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Issue 49: December 2018 Promoting a more transparent and accountable NATO www.natowatch.org NATO Watch Observatory In this edition: No. 49 (September - NATO Watch Essay: December 2018) NATO at 70: Will discord colour the celebrations in 2019? 3 News, Commentary & Reports: Published by NATO Watch - Air Power 6 Gairloch, Scotland - Arms Control & Disarmament: the INF Treaty 6 IV212DS - Chemical Weapons 9 - Collective Defence 9 Editor: Dr. Ian Davis - Arctic Security; Southern Flank - Counter Terrorism 10 - Cyber Security and Information Warfare 10 - Defence Budgets and Welcome to NATO Watch’s quarterly Procurement 11 Observatory: the only online publication - Energy Security 12 dedicated entirely to news and independent commentary on NATO policy-making and - Enlargement & Partnerships 12 - Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bosnia operational activities. The clips are drawn Herzegovina; Colombia; Egypt; EU-NATO from a wide range of subscriptions, feeds relations; Finland; Georgia; Israel; and alerts covering a substantial part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; Jordan; major English language newspapers and Kuwait; Macedonia; Mediterranean other periodicals worldwide. Dialogue; Morocco; Pakistan; Policy; Qatar; Science for Peace and Security Programme; Serbia; Sweden; Ukraine; NATO Watch UN-NATO relations conducts independent monitoring and - Maritime Security 20 analysis of NATO and aims to increase - Military Exercises 21 transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness - NATO Defence Ministers 22 and participation in a progressive reform - NATO Foreign Ministers 23 agenda within NATO. - NATO Military Committee 24 - NATO Parliamentary Assembly 24 - NATO Secretary General 25 - NATO Summit 25 - Nuclear Weapons 25 - Operations and Missions 26 - Afghanistan; Iraq; Kosovo; Libya - Populism and NATO 29 - President Trump and the Transatlantic Bond 29 - Russia-NATO relations 30 - Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance 31 - Women, Peace and Security 31 Security News from NATO Member States 32 Copyright © NATO Watch, 2018. Some rights Albania; Bulgaria; Canada; Croatia; reserved. Denmark; Estonia; France; Germany; This publication is made available under a Creative Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Italy; Latvia; Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 licence, which allows copy Lithuania; Netherlands; Norway; and distribution for non-profit use, provided the Poland; Romania; Slovenia; Spain; authors and NATO Watch are attributed properly and the text is not altered in any way. All citations must be Turkey; United Kingdom; United States credited to NATO Watch and/or the original sources. NATO Watch Essay: why, and there remains a broad commitment to NATO within the US establishment and military. NATO at 70: Will discord Apportioning his rhetoric between colour the celebrations in demagoguery, distraction and personal offence is rarely easy, and it is also not 2019? clear if his views reflect a deeper chasm In April 2019, NATO will celebrate its in the transatlantic relationship. The 70th anniversary with a meeting in current US trade war with China, if Washington at the level of foreign unresolved, could escalate and provoke ministers, and potentially another a resumption of the trade war with NATO Summit later in the year (with the Europe (which fell into an uneasy truce date and location still to be decided). in July last year). Another US-European 2019 is also the 30th anniversary of the trade war in 2019 could also have fall of the Berlin Wall. spillover effects for the transatlantic military alliance and stimulate efforts Despite these being major by Germany and France to finally create anniversaries, the gatherings are that elusive EU army. unlikely to be brimming with alliance conviviality. These are anxious times 2. The demise of the INF Treaty for transatlantic relations on a host of NATO Secretary General Jens issues—see the top 10 potential Stoltenberg has warned Russia that it flashpoints below—and the 2019 has one last chance of complying with Washington meeting (or the the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces subsequent Summit, if it happens) (INF) Treaty after the United States could be where this minefield of threatened to withdraw from it in accrued policy differences finally October. US President Donald Trump explodes into the open. Despite the said he wanted to pull the country from hugely embarrassing 2018 NATO the treaty but was persuaded by summit, the alliance was able to put a European allies in December to give lid on the major disagreements among Russia a 60-day grace period until mid- its political leaders and even produced February to comply. Russia has rejected a detailed and lengthy policy the accusations and complained about communique. Whether NATO is able to US missile defences in Europe that it continue to mask its political says are in breach of the INF Treaty. The differences through alliance solidarity collapse of the INF Treaty in 2019 and norms at the operational or military would mark the end of a very and official working levels will be one productive and successful era of arms of the key challenges in 2019. control and could have especially NATO’s top 10 potential severe implications for European security. flashpoints in 2019 3. Russia and regional security in 1. President Trump and a possible Eastern Europe European-US trade war Russia and NATO relations have been President Trump’s nationalistic getting worse for years and a further ‘America first’ agenda and ‘shaking of downward spiral can be expected in the NATO tree’ suggests that the much- 2019. On the Russian side, President lauded Transatlantic Bond may only be Putin is likely to continue to seek to skin deep and close to breaking point. exploit divisions within the On the other hand, it is often difficult transatlantic community (though to discern to whom the President’s asymmetrical responses, including heated words are actually targeted and efforts aimed at destabilising Western 3 governments), not least in an attempt its three member states (Bulgaria, to boost his faltering domestic Romania and Turkey) that are part of standing. On the NATO side, a the seven Black Sea Basin countries, as continued stiffening of US and NATO well as the reactions of wider alliance forces in Poland and the Baltic States members to developments in Ukraine’s seems likely, which will further raise domestic politics. Turkey’s control of tensions with Russia. In particular, if the Bosporus Straits and the the United States decides to deploy Dardanelles, and limits on the transit of permanent forces to Poland (as is foreign warships, suggest that Russia currently under consideration), such a will retain the upper hand in the Black move would be a major strategic shift Sea. and another indication that senior US military leaders now view Russia as a 6. The Middle East: A congruence military threat on par with China, rather of fault lines than what it really is: a declining The Middle East is steeped in security regional power. dilemmas, including ongoing efforts to 4. Peace or more war in wind down the war in Syria, Saudi– Iranian and US-Iranian rivalry, policies Afghanistan? and rivalries of other external actors With the help of its NATO allies, the US (both regional and global), especially in launched a military campaign in Syria, the war in Yemen, the Israeli– Afghanistan 17 years ago to topple the Palestinian conflict and the waning of Taliban government following the the two core Jihadist groups, Islamic September 2001 attacks on the United State and al-Qaeda. NATO remains States. The longest US war effort has largely on the periphery, with a since killed nearly 140,000 people, Canadian-led training mission in Iraq including security forces, insurgents and two partnership programmes in the and civilians, and has cost Washington region. US President Trump’s decision close to a trillion dollars. However, in mid-December to remove his forces 2019 brings a unique opportunity for from Syria, should it happen (and peace in Afghanistan. With the United indications are that it might be a States planning to pull out almost half qualified and partial withdrawal) may of the 14,000-strong force currently well change the delicate balance of deployed, the intensification of moves forces in the region and lead to further towards peace negotiations in conflict involving Turkey, its Syrian Afghanistan take on even more allies, Syrian Kurds and the Assad importance. However, success or regime. It might also breathe new life failure of the peace talks remains in the into the Islamic State, which thrives on balance. such chaos. With at least four major NATO member states involved in the 5. Militarisation of the Black Sea and region, as well as Russia, NATO may the Sea of Azov well be dragged into deeper Further clashes between Ukraine and engagements in the Southern Flank in Russia in an increasingly militarised Sea 2019. of Azov and in the Kerch Strait seem 7. Brexit and NATO likely in 2019. Russia is proposing to build up its naval resources adding 50 Will 2019 be the year of Brexit, and if military and patrol ships to its Azov so, is NATO prepared for the fallout? A fleet and at least one modernized large no deal withdrawal from the EU will missile boat and 17 new warships to its further strain relations with European Black Sea fleet. NATO’s response in the allies and this could potentially Black Sea will be restricted by the spillover into NATO. Even if a deal is differing interests and approaches of agreed (which currently seems 4 unlikely), the political, economic and takes delivery of the S-400 system. With bureaucratic burden of disentangling the United States tabling an alternative the UK from the EU and of launching $3.5 billion Patriot missile defence numerous new trade agreements will system, the deal with Russia could yet continue to be a huge distraction and be cancelled and the pivot to Moscow absorb vast resources—as are parallel (as witnessed by increased Turkish- moves to rebuild British grandeur as a Russian cooperation in Syria) put on leading global power by ‘pivoting’ to hold.
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