DOCSLIB.ORG

Dual Pension Regimes in China

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Dual Pension Regimes in China Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion : Dual Pension Regimes in China by Yujeong Yang A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) in The University of Michigan 2018 Doctoral Committee: Professor Mary E. Gallagher, Chair Associate Professor Yuen Yuen Ang Associate Professor Lan Deng Professor Allen D. Hicken Yujeong Yang [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4193-42672018 Copyright c Yujeong Yang To my family ii Acknowledgements I have received enormous support and opportunities throughout my journey to com- plete this dissertation. Most of all, I would like to thank my doctoral committee mem- bers. Each member of my dissertation committees has provided me with invaluable support and guidance that helped me complete this dissertation, improve the quality of my research, and prepare my future as a scholar. It has been a great pleasure and privilege for me to work with such an amazing group of scholars. First, I thank my advisor, Mary Gallagher, for her numerous support and encourage- ment. She has been an amazing mentor from the very beginning of this journey. She has spent countless hours in reading my coarse drafts, helping me make my arguments more rigorous, and encouraging me to further develop my research idea. She has come to every single presentation I made during workshops and conferences and given me thorough comments. She has also provided me with opportunities to work with her on exciting research project and to publish the works as co-author. There are many mem- orable moments that made me think I am lucky to have her as my advisor, but one moment I can never forget is when I met her in Shanghai in the winter of 2015. At that time, I was doing my fieldwork in Shanghai, struggling with the loneliness, anxiety, and frustration. She kindly accompanied me on her trip to a conference held in Beijing so that I could network with informants who can enrich my research. During the five-hour express train ride from Shanghai to Beijing, Mary and I had a long conversation about my fieldwork experience, research agenda, and future plan. The thoughtful advice, in- spiration, and support I received from her on the train were the keys that helped me overcome the difficulties I had during my fieldwork and eventually made me fully enjoy the fieldwork experience and my academic journey as a whole. I can confidently say that I am lucky to have an amazing academic advisor and a role model like her. I am also grateful to other members of my dissertation committee. Allen D. Hicken has read and commented on several versions of my papers. He has also helped me think iii about ways to re-frame my research project so that I can target a broader audience and reach beyond the China specialists. He has also provided me with invaluable career advice. Yuen Yuen Ang has witnessed every step of my progress in graduate school as a researcher and as a teacher. As I worked with her as her research assistant and teaching assistant, I could learn how to conduct research, how to collect and manage data, and how to communicate with students. When I was preparing my job market materials, she pushed me to think about ways to pose my question in a more interesting and appealing way. Lan Deng joined the committee from the College of Urban Planning and provided me new perspectives on my dissertation. Her suggestions, encouragement, and questions made me think about alternative explanations. The long journey to complete my Ph.D. was only possible with the support of amaz- ing colleagues and fellow graduate students. When I first came into the program, Qingjie Zeng was one of the few graduate students interested in Chinese politics. Qingjie shige has been a wonderful colleague with whom I discuss research idea and collaborate on research projects. I also benefited from the friendly intellectual community at the Univer- sity of Michigan. Patricia Chen, Yilang Feng, Yuequan Guo, Maiko Heller, Jeffrey Javed, Blake Miller, Mike Thompson, Nicole Wu, and Alon Yakter have provided me with help- ful comments and suggestions for my dissertation and job market papers and have also patiently listened to my presentations for multiple times. I also owe special thanks to Adrian Shin for giving me helpful feedback for my papers, revising my drafts, providing me with invaluable tips, and listening to my concerns. He is the first one I would talk to whenever I have any concerns or questions and I thank him for enduring my endless questions. I am also deeply grateful to the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies, Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, and Rackham Graduate School of University of Michigan for supporting my doctoral research. In China, my interviews were arranged by Sun Zhongwei, Song Jing, Wang Meiyan, and Chen Wei. My fieldwork would have not been productive and enjoyable without their help and support. Yan Yu and Wang Zilong welcomed me wholeheartedly when- ever I visited China and treated me with best local food over the years. I also would like to thank my best friends: Juhyun Song and Jeongeun Kim. They helped me settle in when I first came to Ann Arbor with two suitcases in 2011. They have been great mentors, soul mates, sisters, and study partners since then. I deeply thank Yeonkyung Jeong who’ve always wished my best and provided me with thoughtful academic and non-academic advice. I am also grateful to Yongjoo Park for reading my iv papers, listening to my presentations, providing me with harsh yet helpful comments, and making me laugh when I feel overwhelmed and weary. Finally and above all, I thank my family for their support and sacrifice. I am indebted to my parents, Seungcheon Yang and Hyunsook Choi, and my brother, Sunmo Yang. In my third year in the program, my mother was diagnosed with Lupus and underwent two surgeries. I can only imagine what my family would have gone through during that difficult time. Even then, my family has always given me full support so that I can concentrate on my work. Their support and sacrifice make everything possible. This dissertation is dedicated to them. v Contents Dedication ........................................... ii Acknowledgements ..................................... iii List of Figures ......................................... x List of Tables ......................................... xii List of Abbreviations .................................... xiv Abstract ............................................ xv Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................ 1 1.1 Puzzle......................................... 8 1.2 A Sub-national Approach ............................. 11 1.3 Pension Programs in China ............................ 13 1.4 Main Arguments .................................. 15 1.5 Organization of the Dissertation ......................... 19 2 Theory ........................................... 22 2.1 Introduction..................................... 22 2.2 Theories of Social Policies ............................. 25 2.2.1 Structural Explanation........................... 25 2.2.2 Social-Pressure Based Explanation: Power Resource Theory & Cross- Class Coalition Theory........................... 28 2.2.3 State-Centric Explanation ......................... 31 vi 2.2.4 Summary................................... 34 2.3 Authoritarian Welfare Provision: Who Distributes Welfare Benefits and Why?......................................... 35 2.3.1 Authoritarian Incentives for Welfare Provision............. 35 2.3.2 The Chinese State: Fragmented Political Structure and Diverging Welfare Preferences............................. 38 2.3.3 Summary................................... 40 2.4 Whom to Benefit?.................................. 41 2.4.1 Coopting the Privileged: Collusive Welfare Provision Strategy . 43 2.4.2 Embracing the Underprivileged: Broader yet Modest Welfare Pro- vision..................................... 45 2.4.3 Theoretical Framework: Politics of Welfare Inclusion and Exclusion 47 2.5 Understanding Chinese Local Welfare States .................. 50 2.6 Conclusion...................................... 56 3 How the Central-Local Relationship Shaped the Chinese Pension System ... 60 3.1 Introduction..................................... 60 3.2 Evolution of the Chinese Pension System: Central and Local Government’s Responses to Major Structural Changes ..................... 62 3.2.1 The 1990s: From SOE-based Pension System to Locally Managed Pension System............................... 63 3.2.2 The 2000s: Marketization, Growing Labor Mobility, and Further Fragmentation of the Pension System.................. 68 3.2.3 The 2010s: A Bumpy Road toward the Universal Pension System . 74 3.3 Current Pension System: Consolidation of the Dual Pension Regime with Local Fragmentation ................................ 78 3.3.1 Employment-Based Pension Program .................. 79 3.3.2 Residency-Based Pension Program.................... 85 3.4 Institutional Background behind the Fragmentation of the Chinese Pen- sion System ..................................... 92 3.4.1 Fiscal Incentives .............................. 94 3.4.2 Local Welfare Chauvinism and Local Citizenship Institutions . 97 3.4.3 Economic Incentives: Employer Interests and Local Economic De- velopment..................................100 3.5 Concluding Remarks................................102 vii 4 Creating “Outsiders” : How Labor Informalization and Labor Mobility In- teract in Stratifying Chinese Workers .......................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • CONTEMPORARY CHINA: a BOOK LIST (Winter 1999 — FIRST ON-LINE EDITION, MS Word, L&R Margins 0.9") by Lynn White
    PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Woodrow Wilson School, Politics Department, East Asian Studies Program CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A BOOK LIST (Winter 1999 — FIRST ON-LINE EDITION, MS Word, L&R margins 0.9") by Lynn White This list of items in English has several purposes: --to help advise students' course essays, junior papers, policy workshops, and senior theses about contemporary China; --to supplement the required reading lists of the seminars WWS 576a/Pol. 536 on "Chinese Development" and Pol. 535 on "Chinese Politics," as well as the undergraduate lecture course, Pol. 362; --to provide graduate students with a list that can help their study for comprehensive exams in Chinese politics; a few of the compiler's favorite books are starred on the list, but not too much should be made of this, because some such books may be too old for students' purposes or the subjects may not be central to present interests; --to supplement a bibliography of all Asian serials in the Princeton Libraries that was compiled long ago by Frances Chen and Maureen Donovan. Students with specific research topics should definitely meet Laird Klingler, who is WWS Librarian and the world's most constructive wizard. This list cannot cover articles, but computer databases can. Rosemary Little and Mary George at Firestone are also enormously helpful. Especially for materials in Chinese, so is Martin Heijdra in Gest Library (Palmer Hall; enter up the staircase near the "hyphen" with Jones Hall). Other local resources are at institutes run by Chen Yizi and Liu Binyan (for current numbers, ask at EAS, 8-4276). Professional bibliographers are the most neglected major academic resource at Princeton.
    [Show full text]
  • 27 the China Factor in Taiwan
    Wu Jieh-min, 2016, “The China Factor in Taiwan: Impact and Response”, pp. 425-445 in Gunter Schubert ed., Handbook of T Modern Taiwan Politics and Society, Routledge. 27 THE CHINA FACTOR IN TAIWAN Impact and response Jieh-Min Wu* Since the turn of the century, the rise of China has inspired global a1nbitions and heightened international anxiety. Though Chinese influence is not a ne\V factor in the international geo­ political syste1n, the synergy between China's growing purchasing po\ver and its political \vill is dra\ving increasing attention on the world stage. With China's e111ergence as a global econontic powerhouse and the Chinese state's extraction of massive revenues and tremendous foreign reserves, Beijing has learned to flex these financial 1nuscles globally in order to achieve its polit­ ical goals. Essentially, the rise of China has enabled the PRC to speed up its n1ilitary moderniza­ tion and adroitly co1nbine econonllc measures and 'united front \Vork' in pursuit of its national interests. Hence Taiwan, whose sovereignty continues to be contested by the PRC, has been heavily i1npacted by China's new strategy. The Chinese ca1npaign kno\vn as 'using business to steer politics' has arguably been success­ ful in achieving inany of the effects desired by Beijing. For exan1ple, the Chinese government has repeatedly leveraged Taiwan's trade and econonllc dependence to intervene in Taiwan's elections. Such econonllc dependence n1ay constrain Taiwanese choices within a structure of Beijing's creation. In son1e historical 1no1nents, however, subjective identity and collect­ ive action could still en1erge as 'independent variables' that open up \Vindo\vs of opportun­ ity, expanding the range of available choices.
    [Show full text]
  • China High Level Dialogue
    U.S. – China High Level Dialogue March 29 – April 2, 2015 Beijing, China Major Power Relations & U.S. – China and the Middle East CAP-CUSEF High Level Dialogue TABLE OF CONTENTS Trip Background Information • Vitals and Trip Information • Itinerary (tentative) • Flight Information • Senior Official Meetings Biographies • PRC Structure • Chinese Participant Biographies (tentative) • U.S. Participant Biographies • Track II Dialogue Agenda Trip Documents – Major Power Relations: Key Issues for September 2015 White House Summit 1. Calendar of key U.S. – China Events 2. Memo on Regional Security in the Asia – Pacific, (Vikram Singh, Brian Harding, Rudy deLeon) 3. Memo on the New Silk Road, (Ariella Viehe) 4. Memo on Sustainable Development Goals (Molly Elgin-Cossart) 5. Memo on Development Banks (Molly Elgin-Cossart) 6. Memo on U.S. – China Forecast on Energy and Climate Issues, (Melanie Hart) 7. Memo on U.S. – China's Reform Program: Meetings and Background (Melanie Hart) 8. Memo on U.S. – China Climate Finance, (Pete Ogden) 9. Memo on Domestic U.S. Energy and Climate, (Greg Dotson) 10. Memo on U.S. and Iran Relations, (Hardin Lang, Peter Juul) 11. Memo on U.S. – China and the Middle East Cooperation, (Brian Katulis) 12. CAP Paper for discussion in Track II dialogue (draft) 13. SIIS paper for discussion in Track II dialogue (draft) 14. CAP-SIIS Recommendations on Track II Key Leadership Statements 1. Premier Li Keqiang, “Premier Li Keqiang Meets the Press – Third Session of the 12th NPC.” March 15, 2015 2. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press – Third Session of the 12th NPC.” March 8, 2015 3.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 “The Brookings Institution and Taiwan-China Relations” by Richard C. Bush the Brookings Institution Prepared for the Confe
    “The Brookings Institution and Taiwan-China Relations”1 by Richard C. Bush The Brookings Institution Prepared for the Conference on “Between Power and Knowledge: Think Tanks in Transition” Institute for International Relations, National Chengchi University April 2013 A couple of years ago, I chanced upon an aging copy of the January 1945 issue of National Geographic magazine. To my surprise, there was an article about Taiwan (called “Formosa” in the article). As was common with National Geographic at that time, there were many pictures of the island’s aboriginal peoples (in this case, they were all fully clothed). But there were also pictures of U.S. bomb damage during World War II, and a not-bad description of Taiwan’s history, society, and 20th century circumstances. The author was Joseph Ballantine, who had served in the American Consulate in Taihoku from 1912 to 1914. I had never heard of Ballantine, so I resorted to my default source of information – Wikipedia. Imagine my even greater surprise when I discovered that he had actually been a scholar at Brookings, and that through the Institution’s Press, he had published a book about Taiwan in 1952: Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy.2 I had no idea that my own organization’s coverage of the Taiwan Strait issue had such a long history. So I was pleased when Arthur Ding invited me to write about how Brookings had treated the subject over the last six decades. I do so in a basically chronological way and draw on the books that a series of Brookings scholars have written that addressed cross-Strait relations to one degree or another.
    [Show full text]
  • Who's Behind China's High-Technology “Revolution”?
    Who’s Behind China’s Evan A. Feigenbaum High-Technology “Revolution”? How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing’s Priorities, Policies, and Institutions For seven years after the Tiananmen Square tragedy of 1989, virtually all signiªcant issues in U.S.- China relations became subordinate to concern about human rights and China’s suppression of political dissent. Yet in the three years since China’s 1996 missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait, high-technology issues have come increasingly to replace human rights at the center of the contentious and often politicized discussion that characterizes current debate about U.S.-China policy. Recent allegations concerning satellite exports and nuclear espionage, in particular, demonstrate the centrality of high technology to the debate about China’s place in the world. This makes it especially important to explore links that may bind China’s national technology and industrial policies to its ap- proach to security and development. How has the Chinese understanding of this linkage changed as the past priority of militarized growth has given way to the rapid expansion of a commercial economy since the late 1970s?1 Who is responsible for making important technology decisions in China? How have Chinese technology leaders thought about the relationship between technology and national power during the past twenty years? Has political change affected this worldview? Finally, how has renewed contact with international technical circles since the 1970s affected the Chinese approach to national high-tech strategy and investment? Evan A. Feigenbaum is a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F.
    [Show full text]
  • Containment by Stealth: Chinese Views of and Policies Toward America’S Alliances with Japan and Korea After the Cold War
    Containment by Stealth: Chinese Views of and Policies toward America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea after the Cold War Yu Bin September 1999 1 2 About the Author Yu Bin is associate professor in the Political Science Department of Wittenberg University, Ohio, and faculty associate of the Mershon Center, Ohio State University. His research focuses on East Asian politics and foreign relations. 3 4 Containment by Stealth: Chinese Views of and Policies toward America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea after the Cold War Yu Bin Introduction At the height of the Cold War, the dominant Western theories of alliance building in interstate relations argued that alliances tend to be motivated more by an external need to confront a clearly defined common adversary than by the domestic attributes of alliance partners.1 The newly reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance,2 however, together with the newly expanded NATO, seems to depart from the conventional pattern by emphasizing shared democratic values and by maintaining a high degree of ambiguity regarding the goals and targets of the alliance. Although these new features of American-led military alliances provide an anchor in an other- wise highly fluid situation in the post–Cold War world, many Chinese foreign- and defense- policy analysts believe that U.S. alliances with Asian countries, particularly with Japan, pose a serious, long-term challenge, if not a threat, to China’s national security, national unification, and modernization. The ambiguity of the revised U.S.-Japan security alliance means that it is at best searching for targets and at worst aiming at China.3 China’s concerns about the intention, scope, and capability of the alliances are set against a backdrop of several major changes in the region: the end of the Cold War, the simultaneous rise of China and Japan, the post-revolution reforms of Asian communist regimes, and the United States as the sole superpower.
    [Show full text]
  • Identity and Integration As Conflicting Forces Stimulating the Sunflower Movement and the KMT’S Loss in the 2014 Elections
    Identity and Integration as Conflicting Forces Stimulating the Sunflower Movement and the KMT’s Loss in the 2014 Elections Cal Clark, Auburn University and Alexander Tan National Sun Yat-sen University University of Canterbury 1 Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, University of St. Thomas, Houston, October 9-11, 2015. Over the past twenty years, there have been two important trends in Taiwan’s political economy whose contradictory implications provide an important explanation for the dramatic events of 2014, the Sunflower Movement and the major losses suffered by the Kuomintang (KMT) in the local elections. The first of these is the growing sense of a Taiwanese identity in the country; and the second is the increasing economic integration across the Taiwan Strait in terms of trade, investment, integrated production processes, and tourism. The logic of each pulls Taiwan in different directions. During the Presidency of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), the ruling party pushed for more Taiwanization, while the administration of his successor, the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou, pushed for deepening economic linkages with China as the best means for promoting economic growth. The Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services that was negotiated by Taiwan and China in 2013 became highly controversial because it raised fears that it would harm Taiwan economically and undermine the nation’s sovereignty. The Sunflower Movement arose in the Spring of 2014 when the KMT threatened to ram the 2 Agreement through the Legislative Yuan with little debate; and in November the KMT received a devastating thumping at the hands of the electorate.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign High-Tech R&D in China
    THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER L. STIMSON THE HENRY 11 DUPONT CIRCLE, NW • NINTH FLOOR • WASHINGTON, DC 20036 TEL (202) 223.5956 • FAX (202) 238.9604 • WWW.STIMSON.ORG Located in Washington, DC, The Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to offering practical solutions to problems of national and international security. From the beginning, the Stimson Center has been committed to meaningful impact, a thorough integration of analysis and outreach, and a creative and innovative approach to problems. The Center has four basic program areas, including: Reducing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Building Regional Security; Strengthening Institutions of International Peace and Security; and Linking Foreign High-Tech Trade, Technology & Security. These four program areas encompass work on a wide range of security issues, from Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation to Regional Security in Asia to the Future of Peace Operations. R&D in China RISKS, REWARDS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS FOREIGN HIGH-TECH R&D IN CHINA: for U.S.-China Relations and Implications Risks, Rewards, Propelled by open markets and economic reform, the 1990s brought unparal- leled growth and economic development to the People’s Republic of China. At the same time, but less widely known, China has begun to assume an influential role in the globalization of high-tech research and development (R&D). Consequently, the PRC is poised to become not only Asia’s assembly line, but also one of the Pacific Rim’s — and the world’s — centers of innovation. A growing number of the world’s leading high-tech multinationals have established R&D programs or centers in China, raising many questions for US policymakers regarding the benefits and risks of overseas R&D in terms of near- and long-term US security and economic interests.
    [Show full text]
  • The Suitability of a Greater China Currency Union
    THE SUITABILITY OF A GREATER CHINA CURRENCY UNION YIN-WONG CHEUNG JUDE YUEN CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1192 CATEGORY 6: MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE MAY 2004 An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1192 THE SUITABILITY OF A GREATER CHINA CURRENCY UNION Abstract The study assesses the level of integration among the three Greater China economies (namely China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and examines the suitability of a Greater China currency union. Currently, the three economies have extensive trade and investment linkages. Our analyses show that these economies share common long-run and short-run cyclical variations. We also estimate the output costs of relinquishing policy autonomy to form a currency union. The estimated output losses, which depend on, for example, the method used to generate shock estimates, seem to be moderate and are likely to be less than the efficient gains derived from a currency union arrangement. JEL classification: F33, F31, F41. Keywords: Greater China, trade and investment, common stochastic trend, synchronized and non-synchronized business cycles, output losses, exchange rate regime. Yin-Wong Cheung Jude Yuen Economics Department Economics Department University of California University of California Santa Cruz, CA 95064 Santa Cruz, CA 95064 U.S.A. U.S.A. [email protected] [email protected] The authors thank the seminar participants at the Peking University and Shandong University for their comments and suggestions. Also, we thank Desmond Hou and Dickson Tam for compiling the data. The financial support of faculty research funds of the University of California, Santa Cruz is gratefully acknowledged.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Business Networks and Their Implications for South Korea
    3 Chinese Business Networks and Their Implications for South Korea YOUNG ROK CHEONG In the past 20 years, no country seems to have beaten China in its grand comeback in both global political and economic arenas. China has be- come a key player in formulating the world order since gaining member- ship in the United Nations in 1972. China has also recorded an average annual real growth rate of more than 10 percent—shocking the world. In human history, no other country has shown such tremendous economic growth while having such a huge population. And with regard to the source of China’s rapid economic growth, the contribution of overseas Chinese1 has often been mentioned by many China watchers.2 First of all, overseas Chinese not only provided the People’s Republic of China with capital at the initial stages of its Economic Reform and Open Door policies in 1978 and thereafter, but they also gave it a developmental model to be copied. Even more important, overseas Chinese global busi- ness networks were a key element in rescuing China from the economic bottleneck it suffered when confronted with sanctions from Western countries after the Tiananmen Square incident. Yet it is too early to judge whether there is a strong relationship between these overseas Chinese networks and China’s rapid economic development. Young Rok Cheong is professor of economics at Seoul National University. 1. Defining “overseas Chinese” is somewhat complex. In this chapter, the term “overseas Chinese” means the Chinese living abroad, regardless of their citizenship. 2. Barry Naughton has been among them.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Case
    MIT Japan Program Working Paper 01.03 Technology Development in the New Millenium: China in Search of a Workable Model Barry Naughton Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California, San Diego and Adam Segal Center for International Studies, MIT Union of Concerned Scientists Revision of the paper presented to the second meeting of Innovation and Crisis: Asian Technology after the Millenium, Cambridge, September 15-16, 2000 Draft version of February, 2001. MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series 01.03 Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Room E38-7th Floor Cambridge, MA 02139 Phone: 617-252-1483 Fax: 617-258-7432 Date of Publication: May 28, 2001 © MIT Japan Program Preface Like other East Asian countries, China has been undergoing a process of liberalization and of opening to the world economy. During the last twenty years, economic reforms have slowly moved the country as a whole toward a more open, more market-oriented economy, and science and technology (S&T) policies and institutions have been reformed in a similar spirit. Policy makers gradually dismantled a highly centralized and hierarchical model of technological innovation and began replacing it with a more flexible and “bottom-up” system. Leaders at all levels have moved away from a research and development system dominated by central planning and state-owned enterprises to one that increasingly relies on individual innovation and entrepreneurship, while foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational corporations both play larger roles in Chinese development plans. The openness to a diversity of actors crucially includes both outside actors--multi-national corporations (MNCs)--and domestic non-state owned corporations.
    [Show full text]
  • Coercive Capacity and the Durability of the Chinese Communist State
    Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 13–25 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Communist and Post-Communist Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud Coercive capacity and the durability of the Chinese communist state Yuhua Wang Department of Political Science, The University of Pennsylvania, United States article info abstract Article history: Why has the Chinese communist state remained so durable in an age of democratization? Available online 14 February 2014 Contrary to existing theories, this article argues that the strong state coercive capacity has survived the authoritarian rule in China. We demonstrate that the Chinese Communist Keywords: Party has taken deliberate actions to enhance the cohesion of its coercive organ- Coercion izationsdthe police, in particulardby distributing “spoils of public office” to police chiefs. Coercive capacity In addition, the state has extended the scope of its coercion by increasing police funding in Authoritarian durability localities where the state sector loses control of the population. We use and rely on mixed China Police methods to test this theory. Ó 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Why has the Chinese communist state remained so singularly durable in an age of democratization? The Chinese case seems to contradict modernization theory’s prediction that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” (Lipset, 1959: 75) China has far surpassed the “threshold” of per capita income for democratic transition, as calculated by Przeworski et al. (2000: 94) to be $4,115, whereas China’s per capita GDP in 2011 was $8,394.
    [Show full text]