DOCSLIB.ORG

The North Atlantic Treaty at 70--Article 10

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The North Atlantic Treaty at 70--Article 10 Emory International Law Review Volume 34 Issue 0 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Seventieth Anniversary 2019 The North Atlantic Treaty at 70--Article 10 Nick Minogue Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr Recommended Citation Nick Minogue, The North Atlantic Treaty at 70--Article 10, 34 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 165 (2019). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol34/iss0/11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MINOGUEPROOFS2_10.24.19 10/28/2019 2:30 PM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AT 70—ARTICLE 10† Nick Minogue* Article 10 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.1 When Montenegro deposited the instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty (“Treaty”) with the U.S. Department of State on June 5, 2017, it became the twenty-ninth Party to the Treaty, and the seventieth to accede under its Article 10.2 At the time of writing, and following the agreement between Athens and Skopje on the resolution of the name issue, Allies are in the process of signing the accession protocol for the future Republic of North Macedonia with a view to it, under its new name, becoming the thirtieth.3 Citing Euro-Atlantic integration’s role in anchoring democracy and the rule of law and strengthening peace, cooperation and stability in Europe, nations have consistently lauded the Alliance’s Open Door policy under Article 10 of the Treaty as one of its great successes.4 Accordingly, the Allies view Article 10 as one of the core tools by which the treaty achieves the purpose of the Alliance, even as this purpose has evolved from the Cold War context in which it was founded, and the corresponding focus on self-defense, to the modern, more multifaceted approach to safeguarding security presented by the 2010 Strategic Concept.5 In this regard Article 10 operates hand in glove with Article 3 of the † This Article contains views provided in the author’s personal capacity and may not reflect agreed upon policy or views of the NATO International Staff or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. * Assistant Legal Adviser, NATO International Staff Office of Legal Affairs. 1 North Atlantic Treaty, art. 10, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 2 Montenegro Joins NATO as 29th Ally, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jun. 5, 2017), https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_144647.htm?selectedLocale=en. 3 Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (FEB. 15, 2019), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48830.htm?selectedLocale=en. 4 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10; For example, in the 2015 NAC statement to mark the anniversary of the then three latest rounds of accession in 2014, and most recently in the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration. 5 See Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the MINOGUEPROOFS2_10.24.19 10/28/2019 2:30 PM 166 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 Treaty, providing a means of extending the inherent stability represented by the increasing integration and cohesiveness of the Allies’ security structures. Whilst Article 10 is not without questions of legal interpretation, its relatively brief content belies the detailed procedures developed by the Alliance since the Treaty’s entry into force to provide a pathway to accession. Similarly, accession to the Treaty is only one element of the legal obligations and political commitments that a State must undertake before it is able to operate as an effective member of NATO. This Article will, therefore, in addition to examining Article 10 itself, focus on the policies and practices that have evolved to govern accession to the Alliance over the seven rounds of enlargement since the Treaty entered into force, as well as the content of the so-called Treaty legal acquis, and the mechanisms by which it binds States newly acceded to the Treaty. A. Drafting History of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty According to a contemporaneous U.S. record of the Treaty negotiations, the seven participating governments saw the need for an accession provision from the outset, believing that, “a North Atlantic security system, to be fully effective, should provide not only for their own security but for that of other countries in the general North Atlantic area whose security was intrinsically and strategically interdependent with their own.”6 At the same time, the participating governments recognized that not all such States would be able to become part of the Alliance from the beginning, either because the governments of such States might not initially be prepared to assume the necessary responsibilities of the Alliance, or due to lack of agreement amongst the seven Governments themselves.7 An accession provision was thus seen as necessary to avoid closing the door to future membership of the Alliance for those states, although the precise content of what became Article 10 was developed only later in the negotiations.8 Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO SUMMIT (Nov. 19–20, 2010), https://www.nato.int/ strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf. 6 John F. Hickman, North Atlantic Pact: The Drafting of the Treaty, PACT D-6/1, at 28 (Mar. 29, 1949). 7 Id. 8 Id. MINOGUEPROOFS2_10.24.19 10/28/2019 2:30 PM 2019] ARTICLE 10 167 The final text of Article 10 comprises essentially four elements: 1. Procedure for Accession Article 10 confirms that accession is only at the invitation of the Parties to the Treaty, and that once invited, a State may become party by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America— the registry for the Treaty—who would inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument.9 These procedural elements were all present in the first draft of the Article considered in negotiations, with the exception of the identity of the depository State, later confirmed as the United States.10 Section C below sets out how these elements have been built upon over successive accession rounds into the considerably more detailed practice followed today. 2. Voting Rule Article 10 specifies that unanimous agreement of the Parties is required to extend an invitation to accede to the Treaty.11 This represents the only reference to a voting rule in the Treaty and was reportedly chosen by the drafters due to the impact of new membership on the obligations of the existing Parties.12 The Alliance’s practice has been to enshrine the decision to invite in an accession protocol to the Treaty itself, thus requiring the agreement of all. As such, the question in principle of whether unanimity could be reached in the face of an abstention will never arise in practice.13 3. Limitation to European States Article 10 limits a potential invitation to any other “European State,” and provides no definition of “European” to clarify its intended scope.14 The first draft of the accession article limited invitations to any other country in the “North Atlantic or Western European regions,” but this was reportedly 9 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1 at art. 10. 10 Hickman, supra note 6; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10. 11 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1 at art. 10. 12 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1; Hickman supra note 6 at ¶ 29. 13 As would be the case, for example, within the Council of the European Union. 14 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10. MINOGUEPROOFS2_10.24.19 10/28/2019 2:30 PM 168 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 considered by the negotiators as too limited, as was the subsequent draft’s reference to “any other neighbouring State.”15 The reference to “North Atlantic” was also dropped because Canada and the United States would be initial signatories and other American countries were actual or potential Parties to the Rio Treaty.16 By February 22, 1949, the drafters had settled on the reference to “any other European State,” as included in the final text.17 There is some evidence that the Allies interpret the reference to “European State” relatively broadly, and independently of the definition of “Europe” in Article 6. Whilst the accession protocol for the Republic of Turkey supplements Article 6’s reference to the territory of any of the Parties in Europe with an express reference to the territory of Turkey, the protocol makes no similar amendment to Article 10.18 Thus, whilst the then Allies evidently felt that at least some clarification was needed to avoid any uncertainty over whether Article 5 applied to all parts of Turkish territory, they implicitly understood the Republic of Turkey to fulfil the definition of a “European State” for the purposes of Article 10.19 Similarly, Georgia’s geographical position to the east of Turkey has not prevented Allies from envisaging its accession.20 At the same time, a different approach to Article 6 and Article 10 can be readily explained at a practical level, leaving aside questions of interpretation.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now 443
    Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now 443 Chapter 19 Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now Pavel Palazhchenko The purpose of this chapter is to bring to the attention of research- ers materials relating to the antecedents of NATO enlargement that have not been widely cited in ongoing discussions. In the debate on NATO enlargement, both in Russia and in the West, the issue of the “assurances on non-enlargement of NATO” giv- en to Soviet leaders and specifically Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989-1990 has taken center stage since the mid-1990s. The matter is discussed not just by scholars, journalists and other non-policy-makers but also by major political figures, particularly in Russia, including President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In the West, there has recently been renewed interest in the subject following the publi- cation of some declassified material by the National Security Archive, a Washington, D.C., non-profit organization with a somewhat mislead- ing name. While some of the aspects of the discussion of the “assurances” are similar in Russia and the West (conflation of fact and opinion, of bind- ing obligations and remarks relating to expectation or intent) the sub- text is different. In Russia most commentators accuse Gorbachev of being gullible and naïve and blithely accepting the assurances instead of demanding a binding legal guarantee of non-enlargement. In the West, the subtext is more often of the West’s bad faith in breaking what is supposed to be an informal “pledge of non-enlargement” given to Gor- bachev.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Expansion: Benefits and Consequences
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2001 NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences Jeffrey William Christiansen The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Christiansen, Jeffrey William, "NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences" (2001). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8802. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8802 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ■rr - Maween and Mike MANSFIELD LIBRARY The University of M ontana Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in published works and reports. **Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature** Yes, I grant permission X No, I do not grant permission ________ Author's Signature; Date:__ ^ ^ 0 / Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with the author's explicit consent. MSThe»i9\M«r«f»eld Library Permission Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NATO EXPANSION: BENEFITS AND CONSEQUENCES by Jeffrey William Christiansen B.A. University of Montana, 2000 presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The University of Montana 2001 Approved by: hairpers Dean, Graduate School 7 - 24- 0 ^ Date Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Enlargement Reloaded
    Research Paper Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome - No. 81 – September 2012 NATO Enlargement Reloaded by Karl-Heinz Kamp 1 The dispute about who will become a new NATO member and when is Contents set to make it back on the transatlantic agenda. Debates in the Alliance have for years been dominated by the operations in Afghanistan or the Two Difficult Membership evolution of NATO’s partnership approach, but now the enlargement Applicants 2 question is coming up again and might lead to strong disagreements The Roots of the Debate 3 among the allies. All NATO nations certainly concur that the door for Russia and Enlargement 4 new members should remain open; the question is which countries Georgia in NATO – Pros and Cons 5 should join the Alliance, and when? How to Deal With the Membership Question? 7 At NATO’s Chicago Summit in May 2012, US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton suggested that Chicago should be the last NATO summit not explicitly focusing on enlargement.2 From this statement, which went largely unnoticed by the public, it can be logically inferred that all forthcoming summits should deal with inviting new members to join NATO, showing the degree of emphasis the US government is set to place on the enlargement issue in the coming years. Even if a statement of this kind in Chicago – in the midst of the presidential campaign and at the first NATO summit on US territory since 1999 – is partly directed to a domestic audience, it still shows the current Research Paper mood in US political circles: NATO enlargement is regarded as a ISSN 2076 - 0949 unique benefit, and the United States sees itself as the spearhead of (Res.
    [Show full text]
  • 10 Years After Bucharest Why NATO Should Double-Down on Georgian
    C - 0; M - 95; Y - 100; K - 2; PANTONE 485 CP C - 0; M - 98; Y - 91; K - 30; PANTONE 7621 CP C - 0; M - 97; Y - 87; K - 60; PANTONE 7624 CP POLICY BRIEF EUROPE IN THE WORLD PROGRAMME 3 JULY 2018 10 years after Bucharest Why NATO should Amanda Paul Senior Policy Analyst, EPC double-down on Ana Andguladze Georgian membership Policy Researcher, ISPED 2018 is a momentous year for Georgia: it marks the interest to strengthen ties with Tbilisi. As a reliable 100th anniversary of the first Democratic Republic of partner that shares common interests and values, the Georgia. It is also the 10th anniversary of the war with country offers the West a strategic foothold in the South Russia (August 2008) and of the Bucharest Summit, Caucasus. The Alliance must reaffirm its membership when Tbilisi was promised a seat at NATO’s table. commitment and reiterate that no third country has a veto on its enlargement. It should further deepen A decade on, NATO-Georgia cooperation has practical cooperation and bolster Georgia’s ability substantially deepened. The country now meets to defend itself. Reaffirming NATO’s support would NATO standards in many areas: it has modernised its reassure Georgian society, boost reform efforts and move armed forces and interoperability between Georgian the country ever closer to the Alliance. troops and the armies of NATO countries has increased. Georgia has contributed more to international NATO missions than many existing members and also meets the Alliance’s defence spending target. Tbilisi has also undertaken reforms to strengthen democracy, eradicate Georgia has contributed more to corruption and ensure civilian control of the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Remarks at the Opening of the North Atlantic Council Meeting on Kosovo April 23, 1999
    Administration of William J. Clinton, 1999 / Apr. 23 that is doing so much to reduce crime on our By taking actions to prevent future acts of streets to our schools. Today I’m pleased to violence in our schools, we can best honor the announce the first of the grants funding these memories of those who lost their lives. community police will be awarded to 336 Thank you very much. schools and communities to help hire more than 600 police officers. Like their counterparts on Legislative Initiatives/Kosovo the streets, these school officers will work close- Q. Mr. President, you didn’t mention gun ly with the citizens they serve, with students, control. Are you going to do more on gun con- teachers, and parents, to improve campus secu- trol? rity, to counsel troubled youth, to mediate con- Q. To be clear, sir, do all hostilities in Kosovo flicts before they escalate into violence. have to end before there can be consideration I want to thank Senator Chuck Robb for his of ground troops, sir? strong leadership on this issue. By the end of The President. First of all, I know you under- the year we hope to have 2,000 new officers stand I’ve got to run over there and meet all in our schools, and I encourage all communities the people who are coming. We will have more to apply for these grants. legislative initiatives to announce in the days I also want to take this opportunity to remind ahead. As I said a couple of days ago, we will communities that they have until June 1st to have some legislative responses and efforts we apply for the Federal Safe Schools-Healthy Stu- have been working on for some time, actually.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Meddling in Elections and Referenda in the Alliance
    SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA IN THE ALLIANCE General Report by Susan DAVIS (United States) General Rapporteur 181 STC 18 E fin | Original: English | 18 November 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 II. RUSSIA’S MOTIVATIONS BEHIND MEDDLING IN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA .......... 1 III. WHAT WE KNOW: RECENT RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN ALLIED COUNTRIES ..................... 4 A. THE UNITED STATES ................................................................................................. 4 B. THE UNITED KINGDOM .............................................................................................. 7 C. FRANCE ....................................................................................................................... 8 D. GERMANY ................................................................................................................... 8 E. SPAIN ........................................................................................................................... 9 F. THE NETHERLANDS ................................................................................................... 9 IV. POLICY RESPONSES AND THE WAY FORWARD ............................................................ 10 A. ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE ................................................................................ 10 B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS ........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • NATO's 60Th Anniversary Summit
    NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit Paul Belkin, Coordinator Analyst in European Affairs Carl Ek Specialist in International Relations Lisa Mages Information Research Specialist Derek E. Mix Analyst in European Affairs April 14, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40454 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit Summary On April 3 and 4, 2009, the heads of state and government of the 26 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany for a summit marking the 60th anniversary of the alliance. The summit was one of three stops on President Obama’s first official visit to Europe as President. Alliance leaders used the anniversary summit to pay tribute to NATO’s past achievements and to reaffirm their commitment to the alliance as the preeminent transatlantic security framework. They also completed a new round of NATO enlargement, sought common positions on the range of challenges currently facing the alliance, and began to set the parameters for NATO’s future direction. The key issue facing the alliance is the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, where allied governments are struggling to reach a strategic consensus on how to stabilize the country. The deteriorating security situation in the country has caused many to question the ability of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to achieve its objectives and has exposed rifts within the alliance as to ISAF’s mission and the appropriate means to accomplish it. NATO’s strained relations with Russia are a second key issue.
    [Show full text]
  • Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression for More Information on This Publication, Visit
    C O R P O R A T I O N MICHAEL J. MAZARR, JOE CHERAVITCH, JEFFREY W. HORNUNG, STEPHANIE PEZARD What Deters and Why Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3142 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0397-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: REUTERS/Kyodo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled What Deters and Why: North Korea and Russia, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO 20/2020: Twenty Bold Ideas to Reimagine the Alliance After The
    NATO 2O / 2O2O TWENTY BOLD IDEAS TO REIMAGINE THE ALLIANCE AFTER THE 2020 US ELECTION NATO 2O/2O2O The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. The Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative brings together top policymakers, government and military officials, business leaders, and experts from Europe and North America to share insights, strengthen cooperation, and develop innovative approaches to the key challenges facing NATO and the transatlantic community. This publication was produced in partnership with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division under the auspices of a project focused on revitalizing public support for the Alliance. NATO 2O / 2O2O TWENTY BOLD IDEAS TO REIMAGINE THE ALLIANCE AFTER THE 2020 US ELECTION Editor-in-Chief Christopher Skaluba Project and Editorial Director Conor Rodihan Research and Editorial Support Gabriela R. A. Doyle NATO 2O/2O2O Table of Contents 02 Foreword 56 Design a Digital Marshall Plan by Christopher Skaluba by The Hon. Ruben Gallego and The Hon. Vicky Hartzler 03 Modernize the Kit and the Message by H.E. Dame Karen Pierce DCMG 60 Build Resilience for an Era of Shocks 08 Build an Atlantic Pacific by Jim Townsend and Anca Agachi Partnership by James Hildebrand, Harry W.S. Lee, 66 Ramp Up on Russia Fumika Mizuno, Miyeon Oh, and by Amb.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Enlargement: Poland, the Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia
    University of Central Florida STARS Honors Undergraduate Theses UCF Theses and Dissertations 2018 NATO Enlargement: Poland, The Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia Christopher M. Radcliffe University of Central Florida Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the UCF Theses and Dissertations at STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Radcliffe, Christopher M., "NATO Enlargement: Poland, The Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia" (2018). Honors Undergraduate Theses. 400. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses/400 NATO ENLARGEMENT: POLAND, THE BALTICS, UKRAINE AND GEORGIA By CHRISTOPHER M. RADCLIFFE A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in International and Global Studies in the College of Sciences and in the Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Spring Term, 2018 Thesis Chair: Houman Sadri, Ph.D. i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This is the most difficult project that I’ve ever taken on. At this time, I’d like to thank a number of people that helped me through this process. I’ve had the pleasure of working with two brilliant professors – Dr. Houman Sadri, who is my thesis chair and Dr. Vladimir Solonari, a member of my thesis committee. Thank you for all of the motivation over the past year and time you both have taken to assist me with completing this project.
    [Show full text]
  • Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance Ergodan Kurt Old Dominion University
    Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Graduate Program in International Studies Dissertations Spring 2010 Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance Ergodan Kurt Old Dominion University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Kurt, Ergodan. "Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance" (2010). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/4bgn-h798 https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/75 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DOUBLING NATO: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE by Erdogan Kurt B.A. August 1996, Turkish Military Academy M.A. July 2001, Naval Postgraduate School A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY May 2010 Approved by: ©2010 Erdogan Kurt. All rights reserved. ABSTRACT DOUBLING NATO: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE Erdogan Kurt Old Dominion University, 2010 Director: Dr. Regina Karp This dissertation studies NATO expansion as institutional adaptation. More specifically, it examines the interaction between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement. This study asserts that there is a close relationship between NATO's new functions and its enlargement.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded from the Trump Twitter
    World Leaders a-Twitter: Communication Platforms and Agenda-Building During the 2018 NATO Summit Katja C. Walton International Affairs Program University of Colorado Boulder Defended April 2, 2019 Honors Thesis Defense Committee Dr. Janet Lynn Donavan, Primary Advisor Department of Political Science Dr. Douglas Snyder, Honors Council Representative International Affairs Program Dr. Levente Szentkirályi, Thesis Committee Member Program for Writing and Rhetoric World Leaders a - T w i t t e r | 2 Abstract: Twitter is a thriving microblogging service with growing prominence in the political sphere. In this study, I examine the differences between Twitter communications and verbal communications by three heads of state and government in relation to the most recent NATO Summit in July 2018. Through a three-step analysis, including descriptive statistics, content and tone analysis, and comparative analysis, the study investigates Twitter’s influence on content and tone and its agenda-building capacity for face-to-face summits. After hand-coding over 2,000 tweets and 15 verbal communications, I find that Twitter does not support more negative content and tone among world leaders than verbal communication. Rather, a leader’s tone remains consistent on both communication platforms, suggesting the salience of personality and political strategy as well as the importance of anonymity in online behavioral disinhibition. Findings also demonstrate that, in the case of Burden-Sharing negotiations during the 2018 NATO Summit, U.S. President Trump successfully implemented Twitter as an agenda-building tool to position Burden-Sharing as a prominent Summit topic. Ultimately, I conclude that the rejection of the platform’s legitimacy for diplomatic exchanges and the lack of direct discussion between politicians on Twitter demonstrates that Twitter is not a viable replacement for face-to-face summits.
    [Show full text]