A Reinterpretation of the Ottoman Neutrality During the War
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25 A Reinterpretation of the Ottoman Neutrality During the War HALIT DÜNDAR AKARCA s in much of the rest of the world, the Russo-Japanese War was also Afollowed with great interest by the public, and with close attention by the government in Turkey. Since one of the belligerents was the arch- enemy of the Ottoman Empire, and the victorious party was an Asian Power, it was assumed that the Ottoman government and Sultan Abdulhamid II himself were thought to be emotionally inclined towards the Japanese.1 However, due to Abdulhamid’s well-known policy of pre- serving the equilibrium among, and equal distance from, the Great Powers, he acted to please or not to antagonize both parties throughout the war.2 Hence, a careful reading of the Ottoman and Russian archival sources reveals that, willingly or not, the Ottoman government pursued a neutrality which would intentionally please and at least not irritate the Russian party per se, in contrast to the public support for the Japanese side. There were substantial reasons for the Turkish public and the intellec- tuals to follow the ongoing war enthusiastically and wish for a Japanese victory. First of all, one of the two belligerents was the Russian Empire which had expanded to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire over the last two centuries. The disastrous consequences of the last war of 1877–78, which had debilitated the Ottoman Empire and rendered it more vulnerable to Russia and other Great Powers, were not forgotten. The Russophobia of the Turkish public probably exceeded similar feel- ings elsewhere in the world. Secondly, the other belligerent was from the East and had been in regression and under the domination of the West. The Japanese Empire had been hailed by the intellectuals of Eastern countries as an example of the possible revival of an Eastern nation embracing Western standards and challenging the West without losing its intrinsic character.3 384 Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05 The extensive coverage of the war news by the Istanbul and the Young Turk press abroad, eyewitness reports, as well as the memoirs of the con- temporaries, reinforces this point. The Istanbul press covered the war from the very inception to the end and and remained its principal focus throughout. However, they could only include reports taken from inter- national news agencies, without commenting very much on them.4 On the other hand, the Young Turk newspapers and journals such as Mes¸veret, S¸ura-yi Ümmet, Terakki and Türk5 which were issued in Egypt and France published articles analyzing and praising the Japanese victo- ries, and the Japanese example of reformation and renovation.6 The news on the war had been the main issue of people of all levels. As stated in a report to Abdulhamid written by the distinguished com- mander Ahmed Muhtar Pasha: “From the youngest to the oldest, all people talk about the war with their families at their homes; and with their acquaintances on the street. The literates, the merchants, even the coachmen ask each other news from the current war.” An interesting Japanese figure, Yamada Torajiro, wrote about the great sympathy and the admiration of the Turkish people for the Japanese during the war.7 The public admiration and support for the Japanese encouraged two Japanese residents of Istanbul to to find a practical application for these sentiments during the first months of the war in Northeast Asia. Yamada Torajiro who had resided in Istanbul from 1892 to 1914 and who had been the Japanese unofficial envoy to bring Japanese donations to the families of the Ertugˇrul staff in 1892,8 together with his friend, Nakamuro Ejiro the owner of the two Japanese shops in Istanbul, sold tickets to collect money for the Japanese Red Cross. Moreover, it was stated by a Japanese historian that some Turks had sent money and commodities to Japanese newspapers.9 The Sublime Porte had also been prudently following the events in Northeast Asia. Numerous translations from foreign newspapers and the reports of Ottoman ambassadors and consulates to the European states, concerning the international atmosphere around the Far Eastern crisis are to be found in the holdings of the Ottoman Archives today. However, at the same time, from the very first months of the war, the Ottoman gov- ernment was on tenterhooks. It was the characteristic policy of the Sultan to avoid any conflicts that would undermine the shaky balance he was trying to preserve. To this effect, he was trying “to give no party any justified pretext for quarrel, to refrain from actions which incite the mutual enmities of the Powers, and to preserve order and govern well at home.”10 When news appeared concerning the Japanese advance against the Russians, the Ottoman government felt this was a threat that could incite Russian enmity. As early as March 4, 1904, the Special Council of Ministers (Encümen-i Mahsusa) directed an instruction to the Ministry of Interior to prevent war news being printed that would antagonize the Russian government. Some of the papers were even closed due to the extensive coverage of the pro-Japanese news.11 Adding to its concern not to annoy the Russian.