DOCSLIB.ORG

Tems-In-Heads of States - Kampuchea

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Tems-In-Heads of States - Kampuchea UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Pa9e 82 Date 15/06/2006 Time 4:59:22 PM S-0907-0005-14-00001 Expanded Number S-0907-0005-14-00001 Title |tems-in-Heads of States - Kampuchea Date Created 26/01/1973 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0907-0005: Correspondence with heads-of-state 1965-1981 Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit MKP/SR/ CC: SG/ BF: RVAR/JPB/FMG/IL/MC Le 7 dgcembra 1978 Monsieur 1'Ambassadeur, Je vous remercie d1avoir bien voulu me fairs parvenir le texte du message en date du 24 nobfernbre 1978 -gue'Son Excellence Monsieur Khieu Samphan, President du Pr^sidausm de 1'E'tat dxa Kampuchea D^mocratique a adressS aux Chefs d'ltat des pays ayant des relations diplomatiques avec le Kampuchea D&nocratique. ." L J'ai lu avec attention cette communication efc vous sais gr^ de me tenir inform^ des d^veloppements concernant votre pays et votre region. Vouillea agr^er, Monsieur 1'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma tres haute consideration. Kurt WaldheiKi Son Excellence Monsieur In Wat Ambassador Extraordinaire et Pl^nipotentiaire Dil^gation du Kampuchea D&nocratique DELEGATION DU KAMPUCHEA DEMOCRATIQUE New York, le Monsieur le Secretaire General, D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai 1'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint, pour votre information, la copie du message en date du 24- novembre 1978 du President du Presi- dium de 1'Etat du Kampuchea Democratique KHIEU SAMPHAN aux Chefs d'Etat des pays ayant des relations diplomatiques avec le Kampuchea Democratique. Je vous prie, Monsieur le Secretaire General, d'agreer 1'assurance de ma tres haute consideration. Pour la Delegation du Kampuchea Democratique NAT Ambassadeu- r Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR KURT WALDHEIM SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L1ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES NEW YORK (Traduction) Respectee Votre Excellence, Depuis la fin de 1977 et au cours de cette annee, Votre Gouvernement a bien voulu tougours porter son attention aux actes d'agression et d'annexion perpetres de facon barbare par le Vietnam centre le Kampuchea Democratique. Au nom du peuple et du Gouvernement du Kampuchea Democratique, je Vous exprime mes chaleureux remerciements. Oomme Votre Gouvernement le sait, le Vietnam nourrit depuis de longue date 1'ambition de faire entrer le Kampuchea dans la "Federation Indochinoise" placee sous la domination du Vietnam afin de 1'avaler au bout djune periode determinee. En meme temps, le Vietnam veut prendre le Kampuchea comme tremplin pour assouvir son ambition regionale dans le Sud-Est asiatique. Cette ambition regionale vietnamienne s'accorde avec I1ambition expansionniste mondiale de I1Union Sovietique. .../ 2 - 2 - C'est pourquoi les actes d'agression du Vietnam ne frappent pas settlement le Kampuchea, mais encore menacent directement la securite, la paix et la stabilite en Asie du Sud-Est, en Asie et dans le monde. Ges menaces se sont aggravees depuis la signature du "Traite d1amitie et de cooperation" entre le Vietnam et I1Union Sovietique. Ce traite place le Vietnam integralement dans le bloc sovietique. II lui confere le statut legal de poste avance et de pion de I1Union Sovietique en Asie du Sud-Est, au service de 1'ambition et de la politique de cette grande puissance dans la region et dans toute 1'Asie. Avec ce statut, le Vietnam devient plus arrogant et intensi- fie encore plus ses actes d'agression et d'annexion centre le Kampuchea independant, pacifique, neutre et non-aligne. Malgre les lourdes defaites de ses attaques d'agres- sion et d'invasion de grande envergure a la fin de 1977 et au debut de 1978 en vue de s'emparer du Kampuchea d'un seul coup suivant sa strategic "attaque-eclair, victoire-eclair", malgre ses innombrables difficultes inextricables a 1'inte- rieur du pays et malgre qu'il soit demasque sur le plan in- ternational, le Vietnam s'efforce de poursuivre frenetique- ment son agression contre le Kampuchea. Cela parce que 1'Union Sovietique et le Vietnam considerent le Kampuchea independant comme un grand obstacle a leur plan d'expansion en Asie du Sud-Est, Au cours de la saison seche qui commence avec ce mois de novembre, le Vietnam s'aventurera a lancer encore une fois des attaques d'agression et d'invasion de grande envergure contre le Kampuchea Democratique. Plusieurs divisions de l*ariaee vietnamienne sont deja pretes. Quant a I1Union Sovietique, avec la couverture legale du "Traite d'amitie et de cooperation", elle a encore envoye de nombreux conseillers et d'importantes quantites de materiel de guerre au Vietnam. Parallelement a ses preparatifs militaires, le Viet- nam a mene de nombreuses activites diplomatiques. II repand .../ 3 - 3 - partout des mensonges sur son soi-disant desir de paix, son soi-disant respect de 1'independance et de la souverainete d'autres pays, et ce, au moment meme ou il poursuit avec impu- dence son agression centre le Kampuchea Democratique. Ces men- songes sont destines a caclier son visage d'agresseur du Kampu- chea et celui de pion de 1'Union Sovietique en Asie du Sud-Est. En meme temps, le Vietnam a depuis trois mois, fabri- que de nombreux mensonges, tels que les soi-disant insurrec- tions contre le Gouvernement du Kampuchea Democratique dans 16 provinces„ Et le Gouvernement vietnamien lui-meme a lance des appels a la revolte contre le Gouvernement du Kampuchea Demo- cratique. Le Gouvernement vietnamien sait pertinemment que 1'opinion publique mondiale ne manquera pas de denoncer et con- damner vigoureusement ces impudentes ingerences et incitations a la revolte qui violent de facon arrogante le droit interna- tional, les principes du non-alignement et la Charte des Na- tions Unies. Neanmoins, le Gouvernement vietnamien continue avec obstination a recourir a de tels actes car ils font partie integrante de son plan d'agression et d1 invasion de grande ,.en- vergure de cette saison seche. Le Vietnam a besoin de faire de telle propagande pour camoufler les attaques lancees par son armee. Il utilise constamment, tant chez lui que dans d'autres pays, cet odieux stratageme qui montre bien son hypocrisie et sa perfidie. Dans son agression contre le Kampuchea, le Vietnam n'a aucunement hesite a employer a plusieurs reprises des gaz toxi- ques causant la mort de plusieurs jeunes et vieux parmi la po- pulation innocente. G'est la un nouveau fait qui montre claire- ment que la guerre d'agression du Vietnam contre le Kampuchea Democratique n'est pas un probleme ordinaire de frontiere. C'est un acte criminel visant a exterminer la nation du Kampuchea. Le Gouvernement du Kampuchea Democratique, en Vous presentant ces quelques points, espere que Votre Gouvernement apportera sa contribution pour s'opposer aux actes d'ingerence, d1intervention, d'agression et d'annexion du Vietnam contre le Kampuchea Democratique, et au plan d'expansion du Vietnam et de I1Union Sovietique en Asie du Sud-Est. .../ * Le Kampuchea Democratique n'a pas d'autre desir que de vivre en paix, dans 1'independance et la souverainete dans son integrite territoriale, dans 1'honneur et la dignite na~ tionale. Avec le Vietnam, le Kampuchea Democratique desire entretenir d'etroites relations d'amitie et vivre en bon voi- sinage avec lui. C'est pourquoi en juin 1975> au moment meme ou le Vietnam occupait nos iles Koh Way et violait ainsi gra- vement 1!integrite territoriale du Kampuchea Democratique, nous avons propose au Vietnam de conclure un traite d'anitie et de non-agression. Depuis lors, nous avons successivement souleve avec le Vietnam ce probleme de traite, ivlais le Viet- nam n'a pas voulu prendre en consideration cette bonne volonte du Kampuchea. Au contraire, il a intensifies ses actes d'agres- sion centre le Kampuchea Democratique. Malgre cela, si mainte- nant le Vietnam cesse son agression centre le Kampuchea Demo- cratique, abandonne son ambition d'avaler le Kampuchea et sa strategic de "Federation Indochinoise", et s'il respecte par des actes concrets 1'independance, la souverainete, I1integrite territoriale du Kampuchea Democratique et le droit du peuple du Kampuchea de decider lui-meme de sa propre destinee, le G-ouvernement du Kampuchea Democratique proposer ait a nouveau au Vietnam la signature d'un traite d'amitie et de non-agres- sion. Mais dans la situation qui prevaut actuellement, le peuple et 1'Armee Revolutionnaire du Kampuchea elevent con™ stamment leur vigilance pour resister au Vietnam parce que ce dernier poursuit avec Destination ses actes d"agression et d'annexion centre le Kampuchea Democratique. Us mettront en pieces tous les actes d'ingerence , d'intervention et d'agres™ sion du Vietnam jusqu'a ce que la strategie d1agression, d1ex- pansion et d'annexion du Vietnam et de 1'Union Sovietique con- tre le Kampuchea Democratique subisse une defaite totale. .../ 5 — 5 — Le peuple et I1 Arm.ee Revolutionnaire du Kampuchea portent toujours haut le drapeau de 1'independance nationale et celui de 1'honneur et de la dignite nationale. Par leur lutte opiniatre et resolue, et avec la sympathie, I1encoura- gement, le soutien et 1'aide de tous les pays epris d1inde- pendance et de justice dans le monde dont fait partie Votre pays, le peuple et 1'Armee Revolutionnaire du Kampuchea ont defendu et assure la perennite du Kampuchea Democratique, en tant que pays independant et non-aligne. Le Gouvernement du Kampuchea Democratique est convaincu que le Kampuchea indepen- dant constitue un facteur favorable a la cause de la defense de la securite, de la paix et de la stabilite en Asie du Sud- Est et repond aux interets de tous les pays d'Asie et du monde. Acceptez, Excellence, mes salutations les meilleures ainsi que 1'assurances de ma tres haute consideration.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1973 - August 1974
    £cx?N.Mlc \MPUcfifCtoNS THE LIMITS TO STABILITY: THE AE3ERMAT-H OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM, JANUARY 1973 - AUGUST 1974. YVONNE TAN PHD. THESIS UNIVERSITY OF LONDON (EXTERNAL) 1991. 1 ProQuest Number: 11015921 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 11015921 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 ABSTRACT ECONOMIC (MPUcAHws THE LIMITS TO STABILITY : THE AFTERMATH OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM, JANUARY 1973 - AUGUST 1974. The Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973 was intended, at least by some of its authors, to end the war and to bring peace to Vietnam and Indochina. Studies on the Agreement have gen­ erally focused on the American retreat from Vietnam and the military and political consequences leading to the fall of Saigon in April 1975. This study will seek to explore a number of questions which remain controversial. It addresses itself to considering whether under the circumstances prevailing between 1973 and 1974 the Paris Agreement could have worked. In the light of these circum­ stances it argues that the Agreement sought to establish a frame­ work for future stability and economic development through multilateral aid and rehabilitation aimed at the eventual survival of South Vietnam.
    [Show full text]
  • Speaking in Two Tongues: an Ethnographic Investigation of the Literacy Practices of English As a Foreign Language and Cambodian Young Adult Learners’ Identity
    Speaking in Two Tongues: An Ethnographic Investigation of the Literacy Practices of English as a Foreign Language and Cambodian Young Adult Learners’ Identity Soth Sok Student Number: 3829801 College of Education, Victoria University Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education February 2014 Speaking in Two Tongues: An ethnographic investigation of the literacy practices of English as a foreign language and Cambodian young adult learners’ identity Abstract This study focuses on how the literacy practices in English of young Cambodians shaped their individual and social perception as well as performance of identity. It examines the English language as an increasingly dominant cultural and linguistic presence in Cambodia and endeavours to fill the epistemic gap in what Gee (2008, p. 1) has identified as the ‘other stuff’ of language. This other stuff includes ‘social relations, cultural models, power and politics, perspectives on experience, values and attitudes, as well as things and places in the world’ that are introduced to the local culture through English literacy and practices. Merchant and Carrington (2009, p. 63) have suggested that ‘the very process of becoming literate involves taking up new positions and becoming a different sort of person’. Drawing on the life stories of five participants and my own-lived experiences, the investigation is in part auto-ethnographical. It considers how reading and writing behaviours in English became the ‘constitutive’ components of ‘identity and personhood’ (Street 1994, p. 40). I utilised semi-structured life history interviews with young adult Cambodian participants, who spoke about how their individual and social performance of identity was influenced by their participation in English literacy practices and events in Cambodia.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Essays on Indonesia: Airpower and Sovereignty in Revolution; Cambodia and the Indonesian Connection
    TWO ESSAYS ON INDONESIA: AIRPOWER AND SOVEREIGNTY IN REVOLUTION; CAMBODIA AND THE INDONESIAN CONNECTION A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by David Wayne Bell August 2014 © 2014 David Wayne Bell ABSTRACT “Airpower and Sovereignty in Revolution” addresses how the Indonesian Republican government used foreign pilots to acquire meaningful airpower during its struggle for independence. Samuel Crowl (2009) argued that the Indonesian revolution was successful because the Republican government carried out “an unprecedented ‘diplomatic revolution’” by attracting international support beyond Europe and the United States. Without airpower the Republicans would not have been able to maintain their diplomatic revolution in the face of increasing Dutch Isolation. This essay explores how the Republicans acquired and employed airpower. “Cambodia and the Indonesian Connection” argues that the events in Cambodia since its independence are better understood by examining the relationship between Indonesia and Cambodia from 1955 through 1975. By examining this relationship one can better understand 1) the neutralist course Prince Sihanouk attempted to pursue, 2) the path to the Cambodian genocide, and 3) the importance each state played in the other’s foreign policy. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH David Bell was raised in Southern Oregon and graduated from Crater High School in 1997. Following graduation he attended Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. During his studies at Brigham Young, David enrolled in the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps and enlisted in the Utah National Guard. David took two years off from his studies at Brigham Young to serve a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Thailand from 1999 to 2001.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Indonesia in Creating Peace in Cambodia: 1979-1992
    Journal of Critical Reviews ISSN- 2394-5125 Vol 7, Issue 2, 2020 Review Article THE ROLE OF INDONESIA IN CREATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA: 1979-1992 1Ajat Sudrajat, 2Danar Widiyanta, 3H.Y. Agus Murdiyastomo, 4Dyah Ayu Anggraheni Ikaningtiyas, 5Miftachul Huda, 6Jimaain Safar 1Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Indonesia 2Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Indonesia 3Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Indonesia 4Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Indonesia 5Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris Malaysia 6Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Received: 05.11.2019 Revised: 25.12.2019 Accepted: 07.01.2020 Abstract The 1979-1992 conflicts were a thorn in the flesh for the peace in the Indochina area, and the Southeast Asia area. Because Indonesia is part of the countries in Southeast Asia, it is reasonable if Indonesia contributes to creating peace in Cambodia. Therefore, this study tried to find out the beginning of the conflict in Cambodia, to know the role of Indonesia in realizing peace in Cambodia in 1979-1992, and to understand how the impact of Cambodia peace for Indonesia in particular and Southeast Asia in general. The conflict in Cambodia caused political uncertainty in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia countries attempted either independently or within the framework of ASEAN to resolve the conflict. Indonesia’s extraordinary contribution assisted in the peace in Cambodia, both through ASEAN and the United Nations. Indonesia as the representative of ASEAN, has successfully held several important meetings as a solution to solving Cambodia's problems. Successive is Ho Chi Minh City Understanding (1987), and Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) I and II (1988-1989). In the United Nations Framework, the Indonesian Foreign Minister and the French Foreign Minister were appointed Chairman, at the 1989 Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC-Paris International Conference on Cambodia).
    [Show full text]
  • U.S.-Cambodia Relations (PDF: 9.28
    President Obama’s Letter to His Majesty King Norodom Sihamoni on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Cambodia Your Majesty: On behalf of the American people, I wish to congratulate the Kingdom of Cambodia on the Occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. This important milestone presents us with the opportunity to reflect on our shared past and to plot a course for the future based on the strong foundation we have built together. Both Cambodia and the United States have changed immensely since July 11, 1950, when our first Ambassador to your country presented his credentials to King Sihanouk. As with any bilateral relationship, there have been times when we have not agreed, but the overall growth in the depth and breadth of our engagement reflects a maturing partnership. Over the last several years, for example, we have seen many positive developments, including the establishment of the Peace Corps program in Cambodia, the creation of the Extraordinary Cambers of the Courts in Cambodia and completion of its first trial, and the inauguration of Cambodia’s peacekeeping force, a truly momentous achievement for a coutry that was the beneficiary of peacekeepers less than two decades before. The United States is now the top market for Cambodia’s garment exporters, forming a pillar for the country’s economic growth. Military-to-military and counterterrism cooperation between our two countries has grown as well, creating a safer environment for both Americans and Cambodians. In the coming years, we look forward to taking advantage of the positive momentum that has been created and to see the patnership between our two nations grow stronger and deeper in areas such as food security, climate change, health, education, human rights, and strengthening democratic institutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Witness to a Nation's Death
    A 12 Thursday, Slay 8,1975 THE WASHINGTON POST WXPoct MAY F 1975 Witness to a Nation's Death Distraught Premier Sought Newsman's Advice By Jean-Jacques Cazeaux Long Boret looked every Agence Prance-Presse inch a beaten man. He low- ready at the gates of Phnom BANGKOK, May 7—Long ered his head, as if to beg Penh. Boret, the last premier of my pardon for the trouble the Cambodian Republic, The question was no he was causing by asking longer bne of "proposing spoke in hushed tones as we me to come to see him. walked together from the any sort of political solu- Then he admitted to me that tion" but one of surrender. sitting room to the dining all was lost for him. room. "I asked you to come It was a time to accept real- As one of the seven ity. here so that you could tell "super-traitors" condemned me..." to die by the Khmer Rouge, Perhaps, I suggested, this He fell silent for a few was not the moment to men- "... What I there was noting that could moments. be saved "except, assuredly, tion the "last resolution of should do." , the General Assembly of the It was 11 p.m. on April 15. many human lives." He told me he was ready to do any- United Nations" (in which Only on that day did Long the Lon Nol government Boret, who had flown back thing. He was ready to leave: not kept Cambodia's seat at the to an almost-certain death in United Nations and in which Phnom Penh seven days ear- to save himself, for now he the assembly called for ne- lier from a safe exile with hoped for death, but to pre- gotiations between the two former President Lon Nol, vent others from dying.
    [Show full text]
  • Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide
    Thailand’s Response to the Cambodian Genocide Puangthong Rungswasdisab Independent Researcher Introduction In January 1999, Cambodian Prime Minister Hen Sen proposed that the Khmer Rouge’s foreign backers be brought to justice. His proposal was an act of retaliation against the international community who condemned his warm welcome of two defected Khmer Rouge leaders, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea. His remark prompted the Thai leaders to distance the country from its past involvement with the murderous regime. The then Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai asserted that Thailand was not involved and had even objected and disagreed with the genocide. He reiterated that a trial was a matter for Cambodia alone. But the Cambodian problem was rarely regarded by its neighbors as an internal affair. The rise of the communist regime in Cambodia, together with those in Laos and Vietnam in 1975, was perceived as a threat for Thailand. But ironically, soon after its fall, the Khmer Rouge became Thailand’s military ally in fighting against the Vietnamese and the new Cambodian regime. Later on, a new dimension was added to the relationship between Thailand and the Khmer Rouge. Though a policy of turning Indochina from a battlefield into a market place of the Chatichai Choonhavan government was initially aimed at breaking a decade-long impasse of the Cambodian conflict, the Thais nevertheless enjoyed having the Khmer Rouge as their business partner. This chapter examines the development of Thailand’s policy towards the genocidal regime between 1975 and the mid 1990s. And as the friendly relationship with the regime was widely supported by the Thais, this chapter also sheds light on the perspectives of various Thai political groups on the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge.
    [Show full text]
  • Ready Been Forced to Marry
    10qñaMEsVgrkkarBitedIm,IkarcgcaMnigyutþiFm’³1997-2007Ten Years of Independently Searching for the Truth: 1997-2007 mCÄmNÐlÉksarkm<úCaDocumentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia Tel.: + 855 (23) 211-875 Fax.: + 855 (23) 210-358 E-mail: [email protected] Homepage: www.dccam.org A HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (1975-1979) Rbvtþisa®A History of sþkm<CaRbCaFibetyü¬1975-1979 Democratic Kampuchea 1. Cambodia-History-1975-1979 I. Dy, Khamboly II. Chandler, David III. Cougill, Wynne Funding for this project was generously provided by the Soros Foundation's Open Society Institute (OSI) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Support for DC-Cam's operations is provided by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). Disclaimer: The views expressed in this book are those of the author only. This text was submitted to the Government Working Commission to Review the Draft of the History of Democratic Kampuchea. On January 3, 2007, the Commission decided that, "the text can be used as supplementary discussion material [for teachers] and as a base to write a history lesson for high school students.” Copyright © 2007 by the Documentation Center of Cambodia. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Concept and book design: Stacy Marchelos, in conjunction with Double Happiness Creations, Inc., and Youk Chhang. Cambodians working on an irrigation project. Dam "January 1st," Chinith River, Kampong Thom Province, 1976.
    [Show full text]
  • Cambodia” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R
    The original documents are located in Box 12, folder “Indochina - Cambodia” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Ron Nessen donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 12 of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library CAMBODIA EVACUATION FYI ONLY: The following exchange took place during the State Department briefing yesterday. It may be of use to you if you are pressed further on evacuation questions. Q. Bob, there were some Cambodians who were pulled out too. I was just wondering about them. A. What were you wondering about? Q. Well, whether there was any plan, whether you w wld :r:ule out any evacuation of other Cambodians? A. No. T:he question of the Evacuation of the Cambodians that came out - with our Americans, David, that was done.:.._ as my statement on Saturday night very clearly stated --this was an evacuation of Americans. And to the extent that ~:pace was available on aircraft involved in the leftout of American citizens, we wwld do everything we could to help Cambodians also to be included.
    [Show full text]
  • Abstract Son Ngoc Thanh, the United States, and The
    ABSTRACT SON NGOC THANH, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CAMBODIA Matthew Jagel, PhD Department of History Northern Illinois University, 2015 Kenton Clymer, Director The Khmer Rouge period of Cambodia’s history is one of the most scrutinized in studies of modern Southeast Asia. What has yet to be examined in sufficient detail is the period leading up to Democratic Kampuchea and the key players of that era, aside from Cambodia’s King (later Prince) Norodom Sihanouk. The story of Son Ngoc Thanh, one of Cambodia’s modern heroes, has yet to be told in detail, and will be a goal of this project. This is not a traditional biography, but instead a study of how Cambodian nationalism grew during the twilight of French colonialism and faced new geopolitical challenges during the Cold War. Throughout Son Ngoc Thanh is the centerpiece. Following a brief stint as Prime Minister under the Japanese, Son Ngoc Thanh’s influence pushed Sihanouk toward a hard-line stance with respect to independence from France, resulting in a free Cambodia by 1953. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Thanh and his group the Khmer Serei (Free Cambodia) exacerbated tensions between Cambodia and its Thai and South Vietnamese neighbors as he attempted to overthrow the Sihanouk government. Thanh also had connections to both American Special Forces and the CIA in South Vietnam. He was involved with the coup to unseat Sihanouk in 1970, and returned to the new Khmer Republic government later that year, only to be pushed out by 1972. NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY DEKALB, ILLINOIS MAY 2015 SON NGOC THANH, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CAMBODIA BY MATTHEW JAGEL ©2015 Matthew Jagel A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY Doctoral Director: Kenton Clymer ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
    [Show full text]
  • Nixon, Cambodian Foreign Minister Long Boret
    File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library I MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON ~/NODffi/XGDS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon Long Boret, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Khmer Republic AIIlb. UIIl SiIn, CaIIlbodian Ambassador Major General Brent Scowcroft, Dep~ty·A s sistant to the President for National Security Affairs DATE AND TIME: Thursday, NoveIIlber 15, 1973 12:11 - 12= 30 p. Ill. PLACE: The Oval Office The President: You IIlUSt win your struggle in the UN. Boret: I have IIlet with sixteen foreign IIlinisters. I aIIl confident we will prevail. The President: I didn't IIleet you in CaIIlbodia in 1953; you were probably in school. Boret: Thank you very IIluch for seeing IIle. I want to convey greetings and best wishes of our President, Our PriIne Minister, and our people. Our people and government have the greatest admiration for you, Mr. President. Your naIIle inspires total confidence in our people and govern­ IIlent. Each and every word you have said on CaIIlbodia has been a source of inspiration to us and we appreciate everything you have said. The situation in Illy country is of serious concern. We expect a new offen­ sive, and in the econoIIllc area we are having inflation, and you are aware of our diploIIlatic probleIIls. I spoke of theIIl to Secretary Kissinger and he assured IIle of your support. We are firInly deterIIlined to overCOIIle these difficulties though our resources are sliIn. " ',~~.';lF~F.D BY Brent Scowcroft ~ /NODIS/XGDS ..
    [Show full text]
  • Published by the Cabinet of Samdech Hun Sen MP of Kandal Prime Minister
    Published by the Cabinet of Samdech Hun Sen —————— MP of Kandal Prime Minister Monthly Bulletin, Issue 14 January, 1999 AIDE MEMOIRE: An Analysis on Seeking a Formula for Bringing Top KR Leaders to Trial Handed over to H.E. Ambassador Thomas Hammaberg, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia, by Samdech Prime Minister Hun Sen during the meeting on January 21, 1999. antee for social issue and eco- nomic development within stable and peaceful environment of Cambodia. The two topics, to seek a formula for the trial and national reconciliation, must be taken into consideration simulta- neously, without intending to pri- oritize one over another. This means that the two topics deserve concurrent consideration within the context of national reconcilia- tion and inviolability of Cambo- dian sovereignty. They wish to see that the RGC continues to make efforts in line with this ten- - Over the past weeks, after the re- yet succeeded before. The threats dency, and are prepared to pro- turn to the fold of the nation as of the return of the genocidal re- vide assistance to the latter. Sev- simple citizens of Khiev Samphan gime that was in existence within eral questions have also been and Nuon Chea on December 25, the past 20 years had come to an raised: 1998, there emerged public opin- end. - What is an appropriate tribunal ions and positions that deserved - At the same time, there existed to be established? International to take into consideration. First opinions that demand for an ur- or national? A mixed of both? of all, everyone welcomes this gent trial.
    [Show full text]