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Global Terrorism: on High Alert! a Changing Terrorism MO and What It Means for Your Business

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Global Terrorism: on High Alert! a Changing Terrorism MO and What It Means for Your Business AIG Terrorism White Paper Global terrorism: On high alert! A changing terrorism MO and what it means for your business in association with RUSI and NYA International AIG Terrorism White Paper Terrorism remains a significant threat to businesses and communities the world over and does not just take one form. ISIS is currently the most active group after entering a new phase of inciting attacks beyond its immediate borders in 2015. AIG, in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and NYA International, considers what this means for businesses, how the threat could manifest itself and how organisations should prepare. AIG White Paper Page 2 of 14 AIG Terrorism White Paper Part One: From hard to soft targets... how and why terrorists made the shift ISIS may be losing territory but it retains an ability to inspire individuals and groups outside of its heartlands in Iraq, Syria and Libya. This was evident in the most recent ISIS-inspired attacks in a Berlin Christmas market and an Istanbul nightclub. The threat posed by returning foreign fighters is also increasing. While it can be argued that civilians have always been targeted in terrorist attacks – with nearly The Global Terrorism Index defines 3,000 people killed on one day in the 9/11 attacks 15 years ago - the intention to target civilians terrorism as: by groups such as ISIS has never been as explicit or so easily communicated. These terrorist groups increasingly look to inspire acolytes through deft online propaganda videos. “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by Since the Mumbai marauding attacks of 2008, groups such as ISIS, Lashkar-e-Toiba and a non‐state actor to attain a Al-Shabaab have increasingly shifted attention to soft targets. The Mumbai attacks political, economic, religious, demonstrated how several well-armed individuals with small explosive devices and automatic or social goal through fear, weapons could cause significant loss of life by attacking a heavily-populated area and easily coercion, or intimidation”. accessible public buildings. This definition recognises that terrorism In many ways Mumbai was a major precedent, inspiring subsequent marauding terrorist firearms is not only the physical act of an attack, attacks (MTFA), including those in Nairobi 2013, Tunisia June 2015, Paris November 2015 and but also the psychological impact it has Istanbul on New Year’s Day 2017. Armed assaults – used in around 20% of all terrorist attacks – on a society for many years after. are more deadly than other forms of attack. Just over half of attacks on civilians utilise bombings and explosions. In 2015, there were over 12,500 civilian deaths arising from terrorist attacks, an increase of 550% since 2000i. Top trends in terrorism (source: Global Terrorism Index) Terrorist organisations such as ISIS are actively encouraging their followers to • Private citizens and soft targets (e.g. restaurants, shopping target civilians in Western countries malls, museums and hotels) are increasingly targeted • Improvements in counter-terrorism Fig 1 Deaths from terrorism, 2000-2015 surveillance have increased the Iraq Afghanistan, 2015 saw the first reduction in terrorism since 2010, although likelihood of more complex plots Pakistan and Syria it was still the second worst year recorded for terrorism being intercepted Nigeria Rest of the world • Two groups - Boko Haram and 35,000 ISIL DECLARES ISIS - are responsible for half the CALIPHATE 30,000 deaths from terrorism, with ISIS in US INVADE particular encouraging attacks in THS 25,000 IRAQ US TROOP OECD countries SURGE 20,000 SEPTEMBER 11 SYRIAN CIVIL WAR BEGINS 15,000 US INVADE AFGHANISTAN 10,000 5,000 NUMBER OF DEA 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006200722008 20092010201120122013 0142015 YEAR (Source: START GTD, IEP calculations) i http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%202016_0.pdf AIG White Paper Page 3 of 14 AIG Terrorism White Paper Inspiring lone actors Lone-actor attacks, such as those in Nice in 2016, Sydney in 2014 and The intention to target civilians Norway in 2011, are the most frequent type of terrorist activity in the Western world. This type of attack is responsible for 70% of all deaths [in terrorist attacks] has never from terrorism in the West since 2006ii. In 2015 there were 33 lone been as strong, as explicit, actor attacks in connection with ISIS, up from 13 in 2014. or so easily communicated. Until the end of July 2016, there were 22 ISIS-inspired lone actor attacks, including the Nice truck attack which killed 85 and the These attacks have demonstrated that a very real potential remains for Orlando, Florida, night club shooting, which killed 50. More recent complex operations to be planned and orchestrated. The attacks in events include the truck attack by Tunisian Anis Imri in a Berlin Christmas France, Belgium and Turkey were amongst the most devastating in the market, which killed 12 people in December 2016, and the massacre of history of these countries and, according to IEP, “reflect a disturbing 39 people by a lone gunman in a nightclub in Istanbul in the early hours return of the transnational group-based terrorism more associated with of New Year’s Day 2017. al-Qaeda before and immediately after September 11”. In RUSI’s analysis of lone-actor plots in Europe, nearly a third used One reason behind the overt targeting of civilians is the goal of creating firearms, 17% involved explosives and 12% involved blades. For fear and chaos, and because most public targets are easy to access. nearly a decade, Islamic extremists have encouraged the use of a Higher per capita spending on counterterrorism vis-à-vis interpersonal wide range of attacks. This includes those that are easy to carry out, violence in countries such as the US and UK “underscores the impact involving vehicles and knives, such as the Nice and Woolwich attacks that the fear of terrorism has on the general population,” according to (with attackers in the latter buying their main weapon from a home the IEP. Meanwhile, empty beaches and resorts in Turkey and Tunisia in improvement store). the months immediately following attacks there, are also testament to the In spite of the increased number of deaths from terrorism in the West, impact of this strategy. 2015 saw the first drop in overall deaths since 2010, due to the Counter-terrorism surveillance is another reason for the changing weakening of ISIS and Boko Haram in their core areas. MO of attacks carried out by some terrorist groups. Because there is a high likelihood of complex attacks being intercepted, some terrorist Growing threat for OECD countries organisations are actively encouraging their followers to plan assaults 2015 was a particularly bad year for OECD countries, which involving fewer individuals. Therefore, terrorist groups such as ISIS experienced a 650% rise (to 577 in 2015 from 77 in 2014) in the and AQAP seek to inspire smaller-scale attacks while also planning number of fatalities resulting from terrorism, according to the Global ‘spectaculars’ like the Paris attacks in November 2015. Terrorism Index 2016 (GTI), published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The majority of deaths occurred in Turkey and France An audio message released by the ISIS media arm al-Furqan in May and more than half were in connection to ISIS, with attackers in Paris, 2016 urged sympathisers in Europe and the US to launch attacks on Brussels and Ankara targeting crowded public places such as sport civilians if they were unable to travel to the group’s self-proclaimed stadiums, transportation hubs, restaurants and music venues. caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Fig 2 Deaths from terrorism in OECD countries, 2000 to July 2016 In 2015 deaths from terrorism increased by 650 per cent compared to 2014. This was the second worst year for terrorism in the OECD after 2001 with the September 11 attacks. 600 6 people THS 500 400 tacks killed 2,99 at 300 11 y - July e 9/ 200 Th Januar 100 NUMBER OF DEA 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 mid 2016 YEAR (Source: START GTD, IEP calculations, IEP estimates) ii http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf AIG White Paper Page 4 of 14 AIG Terrorism White Paper The internet and social media has made it easier to influence and gain access to the latest generation of susceptible individuals, with Fig 3 Deaths from attacks targeting private citizens, 2000-2015 ISIS often claiming lone self-radicalised attackers as “soldiers of the There has been a 550 per cent increase in the number of deaths of private Caliphate”. “(ISIS) uses the digital world to create an idealised version citizens from terrorism since 2000. of itself, a reality show that is designed to find resonance and meaning among its diverse supporters”, notes GTI. However, while social media 16,000 is an important tool, most radicalisation still involves real-world social 14 ,000 interaction. 12,000 Fears remain that a large, meaningful attack could be waged by ISIS 10,000 on the West in retribution for the fall of Mosul and impending offensive against Raqqa, which is at the heart of the Caliphate. Current estimates 8,000 M TERRORISM are that between 25,000 and 30,000 fighters, from 100 different 6,000 countries, have arrived in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Those who have 4,000 not perished in the conflict could plan attacks on home soil when they return to their countries. THS FRO 2,000 Some will have received Complex terrorist DEA 0 operational training in 0 3 5 7 9 01 04 10 11 12 13 14 15 plots cannot be ruled 008 explosives assembly and 200 20 2002 200 20 200 2006 200 2 200 20 20 20 20 20 20 suicide attacks.
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