Turkmenistan’s ambivalent foreign policy towards Afghanistan “A condition of persistent instability along the Afghan-Turkmen border will have a negative impact on the main trade and energy gateways (namely Aqina and Tourghundi) so freezing or delaying all bilateral projects and perspectives of economic growth and development”, – political analyst Fabio Indeo (Italy) notes in an article written specifically for the analytical platform CABAR.asia. The decision of US president Biden to definitely complete the withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan after 20 years – also NATO made the same step – by September 11 has spread serious concerns among Central Asian republics as well as among external involved actors (China, Russia, Iran) about threats which could affect regional stability and security. Indeed, we can observe that the US military disengagement has revitalized Taliban activism (editor’s note: the terrorist movement banned in Central Asian countries) and their ambitions to seize the power, pushing them to extend their control on the Afghanistan’s northern districts along the border with Central Asian countries: according to the Tajik officials, the Taliban terroristic movement already controls 900 kilometres of the 1,357- kilometer border with Tajikistan.[1] A new long-term conflict could flare up in Afghanistan – not only opposing terroristic Taliban against Kabul’s government, but also Taliban against the Islamic State-Khorasan’s foreign fighters because of their ideological divergences – triggering a dangerous condition of instability and its potential spillover to the whole Central Asia region: the worsened domestic scenario will fuel a potentially consistent flux of civil refugees from Afghanistan to the bordering countries, which should provide them humanitarian assistance.[2] In the meanwhile, hundreds Afghan military troops crossed the border seeking protection in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the last weeks, escaping from Taliban offensive.[3] These events have immediately pushed Tashkent and Dushanbe to actively play a role to deal with the alarming situation at their border (Tajikistan plans to reinforce its border sending additional 20,000 troops, while Uzbekistan aims to undertake a diplomatic initiative expressly excluding a military solution),[4] while Turkmenistan at the beginning did not officially express concerns towards Taliban activism, mainly because the country appears not directly affected. However, the scenario of volatility along the shared border with Afghanistan has become progressively worrying for Turkmen authorities, as a potential perceived threat to the domestic stability and security. Turkmenistan’s ambivalent foreign policy towards Afghanistan How will terrorist activity in the north of Afghanistan affect the countries of Central Asia? In less than one month, Taliban militants expanded their presence in the Faryab province, controlling of 13 out of 14 districts. On June 25 Taliban took the control of the Qaramqol and Ghormach settlements, while Afghan forces expelled Taliban’s presence from the strategic city of Andkhoy (situated about 32km from the border with Turkmenistan).[5] Taliban’s temporary control of Andkhoy district pushed Afghan authorities to close Aqina border port which is main trade gateway of foodstuff from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, so exposing local communities to a shortage of foods and rising prices.[6] On July 9, Taliban seized the control of Torghundi border town in the western province of Herat, the other dry port between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.[7] Similarly to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan has decided to adopt measures aimed at reinforcing security along the border, concentrating heavy weaponry, helicopters and other aircraft as well as moving additional troops from Mary 1 and Mary 2 military bases (in the Lebap region) to Serhetabad, a major border crossing with Afghanistan, with the task to support border guard units.[8] Moreover, according to Radio Azatlyk (the RFE/RL’s Turkmen service), Turkmen authorities summoned some reservists to military recruiting posts in Ashgabat, alerting them to be ready for a possible deployment.[9] A turbulent border For Turkmenistan, the main concern is to prevent armed incursions of terrorists and militants from the shared border: even if Taliban reassures about their “national aspirations”, namely to rebuild the Islamic Emirate only in Afghanistan and that they are not interested to undermine national borders and sovereignty of Central Asian neighbouring countries,[10] IS-K foreign fighters could benefit from the volatility along the border to lead destabilizing actions inside Turkmen territory. This appears as a realistic threat considering that in 2017 IS-K fighters claimed to have captured Darzab district in Afghanistan’s Jowzjan Province, which is territorially contiguous Turkmenistan’s ambivalent foreign policy towards Afghanistan with Turkmenistan’s eastern province of Lebap. For the first time IS claimed the temporary control of an Afghan district so closer to the Turkmen border, spreading fears about their expansionist intentions, but Afghan security forces and Taliban were able to drive out IS fighters from this district.[11] In the last decade, several incidents and clashes occurred along the Turkmen-Afghan border, involving smugglers but also armed extremists, which highlight the condition of vulnerability in security terms: the most serious incident happened in 2014, when Afghan Taliban killed six Turkmen border guards in two ambushes, and in 2016 with the deaths of 27 Turkmen conscripts along the Afghan border. The situation is further complicated by the presence of an estimated 1.5 million ethnic Turkmens in the northern Afghan provinces of Faryab and Jowzjan, just beside the border with Turkmenistan: some years ago, ethnic Turkmens formed the “Arbeki” militias – a paramilitary force which was not economically or military supported by Kabul or Ashgabat government – with the task to defend their villages from Taliban attacks.[12] Consequently, a potential conflict involving different ethnic communities represents an additional dangerous perspective for Ashgabat, which could undermine its domestic stability. Dialogue with Taliban, relations with President Ghani: energy and infrastructural projects as main strategic goals In addition to the military dimension, Turkmenistan has also decided to adopt a diplomatic initiative aimed at implementing a political dialogue with Taliban: on July 11, Taliban representatives were hosted in Ashgabat to hold talks with Turkmen Foreign Ministry officials, mainly focussed on security and border issues in order to prevent incursions inside Turkmen territory and to contain migrant refugees. Turkmen authorities did not officially confirm this meeting because they don’t want to irritate Kabul official government with these diplomatic steps which appear as a political recognition of Taliban movement in opposition to President Ghani’s leadership.[13]The idea to promote a dialogue with Taliban appears a current shared trend in the region, considering that Uzbekistan held talks with Taliban in 2018, while on July 8 Russia hosted a meeting with Taliban representatives in Moscow: Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov received assurances that Taliban have not plans to violate Central Asian borders, while he tried to engage them to take actions to prevent the conflict in Afghanistan from spilling over its borders.[14] Actually, Turkmen authorities started bilateral dialogue with Taliban in January 2021, some months before their military offensive in Afghanistan as well as before the US withdrawal’s announcement. The ratio of this diplomatic initiative is linked to the fact that for Turkmen authorities the main strategic goal is to protect infrastructures’ projects and investments, Turkmenistan’s ambivalent foreign policy towards Afghanistan which will allow Turkmenistan to boost national economy benefiting of additional revenues: the diversification of natural gas’ export routes, to increase electricity exports to Afghanistan, to play a role in the architecture of regional interconnectivity developing road and railway routes from Afghanistan and Central Asia to Europe and the Arabian Sea. The main precondition to implement these projects is to maintain cooperation with Afghanistan: considering the strategic relevance of these energy and infrastructural projects for the national economy (according to Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov Turkmenistan has spent $1.25 billion on projects integrating Turkmenistan with Afghanistan), until now Turkmen authorities have dealt with Kabul government but also preserving at the same time relations and a dialogue with Taliban. As a matter of fact, we can observe that less than one week after the meeting with Taliban, Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov had a meeting in Kabul with Afghanistan Foreign Minister Atmar and President Ghani to discuss initiatives and cooperation for the next two years.[15] On January 14, 2021, during a virtual ceremony Afghan President Ghani and Turkmen President Berdymukhamedov inaugurated three major energy and connectivity projects, underlining the improvement of the bilateral cooperation and the strong engagement to realize regional connectivity projects aimed at promote Afghanistan’s socio-economic development and its integration in the regional economy.[16] Turkmen government financially supported Afghanistan to realize the Aqina–Andkhoy railway on Afghan territory, which is a key segment