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Rnment Sent a Written Protest to Libya on Same Day Submitted a Note Of ?ORARY ARCHIVES 28515 the decision taken. After exchanging instruments of ratification we will then take the matter to the [Internationall Court in The Hague." Commenting on the results of the talks, Mr Chatti laid emphasis on the fact that both Tunisia and Libya had reaffirmed their desire to "strengthen and develop fraternal relationiand co-operation". Earlier Developments in the Dirpute and in TunisiiLibym Relations The conflict between Tunisia and Libya arose from. the presence in the Gulf of Gabts of a shelf containing important oil reserves, said to be capable of producing 20,000,000 tonnes per year. Sovereignty over the shelf was contested by both . Tunisia and Libya, and several attempts had been made in the past to decide the issue. In 1973 the Tunisian Government had proposed that the matter be handed over to the International Court, but this proposal had been rejected by Libya. In August 1976, however, after extensive talks had been held between Mr Taha as Sharif Ben Amer, the Libyan Minister of State for Revolutionary Command Council Affairs, and President Bourguiba, the Tunisian head of state, together with Mr Nouira rnment sent a written protest to Libya on and several other members of the Tunisian Cabinet, it was same day submitted a note of complaint announced on Aug. 24 that both countries had agreed to submit ion to the Arab League. Tunisia stated that the question to arbitration. g to accept what it described as a fait accompli This move to settle the disagreement over exploration in the Gulf of Gabbs was seen as reflecting a desire by both countries to improve bilateral d "decided to use all its rightsyo ensure that its relations which had been strained mainly due to the failure of an *tempt ignty was respected". to merge Tunisia and Libya [proposed in January 1974-see 26466 A], the t it was violating Tunisia's territorial waters, and a subsequent freezing of relations [see 26980 Bl, the expulsion of Tunisian he Libyan news agency, on May 29 maintained that the workers from Libya in March 1976 [see 27774 A] and the discovery later inside the continental shelf of the Socialist People's in the same month of an alleged Libyan plot to assassinate or kidnap in conformity with international law" and was 45 President Bourguiba or Mr Nouira [ibid.]. hat Libya claimed to be the border line between the A joint statement issued on Aug. 24 said that pending a inn continental shelves. ruling of the International Court both countries would prospect authorities, on the other hand, claimed that the border should be drawn taking into account the Kerkennah together for oil along the continental shelf. At the same time Island rather than being based on the coast of the main- Tunisia promised to send back to Tfipoli its High Representa- tive (ambassador), who had been reoalled following the dis- covery of the alleged Libyan assassination plot in March. Despite the agreement reached between Tunis and Tripoli on Aug. 24 and despite several meetings between politicians and the joint communiqu6 experts on both sides, the matter was nevertheless not sub- ntries approved inter- mitted to the International Court, and the delineation question al shelf dispute [see remained unresolved. 's sovereignty and rule". e delivered to Mr Mahmoud Riad, the Secretary- the Arab League, on June I, Libya stated inter alia Id continue to drill for oil in the Gulf of Gabb operations were being carried out in Libyan terri- not only in the Gulf of Gab& but e intervened to help solve the conflict and on stated that he had met in Cairo with the or to Egypt and the Libyan delegate to the that both sides had expressed their readiness negotiations on the disputed area. quently held in Tunis on June 8-10 between at Turayki, the Libyan Foreign Minister, and erpart, Mr Chatti, with Mr Riad mediating at f of Gab& to the to the presence of the In an interview with ARNA on Mareh IS lo' saying in this wnnexion Jallud, the Libyan Prime Minister, &d that th; r Ie" with the spirit of the shelf "dots not exkt" %museTunisia had ?' itself in 1967 when it gave the Fnneh oil w to explore for oil and, in amdance wit* d a crisis which could have had "grave conso- had awarded concession to the same ce the dispute official and (iii) had put at the the following year. sides the compromise which would allow the Inter- Major Jallud added that Tur' o intervene in the affair. Mr Chatti continued: "Thii time regard until the prospecting or taken the fitsteps towards arbitration and it will no oil in the former part of tb le to go back. The Libyan People's Congresc must ratify Libyan continental she@a- 285 16 KEESING'S CONTEMP~ORARY ARCHIVES Tunisia rejected the Libyan interpretation of the delineation, saying their own right. (One of the most prominent Nasserist le that "it is the sovereign right of every state to carry out research in any Eddin Rifaat, died in Cairo on July 13 after suffering a zone of its continental shelf without this being considered a delineation of Rifaat had been a minister and member of the Presidency C international borders". President Nasser.) Earlier, in January 1977, controversy had arisen over the The new law also stipulated that any new party m presence in the area claimed by Tunisia of an oil rig owned by "national unity", maintain "social peace" and ackno the Italian company SAlPEM (a subsidiary of the state oil cor- Egypt's problems must be resolved by "sociali poration ENI) which was operating under a Libyan licence. The Tunisian Government put much pressure on Libya to distinct from those of the groups affiliated to the AS remove the drilling platform or to take the matter to arbitration Following the implementation of the law, all existing A tions were dissolved and full-time political employment and maintained that to Tunisia the problem was "vital", that ended. In a report on the new law signed by President Sadnt Tunisia would adhere to "its rights" and that it was always was stated that Mr Mustapha Khalil, the general secretary oft ready for negotiations and would do everything "to the in accordance with the new law. submitted his resignation, and absolute limit to avert dangerous complications". leadership and other members of the ASU had been tha Mr Nouira had talks towards the end of March with several President for their "efforts in performing their tasks". Later, at a meeting of the ASU central committee held on Arab and Western ambassadors in Tunis while Mr Chatti put appointment of two new assistant secretaries-general was forward the Tunisian point of view in Algiers and Rabat after namely of Mr Sayyid Zaki, elected to represent the vario which he said that an appeal had been made to "fraternal and factions, and of Mr Mahdi Shuman, to represent the workers a friendly nations" to settle the difference between Libya and Tunisia. President Sadat's Attack on Egypt's Left While the discussions on the legalization of polit It was finally announced on May 12 by Mr Abdallah Farhat, were in progress, President Sadat made a strong att the Tunisian Minister of Defence, that Libya had instructed the left-wing National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP Italian firm to withdraw its drilling rig, and this order was subse- ing a group of journalists in Alexandria on June 26 quently carried out. In his statement, Mr Farhat expressed his the leaders of the opposition party of being "trai wish that "this positive action would pave the way for finding a "agents" of the Soviet Union and said that he w definite solution to the problem". country's left wing "to be Egyptian, not Soviet". The Meanwhile, in April 1977, Libya had freed five Tunisian President also repeated his earlier allegations that the soldiers in exchange for a Libyan citizen, Mr Muhammad Ali had been responsible for the Cairo food riots in Jan Nayel, who had been sentenced to death in Tunis on April 23, 28264 A]. 1976, for participating in the alleged assassination plot of On the same day Dr Rifaat Said, the secretary oft the previous month [see above]. In July Libya unfroze a steering committee, announced that members of the 20,000,000 dinar loan (approximately S50,000,000) which it by Mr Khaled Mohieddin, had met that evening to b had originally granted to Tunisia in November 1973. The loan, sions on their future. Dr Said, who had been arrest which would be used to develop the tourist industry and to January riots and had recently been released after thr finance development projects in the south of Tunisia, was offici- ally ratified on July 19.-(Le Monde - Times - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (Prev. rep. Tunisian-Libyan Relations, 27774 A) Moscow and Cairo as this was "in Egypt' Monde - Neue Zurcher Zeitung - Times - A. EGYPT - Law on Political Parties - President Sadat's national Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of Attack on NPUP (Prev. rep. Political Parties, 281 After several weeks of debate, the Egyptian Parliament on June 29, 1977, finally adopted a new law on political parties B. SOVIET UNION - Local Elections which, for. the first time since their abolition in 1953 [see In local elections held for the soviets of te 12748 A] following the overthrow of King Farouk in the districts, towns and villages throughout the previous year [see 12361 A], permitted the establishment of June 19, 1977, votes were cast, as officially political parties subject to certain conditions.
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