Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) Gianluca Pastori

NATO at seventy: the challenges for 2019

The Atlantic Alliance approaches the seventieth anniversary of the Treaty of Washington (April 4, 2019) coming from a troublesome period. The summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Brussels on June 11-12, 2018, seems not having been able to dissipate the doubts that in the last two years have emerged on NATO’s future. During the summit, the press and the analysts expressed in different forms the same concern: that the organization was on the path of a quick decline (if not of disappearance) due to the US will to reduce its engagement. The summit led to several results. The new Republic of North Macedonia (FYROM) was officially invited to start the accession talks, although the failure on the non-binding referendum on the country’s name could make things difficult. The commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq was reaffirmed, extending operation Resolute Support to 2024 and announcing the starting of a mission in support of Baghdad’s authorities. Measures were announced to face the new hybrid challenges (including propaganda, disinformation and malicious cyber activities) and to increase force readiness through the so-called “four-thirty” program. Finally, three new commands have been established: a Cyber Operations Center (CYOC) in Mons (Belgium), a Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk (Virginia, US) and a Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Ulm (Germany)1. In the following months, rumors on a possible US withdrawal from Afghanistan have been a source of tension within the Alliance. However, Washington has remarked that «any potential U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan» (also connected to the talks currently undergoing to reach an agreement with the insurgent forces operating in the country) «would be “coordinated” with other NATO members», and that from Afghanistan (which, according to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg «remains a [NATO] top priority»2) «there will be no unilateral troop reduction»3. The “Trident Juncture 2018” exercise (TJ18, October 25-November 23, in two parts, the first one, on the ground, until November 7, the second one, computer assisted, since November 14) was another important moment, due to both the quality and quantity of the assets that the thirty-one participating countries deployed, and its overall political value. TJ18’s political relevance was enhanced by the participation of two neutral countries (although increasingly close to the Atlantic Alliance) such as Sweden and Finland. According to Admiral James G. Foggo III, US Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples and Commander of the exercise, the aim of TJ18 was to «show the world that NATO is relevant, united and ready to defend itself in this Article 5 scenario, testing our collective defence»4. An almost similar position was expressed – soon before the opening of the exercise – by Secretary General Stoltenberg, who labelled TJ18 a response to the deterioration of the current European security environment and a message sent «to any potential

1 Brussels Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm. 2 Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the North Atlantic Council meeting on NATO's operations at the level of Defence Ministers, [Brussels], Feb. 14, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_ 163392.htm?selectedLocale=en 3 U.S. Vows ‘No Unilateral’ Troop Reduction In Afghanistan, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Feb. 14, 2019, https://www. rferl.org/a/nato-allies-discuss-afghan-mission-s-future-after-proposed-u-s-withdrawal/29769700.html. On the European fears of a possible US disengagement, see J. Marson - J. Donati, As Allies Grapple with U.S. Pressure on NATO, Europe Pleads for Caution in Afghanistan, “The Wall Street Journal”, Feb. 19, 2019, https://www.wsj. com/articles/as-allies-grapple-with-trumps-nato-insults-europe-pleads-for-caution-in-afghanistan-11550582842. 4 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/157833.htm.

Osservatorio Strategico 2018– Year XX issue III 8 Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) adversary» regarding the Alliance's determination in protecting the North Atlantic territory from any possible aggression5. Perceived by Moscow as another proof of NATO’s hostile attitude towards Russia, the exercise has been, from many points of view, a demonstration of the Alliance’s unity around its core business, i.e. the principle of collective security. Collective security has always been at the foundations of NATO and has never been abandoned, not event in early 1990s, when, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Alliance started its transformation process. What have changed during the years have been the ways in which this principle was applied. The Strategic concepts adopted in 1991 (Rome), 1999 (Washington), and 2010 (Lisbon) have been the tools of such an evolution. However, behind them, the real engine of the change has been the members’ common will; a will that, in most recent years, seems lacking. It has been widely pointed out the role that the perception of a Russian threat on the Alliance’s eastern border has had in fueling this process. The pressure that Moscow exerts along the borders of its former “external empire” increases the demand for security expressed by the neighboring NATO countries, pushing the Alliance to (re)assume a “cold war” posture which, in its turn, Russia exploits to legitimate its initiatives. The consequence is a growing attention – on both sides – to hard security, as attested by the freezing of all NATO-Russia Council activities with the exception of the ones related to «a periodic, focused and meaningful political dialogue with Russia on the basis of reciprocity, as agreed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016»6. On the need to re-focus on a Russian threat perceived as growing a relatively strong consensus is emerging, at least in Europe. This idea is behind the words of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Curtis Scaparrotti, on the need to improve collective defense and NATO’s ability to deter adversaries, or behind the words of NATO’s current Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Rose Gottemoeller, on the «unacceptable pattern of behavior» held by Moscow in recent years7. More difficult is dealing with the other priorities that, during the time, NATO have piled up, due partly to the changes of the international system, partly as a heritage of its previous activities. There is an inherent tension between the NATO “projected out of area” existing until the beginning of the Ukraine crisis and its return, since 2014, to a posture “vigilant and prepared”, following what the Alliance, in its statements, regularly calls the «illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea by Russia»8. This tension emerges at different levels and is strengthened by the need to keep a watchful eye on the evolution of the security environment and on the new emerging threats. In face of limited (although increasing) resources, the proliferation of new missions and tasks can only heighten rivalries, in a process that, in its turns, over-emphasizes the issue of burden sharing. The Trump administration has made the issue of burden sharing one of its battle horses. In 2014, at the end of the summit held in Celtic Manor, the Allies formalized the (previously informal) commitment to devote 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense expenditure and to devote 20 percent of the sum to the acquisition of new equipment. In Celtic Manor, it was also agreed a “convergence commitment”, binding the countries below the threshold to reach it in a ten years period9.

5 NATO Secretary General briefs on exercise Trident Juncture, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_ 159663.htm. 6 https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_50091.htm?selectedLocale=en. 7 Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the conference “Resourcing a Coherent and Credible Alliance” at l’École Militaire in Paris, Oct. 16, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_159471.htm; on General Scaparrotti’s position, see A. Shahlal, U.S. top commander in Europe wants more resources, forces to deter Russia, “Reuters”, May 24, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-security/us-top-commander-in-europe- wants -more-resources-forces-to-deter-russia-idUSKCN1IP3IG. 8 See, for example, NATO Allies and partners discuss Ukraine crisis, Mar. 11, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ news_118114.htm. 9 Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, Sept. 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

Osservatorio Strategico 2018– Year XX issue III 9 NATO at seventy: the challenges for 2019

Five out of the then twenty-eight NATO members reached the target in 2015. In 2018, of present day twenty-nine members (Parliament of Montenegro ratified the country’s entry into NATO on April 28, 2017), eight are about to reach it, while six others have adopted measures to do it by 2024, in most of the cases by implementing large-scale procurement programs10. However, it has been recently pointed out that reaching the 2/20 quantitative target “in itself” could be misleading if not framed into a wider effort «to make efficient and effective use of […] resources rather than seek random increases in spending, or unplanned acquisition of a military weapon system that does not contribute to increased national defense capability»11. The adoption of the Brussels Summit Declaration seems following this path. The Declaration not only starts the above-mentioned “four-thirty” program (“NATO Readiness Initiative”) aimed at having, by 2020, 30 battalions; 30 air squadrons; and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days or less. It also underlines the need to improve the readiness, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability of NATO forces, to improve military mobility, and to evolve capabilities in all domains. It makes cyber defense part of NATO’s core task of collective defense, confirms the decision already undertaken in the field of missile defense, and sets broad strategic and force planning priorities both on am Alliance-wide and regional basis. Finally, it describes improvements in NATO forward presence and its chain of command, envisioning the Multinational Division North East Headquarters in Elblag (Poland) achieving full capability by December 201812, and emphasizes the need to support collective action in dealing with Russia, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, terrorism, and other out of area challenges13. Overall, an ambitious program, which pushes on the background the emphasis generally placed on the issue of burden sharing. Moreover, it is worth noting that the US administration has increased its contribution to the European security in fiscal year 2019 (October 1, 2018-September 30, 2019). The proposed budget for FY2019 increases US contribution to NATO European Defense Initiative from 2.4 billion dollars in 2017 to 6.5. Although this will led to no increase in US permanent presence in Europe, it will allow the deployment on a rotation basis of a US Army armored brigade combat team (ABCT) with enablers, a combat aviation brigade (CAB), a battalion to support NATO’s Enhance Forward Presence (EFP), and continued buildout of the APS Unit Set. It will retain US Air Force F-15C aircraft in Europe, Continue Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) interoperability to enable intelligence sharing with NATO and European partners, and Continue Theater Security Packages and aviation rotations. It will also enhance air defense and surveillance activities, flying training exercises, airlift support, and improvements to airfield infrastructure and prepositioning of equipment in Europe. It will upgrade US Navy infrastructure to support theater anti-submarine warfare operations, prepositioning of equipment, and meet other logistic requirements. It will support US Marine Corps rotational engagements with allies and partners throughout Europe, and it will provide defense-wide support to NATO and multinational exercises, USEUCOM’s Joint Exercise Program; US participation in NATO very high readiness joint task force (VJTF, “Spearhead force”) exercises; and funding for Multi-National Information Sharing capability14.

10 On the evolution of NATO defence expenditure, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm; a positive evaluation of the current trend is in Brussels Summit Declaration, sub (3). 11 A.H. Cordesman, NATO “Burden Sharing”: The Need for Strategy and Force Plans, Not Meaningless Percentage Goals, Washington, DC, Aug. 16, 2018, p. 2, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180816_ NATO_Burden_Sharing_0.pdf. 12 MNDNE HQ full operational capability was officially declared on December 7, 2018 (https://mndne.wp.mil.pl/en/articlesnews-u/2018-12-07d-we-achieved-full-capability/). 13 See Brussels Summit Declaration: sub 14 (NATO Readiness Initiative), 3 (readiness, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability of NATO forces), 17 (military mobility), 19 (strengthening of the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture in all domains), 20 (cyber defence as part of NATO’s core task), 37 (commitment to the decisions taken in the field of missile defense), 25 (Multinational Division North East HQ), and 47 ff (out-of-area threats). 14 Cordesman, NATO “Burden Sharing”, pp. 6-7.

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Such an approach is in line with the provisions of both the current US National Security Strategy (affirming that «[t]he NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our competitors, and the United States remains committed to Article V of the Washington Treaty»15), and the current US National Defense Strategy (NDS), where strengthening the Atlantic Alliance is mentioned as a main aim to «deter Russian adventurism, defeat terrorists […], and address the arc of instability building on NATO’s periphery»16. Although the public document is just a summary of the more detailed classified version, the NDS also clearly states that Europe – as well as Asia-Pacific – is one of the main theatres of future US engagement. Among the observers, the NDS is widely believed as a brainchild of former Defense Secretary, James Mattis, and the consequence of his resignation (announced in December 2018) could affect its future revisions. However, it seems difficult that the new head of the Pentagon (whose name is still unknown, although Mattis’s former deputy, Patrick Shanahan, has been appointed Acting Secretary of Defense after the Secretary resignation) could overturn its guidelines17. Thus, if within the Atlantic Alliance tensions exist, their magnitude seems, nonetheless, less critical it could appear at first glance. Despite the above-mentioned limits, the convergence toward the Celtic Manor targets is underway and several members have already started their procurement programs. The aggregate defense expenditure of the twenty-nine member is growing since 2015, with 2018 growth rate for European members plus Canada being around +3.8 percent. In early October 2018, the US offered cyber war capabilities to NATO allies, albeit retaining national control on both the assets and personnel. Since early 2000s, NATO has also started collaborating with the European Union to carry out common actions in the fields of hybrid threats, cybersecurity, and capacity building, as well as in the field of industry, research, and political dialogue18. However, the problem of the development of an autonomous European military identity (for example, through the establishment of a European Intervention Initiative) keeps on raising doubts. For example, the he Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Air Chief Marshall Stuart Peach19 has recently pointed out the risk of duplications that it entails and to its possible weakening impact on a NATO mechanism whose strength is based on compactness and unity of command.

15 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf), [Washington, DC], Dec. 2017, p. 48. 16 US Department of Defence, Summary of the National Defense Strategy. Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf), [Washington, DC], s.d., p. 9. 17 On Mattis’ resignation see, e.g., H. Cooper, Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of Trump’s Worldview, “The New York Times”, Dec. 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/jim-mattis-defense-secretary- trump.html; in a different perspective, see B. Starr, After the shock of Mattis' resignation, some see a different narrative, CNN, Dec. 31, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/24/politics/mattis-resignation-narrative/index.html; on Patrick Shanahan as Acting Secretary of Defense, see V. Stracqualursi, Trump's acting secretary of defense will step into role with no foreign policy, military experience, CNN, Dec. 26, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/24/politics/who-is- patrick-shanahan-acting-defense-department-secretary/index.html. 18 On EU-NATO defence cooperartion see, N. Koenig, EU NATO Cooperation. Distinguishing Narrative from Substance, Berlin, 2018; on US support to NATO allies in the field of cyber security, see US to offer cyberwar capabilities to NATO allies, CNBC, Oct. 3, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/03/us-to-offer-cyberwar-capabilities-to-nato-allies.html; on the increase in NATO members defence expenditure, see M. Banks, How are NATO members doing on reaching defense spending goals?, “Defense News”, June 7, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/06/07/how-are-nato-members-doing-on-reaching-defense- spending-goals/ 19 On Peach remarks see J. Gould, NATO official warns EU force would be ‘unwise’, “Defense News”, Nov. 17, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/11/17/nato-official-warns-eu-force-would-be-unwise; form a different perspective see, among others, E. Brattberg, Beyond European Versus Transatlantic Defense, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, DC, Jan. 2018.

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There are also other problems. The Brussels summit, for example, once again underlined the importance of the southern front, also through the adoption of a specific “Package on the South” including initiatives of political cooperation in favor of NATO’s Middle East and North Africa (MENA) partners. The package aims at developing NATO’s capabilities in the field of deterrence and defense with a specific reference to the threats from the south, at contributing to the international efforts to deal with regional crises, and at helping the MENA partners to increase resilience against any threat to their security, included terrorism. Within this framework, the Alliance has started training programs with Tunisia and Jordan (both part of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue) and strengthened connection, consultation and coordination activities, with the aim of better understanding regional dynamics, more quickly assessing emerging threats, and better integrating the response of the different relevant actors. Within the same framework (whose reference is the “360° approach” sketched in the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit20 that led to the implementation of Operation Sea Guardian), the full operational capability has been declared for the Joint Force Command Naples’ NATO Strategic Direction South Hub (NSD-S), following the decision taken by the Ministers of Defense of member countries on February 15, 2017. Now, the challenge is providing a concrete dimension to these decisions, also in the light of the perceptions of the Mediterranean members of the Alliance. Finding a balance between the southern and the eastern dimension is a difficult task and involves the US too. The focus of this debate ism in fact, on the tasks that NATO is called to perform in the future and, through this, on the capabilities that the Alliance must develop in the framework of a growth that is not only quantitative and of a burden sharing process aimed at filling the existing capability gaps21. The attitude of the US administration is a potentially problematic element. The uncertainties surrounding the future US posture, although unsupported by evidences of a real disengagement, fuels the tensions within the Alliance, both between the US itself and Europe and among the different European countries. It also contributes in projecting a critical light on the efforts currently undergoing to give birth to a meaningful European military identity. On November 6, 2018, French President Emanuel Macron declared that Europe should dote itself of a «real army» («une vraie armée européenne») «to protect us from China, Russia, and also the United States» («nous protéger à l'égard de la Chine, de la Russie et même des Etats-Unis d'Amérique»). This is a clear sign of the mistrust existing between the two shores of the Atlantic. Despite the effort to scale back their meaning, Marcon’s words (confirmed, in the essence, by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a speech in front of the European Parliament) triggered an heated reply by President Trump, reply that, in its turn, further fueled the existing tensions. The words by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, reaffirming the strength of the transatlantic bond, only partially mended a drift made even more relevant by its being just the last one in a long string22.

20 Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm, sub. 81; the “360° approach” was reaffirmed in the 2018 Brussels summit: Brussels Summit Declaration, sub 1 (The Alliance will continue to pursue a 360-degree approach to security and to fulfil effectively all three core tasks as set out in the Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security»), 10 («NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism is an integral part of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence and projecting stability; as such, it contributes to all three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security») e 50 («The Alliance’s long-standing efforts at ensuring security for its members and contributing to stability beyond its borders are related to its three essential core tasks and its 360-degree approach»). 21 Brussels Summit Declaration, sub 55; see sub 55 ff for other initiative focusing on the Mediterranean region and the Balkans. 22 On Macron’s declarations on the «real European army», see Macron propose «une vraie armée européenne» (Europe 1), “Le Figaro”, Nov. 6, 2018, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2018/11/06/97001-20181106FILWWW00034-macron- pro pose-une-vraie-armee-europeenne-europe-1.php; on Merkel’s speech to the European Parliament, see R. Lough, Germany's Merkel calls for a European Union military, “Reuters”, Nov. 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu- politics-merkel/germanys-merkel-calls-for-a-european-union-military-idUSKCN1NI1UQ; on Stoltenberg’s reply to Macron, see Europe should keep its defense within NATO, says Stoltenberg, “Deutsche Welle”, Nov. 12, 2018, https://www.dw. com/en/europe-should-keep-its-defense-within-nato-says-stoltenberg/a-46266886, and – after Merkel’s speech – Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg prior to the European Union

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The recent US decision to denounce the INF treaty (whom, despite its limits, the European countries attach a special relevance, both emotional and practical) is another potentially divisive issue. On December 4, 2018, the Foreign Ministers of the Atlantic Alliance unanimously voted to «strongly [support] the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF»23. However, the real problem is the posture that the European countries could assume if threatened by the risk of a re-nuclearization of continental security, due to the Russian decision to deploy the Novator 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles that are the bone of the contention. The choice to increase NATO’s ability to cope with the Russian missile threat could lead to new division within the Alliance and to tension similar to the one that affected it in early 1980s, at the time of the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. However, equally divisive could prove the search for a diplomatic solution (e.g. through a system of mutually agreed inspections, that Russia, on the other hand, has already rejected), aimed at defusing the accusation moved by Moscow after the installation in Poland and Rumania of the Aegis Ashore launching system of the contested NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NIAMDS)24. From this point of view, the summit that, on April 4, 2019, will see gathering in Washington the representatives of the twenty-nine NATO member states, will hardly be just a celebration of the Alliance’s seventieth anniversary. In 2019 is scheduled, among other, the adoption of the new Political Guidance, a key passage for the adoption of the new Strategic concept. Within this framework, in March 2018, the Framework for Future Alliance Operations has been published, with the aim of «[helping] to inform the Alliance of opportunities to improve its defense and deterrence posture together with its ability to project stability, ensuring it remains continuously proactive, ready, and responsive»25. It is worth noting that, although in a long-term perspective, the opportunity to rethink some of the guidelines adopted in Lisbon has already been raised in the past26. The obstacles to overcome are different, first of all the ones related to the cleavages dividing members’ security perceptions. The situation it is not a new one. During the 2000s, NATO actually operated despite the fact that the 9/11 attacks had made the 1999 Strategic concept, based in the experience in former Yugoslavia, largely obsolete. However, today, there is also another – maybe more challenging – problem: that the Alliance’s inability to elaborate a common and shared vision could highlight its existing internal fractures, with the unavoidable negative consequences of this process on a structure whose effectiveness largely rests on credibility.

Foreign Affairs Council meeting, [Brussels], Nov. 20, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_160495.htm?selectedLocale=en. 23 NATO Foreign Ministers agree Russia is in violation of INF Treaty, [Brussels], Dec. 4, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/news_161115.htm; thise position was recently reaffirmed: Statement on Russia's failure to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Issued by the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 1 February 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_162996.htm?selectedLocale=en. 24 On Europe and the demise of the INF Treaty see S. Pifer, Will Europe try to save the INF Treaty?, Stanford University - The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford, CA, Dec. 11, 2018, https://medium.com/freeman- spogli-institute-for-international-studies/will-europe-try-to-save-the-inf-treaty-1cd66196556f; S. van der Meer, The demise of the INF treaty: can the EU save arms control?, “EU Observer”, Jan. 24, 2019; J. Dempsey, Europe and the End of the INF Treaty, The Carnegie Foundation - Europe, Brussels, Feb. 5, 2019, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/ 78284. 25 Framework for Future Alliance Operations, 2018 Report (http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/ 180514_ffao18.pdf), Norfolk, VA, 2018, p. 2. 26 K.-H. Kamp, Why NATO Needs a New Strategic Concept, NATO Defence College Research Report, Rome, 2016; on the Alliance’s cautious attitude on the issue, see S.R. Sloan, Don’t Expect a New NATO Strategic Concept Any Time Soon, The Atlantic Council, Feb. 24, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/don-t-expect-a-new- nato-strategic-concept-any-time-soon.

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