Africa Uprising? the Protests, the Drivers, the Outcomes by Valerie Arnould, Aleksandra Tor and Alice Vervaeke

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33 2016 Themba Hadebe/AP/SIPA Africa uprising? The protests, the drivers, the outcomes by Valerie Arnould, Aleksandra Tor and Alice Vervaeke

Political and social protests across the African con- To what extent can this surge challenge sitting gov- tinent have garnered much attention over the past ernments or even be the harbinger of broader so- year. Ethiopia has been rocked by mass street pro- cial and political change on the continent? tests across its Oromia and Amhara regions over grievances about political exclusion, which gained The historical pattern global prominence when an Ethiopian athlete at the Olympic Games in Brazil made a gesture While the recent spike is notable, Africa has a long (wrists crossed above his head) which has come to history of mass street protests. Colonial powers symbolise the demonstrations. Elsewhere, South faced opposition from national liberation move- Africa has witnessed large-scale and persistent stu- ments, as well as strikes by labour unions and dent unrest at campuses across the country over street demonstrations by disenfranchised urban tuition fees and demands to ‘decolonise’ universi- populations. After independence, both political ties, resulting in significant disruption to the aca- protests and economic strikes continued intermit- demic year and damage to property. Meanwhile, tently, driven by discontent over the dominance of highly-contested electoral processes saw protests one-party rule and dictatorships, as well as wors- break out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ening economic conditions and draconian auster- (DRC), Gabon, and Uganda. Even countries such ity measures. as Chad, Angola and Zimbabwe – which tradition- ally see few protests because of the tightly con- Protests gained particular prominence in the late trolled nature of the public space – experienced 1980s and 1990s, and have been credited with large-scale public unrest. helping to bring about a democratic shift across the continent. Between 1989 and 1994, 35 coun- These developments chime with similar mass anti- tries moved from one-party rule to multi-party government protests in previous years in coun- elections, resulting in changes of leadership in 18 tries such as Burundi, Senegal and Burkina Faso. countries (compared to none before 1990, with In fact, data suggests that the number of popular the exception of South Africa and Mauritius). protests in Africa has increased significantly since the mid-2000s, reaching its peak in recent years, Recent protests do not, therefore, represent a radi- and that this rise has affected the entire continent. cally new development for Africa. Rather, they fit

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) December 2016 1 into a historical pattern of popular mobilisation to the political opposition, media or civil society fre- express discontent with the performance of gov- quently face harassment, curtailment and control. ernments. At their core, they are expressions of unmet popular aspirations for change and of the Protests are further driven by frictions caused by inability or unwillingness of many countries to the arbitrariness of state rule and its often violent provide a serious response to the grievances which interference in the day-to-day lives of people – triggered earlier waves of protest. through the destruction of informal settlements, the dismantlement or relocation of informal mar- The latest protests started in the late 2000s and kets, daily police harassment and extortion, for in- spiked dramatically from 2010-2011 onwards. In stance. This, in turn, impacts on already insecure part, the protests overlapped with the ‘Arab Spring’, and precarious economic situations. Recent pro- suggesting the latter may have had a contagion ef- test movements in South Africa and Ethiopia of- fect across the continent. However, protests had fer an illustration of the close intertwining of these already started increasing since 2005, well ahead different protest dynamics. of the Arab Spring, which suggests that deeper dynamics are at play. Popular unrest has taken dif- Workers and students in the south ferent forms, varied in scale, and occurred both at the local and national level. They include street South Africa, a country with a long history of pro- demonstrations against rising food prices and the tests, has been most strongly affected by the in- cost of living (Chad, Guinea, Niger), strike actions crease in strikes and demonstrations over the past over arrears in wage payments and labour disputes five years, driven by a spiralling economic crisis as (Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe), pro- the country confronts shrinking economic growth, tests over rigged elections or attempts by leaders a strong depreciation of the rand, and a 25% un- to extend their constitutional term limits (Burkina employment rate. Protests are also fuelled by pop- Faso, Burundi, DRC, Gabon, Togo, Uganda), stu- ular discontent over the ruling African National dent protests (Uganda, South Africa), and out- Congress (ANC) party’s perceived failure to ad- breaks of unrest over police violence, extortion, dress the inequalities inherited from the apartheid corruption and impunity (Chad, Kenya, Senegal, era. This is particularly the case among poor and Uganda). What many of these popular protests marginalised communities living in urban areas have in common is that they are driven by deep- and informal settlements. Poor service delivery, ur- seated frustration with ban housing, local gov- the economic and po- ernment corruption, litical status quo. ‘Despite the introduction of multi-party and forced evictions are systems in many countries, the political the most common trig- Africa rising? gers of protests. These space often remains tightly controlled are generally localised Rising economic growth and spontaneous, but on the continent over by the regimes in power; free, fair and they have the capacity the past two decades genuinely competitive elections are in to rapidly expand and led to optimistic nar- escalate, and often in- ratives about ‘Africa short supply; and critical voices [...] volve the destruction of rising’ as real GDP in- vehicles and state prop- creased by around 5% frequently face harassment...’ erty. The mining sec- each year since 2000. tor, which accounts for However, this has not translated into a substantial about 7% of South Africa’s GDP, is also frequently reduction in economic inequality, (youth) unem- marred by mass strike actions and unrest over ployment, a reliance of large sections of the popu- wages, labour conditions, and slow progress in im- lation on the informal sector, and overall poverty. proving black ownership of mining assets. At the same time, data from Afrobarometer, a pan- African research network, suggests that while there Protests in South Africa are renowned for being of- has been an increase between 2002 and 2010 in ten accompanied by violence. This is in part driven the demand for democracy, there is also a wide- by the heavy-handed tactics employed by the po- spread perception that political leaders are failing lice, which provoke retaliatory violence. The most to deliver. Despite the introduction of multi-party notorious incident in recent years was the 2012 systems in many countries, the political space of- Marikana massacre, when the police – pressured by ten remains tightly controlled by the regimes in a platinum mining company (of which the coun- power; free, fair and genuinely competitive elec- try’s current Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa tions are in short supply; and critical voices within was a non-executive board member) and senior

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) December 2016 2 Riots and protests in Africa (1997-2014)

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) 2016 officials – opened fire on striking workers, killing urban constituencies, and the divisions within the 41 and injuring 78. But violence by protesters is also trade union movement (an important traditional a reaction to what they perceive as ANC unrespon- power base for the ANC). They reflect an increased siveness to their grievances. Violence, and in par- questioning of the hegemony of the ANC over its ticular destruction of public property, is seen as an failure to address economic disenfranchisement and effective means to force authorities to pay attention redress racial and class inequalities. to their demands. Ethnic groups and regions in the east Over the past two years South Africa has also seen an escalation of student protests at universities, When Ethiopia’s government announced its land which have resulted in the disruption or suspension reform measure, the ‘Greater Addis Ababa Master of academic activity at all major universities, violent Plan’, in November 2015, regions inhabited by the confrontations between students and the police, Oromo and Amhara peoples – the two largest ethnic and extensive damage to property. Students initially groups in the country – saw a sharp rise in street started protesting against higher student fees, con- protests. The plan provided for an expansion of the cerned that this would prevent many already dis- capital of Addis Ababa into the surrounding Oromia enfranchised youths from accessing education, and region, a move which would cause the Oromo to the outsourcing of service jobs on campuses. But the lose their constitutionally-enshrined regional rights. movement has since expanded to also include calls Although the government abandoned its plan just for the ‘decolonisation’ of South African universi- two months later, the widespread opposition trans- ties, as epitomised by the #RhodesMustFall campaign formed a single-issue protest into a wider political launched at the University of Cape Town in March campaign. 2015 to denounce institutional racism on campus. Universities are accused of having taken insufficient Although the protests began over a land reform measures to increase the number of black students measure, grievances run much deeper. They vary and faculty members and to revise curricula to en- between regions and between political parties, but sure they include the works of African thinkers and common factors are the opposition to the govern- secure a place for indigenous knowledge systems. ment, the call for a more democratic political space and a fairer distribution of wealth and jobs, and the Although student protests have received the moral fight against corruption. In sum, Ethiopia is con- support of labour unions and churches, they have fronted with the aspirations of a growing and in- yet to link up with social movements beyond cam- creasingly well-educated youth that wants to partic- puses, and it is unclear how sustainable the protests ipate in the political and economic system. In 2016, will be – also considering the loose organisation of the protests in Oromia spread to the neighbouring the student movements. However, the protests feed Amhara region. While there are currently no indica- into a broader backlash against the ANC, as illus- tors of a formal alliance, a political rapprochement trated by the growing influence of the Economic between both groups would represent a significant Freedom Fighters movement, the poor performance threat to the government and an important shift in of the ANC in the August municipal elections in key Ethiopia’s socio-political landscape.

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) December 2016 3 The protests took a violent turn on both sides when mobilisation while also raising international vis- protesters damaged foreign investments and gov- ibility. However, due to the relatively low level of ernment forces opened fire during the Oromo cul- internet penetration in Africa compared to other tural festival last August in Bishoftu. The incident regions of the world, the mobilising effect of social triggered the imposition of a state of emergency on media continues to be mostly limited to urban areas, 9 October for a period of six months, which in- while street mobilisation remains reliant on more cluded a curfew, detention without a court warrant, traditional methods such as leaflet distribution and the monitoring of all communications, the deploy- word-of-mouth information spreading. ment of federal security forces to the regions, and the prohibition of public gatherings. Since then, The prospects of the recent protests triggering po- 11,000 people have been arrested – according to litical and socioeconomic change are challenged government sources – while Amnesty International by the mostly repressive response deployed so far estimates that around 1,000 have been killed in the by governments. Excessive use of force by law en- protests since November 2015. forcement actors against protesters, arbitrary detention, and harassment of protesters or their leaders Internet access and social media activity have also are widespread. Governments also react by restrict- been severely restricted. Several bloggers have been ing freedom of movement, shutting down media arrested and magazines have been pressured to stop outlets, and tightening legislation on non-govern- publishing. The state of emergency effectively puts mental organisations’ (NGO) operations and fund- Ethiopia under military rule, and all constitutional ing. Data from Freedom House, a US-based NGO, rights are suspended. While it contained the protests clearly shows that there has been a general decline in the short term, a political response is required to in civil liberties and political rights on the continent prevent a further escalation of the crisis. Political re- since the new wave of protests started – although forms were discussed at the Council meeting of the this does not necessarily mean that such a decline ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic is driven only by the protests. A willingness on the Front (EPRDF) party in August, with an emphasis part of governments to engage in a dialogue and en- on the internal causes, political extremism and cor- act reforms to address the grievances has so far been ruption. In October, the beginning of the parlia- limited. mentary year, the president announced far-reaching reforms, including electoral reform, a more propor- Most protests in Africa are unlikely to result in re- tional system, a drive against corruption and the gime change. While the successful removal of for- liberalisation of the economy. In November, Prime mer presidents Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal and Minister Desalegn announced a cabinet reshuffle, Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso raised hopes, the which included the appointment of people with a particular circumstances in both countries are not more technocratic profile and the inclusion of nine easily replicable. What is more, the Burundian expe- new Oromo representatives. However, further con- rience shows that protests can also have the counter- crete steps may be needed to address demands for productive effect of hardening a regime in power. job creation, fairer power-sharing, re-balancing the And a key lesson to be drawn from the democra- federal system between the centre and the regions, tisation wave of the 1990s in Africa is that regime and more inclusive economic reforms. change does not necessarily lead to systemic change. Where next? The current protests do, however, need to be taken seriously as evidence that more formal processes to An important aspect of the recent protests is the cen- affect change are not working, thus sending a strong tral role played by youth movements such as Y’en a signal to donors interested in supporting democ- marre in Senegal, Balai citoyen in Burkina Faso and ratisation. Protests in Africa, therefore, should not La Lucha in the DRC. They have been the harbinger necessarily be viewed as vehicles for regime change, of new forms of protest (different from more tra- even though this is the declared aim of some of ditional civil society actions) and are rooted in the them. Instead they are to be seen as a means to press development of connections between grassroots ac- for reform and challenge the state’s monopoly of po- tivities and national-level protests. Social media has litical discourse and action. also played an important role in facilitating protests, in line with a wider trend of a growing popularity of hashtag campaigns. The #Tajamuka (‘We are fed up’) Valerie Arnould is a Senior Associate Analyst, campaign in Zimbabwe, #Unemploymentmovement and Aleksandra Tor and Alice Vervaeke are and #IShallNotForget campaigns in Botswana, or Junior Analysts at the EUISS. #Feesmustfall in South Africa illustrate how social media has enabled both a rapid and broad social

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) December 2016 4