The United Nations & Civil Wars

Jean-Marie Guéhenno

Abstract: The UN engagement in civil wars was almost nonexistent until the end of the Cold War, but recent experience brings some important lessons: the traditional principles of peacekeeping are ill-suited for civil war, as demands on peacekeepers, in particular the protection of civilians, are expanding. But military force is there to support a political strategy. The UN must focus on politics, using its comparative advantage–its independence–to win the confidence of the parties, while preserving its access to big powers to put pressure on them. However, it is challenged by the growing divisions in the Security Council, the changing nature of conflict, and a crisis of states that reflects long-term trends. This is not a reason for the UN to abandon its role in ending civil wars, but it needs to recalibrate its ambitions and adapt its approach: be less state-centric and more inclusive; more robust militarily; and more disciplined in its priorities.

The United Nations was not designed to deal with civil wars. It is an organization of sovereign states that decided, at the end of World War II, that their relations should be governed by a set of binding rules, enshrined in a charter, and policed by a select group of nations in the form of the Security Council. The international order that the charter of the United Nations organized is based on the assumption that sovereign states, as the building blocks of the international system, are the benevolent custodians of their people; and the main purpose of the charter is to regulate relations between sovereign states while refraining from interfering with their domestic affairs, including civil wars. Paragraph 7 of article 2 of the charter explicitly JEAN-MARIE GUÉHENNO is a member of the high-level advisory states: board on mediation recently creat- Nothing contained in the present Charter shall autho- ed by the United Nations Secretary- rize the United Nations to intervene in matters which General. He served as the United are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any Nations Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from state or shall require the Members to submit such mat- 2000 to 2008. He is the author of ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of Peace- principle shall not prejudice the application of enforce- keeping in the 21st Century (2015). ment measures under Chapter VII.

185 The United This paragraph was the result of diffi- a peace-building fund established under Nations & cult discussions in San Francisco. France its responsibility. un Secretary-General Civil Wars had initially argued that violations of hu- António Guterres, recognizing the politi- man rights could be a basis for interven- cal nature of peace-building, plans to inte- tion, but this view was strongly rejected by grate the peace-building support office in the American delegation, and a few years the department of political affairs. Outside later, when the Algerian War of Indepen- the Secretariat, the United Nations Devel- dence started, a preparatory report of John opment Programme’s Bureau for Crisis Pre- Foster Dulles that had been the basis for vention and Recovery (bcpr) was for many that rejection would be quoted in a French years the centralized repository of expertise periodical to justify the French position.1 dedicated to the needs of countries teeter- France had come to agree with the United ing on the brink of civil war or recovering States that there should be no exception to from one. It has now been disbanded and the principle set in paragraph 7 of article 2 replaced by a leaner Crisis Response Unit; of the charter. That is why, until the end of expertise previously housed in the bcpr has the Cold War, the United Nations did not been largely decentralized, with the aim of concern itself with civil wars, with the two bringing it closer to the areas where it might exceptions of the Congo, where its role was be deployed, but also with the risk that the to protect the integrity of a state emerg- critical mass of expertise that was assem- ing from decolonization, and Cyprus, bled will be diluted, and the specificity of which involved a confrontation between postconflict challenges may be lost. two states (Turkey and Greece). Twenty-six years after the end of the The end of the Cold War opened a new Cold War, it is time to reflect on this new chapter: there have been fewer interstate engagement of the un in civil wars, all the wars and more civil wars; and the less- more so because that experience is book- divided Security Council has authorized ended by tragedies: in the nineties, the hor- twice as many operations in the last twenty- rors of Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the de- six years as it authorized in its first forty- bacle of Somalia; now the massive failure four years, and most of the new missions of Syria. This gives a particular urgency to have been deployed to accompany peace the issue, which I will address in three steps. processes aimed at ending civil wars. Based First, there are enough case studies to draw on the assumption that the stabilization of some lessons from the experiences of recent a postconflict country requires a “com- years; second, one must consider that the prehensive approach,”2 they have been in- “international system” is rapidly chang- creasingly multidimensional, often including, and so are conflicts, raising questions ing political, military, development, and on the applicability of recent experience; humanitarian components.3 and third, there is therefore a need to rede- As a response to that assumption, the un fine what the un can contribute in the res- has developed several new capacities during olution of civil wars, and what it should not the last fifteen years. In 2005, a new inter- do. What is a reasonable level of ambition? governmental advisory body, the Peace- building Commission, was inaugurated, How can a third party help to end a civil and it presently has six countries on its war and bring stability to a country emerg- agenda, four of which have been hosts to ing from conflict? What is the right balance peacekeeping operations.4 In addition, a between political engagement and use of peace-building support office was creat- force? Which capacities are most needed ed in the United Nations Secretariat, with after the devastation of war? What should

186 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences be the priorities: Demobilization, disarma- ing ground to a third, neutral party rath- Jean-Marie ment, and reintegration? Security sector re- er than to an enemy. The situation is com- Guéhenno form? Transitional justice? Rule of law? Ef- pletely different in the context of a civil war. fective governance structures? Provision of Nonstate actors have much less to lose if basic services (such as education and health they break their commitment, because the care)? Job creation? What is the right tim- international community does not have the ing and sequence for elections? There are legal leverage that it holds over a state party. probably no definitive answers to any of Their chain of command is also weaker, and those questions, and certainly no single an agreement reached at the top level does answer. They have generated an abundant not ensure implementation at lower levels. literature, usually focused on one issue at a The notion of consent, both on the govern- time rather than the overall balance and pri- ment and rebel sides, has also become much oritization of numerous, often contradicto- less clear; parties to a conflict now tolerate, ry goals. And yet I will argue that intelligent rather than request, a un presence, mean- orchestration is the most important strate- ing that the un peacekeepers have to nego- gic variable, and that isolated policies, even tiate the continuation of consent. The gov- well-executed ones, are unlikely to pro- ernment of Sudan was always deeply sus- duce lasting results unless they are part of picious of an international deployment in an overall coherent and consistent strategy. Darfur, and would only agree to a hybrid The first and most sensitive issue is the mission combining the un and the African balance between politics and force, and the Union (au), knowing that its influence on United Nations, like the United States in its the au would help constrain the un. own state-building efforts over the last fif- Meanwhile, the demands on un forces teen years, has had great difficulty finding have increased considerably. In civil wars, the right answer.5 Military deployments, civilian populations are often the target, because they are concrete, have obvious rather than collateral, and the tragedies of appeal that messy and inconclusive politi- Yugoslavia and Rwanda have led the Securi- cal processes do not. Gradually, the military ty Council to include in most un mandates component has taken a more central role, the protection of civilians, at least in areas which has led to a profound change in what where un forces are deployed and where is expected from un troops. The principle they have the means to provide protection. of “no peacekeepers where there is no peace This in turn has led to an evolution of the to keep,” advocated by a panel on peace- doctrine of peacekeeping, which no longer keeping chaired by the experienced un of- limits the use of force to self-defense, but in- ficial Lakhdar Brahimi, has in practice been cludes “defense of the mandate.” This evo- abandoned. More and more, un forces are lution has not been formally endorsed, be- deployed in situations where there is not yet cause many of the troop-contributing coun- full peace, even if the most intense phase of tries are aware of the much higher level of a civil war has ended. The traditional prin- risk that this new posture entails, and of the ciples guiding the conduct of un blue hel- great imbalance between the needs and the mets are ill-suited for that gray zone: con- resources, which can raise undue expecta- sent of the parties, impartiality, and nonuse tions and set up troops for failure.6 of force except in self-defense. These prop- In the Democratic Republic of the Con- ositions were established at a time when un go, un blue helmets have repeatedly been deployments had a largely symbolic value, accused of standing by as civilians are separating state parties along a cease-fire massacred. In South Sudan, the un force line and allowing them to save face by ced- opened the gates of its bases to terrorized

147 (1) Winter 2018 187 The United Nuer fleeing government forces, de facto force on the ground, must have the capaci- Nations & transforming parts of the mission into gi- ty to make effective use of it, otherwise the Civil Wars gantic camps for internally displaced per- presence of troops, far from enhancing its sons, but was unable to stop government role, may actually undermine it. The gap forces from raiding a camp in Malakal. that opens between the expectations of the If preelectoral violence flares up in the population when blue helmets deploy and Democratic Republic of the Congo and what the troops can actually achieve can government forces use excessive force destroy the authority of the un.7 against demonstrators, the un will be un- Politics, and not force–unless it is over- able to protect civilians: un blue helmets whelming force, something that the un are not ready, politically and operational- never has the capacity to wield–brings ly, to shoot at government forces. Politi- peace. Because it is easier for the Secu- cally, impartiality becomes impossible if rity Council to agree on the number of its logical conclusion is to pit a un force troops or police than on a political strate- against a government force. Operational- gy, the excessive reliance on peacekeepers ly, even after a peace agreement has been –which has reached record levels, but signed, a un force quickly finds it limits. also an implicit ceiling, with a budget of In most peacekeeping missions, the ratio $8.5 billion–can become a distraction. of troops deployed to the population that Troop deployments have to be integrat- needs protection is woefully inadequate, ed in a political strategy, and they create and the problem is compounded by the un- expectations that should make the Secu- willingness of most troop contributors to rity Council think twice before includ- take the risks that effective physical protec- ing a military component in a peace op- tion would require. They are generally re- eration. In the end, military deployments luctant to conduct night patrols and estab- achieve little if they are not supporting a lish mobile forward bases, and they often well-thought-through political strategy, as lack the equipment, training, and capaci- the United States, with forces infinitely su- ties that would mitigate risks for troops and perior to what the un could ever mobilize, compensate for insufficient numbers, such discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan. as good intelligence to preempt violence The United Nations should, in principle, and mobility assets to redeploy rapidly. have some comparative advantage there: And yet effective protection of civilians, parties to a conflict are more likely to make apart from its obvious humanitarian value, lasting compromises if they are encouraged can become a key dimension of a political by a neutral organization than if they are strategy; it gives credibility and leverage responding to the pressure of a powerful to a un mission trying to move a political state, and external advice is more likely to process forward. This raises fundamental be accepted if it is not suspected of serv- questions for peacekeeping in a context ing the interests of a particular country. of civil war. The symbolism of blue hel- But for that to happen, the United Nations mets, which is the basis of peacekeeping must be given the space to operate with suf- between states, is not enough in a situa- ficient independence. If it is seen to be just tion in which parties have not decisive- the agent of big powers, it loses its credi- ly ruled out the use of force. This consid- bility, while if big powers make clear that eration becomes a major challenge when they will not support the un effort, it will criminal armed groups have no negotiable also fail. In the last decade and a half, ex- political goal and actually benefit from a perience shows that the un has had diffi- continuation of conflict: the un, if it has a culty finding its way along that very narrow

188 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences path. The un by itself has little power, and of Afghanistan, rather than helped build it Jean-Marie its leverage to achieve that transition from (more on that below). Guéhenno war to peace depends largely on its capacity In Iraq, the United Nations was not giv- to harness the power of its member states, en any significant space, and the process especially the most powerful ones. It must was largely driven by the United States. conduct a delicate balancing act, using its Apart from Washington’s well-document- independence to win the trust of the con- ed mistakes, this secondary role has deeply flicting parties and using its access to pow- damaged the image of the un in the Mid- er to put pressure on them.8 dle East, which is now often seen as an The situations in which the un has most adjunct of U.S. power and has therefore a been able to make a difference are those limited capacity to play a constructive role where there was sufficient interest of a main the region. jor power for the un to have leverage, but where the un was given enough space to When the un is given enough space to pursue its own strategy. In Sierra Leone, develop a political strategy, how should one the United Kingdom had a strong interest, define success? What is a successful politi- but sometimes disagreed with the strategy cal strategy to end a civil war? The end goal pursued by the un: it wanted more force- has the appearance of clarity: to consolidate ful and immediate action against the Rev- a center of power that is perceived as legit- olutionary United Front, while the special imate enough not to rely on coercion to representative of the secretary-general, maintain its authority. That statement rais- Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, preferred to es many more questions: Is perceived legit- gradually consolidate the authority of the imacy distinct from legitimacy? Or should government. But because it was not a vi- we accept that the definition of legitima- tal interest of the United Kingdom, then- cy is circular, that legitimacy is what is per- Secretary-General Kofi Annan was able to ceived as legitimate? And what is “legiti- push back, and eventually the un strategy mate enough”? Every state relies on some proved to be the right one. In Afghanistan, measure of coercion, and the balance be- the Bonn process was relatively success- tween coercion and voluntary adherence ful because Lakhdar Brahimi, the special varies considerably around the world. And representative of the secretary-general, in a country in which the state has lost its was able to shape an autonomous politi- monopoly on the legitimate use of force, cal strategy while maintaining close and coercion may have a greater role than in positive relations with the United States. a well-established regime. That monopo- He managed to create an evolutionary pro- ly is not reinstated all at once, and a polit- cess that moved from what was largely a ical strategy should carefully map the dif- peace of the winners in Bonn to a more ferent power centers and make appropri- inclusive process in the constitutional ate judgments on the appropriate mix of Loya Jirga two years later. But that was political incentives, use of force, and other not enough to achieve real success: the means that can gradually move a country un was unable to influence the military from open war to peace, even wary peace. strategy of the U.S.-led coalition, failed in The role of the United Nations in civil convincing successive administrations to wars is further complicated by the growing engage with the Taliban before they had role of regional and subregional organiza- recovered from their defeat in 2001, and tions.9 In Africa, the un has had to adjust had almost no say in the massive bilateral to the increased relevance of the African aid efforts that often undermined the state Union and subregional organizations. In

147 (1) Winter 2018 189 The United the 1990s and early 2000s, the un was usu- strategy should be. They all want to restore Nations & ally the lead actor, for instance in Mozam- stability, but their understanding of stabili- Civil Wars bique or Namibia. But in the Democratic ty varies widely. Is stability based on inclu- Republic of the Congo and Burundi, the sive government and robust institutions Organization of African Unity tried to de- that can manage differences and allow for fine its own strategy, to be implemented by free and fair elections that do not lead to the un; although in these cases, the Secu- confrontation? Or is stability based on the rity Council intervened and redefined the capacity of a government to suppress dis- role of the un. Moreover, the un peace- sent? The balance between coercion and keeping operation and the un envoy for adherence is seen differently by different the Great Lakes have seen their political countries, and the Security Council is un- role gradually reduced, and a pattern has able to give a unified answer to that ques- emerged whereby the un plays a civil- tion. In itself, that ambiguity is not fatal to humanitarian-military role, while the Af- a un role, and can actually give more politi- rican Union or subregional organizations cal space to a un envoy who is not bound by like the Intergovernmental Authority on detailed prescriptions of the Security Coun- Development or the East African Com- cil. But it requires envoys who are prepared munity are expected to play the lead po- to take the initiative without the cover of a litical role. This division of labor has not Security Council mandate, and it frequently worked well: it raises excessive expecta- leaves open the role of elections in a politi- tions on the operational role of the un, cal strategy: too often, the Security Coun- and hands over political responsibilities cil has found dubious unity in pushing for to organizations that are deeply divided, elections as an exit strategy, even if the con- institutionally weak, and therefore often text of elections makes it unlikely that they incapable of playing a strong political role. will provide a solid foundation for stabili- And yet the emergence of regional and ty. More recently, various electoral crises in subregional organizations is a welcome Africa have confronted the Security Coun- evolution that should in time strengthen cil with real dilemmas: an election can trig- the capacity of the international communi- ger violence if its results are contested, but ty to deal with civil wars; but only if the re- the postponement of an election, as seen lationship with the un is clarified first. Such in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, clarification depends on a shared political can also be a source of violence and insta- understanding that needs to be reached be- bility. This raises new questions for coun- tween the un and African institutions and tries like China that do not prioritize elec- leaders. The fact that the African Union and tions as the foundation of stability but are Secretary-General António Guterres have worried about instability. The liberal agen- agreed to have regular consultations at the da that dominated the first twenty years of head-of-state level is an important first step. the post–Cold War period may be under at- Chapter VIII of the un charter envisaged an tack and fading, but the question of how to important role for regional organizations. stabilize countries emerging from conflict In coming years, the diffusion of power remains, and there is no genuine agreement should in principle give increased relevance in the Security Council on what the answer to regional organizations. should be. The un is, however, often hesitant to That ambivalent attitude of the Security play an active political role: the members Council with respect to the centrality of a of the Security Council are deeply divid- political strategy largely explains why the ed on what the ultimate goal of a political Security Council tends to focus more on the

190 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences military part of a mandate and on a techni- At the global level, the impotence of the in- Jean-Marie cal approach to peace-building. This tech- ternational community to bring the Syrian Guéhenno nical bias suits development agencies well, tragedy to an end casts a long shadow on the since they have traditionally stressed the potential role of the United Nations in end- nonpolitical nature of their work and their ing civil wars. The divisions of the Security technical expertise to gain access to govern- Council were always there, as noted above. ments. But this focus jeopardizes a credible The repeated vetoes that have prevented un role in dealing with civil wars. Not only any sustained joint effort in Syria are an il- does it provide a convenient alibi for not ad- lustration of the zero-sum game that often dressing the most difficult political issues, guides Security Council decision-making. but it exposes the limits of state-building Security Council intervention in Libya in strategies.10 Over the last fifteen years, the 2011, which led to the overthrow of the state-building record of the un and of the Gaddafi regime, appears to have served as international community more generally a warning to permanent members China has been mixed at best: a lack of prioriti- and Russia, who abstained from the Libya zation, an absence of effective orchestra- vote but have more proactively vetoed such tion, and a supply-driven approach that of- proposals for action since. For a while, ad- ten ignores locally identified needs and ac- vocates of a more active Security Council countability have resulted in considerable hoped that the escalating tension between waste. In the worst cases, like South Sudan, Russia and the United States would affect the state-building focus entirely missed the only those conflicts in which Russia has a fact that the political foundations of the direct and pressing interest, like in Syria and state were missing, leading to a devastat- Ukraine. But it is now clear that, even if the ing resumption of war. Security Council is still capable of reach- The lessons of a decade and a half offer ing consensus on a number of peace oper- a cautionary tale on the limits of what the ations, the confrontation is spilling over un can achieve militarily, politically, and to other conflicts. The principles of sover- from a state-building standpoint. Howev- eignty and noninterference in domestic af- er, they should not lead to abandoning the fairs have provided a rallying point to coun- effort altogether. And there is considerable tries suspicious that a regime-change agen- risk today that it might happen, as skepti- da might hide behind demands for a more cism on what can actually be done grows proactive posture of the Council. Thus, in and as many countries that once supported Burundi and the Democratic Republic of a global agenda are confronted with press- the Congo, the risk of large-scale violence ing domestic issues. Adopting an “isola- has not been enough to mobilize the Secu- tionist” posture and dealing only with rity Council. emergencies has increasing appeal when At the regional level, preexisting divides conflict resolution and peace-building are are also deepening, and are given increased found to be protracted enterprises with salience by paralysis at the global level, al- uncertain results. lowing regional powers to fill the vacuum and play a greater role. The Syrian crisis is The doubts about what the international a case in point: Regional powers such as community and, more specifically, theun Iran or Saudi Arabia cannot be considered can do to prevent or end civil strife are re- as proxies of Russia and the United States, inforced by the rapid deterioration of the even if they receive support from them. international system and by the changing They have their own distinct agendas, nature of conflict.11 which add a layer of complexity to the res-

147 (1) Winter 2018 191 The United olution of the conflict. This can create situ- gies of powerful member states over which Nations & ations in which allies are on opposite sides. it has no influence. Civil Wars For example, because it has been among the While a better effort should be made to most effective fighting forces against the Is- engage terrorists and even terrorist organi- lamic State, the United States has provided zations, contemporary terrorism presents military support to the ypg (People’s Pro- a specific challenge for the international tection Units, a Kurdish militia in Syria). community and the United Nations. At the However, the ypg is affiliated with thepkk operational level, successful peacekeeping (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which is des- requires peacekeepers to create a sense of ignated a terrorist organization by both the proximity with the population; it is an im- United States and Turkey, and which Tur- portant part of the psychological reassur- key considers the greatest regional threat to ance they provide. And the civilian com- its security! This has been a bitter point of ponent of a mission needs to engage as in- contention between allies Turkey and the tensely and continuously as possible with United States. Too often, conflicting prior- the people of the host country. But when ities mean that regional actors can manip- security concerns limit such contacts, and ulate global actors for their own purposes, even armed peacekeepers have to patrol in prolonging conflict without having to bear convoys, that proximity is lost, and most the consequences. un troops are poorly equipped and pre- In theory, the shared threat of global ter- pared for that environment. In many sit- rorism should bring together the interna- uations, irreconcilable agendas suggest tional community and facilitate joint ef- that, on the military side, peace enforce- forts. In reality, the agenda of “countering ment rather than peacekeeping is required. violent extremism” complicates rath- On the political side, if the radical nature er than facilitates cooperation. Different of many of the demands of terrorist groups countries have different views on who is a was not enough to make any negotiation terrorist, and the “terrorist” label, gener- very difficult, their transnational and dif- ously applied to a multitude of groups, con- fuse character can destroy the possibility siderably shrinks the political space need- of a credible political process. Moreover, ed to conduct effective negotiations. Many uncoordinated parallel military operations “terrorists” have joined terrorist organi- conducted by non-un troops, aimed at de- zations for opportunistic reasons, ranging stroying the chain of command of groups from military prowess to criminal gains. labeled as terrorist, can make any engage- Their motives, even when they join organi- ment impossible. zations with a global agenda like Al Qaeda Another evolution that contributes to or the Islamic State, can be very local, relat- making the termination of a conflict more ed to tribal affiliations more than to a reli- difficult is the blurring of the distinction gious program. Lumping together individ- between political and criminal agendas, uals and groups with very different agendas or maybe more accurately, the criminal- makes it more difficult to support inclusive ization of politics. There are a number of processes and peel off those who could be situations around the world–from Cen- co-opted.12 The dominance of the “coun- tral America to the Great Lakes region in tering violent extremism” agenda thus con- Africa–in which powerful groups have an tributes to the diminishing political role of interest in having neither full war nor full the United Nations in resolving civil wars, peace. Full war is bad for business, and full and puts the un in the awkward position peace is bad for their business, which can of accompanying overly militarized strate- thrive only in a situation of semilawless-

192 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ness that allows for all sort of illicit traf- the conflict is to be resolved–a function- Jean-Marie fics.13 The United Nations is ill-equipped ing state–is not questioned. Confronted Guéhenno for that kind of low-intensity, protracted with actors who are beyond political com- conflict, which knows no borders and is of- promise, either because of the radical na- ten shaped by transnational relationships. ture of their goals, or because of their non- Ending these conflicts would require fo- political character, the un will often find it- rensic capacities to track money flows that self powerless. the un does not have. And criminal agendas, like terrorist agendas, cannot be ac- What then can be done? An organization commodated in the same way a political of states like the United Nations cannot be agenda can through an inclusive process. expected to be more effective than its com- The civil wars of the twenty-first century ponent parts. In the absence of a global poli- are not a passing phenomenon, but are ty, a global organization needs the legitima- symptoms of evolutions that go beyond cy of its member states to be legitimate, and the birth pangs of decolonization or the legitimacy is a condition of its effectiveness: unraveling of former empires. We some- precisely because they are in crisis, states times read the crises affecting countries in will deflect the challenges against their au- Africa or the Middle East as a sign of their thority by passing the blame to more glob- backwardness, as they catch up with oth- al institutions, as we see today with the Eu- er regions where the state has found its de- ropean Union. finitive form; we describe such countries in This crisis, as noted above, is not going crisis as “failed states.”14 But that is ignor- to go away. An old order of nation-states– ing the crisis that is creeping into some of which found its modern form in Europe the most advanced countries of the world, with the treaties of Westphalia that ended where indeed no civil war has broken out, a century of religious wars–is slowly begin- but where the polity is at risk of fracturing.15 ning to unravel, and the United Nations is Its causes go beyond the scope of this essay, part of that order. In the flatter and less-ter- but flow in large part from a combination ritorial world produced by the Internet, hu- of the atomization of society and global- man communities will invent new political ization that have unraveled geographical- structures to organize themselves, and it is ly defined communities. States are suffer- impossible to predict them. But the tran- ing from a dual crisis of legitimacy: they sition is likely to take time, just as during reflect the fragmentation of the polities of the Renaissance, it took time for Europe to which they are the expression, as well as overcome the crisis of legitimacy that was their own declining effectiveness, while opened by religious war. In an age of nuclear they confront challenges that are beyond weapons, making that transition as peace- their capacities. And this crisis of politics– ful as possible should be an absolute prior- observed worldwide–also affects conflicts: ity, and the United Nations, with its limita- they are less about the control of power in a tions, can nevertheless help manage that given polity than about the polity itself and transition while not abandoning its role in what defines it. And that transformation of ending civil wars. conflict in turn affects the United Nations, The un should, however, define its role whose main comparative advantage re- with the utmost humility, acknowledging mains its unparalleled capacity to broker that it cannot be the solution to the chal- political compromises precisely because it lenges that states face, nor can it limit itself does not itself have a political agenda. But to shoring up nation-states in their most that assumes that the framework in which traditional form.16 Global government is

147 (1) Winter 2018 193 The United not a realistic response to globalization, nor be sufficient to manage the multiple lay- Nations & is a return to self-contained fully autono- ers of contemporary conflict. The repre- Civil Wars mous states. What the United Nations can sentativeness of traditional political orga- do is help fractured communities, through nizations is weakening, and it is often not negotiations, find new compromises that enough to bring them into a negotiation eventually will help human communities to achieve implementable results. As not- redefine themselves. To take the example ed above, the distinction between criminal of Syria and Iraq, the solution is probably and political agendas is eroding. There are not in redrawing the borders drawn by Mes- also many new nontraditional actors who sieurs Sykes and Picot, but in redefining the can play a critical role in restoring the fabric exercise of power within those borders. of society. Women’s associations are a case To remain relevant, the un should in point. The United Nations needs an in- evolve in the way it approaches conflict clusive approach that makes room for such resolution, taking into account the chang- political actors. It must also recognize that es in the strategic as well as the operation- elections, which make no distinctions–and al environment. At the strategic level, it should not!–between individuals, except should have a less state-centric approach, through quotas, cannot be the only founda- and broaden its focus. On the one hand, it tion of political legitimacy, all the more so should have a greater regional focus: most because the legitimacy provided by num- conflicts now spill over borders, and while bers competes with other sources of legit- defining them as proxy wars between re- imacy. Depending on the circumstances, gional powers is excessive, it is unrealistic other nonelected bodies can acquire a great- to expect to resolve them in isolation from er role. The un must be at the forefront of their regional context. And in many situ- such new forms of political organizations. ations, hard borders are part of the prob- At the operational level, the United Na- lem.17 Managed movements of a populations should accept that, in a period of tion are part of the solution. On the other profound transformation, it might be an hand, many issues need to be resolved at illusion to aim for an end state. Peacefully a smaller level than the state, and a politi- managing a process of transformation is cal deal in the capital is not sufficient to ad- already an ambitious goal, and it may be dress problems of peripheries or of mega- preferable to build into peace agreements cities. “National” politics are increasing- enough flexibility for them to evolve and ly irrelevant not only for minorities who be revisited as circumstances change. In do not identify with the group controlling that respect, the Dayton Peace Accords, power at the central level–a problem that which were not negotiated by the un, are could be solved through more inclusive a good example of what not to do, since government–but for groups who do not they freeze into the unwieldy constitution expect a distant power structure to solve of Bosnia and Herzegovina the specific cir- their specific problems. Paradoxically, in cumstances that presided over the termi- a connected and mobile world, physical nation of war in the former Yugoslavia. proximity is seen as a key ingredient of ef- The un should also adapt its peace opera- fectiveness, accountability, and legitimacy. tions to the changing situation. Its military That means that more and more, any na- posture has already evolved. To avoid fail- tional peace process will need to be com- ure, it must not only lower expectations, but plemented by more locally driven efforts.18 deploy stronger capacities, which will not The un should also acknowledge that a turn un blue helmets into a war-fighting traditional diplomatic approach will not machine, but should allow them to raise the

194 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences threshold for spoilers intent on derailing a sector, legal framework, and revenue col- Jean-Marie peace process. And in theaters in which lection. And to be effective in its delivery, Guéhenno irreconcilable groups operate, peace en- it should become a much more open ar- forcement needs to coexist with peace- chitecture, ready to partner with organiza- keeping. That requires a much greater en- tions, governmental and nongovernmen- gagement from the best-equipped armies of tal, that may be better equipped to deal the world. In some cases of peace enforce- with specific issues. ment, they may operate in parallel with a The United Nations therefore needs to un force, which creates considerable oper- be both very ambitious in the methods it is ational complications. In other situations, prepared to adopt, revisiting long held prac- they should operate within the un mission, tices and testing new approaches, and very providing it with the mobility, firepower, humble in the results it expects to achieve. and intelligence that will allow un peace- In the best of circumstances, bringing to an keepers to act early and decisively: effec- end a civil war has always been a daunting tive quick-reaction forces should be a com- task. Throughout history–from the Greek ponent of any peacekeeping operation de- wars of Antiquity to the French Wars of Re- ployed in an unsettled environment. But ligion, the war of secession in the United military force cannot be the centerpiece of States to the devastating war in Syria today a strategy, and the separation, enshrined in –civil wars have been the most vicious wars the budgetary arrangements of the un be- because they challenge identities. And that tween peacekeeping operations and politi- challenge is even greater for foreigners, cal missions, should disappear. The path to whose future is not at stake and can only peace is not linear, and the military compo- nudge warring parties toward peace. Only nent may fluctuate, from significant to zero. those who have made war can make peace. In the end, the un must recalibrate its When the end goal is elusive because the ambitions: it should not abandon multi- concept of the state itself is going through dimensional operations, recognizing that, a radical evolution, the task of a third par- in complex situations, only a comprehen- ty becomes even more difficult. But it is not sive approach has a chance of succeeding. a reason to give up: the alternative would But it should not be supply-driven; instead be a protracted period of spreading chaos. it should be more disciplined and focused The un has an important role to play in ac- in its agenda, limiting its role to those ar- companying the evolution toward an un- eas that are key to the sustainability of a known future. state apparatus: governance, the security

endnotes 1 See John Foster Dulles, “The General Assembly,” Foreign Affairs (October 1945); and Georges Fischer, “Quelques réflexions sur la position de la France à l’onu,” Politique étrangère 20 (6) (1955). 2 The European Union has made the “comprehensive approach” an important component of its strategy. See European Union Global Strategy, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels: European Union Global Strategy, June 2016). 3 Richard Gowan and Stephen John Stedman, “The International Regime for Treating Civil War, 1988–2017,” Dædalus 147 (1) (2018).

147 (1) Winter 2018 195 The United 4 These are Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Central African Republic. Nations & 5 Civil Wars James D. Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System,” Dædalus 146 (4) (2017). 6 The standard language, “within its capabilities and areas of deployments,” gives legal cover but exposes troop-contributing countries politically. See also Gowan and Stedman, “The In- ternational Regime for Treating Civil War.” 7 “In the absence of a larger political process to end wars, peacekeeping missions to protect civilians become lengthy, protracted, dangerous assignments. It is worth asking how com- mitted troop contributing countries will be to open-ended missions in ongoing civil wars.” Gowan and Stedman, “The International Regime for Treating Civil War.” 8 Charles T. Call and Susanna P. Campbell, “Is Prevention the Answer?” Dædalus 147 (1) (2018). 9 Ibid. 10 Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System.” 11 Nancy E. Lindborg and J. Joseph Hewitt, “In Defense of Ambition: Building Peaceful & Inclusive Societies in a World on Fire,” Dædalus 147 (1) (2018); Barry R. Posen, “Civil Wars & the Struc- ture of World Power,” Dædalus 146 (4) (2017); and Hendrik Spruyt, “Civil Wars as Challenges to the Modern International System,” Dædalus 146 (4) (2017). 12 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Jihadi Rebels in Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (2018). 13 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Organized Crime, Illicit Economies, Civil Violence & International Order: More Complex Than You Think,” Dædalus 146 (4) (2017). 14 William Reno, “Fictional States & Atomized Public Spheres: A Non-Western Approach to Fragility,” Dædalus 146 (4) (2017). 15 Bruce D. Jones and Stephen John Stedman, “Civil Wars & the Post–Cold War International Order,” Dædalus 146 (4) (2017). 16 The timeframe of the un, and of political actors, is inevitably much shorter than the timeframe of history. See Francis Fukuyama, “The Last English Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (2018). That is a reason for humility. 17 Spruyt, “Civil Wars as Challenges to the Modern International System.” 18 Clare Lockhart, “Restoring Core Governance Functions as a Postconflict & Conflict-Prevention Measure,” Dædalus 147 (1) (2018).

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