DOCSLIB.ORG

Promoting a More Transparent and Accountable NATO

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Promoting a More Transparent and Accountable NATO Issue 46: December 2017 Promoting a more transparent and accountable NATO www.natowatch.org NATO Watch Observatory In this edition: No. 46 (October- December NATO Watch Essay: 2017) - Patriot Games: misinformation, exaggeration and military exercises 3 Published by News, Commentary & Reports: NATO Watch - Arms Control & Disarmament 11 - Artificial Intelligence 12 Gairloch, Scotland - Climate Change 12 IV212DS - Collective Defence 12 Email: - Counter Terrorism 12 - Cyber Security and Information Editor: Dr. Ian Davis Warfare 13 - Defence Budgets and Welcome to NATO Watch’s quarterly Procurement 14 Observatory: the only online publication - Demographic Trends and dedicated entirely to news and independent Security 15 commentary on NATO policy-making and - Enlargement & Partnerships 16 operational activities. The clips are drawn - Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bosnia from a wide range of subscriptions, feeds Herzegovina; China-NATO relations; EU- and alerts covering a substantial part of the NATO relations; Finland; Georgia; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Macedonia; major English language newspapers and Mediterranean Dialogue; Moldova; OSCE- other periodicals worldwide. NATO relations; Policy; Science for Peace and Security Programme; Serbia; South NATO Watch Korea; Sweden; UAE; Ukraine; UN-NATO conducts independent monitoring and relations analysis of NATO and aims to increase - History 23 transparency, stimulate parliamentary - Institutional Reform 23 engagement and broaden public awareness - Intelligence 24 and participation in a progressive reform - Maritime Security 24 agenda within NATO. - Military Exercises 24 - Missile Defence 25 - NATO Defence Ministers Meeting 26 - NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting 27 - NATO Parliamentary Assembly 28 - Nuclear Weapons and North Korea 28 - Operations and Missions 30 - Afghanistan; Kosovo; Libya - Responsibility to Protect 32 - Russia-NATO relations 33 - Secretary General 35 - Strategic Concept 35 Copyright © NATO Watch, 2018. Some rights reserved. - Summits 35 This publication is made available under a Creative - Technology 35 Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 licence, which allows copy - Transparency, Accountability and and distribution for non-profit use, provided the authors and NATO Watch are attributed properly and Good Governance 35 the text is not altered in any way. All citations must be - Women, Peace and Security 36 credited to NATO Watch and/or the original sources. Security News from NATO Member States 36 New Research Projects 46 2 Zapad 2017 NATO Watch Essay: While Russia’s military exercises often Patriot Games: provoke widespread media and expert interest in the West, the bilateral misinformation, Belarus-Russia Zapad 2017 (which ran exaggeration and military from 14 to 20 September and took exercises place across Kaliningrad, Belarus and Russia’s Northwest Military District) By Dr Ian Davis saw unprecedented attention and feverish conjecture concerning “…[This nation is] aiming at the Moscow’s goals. This was not a ‘snap exclusive domination of the [world], lost exercise’, since Zapad (meaning ‘west’ in corruption, [characterized by] deep- in Russian) has taken place every four rooted hatred towards us, hostile to years since 2009 and is announced well liberty wherever it endeavours to show in advance. Russia holds at least one its head, and the eternal disturber of major military exercise every year on a the peace of the world”. rotating basis in four different regions—Zapad (‘west’ 2017), Kavkaz Consider the above quote. Who do you (‘Caucasus’ 2016) Tsentr (‘center’ think said that and to what nation was 2015) and Vostok (‘east’ 2014)— he or she referring? (The answer is suggesting that Russian strategists provided in the conclusion to this believe their armed forces need to be essay). prepared for a major conflict from any ------------ direction and not just from NATO in the West. Major military exercises are being On this occasion, the main Western conducted with increasing frequency in concerns were that Zapad 2017 could Europe and since 2013 on the Russian be used as cover to launch a military side, often without prior notification attack against one or more of Belarus’ (so-called ‘snap exercises’). This year, neighbouring states, or even to leave both Russia and NATO have been troops behind to destabilize Belarus. holding large Cold War-style war Predictably, this did not come to pass. games. Both sides claim the exercises, which involve mainly conventional air, Much of the excitement in Western sea and land assets, but also cyber and media stemmed from the issue of how potentially nuclear warfare simulations, many Russian military personnel would are purely defensive in nature. But it is arrive in Belarus for the exercise. The clear the exercises are also meant to figure of 100,000 Russian troops was showcase new capabilities and widely reported, including by the technologies, and display not only the Washington Post, New York Times and strength of their respective alliances, the Economist (see the wider sample of but how quickly troops and heavy press coverage in the previous NATO equipment can move to defeat a Watch Observatory), as well as by territorial incursion at the frontier. Both several US generals and western Russia and NATO have been testing politicians, but was always highly their strategic deterrence and coercive unlikely. Moscow claimed that it would capabilities, but only one side tends to stay within the ceilings provided by the be criticised in the West for doing so. Organization for Security and The ideological confrontation of the Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Vienna Cold War may be over, and Russia may Document, whereby any military be a shadow of the former Soviet Union, exercise involving more than 9,000 but an anti-Russian drumbeat troops requires advance notification of continues to beat loud and clear. 3 at least 42 days; and any exercise Western analysts allege, with some involving more than 13,000 troops justification, that Russian military must be preceded by an invitation to exercises often work around the two the other 56 OSCE participating states Vienna Document ceilings. So, on this to send two observers. occasion, did the real number of Russian troops in Zapad 2017 exceed The latest iteration of the Vienna the official figure of 12,700 soldiers, Document was agreed in 2011 and supported by 680 armoured vehicles builds on several previous agreements and 200 artillery systems? While (the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the Western estimates—ranging between Document of the Stockholm 100,00-60,000—appear to be inflated, Conference of 1986, the 1992 Helsinki the real numbers are still unconfirmed: Document, and the Vienna Documents “We don’t know the exact numbers and of 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1999). It is probably never will” a NATO source said part of an interlocking web of mutually on the 29 September, adding “There enforcing agreements, including the were ground, air, Treaties on and paratrooper Conventional Arms forces as well as Control in Europe homeland defence (CFE) and Open participants, so Skies, which form getting a final the current European accurate count will conventional arms be difficult”. control framework. Nevertheless, by 2 This framework aims October, US Army to increase military Europe commander transparency Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (especially when it was confident comes to military enough to “guess” exercises) and that Zapad 2017 augment mutual involved around security by 40,000 Russian diminishing the risks troops. of miscalculation and misperception. From NATO’s security posters collection. Over However, one study the years, the posters, cards, and calendars records more than reproduced in this 60 seriousness edition of the NATO incidents across the Watch Observatory have Euro-Atlantic area adorned the walls and involving NATO and/or its partners and the desks inside the alliance headquarters, reminding NATO employees of the importance Russia between 2014 and 2016, of discretion and internal security. As NATO including airspace violations of NATO says, “These cultural artefacts are testimonials countries (Estonia and Lithuania) and to the preoccupations of our times” – credit: their partners (Sweden and Finland); NATO. two near collisions between civilian However, missing from many of the airliners and military aircraft; NATO reports of Zapad 2017 is the fact that warships being harried by Russian 14 observers from seven countries— aircraft; and several pursuits of Russian Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, submarines suspected to be operating Poland, Sweden and Ukraine—were in the territorial waters of another invited on voluntary basis by Belarus to state. This increased number of military observe the Belarus part of the incidents has added to rising tensions. exercise. (No invitations were 4 forthcoming from Russia). NATO also counting full units as having sent two experts, but rightly participated when only parts of units complained that the access given fell were involved. (For a detailed short of a fully-fledged observation breakdown of all Russia's military mission under the Vienna Document, manoeuvres during the exercises, see which would get briefings, interviews Michael Kofman's blog on Zapad-2017; with soldiers and overflights. and for a historical comparison of the Nonetheless, one of those observers, large gap between official Russian Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Möller from numbers and Western assessments of Sweden, apparently witnessed enough Russian military exercises since 2008, to confirm in an interview on 27 see Table 3 in
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russian Meddling in Elections and Referenda in the Alliance
    SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA IN THE ALLIANCE General Report by Susan DAVIS (United States) General Rapporteur 181 STC 18 E fin | Original: English | 18 November 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 II. RUSSIA’S MOTIVATIONS BEHIND MEDDLING IN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA .......... 1 III. WHAT WE KNOW: RECENT RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN ALLIED COUNTRIES ..................... 4 A. THE UNITED STATES ................................................................................................. 4 B. THE UNITED KINGDOM .............................................................................................. 7 C. FRANCE ....................................................................................................................... 8 D. GERMANY ................................................................................................................... 8 E. SPAIN ........................................................................................................................... 9 F. THE NETHERLANDS ................................................................................................... 9 IV. POLICY RESPONSES AND THE WAY FORWARD ............................................................ 10 A. ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE ................................................................................ 10 B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS ........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression for More Information on This Publication, Visit
    C O R P O R A T I O N MICHAEL J. MAZARR, JOE CHERAVITCH, JEFFREY W. HORNUNG, STEPHANIE PEZARD What Deters and Why Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3142 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0397-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: REUTERS/Kyodo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled What Deters and Why: North Korea and Russia, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded from the Trump Twitter
    World Leaders a-Twitter: Communication Platforms and Agenda-Building During the 2018 NATO Summit Katja C. Walton International Affairs Program University of Colorado Boulder Defended April 2, 2019 Honors Thesis Defense Committee Dr. Janet Lynn Donavan, Primary Advisor Department of Political Science Dr. Douglas Snyder, Honors Council Representative International Affairs Program Dr. Levente Szentkirályi, Thesis Committee Member Program for Writing and Rhetoric World Leaders a - T w i t t e r | 2 Abstract: Twitter is a thriving microblogging service with growing prominence in the political sphere. In this study, I examine the differences between Twitter communications and verbal communications by three heads of state and government in relation to the most recent NATO Summit in July 2018. Through a three-step analysis, including descriptive statistics, content and tone analysis, and comparative analysis, the study investigates Twitter’s influence on content and tone and its agenda-building capacity for face-to-face summits. After hand-coding over 2,000 tweets and 15 verbal communications, I find that Twitter does not support more negative content and tone among world leaders than verbal communication. Rather, a leader’s tone remains consistent on both communication platforms, suggesting the salience of personality and political strategy as well as the importance of anonymity in online behavioral disinhibition. Findings also demonstrate that, in the case of Burden-Sharing negotiations during the 2018 NATO Summit, U.S. President Trump successfully implemented Twitter as an agenda-building tool to position Burden-Sharing as a prominent Summit topic. Ultimately, I conclude that the rejection of the platform’s legitimacy for diplomatic exchanges and the lack of direct discussion between politicians on Twitter demonstrates that Twitter is not a viable replacement for face-to-face summits.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO at Seventy (PDF)
    PROJECT ON EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP NATO at Seventy An Alliance in Crisis Ambassador Douglas Lute Ambassador Nicholas Burns REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 www.belfercenter.org/Transatlantic Statements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The authors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly cite the source. Design and Layout by Andrew Facini Cover photo: A U.S. Marine carries cold weather equipment as he begins to march across the Icelandic terrain in preparation for NATO’s Trident Juncture 2018 exercise, October 19, 2018. (NATO Photo) Copyright 2019, President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America PROJECT ON EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP NATO at Seventy An Alliance in Crisis Ambassador Douglas Lute Ambassador Nicholas Burns REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 About this Report “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis” is a report by the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. This Project aims to strengthen teaching, research, and policy-making on the relationship between the United States and Europe. This report is timed to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2019 as the world’s most successful alliance faces perhaps the most daunting and complex set of challenges in its history.
    [Show full text]
  • Documento Informativo Para As Entidades Da Base Tecnológica E Industrial De Defesa
    DOCUMENTO INFORMATIVO PARA AS ENTIDADES DA BASE TECNOLÓGICA E INDUSTRIAL DE DEFESA NOVEMBRO 2018 DOCUMENTO INFORMATIVO PARA AS ENTIDADES DA BASE TECNOLÓGICA E INDUSTRIAL DE DEFESA ÍNDICE I. SOBRE O NATO-INDUSTRY FORUM 2018 ....................................................... 3 II. TEMAS DISCUTIDOS NO NIF18 ....................................................................... 4 II. a) Logistics & Sustainment ........................................................................................ 4 II. b) Enhancing Military “Decision-Making” ...................................................................5 II. c) Disruptive Technologies ........................................................................................ 6 II. d) Autonomy .............................................................................................................. 7 II. e) Innovation and Disruptive Technologies ............................................................... 8 II. f) Trans-Atlantic Policies and Strategies for 21st Century Capabilities ..................... 10 II. g) NATO and Industry – Ready for Novel Challenges ............................................... 12 Página 2 de 14 . DOCUMENTO INFORMATIVO PARA AS ENTIDADES DA BASE TECNOLÓGICA E INDUSTRIAL DE DEFESA I. SOBRE O NATO-INDUSTRY FORUM 2018 O NATO-Industry Forum 2018 (NIF18) decorreu na Alemanha com o alto patrocinio do Secretário-Geral da NATO e coorganizado pelo NATO Allied Command Transformation e o Secretário-Geral Adjunto para o Investimento em Defesa. O NIF18 teve como
    [Show full text]
  • Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence
    Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence Eva Hagström Frisell and Krister Pallin (eds) Albin Aronsson, Bengt-Göran Bergstrand, Robert Dalsjö, Johan Engvall, Jakob Gustafsson, Michael Jonsson, Diana Lepp, Viktor Lundquist, Björn Ottosson and Anna Sundberg FOI-R--5012--SE February 2021 Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence Eva Hagström Frisell and Krister Pallin (eds) Albin Aronsson, Bengt-Göran Bergstrand, Robert Dalsjö, Johan Engvall, Jakob Gustafsson, Michael Jonsson, Diana Lepp, Viktor Lundquist, Björn Ottosson and Anna Sundberg FOI-R--5012--SE Title Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence Report No. FOI-R--5012--SE Month February Year 2021 Pages 132 ISSN 1650-1942 Customer Ministry of Defence Research Area 8. Security Policy Project No. A 12112 Approved by Malek Finn Khan Division Defence Analysis Cover: Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP. US Marines prepare their M1 Abrams tank before taking part in an exercise to capture an airfield during Trident Juncture 2018, near the town of Oppdal, Norway. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. ii FOI-R--5012--SE Abstract The conclusion of our analysis of Western military capability in Northern Europe in 2017 was that the West had several shortcomings compared to Russia when it came to high-intensity warfighting. Considerable resources and time would be required before the West could change the situation.
    [Show full text]
  • H-Diplo | ISSF POLICY Series America and the World—2017 and Beyond
    H-Diplo | ISSF POLICY Series America and the World—2017 and Beyond Sound and Fury, Signifying Something? NATO and the Trump Administration’s Second Year Essay by Joshua Shifrinson, Boston University Published on 15 July 2018 | issforum.org Editor: Diane Labrosse Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Shortlink: http://tiny.cc/PR-1-5BI Permalink: http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5BI-NATO PDF URL: http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5BI.pdf s the Trump administration’s second year in office rolls onward, what is the state of the transatlantic alliance? Writing for H-Diplo last year, I argued that Trump’s first year in office saw the emergence of a “Trumpian NATO policy.”1 In brief, this policy encompassed significant continuity with the Asubstance of prior U.S. policy towards NATO, coupled with highly conditional U.S. rhetorical backing for the transatlantic relationship. As Trump—in a break from his campaign rhetoric—emphasized through mid- 2017, NATO provided value to the United States, even as he suggested the United States might exit the alliance should its allies not agree to U.S. demands in intra-alliance discussions. One year on, the fundamentals of this policy have not changed. The substance of U.S. policy towards NATO is strikingly similar to that of prior administrations, whereas the rhetoric remains a stark departure from past practice. Moreover, the bifurcated European response to Trump’s policy—praising the substance and decrying the rhetoric—has, if anything, grown clearer. Instead, the big shift has come in how many analysts themselves assess the long-term impact of Trump’s strategy.
    [Show full text]
  • 081 Stctts 17 E
    STC 076 STC 18 E Original: English NATO Parliamentary Assembly SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA IN THE ALLIANCE DRAFT GENERAL REPORT* Susan DAVIS (United States) General Rapporteur www.nato-pa.int 16 March 2018 * Until this document has been adopted by the Science and Technology Committee, it only represents the views of the Rapporteur. 076 STC 18 E TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 II. RUSSIA’S MOTIVATION BEHIND MEDDLING IN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA ............. 1 III. WHAT WE KNOW: RECENT RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN ALLIED COUNTRIES ..................... 4 A. UNITED STATES ......................................................................................................... 4 B. UNITED KINGDOM ...................................................................................................... 6 C. FRANCE ....................................................................................................................... 6 D. GERMANY ................................................................................................................... 7 E. SPAIN ........................................................................................................................... 8 IV. POLICY RESPONSES AND THE WAY FORWARD .............................................................. 8 A. ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE .................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • NATO at 70 Washington Treaty
    róbert ondrejcsák PANORAMA SPECIAL EDITION OF PANORAMA OF THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 2019 For more than thirteen years, Panorama of Global Security Environ- Tyler. H. Lippert (eds.) ment has brought quality analysis with inside knowledge written by experienced authors from various areas of employment. It is one of the most prestigious annual or bi-annual publications with a focus on European security, NATO, advanced technologies, new security threats and geopolitics. The goal of Panorama has always been to provide both scholars and decision-makers with up-to-date analysis of the trends and issues of the global security environment. Throughout its history, the book has attracted a wide readership and it has published texts by authors from all the continents. Since 2012, Panorama is indexed in the prestigious Thomson Reuters Web of Science Book Citation Index. Every Panorama issue is publicly available online on the STRATPOL webpage. Slovakia celebrated 15 years in NATO along with six of its allies. It was the sixth enlargement and still remains as NATO’s largest. Apart from that, NATO is celebrating 70 years since the signature of the NATO at 70 Washington Treaty. Therefore, Panorama 2019 is fully devoted to NATO, its current role in the international architecture, but also to finding gaps in the relationship of Slovakia towards the Alliance. NATO is the longest serving defense alliance in modern history. None of the authors argued this will change soon and although they raised important critical points to some of NATO’s policies, the overwhelming consensus is that this tumultuous period would be much harder to cope with without NATO.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
    Research NATO and the Treaty Paper on the Prohibition International Security Programme of Nuclear Weapons January 2021 Steven Hill Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. Contents Summary 2 01 Introduction 3 02 NATO nuclear policy 6 03 NATO’s concerns about the TPNW 10 04 The TPNW and customary international law 23 05 NATO’s ADN policy 26 06 Conclusions 29 About the author 31 Acknowledgments 32 1 Chatham House Summary — The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. The treaty had been opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 20 September 2017, and the threshold of 50 deposits of instruments of ratification, required for the TPNW to enter effect, was reached on 24 October 2020. — As part of a project on understanding NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for the 30 NATO member states (Allies). NATO has maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the TPNW. Several NATO partner countries have joined the treaty; others have decided not to join, often citing the potential effect on their security and ongoing cooperation with NATO as grounds for this decision. — The reality is that the TPNW will now be here to stay. Even if the prospect of a NATO Ally becoming a party to the TPNW may be currently assessed as unrealistic, a too intense focus on opposing the TPNW may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament.
    [Show full text]
  • The Relationship Between CSDP and NATO After Brexit and the EU Global Strategy
    The relationship between CSDP and NATO after Brexit and the EU Global Strategy Maria Eleni Koppa Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, Panteion University of Athens FEPS STUDIES APRIL 2019 The relationship between CSDP and NATO after Brexit and the EU Global Strategy The Brexit referendum initiated a series of events of still unpredictable consequences for the future of the European Union (EU). Especially in the area of Security and Defence, the EU will lose one of the so-called ‘Big Three’, at the same time that it tries to redefine its relationship to NATO through the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is undeniable that during the two and a half years since the British referendum, more things have happened at the level of European Security and Defence that during the last 60 or more. These developments were received by NATO with restrained suspicion, while new international risks and threats made EU/NATO cooperation more necessary than ever. However, NATO is facing new challenges (Putin’s Russia, China, internal problems by a member of the Alliance, i.e. Turkey), with the United States (US) President expressing views on an eventual American withdrawal from the alliance. After the Brexit referendum there is a clear distinction between EU Security and European Security, where the UK and NATO play a central part. The UK is and will definitely be part of the European Security arrangements and architecture without being any more part of the CSDP. At the same time we witness a double trend at the EU level: deepening of the CSDP while enhancing cooperation with NATO.
    [Show full text]
  • Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) Gianluca Pastori
    Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) Gianluca Pastori NATO at seventy: the challenges for 2019 The Atlantic Alliance approaches the seventieth anniversary of the Treaty of Washington (April 4, 2019) coming from a troublesome period. The summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Brussels on June 11-12, 2018, seems not having been able to dissipate the doubts that in the last two years have emerged on NATO’s future. During the summit, the press and the analysts expressed in different forms the same concern: that the organization was on the path of a quick decline (if not of disappearance) due to the US will to reduce its engagement. The summit led to several results. The new Republic of North Macedonia (FYROM) was officially invited to start the accession talks, although the failure on the non-binding referendum on the country’s name could make things difficult. The commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq was reaffirmed, extending operation Resolute Support to 2024 and announcing the starting of a mission in support of Baghdad’s authorities. Measures were announced to face the new hybrid challenges (including propaganda, disinformation and malicious cyber activities) and to increase force readiness through the so-called “four-thirty” program. Finally, three new commands have been established: a Cyber Operations Center (CYOC) in Mons (Belgium), a Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk (Virginia, US) and a Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Ulm (Germany)1. In the following months, rumors on a possible US withdrawal from Afghanistan have been a source of tension within the Alliance.
    [Show full text]