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China High Level Dialogue U.S. – China High Level Dialogue March 29 – April 2, 2015 Beijing, China Major Power Relations & U.S. – China and the Middle East CAP-CUSEF High Level Dialogue TABLE OF CONTENTS Trip Background Information • Vitals and Trip Information • Itinerary (tentative) • Flight Information • Senior Official Meetings Biographies • PRC Structure • Chinese Participant Biographies (tentative) • U.S. Participant Biographies • Track II Dialogue Agenda Trip Documents – Major Power Relations: Key Issues for September 2015 White House Summit 1. Calendar of key U.S. – China Events 2. Memo on Regional Security in the Asia – Pacific, (Vikram Singh, Brian Harding, Rudy deLeon) 3. Memo on the New Silk Road, (Ariella Viehe) 4. Memo on Sustainable Development Goals (Molly Elgin-Cossart) 5. Memo on Development Banks (Molly Elgin-Cossart) 6. Memo on U.S. – China Forecast on Energy and Climate Issues, (Melanie Hart) 7. Memo on U.S. – China's Reform Program: Meetings and Background (Melanie Hart) 8. Memo on U.S. – China Climate Finance, (Pete Ogden) 9. Memo on Domestic U.S. Energy and Climate, (Greg Dotson) 10. Memo on U.S. and Iran Relations, (Hardin Lang, Peter Juul) 11. Memo on U.S. – China and the Middle East Cooperation, (Brian Katulis) 12. CAP Paper for discussion in Track II dialogue (draft) 13. SIIS paper for discussion in Track II dialogue (draft) 14. CAP-SIIS Recommendations on Track II Key Leadership Statements 1. Premier Li Keqiang, “Premier Li Keqiang Meets the Press – Third Session of the 12th NPC.” March 15, 2015 2. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press – Third Session of the 12th NPC.” March 8, 2015 3. Assistant Secretary Daniel R. Russel, “Remarks at the Brookings Institution.” December 16, 2014. 4. Secretary John Kerry, “Press Availability: Remarks on APEC.” Beijing, China, November 2014 5. President Obama and President Xi, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference,” November 2014 6. President Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major-Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.” November 28-29, 2014 7. President Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at APEC CEO Summit,” Beijing, China, November 2014 8. President Obama, “Statement by the President to the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” Beijing, China, July 2014. China’s Internal Politics 9. Chris Buckley, “X Jinping’s ‘Four Comprehensives’ Give Shape to a Crowded Agenda,” The New York Times, March 2015 10. Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip,” Foreign Affairs, November 2014 11. David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” The Wall Street Journal, March 2015 12. Stephen Harner, “Why David Shambaugh’s ‘Coming Chinese Crackup’ Case is Wrong.” Forbes. March 2015. Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific 13. United States Senate, “Letter from Senators McCain, Read, Corker, and Menendez on Chinese Maritime Strategy,” March 19, 2015. 14. Choe Sang Hun, “Chinese, Japanese and South Korean Ministers to Resume Three-Way Talks,” New York Times, March 21, 2015 15. Fred Hiatt, “China’s Lawless Path,” The Washington Post, March 2015 16. Shuan Sim, “WWII 70th Anniversary: China To Invite World Leaders For Military Parade,” International Business Times, March 2, 2015 17. Evan A. Feigenbaum, “The New Asian Order: And How the United States Fits In.” Foreign Affairs, February 2015 18. Melanie Hart, “Expanding the Frontier of U.S. – China Strategic Cooperation Will Require New Thinking on Both Sides of the Pacific,” Center for American Progress, November 2014 19. Matthew Goodman and Ely Ratner, “China Scores: And What the US Should Do Next,” Foreign Affairs, November 23, 2014 20. Rudy deLeon and Blair Vorsatz, “Revisiting the Shangri-La Dialogue: Candid and Heated Conversation are Encouraged,” Center for American Progress, August 2014 New Silk Road 20. An Lu, “China’s Belt and Road initiatives not solo, but symphony: FM.” Xinhua. March 2015. 21. Assistant Secretary Nisha Biswal, “The New Silk Road Post-2014: Challenges and Opportunities.” US Department of State. January 2015. 22. Jeremy Page, “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order.” Wall Street Journal. November 2014. Sustainable Development Goals 23. S.R., “Why China is creating a new “World Bank for Asia,” The Economist, November 11, 2014. 24. Lingling Wei and Bob Davis, “China forgoes veto power at New Bank to Win Key European Nations’ Support,” Wall Street Journal. March 2015. Chinese Economy and U.S.-China Economic Relations 25. David Dollar, “China’s NPC recognizes the “new normal” of slower growth.” Brookings. March 2015 26. Matt O’Brien, “Is China’s 1929 Moment Coming?” The Washington Post, March 2015 27. S.R., “Why China’s economy is slowing.” The Economist. March 2015 28. Michael Pettis, “How might a China slowdown affect the world?” Michael Pettis’ China Financial Markets. December 2014. Energy, Climate and Environment 29. Armond Cohen, “China’s Power System: The Green and the Black,” Clean Air Task Force, March 24, 2015 30. Yiqin Fu, “China’s National Conversation on Pollution Has Finally Begun,” Foreign Policy, March 2, 2015. 31. Melanie Hart, “Exploring the Frontiers of U.S. – China Strategic Cooperation: Energy and Climate Change,” Center for American Progress, November 2014 32. Pete Ogden, “China’s latest move: a BRICS bank for climate finance?” Points of Order, December 15, 2014. U.S. Domestic Energy 32. Pete Ogden and Gwynne Taraska, “Opportunities for the Green Climate Fund in 2015,” Center for American Progress, March 23, 2015. 33. Anna Driver, “Insight- US shale oil’s crash diet likely to bring forward output dip,” Reuters, February 23, 2015 U.S. and Iran 34. Ben Blanchard, “China’s Foreign Minister Pushes Iran on Nuclear Deal.” Reuters, February 2015. 35. Michael Singh, “China’s Military Presence in the Gulf.” Wall Street Journal. September 2014. 36. Feng Zhongpeng and Huang Jing. “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a Changing World.” June 8, 2014. U.S. – China and the Middle East 37. Ben Blanchard, “China pushes Iran again to reach nuclear deal with world powers,” Reuters, March 2015 38. Hakim Almasmari, Yemen’s Houthis Seek Iran, Russia And China Ties, The Wall Street Journal, March 2015 39. Edward Wong, “Barnett Rubin on China’s Role in Afghanistan.” The New York Times. February 2015. 40. Jeremy Page, As U.S. Exits, China Takes On Afghanistan Role, The Wall Street Journal, February 2015 41. Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 2014 42. Mike Flynn, Senior Egyptian Statesman: Obama Is Losing Long-Time Ally Egypt, Breitbart, February 2015 VITALS AND TRIP INFORMATION CONTACT Melanie Hart China Cell: (011-86) 13522998183 Cell: 202-294-6118 Aarthi Gunasekaran Cell: 202-758-4285 Ken Sofer Cell: 202-446-7129 St. Regis Hotel Phone: (86)(10) 6460 6688 HOTEL St. Regis Beijing 21 Jianguomenwai Dajie, Beijing, 100020 China TIME DIFFERENCE 12 hours Beijing is 12 hours ahead of EST 9:00PM Beijing time 9:00AM EST 9:00AM Beijing time 9:00PM EST the previous evening CURRENCY Chinese Yuan (RMB) 1 RMB = $0.16 USD 6.26 RMB = $1 USD WEATHER Beijing Beijing enjoys a mild and pleasant climate in the spring. You need to bring lightweight clothing: long-sleeved shirts or T-shirts, plus one or two jackets and sweaters. It will be particularly warm Sunday and Monday – high of 79 F – and there will be rain showers Tuesday and Wednesday, with a high of 55 F. Average High Average Low Average Rainfall 68° F 46° F 0.08 inches Updated 03/27/2015 CAP Delegation Tentative Agenda Sunday, Mar 29 05:40 Mr. Tony Podesta arrives Beijing via TG 674 (Terminal 3) Pick-up by: Peter Ting 08:00 Check-in at Hotel: St. Regis Beijing 北京瑞吉酒店 21 Jianguomenwai Dajie; Beijing; 100020 Phone: +86 10 6460 6688 14:40 CAP delegation arrives Beijing via UA 807 (Terminal 3) Exit via VIP channel (contact at airport TBC) Pick-up by: Peter Ting 17:30 – 18:00 CAP delegation arrives and check-in at St. Regis Beijing 18:00 – 18:30 Alan meets and greets delegation at Hotel Lobby 18:30 – Foreign Policy discussion with Rising Scholars Venue: Xi He Ya Ju Restaurant 羲和雅居 (TBC) Ritan E Rd, Chaoyang, Beijing, China Phone: +86 10 8561 7643 Monday, Mar 30 08:30 Meet at lobby and depart for meetings 09:00 – 10:00 Meeting with Li Wei, President, Development Research Center of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 会见国务院发展研究中心主任李伟 Venue: Development Research Center 10:30 – 11:30 Meeting with Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China (TBC) 会见外交部长王毅 (TBC) (Time Spot Open) 12:00 – 14:00 1-to-1 lunch meeting between Mr. John Podesta and Mr. Xie Zhenhua Interpreter needed Lunch venue for the delegation: St. Regis Updated 03/27/2015 15:30 – 16:30 Meeting with Yang Jiechi, State Councilor 会见国务委员杨洁篪 Venue: Zhongnanhai 17:00 – 19:00 Track II dialog with Chinese scholars Venue: Villa 17, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse Topic: U.S.-China Major Power Relations: Key Issues for September 2015 White House Summit a. Climate and Energy b. Regional Security Issues c. U.S. – China Commercial Ties Chinese Scholars: Lt. Gen. Chen Xiaogong 陈小功中将, Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu 姚 云竹少将, Amb. Chen Naiqing 陈乃清大使, Amb. Chen Yonglong 陈永龙大使, Mr. Zou Ji 邹骥, Mr. Cui Liru 崔利如, Mr. Zhou Dadi 周大地 19:00 – 21:00 Mr. C. H. Tung hosts dinner for the delegation and scholars Venue: Diaoyutai State Guesthouse Wan Liu Tang Tuesday, Mar 31 07:00 – 08:00 Possible time spot for 1-to-1 breakfast meeting between Mr. C. H. Tung and Mr. John Podesta 08:00 Meet at lobby at depart for meetings 09:00 – 10:00 Meeting with Nur Bekri, National Energy Administration Head (TBC) 会见国家能源局局长努尔·白克力 (TBC) (Time Spot Open) 10:30 – 11:30 Meeting with Wan Gang, Minister for Science and Technology 会见科技部部长万刚 Venue: Ministry of Science and Technology 12:00 – 13:30 Possible time spot for 1-to-1 lunch meeting between Mr.
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