NEWCOL D WEAR INTERNATIONALVIDENCE HISTORY PROJECT ONBULLETIN 148 THE EMERGING DISPUTES BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW: TEN NEWLY AVAILABLE CHINESE DOCUMENTS, 1956-1958 Translated and Annotated by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian Translators’ Notes: In February 1950, conversation with the Soviet Ambassador as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong kept silent on the resolution [condemning the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friend- related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to you], although we published articles to criti- ship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, a series of more general questions concern- cize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the ing the overall relationship between the two not have done that; we should have dis- Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two countries, revealing comprehensively (often cussed [this issue] with you: if some of your “brotherly” Communist countries, would in cynical tones) his understanding of the viewpoints were incorrect, [we should have last forever. However, serious problems historical, philosophical, and political ori- let] you conduct self-criticism, and there soon emerged between the Chinese and gins of the problems existing between Beijing was no need to hurry [into the controversy] Soviet parties and governments. Starting in and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: 1960, the two parties became engaged in an emphasized the issue of “equality,” empha- should you disagree with us, you should do increasingly heated polemical debate over sizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow’s the same thing, that is, the adoption of a the nature of true communism and which treatment of the CCP as a junior partner. method of persuasion and consultation. party represented it. By the late 1960s, the The third group includes four Chinese docu- There have not been that many successful relationship between the two countries had ments from Russian Foreign Ministry ar- cases in which one criticizes foreign parties deteriorated to such an extent that a major chives, which demonstrate the extent to which in newspapers. [Your] case offers a pro- border war erupted between them in March China had been dependent upon the military found historical lesson for the international 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union and other material support of the Soviet communist movement. Although you have change from allies to enemies? What prob- Union in the 1950s. These documents make suffered from it, the international commu- lems caused the decline and final collapse it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet rela- nist movement has learned a lesson from this of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to tions from another perspective. mistake. [The international communist answer these questions, scholars need ac- movement] must fully understand [the seri- cess to contemporary documentary sources, Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the ousness of ] this mistake. and these translations of the newly avail- Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences When you offered to recognize new able Chinese documents provide a basis for China, we did not respond, nor did we de- beginning to answer these questions. 1. Minutes, Mao’s Conversation with a cline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have The documents are divided into three Yugoslavian Communist Union Delega- rejected it, because there was no reason for groups. The first group includes two tion, Beijing, [undated] September 19561 us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Se- did not say no to it. How could we find any Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist Chinese Communist view on such important (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical country? questions as Khrushchev’s criticism of Documents, 1993), 251-262 There was, however, another factor Stalin, the general principles underlying which prevented us from responding to you: the relations among “brotherly parties and We welcome you to China. We are very the Soviet friends did not want us to form states,” and their perception of the Soviet pleased at your visit. We have been sup- diplomatic relations with you. If so, was Union’s attitude toward the Chinese revo- ported by you, as well as by other brotherly China an independent state? Of course, yes. lution. Particularly interesting is Mao [Communist] parties. We are invariably If an independent state, why, then, did we Zedong’s repeated reference to the “un- supporting you as much as all the other follow their instructions? [My] comrades, equal” relationship between the Chinese brotherly parties. In today’s world, the Marx- when the Soviet Union requested us to fol- Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet ist and Communist front remains united, low their suit at that time, it was difficult for Union during Stalin’s era. Through these whether in places where success [of Com- us to oppose it. It was because at that time documents one is able to sense some of the munist revolution] is achieved or not yet some people claimed that there were two deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of achieved. However, there were times when Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group we were not so united; there were times when other in China, even if no one passed a includes three documents reflecting the CCP we let you down. We listened to the opinions resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have leadership’s response to the Soviet propos- of the Information Bureau2 in the past. Al- once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that als in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio though we did not take part in the Bureau’s [they] suspected that I was a half-hearted station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet [business], we found it difficult not to sup- Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When submarine flotilla in 1958. In his long port it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito 149S COLDIN WARO INTERNATIONAL-SOVIET HISTORY PROJEC T BULLETINRELATIONS from my head? The tag was removed after tion. [Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us people who had suspected whether China’s [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] correct this mistake: while Wang Ming was a real revolution. and came to [North] Korea’s aid and when “decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang],” You might wonder why [we] still pay a [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow. Jiang Jieshi “slapped his face and kicked tribute to Stalin in China by hanging his The Wang Ming line3 was in fact Stalin’s him out.” Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China’s portrait on the wall. Comrades from Mos- line. It ended up destroying ninety percent best instructor: he had educated the people cow have informed us that they no longer of our strength in our bases, and one hundred of the whole nation as well as all of our Party hang Stalin’s portraits and only display percent of [our strength] in the white areas.4 members. Jiang lectured with his machine Lenin’s and current leaders’ portraits in pub- Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi5 pointed this out in guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with lic parade. They, however, did not ask us to his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.6 his own words. follow their suit. We find it very difficult to Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the The third time was after Japan’s surren- cope. The four mistakes committed by Stalin losses] to the [impact of] Stalin’s line? There der and the end of the Second World War. are yet to be made known to the Chinese is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and people as well as to our whole party. Our could criticize Stalin; but it would be inap- [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give situation is quite different from yours: your propriate for us to criticize him. We should the whole of China to America and Jiang [suffering inflicted by Stalin] is known to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Jieshi. In terms of material and moral sup- the people and to the whole world. Within Union. Maybe [we] could make our criti- port, especially moral support, Stalin hardly our party, the mistakes of the two Wang cism public sometime in the future. It has to gave any to us, the Communist Party, but Ming lines are well known; but our people be that way in today’s world, because facts supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was do not know that these mistakes originated are facts. The Comintern made numerous made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later in Stalin. Only our Central Committee was mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his aware that Stalin blocked our revolution and were not so bad, but its middle stage was not conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in regarded me as a half-hearted Tito. so good: it was all right when Lenin was his autobiography. We had no objection that the Soviet alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in Only after the dissolution of the Union functions as a center [of the world charge.7 The first Wang Ming line domi- Comintern did we start to enjoy more free- revolution] because it benefits the socialist nated [our party] for four years, and the dom.