal and said that I might as well ments from the period they were discussing tion. That same day, Stalin received just “go on sleeping at my dacha.”22 and depicted events as faithfully as they Mao Zedong, but they held no con- could, the passage of so many years is bound fidential talks of the sort that Mao Mao revealed these “problems and difficul- to cause certain failings of memory.17 had wanted. After that, Mao spent ties” to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit Two important factors might lead one numerous boring days at the dacha. somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko’s Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan at the CCP’s Chengdu conference in March version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than stopped by to see him, but had only 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced to Khrushchev’s. First, Fedorenko and Shi very brief official conversations. I into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight participated in all the private talks between was in touch with Mao and saw him years earlier: Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and every day, and I was aware that he Gromyko were present at only the public was upset and apprehensive.20 In 1950, Stalin and I argued with meetings.18 Second, it is conceivable that each other in Moscow for two Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin’s Kovalev also noted that in late December, months about our mutual defense behavior in an unduly negative light. Mao asked him to convey a formal request to treaty, about the Chungchang rail- (Khrushchev may have done this sub-con- Stalin for another private meeting, indicating road, about joint economic ventures, sciously, or he may have been seeking to lay that “the resolution of all matters, including and about our boundary lines. Our the “blame” on Stalin for the subsequent the question of [Mao’s] spare time and medi- attitudes were such that when he rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko cal treatment, [would] be left entirely to your offered a proposal which was unac- had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height [i.e., Stalin’s] discretion.”21 According to ceptable to me, I would resist it; but of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and “as when he insisted on it, I would give Stalin. One could therefore make a prima before, Mao remained practically in isola- in. I did so for the sake of social- facie case on behalf of Fedorenko’s ac- tion.” Even when Mao “retaliated by refus- ism.23 count. ing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador On the other hand, most of the latest to China,” it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev Mao noted with particular distaste that he evidence tends to support Khrushchev’s and emphasized that it was “not until Zhou Enlai had allowed Stalin to get away with treating Gromyko’s versions, rather than arrived in Moscow at the end of January Manchuria and Xinjiang as mere “colonies” Fedorenko’s. One of the most trusted aides 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more of the Soviet Union—a point mentioned by to Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, who re- successfully.” All this amply corroborates Zimyanin as well.24 At Chengdu and in mained a staunch defender of the Soviet what Khrushchev wrote. numerous other speeches before closed CCP dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev’s depiction of the Stalin- gatherings, Mao repeatedly condemned Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that Mao relationship is also borne out by newly Stalin’s “serious mistakes” and “shortcom- when the Chinese delegation came to Mos- declassified testimony from another key ings,” a practice that suggests long pent-up cow in December 1949, Mao had to wait source, namely Mao himself. In a private feelings of animosity toward the late Soviet many days or even weeks after his initial meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China dictator.25 perfunctory meeting with Stalin until the in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about Furthermore, even some of the com- Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him the “ugly atmosphere” he had confronted in ments in Fedorenko’s and Shi’s own articles again.19 This corresponds precisely to what Moscow in 1950 and about the “profound imply—if only inadvertently—that the rela- Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the distrust and suspicion” that Stalin had shown tionship between Stalin and Mao was not sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) really so cordial after all. Both Fedorenko Khrushchev’s account is further strength- leadership. Mao also recalled the “insulting” and Shi acknowledged that a residue of ened by the recollections of General Ivan treatment he had suffered after his prelimi- tension still plagued Sino-Soviet relations in 173 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the early 1950s because of Stalin’s refusal Wladyslaw Gomulka, and urged the Soviet cally warned that local Third World con- during the Chinese civil war to provide Union to forgo military intervention in Po- flicts could escalate to a highly destructive greater support for the Communist rebels.26 land. Ultimately, Khrushchev did accept a global war if the superpowers directly inter- This tension inevitably caused personal peaceful settlement with Gomulka. Senior vened on opposing sides. strains between the two leaders, as Mao Chinese officials also initially counseled In terms of actual policy, however, the himself observed during his March 1956 against an invasion of Hungary when they difference between Soviet and Chinese ap- meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in traveled to Moscow on October 30 for emer- proaches was relatively small.31 If only for one of his secret speeches two years later at gency consultations. By that point, logistical reasons, it was the Soviet Union, the Chengdu conference: Khrushchev and his colleagues were no not China, that had been the primary arms longer confident that “the Hungarian work- supplier to Communist insurgents in numer- The victory of the Chinese revolu- ing class” could “regain control of the situ- ous Third World countries (e.g., Indonesia, tion was against Stalin’s wishes.... ation and suppress the uprising on its own,” Malaya, South Vietnam, Guatemala, the Phil- When our revolution succeeded, but they agreed for the time being to desist ippines, and Cuba).32 Moreover, Chinese Stalin said it was a fake. We made from further intervention in Hungary.28 Less leaders, for all their seeming belligerence, no protest.27 than 24 hours later, however, the Soviet were often hesitant about translating rheto- authorities reversed their decision and voted ric into concrete policy. In private discus- Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into in favor of a large-scale invasion.29 When sions with Soviet officials, senior Chinese a “sullen” mood during the 1949-50 meet- Mao Zedong was informed of this last-minute representatives argued that “reasonable cau- ings whenever Mao was being deliberately change, he immediately and strongly en- tion” was needed even when “conditions “evasive.” This was particularly evident, dorsed the Soviet decision, not least because were ripe for the spread of progressive ideas according to Shi, when negotiations on the Imre Nagy had announced on November 1 in certain [Third World] countries.”33 treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin (the day after the Soviet Presidium decided Despite the underlying similarities be- repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to “gauge to invade) that Hungary was pulling out of tween Chinese and Soviet policies, the two Chairman Mao’s intentions.” Shi added that the Warsaw Pact and establishing itself as a Communist states were bound to disagree at the testy exchanges between the two leaders neutral state. times. This was evident in July 1958 when prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcas- China subsequently became the most a leftist coup against Iraq’s pro-Western tically that Stalin was wont to “blame the vocal supporter of the invasion and even government sparked a brief but intense crisis Chinese for all the mistakes” in bilateral publicly welcomed the execution of Imre in the Middle East, leading to U.S. and relations. Similarly, Fedorenko alluded to Nagy in June 1958, but the whole episode, as British troop landings in Lebanon and Jor- Stalin’s extreme suspiciousness during the Chinese officials later confirmed, had a jar- dan. Both publicly and privately, Chinese talks, as reflected in the Soviet dictator’s ring effect in Beijing. Zimyanin promi- officials urged the Soviet Union to take a incessant complaints about “conspiracies,” nently cited the Soviet declaration of 30 firm stand against “American imperialist “plots,” and “illegal murmurs.” This behav- October 1956 in his report, but he made no aggression” in the Middle East, a task that ior, too, suggests that Stalin may not have mention of the turmoil that had given rise to China itself could not perform because of its been quite as hospitable as Fedorenko ini- the declaration or of the actions that fol- lack of power-projection capabilities. Con- tially implied. lowed. trary to Beijing’s wishes, however, Soviet Despite the wealth of new evidence, • Sino-Soviet policies in the Third World. leaders quickly decided there was little to be there are still many unresolved questions In the late 1950s, Chinese leaders began gained by risking a direct East-West con- about the nature of Stalin’s relationship with vigorously championing—and, where pos- frontation.34 Rather than sending “volun- Mao. Further scrutiny of the emerging docu- sible, actively promoting—“wars of national teers” to the Middle East or extending an mentation and first-hand accounts will be liberation” and “anti-imperialist struggles” overt military guarantee to the new Iraqi essential to set the record straight. in the developing world.30 This strategy regime (as urged by Beijing), the Soviet Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s recollections mirrored the growing radicalization of Union relied mainly on diplomacy and called seem to be corroborated by the latest disclo- China’s domestic politics at the time. It also for a special UN-sponsored meeting to re- sures, but Fedorenko’s and Shi’s accounts flowed naturally from Mao’s view, first enun- solve the situation. Although the peak of the must be taken seriously, at least for now. ciated in November 1957, that “the East crisis had subsided (and Sino-Soviet differ- Zimyanin’s analysis, with its strong criti- Wind is now stronger than the West Wind.” ences on this score had seemingly waned) by cism of Soviet policy during the early 1950s, Recent Soviet breakthroughs with long-range the time Khrushchev arrived in China at the is more compatible with Khrushchev’s ver- nuclear missiles, according to Mao, would end of July 1958, the ongoing tensions in the sion than with Fedorenko’s, but the report deter Western countries from responding to Middle East were a prominent topic of dis- provides no conclusive evidence one way or Communist-backed guerrilla movements. cussion during his visit.35 The resulting the other. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautious— exchanges may have been partly responsible • The crises in Poland and Hungary in at least rhetorically—than their Chinese for the bolder stance that the Soviet Union October-November 1956. During the stand- counterparts, not least because they were took during the Quemoy Islands crisis a few off between the Soviet Union and Poland in aware that the East-West military balance weeks later (see below). October 1956, Chinese officials generally had not improved as much as most Chinese Judging from numerous documents pre- supported the defiant Polish leader, officials assumed. Soviet leaders periodi- pared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 174

Eastern department in 1958 and early 1959, the United States responded by deploying a buke the “many people both inside and out- there is no doubt Zimyanin was aware that huge naval contingent to the Taiwan Straits. side the Party who do not understand the Chinese leaders had been disappointed by Simultaneously, top U.S. officials, including paper tiger problem.”46 Soviet policy during the first ten days of the President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Soviet leaders, for their part, were con- 1958 Middle Eastern crisis, when it still John Foster Dulles, publicly reaffirmed their vinced until late September that the PRC’s appeared that U.S. and British forces might commitment to protect Taiwan against Chi- effort to get rid of Jiang Jieshi was still on try to restore a pro-Western government in nese incursions and to counter any naval track. When Soviet Foreign Minister Iraq. The initial phase of the crisis marked threats in the Taiwan Straits.40 The strongest Gromyko flew secretly to Beijing shortly one of the first times that Soviet and Chinese warning to this effect came on September 4, after the crisis began, he found that Mao was policies in the Third World had diverged, three days before heavily armed U.S. ships still expressing hope of “responding with albeit only temporarily.36 It is odd, there- began escorting Taiwanese vessels on resup- force against force.”47 After hearing back fore, that Zimyanin’s briefing report for ply missions to Quemoy. U.S. naval aircraft from Gromyko, Khrushchev followed up on Khrushchev barely mentioned the crisis and also were called into action to support the his earlier pledge to support the Chinese gave no intimation that Beijing and Mos- Taiwanese air force as it established control operation. On September 7, while U.S. cow had been at odds about the best way to of the region’s airspace. In a rapid series of ships were embarking on their first escort handle it. air battles, Taiwanese pilots flying U.S.- missions, the Soviet leader issued a public • Lessons derived from the 1958 Tai- made fighters routed their Chinese oppo- warning that any attack against mainland wan Straits crisis. Shortly before nents, casting serious doubt on the quality of China would be deemed an attack against the Khrushchev’s trip to Beijing in July-August China’s air crews and Soviet-made MiGs.41 Soviet Union as well.48 This warning was 1958, the Chinese Communist Party’s Mili- These humiliating defeats forced Mao and followed two weeks later by a declaration tary Affairs Committee (which had been several of his top military commanders onto that any use of nuclear weapons against meeting in an extraordinary two-month ses- the defensive during subsequent intra-party China would be grounds for a Soviet nuclear sion since 27 May 1958) approved Mao’s debates.42 attack against the United States. Many plans for a major operation in late August to The unexpectedly forceful U.S. response Western analysts have claimed that these recapture China’s small offshore islands. posed a dilemma for Chinese and Soviet two Soviet statements were largely cosmetic, The aim of the operation was to weaken or leaders.43 On September 5, Mao privately and that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric even undermine the Guomintang (Chinese acknowledged to the PRC’s Supreme State only when he believed there was no longer Nationalist) government in Taiwan by ex- Conference that he “simply had not antici- any danger of war. New evidence does not posing its inability to defend against an pated how roiled and turbulent the world bear out this long-standing view. A week attack from the mainland.37 Khrushchev would become” if China “fired a few rounds after Khrushchev issued his initial warning, was not explicitly informed of the proposed of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu.”44 Con- he met secretly with the Chinese ambassa- undertaking during his visit to Beijing, but fronted by the threat of U.S. military retalia- dor, Liu Xiao, and gave every indication that he was told in general terms that a military tion, Mao abandoned any hopes he may have he still expected and hoped that China would operation was being planned to “bring Tai- had at the time of seizing the offshore islands proceed with its “decisive” military action wan back under China’s jurisdiction.”38 The or, perhaps, attacking Taiwan.45 Although against Taiwan.49 Although Khrushchev Soviet leader welcomed the news and of- Chinese artillery units continued in Septem- clearly wanted to avoid a war with the United fered both political and military backing for ber and early October to shell U.S.-escorted States, the failure of U.S. aircraft carriers to China’s efforts. In the first few weeks of convoys as they landed with resupplies in attack mainland China after Chinese artil- August the Soviet Union transferred long- Quemoy, these actions were coupled with lery units resumed their bombardment of range artillery, amphibious equipment, air- efforts to defuse the crisis by diplomatic Quemoy gave the Soviet leader reason to to-air missiles, and combat aircraft to China means. Most notably, on September 6, Zhou believe (or at least hope) that U.S. forces in the expectation that those weapons would Enlai proposed a resumption of Sino-Ameri- would not follow through on their commit- facilitate a “decisive move against the Jiang can ambassadorial talks, and on October 6 ment to defend Taiwan. Later on, Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] regime.”39 Soviet the Chinese government announced a provi- Khrushchev acknowledged that he had felt military advisers also were sent to China to sional cease-fire, effectively bringing the betrayed when he finally realized in late help supervise—and, if necessary, take part crisis to an end. The continued bombard- September/early October that Mao had de- in—the upcoming operation. ment of Quemoy had posed some risk that cided to bail out of the operation.50 Although Chinese and Soviet leaders wider hostilities would break out, but Chi- To that extent, the Quemoy crisis ended assumed (or at least hoped) that the action nese leaders were careful throughout the up sparking discord between Soviet and would not provoke a direct military re- crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with Chinese officials, but for a much different sponse from the United States, this assump- U.S. forces. Mao’s retreat came as a disap- reason from what has usually been sug- tion proved erroneous from the very start. pointment to some of his colleagues because gested. Most Western analysts have argued After the Chinese army launched a heavy of his earlier claims that the United States that Chinese leaders were dismayed when artillery bombardment of the Quemoy Is- was merely a “paper tiger.” At a meeting of the Soviet Union allegedly provided only lands on August 23 and Chinese patrol boats senior Chinese officials in late November lukewarm military backing for the probe were sent to blockade Quemoy and Matsu (several weeks after the crisis had been de- against Taiwan.51 New evidence suggests against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts, fused), Mao even found it necessary to re- that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union did 175 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN everything it had promised to do in support submarine-launched ballistic missiles • Differences about Soviet efforts to of the Chinese operation, and that it was (SLBMs), the naval version of the SS-1B.56 seek improved ties with the United States. China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to Although the R-11FM had a maximum range Starting in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union follow through.52 This outcome explains of just 162 kilometers and could be fired pursued a line of “peaceful coexistence” why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned only from the surface, it was the most ad- with the United States. Chinese leaders, by once, was determined not to let it happen vanced Soviet SLBM at the time. contrast, wanted to step up the confrontation again. From then on he emphasized the need Despite the initial success of these ef- between the Communist world and the capi- for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan prob- forts, Soviet leaders decided by early 1958 talist world and to avoid any hint of compro- lem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to that it would be inadvisable, in light of mise. Chinese leaders even claimed that draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude Beijing’s territorial claims against the So- they were willing, in extremis, to risk a of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These viet Union, to fulfill the pledge undertaken global nuclear war in the “struggle against different views became a sore point in Sino- in the NDTA to supply a prototype nuclear imperialism.” To be sure, the connection Soviet relations, as was evident during bomb to the PRC.57 Chinese officials were between rhetoric and concrete policy was Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in the autumn not informed of this decision until nearly a often tenuous; in 1958, China quickly backed of 1959.53 Zimyanin’s brief discussion of year and a half later, and in the meantime down when confronted by a massive U.S. Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does mutual recriminations occurred behind the naval force in the Taiwan Straits. Neverthe- not mention the frustration that Soviet lead- scenes when the promised shipment repeat- less, even after that humiliating retreat, offi- ers felt and the lasting impact this had on edly failed to materialize. Khrushchev tried cials in Beijing continued to insist that “if the Khrushchev’s approach to the Taiwan issue. to alleviate the burgeoning tension when he imperialists launch an all-out war,” it inevi- • Soviet assistance to China’s nuclear traveled to Beijing at the end of July 1958, tably would result in “victory” for the Com- weapons program. When Chinese leaders but his trip proved of little avail in this munist states and “inspire hundreds of mil- formally decided in January 1955 to pursue respect and tensions continued to increase. lions of people to turn to socialism.” Mao’s an independent nuclear weapons program, Finally, in a secret letter dated 20 June 1959, seeming indifference to the potential conse- they did so in the expectation that they Soviet leaders formally notified their Chi- quences of nuclear war chastened Soviet would receive elaborate advice and backing nese counterparts that no prototype bombs leaders, who were concerned that the Soviet from Moscow. Between January 1955 and or detailed technical blueprints would be Union might be drawn into a large-scale December 1956 the Soviet Union and China provided. The letter infuriated the Chinese, conflict against its will.60 Soviet officials concluded four preliminary agreements on but Khrushchev and his colleagues were like Zimyanin were fully cognizant of these bilateral cooperation in uranium mining, willing to pay that price at a time when, in divergent outlooks (and the high-level con- nuclear research, and uranium enrichment, their view, Sino-Soviet “relations were cern they had provoked in Moscow), so it is and these were followed in October 1957 by steadily deteriorating” and the NDTA was odd that he made no more than an oblique the signing of a New Defense Technology “already coming unraveled.”58 Curiously, reference to the matter. Agreement (NDTA), which provided for the letter did not yet cause officials in Beijing Nor did Zimyanin mention the disagree- broad Soviet assistance to China in the de- to give up all hope of obtaining further ments between Moscow and Beijing about velopment of nuclear warheads and delivery assistance from Moscow on nuclear arms. the value of East-West arms control. Chi- vehicles.54 Soon thereafter, Soviet nuclear At the summit in October 1959, Chinese nese officials were deeply suspicious of the weapons scientists and engineers were dis- prime minister Zhou Enlai formally requested U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the late 1950s patched to China, sensitive information was Soviet aid in the development and produc- aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear transferred, equipment was sold for uranium tion of nuclear-powered strategic subma- test ban. Chinese leaders feared that their processing and enrichment, and prepara- rines and longer-range, solid-fueled SLBMs. country, too, would come under pressure to tions were made to ship a prototype nuclear Khrushchev immediately turned down both sign a test ban treaty (even though they had bomb to the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Re- proposals, thus dashing any lingering ex- taken no part in the negotiations), and that search Institute for training and instruction pectations that Mao and Zhou still had of this would effectively end China’s hopes of purposes. In addition, a group of high- pursuing new forms of nuclear-weapons co- becoming a nuclear power.61 The inception ranking Soviet military specialists were sent operation or of at least reviving the NDTA.59 of a U.S.-Soviet test moratorium in the spring to help the Chinese establish new regiments The Soviet Foreign Ministry had not of 1958, coupled with the Soviet letter of 20 for nuclear-capable SS-1 (8A11) and SS-2 been involved in the implementation of the June 1959 (which explicitly cited the test (8Zh38) tactical missiles.55 The Soviet of- NDTA, but senior ministry officials most ban negotiations as a reason not to supply a ficers not only gave detailed advice on the likely were aware that nuclear assistance prototype nuclear bomb to China), intensi- technology and operational uses of the mis- was being provided to China. (After all, the fied Beijing’s concerns that arms control siles, but also helped find suitable locations Foreign Ministry had been the initial contact talks were antithetical to China’s nuclear for SS-1/SS-2 test ranges and deployment point for Chinese leaders in mid-1957 when ambitions.62 Zimyanin was well aware of fields. Similar cooperative arrangements they sought to open negotiations for the these differences, but chose not to bring were established for naval delivery vehicles. agreement.) Hence, it is surprising that them up. The Soviet Union provided China with tech- Zimyanin did not bring up this matter at all, • China’s deepening confrontation with nical data, designs, components, and pro- apart from two oblique references to “ques- India. Sino-Indian relations had been har- duction equipment for liquid-fueled R-11FM tions of defense cooperation.” monious for several years after the Commu- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 176 nists took power in Beijing, but the relation- provided for subsidized credits to India of to China was quite different. The MFA ship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as some $385 million over five years. ended up with a dominant role in the prepa- a result of differences over Tibet and the These events were still under way—and rations for the trip, thanks in part to a delib- disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the tensions along the Sino-Indian border were erate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater Himalayas.63 In the spring of 1959 China still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his say for the Foreign Ministry in policy to- crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and de- report, so it was probably too early for him to ward China.72 When Gromyko first asked ployed many thousands of extra troops on gauge the significance of Moscow’s deci- Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with sion to remain neutral.68 Even so, it is odd China, the foreign minister knew that he great apprehension in neighboring India. that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian would soon be accompanying Khrushchev Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up on a two-week visit to the United States, a border dispute heated up, leading to a seri- having such a deleterious effect on task that would enable him to bolster the ous incident in late August 1959, when Khrushchev’s visit.69 Foreign Ministry’s standing (as well as his Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a own influence) on other issues, especially contested border post at Longju. Although Zimyanin’s Report and Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in each side blamed the other for the incident, Soviet Policy-Making between Khrushchev’s two visits in late the clash apparently was motivated in part September was so limited, briefings for the by the Chinese authorities’ desire to take a The submission of Zimyanin’s report to China trip had to occur almost entirely on the firm stand against India before Khrushchev Khrushchev was one of several indicators of plane. Gromyko was aware that the other arrived in Beijing. a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy- senior members of the Soviet “party-gov- As recriminations between India and making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the ernment delegation,” led by Mikhail Suslov, China escalated, Chinese officials secretly 1950s the Soviet Union’s dealings with the were scheduled to depart for China on Sep- urged “the Soviet Union and other fraternal PRC, as with other Communist states, had tember 26-27, while Khrushchev and socialist countries to exploit all possible been handled mainly along party-to-party Gromyko were still in the United States. opportunities” to “conduct propaganda mea- lines. A special CPSU Central Committee Hence, the foreign minister knew he would sures against India” and “expose the subver- department, known after February 1957 as be the only top official accompanying sive role of imperialist and reactionary Ti- the Department for Ties with Communist Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the betan forces” armed and supported by In- and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries, 29th and 30th.73 (Gromyko, of course, also dia.64 These pleas were of no avail. Instead was responsible for keeping track of devel- intended to make good use of his privileged of rallying to China’s defense, the Soviet opments in East-bloc countries and for man- access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and Union scrupulously avoided taking sides aging relations with those countries on a day- flight back from, the United States.74) during the skirmishes, and released a state- to-day basis.70 (Matters requiring high-level Under those circumstances, the Foreign ment on 9 September 1959 expressing hope decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium Ministry’s report on China, prepared by that China and India would soon resolve the or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Zimyanin, became the main briefing mate- matter “in the spirit of their traditional friend- Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded rial for Khrushchev, along with a short up- ship.”65 Chinese officials were shown the from Soviet policy-making toward China. date (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent TASS statement before it went out, and they On some issues, such as the effort to gain a personnel changes in the Chinese military did their best to persuade Moscow not to seat for Communist China in the United High Command.75 What is more, Zimyanin release it; but far from helping matters, Nations, the MFA was the only important (who was a member of the MFA Collegium Beijing’s latest remonstrations merely in- actor involved. Also, the foreign minister as well as head of the ministry’s Far Eastern duced Soviet leaders to issue the statement himself at times played a key role, notably in department) and a number of other senior a day earlier than planned, without any the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing amendments.66 Mao and his colleagues authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold to provide on-site advice and support, some- were so dismayed by the Soviet Union’s secret negotiations with Mao about “issues thing that had not happened during refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a of war and peace, the international situation, Khrushchev’s earlier visits to China.76 Al- dispute with a non-Communist state that and the policy of American imperialism.”71 though the head of the CPSU CC department they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and on September 13 claiming that “the TASS Ministry’s input was limited. Apart from a few other CC department heads also trav- statement has revealed to the whole world standard diplomatic support, the MFA had eled to China as advisers, the Foreign the divergence of views between China and contributed relatively little during Ministry’s role during the visit was far more the Soviet Union regarding the incident on Khrushchev’s two previous visits to China salient than in the past. (This was reflected the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as in Gromyko’s own role as well; among other has literally brought joy and jubilation to the well as his visits to most other Communist things, he was the only Soviet official be- Indian bourgeoisie and to American and states. The bulk of the preparations had been sides Suslov who took part in all of British imperialism.”67 The irritation and handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Khrushchev’s talks with Mao and Zhou sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two Central Committee departments and by Enlai.77) Hence, Zimyanin’s report proved days later when Soviet and Indian leaders Khrushchev’s own staff. highly influential. signed a much-publicized agreement that In that respect, the September 1959 trip As things worked out, however, the 177 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

MFA’s expanded role had little effect one nior ideological officials from the CPSU, months after he took over the Far Eastern way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail department and a month after Khrushchev’s The trip in September-October 1959 left Suslov, ended up handling most of the So- ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the crucial differences unresolved, and the two viet Union’s polemical exchanges and other Foreign Ministry’s role in policy-making sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to dealings with China. Throughout the late toward China remained well short of what it take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after 1950s (and even well into 1960) Suslov had had been in September 1959. Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet been the chief proponent within the Soviet The MFA’s diminished impact on Sino- Union quietly began pulling some of its key leadership of a conciliatory posture toward Soviet relations was largely unchanged until military technicians out of China.78 Ten- China; but as attitudes on both sides steadily mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department sions increased rapidly over the next several hardened and the split became irreparable, was bifurcated, and the ministry’s senior months, culminating in the publication of a Suslov embraced the anti-Chinese line with expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April a vengeance, in part to compensate for his in charge of the new “First Far Eastern” 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anni- earlier, more accommodating stance. Oleg department.84 That department, under versary of Lenin’s birthday.79 The state- Rakhmanin, a senior official and expert on Kapitsa’s highly visible direction for well ment, entitled “Long Live Leninism!” re- China in the CPSU CC Department for Ties over a decade (until he was promoted to be moved any doubts that Soviet officials and with Communist and Workers’ Parties of a deputy foreign minister in December 1982), diplomats still had about the magnitude of Socialist Countries, also gained an increas- was responsible for China, Korea, and the rift between the two countries.80 Soon ing role in policy toward the PRC.83 Mongolia, while the “Second Far Eastern” thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East Rakhmanin’s expertise and aggressive anti- department handled Indonesia, Japan, and European governments became aware of the Maoist stance gave Soviet leaders precisely the Philippines.85 Even after separate de- conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong what they needed as the split widened, and partments were established, however, the criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in the result was an even more confrontational continued hostility between China and the Beijing of the World Federation of Trade policy toward Beijing. Soviet Union left the MFA’s First Far East- Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a Foreign Ministry employees were not ern department with a relatively modest role few weeks later at the Third Congress of the necessarily any more favorably disposed in policy-making, in part because the depart- Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, toward China than senior party officials were, ment overlapped so much with the sections where Khrushchev sought to rebut the com- but the demand for input from the MFA on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the ments expressed at the WFTU meeting and tended to decline as bilateral tensions grew. CPSU CC Department for Ties with Com- to retaliate for China’s decision to provide Although Soviet diplomats in China still had munist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist other delegates with copies of a confidential important liaison and information-gather- Countries. Not until the 1980s, when rela- letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP ing roles, the expertise of the MFA’s Far tions between Moscow and Beijing finally leadership. The top Chinese official in Eastern department was largely eclipsed dur- began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.81 ing the 1960s. Zimyanin left the department regain extensive influence over policy to- Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet as early as February 1960, having been ap- ward China. That trend was under way as Union withdrew all its remaining military pointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Sub- early as 1982, but it gathered much greater technicians and advisers from China in July sequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin momentum after 1986, as Eduard and August 1960, and simultaneously began served briefly as a deputy foreign minister Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as recalling its thousands of non-military per- and then gained prominence within the CPSU Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail sonnel, causing disarray in many of China’s in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, largest economic and technical projects and of Pravda (from 1965 to 1976), as a full the MFA had acquired a dominant role in scientific research programs.82 Although Central Committee member (from 1966 on), policy-making toward China. Soviet and Chinese officials managed to and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC The status of the Foreign Ministry on gloss over the dispute at a “world confer- Secretary, beginning in 1976. this issue was never quite as prominent dur- ence” of 81 Communist parties in Moscow Like Zimyanin, the new head of the ing Andrei Gromyko’s long tenure as for- in November 1960, the polemics and re- Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, eign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA’s criminations soon resumed, with ever greater I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on stridency. Subsequently, as news of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appoint- the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin’s conflict spread throughout the world, ment, but aside from that one distinction, report thus symbolized a high point for the Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional Tugarinov was an obscure official whose ministry vis-a-vis China in the pre- attempts to reconcile their differences; but tenure at the department lasted only until Gorbachev era. the split, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes August 1963. His successor, N. G. The translation of Zimyanin’s report of restoring a semblance of unity in the Sudarikov, was not yet even a member of the follows below: international Communist movement were MFA Collegium when he became head of dashed. the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of * * * * * * The downward spiral of Sino-Soviet the department’s waning influence. relations after Khrushchev’s visit in 1959 (Sudarikov was not appointed to the Col- tended to rigidify Soviet policy-making. Se- legium until November 1964, some 15 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 178

Soviet-Chinese Relations tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to ing the rightist elements, did not offer any a more frequent and more amicable exchange open condemnation of statements expressed of candid views. The Chinese friends began by them about so-called “territorial claims The victory of the people’s revolution to speak more openly about their plans and on the USSR.” in China and the establishment of the Chi- difficulties and, at the same time, to express The Soviet government’s declaration of nese People’s Republic marked the start of critical comments (from a friendly position) 30 October 1956 [endorsing the principle of a qualitatively new stage in relations be- about Soviet organizations, the work of So- equality in relations between the Soviet tween the peoples of the Soviet Union and viet specialists, and other issues in Soviet- Union and other communist countries—ed.] China, based on a commonality of interests Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Commu- was received with great satisfaction in and a unity of goals in constructing a social- nist Party of China Central Committee] fully China.94 In January 1957 a government ist and Communist society in both coun- supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the tries. the cult of personality and its consequences. Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a . . . . It is worth noting, however, that the CPC CC, joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.95 The When discussing the overall success of while not speaking about this directly, took a Declaration emphasized the complete unity the development of Soviet-Chinese rela- position different from ours when evaluating of the USSR and PRC as an important factor tions during the first three years after the the activity of J. V. Stalin.90 A bit later the in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it formation of the PRC, we must not overlook Chinese comrades reexamined their evalua- exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched several negative features of these relations tion of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in claims about a “struggle between the CPSU connected with the violation of the sover- Mao Zedong’s pronouncements when he was and CPC for the right to leadership of world eign rights and interests of the Chinese visiting Moscow.91 For example, he said: “. Communism.” In accordance with the Dec- People’s Republic, as reflected in bilateral . . Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now laration, the Soviet Union devised and imple- agreements signed between the Soviet Union have the same view as the CPSU.” In a mented concrete measures aimed at the fur- and PRC, including, for example, agree- number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a ther development of Soviet-Chinese friend- ments to prohibit foreigners from entering critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. ship and cooperation on the basis of equal- Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), Stalin. ity, mutual interest, and complete trust. to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock com- Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a In 1957 a series of consultations took panies, and to set the rate of exchange for the campaign was launched in China to combat place between the CPSU CC and the CPC ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to CC on common, concrete matters pertaining 1950), as well as other such documents.86 “let a hundred flowers bloom.”92 In connec- to the international situation and the Com- Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took tion with this the Chinese press began, with munist movement. The Chinese friends measures to eliminate everything that, by increasing frequency, to express criticism of actively participated in the preparations and keeping the PRC in a subordinate position specific conditions and of works by Soviet conduct of the Moscow conference of offi- vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the suc- authors in the fields of philosophy, natural cials from Communist and workers’ parties cessful development of Soviet-Chinese re- history, literature, and art. This inevitably in November 1957.96 While the Chinese lations on the basis of full equality, mutual- gave strong impetus to hostile statements by delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong ity, and trust.87 Over time, the above- rightist forces who denounced the Soviet spoke approvingly about the positive expe- mentioned agreements were annulled or re- Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rience of such consultations and the constant vised if they did not accord with the spirit of rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing readiness of the Chinese comrades to under- fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a to uphold principles of equality and mutual- take a joint review of these and other mat- Soviet party and state delegation headed by ity, and they alleged that Soviet assistance ters.97 C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October was self-interested and of inferior quality. The steps to reorganize the manage- 1954 played an important role in the estab- They also asserted that the Soviet Union had ment of the national economy in the USSR lishment of closer and more trusting rela- not provided compensation for equipment were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The tions. As a result of this visit, joint declara- taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the tions were signed on Soviet-Chinese rela- the Soviet Union was extracting money from June [1957] and other plenary sessions of tions and the international situation and on China in return for weapons supplied to the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press relations with Japan.88 In addition, a com- Korea, which were already paid for with the did not feature an official commentary or munique and additional agreements were blood of Chinese volunteers.93 In addition, reactions to the decisions of these sessions. signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the they lodged a number of territorial demands After details about the activity of the Anti- Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock against the USSR. The airing of these types Party faction had been explained to the CPC companies responsible for scientific-tech- of statements during the struggle against CC, the friends began to speak more reso- nical cooperation, the construction of a rightists can in no way be justified, even if lutely about these matters. “If Molotov’s Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the one takes account of the tactical aims of our line had prevailed within the CPSU,” Mao construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator rail- friends, who were seeking to unmask the declared in Moscow, “that would have been road, and so forth.89 rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against dangerous not only for the USSR, but for The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of them for all their statements. It is also worth other socialist countries as well.”98 exceptionally great importance for the fur- noting that the Chinese friends, despite crush- Taking account of the divisive activity ther improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela- 179 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN of revisionists and the surge of imperialist The letter from Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, began to display a more proper understand- propaganda, which tried to use several ideo- and a variety of reports from the CPSU ing of matters considered by the 21st Con- logical campaigns in China in 1957—and, in CC—about the provision of assistance to the gress, such as the question of the signifi- particular, the campaign to “let a hundred PRC to continue strengthening its defense cance of creating a material-technical base flowers bloom” as well as the publication of capability, about a reduction in the number and increasing the productivity of labor for a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of of Soviet specialists in the PRC and the the construction of socialism, the question Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among elimination of the network of Soviet “ad- of the role of the principle of material incen- the People”—to provoke a schism in rela- viser-consultants,” about the CPSU CC’s tives and labor distribution under socialism, tions between the Soviet Union and PRC, views of the Yugoslav Communist League’s and other questions. the leadership of the CPC CC and the gov- draft program, and about other matters— The CPSU’s position in offering a prin- ernment of the PRC emphasized the close had important political benefits. cipled explanation of a number of Marxist- unity of the socialist camp and the leading The results of the CPSU’s 21st Con- Leninist precepts and laws of the building of role of the CPSU among Communist and gress provided a great boost to the practical socialism and Communism, which were ig- workers’ parties. Mao Zedong stated this activity of the CPC in overseeing socialist nored in China during the implementation of very definitively in his speech to Chinese construction in the country.104 It is worth the “Great Leap Forward” and the establish- students attending Moscow State University noting that after the publication of the theses ment of communes (see the report and speech (November 1957), and he spoke about it at of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev at the by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Con- length with officials from Yugoslavia and CPSU’s 21st Congress and during the pro- gress and the speeches that followed), helped also during meetings that PRC government ceedings of the Congress, the Chinese friends, the Chinese comrades to evaluate the situa- delegations had with delegations from Po- while giving a generally positive evaluation tion correctly and to begin rectifying the land and other countries of the socialist of the achievements of socialist construction mistakes and shortcomings that had arisen. camp.99 In 1959 the CPC CC, having reex- in the USSR, made almost no mention of the The statement by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev amined the proposal of the CPSU CC to theoretical portions of the report by Cde. about the permanent foundations of Soviet- clarify its formula about the leading role of N.S. Khrushchev and said that those por- Chinese friendship swept the rug out from the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again tions related only to the practice of socialist under imperialist and Yugoslav revisionist affirmed that this formula must be preserved and Communist construction in the propaganda, which was intended to sow in the future. USSR.105 mistrust between our countries and provoke The durability of Soviet-Chinese rela- In a similar vein, the provisions adopted a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. tions and the role of Soviet-Chinese friend- at the Second Session of the CPC’s 8th . . . . ship gained new strength as the international Congress (May 1958) regarding a struggle An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations situation deteriorated in the Middle East and against “blind faith” and regarding the need over the past decade confirms that relations also in connection with the provocations by to foster sentiments of national pride among of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the the people, as well as some preliminary have been established on a lasting basis and summer of 1958. The most important politi- success in implementing the “Great Leap are growing wider and stronger with every cal event that year in Soviet-Chinese rela- Forward,” caused a number of cadre work- passing year. These relations are a decisive tions, which had an enormously positive ers in the PRC to take on airs.106 They factor in the further growth of the might and influence on the development of the whole began excessively emphasizing China’s cohesion of the world socialist camp and in international situation, was the July-August uniqueness and displaying a guarded atti- the consolidation of world peace and the meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. tude toward Soviet experience and the rec- security of nations. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong.100 During ommendations of Soviet specialists.107 an exchange of views they considered a Some began declaring that the Soviet Union 1. N. S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 6 vols. (Moscow: number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chi- had stayed too long at the socialist stage of typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. 5 (“Vzaimootnosheniya s nese relations and, in particular, questions of development, while China was moving val- sotsialisticheskimi stranami”), Part G 101 (“Vzaimootnosheniya s Kitaem”), pp. 77-78. military cooperation. The speech by iantly ahead toward Communism. The Chi- 2. “Vnutripoliticheskoe, ekonomicheskoe i Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his state- nese press quite actively featured criticism mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie KNR,” Fond (F.) 5, Opis’ ment that an attack on the PRC would be of the socialist principles implemented in (Op.) 30, Delo (D.) 307, Listy (Ll.) 49-79, TsKhSD. regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union the USSR for the distribution of material 3. The section, entitled “Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya,” is on Ll. 71-79. itself, was fervently greeted with expres- goods in accordance with one’s labor, for the 4. For two quite different versions of this theme, see sions of gratitude and approval in China.102 compensation of labor on a job-by-job basis, Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956- The government of the PRC displayed great and so forth. Some authors essentially ar- 1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); satisfaction at our assurance about our readi- gued that communes were incompatible with and Steven M. Goldstein, “Nationalism and Interna- 108 tionalism: Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Thomas W. ness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation kolkhozes. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese For- for a nuclear strike against China.103 In Later on, after studying materials from eign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon turn, the Chinese government declared that the Congress and after numerous mistakes Press, 1994), 224-265, esp. 224-248. Zagoria argues the PRC will come to the assistance of the arose during the establishment of the peas- that China’s policy vis-a-vis other countries (including the Soviet Union) was largely determined by the shift- USSR in any part of the globe if an attack is ant communes and during the implementa- ing fortunes of “left” and “right” factions within the carried out against it. tion of the “Great Leap Forward,” the CPC Chinese leadership. Goldstein attributes the collapse of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 180

Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in 1818. Predsedatelem Tsentral’nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva [Mao’s own] domestic political priorities,” which el- 9. See, e.g., “The Origin and Development of the Differ- Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Mao Tsze-dunom 16 evated “national” over “internationalist” concerns. ences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Our- dekabrya 1949 g.,” Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Although Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics selves: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Federatsii (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 9-17; and altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of “Zapis’ besedy I. V. Stalina s Predsedatelem and the agenda of Chinese politics” himself, and that People’s Daily and Red Flag,” 6 September 1963, in Tsentral’nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva Kitaiskoi China’s relations with the Soviet Union were therefore Peking Review 6:37 (13 September 1963), 6-23. Narodnoi Respubliki Mao-Tsze-Dunom, 22 yanvarya “decisively altered” when “Mao’s thought about 10. Among countless studies citing 1956 as the start of 1950 g.,” APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38. China’s domestic condition underwent a sea change in the conflict are Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict; Wil- 16. Among many examples of gaps in official tran- the years 1956-9” (emphasis added). For an opposing liam E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, MA: scripts are the exchanges deleted from the Polish record view, see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922- The MIT Press, 1964); Francois Fejto, Chine-URSS, de of the five-power meeting in Warsaw in July 1968 1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Unlike l’alliance au conflit, 1950-1972 (Paris: Editions due (“Protokol ze spotkania przywodcow partii i rzadow Zagoria and Goldstein (and many others), Gittings Seuil, 1973); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: krajow socjalistycznych: Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, avers that changes in the external climate led to shifts Unity and Conflict, rev. and enlarged ed. (Cambridge, Wegier, i ZSRR,” in Archiwum Akt Nowych, Arch. KC in Chinese domestic politics, rather than the other way MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), esp. 271-308 and PZPR, Paczka 193, Tom 24, Dokument 4) and the around. For a similar, though more qualified, assess- 357-432; Jean Baby, La grande controverse sino- Czechoslovak account of the Soviet-Czechoslovak ment, see Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World sovietique, 1956-66 (Paris: Grasset, 1966); G. F. Hudson, meeting in Cierna nad Tisou in July-August 1968 Affairs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), esp. 11- “Introduction,” in G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, (“Zaznam jednani predsednictva UV KSC a UV KSSS 42 and 102-129. Curiously, very few Western scholars and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dis- v Cierna n. T., 29.7.-1.8.1968,” in Archiv Ustredniho have attempted to connect shifts in Soviet domestic pute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 1-8; and Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska, Prague, politics with changes in Soviet policy toward China (or Thomas G. Hart, Sino-Soviet Relations: Re-Examining F. 07/15, Archivna jednotka 274.). In the former case, vice versa). Alexander Dallin outlined a general frame- the Prospects for Normalization (Aldershot: Gower, discussions held during a formal recess in the talks (as work in “The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign 1987). For a variant of this point, see Goldstein, “Na- recorded verbatim in the diaries of a key participant, Policy,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context tionalism and Internationalism,” 224-242, which claims Pyotr Shelest’) were not included in the final transcript. of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Col.: Westview that Mao’s rethinking of Chinese domestic priorities, This omission was important because the discussions Press, 1981), 335-408, but he made no specific appli- rather than Khrushchev’s secret speech, was the water- pertained to military options vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. cation to Soviet ties with China. Carl A. Linden offered shed event in 1956. Among those who cite 1958 as the In the latter case, Shelest’s anti-Semitic slurs about a a few comments about the effect of Soviet leadership beginning of the dispute are Yahuda, China’s Role in Czechoslovak official, Frantisek Kriegel, were omitted politics on Khrushchev’s stance vis-a-vis China in World Affairs, esp. 102-129; Allen S. Whiting, “The from the transcript. Fortunately, these derogatory com- Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 Sino-Soviet Split,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John ments were recorded by several participants, including (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, (fittingly enough) Shelest’ himself in his diaries. and Victor Baras discussed the impact of China on Vol. 14: The People’s Republic, Part I: The Emergence 17. On the need for caution in using memoirs, see Mark Soviet leadership politics (1953-1956) in a brief re- of Revolutionary China 1949-1965 (New York: Cam- Kramer, “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: search note, “China and the Rise of Khrushchev,” bridge University Press, 1987), 478-538; and Roderick Should We Swallow Oral History?” International Se- Studies in Comparative Communism 8:1-2 (Spring- MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, curity 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-218; and Mark Kramer, Summer 1975), 183-191; but most of Baras’s and Vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960 (New “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” Linden’s observations are speculative and (particu- York: Columbia University Press, 1983), esp. 36-40 Cold War International History Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), larly in Linden’s case) not wholly convincing. Even the and 255-292. 1, 14-37. illuminating book by James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s 11. For documentation and analysis of these territorial 18. The transcripts reveal that, in addition to Stalin, the Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic issues, see Dennis J. Doolin, comp., Territorial Claims Soviet participants in the talks included Vyacheslav Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer- in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Andrei Vyshinskii, sity Press, 1994), which focuses on the connection (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1965); George plus Anastas Mikoyan and Nikolai Bulganin at some of between Soviet domestic politics and foreign relations, Ginsburg and Carl F. Pinkeles, The Sino-Soviet Territo- the meetings. barely mentions Soviet policy toward China. It may rial Dispute, 1949-64 (New York: Praeger, 1978); W. 19. F. Chuev, ed., Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz well be that domestic-external linkages in Sino-Soviet A. Douglas Jackson, Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone dnevnika F. Chueva (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 114. relations, to the extent they existed for either China or of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict?, rev. ed. 20. “Istoriya i sovremennost’: Dialog Stalina s Mao the USSR, were weaker in the Soviet case, but that (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1968); Tai Sung An, The Tszedunom,” Problemy Dal’nego vostoka (Moscow) remains a fitting topic for study. Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute (Philadelphia: 1/2 (1992), 109. This comes from the second part of a 5. The phrase “reluctant and suspicious ally” comes Westminster Press, 1973), 13-73; and Luke T. Chang, fascinating interview with Kovalev by the historian from two recent essays by Steven M. Goldstein which China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes (New Sergei N. Goncharov. For the first part of the interview, debunk the notion that China was “forced” into an York: Oceana Publications, 1982), 9-38 and 107-197. as well as background on Kovalev’s career, see Problemy alliance with the Soviet Union in 1949-50 because of For an intriguing argument that territorial issues were Dal’nego vostoka 6 (1991), 77-91. hostility on the part of the United States. See Goldstein’s not at the heart of the Sino-Soviet rift, see Klaus Mehnert, 21. “Istoriya i sovremennost’,” 110. “Nationalism and Internationalism,” 231 ff. and “The China nach dem Sturm: Bericht und Kommentar 22. “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937 to 1962: Ideology and (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971), esp. 228- 1956 g.,” Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Unity,” forthcoming in Harry Harding, ed., Patterns of 234. Although Mehnert’s case is generally persuasive, Yudin, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of China. Zimyanin’s report as well as other new evidence (see TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 93-94. Fedorenko’s 6. For further comments by Khrushchev on Stalin’s below) suggests that China’s territorial claims were a article referred to the meeting that he and Kovalev had treatment of the PRC, see Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part more serious irritant (at least from the Soviet perspec- with Mao, but Fedorenko gave no intimation that Mao G, pp. 5-13. See also Andrei Gromyko’s remarks on tive) than Mehnert implied. had found anything “unpleasant” about it. the same subject in A. A. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, 2 vols. 12. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 6- 23. Mao’s three speeches at the Chengdu conference (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), 7. were first published in 1969 in a CCP collection, Mao Vol. 2, pp. 127-130. 13. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 128-129. Zedong sixiang wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong 7. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson 14. Shi Zhe, “‘Soprovozhdaya Predsedatelya Mao’,” Thought”), pp. 159-172, the text of which was later to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 11 February 1950, in U.S. and N. Fedorenko, “Stalin i Mao: besedy v Moskve,” spirited to the West. The speech cited here is the one Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Problemy Dal’nego vostoka 2 (1989), 139-148 and 149- delivered on 10 March 1958. An English translation of States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 6/China (Washington, D.C.: 164, respectively. A slightly abridged version of the speech first appeared as “Address on March 10,” in U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 309. Fedorenko’s article appeared as “Nochnye besedy: Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95- 8. Memorandum of Eisenhower-Churchill-Bidault Stranitsy istorii,” Pravda (Moscow), 23 October 1988, 98. meeting, 7 December 1953 (Secret), in U.S. Depart- 4. 24. Mao also discussed this point at length in his March ment of State, FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 5/China, pp. 1808- 15. “Zapis’ besedy tovarishcha Stalina I. V. s 1956 meeting with Yudin, remarking that Dongbei and 181 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influ- account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the allowed to obscure the real purpose of the operation, as ence.” See “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis revealed in Mao’s secret speeches in September 1958. marta 1956 g.,” L. 93. Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that 38. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 72- 25. For a useful list of collections of Mao’s secret Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that 73. The present author confirmed this point in an speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Khrushchev’s account. The September 1963 statement the former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene goes on to claim that Chinese leaders “insisted on the policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: adoption of all necessary measures to smash the coun- Soviet leader during this trip to Beijing. From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward, terrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly op- 39. Ibid., 73. Harvard Contemporary China Series No. 6 (Cambridge, posed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This 40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard Univer- assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev’s claim Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: sity Press, 1989), 78-81. that Mao strongly supported the invasion after the Doubleday, 1965), 293-294, 691-693. 26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on 41. Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any Power (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54-55. 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more chronology, it creates the impression that Mao’s back- 42. See, e.g., Mao’s speech on 9 November 1958 at the nuanced appraisal of Stalin’s policy. Among many ing for an invasion preceded the Soviet decision, but the First Zhengzhou Conference, translated in MacFarquhar, items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection statement would hold up equally well if, as appears Cheek, and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman of documents being compiled under the auspices of the likely, Mao’s support for an invasion followed rather Mao, esp. 460-461. Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the 43. For a cogent assessment of Sino-Soviet dynamics from Recent History (RTsKhIDNI): Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not during the crisis, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bol’sheviki), Komintern, necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev’s ac- Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,” in Morton H. i Narodno-revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae. The first count. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published 29. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 265-303. in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the TsK ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” Halperin’s and Tsou’s conclusions differ markedly Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been No. P49/VI (STRICTLY SECRET), 31 October 1956, from standard Western interpretations of the crisis, published in several recent issues of the journal Problemy in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. which posited it as a case of Chinese aggressiveness and Dal’nego vostoka. Perhaps the most intriguing of these 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41. Soviet timidity. For a typical example of this view is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to 30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in (which, unlike Halperin’s and Tsou’s analysis, does not the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in January- particular Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese fare well in light of new evidence), see John R. Thomas, February 1949, which is presented along with support- Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National “The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958,” ing documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, Orbis 6:1 (Spring 1962), 38-64. John Lewis Gaddis has and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. 1970). noted that U.S. officials at the time “interpreted [the Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, 31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the bombardment of Quemoy] as a joint Sino-Soviet probe which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan’s report, supposed contrast between Soviet and Chinese ap- intended to test Western resolve.” See “Dividing Ad- were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei proaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking versaries: The United States and International Commu- Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta rhetorical flourishes for actual policy. nism, 1945-1958,” in The Long Peace: Inquiries Into RF: Perepiska I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v 32. See Mark Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers and the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford yanvare 1949 g.,” Novaya i noveisha istoriya (Mos- Military Aid to the Third World,” in S. Neil MacFarlane University Press, 1987), 186-187. Gaddis seems to cow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., Gorbachev’s Third World believe that this perception was not quite accurate, but six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January Dilemmas (London: Routledge, 1989), 66-110, esp. in fact the evidence amply bears out the views of 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, Ll. 68-70. President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. 95-118. 33. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi 44. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 233. Mao’s 27. “Address on March 10,” 98. For Mao’s extended propagandy i kul’turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi reference to “a few rounds of artillery” is disingenuous comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SE- to say the least, since the Chinese leader himself ac- see “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta CRET) of a speech by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the knowledged in a secret speech in April 1959 (ibid., 290) 1956 g.,” Ll. 88-92. PRC’s Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, 24 April that some 19,000 shells had been fired at Quemoy on 23 28. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part C (“O 1959, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, L. 26. August 1958 alone. The U.S. Central Intelligence Vengrii”), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev’s 34. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 6 (“Otnosheniya Agency estimated that the number of shells fired on the version of events is borne out by a close reading of the s kapitalisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami”), first day was closer to 41,000, but whichever figure may Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chi- Part H (“Otnosheniya s arabskimi stranami”), pp. 57- be correct, it is clear that far more than “a few rounds of nese media spoke positively about the events in Hun- 58. artillery” were fired. gary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced 35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao 45. As Allen Whiting points out (“Quemoy 1958,” 266- Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two Tsze-duna,” Pravda (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. 267), there is little evidence that Mao intended at this days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October point to attack Taiwan. Instead, he was hoping merely Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers sud- 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassa- to destabilize the Guomintang government. denly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in dor in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev 46. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 255. See also Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East during the 1958 trip. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958,” 266-267. German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chi- 36. In Peking und Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- 47. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, p. 132-133. nese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht Anstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that 48. Full citations for Khrushchev’s two major state- uber die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern cri- ments, as mentioned here and in the next sentence, are Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der sis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the provided below in my annotations to Zimyanin’s re- Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis port. Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, began). Mehnert’s comments have no bearing on the 49. On this point, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassa- initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force dor in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev’s has shown, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely dif- Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford account. (Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by fered in their views about how to respond. University Press, 1994), 16. David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 37. See Allen S. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958: Mao’s 50. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 73- 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev’s version is not Miscalculations,” The China Quarterly 62 (June 1975), 74. inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 263-270. The various post-hoc rationalizations that 51. This also was a theme in official Chinese polemics September 1963 (cited in note 9 supra), despite the way Mao offered (so that he could avoid admitting what a beginning in 1963. Reliable documentation from 1958 that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev’s failure the whole venture had been) should not be undercuts these post-hoc Chinese accusations. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 182

52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting, also three official Chinese statements released in 1963: 69. For the effect on Khrushchev’s trip, see his “The Sino-Soviet Split,” 499-500. “Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 78-82. For the 53. Ibid. and “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Complete, Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition official Chinese perspective, see The Truth About How Pekine 2 oktyabrya 1959 g.,” Osobaya papka and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,” Peking Review the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with (STRICTLY SECRET), APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, 6:31 (2 August 1963), 7-8; “Statement by the Spokes- India Against China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Ll. 12-15. man of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Press, 1963). 54. For a brief but reliable overview of Sino-Soviet Soviet Government’s Statement of 3 August,” Peking 70. CPSU CC General Department, “Otdel TsK KPSS nuclear weapons cooperation, see the highly acclaimed Review 6:33 (16 August 1963), 7-15, esp. 8-10; and po svyazyam s inostrannymi kompartiyami, mart 1953- book by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Govern- fevral’ 1957 g.,” 1958 (Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, ment: A Comment on the Soviet Government’s State- 28, “Predislovie,” L. 2. 1988), 39-46, 60-65, 71-72, and 221-222. Additional ment of 21 August,” Peking Review 6:36 (6 September 71. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 132-135. Ac- valuable details, especially about cooperation in deliv- 1963), 7-16. These formed the basis of a booklet cording to Gromyko, the talks focused almost exclu- ery vehicle technology, are provided by Lewis and Xue published in late 1963 by the Foreign Languages Press sively on recent developments in the Taiwan Straits, in their subsequent study, China’s Strategic Seapower, in Beijing, People of the World, Unite for the Complete, and were largely unproductive. He said he was “as- 2-4, 10-18, 47-49, and 130-134. See also Robert S. Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and De- tounded” when Mao nonchalantly proposed that Ameri- Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, struction of Nuclear Weapons! can troops be allowed to penetrate deep into China so Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5: British, French, 62. On 21 January 1960 the Chinese National People’s that they could be wiped out by a Soviet nuclear strike and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Congress adopted a resolution stipulating that China (p. 133). Gromyko’s retrospective assertions about this Press, 1994), 324-356. For a sample of earlier ac- would not be bound by any arms control agreement particular matter have been controversial from the time counts, see Harold P. Ford, “The Eruption of Sino- unless it had participated in the negotiations and had they appeared in 1988. A leading Western expert on Soviet Politico-Military Problems, 1957-60,” in given its express consent. political-military affairs in China, John Wilson Lewis, Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Rela- 63. For background and widely differing perspectives has discounted Gromyko’s report (see Lewis and Xue, tions (New York: Praeger, 1966), 100-113; Thomas on these matters, see Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China’s Strategic Seapower, 16 and 258), but has W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cam- China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, adduced no specific evidence to contradict it. What is bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 216- 1990), 9-74; Wilhelm von Pochhammer, Die known about China’s cautious policy during the Quemoy 224; Alice Langley Hsieh, “The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Auseinandersetzung um Tibets Grenzen (Frankfurt am crisis (see above) does raise doubts about Gromyko’s Dialogue: 1963,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 8:2 Main: A. Metzner, 1962); Alastair Lamb, The China- claim, but it seems likely that Mao said something (June 1964), 99-115 (Hsieh uses the Sino-Soviet ex- India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries reasonably close, and that Gromyko may have some- changes of 1963 to look back at the earlier period of (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Alastair what misinterpreted it. After all, on 5 September 1958 nuclear cooperation as well as the subsequent dis- Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh (Columbia: Mao told a closed gathering of the PRC’s Supreme putes); Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China’s Strat- University of South Carolina Press, 1975); W. F. Van State Conference that China should be ready, if neces- egy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute sary, for a “war in which hydrogen bombs” would be Hall, 1962), 70-109; Morton H. Halperin, “Sino-So- with China, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, used: “If we must fight, we will fight. If half the people viet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960,” in Halperin, ed., 1967); Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (New York: die, there is still nothing to fear.” (See Mao Zedong Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 117-143; and Pantheon, 1970), esp. 47-134; Allen S. Whiting, The sixiang wansui, 1969, p. 237.) Assuming that Mao said Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina roughly the same thing to Gromyko, it is plausible that Praeger, 1965), 78-82. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 1-41; the Chinese leader also made comments similar to what 55. The information here was first revealed by the R. K. Jain, ed., China-South Asian Relations, 1947- Gromyko alleged. This is the view of Oleg Troyanovskii, former head of the Soviet “missile group” in China, 1980, 2 vols. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy ad- Major-General Aleksandr Savel’ev, in Aleksandr Press, 1981), Vol. 1: India, pp. 97-151; Chang, China’s viser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes, esp. 61-78; leader during his trip to China in 1958, a few weeks Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1995, 6. Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. before Gromyko’s visit. In an interview in Cambridge, 56. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, 131- Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Ri- Massachusetts on 6 October 1995, Troyanovskii said, 132. For more on the R-11FM, see Mikhail Turetsky, valry in Ladakh (New York: Praeger, 1963); G. V. “I recall hearing something about this at the time, after The Introduction of Missile Systems Into the Soviet Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s the crisis began. It fits in with what Mao said during the Navy (1945-1962), Monograph Series on Soviet Union Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) Moscow conference in November 1957, which shocked No. 8 (Falls Church, VA: Delphic Associates, Febru- (New York: Paragon, 1964), 111-186, esp. 111-151; us all.” ary 1983), 65-72. and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Misperceptions in For- 72. For background, see A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, 57. This is discussed by Khrushchev in Vospominaniya, eign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959- Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 98-99. 1962 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. 58. Ibid., p. 98. Details of the NDTA and the June 1959 64. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi I. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K. U. Chernenko i M. letter were first publicly revealed in a Chinese broad- propagandy v kul’turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi S. Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye cast on 15 August 1963, which claimed that Khrushchev stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SE- otnosheniya, 1994), 71-72; and O. Grinevskii, “Na had reneged on the agreement so that he would have “a CRET), 24 April 1959, by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of Smolenskoi Ploshchadi v 1950-kh godakh,” gift to take to Eisenhower when visiting the USA in the PRC’s Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (Moscow) 11 (November September.” A very similar formulation was used in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, Ll. 18, 27. 1994), 120-126, esp. 124. the official Chinese statement cited in note 9 supra. 65. “Zayavlenie TASS,” Pravda (Moscow), 10 Septem- 73. “Pribytie N. S. Khrushcheva v kitaiskuyu stolitsu: 59. “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya ber 1959, 3. Vstrecha na aerodrome Shoudu,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SE- 66. MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 258-260. October 1959, 1. CRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, 67. Cited in O. B. Borisov (pseud.) and B. T. Koloskov, 74. A very useful account of Khrushchev’s interactions Ll. 12-15. For an assessment of the Chinese leadership’s Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii with Gromyko during the trip is in Khrushchev’s perspective on this matter, see Lewis and Xue, China’s ocherk (Moscow: Mysl’, 1972), 155. Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part E (“O poezdke v SShA”), Strategic Seapower, 17-18, 133. 68. A more serious incident occurred in late October, pp. 7-25. Khrushchev notes that he “greatly respected 60. Khrushchev deals with this point at length in his two-and-a-half weeks after Khrushchev’s visit to China. Gromyko as foreign minister both during this time and memoirs; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 71- Nine Indian policemen were killed or wounded and ten afterwards” (p. 8). 76. See also Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, vol. 2, pp. 133- were taken prisoner after they clashed with Chinese 75. A cover note on Zimyanin’s report alludes to a one- 134. troops near Kongka Pass in Ladakh (northeastern Kash- page update, but the text has not yet been located. No 61. On this point, see Lewis and Xue, China Builds the mir, along the Tibetan border). The Soviet authorities doubt, the update cited the announcement on 17 Sep- Bomb, 64-65 and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “The Nuclear again maintained a policy of strict neutrality in their tember 1959 that the Chinese defense minister, Marshal Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Halperin, ed., coverage of this incident, further antagonizing the Chi- Peng Dehuai, was being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao. Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 146-147. See nese. Numerous other top military officials also were re- 183 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN moved at this time: the chief of the Chinese General sovetskikh gostei: Ot”ezd iz Pekina partiino- other documents cited here by Zimyanin, see Staff, General Huang Kecheng (who was replaced by pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), “Soglashenie mezhdu Soyuzom Sovetskikh the public security minister, General Luo Ruiching); 5 October 1959, 1. The MFA Collegium was a group of Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi two other deputy defense ministers, General Xiao Ke 12-15 of the most senior officials in the ministry, Respublikoi o Kitaiskoi Chanchun’skoi zheleznoi and General Li Da; and a half dozen lower-ranking including the minister, all the first deputy and deputy doroge, Port-Arture i Dalnem,” 14 February 1950; generals. These officers and two deputy foreign minis- ministers, and about a half dozen others, among them “Soobshchenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR ters were all removed because of their purported links Zimyanin. i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii dvukh with Peng Dehuai, who was accused in mid-1959 of 77. See “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya Sovetsko-kitaiskikh aktsionernikh obshchestv,” 29 “rightist opportunism” and forming an “anti-Party 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SE- March 1950; and “Soobshchenie o podpisanii clique.” These charges, approved by the CCP Central CRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Committee at its plenum in Lushan in the first half of L. 1; and “Beseda N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze- Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii Sovetsko-kitaiskogo August, stemmed from a secret “letter of opinion” that duna,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1. aktsionernogo obshchestva grazhdanskoi aviatsii,” 2 Peng sent to Mao in mid-July, which strongly criticized 78. This is documented in Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red April 1950, all in I. F. Kurdyukov, V. N. Nikiforov, and the “confusion,” “shortcomings,” “extravagance,” and Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, trans. by A. S. Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, “waste” of Mao’s economic policies. The letter was (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), 572-573. Nie 1917-1957: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo disclosed to other senior officials at an expanded ses- Rongzhen was the long-time head of China’s strategic Vostochnoi literatury, 1959), 221-222, 227-228 and sion of the CCP Politburo in Lushan in the latter half of weapons program; his memoirs were first published in 228-229, respectively. For further commentary on July. Mao regarded the document as a grave threat to Chinese (Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu) in 1984. these agreements, see Chang, China’s Boundary Trea- his authority, and he responded with a furious counter- 79. “Long Live Leninism!” was first published in ties and Frontier Disputes, 9-38, and for a detailed attack, forcing members of the Politburo to side either Hongqi 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in contemporary assessment of the inequitable nature of with him or with Peng. Although several top officials translation in Peking Review 3:17 (April 1960), 14-22. the joint stock companies, see the top-secret memoran- undoubtedly shared Peng’s misgivings about recent This statement and many others from 1959 and 1960 are dum “O nedostatkakh deyatel’nosti Sovetsko-kitaiskikh policies, they were unwilling to take a stand against available in well-annotated translation in Hudson, obshchestv Sovkitmetall i Sovkitneft’ v Sintszyane,” Mao. By the time the enlarged Politburo session in Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet from N.V. Vazhnov, secretary of the CPSU branch at Lushan adjourned at the end of July and the Central Dispute and as appendices in John Gittings, ed., Survey the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, 25 February 1954, in Committee plenum convened a few days later, Peng’s of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967 (New York: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 9, D. 1933, Ll. 18-38. fate was sealed. For solid analyses of the Peng Dehuai Oxford University Press, 1968), 287-394. The Gittings 87. For Khrushchev’s version of these efforts, see affair, see Jurgen Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and book also includes key statements from 1963-1967 Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 25-31. the Image (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), organized thematically to shed light on events from the 88. “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel’stva Soyuza esp. 77-106; MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 1950s and early 1960s. Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitel’stva 187-237; J. D. Simmonds, “P’eng Teh-huai: A Chrono- 80. See, e.g., Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki,” 12 October 1954, and logical Re-Examination,” The China Quarterly 37 (Janu- obuchali,” 6. “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel’stva Soyuza ary-March 1969), 120-138; and Frederick C. Teiwes, 81. For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitel’stva Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and De- includes details omitted from the official transcript, see Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki ob otnosheniyakh s cline of Party Norms 1950-1965 (White Plains, NY: M. Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Yaponiei,” 12 October 1954, both in Kurdyukov, E. Sharpe, 1979), ch. 9. Another invaluable source on Peking (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 97-110. Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie the affair is the “memoir” by Peng Dehuai himself, 82. For a useful account of this process by a participant, otnosheniya, 299-301 and 301-302, respectively which was compiled posthumously on the basis of see Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China 89. “Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o peredache autobiographical notes Peng wrote in response to inter- (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike sovetskoi doli uchastiya rogators during the Cultural Revolution. An English 1964), esp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, “Kak nashi v smeshannykh obshchestvakh,” 12 October 1954, version is now available: Memoirs of a Chinese Mar- raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” 6. “Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o stroitel’stve shal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai 83. For a good indication of Rakhmanin’s views at the zheleznoi dorogi Lan’chzhou-Urumchi-Alma Alta,” (1898-1974), trans. by Zheng Longpu (Beijing: For- time, see his pseudonymously written book, O. B. 12 October 1954, “Sovmestnoe kommyunike eign Languages Press, 1984). The book includes a Borisov, Iz istorii sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii v 50- pravitel’stv Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh whole chapter on the Lushan plenum (pp. 485-509) and kh godakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981). Although the Respublik, Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki i Mongol’skoi an appendix with the full text of the letter that Peng sent book was written much later, his views were remark- Narodnoi Respubliki o stroitel’stve zheleznoi dorogi ot to Mao in July 1959. For additional documentation, see ably constant over the years. Rakhmanin wrote numer- Tsenina do Ulan-Batora i organizatsii pryamogo The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968 (Kowloon: ous other books about China (also under the pseudonym soobshcheniya v 1955 g.,” 12 October 1955, ibid., 303- Union Research Institute, 1968). Contrary to much of O. B. Borisov), which are also worth consulting. See 304, 305, and 305-306, respectively. speculation in the West, there is no reason to believe in particular O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetsko- 90. Zimyanin’s chronology here is slightly amiss. In that Peng’s challenge to Mao revolved around military kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk (Mos- private discussions with Soviet officials as early as issues per se or had anything to do with the Soviet cow: Mysl’, 1972). March 1956 (a few weeks after Khrushchev’s secret Union. Peng undoubtedly was troubled by the growing 84. For background on Kapitsa and his dealings with speech), Mao began condemning the “great and serious frictions with Moscow because he knew how depen- Rakhmanin, see Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Social- mistakes committed by Stalin,” including his “errone- dent China still was on the USSR for military technol- ism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton, NJ: ous and ill-considered” actions vis-a-vis China. See ogy, but he never raised this issue in his confrontation Princeton University Press, 1985), 51-53. “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 with Mao. Nor is there any evidence to substantiate 85. All other Southeast Asian countries came within the g.,” Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Yudin, claims about a “Soviet connection” made in David A. purview of the MFA’s Southeast Asian Department, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in TsKhSD, Charles (pseud.), “The Dismissal of Marshal P’eng which remained a unified entity. F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 88-99. Only after the upheavals Teh-Huai,” The China Quarterly 8 (October-Decem- 86. The provisions excluding foreigners from Manchu- in Eastern Europe in October-November 1956 did Chi- ber 1961), 63-76. Charles’s article alleges that Peng’s ria and Xinjiang were not made public in February 1950 nese leaders express strong reservations about the de- letter to Mao was prepared with Moscow’s knowledge, and indeed had not been publicly disclosed at the time Stalinization campaign. Zimyanin is right, however, and that “Khrushchev’s refusal to apologize for this Zimyanin was drafting his report. The existence of that Mao had been uneasy about Khrushchev’s secret intervention in Chinese domestic affairs perhaps pre- these agreements first came to light in 1969 when a speech from the very start. For reasons discussed cipitated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute.” secret speech delivered by Mao in March 1958 was above, it is unlikely that Mao’s aversion to the reassess- These assertions are no more than dubious speculation. published in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang ment of Stalin stemmed from any great feeling of 76. On the role of senior MFA officials during the trip, wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought”), 159-172. personal warmth toward the late Soviet dictator. The see, inter alia, “Uzhin u Mao Tsze-duna” and An English translation of the speech was published in more probable reasons for Mao’s hostility toward the “Prebyvanie v Pekine sovetskoi partiino- Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95- de-Stalinization campaign were threefold: (1) his irri- pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii,” both in Pravda (Mos- 98. Mao emphasized that these provisions relegated tation that Khrushchev had not consulted with him cow), 3 October 1959, 1; and “Kitai teplo provozhaet Manchuria and Xinjiang to the status of “colonies.” For before delivering the secret speech; (2) his concern that COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 184 attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own debt was not fully repaid until 1965. During the “anti- title used for eight earlier compilations of secret speeches status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3) rightist” crackdown after the Hundred Flowers cam- by Mao). All three speeches were translated into his belief that the chief features of Stalinism, especially paign, Lung was punished for his remarks, but he English, introduced, and annotated by Michael the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were managed to regain his spot on the National Defense Schoenhals in “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on, Council in December 1958. See MacFarquhar, The ‘Moscow Conference’,” The Journal of Communist after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellec- Studies 2:2 (June 1986), 109-126. Mao’s comments for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate tuals, 50. See also Mineo Nakajima, “Foreign Rela- about the Anti-Party Group were as follows: “I endorse against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement tions: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in the CPSU Central Committee’s resolution of the from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., The People’s Repub- Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of lic, Part I, 270, 277. The facts show that unity could not be achieved and that Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central 94. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Depart- dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva clique took the opportunity to attack when Comrade ments of People’s Daily and Red Flag,” 13 September mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, 1963, in Peking Review 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8- Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU even though they launched a surprise attack, our Com- 15. Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vypiska rade Khrushchev is no fool; he is a smart man who 91. The reference here is to Mao’s trip in November iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 immediately mobilized his forces and launched a victo- 1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/ rious counterattack. That struggle was one between outside China) since early 1950. On the point dis- 1 (STRICTLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In cussed in the next sentence, see Khrushchev, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30. Zimyanin’s description the four or five years since Stalin’s death the situation Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105. of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities in the Soviet Union has improved considerably in the 92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip shows that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev Hundred Schools of Thought Contend”; and in the to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for is more correct and that opposition to this line is spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly incorrect. Comrade Molotov is an old comrade with a published a directive inviting public criticism, many praised the October 30 statement as evidence of long fighting history, but this time he made a mistake. Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportu- Moscow’s “determination to eliminate certain abnor- The struggle between the two lines within the CPSU nity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques mal features of its relations with other socialist states.” was of an antagonistic variety because the two sides of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had 95. “Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 could not accommodate each other and each side ex- anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the January 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, cluded the other. When this is the case, there need not authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 330-335. be any trouble if everything is handled well, but there is new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds.” Zimyanin’s characterization of this declaration (see the danger of trouble if things are not handled well.” Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter- next sentence) is accurate. 99. “Vstrecha Predsedatelya Mao Tsze-duna s kitaiskimi revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000 96. The reference here is to a two-part conference in studentami i praktikantami v Moskve,” Pravda (Mos- eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other Moscow on 14-19 November 1957 marking the 40th cow), 22 November 1957, 3. punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of 100. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Hundred all 13 ruling Communist parties were invited to the first Mao Tsze-duna,” 3 August 1958, in Kurdyukov, Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New session on 14-16 November, but at the outset Yugosla- Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie York: Praeger, 1960), which includes extensive docu- via declined to take any further part. As Zimyanin otnosheniya, 403-406. mentation as well a lengthy narrative and critical com- accurately observes below, China joined the other par- 101. The “questions of military cooperation” discussed mentaries. For a perceptive analysis of the fundamen- ticipants in issuing a statement that reaffirmed the at this meeting were essentially fivefold. First, China tal differences between the Hundred Flowers cam- CPSU’s preeminent role in the world Communist move- sought new weapons and broader military backing from paign in China and the post-Stalin “Thaw” in the Soviet ment. See “Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei Moscow for a possible operation against Taiwan (see Union, see S. H. Chen, “Artificial Flowers During a kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii above). Second, Khrushchev sought, once again, to Natural ‘Thaw’,” in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostoyavshegosya v Moskve persuade China to permit a long-wave military commu- and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differ- 14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 nications center to be established on Chinese territory ences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), November 1957, 1-2. Yugoslav officials refused to by 1962 for Soviet submarines operating in the Pacific. 220-254. Useful insights into Mao’s own goals for the endorse the 12-party statement, but they agreed to This idea was first broached to the Chinese by Soviet Hundred Flowers campaign can be gained from 14 participate in the second phase of the conference, which defense minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii in April secret speeches he delivered between mid-February was held immediately afterwards, on 16-19 November. 1958, and over the next few months the two sides and late April 1957, collected in MacFarquhar, Cheek, A total of 64 Communist parties from around the world haggled over the funding and operation rights. At the and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, took part in that session, which culminated in the adop- summit, Khrushchev and Mao concurred that China 113-372. tion of a so-called Peace Manifesto. would build and operate the station with Soviet funding 93. These particular complaints were expressed by a 97. “Rech’ rukovoditelya delegatsii Kitaiskoi Narodnoi and technical assistance, and a formal agreement to that high-ranking Chinese military officer, General Lung Respubliki Mao Tsze-duna na yubileinoi sessii effect was signed. (The withdrawal of Soviet personnel Yun, the vice chairman of the PRC National Defense Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), 7 No- from China in mid-1960 left the communications center Council, in the newspaper Xinhua on 18 June 1957, at vember 1957, 2. See also Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, only half-completed, but the Chinese eventually com- the very end of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 42-46. pleted it on their own.) Third, Chinese prime minister declared that it was “totally unfair that the People’s 98. This is a paraphrase of what Mao said in a speech at Zhou Enlai requested Soviet aid in the development of Republic of China had to bear all the expenses of the the 64-party conference on 18 November 1957, the only nuclear-powered submarines, a proposal that Korean War,” noting (accurately) that China had been time he is known to have offered direct support for Khrushchev quickly brushed aside, as he had in the forced to pay for all the military equipment it received Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group. Excerpts past. Fourth, Khrushchev renewed an earlier proposal from the Soviet Union. Lung contrasted Moscow’s from the speech were later published in Renmin Ribao, for a joint submarine flotilla, which effectively would position with the “more suitable” policy of the United but all references to Khrushchev and the “Molotov have been a reciprocal basing arrangement for Soviet States during World War I and World War II, when clique” were omitted. As a result, until the mid-1980s submarines at Chinese ports and Chinese submarines at Allied debts were written off. He also emphasized that Western scholars assumed that Mao had never spoken Soviet Arctic ports. Mao summarily rejected this idea, China’s debt to the Soviet Union should be reduced in out against the Anti-Party Group. Fortunately, in 1985 just as he did when it was first raised via the Soviet any case as compensation for the large amount of the full text of Mao’s 18 November 1957 speech was ambassador in China, Pavel Yudin, ten days before industry that the Soviet Union extracted from Manchu- published, along with the texts of two other other unpub- Khrushchev’s visit. Fifth, the question of nuclear ria in 1945-46. Lung’s appeals went unheeded, and the lished speeches he gave during the November 1957 weapons cooperation came up. In accordance with the Chinese government continued to pay off the bills it conference, in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang NDTA, the Soviet Union at the time was training had accumulated, equivalent to nearly $2 billion. The wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,” the same Chinese nuclear weapons scientists and was providing 185 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN information needed to build nuclear weapons. But Strategic Seapower, 15-17 and Whiting, “The Sino- assistance. (In other words, they wanted to receive unbeknownst to Chinese officials, Soviet leaders had Soviet Split,” 499-500. For an earlier study reaching Soviet weaponry and sensitive technology, but to use decided in early 1958 not to transfer a prototype nuclear the same conclusion, see Halperin and Tsou, “The 1958 these in accordance with China’s own doctrine, strat- bomb to China, despite having made a pledge to that Quemoy Crisis,” 265-303. egy, and political goals.) At Mao’s behest, Chinese effect in the October 1957 agreement. Mao raised this 104. “Vneocherednoi XXI S”ezd Kommunisticheskoi officials began speaking against the “mechanical imita- matter during the talks with Khrushchev, but got a non- partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O kontrol’nykh tsifrakh tion of foreign technology” and “excessive reliance on committal response. Information here is derived from: razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistvo SSSR na 1959-1965 assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal (1) an interview with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former gody — Doklad tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva,” Pravda countries,” and warned that “there is no possibility for Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to (Moscow), 28 January 1959, 2-10; and “Vneocherednoi us to make wholesale use of the existing experiences of Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader dur- XXI S”ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo other countries.” They emphasized that China “must ing this trip to China, in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Soyuza: Zaklyuchitel’noe slovo tovarishcha N. S. carry out advanced research itself” instead of “simply 6 October 1995; (2) Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Khrushcheva,” Pravda (Moscow), 6 February 1959, 1- hoping for outside aid.” For more on this point, see Seapower, 14-15; and (3) Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 3. These speeches and other materials from the Con- Ford, “The Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 76-78. gress were republished in XXII S”ezd Problems, 1957-60,” esp. 102-104; Lewis and Xue, 102. Khrushchev declared that “an attack against the Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Mos- China’s Strategic Seapower, 3-4, and MacFarquhar, Chinese People’s Republic, which is a great friend, ally, cow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi The Great Leap Forward, 36-40, passim. For a good and neighbor of our country, would be an attack against literatury, 1962). example of Mao’s own thoughts on the topic, see his the USSR itself. True to its duty, our country will do 105. Zimyanin’s characterization of the Chinese re- secret “Address on March 10” at the Chengdu Confer- everything necessary, in conjunction with People’s sponse to Khrushchev’s report (especially the section ence, published in Issues & Studies 10:2 (November China, to defend the security of both states.” This on “The New Stage in Communist Construction and 1973), 95-98. statement was repeated, in more or less identical phras- Certain Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory”) is ac- 108. For Soviet officials’ views of these ideological ing, in numerous high-level Soviet statements. See, curate. Beijing’s tepid initial response appeared in the disputes, see the voluminous files in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. e.g., “Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR main daily Renmin Ribao on 5 February 1959, and a 30, Dd. 247, 301, 398, and 399. N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SShA D. Eizenkhaueru much more extended commentary was published in the po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 7 Septem- theoretical journal Hongqi on 16 February. ber 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, 106. Zimyanin is referring here to the momentous Mark Kramer, a scholar at the Russian Re- eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 411. According Second Session of the CPC’s 8th Congress, which to Khrushchev’s memoirs, as soon as this statement was adopted a “General Line” of drastically accelerated search Center at Harvard University, con- issued, Mao expressed doubt that the Soviet Union had economic development and ideological fervor. The tributes frequently to the Bulletin. any intention of fulfilling it; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, hallmarks of the new line, as it evolved over the next Part F (“Mao Tsze-dun”), pp. 4-5. This assertion is few months, were: (1) the Great Leap Forward, a crash problematic, but there is not yet (and perhaps cannot be) program of industrialization relying primarily on China’s any direct evidence to contravene it. own resources; (2) the establishment of huge “people’s 103. The clearest statement to this effect came in a letter communes” (the “basic social units of a Communist Khrushchev sent to President Eisenhower during the society”), which were intended to replace collective Quemoy crisis, warning that “those who are concocting farms and to combine agriculture with industry (includ- plans for an atomic attack against the PRC should not ing “backyard” steel furnaces) all around the country; forget that it is not only the USA, but the other side as (3) the elimination of virtually all remaining forms of well that possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and private property; (4) the further leveling of social classes the means of delivering them, and that if such an attack and systematic deprecation of expertise; (5) the aban- is carried out against the PRC, the aggressor will be donment of earlier birth control efforts; and (6) the dealt a swift and automatic rebuff in kind.” See “Poslanie conversion of the army into a full-fledged people’s Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. militia (via the communes) and the establishment of an Khrushcheva Prezidentu SShA D. Eizenkhaueru o “Everyone a Soldier” campaign requiring Chinese mili- polozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 19 September 1958, in tary officers to spend at least one month a year perform- Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko- ing the duties of a common soldier. Chinese leaders’ kitaiskie otnosheniya, 417. At the time, the Chinese hopes of achieving immediate, rapid growth via the authorities warmly praised Khrushchev’s statement, Great Leap Forward were evident from the goals they describing it as “a lofty expression of our fraternal set for steel output (to cite a typical case). In 1957 steel relations.” See “Sotsialisticheskii lager v sovremennoi production in China had been 5.9 million tons, whereas mezhdunarodnoi obstanovke,” Pravda (Moscow), 10 the target for 1958 was nearly twice that, at 10.7 million November 1958, 3. Mao himself said he was “deeply tons, and the targets for subsequent years were even touched by [the Soviet Union’s] boundless devotion to more ambitious. Not surprisingly, these goals proved the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international- unattainable, and the whole effort turned out to be a ism” and wanted to “convey heartfelt gratitude” to debilitating failure. The communes (which became Khrushchev for his support during the Taiwan Straits smaller but more numerous after 1958) produced equally crisis. Several years later, however, Chinese leaders disastrous results, causing widespread food shortages shifted their view (in accordance with the polemics of and starvation in the early 1960s. The Chinese armed the time) and expressed contempt for Khrushchev’s forces also suffered immense damage from both the pledge, arguing that “Soviet leaders declared their demoralization of the officer corps and the disarray support for China only when they were certain there within the military-industrial complex. Of the many was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out Western analyses of Chinese politics and society during and there was no longer any need for the Soviet Union this period, see in particular MacFarquhar, The Great to support China with its nuclear weapons.” See “State- Leap Forward. ment by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A 107. This was indeed the thrust of China’s campaign Comment on the Soviet Government’s Statement of 21 against “blind faith in foreigners” (quoted by Zimyanin August,” 1 September 1963, in Peking Review 6:36 (6 in the previous sentence), as formulated in the spring September 1963), 9. New evidence suggests that these and summer of 1958. Although Chinese officials and accusations were unfounded, and that Khrushchev’s military commanders at this point were still hoping for pledge was far more meaningful than the Chinese an increase in Soviet military-technical aid, they wanted authorities later claimed; see Lewis and Xue, China’s to limit the political and doctrinal effects of Soviet COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 186 New Evidence on The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71

EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTS have become available.4 divided China, the Chinese leadership used ON THE BORDER CONFLICT, 1969 Border disputes between Russia and the conflict over the border to draw attention China had a long historical tradition.5 Com- to Czarist imperial legacies in Soviet foreign by Christian F. Ostermann1 peting territorial claims and differences over policy and serve as proof for what was later borderlines reached back to the seventeenth labeled Soviet “social imperialism.” More- The Sino-Soviet border crisis of March- century. In 1860, the conclusion of the over, Beijing hoped that the incidents would September 1969 is one of the most intrigu- Treaty of Beijing provided for a temporary serve notice to the USSR that the PRC would ing crises of the Cold War. For several settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, Chi- no longer put up with Soviet subversion in months, the Soviet Union and the People’s nese and Russian cultures and territorial am- the volatile border regions. Chinese border Republic of China (PRC) stood on the brink bitions continued to clash in the border areas. violations had occurred in Xinjiang in 1959, of war which—on the Soviet side—in- Following the Communists’ victory in the and continued in the early 1960s.8 volved the threat of nuclear strikes. It re- Chinese Civil War in 1949, and Mao Zedong’s Moscow had initially refused to accept sulted in a sharp increase in Soviet military option for an alliance with Moscow (1950), the Chinese notion of “unequal treaties” and strength in Central Asia and a fierce Soviet- the Chinese Communists apparently accepted enter into negotiations which Beijing had Chinese arms race. Like the Cuban Missile the territorial status quo along the 4,150 demanded possibly as early as 1957 and Crisis, the 1969 border conflict also rein- mile-long border with Russia.6 Largely de- again in 1960. Negotiations, Moscow must forced the trend toward a fundamental re- pendent on the Soviet protection and sup- have felt, would call into question the legiti- alignment in the Cold War international port, the Chinese signed the 1951 Border macy of the border arrangement and open a system: polycentrism within world commu- Rivers Navigation Agreement which implied Pandora’s box of questions. As Soviet- nism, Sino-Soviet tensions, U.S.-Chinese their consent to the existing border regime. Chinese polemics and Chinese border intru- rapprochement and “triangular diplomacy”.2 This included acceptance of armed Soviet sions mounted in the wake of the Cuban Unlike in the case of Cuban Missile Crisis of control of the Amur and Ussuri border rivers Missile Crisis, and as Beijing demonstrated 1962, however, the documentary evidence and of more than 600 of the 700 islands its readiness to employ its growing military on the crisis is extremely sparse. Both located in these strategically important wa- power in several military campaigns against Moscow and Beijing have published their terways in the extreme northeastern border India in 1962, Moscow finally agreed to mutual recriminations, but beyond official region. The agreement also required the Chi- consultations on the border. Following a notes and journalistic accounts, few sources nese to obtain Soviet permission before us- letter by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev have become available on either side, nor, ing the rivers and the islands. Similar proce- to CCP Chairman Mao Zedong in Novem- for that matter, in the United States.3 dures had been established for the use of ber 1963, secret negotiations began in Feb- Numerous questions remain unan- Soviet-claimed pastures by Chinese herds- ruary 1964 but soon stalemated over Chi- swered: What was the motivation on both men in the northwestern Xinjiang border nese claims to large territories in Siberia and sides behind the 1969 border incidents? province. Disagreements over the border demands for recognition of the “unequal” How likely was the outbreak of a major never ceased to exist but local authorities nature of the historical border arrangement. war? How serious was the Soviet nuclear kept them at a low level.7 Disagreement also existed regarding the threat? Were there divisions within the With the emerging Sino-Soviet split in exact borderline. While Moscow was ready Chinese leadership over the Zhen Bao/ the late 1950s and the open collision of to concede that the thalway—a line follow- Damansky Island Incident? What was the Soviet and Chinese leaders at the Interna- ing the deepest point of a valley or river— debate in Moscow? How much did the tional Conference of Communist Parties in constituted the borderline in the northeast- United States know about the conflict? What Bucharest in 1960, the dormant border issue ern border rivers, the Soviets were unwilling was the U.S. role in the dispute? How was resurfaced again. It now seems evident that to relinquish control over most of the 700 the crisis resolved? Even with the opening the border issue was a symptom rather than a islands in the frontier rivers. When Mao of the former Soviet archives, little new cause of heightening tensions between both publicized the controversy and accused the evidence on the crisis has emerged. The countries. Both sides, however, found the Soviets of “imperialism,” Khrushchev de- following three documents, obtained by the issue extremely useful as an instrument in cided to suspend the talks (October 1964).9 author in the “Stiftung Archiv der Parteien their ideological and power-political rivalry. The onset of the Great Proletarian Cul- und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen For the Chinese, the border incidents were a tural Revolution led to a further decline in DDR im Bundesarchiv” (SAPMO), the ar- way to underline their ideological challenge Sino-Soviet relations. Following an abor- chives which house the records of the former by quasi-military means and to put the Sovi- tive meeting with Soviet premier Aleksei East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in ets on the defensive. Claiming that the bor- Kosygin in February 1965, Mao broke party Berlin, are among the first authentic, previ- derline had been “dictated” by the Russian relations with the CPSU in 1966 and re- ously secret documents on the crisis that Empire in “unequal treaties” with a weak and duced communications with Moscow to low- 187 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN level contacts. Concurrently, the situation against China. Soviet border patrol unit on the Zhen Bao/ on the borders worsened. In the spring, Despite heightened Chinese aggressive- Damansky Island in the Ussuri, killing the Beijing unilaterally announced stricter navi- ness and Soviet nuclear sabre-rattling, the Soviet officer and 30 soldiers. Document gation regulations governing “foreign” (thus border conflict did not immediately or inevi- No. 1 (printed below), an informational note Soviet) vessels on the border rivers. Later tably develop into shooting engagements. given to the East German leadership and that year small-scale skirmishes occurred Chinese fishermen and soldiers continued to circulated in the SED Politburo, provides along the Sino-Soviet and Chinese-Mongo- enter border islands on the Ussuri and Amur the first internal Soviet account of this cru- lian borders. Ever more aggressively, the which they claimed as their own, thus en- cial incident. Chinese asserted their claims to the islands croaching on territory controlled by Soviets The document accords with the publi- within their half of the border rivers along border guards. In each case, the Soviets cized Soviet version of the incident, consid- the Chinese Northeast. Groups of Chinese dispatched border guard units which ex- ered by scholars as closer to the truth than the soldiers and fishermen were now sent on the pelled the Chinese from the islands. Fight- opposing Chinese account which claimed border islands instructed to fight if their ing was usually avoided. Over the years, that the Soviets started the gunfire and thus normal patrol routes were blocked by Soviet Soviets and Chinese came to adopt a pattern broke the most significant tacit principle of guards. Later, Beijing claimed that a total of of almost ritualistic practices and unwritten confrontation.16 According to the docu- 4,189 border incidents had occurred between rules to resolve border violations in a non- ment, Soviet observations posts noted the 1964 and 1969 alone.10 shooting fashion. Even after Mao turned presence of thirty armed Chinese soldiers on The new Soviet leadership under Le- toward a more aggressive policy of “forceful the island around 9 a.m. on March 2, causing onid I. Brezhnev (which overthrew forward patrolling” (which implied fighting the Soviets to send a unit of border guards to Khrushchev in October 1964) had responded if necessary) during the Cultural Revolu- the island to expel the Chinese intruders. to Beijing’s confrontational posture by in- tion, shooting engagements were avoided When, according to the long-established creased economic and military pressure. by both sides. Neither Beijing nor Moscow practice, the Soviet post commander and a Early on in the confrontation, the Soviets was apparently interested in starting major small advance contingent of border guards had withdrawn vital economic support and fighting.14 confronted the Chinese and protested the advisers from the PRC. Moscow had also The Sino-Soviet “cold war” on the bor- border violation, demanding that the Chi- initiated a major long-term build-up of its der turned hot in the aftermath of the Soviet nese leave the island, the Chinese opened military power in the Soviet Far East. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968) fire. In the ensuing fight, the Soviet com- conventional force levels rose dramatically and the Soviet enunciation of the “Brezhnev mander and thirty Soviet soldiers were killed. after 1965, from approximately 17 divisions doctrine.” It is likely that the Chinese lead- Artillery fire was also opened on the unit to 27 divisions by 1969 (and about 48 divi- ership perceived the Soviet claim to inter- from larger and well-equipped Chinese forces sions in the mid-1970s).11 Moscow also vene in any socialist state where socialism hidden on the island and from the Chinese decided to deploy SS-4 MRBMs as well as was considered “in danger”—and the poten- shore. Only after Soviet reinforcements short-range rockets (SCUD and FROG). tial application of the Brezhnev doctrine to arrived were the Chinese expelled from the Other initiatives aimed at strengthening bor- Asia—as a threat and challenge to Chinese island. der controls along the frontier with the PRC. security interests. PRC Defense Minister Despite the assertion that the incident Increasing the geostrategic pressure on Lin Biao, Mao’s heir apparent, allegedly was the “logical consequence” of previous Beijing, Moscow also concluded a twenty- warned the CCP Politburo and the Military border provocations, the memorandum to year treaty of friendship with Mongolia. Affairs Commission that China would be the East German leadership, communicated The treaty provided for joint Soviet-Mongo- attacked by the the Soviet Union. In October a few days after the event took place, reflects lian defense efforts and led to the stationing 1968, he issued Directive No. 1 which put Soviet anxiety over the new level of prepa- of two to three Soviet divisions in the Mon- the People’s Republic on war footing. Oth- ration, violence and weaponry exhibited by golian People’s Republic.12 ers within the Politburo—including Premier the Chinese in carrying out the ambush. The Most importantly, Moscow did not shy Zhou Enlai and probably Mao Zedong— document reveals that the Soviet were noth- away from thinly veiled nuclear threats. As apparently doubted Moscow’s readiness for ing less than stunned over the fact that the early as September 1964, Khrushchev had war with China.15 These differences not- Chinese had departed from the long-estab- announced that the Soviet Union would use withstanding, the Chinese leadership opted lished practice of resolving border viola- all necessary measures including “up-to- for a more forceful attitude towards Russia. tions short of firefights. Was this a prelude date weapons of annihilation” to defend its Chinese border guards were now instructed to a full-fledged war? To some extent, the borders.13 Repeatedly throughout the bor- to carry uniforms and weapons and to con- document thus corroborates evidence by der crisis, Moscow secretly and publicly front the Soviets and shoot if necessary. high-level Soviet defector Arkady N. aired the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear Incidents of growing violence (though still Shevchenko who has argued that “the events strike against Chinese nuclear installations. non-shooting) occurred in late 1968 and in on Damansky had the effect of an electric Faced with the PRC’s growing military ca- January and February of 1969. But it was shock in Moscow. The Politburo was terri- pabilities and Mao’s apparent “mad” “op- not until 2 March 1969 that the transition fied that the Chinese might make a large- portunism”, Moscow increased its nuclear from non-shooting confrontations to fire- scale intrusion into Soviet territory. ... A strength in Asia and, by 1969, had installed fighting was made. On this day, Chinese nightmare vision of invasion by millions of an anti-ballistic missile system directed soldiers ambushed and opened fire on a Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost fran- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 188 tic. Despite our overwhelming superiority East German Embassy in Beijing in early between June and August alone. Consider- in weaponry, it would not be easy for the April 1969, documents one of the early ing the concurrent hints of potential nuclear USSR to cope with an assault of such mag- Soviet peace feelers. The telegram reports attack, the summer of 1969 can be seen, as nitude.”17 information provided by the Soviet chargé the Thomas Robinson has put it, “as a text- Soviet concerns that the border conflict d’affairs in Beijing according to which book case of the use by Moscow of com- would spin out of control were central to the Kosygin, acting on behalf of the CPSU polit- bined political, military, and propaganda Soviet response to the Chinese challenge. buro, tried to contact Mao on March 21 means to force Peking to take an action— Yet so was the specter of an even more through the existing hotline between Mos- renew the talks—it otherwise resisted....”23 radical shift in Chinese foreign policy evi- cow and Beijing. The Chinese, however, Soviet strategy in the border conflict dent in the offensive posture displayed in refused to put Kosygin through. Reflecting proved successful with regard to the re- the ambush and atrocities. For Moscow, the Moscow’s concern over the crisis, Kosygin sumption of border talks. In May, the Chi- March 2 incident also carried geostrategic reportedly indicated that, “if necessary,” he nese Government signaled its readiness for meaning: it revealed “Beijing’s intention to would agree to meet even with Zhou Enlai. talks through an official government note. activate its opportunistic political flirtation When the Soviet Embassy communicated Contrary to their refusal in previous year, the with the imperialist countries—above all the Soviet desire for talks to the Chinese Chinese, in June, agreed to hold a meeting of with the United States and West Germany.” Foreign Ministry the following day, the So- the Commission on Border Rivers Naviga- The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership viets were informed that a direct line be- tion which had been created by the 1951 adopted a carrot-and-stick approach in re- tween the CPSU Politburo and the CCP was Agreement. After an abortive Chinese walk- sponse to the crisis: First, Moscow sought to no longer “advantageous.” Mao’s intransi- out, negotiations resulted in the signing of a isolate Beijing further and increase military gence may well have stemmed from the new protocol in August. More significantly, pressure on the PRC. The March 2 clash had realization that Moscow had only limited the Chinese finally agreed to a high-level initially provoked a heated debate within military leverage. Moreover, by publicly meeting: on 11 September 1969, a meeting the Soviet leadership. Soviet Defense Min- degrading Moscow, Mao probably sought to between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai took place ister Andrei Grechko reportedly advocated strengthen his position at the Chinese Com- in Beijing which laid the foundations for the a “nuclear blockbuster” against China’s in- munist Party conference in April 1969.21 eventual resolution of the border crisis.24 dustrial centers, while others called for sur- Soviet overtures for border discussions Document No. 3, an informational gical strikes against Chinese nuclear facili- continued, however. On March 29, Moscow memorandum handed by the Soviets to the ties.18 Brezhnev eventually decided to opt publicly called for negotiations on the border East German leadership, is a record of the for a more vigorous build-up of Soviet con- issue. Two weeks later, on April 11, a Soviet meeting which took place between Kosygin ventional forces in the East (including relo- Foreign Ministry note to the PRC again pro- and Zhou Enlai. Few details of this crucial cation of Soviet bomber fleets from the posed the immediate resumption of the bor- meeting have become known. According to West), not necessarily precluding, however, der talks, to no avail. Major Chinese intru- the memorandum, the meeting was the re- the use of tactical nuclear weapons.19 Dem- sions occurred, according to these informa- sult of “one more initiative” on the part of the onstrating their determination to retaliate tional notes given by theSoviets to the East CPSU Central Committee to effect a peace- with superior force, the Soviets, after a 12- Germans, throughout May, climaxing in in- ful resolution of the crisis. The Chinese day stand-off, attacked Chinese positions cursions on May 2, 9, 13, and 14 in the responded “pretty quickly” to the Soviet on the island with heavy artillery and over- western border regions as well as along the proposal to take advantage of Kosygin’s whelming force, foregoing, however, the controversial border rivers in the east. presence in Hanoi on the occasion of Ho Chi use of air or nuclear strikes.20 Facing Chinese intransigence, Moscow Minh’s funeral. The Soviet delegation un- To some extent, the Kremlin’s forceful continued its “coercive diplomacy” through- der Kosygin, however, learned of Chinese but limited military response was influ- out the summer of 1969, launching a further readiness to talk only one hour after its enced by heightened concern over the mili- military build-up to ensure complete superi- departure from Hanoi. Indicative of tarization of the crisis among Moscow’s ority in strategic and conventional weapons. Moscow’s strong interest in de-escalation, European and Asian allies. Moscow, how- Indeed there is every reason to believe that Kosygin, who had already reached Soviet ever, had no interest in escalating the crisis following the March 2 engagement, the So- Central Asia, turned around and flew to beyond control for other reasons as well. viets were largely responsible for incidents Beijing, there he was met by Chinese leaders Added pressure on the PRC would not in- along the Sino-Soviet border, the most im- Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi.25 duce Mao to forego his “political flirtation” portant of which occurred on August 13 The four-hour talk apparently centered with the West—in fact, it might reinforce along the Central Asian border in Xinjiang, on the border issue. According to the Soviet such a move, which would run counter to six miles east of Zhalanashkol.22 Taking account, Zhou Enlai declared that “China Soviet geostrategic interests. Thus, advantage of their superiority in armor and has no territorial pretensions toward the Brezhnev also sought to defuse the crisis by weaponry, the Soviets sought to demonstrate Soviet Union” and—despite his assertions resuming negotiations with the Chinese. to the Chinese their determination through about the unequal nature of the treaties— Within a week of the March 15 incident, repeated border infringements. Apparently “recognizes that border which exists in ac- Moscow sought to re-establish contact with more anxious about Soviet policy, the Chi- cord with these treaties.” While Zhou stated Beijing. nese, by September, were charging the Rus- that China had no intentions of attacking the Document No. 2, a telegram from the sians with 488 “deliberate” border violations Soviet Union, Kosygin denied assertions of 189 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

“contrived imperialist propaganda” that Chinese soldiers violated the border at the liquor bottles (which had obviously been Moscow was “preparing a preventive strike” Damansky Island several times, operating used by the Chinese provocateurs and the against the PRC. Preparatory to further from Hunzy. After protests by the Soviet participants in this adventure beforehand to negotiations on border issues in Beijing, border guards, the Chinese military returned gain courage) were found. both sides were reported to have agreed to to their border posts or marched along the There are no settlements on the Island three principles: (1) the observance of the line which constitutes the border between of Damansky and it is of no economic im- existing border; (2) the inadmissibility of China and the USSR. portance at all; there are no villages in the armed confrontations; and (3) military dis- In the events of March 2, 1969, the vicinity for dozens of miles. One can obvi- engagement from disputed border areas. border control forces at Hunzy played only ously draw the conclusion that it [the island] Kosygin also proposed the expansion of a secondary role. An especially trained unit was chosen as the site for the provocation trade relations and economic cooperation as of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army because such an endeavor could be prepared well as the normalizing of railroad and avia- with a force of more than 200 men was used there secretly and then presented to the world tion connections. Significantly, the Soviet for the staging of this provocation. Secretly, in a version advantageous to the organizers. premier also acquiesced when Zhou declared this unit was brought on the Island Damanskiy During the provocation, the Chinese that Beijing would not curtail its political during the night of March 2. The men in this military committed incredibly brutal and and ideological criticism of the Soviet Union. unit had special gear and wore camouflage cruel acts against the wounded Soviet border Letting the Chinese save face, Kosygin con- clothes. A telephone line to the unit was guards. Based on the on-site inspection and ceded that, while Sino-Soviet disagreements installed from the Chinese shore. Prior to the expert knowledge of the medical com- “played into the hands of world imperial- this, reserves and munitions, among others mission which examined the bodies of the ism,” Moscow considered polemics on con- PAC batteries, mines and armored artillery dead Soviet border guards, it can be stated troversial issues as “permissible” if con- and heavy fire guns, had been pulled to- that the wounded were shot by the Chinese ducted in a “fitting tone.” gether near the Chinese shore. The stabiliz- from close range [and/or] stabbed with bayo- Moscow was successful in forcing the ers, shelling, mines and grenade splinters, nets and knifes. The faces of some of the Chinese to accept the status quo along the and the kind of crates left in the tanks that casualties were distorted beyond recogni- Sino-Soviet border. But this victory came at were hit, found later provided the proof that tion, others had their uniforms and boots a price in ideological and geostrategic terms. these weapons had indeed been used. taken off by the Chinese. The cruelties Not only did the Soviets concede the validity Around 2 o’clock Moscow time (9 committed by the Chinese toward the Soviet of a direct challenge to its leadership within o’clock local time), our observation posts border guards can only be compared with the the Communist bloc in ideological terms, a noted the advance of 30 armed Chinese worst brutalities of the Chinese militarists development long evident but rarely formu- military men on the Island of Damansky. and Chiang Kai-shek’s [Jiang Jieshi’s] men lated as explicitly as in the Beijing meeting. Consequently, a group of Soviet border during the ’20s and ’30s. In the long run, Moscow’s coercive diplo- guards was dispatched to the location where The crime by the Mao Zedong group macy worsened relations with the United the Chinese had violated the border. The which caused loss of lives has far-reaching States and helped drive China into a rap- officer in charge of the unit and a small objectives. prochement with the West, thus altering the contingent approached the border violators The Maoists exacerbate the anti-Soviet balance of power in Asia to Soviet disadvan- with the intention of registering protests and hysteria and produce a chauvinist frenzy in tage.26 demanding (without using force) that they the country, creating an atmosphere which leave Soviet territory, as had been done enables them to establish Mao Zedong’s * * * * * repeatedly in the past. But within the first anti-Soviet and chauvinist-great power minutes of the exchange, our border guards course as the general line of Chinese policy Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR came under crossfire and were insidiously at the IX Party Convention of the CPC. Leadership on 2 March 1969 shot without any warning. At the same time, It is also obvious that the Mao group has Sino-Soviet Border Clashes fire on the remaining parts of our force was the intention of using the anti-Soviet psy- opened from an ambush on the island and chosis it created for its subversive and divi- 5 Copies from the Chinese shore. The guards then sive policy in the international Communist 3/8/69 assumed combat order, and, reinforced by movement. The Maoists apparently strive to the approaching reserve from the nearby make an all-out effort to complicate and On March 2, 1969, at 11 o’clock local border post, threw back the Chinese surprise prevent the convention of the International time, the Chinese organized a provocation attack, and expelled them through decisive Consultation of Communist and Workers’ on the Island Damansky which is located on action from Soviet territory. Parties in order to create distrust in the the river Ussuri south of Khabarovsk, be- There were casualties and wounded men Soviet Union and the CCPU among the tween the points Bikin and Iman (Primorsky on both sides. fraternal parties. Region). When the location on the island where The new dangerous provocations of the The ascertained facts are that this action the incident had happened was inspected, Maoists reveal Beijing’s intention to acti- had been prepared by the Chinese govern- military equipment, telephones, and phone vate the opportunistic political flirtation with ment for a long time. In December 1968 and lines connecting to the Chinese mainland, as the imperialist countries - above all with the in January/February 1969, groups of armed well as large numbers of scattered empty United States and West Germany. It is no COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 190 accident that the ambush on the Soviet bor- nese border and raised territorial claims campaign assumed a military coloration, der unit was staged by the Chinese agencies against the Soviet Union about an area of that an atmosphere of chauvinistic frenzy at a time when Bonn started its provocation altogether 1,575,000 square kilometer. On has been created throughout the country. of holding the election of the Federal Presi- July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong declared in a Faced with this situation the CC of the dent in West Berlin. conversation with Japanese members of par- CPSU and the Soviet government are under- The provocation in the area of the Is- liament with regard to the Chinese territorial taking the necessary steps to prevent further land of Damansky is part of the Maoists’ demands against the Soviet Union that “we border violations. They will do everything policy which aims at forcing a radical rever- have not yet presented the bill for this terri- necessary in order to frustrate the criminal sal in the foreign and domestic policies of tory.” intentions of the Mao Zedong group which the PR [People’s Republic] of China and at On August 22, 1964, the consultations are to create hostility between the Soviet transforming the country de facto into a were interrupted. Despite our repeated pro- people and the Chinese people. power hostile toward the socialist countries. posals the Chinese did not resume the con- The Soviet Government is led in its The Mao Zedong group has prepared versations and did not react even when the relations with the Chinese people by feel- the organization of armed provocations along question was mentioned in the Soviet foreign ings of friendship and is intent on pursuing the Soviet-Chinese border for a long time. ministry note of August 31, 1967. this policy in the future. Ill-considered pro- The Chinese authorities have been creating Meanwhile the Chinese authorities con- vocative actions of the Chinese authorities artificial tensions at the Soviet-Chinese bor- tinued to violate grossly the Soviet-Chinese will, however, be decisively repudiated on der since 1960. Since this time the Chinese agreement of 1951 on the regulation of the our part and brought to an end with determi- have undertaken several thousand border navigation in the border rivers. In 1967 and nation. violations with provocative goals. 1968 they blew up the consultations of the At the beginning of 1967, the number mixed Soviet-Chinese navigation commis- [Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; of border violations by Chinese authorities sion which had been established on the basis translation from German by Christian F. increased sharply. In some districts they of the agreement of 1951. Ostermann.] tried to install demonstratively border pa- In the Chinese border areas large mili- trols on the islands and those parts of the tary preparations set in (construction of air- * * * * * rivers belonging to the USSR. In December ports, access routes, barracks and depots, 1967 and in January 1968, the Chinese training of militia, etc.). Document No. 2: Telegram to East undertook large provocative actions on the The Chinese authorities consciously German Foreign Ministry from GDR island of Kirkinsi on the Ussuri [River] and conjure up situations of conflict along the Ambassador to PRC, 2 April 1969 in the area of the Kasakevich Canal. On border and stage provocations there. On our January 23, 1969, the Chinese staged an part, all measures have been taken to avoid Council of Ministers of the armed attack on the Island of Damansky. an escalation of the situation and to prevent German Democratic Republic The border in the area of the Island of incidents and conflicts. The Soviet border The Minister for Foreign Affairs Damansky was established according to the troops have been instructed not to use their Treaty of Beijing of 1860 and the enclosed arms and, if possible, to avoid armed colli- Berlin, April 2, 1969 map which the representatives of Russia sions. The instruction on the non-use of arms and China signed in June 1863. According was strictly enforced, although the Chinese Comrade Walter Ulbricht to the then drawn-up demarcation line the acted extremely provocatively in many cases, Willi Stoph Island of Damansky is located on the terri- employed the most deceitful tricks, picked Erich Honecker tory of the USSR. This line has always been fights, and attacked our border guards with Hermann Axen protected by Soviet border guards. stabbing weapons, with steel rod and other Confronted with the Chinese provoca- such things. Berlin tions at the border, the Soviet side, for years, The armed provocation in the area of the has taken active steps towards a regulation Island of Damansky is a logical consequence Dear Comrades! of the situation. of this course of the Chinese authorities and The question of the borderline was dis- is part of a far-reaching plan by Beijing The following is the text of a telegram cussed in the bilateral Soviet-Chinese Con- aiming at increasing the Maoists’ anti-Soviet from Comrade Hertzfeld, Peking, for your sultations on the Determination of the Bor- campaign. information: derline in Certain Controversial Areas of Since March 3, 1969, the Soviet Em- 1964. The Soviet side made a number bassy in Beijing has been exposed again to an “Soviet Chargé stated that there is talk proposals regarding the examination of the organized siege by specially trained groups in Hanoi that Ho Chi Minh wants to go to controversial border question. The Chinese of Maoists. Brutal acts of force and rowdylike Beijing soon to negotiate at the highest level leadership, however, was determined to let excesses against the representatives of So- with the Chinese side since the Vietnamese these consultations fail. The Chinese del- viet institutions are occurring throughout side is very concerned about the aggravation egation put up the completely untenable China every day. All over the country, an of Chinese-Soviet relations. demand to recognize the unequal character unbridled anti-Soviet campaign has been The Ambassador of the Hungarian of the treaties delineating the Soviet-Chi- kindled. It is characteristic that this whole People’s Republic reported that the PR China 191 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Viet- advantageous. nam] [earlier] this year signed an agreement If the Soviet government had to com- on Chinese aid for Vietnam in the sum of 800 municate anything to the PR China, it is The CC CPSU considers it necessary to million Yen. [...] asked to do so via diplomatic channels. inform You about A.N. Kosygin’s conver- The Chargé was called on the evening Allegedly conference in Hongkong on sation with Premier of the State Council of of March 21 by Kosygin on direct line from questions of China policy organized by the the PRC Zhou Enlai which took place on Moscow. Com. Kosygin informed him that US State Department. Dutch Chargé and September 11 of this year in Beijing. he had attempted to contact Mao Zedong Finnish Ambassador here are to attend.” As is well known, relations between the through the existing direct telephone line. USSR and China, and the leadership of the He was not put through by the Chinese side. With Socialist Greetings PRC is to blame for this, are extremely If need be the conversation could also be Oskar Fischer aggravated. The Chinese authorities are held with Zhou Enlai. (Com. Kosygin was exacerbating tension on the border with the acting at the request of the politburo of the [Source: SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; Soviet Union. In the PRC, appeals to pre- CPSU.) translation from German by Christian F. pare for war against the USSR are openly After various attempts by the Soviet Ostermann.] made. Trade relations have been reduced to Embassy to contact the Foreign Ministry in a minimum, scientific-technological and this matter, a conversation between Kosygin * * * * * cultural exchanges have ceased, contacts and Mao Zedong was refused [by the Chi- along diplomatic lines are limited. For more nese] under rude abuse of the CPSU. Desire Document No. 3: Soviet Report on 11 than three years ambassadors have been for talks with Zhou was to be communicated September 1969 Kosygin-Zhou Meeting absent from Moscow and Beijing. The anti- [to the Chinese]. Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership is Secret being used by the imperialist powers in the 3/22 Aide-mémoire by the deputy head of Only Copy struggle against world socialism and the department in the foreign ministry; it stated Information Communist movement. that, because of the currently existing rela- About A.N. Kosygin’s Conversation With In the report of CC CPSU General Sec- tions between the Soviet Union and the PR Zhou Enlai on retary L.I. Brezhnev to the Moscow meeting China, a direct telephone line was no longer 11 September 1969

The Cold War in Asia: 2) Russo-Chinese, Russo-Japanese, cial Archive and Russian State Archive of Khabarovsk Conference Highlights Russo-Korean and Russo-American diplo- the Far East in Vladivostok. These sites hold Role of Russian Far East matic, economic and cultural relations in materials on such Cold War related topics as Northeast Asia; border disputes and clashes, mobilizations, by David L. Wolff 3) the special role of the military as a the draft, voluntary organizations to aid the social and economic force in the borderland; Army, civil defense, military education, the On 26-29 August 1995 an international, 4) the great importance of migration in military-industrial complex and cross-bor- interdisciplinary conference focusing on the this region, whether as colonization, intra- der contacts (trade, tourism, intergovern- borderland nature of the Russian Far East regional mobility or expulsion, and mental negotiations, etc.). Two interesting took place in Khabarovsk, Russia. Brought 5) diaspora communities of the Russian documents from the Khabarovsk archive together by funds from the Center for Global Far East: Chinese, Germans, Japanese, Jews, concerning Sino-Soviet border-tensions ap- Partnership (Abe kikin), the Cold War Inter- Koreans and Russians; pear in translation by Elizabeth Wishnick in national History Project (CWIHP), and the The working language of the confer- this issue of the Bulletin. Russian partici- International Research and Exchanges Board ence was Russian, although several talks pants have also made declassification re- (IREX), 40 scholars made 38 presentations were delivered in English with interpreta- quests in the course of preparing conference about their papers and responded to ques- tion into Russian. There were a surprising papers. tions from the other participants. number of people at the table (actually a big Significantly, a large group of the A number of papers focused directly on square of tables) fluent in three or more region’s archivally active scholars, Ameri- Cold War issues, as can be seen in the full languages and I think everyone met and cans, Chinese, Japanese and Russians be- schedule printed below. There was an ap- talked with just about everyone else. came aware of the Cold War International proximately equal number of papers cover- Representatives from local archives pre- History Project’s past accomplishments, ing events prior to the Cold War and those sented papers on specific areas of strength present activities and future plans. Several more contemporary. General themes touched and exhibited lists of holdings, covering are now undertaking research on the Cold on in discussions included: such themes as Russo-Chinese relations, War and plan to attend the January 1996 1) the special nature of the Russian Far Chinese and Koreans in the Russian Far CWIHP conference at the University of Hong East as a borderland, historically much more East, Russians in China and Birobidzhan. Kong on the Cold War in Asia to present in contact with neighbors than most of Rus- Additionally, aside from myself, six other findings. sia; scholars worked in the Khabarovsk Provin- continued on page 206 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 192 of Communist and Workers’ Parties the nese relations. In this regard, Zhou Enlai’s and the PRC. An initiative was revealed by course of our policy in relation to China was various attempts to introduce into the con- us regarding an expansion of trade, the ful- clearly set forth. The CPSU and the Soviet versation polemics on issues of ideological fillment of contracts which had been con- government, proceeding from its unchang- disagreements were decisively deflected. The cluded, the signing of trade protocols for the ing policy oriented towards an improve- Soviet side firmly declared the immutability current and next year, the working out of ment in relations between the USSR and the of our principled positions and political course measures on trade and economic coopera- PRC, has repeatedly appealed to the Chi- in the area of domestic and foreign policy. tion during the present five-year plan. Zhou nese leadership with concrete proposals A consideration of the situation on the Enlai promised to present these proposals to about ways to normalize relations. The Soviet-Chinese border occupied the central the Politburo of the CC CPC, and expressed pronouncements of the government of the place in the conversation. The sides recog- his agreement to exchange supplemental USSR of March 29 and June 13 of this year nized the abnormality of the existing situa- lists of products for 1969. are very well known. The message of the tion and exchanged opinions regarding the We proposed to the Chinese side to Council of Ministers of the USSR to the search for paths to the settlement of the normalize railroad and aviation connections State Council of the PRC sent in July of this border issues. Zhou Enlai declared that between the two countries, and to reestab- year, in which concrete proposals regarding “China has no territorial pretensions toward lish the high-frequency link which had been the improvement of contacts between the the Soviet Union.” At the same time he interrupted by the Chinese authorities in Soviet Union and China along government repeated his previous assertions about the March of this year. lines were put forth, including the organiza- unfair nature of the agreements which define From the Soviet side there also was tion of a bilateral summit meeting, also the border, although he said that the Chinese raised the issue of mutually sending Ambas- served the aims of putting to rights Soviet- side does not demand that they be annulled sadors and the creation of conditions for the Chinese inter-governmental relations. and “recognizes the border which exists in normal activity of diplomatic representa- Undertaking these actions, the CC accord with these treaties.” From the Soviet tives. CPSU and the Soviet government proceeded side a proposal was introduced to move to- Zhou Enlai stated that these proposals from and proceeds from a principled course ward the practical preparation for negotia- will be submitted to Mao Zedong. in Soviet-Chinese relations. According to tions on border issues. Vis-a-vis these goals, During the consideration of issues of our deep conviction, a softening of tensions we proposed to organize over the next week Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations in relations between the USSR and the PRC or two a meeting between delegations headed Zhou Enlai stressed that the leadership of the would correspond to the interests of our two by the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of CPC does not intend to curtail its political countries, and also of the whole Socialist the two countries. In this regard it was noted and ideological speeches against the CPSU commonwealth overall, would facilitate the by us that the place where these negotiations and the other fraternal parties. He justified activation of the struggle against imperial- will be held has no particular significance for the current forms of “polemics” which are ism, would be an essential support to heroic us. Zhou Enlai responded to our proposal being used by the Beijing leaders as having Vietnam and to the peoples of other coun- about negotiations and expressed a wish that nothing in common with theoretical discus- tries which are leading the struggle for so- the negotiations would be held in Beijing. sions, and referred to the statement of Mao cial and national liberation. As the bases for normalization of the Zedong to the effect that “polemics will Guided by these considerations, the CC situation on the border during the period continue for 10 thousand more years.” CPSU decided to undertake one more initia- before a final settlement which could be The Soviet side stressed that the CPSU tive aimed at a softening of the situation in achieved as the result of negotiations be- believes that polemics on controversial is- relations between the USSR and the PRC. tween the delegations of the USSR and the sues are permissible; however, it is impor- The Chinese side responded pretty PRC, the following principles were put forth: tant that they be conducted in an appropriate quickly to our proposal to hold a meeting of observance of the existing border, the inad- tone, and argued on a scientific basis. Lies A.N. Kosygin, who was present in Hanoi at missibility of armed confrontations, the with- and curses do not add persuasiveness and Ho Chi Minh’s funeral, with Zhou Enlai. drawal of troops of both sides from direct authority to a polemic, and only humiliate However, the Chinese response arrived in contact in controversial sectors. It was agreed the feelings of the other people and aggra- Hanoi an hour after the departure of the that issues which arise in relation to the vate the relations. Soviet Party-State delegation to Moscow economic activity of citizens of both coun- From our side it was also underlined via Calcutta, and therefore A.N. Kosygin tries in the controversial sectors will be de- that disagreements between the USSR and set off for Beijing already from the territory cided according to the agreement between the PRC play into the hands of the world of the Soviet Union. representatives of the border authorities. Both imperialism, weaken the Socialist system The meeting of the Soviet delegation sides agreed to give an instruction to the and the ranks of fighters for national and headed by Comrade A.N. Kosygin with appropriate border organizations to resolve social liberation. It was noted that over the Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi misunderstandings which arise in the spirit whole history of the struggle with Commu- continued for about four hours. From the of benevolence via the path of consultation. nism, imperialism has never received a Soviet side efforts were applied to assure Guided by the instructions of the CC greater gain than that which it has as a result that the conversation took place in the spirit CPSU, the Soviet side put forth concrete of the deepening, which is not our fault, of of a concrete consideration of the knotty proposals on the establishment and develop- the PRC’s differences with the Soviet Union issues of inter-governmental Soviet-Chi- ment of economic contacts between the USSR and other Socialist countries. 193 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

We declared the provocative nature of demonstrate a sober and serious approach to Moscow & Washington, 1949-1988 (Boulder: Lynne the contrived imperialist propaganda to the the proposals which were put forth by us, Riener, 1989), chap. 1; Oleg B. Borisov/B. T. Koloskov, Soviet Chinese Relations, 1945-1970 (Bloomington, effect that the Soviet Union allegedly is that this will frustrate the designs of the IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 327. preparing a preventive strike on China. It imperialist circles to intensify the Soviet- 8. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 271; Wich, was stressed that in the Soviet Union neither Chinese disagreements, to provoke a con- Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 27-28; Robinson, “Sino- the Party nor the government has ever spo- flict between our countries and in this way to Soviet Border Conflict,” 266. 9. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 68. ken about the unavoidability of war and has weaken the common front of the anti-impe- 10. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 275; Nelson, not summoned the people to war. All of our rialist struggle. Power and Insecurity, 70; Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Bor- documents, party decisions summon the The normalization of relations between der Conflict,” 268. people to peace. We never have said to the the USSR and the PRC, if they will demon- 11. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 72. 12. Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The people that it is necessary to “pull the belt strate a desire to do this in Beijing, undoubt- Soviet Far East Military Buildup, (Dover, MA: Auburn tighter,” that war is unavoidable. Zhou edly will facilitate the growth of the power House, 1986), 26-27; Avigdor Haselkorn, The Evolu- Enlai, in his turn, said that “China has no of the camp of Socialism and peace, will tion of Soviet Security Strategy 1965-1975 (New York: intentions to attack the Soviet Union.” He correspond to the interests of a strengthen- Crane & Russak, 1978), 39-42; Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 70. stressed that from the Chinese side measures ing of unit of the anti-imperialist forces and 13. Cited in Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 68. will be undertaken not to allow armed con- to the successful resolution of the tasks which 14. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 270-276. frontations with the USSR. were posed by the International Meeting of 15. On foreign minister Zhou En-lai’s role see Han The conversation took place overall in a Communist and Workers’ Parties. Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 359. constructive, calm atmosphere, despite the 16. Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account of the sharp posing of a range of issues. [Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; 1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” The China Quarterly 56 We evaluate the meeting which has translation from Russian by Mark H. (October/December 1973), 730-739; Cohen, “Sino- taken place with representatives of the Chi- Doctoroff, National Security Archive.] Soviet Border Crisis,” 278. 17. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow nese leadership as useful. The CC CPSU (New York: Knopf, 1985), 164-165. and the Soviet government made a decision 1. I would like to thank Malcolm Byrne and Jim 18. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 73. about the members of the delegation and Hershberg for their support and advice. Translations of 19. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its documents nos. 1 and 2 are mine; translation of docu- time frames for their meetings with the Chi- International Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: Uni- ment No.3 from Russian was provided by Mark versity of Washington Press, 1992), 191-193. nese representatives for the realization of the Doctoroff (The National Security Archive). 20. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 179. concrete proposals which were put forth in 2. On the changing international system see Raymond 21. According to Han Suyin, Eldest Son, 369-70, the course of the conversation. L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American- Kosygin was “more alert to the changing situation than Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Wash- It goes without saying that for the time Brezhnev,” and tried to reach Zhou Enlai but failed ington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 228-242; “because the young telephone operator in Beijing, full being it is still early to make conclusions Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, of Cultural Revolution spirit, told Kosygin, “We do not about the results which this meeting will 1945-1991 (Cambridge History of American Foreign speak to revisionists.” See also Dick Wilson, The Story bring. The anti-Soviet campaign which is Relations, vol. IV), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976 (London: Hutchinson, 1984), sity Press, 1993), 186-187. continuing in the PRC and also the fact that 270. 3. The best study of the crisis based mainly on published 22. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 178. the agreed text of the communiqué about the U.S., Soviet and Chinese sources is Thomas W. 23. Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” 280. See meeting was changed, put us on our guard. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” in Di- also O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia: The “Great Upon its publication in the Chinese press it plomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as an Political Game” (New York: Columbia UP, 1971), 501-506. Instrument (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institu- had been omitted that both sides conducted 24. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 200. tion, 1981), 265-313. See also Thomas W. Robinson, 25. The Kosygin-Zhou Enlai meeting is not mentioned “a constructive conversation.” Time will “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Devel- in Suyin, Eldest Son. But see Wilson, Zhou Enlai, 359. tell whether Beijing’s intention to move opment and the March 1969 Clashes,” American Politi- Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account, 270; Seymor along the path of normalization will be seri- cal Science Review 66 (December 1972), 1178-1182; Topping, Journey between Two Chinas (New York: and his The Sino-Soviet Border Situation, 1969-1975: ous or if this is only a tactical move dictated Harper, 1972), 356. Military, Diplomatic, and Political Maneuvering, HI- 26. Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” 295-313. by the circumstances of the aggravated do- 2364-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, mestic struggle in the PRC and also of that November 1975). Other accounts of the crisis include Christian F. Ostermann, a doctoral candi- isolation in which the Chinese leadership Arthur A. Cohen, “The Sino-Soviet Border Crisis of 1969,” in Avoiding War: Problems in Crisis Manage- date at the University of Hamburg based at has found itself as a result of the consistent ment, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview, the National Security Archive in Washing- and firm policy of the Socialist countries, 1984), 269-296; and Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis ton, D.C., contributes frequently to the Bul- Communist parties, and all forces who have Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communica- letin and authored CWIHP Working Paper condemned the peculiar positions of the tion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980). On U.S. policy see National Security Archive, ed., Presidential 11, “The United States, the East German Chinese leadership. We believe it necessary Directives on National Security From Truman to Clinton Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Roll- to follow attentively and vigilantly the fur- (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), 286. back.” This article was adapted from a ther development of the situation in China 4. On research in the SED Archives see my “New longer analysis of SED archival documents itself, the activity of the Beijing leadership Research on the GDR,” Cold War International His- tory Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 34, 39-44. on the Sino-Soviet border conflict to be in the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations, 5. Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute presented at the CWIHP Conference on New and also the international arena overall. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). Evidence on the Cold War in Asia at the The CC CPSU and the Soviet govern- 6. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 270. University of Hong Kong in January 1996. ment believe that if the Chinese leaders 7. Harvey W. Nelson, Power and Insecurity: Beijing, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 194

IN THE REGION AND ganda in Beijing had not been abated. Bokan’ The new opportunities to examine the hold- IN THE CENTER: urged his comrades to be prepared for any ings of regional party archives will further SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE provocation on the border, while his col- expand our knowledge of regional concerns BORDER RIFT league in the military district, comrade and center-regional relations in the Soviet Popov, noted that Chinese ideological posi- period. by Elizabeth Wishnick tions were dangerous for the international communist movement “and cannot but evoke * * * * * How did Soviet Communist Party offi- alarm” among the Soviet people. Comrade cials and activists in the regions bordering N.V. Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Document I: Stenographic Record of the People’s Republic of China respond to Pedagogical Institute, called attention to the Meeting of Khabarovsk regional and the news of Aleksei Kosygin’s 11 September fact that Zhou had told Kosygin that China’s city party officials, 22 September 1969 1969 meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing? ideological struggle with the CPSU would The two documents below, from the State continue for another 10,000 years. Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray (territory) in In its report, the Khabarovskiy Kray STENOGRAPHIC RECORD the Russian Far East,1 show the reactions committee expressed the region’s support of several leading party members in the for the Center’s policy toward China. In so of the meeting of the Khabarovsk regional frontier region to Central Committee and doing, the regional committee at times in- and city party aktiv Soviet government efforts to defuse the rup- serted comments which were not in the steno- ture with China. graphic record, for example, praising the 22 September 1969 One document is the stenographic Kosygin-Zhou meeting for being mutually record of a 22 September 1969 meeting of beneficial. First Secretary of the Khabarovsk re- the regional and city party aktiv convened Because the region’s reporting function gional committee of the CPSU, comr. A.P. to discuss the Central Committee’s account had the result of legitimating the Center’s Shitikov, opened the meeting: of Kosygin’s discussion of the border con- policies, comments by the regional aktiv Comrades, we brought you together to flict with Zhou. The second document is the which raised uncomfortable questions for familiarize you with the information of the Khabarovskiy Kray party committee’s re- the party leadership were omitted. For ex- Central Committee of the Communist party port of the same meeting to the CPSU CC in ample, the secretary of the Komsomolsk-na- of the Soviet Union about the question of the Moscow. Amure city committee of the CPSU, Com- visit by the Soviet party-governmental del- In comparing the two documents, it is rade Shul’ga, restated the standard line that egation to Hanoi and the discussion between particularly interesting to note their differ- Soviet efforts to improve relations with China comr. A.N Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Today ences in emphasis. The Khabarovskiy Kray would resonate with the healthy forces2 in I will acquaint you with the information. report to the CPSU CC accentuates the Chinese society (i.e., among communists) (Reads the information aloud). positive, stressing that Kosygin’s meeting and then noted that in Czechoslovakia the with Zhou represented a step toward resolv- Soviet Union had correctly intervened in Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to com- ing Soviet-Chinese differences through support of communists when the revolution’s rade Pasternak, secretary of the Khabarovsk peaceful means. According to the steno- gains were endangered. Comrade city committee of the CPSU. graphic record, however, many of the speak- Kadochnikov, a Khabarovsk worker, com- Comr. PASTERNAK ers described the problems in the border mented that he had trouble reconciling Chi- Comrades, the communists of the region in much greater detail than was nese anti-Soviet propaganda with the PRC’s Khabarovsk city party organization and all reported to Moscow. Although they all claim to be a socialist state. Comrade the workers of the city of Khabarovsk di- applauded Kosygin’s meeting with Zhou, Sverdlov stated that in the past polemics had rected particular attention to the report of the some speakers noted that little change in the some value for the international communist meeting in Beijing between the President of border situation had been observed since movement, and then cited the polemics with the Council of Ministers of the USSR and their encounter eleven days before. Com- Palmiro Togliatti, the long-time leader of the the President of the State Council of the PRC rade I.K. Bokan’, for example, the head of Italian Communist Party, as an example. Zhou Enlai. It explains the increasingly the political department of a military dis- Still, he concluded that Chinese policies were tense situation between the PRC and the trict in the region, noting that there had so unrestrained that they went beyond the Soviet Union, which is the fault of the Chi- been over 300 incidents of incursions by definition of useful polemics. nese leaders. Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory in his These two documents are valuable for Khabarovsk residents are well aware of district in 1969 alone, commented that no showing the reluctance of the Khabarovskiy the bandit-like character of the armed provo- substantive changes were observed follow- Kray committee to address substantive prob- cations, and therefore the mendacity of the ing the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. The Secre- lems in their reports to the Central Commit- Maoists’ propaganda, the malicious attacks tary of the Khabarovsk City committee of tee in Moscow: the Center only found out on the policy of our party and government, the CPSU, comrade V.S. Pasternak, made a what it wanted to hear. However, the docu- the kindling of hatred towards the Soviet similar remark, describing Sino-Soviet re- ments also demonstrate that as far back as Union, and the direct call for war with the lations as “increasingly tense” and observ- 1969 regional views on China policy did not Soviet Union, were particularly clear to us. ing that the anti-Soviet hysteria and propa- always run exactly in step with Moscow’s. All this requires our government to pur- 195 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN sue a principled and consistent course vis-a- we will be able to say that about the Chinese Chinese leaders went so far as to stage mili- vis China. We understand that the funda- leadership. tary provocations on the Soviet-Chinese mental interests of the Soviet and Chinese From the information we learned that border. It is strange for us workers and all peoples coincide and we support the policy Zhou Enlai, arbitrarily promised, just as the Soviet people to hear such gibberish of our government to resolve disputed issues Mao himself would have, to continue the from people calling themselves communists. at the negotiating table. ideological struggle against our party, and It is fully understandable that we cannot We view the meeting between comrade consequently, against the policy of all com- passively watch the train of events in China. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai as just such an munist parties of the socialist countries, for We approve the steadfast and principled line effort by our government to resolve these another 10 thousand years. of our government for the settlement of issues by peaceful means. We support those This is not accidental and is evoked as a disputed issues through negotiations and principles which were proposed as funda- reserve option for the long-term anti-Soviet consider that our party and government will mental groundwork for negotiations. We campaign, and it is impossible to overlook exert every effort so that normal relations are convinced that the resolution of the dis- this. Our party, proceeding from the prin- with China can be achieved. puted issues will depend on the position of ciples of Marxism-Leninism, from the rich- As far as we are concerned, we consider the Chinese side. est practice of its own and the international that it is necessary to strengthen the might of We are all the more vigilant since after communist movement, considers a polemic our Motherland through work. Our workers the meeting the anti-Soviet propaganda, the about disputed issues to be fully achievable, work calmly, confident in their strength and anti-Soviet hysteria in Beijing has hardly but this polemic must lead to the interests of in the durability of the Soviet borders. I decreased. We fully support the principled the peoples, the interests of the cohesion of assure the regional committee of the party position of our party, directed against the the ranks of the communist parties, on the that the party can count on us workers, can be anti-Leninist position of the Mao Zedong basis of deep scientific argumentation, with- sure of our unreserved support for all its clique. out insults and abuse vis-a-vis another people efforts to strengthen the international com- We will direct all efforts, to mobilize and party. munist movement. the work of the enterprises to fulfill the We saw that on a number of occasions socialist obligations in honor of the 100th polemics were useful in the revolutionary Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. anniversary of V.I. Lenin’s birth. movement. In its time the CC of our party Shul’ga, secretary of the Komsomolsk-na- honestly, openly noted a series of erroneous Amure city committee of the CPSU. Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to com- views by the late respected Palmiro Togliatti. Comr. SHUL’GA rade Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk There were polemics with other parties. But Comrades, the workers of the city of Pedagogical Institute. such polemics do not have anything in com- Komsomolsk were satisfied with the con- Comr. SVERDLOV mon with the unrestrained policy of the tents of the report about the meeting between Comrades, the information we have been Chinese leaders. the President of the Council of Ministers of listening to clearly and convincingly dem- Therefore it is necessary for us to all the the USSR comr. Kosygin and the President onstrates that our party and its decision- more steadfastly and firmly turn the ideo- of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, making nucleus, in the form of the Leninist logical struggle against the Chinese revi- and hope that the initiative will be under- Central Committee, persistently and consis- sionists. Permit me to state in the name of stood by the healthy forces among the Chi- tently, in the spirit of the decisions of the the workers in higher education that we nese people. Moscow Conference of Communist and unanimously support the proposals and ef- We know that the strengthening of Workers’ Parties, pursues a policy of con- forts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations friendly relations between the peoples of our solidating the international communist move- formulated by our party, and will not spare countries is the basis for Soviet policy. We ment, of surmounting of problems and dis- any effort to contribute to the consolidation provide assistance to many countries in the agreements, temporarily arising in the con- of the strength and might of our great Moth- socialist camp. Now, when the intrigues of temporary revolutionary movement. erland. imperialism are intensifying, it is especially It is natural and understandable that the incumbent upon us to stand on the forefront slightest positive shift in the development of Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. of those forces who are restraining the on- Soviet-Chinese relations would be met with Kadochnikov, a milling cutter at the slaught of the forces of reaction. We could satisfaction by the Soviet people, and all the Khabarovsk heating equipment plant. not do otherwise than go to the assistance of more by us, China’s immediate neighbors. Comr. KADOCHNIKOV real communists, when a threat hung over The information clearly outlined the Comrades, we, workers of the city of the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia. Soviet Union’s proposals for stabilizing Khabarovsk, like the entire Soviet people, It is pleasant for us Soviet communists Soviet-Chinese relations. These proposals, approve the initiative by the Central Com- to realize that we are the members of the which result from the situation at hand, are mittee of our party and the Soviet govern- party, which stands in the avant-garde of the timely, reasonable, and fair, and are capable ment, directed at the normalization of So- international communist movement. Evalu- of fostering the correct resolution of inter- viet-Chinese relations. ating the contemporary policy of the CPC governmental disputes, certainly, once the We were all witnesses to the fact that, as from a principled position, we seek paths to other sides expresses the desire to facilitate the leadership of the CPC [Communist Party normalize relations between our two states. an improvement in relations. It is unlikely of China] loosened its links to our party, the And it is not our fault that at a certain point COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 196 the leaders of China broke off relations gree of restraint. We support the initiative support the general line of our party, di- between the Soviet Union and China. The which took place and the steps taken by our rected at the creation of all the necessary results of this turned out to be deplorable. It government, directed at the stabilization of preconditions for the successful building of began with [China’s] isolation from abso- Soviet-Chinese relations. communism in our country. lutely the majority of the communist par- Fully assessing the danger of the situa- V.I. Lenin’s precepts about the neces- ties. The people of China, who were only tion, we must be prepared for the outbreak of sity of a consistent struggle for the unity of just liberated from feudalism, again found any type of provocation along the border. the international communist movement themselves in a difficult economic situa- The personnel in the district is firmly re- against the forces of imperialist reaction, tion. solved in these days of preparation for the against all forms of opportunism are eter- We approve the policy of the CC of our 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin nally dear to us. These Leninist ideas are the party to decide all disputed issues by peace- to further improve the level of political and basis for all the documents passed by the ful means, not by armed provocations. We military knowledge, increase the military Moscow Conference of Communist and fully understand that today a very difficult preparedness of the forces, to merit with Workers’ parties. situation has been developing on the Far honor the great trust of the party and the The only correct policy - is a policy Eastern borders given the unleashing of people, to defend the inviolability of the which is principled and consistent as is our anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Soviet hys- borders of our Motherland. policy towards China. We are building our teria. And we support the policy of our party policy on the basis of a long-term perspec- to begin negotiations with China, to resolve Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. tive. all questions through peaceful means, par- Plotkin, the head of the “Energomash” con- The meeting between comr. Kosygin ticularly with a country which considers struction bureau. and Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking itself to be socialist. Comr. PLOTKIN is evidence of the readiness of our party to Comrades, today we heard the report in establish normal relations between our coun- Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to which we were informed about the humani- tries. If the Chinese leaders exhibit pru- comr. Bokan’, the head of the political de- tarian mission fulfilled by our delegation dence and undertake to respond with steps to partment of the Krasnoznamennyi Far East- headed by comr. Kosygin. The entire Soviet stabilize relations, this would be received ern border district. people and we, Far Easterners, in particular, with approval by the Soviet people. Comr. BOKAN’ follow with great interest and undivided at- However the position of the Chinese Comrades, the soldiers of the tention the development of Soviet-Chinese leaders cannot but evoke alarm among our Krasnoznamennyi border district reacted to relations. people. Now, in the period of preparation the report of the meeting between comr. The report about the meeting in Peking for the 20th anniversary [ 1 October 1969] of Kosygin and Zhou Enlai concerning the between Kosygin and the Chinese leaders the founding of the PRC, Peking’s propa- stabilization of relations on the Soviet-Chi- was very brief, but we understood the whole ganda continues to fuel an anti-Soviet cam- nese border with a feeling of deep under- value of this step by our government. The paign. The Peking radio programs talk about standing, satisfaction, and approval. trip to Peking, the organization of the meet- this daily. In the report it is apparent that the ing - all this expressed confidence in the All this conceals a serious danger for improvement of relations along the Soviet- correctness of our cause. the international communist movement and Chinese border was the central question at As a member of the plant collective the world socialism system. We, members this meeting. The border events attracted many times I have heard the workers express of the military, know well that Maoism en- the attention not just of Soviet people but of their concerns about the criminal actions of gendered the military provocations and this people all over the world. Incursions by the Chinese leaders. Therefore we are glad to requires of us continuous vigilance and readi- Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory be- hear that our government is searching for ness to give a worthy rebuff to the provoca- came a daily occurrence. paths to stabilize relations. I totally and fully tions by the Maoists at any moment. In this year alone in the area guarded by approve of the policy of our party. Permit me in the name of the soldiers of the forces of our district there were about our district to assure the Central Committee 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citi- Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. of our party, that in the future the commu- zens onto our territory. Ideological diver- Popov, deputy director of the political direc- nists and Komsomol members of our district sions on the Chinese border increased no- torate of the KDVO [Krasnoznamennyi Far will guard our party’s well-equipped weap- ticeably. Eastern Military District]. ons and will always be ready to fulfill any The personnel in the district thoroughly tasks of our party and people. understand the situation and show courage Comr. POPOV Comr. Shitikov - Who else would like to and the ability to counter the provocations. Comrades, communists and all the sol- speak? There are no more speakers. The We feel the constant support of the people of ders of our Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern following two proposals are put forth for Khabarovskiy Kray, the party, state, and military district are completely satisfied by your consideration. youth organizations. the wise domestic and foreign policy of our I. To approve completely and fully the In the period since the meeting in party and the Soviet government. initiative of the CC of our party and the Beijing, no substantive changes have oc- Along with entire Soviet people the sol- Soviet government concerning the meeting curred, with the exception of a certain de- diers of the army and fleet unanimously between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai, 197 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN designed to ease the situation on the border On 22 September 1969 a regional meet- nies, and institutions to fulfill socialist re- and to consider this meeting to have been ing of the party electoral aktiv was held to sponsibilities in a manner worthy of the very useful. acquaint them with the Information from the meeting in honor of the 100th anniversary of II. The regional party aktiv completely CC CPSU regarding the trip by the Soviet V.I. Lenin’s birth.” and fully approves the policy of the party party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and I.P. Kadochnikov, member of the re- and government, aimed at normalizing rela- comrade A.N. Kosygin’s discussion with gional committee of the CPSU, a milling tions between the Soviet Union and China. Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969. cutter at the Khabarovsk heating equipment What other proposals are there? There The First Secretary of the regional party plant, stated: are proposals to accept such a resolution. No committee read the Information from the CC “We cannot passively observe the course one is opposed? No. CPSU. of events in China, where the leaders in- After this the meeting of the aktiv was 7 people spoke at the meeting. The creasingly aggravate relations with our coun- considered closed. participants noted with great satisfaction try and the situation on the Soviet-Chinese that our party, its Central Committee, persis- border. We, Far Easterners, eagerly approve tently and consistently, in the spirit of the the practical steps by our party and govern- 9/23/69 decisions of the Moscow Conference of ment towards the normalization of Soviet- Stenographer Taran Communist and Workers’ parties [in June Chinese relations. 1969 - translator’s note], take a hard line on Our workers work calmly, confident in [Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy strengthening of the peace and security of their own strength and in the durability of the Kray, f. p-35, op. 96, d. 234, ll. 1-12; peoples, consolidating the ranks of the inter- Soviet borders. I feel this every day, every translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.] national communist movement, and over- hour, working among with the collective of coming the difficulties and disagreements many thousands at the plant.” * * * * * within it. They [the members of the aktiv] The rector of the Khabarovsk pedagogi- unanimously approved the initiative of the cal institute, N.V. Sverdlov, noted: Document II: Information Report Sent CC CPSU and the Soviet government, di- “The Information concisely and clearly by Khabarovskiy Kray (Territory) rected at taking concrete measures to nor- states all the proposals by the Soviet Union Committee to CPSU CC, 22 September malize Soviet-Chinese relations, settle dis- to settle the disputes and conflicts in Soviet- 1969 puted issues through negotiations and the Chinese relations and to improve the situa- organization of the meeting in Peking. tion on the Soviet-Chinese border and ex- Proletariat of all countries, unite! The Secretary of the Khabarovsk city pand economic ties between our countries. committee of the CPSU V.S. Pasternak said These timely, reasonable, and fair propos- COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE in his remarks: als, which stem from our mutual interests, SOVIET UNION “The communists and all the workers of combine firmness and flexibility of policy, the city were particularly attentive to the and, most importantly, are capable of foster- KHABAROVSKIY KRAY news of the meeting in Beijing between the ing the correct resolution of intergovern- COMMITTEE president of the Council of Ministers of the mental disputes, of course, under circum- USSR, A.N. Kosygin, and the president of stances when the other side expresses a ______the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. similar understanding of the situation and Khabarovsk residents always steadfastly the desire to find a way out of it.” City of Khabarovsk follow the development of Soviet-Chinese E.A. Plotkin, member of the regional relations, [and] angrily judge the great power, party committee of the CPSU, director of the (Sent 9/22/69) adventuristic course of the PRC leaders. construction bureau of the Khabarovsk CENTRAL COMMITTEE The armed raids by the Maoists on the So- Energomash plant, stated: OF THE CPSU viet-Chinese border, the malicious slander “The trip to Beijing by the president of DEPARTMENT OF against our Soviet people, our state, the the Council of Ministers, A.N. Kosygin, was ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK Communist party, deeply trouble the work- very brief, but we understood how important ers of our city. this meeting was for the Soviet and Chinese INFORMATION The initiative by the CC CPSU and the peoples. The search for paths to stabiliza- Soviet government to stabilize Soviet-Chi- tion, the reasonable resolution of foreign regarding the familiarization of the nese relations and organize a meeting in policy questions, which the Central Com- electoral aktiv of the Khabarovskiy Kray Beijing in such a difficult current situation mittee of the CPSU and our government put party organization with the Information once again vividly affirms the wise policy of forth meet with approval at the plant.” from the CC CPSU about the trip by the our party to resolve disputed issues by The head of the political department of Soviet party-governmental delegation to peaceful means. the Krasnoznamennyi border district, I.K. Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin’s The city party organization aims to im- Bokan’, expressed the thoughts and feelings discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 Septem- prove the ideological work among the work- of the border guards as follows: ber 1969 ers in every possible way, to mobilize the “The troops of the Krasnoznamennyi collectives of firms, construction compa- Far Eastern border district reacted to the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 198 report of the meeting between the president sponses to Soviet diplomatic overtures for of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, How did the Central Committee of the normalizing relations. What the document comrade A.N. Kosygin, with the premier of CPSU view Soviet-Chinese relations in the fails to mention is that Soviet negotiating the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, aftermath of the violent 1969 border clashes efforts were backed up by threats. Five days with feelings of deep understanding and between the two communist powers? The after the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, Victor satisfaction and consider that this discus- following document, a February 1971 secret Louis, a Soviet journalist reportedly em- sion was useful for both sides. One of the background report prepared for and ap- ployed by the KGB, published an article in central questions at this meeting was the proved by the CC CPSU, sheds some light on the London Evening News arguing that an question of the mitigation of the situation on Soviet diplomatic initiatives aimed at ame- attack on Chinese nuclear facilities could the Soviet-Chinese border. liorating the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. not be excluded. Relations along the border exemplify Although the Central Committee analysis is The document also neglects to address the relations between the states. The relatively optimistic about the long-term pros- the discrepancy between the Soviet and Chi- Maoists’ provocative violations of the So- pects for normalizing of Soviet-Chinese re- nese understanding of the results of the viet-Chinese border and their intervention lations, in the short term Chinese territorial Kosygin-Zhou meeting. Contrary to the in Soviet territory attest to the adventuristic claims on Soviet territory and anti-Sovietism Soviet position outlined here, China claimed policy of the Chinese leadership, their aim among Chinese leaders were viewed as ma- that Kosygin had recognized the existence of to decide disputed questions through force. jor obstacles to any improvement in rela- “disputed territories” and agreed to discuss The border forces in the district have at tions. Written not long before the March a withdrawal of forces from the border re- their disposal all that is necessary to fulfill 1971 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Cen- gions. The Central Committee document their sacred duty before the Fatherland in an tral Committee analysis represented an at- would seem to support the Soviet case, but in exemplary way. In these days of prepara- tempt to explain to the Party leadership and the absence of reliable verbatim contempo- tion for the 100th anniversary of the V.I. aktiv why there was only limited progress in raneous documentation from the meeting Lenin’s birth, we will demonstrate our level Soviet-Chinese relations [particularly at a itself it is difficult to evaluate the relative of decisiveness by increasing the military time when Sino-American relations were veracity of the Soviet and Chinese accounts. preparedness of the troops in order to honor- improving]. The document outlines a series One recently published memoir supports the ably merit the great trust of the party, gov- of diplomatic overtures made by the Soviet Soviet position, however. A.I. Elizavetin, a ernment, and people, as well as of the mili- Union in 1969-1971 and attributes the mini- Soviet diplomat in Beijing who took notes tary forces in the Army and Navy, to guar- mal response by the Chinese leadership to during the Kosygin-Zhou meeting, reported antee the inviolability of the Far Eastern their need to perpetuate anti-Sovietism for in his own account of their encounter that border of our beloved Motherland.” domestic reasons. Kosygin suggested the two sides should re- The following resolution was approved One of the most interesting points in the spect the status quo ante on the border and by the participants in the meeting: document pertains to the consequences of open talks on border demarcation as well as 1. Completely and fully approve the the 11 September 1969 discussions between on confidence-building measures.3 initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and The issue of a withdrawal of forces from government about the meeting between the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the bor- the border regions was to remain a stum- president of the Council of Ministers of the der clashes. According to the document, the bling block in bilateral negotiations through USSR A.N. Kosygin and the premier of the People’s Republic of China rejected a later the 1980s. By the early 1980s, the Chinese State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, aimed Soviet proposal to sign a draft agreement on no longer spoke of disputed territories, but at ameliorating the state of relations be- maintaining the status quo on the border, they contended that the stationing of Soviet tween the USSR and China, and consider based on the oral agreement reportedly military forces in the border regions repre- that this meeting was useful. reached by Kosygin and Zhou during their sented an obstacle to the improvement of 2. Unanimously support the actions of meeting. The document notes that the Chi- Sino-Soviet relations. A recently declassi- the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, nese side insisted on signing an agreement fied transcript of a May 1983 CPSU CC directed at normalizing relations with China, on “temporary measures” as a precondi- Politburo meeting indicates that the Soviet and rebuffing any encroachments by the tion, both at the 1969 meeting and subse- military continued to oppose any withdrawal Chinese leadership on the interests of our quently. By “temporary measures” the Chi- of forces, on the grounds that the Soviet state, on the interests of our people. nese meant the withdrawal of forces from Union had spent considerable time and ef- what they viewed as disputed territories in fort to develop forward bases in the border Secretary of the Khabarovsk the border regions. Such a precondition was region.4 Although Moscow and Beijing (A. Shitikov) unacceptable to the Soviet Union, fearing finally normalized relations in 1989 and regional committee of the CPSU that a withdrawal of troops would pave the have reduced their overall military presence way for a Chinese attempt to occupy the 1.5 due to cuts in their respective armed forces, [Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy million square kilometers they claimed were the creation of a dimilitarized zone in the Kray, f.p-35, op. 96, d. 374, ll. 16-21; wrested from China by Tsarist Russia. border region continues to present difficul- translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.] The Central Committee document goes ties even today. At present the main stum- on to criticize the Chinese leadership for bling-block is geostrategic: Russia is un- * * * * * their lukewarm if not outright negative re- willing to withdraw beyond 100km from the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 199 than a year ago. This is the main reason and forwarded a draft of such an agreement gaged in amateur artistic performances. Anti- why, despite all the constructive efforts to Beijing through the ambassador of the Soviet films are always playing in movie made by our delegation, the negotiations on USSR. theaters. The Chinese population also is border issues in essence haven’t made any In sending this draft agreement for con- exposed to anti-Soviet messages in radio progress. sideration by the government of the PRC, the and television programs and through verbal To move things forward, the CC CPSU Soviet side expressed its belief that the ful- propaganda. and the Soviet government came out with an fillment of our proposal - the most rapid Feigning a threat of attack by the Soviet important initiative, and sent a letter from conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of Union, the Chinese leadership actively uses the Chairman of the USSR Council of Min- force [—] would create a more favorable anti-Sovietism to continue their propaganda isters, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Pre- atmosphere for the normalization of rela- about war and war preparations against the mier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou tions between our two states and, in particu- Soviet Union and to strengthen their control Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the lar, would facilitate the restoration of neigh- over the domestic situation in the country. principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we borly relations and friendship between the The Chinese leadership fears that construc- proposed in this letter to begin negotiations USSR and the PRC. tive steps by the USSR and progress in in Moscow, at the same time as the negotia- A positive answer from the Chinese side stabilizing relations between our countries tions in Beijing, between special govern- to the Soviet initiative could lead to a deci- would undermine the basic ideological mental delegations on a draft agreement sive shift forward in the negotiations. How- premise: to convince the Chinese people that between the USSR and the PRC on mutual ever there is still no answer whatsoever from the difficult situation facing them is, as it non-use of force, including nuclear weap- the Chinese side. There is a growing impres- were, the result of the policy of the Soviet ons, [and] the cessation of war propaganda sion that Beijing, as before, is interested in Union, and not of the anti-Leninist and of preparations for war against the other maintaining the “border territorial issue” in adventeuristic policy of the Chinese leaders side. relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad themselves. At the same time, to eliminate many faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming Chinese provocations were met with a controversial issues from the negotiations, a to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic decisive rebuff and furthermore our initia- proposal was made to formulate an inter- goals. tive about carrying out negotiations for a governmental agreement on the demarca- Why have the Soviet steps towards the border settlement created serious obstacles tion of the eastern section of the Soviet- normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations to the organizations of new adventures. Chinese border (4300 km), consisting of encountered such significant difficulties? The The PRC leadership is making efforts to more than half of its length, where most of main reason, as was mentioned previously in emerge from the international isolation in the border incidents took place (from the our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism which China found itself as a result of the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, was and continues to be the main ingredient Red Guard diplomacy in the years of the MPR [Mongolia] meet in the east and fur- in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the “Cultural Revolution.” China activated its ther to the south along the Amur and Ussuri present Chinese leadership. This is con- diplomatic contacts in a number of coun- rivers). firmed, in particular, by the materials of the tries, achieved diplomatic recognition by a The letter expressed the view that, in 11th plenum of the CC CPC (August-Sep- series of bourgeois states. Today even seven the interests of the improvement of Soviet- tember 1970), the nature of the celebration of NATO countries have diplomatic relations Chinese relations, it would be expedient to the 21st anniversary of the founding of the with Beijing. However, the Chinese leader- hold another meeting of the heads of gov- PRC [in October 1970], the continuing slan- ship is making concessions on major issues, ernment of the USSR and the PRC, this time derous campaign against the CPSU and the on which they previously held implacable on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also Soviet Union, carried out both in the outside positions. It is not surprising that the capi- restated a range of other constructive pro- world and especially through domestic Chi- talist states actively use this flirtation in their posals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to nese channels. The strengthening of the anti- own interests. speculate in the international arena and in Soviet campaign is taking place in the pages The imperialist powers, the USA in domestic propaganda on the alleged of the Chinese press. In the last half a year particular, are playing a complex and sly existance of a “threat of force” from the alone the Chinese central newspapers pub- game in their approach to China. On the one USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet lished hundreds of materials containing rude hand they would like to use the anti-Soviet- insinuations. assaults against our party and our country. ism of the Maoists in the struggle against the To deprive the Chinese government of The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai, USSR, but on the other hand, they would a basis for such inventions and facilitate the Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities are like to strengthen their own position in the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, covered with appeals to struggle against “So- PRC, in the vast Chinese market. As a side the subject of the negotiations, on January viet revisionism.” In China anti-Soviet bro- interest these states all the more loudly urge 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet chures and posters are being published in the PRC “to get actively involved in the another step - it made a proposal to the huge numbers and widely distributed. For international community.” leadership of the PRC to conclude an agree- example, not long ago a series of brochures Recently the Chinese leadership has ment between the USSR and the PRC on the with clearly anti-Soviet content was recom- been rather pointedly making outwardly non-use of force in any form whatsoever, mended for children as study aids as well as friendly gestures towards some socialist including missiles and nuclear weapons, for the repertoire of clubs and circles en- states, promising them to open broad pros- 200 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN pects in the area of trade, economic, and and other fellow socialist countries, the Chi- The Central Committee of the CPSU at- scientific-technical cooperation. The Chi- nese leadership is tactically using the PRC’s tributes great importance to this work, since nese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the opposition to both “superpowers” (USSR positive shifts in Chinese politics can be effective political, economic, and other forms and USA), which allegedly “came to terms” facilitated in the near future only by strug- of cooperation among socialist states, as to “divide the world amongst them.” gling relentlessly against the theory and prac- well as by their interaction, which facilitates All this attests to the fact that the leaders tice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism the strengthening of the international posi- of China have not changed their previous figures prominently, by further strengthen- tions of socialism, and their [socialist states’] chauvinistic course in the international arena. ing the cohesion and unity of communist ability to move forward with the resolution Domestically, the Chinese leadership, ranks, and by combining the efforts of the of major issues in world politics. The Beijing having suppressed the enemies of their poli- Marxist-Leninist parties. leadership aims to use any opportunity to cies during the so-called “Cultural Revolu- break the unity and cohesion of the socialist tion”, is now trying to overcome the disor- CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE states, to weaken their existing social struc- der in economic and political life, brought COMMUNIST ture. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases about by the actions of the very same ruling PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION its provocative statements on the Czecho- groups over the course of recent years. The slovak question.5 Beijing has acted simi- well-known stabilization of socio-political 45-mz larly with respect to the recent events in and economic life is occurring through all- sa/ka Poland.6 encompassing militarization, leading to an The communist and workers parties of atmosphere of “a besieged fortress.” The [Source: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li. the fellow socialist countries, which firmly army is continuing to occupy key positions 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the country and serves as the main instru- Wishnick.] and socialist internationalism, understand ment of power. As before a cult of Mao is and respond appropriately to this tactical expanding, the regime of personal power is 1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant step of Beijing’s, which is directed at split- being strengthened in the constitution of the from the International Research and Exchanges Board ting the socialist community and isolating PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed (IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the the Soviet Union. in the country. This, of course, cannot but Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible The Moscow conference of communist have a pernicious influence on the social life for the views expressed. and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong of the entire Chinese people. 2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to In an oral statement made directly to analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., com- munist, forces within society, and the Maoist leader- split them. Convinced by the futility of their Soviet officials about the desirability and ship. efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in possibility in the near future of the normal- 3. A.I. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou individual countries into influential political ization of intergovernmental relations, the Enlai v pekinskom aeroportu,” with commentary by S. parties, and to cobble them together into an Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideo- Gonacharov and V. Usov, Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 5 (1992), 39-63, and 1 (1993), 107-119. international anti-Leninist movement, the logical, and to a certain degree, the political 4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, TskhSD, F. 89, Op. 43. Chinese leadership once again is counting struggle between the USSR and China, will D. 53, L.1. 1-14, translated in Cold War International on its ability to either attract individual com- continue for a lengthy period of time. History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81. munist parties to its side, or at least to achieve As long as the Chinese leadership sticks 5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist move- their refusal to publicly criticize the ideol- to ideological and political positions which ment and Moscow’s subsequent imposition of ortho- ogy and policy of the CPC leadership. To are hostile to us, the stabilization and nor- dox “normalization” there. this end, Beijing’s propaganda and CPC malization of intergovernmental relations 6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities officials are concentrating their main efforts between the Soviet Union and the PRC would to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk in December 1970, and a subsequent government shake- on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of have to be achieved under conditions of up. foreign communists the foreign and domes- sharp ideological and political struggle. tic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the In informing the party aktiv about the USSR, and in the socialist community. At current status of Soviet-Chinese relations, Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the the same time Chinese representatives are the Central Committee of the CPSU consid- Institute of Modern History, Academica aiming to exacerbate disputes in the commu- ers it important to emphasize that the practi- Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on nist movement. They use any means to heat cal measures, which, within the parameters a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with up nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Soviet of our long-term orientation, would lead to China: The Evolution of Moscow’s China dispositions in the ranks of the communist normalized relations with the PRC and the Policy, 1969-95. and national-liberation movement. restoration of friendly relations with the Beijing is trying to take the non-aligned Chinese people, are being supplemented by movement and the developing countries appropriate measures in case of possible under its own influence. For this purpose, provocations by the Chinese side, as well as and in order to alienate the states of the “third by the necessary consistent ideological-po- world” from their dependable support in the litical struggle against the anti-Leninist, anti- struggle with imperialism - the Soviet Union socialist views of the Chinese leadership. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 201

SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980: extensive relations with Romania, Yugosla- No. St-200/4s TWO RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS via, and North Korea. China’s efforts to from March 4, 1980 foster economic and even political ties with by Elizabeth Wishnick the “fraternal countries”—Bulgaria, Hun- Excerpt from the protocol No. 200 gary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslova- 4s CC Secretariat The two Central Committee documents kia—are portrayed here as being of utmost from 1980 printed below illustrate Soviet concern to the Central Committee. The docu- ______foreign policy concerns at a time when the ment shows Soviet displeasure at China’s Soviet Union was particularly isolated in interest in improving relations with these the international arena as a result of its states at a time when it refused to continue Regarding the instructions to USSR December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. negotiations with the USSR.1 ambassadors to socialist countries about In these documents, Soviet policymakers In the Soviet view, relations between the the China question express their fears that their principal adver- socialist community and China had to be saries, the United States and China, were coordinated with Soviet policy, and the “fra- Approve the text of the instructions to drawing closer together due to their shared ternal countries” were expected to wait for USSR ambassadors to socialist countries hostility toward the USSR. The documents and then follow the Soviet Union’s lead. To (proposed). contend that the Sino-American this end, representatives from the Interna- rapproachement had two particularly unfor- tional Departments of these countries had CC SECRETARY tunate consequences: the development of been meeting regularly with the CPSU Inter- Sino-American military cooperation and national Department for over a decade.2 * * * * * increased efforts by China to undermine the Despite all these efforts to coordinate China socialist community. policy, the March 1980 document evokes Secret The October 1980 document about Soviet fears that China had been making Sino-American military cooperation was inroads into the socialist community and was Enclosure written for two audiences. On the one hand, achieving a certain measure of success in k.p.4s,pr.No 200 Soviet representatives were given the task using economic cooperation to tempt indi- of convincing Western public opinion that vidual states to stray from the fold. As a BERLIN, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, military cooperation with China could back- result, the document outlines a series of steps PRAGUE, SOFIA, ULAN-BATOR, fire and engulf their countries in conflict. for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE On the other hand, the document showed foster skepticism about China’s intentions Soviet concern that some non-aligned and and thwart efforts by Chinese representa- SOVIET AMBASSADORS socialist states were choosing to ignore the tives to make wide-ranging contacts in these dangerous tendencies in Chinese policies states. Copy: BEIJING, PYONGYANG, and warned of the perils of a neutral attitude PHNOM PENH, BUCHAREST, towards them. Since China had invaded 1. China claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan BELGRADE Vietnam soon after the Sino-American nor- made it inappropriate to go ahead with the regularly scheduled political talks in 1980. malization of relations in February 1979, 2. Several documents from these meetings attest to this SOVIET AMBASSADORS (for their Soviet policymakers feared that the im- aim. See, e.g., TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 19, d. 525, ll. 29, 107- information) proved U.S.-China relationship had 110, 21 January 1969; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 19. d. 605, ll. 3, emboldened the Chinese leaders to act on 40-42, 12 February 1971; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1077, Recently Beijing’s policy towards so- ll. 21, 9 April 1973; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 242, ll. 4, their hostility toward pro-Soviet socialist 13 April 1975; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 24, d.878; ll. 4, 20 April cialist countries has become noticeably more states and that U.S. military assistance would 1979; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 24, d. 1268, ll. 5, 19 May 1980. active. Under conditions, when imperialist provide the Chinese with the means to act on circles in the USA have undertaken to aggra- their ambitions. * * * * * vate the international situation, the Chinese Which states were neutral on the China leadership, drawing ever closer to imperial- question and why? The March 1980 docu- Document I: CPSU CC Directive to ism, is increasing its efforts to undermine the ment clarifies this in an analysis of China’s Soviet Ambassadors in Communist position of the socialist community. Beijing’s policy of distinguishing among the socialist Countries, 4 March 1980 goals, as before, are to break the unity and states based on their degree of autonomy cohesion of the fraternal countries, inspire from the USSR, a policy referred to here and mutual distrust among them, incite them to in other Soviet analyses as China’s “differ- Proletariat of all countries, unite! opposition to the Soviet Union, destroy the entiated” approach to the socialist commu- unity of action of socialist states in the inter- nity. The document, a series of instructions COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET national arena including on the China ques- about the China question to Soviet ambassa- UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE tion and finally, to subordinate them to its dors to socialist states, notes China’s hostil- own influence. ity to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia TOP SECRET Within the parameters of a policy in- and contrasts this with its development of volving a differentiated approach [to social- 202 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ist states], the Chinese leadership is trying to “study tours,” attempts are being made to intensifying attempts by the Chinese leaders stratify the socialist countries into various send Chinese delegations to some socialist to penetrate into various spheres of the do- groups. With such states as Romania, Yugo- countries and receive their delegations in the mestic life of the socialist countries. With slavia, and the DPRK, China is developing PRC. the participation of the leaders and represen- extensive relations, supporting the national- There are signs that the Chinese may tatives of the political and social circles of istic tendencies in their policies in every reevaluate their relations with the ruling your post countries, direct the following: possible way with the aim of creating its own parties of some socialist countries, and es- 1. Pay attention to the noticeable group on this basis, and using it to counter tablish party-to-party ties with them. Party- activization of Chinese policy towards so- the socialist community. In relations with to-party ties are already developing with cialist states. Using the example of Beijing’s other socialist countries the hostile character Yugoslavia and Romania; the first Chinese recent maneuvers, continuously carry out of China’s policy is strengthening even more, party delegation in recent years went to measures to clarify the danger of the Chi- as the unceasing attacks and pressure on the participate in the RKP [Romanian Commu- nese differentiated approach tactic and ef- SRV [Vietnam], Cuba, DPRL [Laos], and nist Party] congress. forts to penetrate the socialist states. This MPR [Mongolia], attest. China uses a double- Denying in essence the general regu- danger is growing in connection with the dealing tactic including pressure and prom- larities of development of the revolutionary fact that the splitting activity of the Chinese ises in its approach to the PRB [Bulgaria], processes and socialist economic construc- representatives is being coordinated all the HPR [Hungary], GDR, PNR [Poland], and tion in various countries, the Chinese leader- more closely with imperialist circles, above ChSSR [Czechoslovakia]: on the one hand ship has once again returned to the use of the all with the USA, and their intelligence ser- China is continuing its gross interference in conception of the “national model” of so- vices. Expose the false character of Chinese their internal affairs, while clearly ignoring cialism, and especially rises to the defense of assertions, which allege that China is “con- their interests; on the other hand, it is giving the Yugoslav “model”. cerned” about the improvement of relations assurances about its readiness to develop Beijing’s divisive activity shows its lim- with socialist states, and cares about their relations with them on a mutually advanta- ited, but nevertheless negative, influence in interests and security. In fact, Chinese policy, geous basis. Thanks to such a tactic, Beijing certain socialist states. Some of the workers particularly its constant appeals to the USA, is counting on at least forcing these coun- do not always grasp the meaning of the Japan, and the countries of Western Europe tries into positions of “neutrality” regarding Chinese tactic and in certain cases do not to unite with China in a “broad international China’s course, if not to achieve more. provide their own effective rebuff to front” and its pressure on the NATO coun- Within the Chinese leadership dema- Beijing’s hegemonic policy. Moreover, the tries to increase their armaments, including gogic and deceptive practices are widely facts show that responsible leaders of certain nuclear missiles, is totally and fully directed used. It is affirmed, as if China’s struggle fraternal countries, counter to the official against the socialist states, their security. against the USSR need not worry the other positions of their parties, are expressing an Calling for the economic integration and socialist countries, that the development of interest in excluding some important direc- military-political consolidation of the West, relations between them and China could tions in their ties with China from the sphere Beijing is all the more intensively seeking to even facilitate the improvement of Soviet- of multilateral coordination, that in certain undermine the positions of the Organization Chinese relations, that the expansion of ties situations they are taking steps to expand of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of between these states and China meets their ties with the PRC without considering the Mutual Economic Assistance. national interests, and, in particular, could level of relations between China and other One must also keep in mind that the bring them major advantages in the trade- states. changes in domestic policy taking place in economic sphere. Judging from all of this, China’s tactical China, among them the rehabilitation of Liu Beijing has noticeably strengthened its use of a differentiated approach [to socialist Shaoqi at the Vth Plenum of the CC CPC and efforts to penetrate into various spheres of states], which plays on various nuances and the promotion to leading posts of experi- life and activities in the countries of the changes in the domestic political and eco- enced political representatives who were socialist community. Chinese representa- nomic situation in certain socialist states, on victims of the “Cultural Revolution”, do not tives are trying to become more active in any type of temporary difficulties, will not mean, as the facts show, that Beijing has developing relations with official institu- only continue, but may even be more widely renounced its hostile policy towards social- tions and government agencies, social orga- used in the near future. It can be inferred that ist countries. On the contrary, one can nizations, educational institutions, and the attempts by the Chinese to penetrate into expect that this policy will be pursued even mass media; they are establishing contacts various areas of the domestic life of the more tenaciously. with various strata of the population, par- socialist countries will be further intensi- 2. Show the dangerous character of the ticularly with the intelligentsia and youth, fied. Chinese leadership’s aim to undermine the and widely distributing invitations to vari- Under these conditions an important unity of the socialist states, its hypocritical ous events at the PRC embassies. Informa- question in the work of ambassadors is the efforts to separate the questions of bilateral tion is being collected about the domestic effective and systematic opposition of relations between the socialist countries and life of their post country, the decisions of Beijing’s splitting activities in socialist coun- China from Soviet-Chinese relations, to sow party and state organs, the economic situa- tries, the neutralization of its plans to shake illusions concerning its goals in this area, for tion and the military potential, the military the unity of the socialist states, to influence example by using for its own purposes the forces and weapons. Under the guise of their positions. It is necessary to obstruct the fact that Soviet-Chinese negotiations are COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 203 being held. As the leadership of the frater- tries. Under present conditions, when the sector) nal countries was informed, the results of Chinese leadership is strengthening its sub- the Moscow round of Soviet-Chinese nego- versive activities among countries of the Proletariat of all countries, unite! tiations showed that the Chinese side does socialist community, it is all the more impor- not aim, in the near future in any case, to tant to meticulously observe the criteria elabo- COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET come to any agreements about the normal- rated at the meetings of the international UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE ization of relations between the USSR and departments of the CCs of the fraternal coun- the PRC; that China knowingly proposes tries for approaching questions of bilateral TOP SECRET unacceptable preconditions, and rejects the relations between socialist countries and the Soviet side’s constructive proposals, directed PRC. These mandate that the rapproche- No. P217/57 at the elaboration of principles of relations ment between Beijing and the USA (as their between the two countries and the building actions in Indochina and Afghanistan attest) To Comrades Brezhnev, of a political-juridical basis for them. is taking a more and more dangerous form Kosygyn, Andropov, Gromyko, As far as the second round is con- and is directed against the interests of peace Kirilenko, Suslov, Tikhonov, cerned, now it is generally difficult to say and the process of detente. Given the way the Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, anything about it, insofar as the Chinese situation is progressing, keep in mind that the Zamiatin, Smirtyukov. press announced that it would be “inappro- task of decisively repelling the strengthening priate” to hold them at present. Recent attacks on the socialist community on the Extract from protocol No. 217 of events attest to the escalation of Beijing’s part of imperialism, reaction, and Chinese the CC CPSU Politburo session hostility towards the Soviet Union. hegemonism, is all the more important. of October 2, 1980 3. Taking into account the hostile char- 5. Note the necessity of a vigilant ap- ______acter of China’s policy towards socialist proach to the activities of Beijing and its states and the strengthening of its aggres- representatives in socialist countries, its at- Re: Carrying out additional measures to siveness, note the necessity of a careful and tempts to penetrate various spheres of the counter American-Chinese military deliberate approach to the development of domestic life of these countries, to spread its cooperation economic ties and scientific-technical co- influence in various strata of the population, operation with the PRC, particularly in those particularly among young people, some of Approve the draft indicated for Soviet areas which would facilitate the growth of whom are a part of the technical, scientific, ambassadors and Soviet representatives its military-industrial potential. Beijing’s and creative intelligentsia. It is important not (enclosed). efforts to exaggerate the brilliant perspec- to weaken control over their contacts with tives of trade and economic cooperation Chinese representatives, to monitor their vis- CC SECRETARY with some socialist countries don’t have any its to various organizations, including gov- real basis and are only a tactical means of ernment agencies, scientific-research and * * * * * influencing these countries. Beijing now educational institutions, and also to limit the considers it advantageous to orient itself attendance by citizens in the post countries of For point 57 prot. No. 217 towards the West, and not to the develop- events at Chinese embassies. ment of trade-economic ties with the coun- It would be inadvisable to consider the Secret tries of the socialist community. The Chi- explanatory work on this question to be an nese side is prepared to give any promises, episodic campaign. It is necessary to con- FOR ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS however, as experience shows, among them duct it consistently, taking into account the AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES the heralded experience of relations with specifics of the post country, and, as much as Romania and Yugoslavia, China does not possible, involve a wide range of leading At the present time the partnership be- have sufficient foreign currency and trade party and government cadres, as well as the tween American imperialism and Beijing’s resources to fulfill these promises. In 1979, creative intelligentsia. As necessary, con- hegemonism, which is spreading to the mili- for example, the planned trade balance with tribute any suitable proposals for effective tary sphere, is a new negative phenomenon the FSRY [Yugoslavia] was fulfilled only to opposition to Beijing’s subversive activities in world politics and dangerous for all of one fourth. China not only is an undesirable and the neutralization of undesirable tenden- humanity. Counting on using “strong and partner, but also often uses trade-economic cies in the policies of specific socialist states. stable” China in its strategic interests, Wash- relations as a means of pressure on socialist ington is expanding the parameters for coop- states (SRV, MNR, Albania), which refuse * * * * * eration with Beijing in the military-techni- to undertake obligations for purely political cal sphere. In particular, the USA adminis- motives. Document II. CPSU CC Politburo tration has affirmed its readiness to deliver 4. Pay attention to the importance of Directive to Soviet Ambassadors and modern American weapons and technology continuing a consistent and broad coordina- Representatives, 2 October 1980 to China, which could be widely used for tion of actions towards China and its at- military purposes. tempts to use a differentiated approach to Subject to return within 7 days to As American-Chinese military coop- undermine the cohesion of the socialist coun- the CC CPSU (General department, 1st eration develops further, destructive elements 204 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN will grow in international relations. ing China into a military “superpower,” and and USA have agreed to follow. In accordance with the instructions you the resolution of the most serious problems, As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, received previously and taking into account such as increasing the extremely low mate- it has every opportunity to defend its inter- the specifics of your post country, continue rial and cultural level of the Chinese people, ests and repel the presumptions of other your work to reveal the dangerous character has been relegated to an indefinite future. In countries, including the PRC. The calcula- of the developing rapprochement between China they don’t hide the fact that “modern- tions of those who try to direct American- aggressive circles in the West, above all the ization” is the best means of preparing for Chinese relations in such as way as to use USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling war. In practice, unrestrained militarization China as a means of pressure and as a mili- attention to the following aspects. accelerates economic collapse and increased tary counterweight to the Soviet Union are 1. In developing military cooperation instability in China. Thus, those countries short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect with China, the ruling circles in the USA who actively take part in the Chinese pro- Chinese expansion to the north risk major count on the possibility of influencing China gram of “modernization,” actually contrib- miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion to act in a “desirable” way, of channeling its ute to the growth of its military potential and of China’s military potential increases the policies in an acceptable direction. Fre- render a disservice to the Chinese people. danger that certain countries would be in- quently the foreign policy activity of the On the other hand, the policy of milita- veigled into Beijing’s orbit, and in the long- PRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in rizing the country will inevitably engender term, could lead to a situation in which these the international arena. The Chinese leaders unpredictable turns and zigzags and future very countries could become the victims of themselves are not adverse to playing up to evidence of foreign policy adventurism, lead- Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking re- such a discussion and, to this end, without ing to the dangerous destabilization of the alistically, it would follow to recognize that withdrawing the thesis of the “inevitability international situation and the inflammation a “strong” China would chose a different of war,” have begun to use a more flexible of international tension. Any injection of direction for its expansionist plans: in all terminology. However, with the help of a aid, particularly by the USA, either directly likelihood it would swallow up neighboring sham “peaceful nature,” invoked to add or indirectly contributing to China’s milita- countries, grab hold of all the vitally impor- greater “respectability” to the PRC’s foreign rization and to the development of the Chi- tant regions of the world, and would cer- policy, Beijing is simply counting on gain- nese military potential, would enable China tainly not serve as an instrument in the hands ing time to accomplish the forced arming of to find the striking power necessary for the of the USA or any other country. the country. Actually, more and more, the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Un- 5. The development of military-politi- Chinese leadership is resorting to a policy of der conditions when Beijing not only op- cal cooperation between China and the USA, diktat and interference in the domestic af- poses all constructive proposals to strengthen which elicits concern among many states, fairs of other countries, and assumes on peace and detente, but also directly pro- has led already to a noticeable worsening of itself the improper functions of “teaching vokes international conflict, this [aid] would the international situation and complicated lessons” and “punishing” the unruly with mean an increased danger of war breaking the search for real paths to strengthening the force of arms. out and the growth of threats to all humanity, peace and security in various regions of the 2. As before, the PRC government including the Chinese and American peoples. world. In an effort to create favorable condi- declines to make any international legal com- The fact that what is proposed for deliv- tions for the realization of its hegemonic mitments to disarmament, tries to diminish ery to China is “non-lethal” equipment and aims, the Beijing leadership counts on ag- the importance of results achieved in this technology, “defensive,” and “dual-use,” gravating relations between countries, set- area, and refuses to take part in measures to etc., does not change the situation. The issue ting some states against others, and provok- limit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set is not that such distinctions are extremely ing military conflicts. Beijing does not hide about to manufacture and experiment with relative, but that cooperation with military the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear con- intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable modernization will free up the forces within flict between the Soviet Union and the USA, of carrying nuclear warheads, and is work- China and the means necessary for building and, from its ashes, assume world domina- ing on the creation of neutron weapons. All up its principal strike force - its nuclear tion. this drives the global arms race forward and capability. Those who insist on the necessity of directly contradicts the interests of detente. 4. The plans Beijing has been develop- “strengthening” China base their calcula- This policy of Beijing’s seriously threatens ing for a long time to change the global tions on the assumption that Beijing would everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not correlation of forces and the entire structure coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR just the Soviet Union and other socialist of contemporary international relations elicit and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore states. serious alarm. The transfer to China of any would not be dangerous for the West. But 3. There is absolutely no basis for technology or equipment whatsoever—this taking into account the continuing domestic concluding, as some do, that Beijing’s al- would be a step in the direction of the erosion political struggle in China, no one can guar- leged adoption of a “modernization pro- of the established military-balance in the antee that in 5-10 years China would not gram” represents a new political course to world and of a new cycle in the arms race. bring into play an anti-American card or overcome China’s economic backwardness. The destruction of the balance of military anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force In fact this course was taken above all to forces would erode the basis for the arms against those countries which irresponsibly contribute to the realization of pre-existing limitation negotiations insofar as equal se- connived and assisted with the PRC’s re- plans to speed up the process of transform- curity is the main principle which the USSR armament. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 205

The experience of history attests to the Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present COLD WAR IN ASIA fact that the extent of China’s expansion a direct threat to other regions. continued from page 191 will be proportional to the military might of Under these conditions, the Soviet Union the Chinese army. Even today China’s can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC: neighbors, above all the countries of South- only do we carefully monitor the direction of PAST AND PRESENT east Asia which the Chinese leaders con- American-Chinese cooperation in the mili- (Khabarovsk, 26-29 August 1995) sider to be their traditional sphere of influ- tary sphere, but also we must take the neces- ence, experience an immediate threat. It sary steps to strengthen the security of our 26 August 1995: Multiethnic Demographics would be easy to imagine how China will borders. We cannot tolerate change in the behave in relation to its neighbors once the military-strategic balance in favor of forces Morning: Russians Abroad in the Far East USA and its neighbors assist China to ac- hostile to the cause of peace. quire more modern weapons. Above all, (Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, Maria Krotova (Herzen Institute, Peters- China is trying to institute its control over Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, burg): “Russo-Chinese Daily Relations in pre- Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul. 1917 Harbin” Malacca and the straits of Singapore. The post countries should inform MID Lena Aurilena (Institute of History, Under these conditions, attempts to ig- [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Soviet Vladivostok): “Youth Politics in Russian Emigre nore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese ambassadors were sent instructions about Organizations in Manchukuo, 1930s-40s” policy and to remain neutral will only en- carrying out work to counter the negative Nadezhda Solov’eva (Khabarovsk Provin- courage Beijing to undertake new adven- counsequences for the causes of socialism, cial Archive): “Khabarovsk’s Archival Holdings tures and to extend its expansion. Collec- peace, and detente, of the establishment of an on Russo-Chinese Relations” tive efforts by Asian states could, on the American-Chinese military alliance. Famil- David Wolff (Princeton U.): “Interlocking contrary, impede China’s path to increased iarize the recipient with the content of the Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914” military might, which is directed above all aforementioned instructions. Shuxiao LI (Heilongjiang Trade Corpora- against countries of this region. Carry out your work in coordination tion): “The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin’s (For New Delhi only. The connivance with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the Rise as an Economic Center” and outright support of the USA for military Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the preparations in China can only contradict People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Far East, Vladivostok): “Russia’s Far Eastern India’s interests. Although the Chinese Hungarian People’s Republic (HPR), the Ger- Neighbors” leadership is holding talks about normaliz- man Democratic Republic (GDR), the Lao- Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): ing relations with India, there is an entire tian People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR), “The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigra- array of means of pressure against it in the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR), tion, 1920s-30s” China’s arsenal of strategies. In American- the Polish People’s Republic (PPR), and the Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Czechoslovak People’s Republic (CPR).) Afternoon : “Foreigners” in the Russian Far East Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India It is necessary to attentively follow all (RFE): Settlement and Resettlement and as a base of support for the aggressive foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans actions of the USA and China in Southeast for the expansion of American-Chinese mili- Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute, Asia is expanding more and more. In coop- tary cooperation, to regularly and effectively Khabarovsk): “German Intelligence in the RFE eration with the USA, Beijing is flooding inform the Center about them, and to take the during WWI: Suspicions and Realities” India’s neighbors with arms and, by creat- measures required to neutralize the tenden- Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, ing an atmosphere of war psychosis, is at- cies that are undesirable for our interests. Vladivostok): “Intervention and Civil War : New tempting to maintain in power unpopular Documents and Approaches” regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10; Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Beijing is speeding up its military prepara- translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.] Sapporo, Japan): “The Japanese in Vladivostok, tions along the Chinese-Indian border, con- 1906-1922” structing missile bases and strategic roads in Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, Vladivostok): “Forced Migrations in the Far East Tibet, and activating its support for separat- Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the from the 1920s till mid-1950s” ist movements in northeast India, where it is Institute of Modern History, Academica Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing practically waging an “undeclared war” Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on Economies): “Koreans in the Russian Far East: against this country.) a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with Collectivization and Deportation” There is no doubt that as China strength- China: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Viktoriia Romanova (Ped. Institute, ens its military-industrial potential, it will Policy, 1969-95. advance further along the path to the real- Khabarovsk): “The Jewish Diaspora in the mak- ization of Chinese leadership’s openly de- ing of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast” clared territorial pretensions against neigh- Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Ja- boring countries in Southeast, South, and pan): “Reevaluating the ‘Birobidzhan Project’: West Asia. This will not only lead to a The Regional Context” serious destabilization of the situation in 206 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Vladivostok): “Foreign Investment in the Rus- Borderland: Options and Tensions sian Fishing Industry 1920s-1930s” COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL Lidiia Varaksina (Khabarovsk Provincial HISTORY PROJECT Morning: Regional Political-Economy Archive): “Foreign Concessions in the Russian WORKING PAPERS Far East, 1920s-1930s” Pavel Minakir and Nadezhda Mikheeva (In- Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): “For- CWIHP Working Papers are available free upon stitute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “The eign Capital in the Far East in the 1920s” request. Requests can be sent to Jim Hershberg, Economy of the Russian Far East : Between Takeshi HAMASHITA (Tokyo U.): “Japa- Director, CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, Centralization and Regionalization” nese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia” Smithsonian Castle, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Vladimir Syrkin (Institute of Economic Washington, DC 20560; faxed to (202) 357- 4439; or e-mailed to [email protected] Research, Khabarovsk): “Economic Regional- 28 August 1995: The Crossborder Learning ism: Conditions, Factors and Tendencies” Process: Perceptions, Research and Compari- #1. Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and Katherine Burns (Massachusetts Inst. of sons China’s Entry into the Korean War” Technology): “The Russian Far Eastern Initia- tive: Autonomous Decision-Making and Coop- Morning : International Economic Considerations #2. P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the eration in Northeast Asia.” (II) Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San and Warsaw” Diego): “Politics and the Reform of the Primorsk Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar): Fuel and Energy Complex” “Current Issues in Russo-Chinese Border Trade” #3. James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Toward Germany during the Beria Interregnum” Weixian MA (Institute of E. Europe and Afternoon: The RFE as “Outpost” Central Asia, CASS): “Sino-Russian Border #4. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and Trade” the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Infor- Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Natal’ia Bezliudnaia (Far Eastern State U.): mation, 1952-52” Vladivostok): “The Cossack Revival in the Far “‘Geopolitical’ Projects in the Southern Part of East: From Borderguards to Émigrés to Interest the Maritime Province” #5. Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Con- Group” Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin): crete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Vladimir Sokolov (Primor’e Provincial “Sino-Russian Border Trade” Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and Museum): “Russian Nationalism and the Cos- Andrei Admidin and E. Devaeva (Institute the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961” sacks of the Far East” of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Economic #6. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Jun NIU (Institute of American Studies, Relations of the Russian Far East in the Asian- Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)” CASS): “Soviet Policy towards Northeast China, Pacific Region” 1945-49” Douglas Barry (U. of Alaska - Anchorage): #7. Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, “Viet- Ping BU (Institute of Modern History, “Alaska and the Russian Far East : Finding Friends, namese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold Heilongjiang Province Academy of Social Sci- Making Partners” War Period: Two Reports” ences): “Sino-Soviet Disposal of Japanese Chemi- cal Weapons after 1945” Afternoon: Perceptions, Images & Area-Studies #8. Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea Evgeniia Gudkova (Institute of Economic and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives” Research, Khabarovsk): “Military Conversion in Viktor Larin (Institute of History, the Russian Far East” Vladivostok): “Putting the Brakes on Regional #9. Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, James Hershberg (Cold War International Integration: Chinese Migration and the Russian “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, Far East in Two Periods, 1907-14 and 1988- Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports” DC): “Northeast Asia and the Cold War” 1995” Tamara Troyakova (Institute of History, Zhengyun NAN (Beijing Normal U.): “The #10. Norman M. Naimark, “‘To Know Every- Vladivostok): “The Maritime Province on the Roots of Russian Studies in China : Harbin, thing and To Report Everything Worth Know- Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok” 1950s-60s” ing’: Building the East German Police State, Stephen Kotkin (Princeton U.): “Frank 1945-1949” Late Afternoon: International Economic Consid- Golder, Robert Kerner and the Northeast Asian #11. Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, erations (I) Seminar, 1920s-1950s” the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits Evgenii Plaksen (Institute of History, of Rollback” Natal’ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): Vladivostok): “Public Opinion in the Russian Far “The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on East: Accentuations and Priorities” #12. Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, and the Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia Thomas Lahusen (Duke University) : Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery” and China” “Azhaev’s Far East” Mikhail Koval’chuk (Institute of Transport, Tatsuo NAKAMI (Tokyo Foreign Lan- #13. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three Khabarovsk): “Foreign Trade and Transport in guages U.), “Japanese Conceptions of Northeast After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s” Asia in the 20th century” United States and Great Britain” Anatolii Mandrik (Institute of History,