RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY LEBANON THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF Bottor of ^t)ilos(opl)p IN POLITICAL SCIENCE BY KALEEM AHMED Under the Supervision of Professor Mahmudul Haq T^+3i<^ CENTRE OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 1993 MOir=v5?rci^ni 11\ ABSTRACT 7 This thesis deals primarily with the religio-political development in Lebanon during its recent history. The political history of Lebanon is the history of intermittent warfare between the varying religio-ethnic groups. The internal contradiction and regional politics in Lebanon often assumed the form of religious struggle between the various warring groups. The Civil War of 1975-76 was mainly the result of internal contradiction and regional politics. To understand the origin of confessional politics in Lebanon it is necessary to understand the fact that the origin of religious warfare lay in the feudal set up which Lebanon has inherited from its past history. The Druze constitute 7 percent of the Lebanese population. The sect originated in Egypt in the beginning of the eleventh century during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim (909-1171). Druze carried to an extreme the Isma'ili doctrine according to which each of the attributes of God was made manifest to mankind in the personality of a Prophet or Imam. Druze dominated Mount Lebanon and their hegemony established in the early seventeenth century, remained unchallenged for a long time. Mamluks and later on Ottomans permitted the Druze to maintain their special feudal tradition and to manage their affairs as they pleased. But by the end of mid-eighteenth century the growth of the Maronite community in number and social importance had became a matter of political consequence. The Druze ranks, on the other hand, had been steadily weakened by internal divisions. The policies of the Bashir Shihab II further weakened the position of Druze community who infringed upon the hereditory privileges of Druze feudal families. The Druze lost their former position as the dominant Muslim sect to the Sunnis with the establishment of Greater Lebanon. However, it was Kamal Junbalat who brought back his community at the centre stage of Lebanese, politics. No doubt, that the political and economic powers of DrRuze have been eroded. But they will continue to play important role in Lebanese politics due to their concentration in the, strategic Shuf and 'Aley regions and being a close knit society. The origin of Maronites can be traced back to the 4th century Syrian hermit, St. Maron who started a religious movement in Horns, Hama and Aleppo. However, a monk from Antioch brought the Maronites to the high valleys of northern Lebanon in the 7th century. Following the establishment of the Emirate in 1590, Maronites began to move from northern Lebanon to southern Lebanon. Freedom and protection were extended to them by the Druze feudal lords in matters of personal safety and the, exercise of religious activities. The Maronites Churches in particular started to grow and flourish under the auspices of the feudal lords. In the early stages of economic relations between the Church and the feudal lords, the interests of the two parties converged: the Church was then the weaker and dependent partner. However, as its economic strength grew, the Church { started opposing feudalism not only to defend the rights of the peasants but also to defeat the feudal lords, whom it now perceived as its poltical rivals. The clergy were the first to develop the idea of a Maronite state, claiming that Mount Lebanon had for centuries been an independent or autonomous Maronite homeland. It was due to the efforts of Maronite Church and its Patriarch which ultimately led to the establishment of Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920. Even after independence in 1943 the Church and its patriarch continued to play important role in the Lebanese politics and influence the course of development there. Lebanon's Sunni community is of comparatively recent development. The population of Sunni sect was multiplied approximately eight times with the establishment of Greater Lebanon. The Sunni very much resented to the creation of Greater Lebanon. The incorporation of Sunnis areas in Lebanon involved a grave religious, cultural, political and economic crisis and a powerful emotional blow. Sunnis also resented the French mandate. In the beginning the Sunnis were reluctant to participate in the political process of Lebanon. They refused to participate in the census on the grounds that they were being defined as citizens of Greater Lebanon. Only in the late 1930s and 1940s, with the rise to power of young generation of Sunni leaders who had grown up under the new Lebanese poltical system, was the way opened to a modus vivendi between these leaders and their Christian counterparts. The Sunni community suffers today from numerous problems and difficulties. Sunnis do not have a charismatic leader behind whom they could rally. They also have no political organization that appeals to the membera of the community wherever they live. Furthermore, the regional particularist tendencies of the Sunnis appear to be greater than they are among other communities. Their traditional leaders are weaker today than they were in the late seventies. They proved weaker during the Civil War due to lack of military power. However, the political claims of the Shi'a were blunted in favour of sunni Msulims in the Taif agreement brokered by the Arab League. The powers of Prime Minister were increased and Sunnis were given 22 seats in parliament equal to Shi'a. Thus, it may be said that the Sunnis will continue to have sufficient political powers in near future. Shi'a Muslim came into being as a result of a schism that took place in Islam in the decade after the death of Prophet Muhammad on the question of his successor (Caliphate). They are the oldest community in Lebanon. The socio-economic status of Shi'a fare poorly in comparision to their non-shi'a cohorts. From 1920s to the mid 1950s, Shi'a political representation was practically monopolized by the six prominent landowning families- the Asads, the Zeins and the Ossirans in southern Lebanon, and the Hamadehs, the Haiders and the Husseinis in Ba'lbek and Bint Jubayl. The social effects of the emigration to the Arab oil-producing countries in 1950s and 1960s were considerable. Tradtional notables and religious family lost much ground in favour of the wealthy returning migrants. Moreover, due to high birth •) rate Shi'a community emerged as a single largest community in Lebanon. The Shi'a now had an active and radicalized intelligentsia, an ambitious and enterprising counter-elite, and other new strata with new demands. They began to challenge the rules of the game and to question the distribution of power and resources in the Lebanese system. In this context, the movement of Imam Musa al-sadr was born in 1970s, an expression of the demographic and socio­ economic shift of the Shi'a from the periphery towards the city-state of Beirut. During the years before the outbreak of Civil War in 1975, the movement attempted to satisfy its social and political demands through various forms of mobilization, pressure and action. Imam Musa al-Sadr*s mobilization strategy threatened both the traditional leadership and the left's hold on the young Shi'a. Sadr founded Amal, a militia group, attached to the Movement of Deprived, to protect the community in the Civil War. Two important militant group. Islamic Amal and Hizbollah, emerged after the Israeli invasion of 1982. These groups played important role in the withdrawal of Israeli troops to their self-proclaimed security zone and in withdrawal of Multi National Force from Lebanon. Although, the Taif accord of 1989 increased the political role of the speaker, traditionally a Shi'a Muslim who will now serve a four year term. Now the nomination of a prime minister by the President would require consultation with the speaker who conveys the results of binding parliamentary consultations. But the poltical claims of the Shi'a were blunted in the Taif accord in favour of the Sunni Muslims. The Shi 'a gained • 1 only three of the new appointive seats given to them, like the Sunni Muslims, a total of 22 seats. The Shi 'a challenge ahead is to translate their strength into actual political power . The roots of confessionalism in Lebanese poltics can be traced back to the 16th century. It was the constitution of 1926 which placed confessional ism on a firm footing. Article 95 of this constitution reads : "As a provisional measure and for the justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the ministry, provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state". Confessionalism was further strenthened in the unwritten National Pact agreed upon by the representatives of the combined Muslim and Christian communities in 1943. Initially, confessionalism served a number of conflict-management functions. But confessional system failed because it was a static solution, depending upon continued acceptance of the validity of the original proportions. Moreover, it institutionalized sectarian structures and perpetuated sectarian identifications. Abolition of confessionalism from Lebanon's political life has always been a major issue. It is through the abolition of this political system that the Muslim community aims to redress the existing distribution of power in the state and the concomitant special privileges which the Maronites have so far enjoyed. Ta'if Accord of 1989 represented the end of efforts to jettison the National Pact of 1943. Indeed, the Ta'if document implicitly ratifies the National Pact with its emphasis upou confessional compromise and intercommunual cooperation.