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Home , Abu Snan, Azmi Bishara, Deir Hanna, Divine call, Druze, Druze in Israel

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date:______

I, ______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of: in:

It is entitled:

This work and its defense approved by:

Chair: ______

The Construction of Ethnicity:

Druze in between State Policy and Palestinian Arab

A Dissertation submitted to the

Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY

in the Department of Political Science of the College of Arts and Sciences

2005

by

Lina M. Kassem

B.A. University of Cincinnati, 1991

M.A. University of Cincinnati, 1998

Committee Chair: Professor Laura Jenkins

i

ABSTRACT:

Eric Hobsbawm argues that recently created in the , such as Israel or

Jordan, must be novel. In most instances, these new nations and nationalism that goes along with them have been constructed through what Hobsbawm refers to as “invented traditions.” This thesis will build on Hobsbawm’s concept of “invented traditions,” as well as add one additional but essential national building tool especially in the Middle East, which is the military tradition.

These traditions are used by the state of Israel to create a sense of shared identity. These

“invented traditions” not only worked to cement together an Israeli Jewish sense of identity, they were also utilized to create a sub national identity for the Druze. The state of Israel, with the cooperation of the Druze elites, has attempted, with some success, to construct through its policies an ethnic identity for the Druze separate from their . The policy of the state of Israel was to encourage the Druze to distinguish themselves by facilitating their imagining of a Druze ethnic identity. Israeli and Druze elites fashioned this identity through distinct military, economic, and cultural policies for the Druze. The need for inventing a sub- national identity for the Druze arose from the state’s interest in dividing the along sectarian lines, in order to facilitate their control. Thus the Druze were no longer just a different but also ethnically differentiated from Arabs. This is an example of a classic strategy that has been used by colonial states to subdue native populations, commonly known as “divide and conquer.” What is perhaps unique to the Israeli situation is how the state tried to simultaneously encourage as well as civic nationalism among the . In other words, the state encouraged Druze ethnic nationalism to thwart Palestinian Arab national aspirations, while cultivating Israeli civic nationalism among the Druze, most notably through their military

ii service. This case study demonstrates that these two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

iii iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Laura Jenkins, my advisor, for her intellectual guidance, encouragement, and most of all, patience. Although I didn’t start out as her student, she graciously agreed to be my advisor and gave her time to carefully read and comment on different versions of the manuscript. Her comments and insights made the final version richer. I thank

Joel Wolfe for his valuable feedback on the manuscript. He was instrumental in pushing for greater clarity and coherence. Howard Tolley has been a source of inspiration throughout my academic career, not just a professor but a mentor as well. His guidance over the years has been a constant source of support. His trust in me was crucial in strengthening my resolve to finally complete this project.

I would like to thank my friends Hani Awad, Waseem Faidi, Ahmad and Suha Hattab,

Linda Abu-Sway, Maher and Dalia Bayyari, Lina Alyan, and Haya Aljareedeh for their constant friendship, love and support through the long span of this work. I am thankful to Nabila Assaf, for all her help and encouragement, which made it possible for me to take the first steps in this project. I would also like to thank my family in the , my uncles Mahmoud and Ahmad

Said in Nahef and cousins Walid and in , who helped me set up the interviews.

Many thanks to Maher Zein and Yuechen Zhao for their friendship and for their expert help in making the graphs; they helped me save the work at a scary moment when I thought all was lost.

I am also thankful to my cousin Suhail Khleif, for his tireless help in proofreading this manuscript, and most importantly for driving five hours to attend my defense. I would like to

v thank members of my family: Hassan, Terri, Salim, Rania, and my sister Rania, for their love and support. I can’t begin to express my gratitude to Amal Amireh, the most skillful and patient editor; without her valuable criticism and support this work wouldn’t have been possible.

Finally, my most sincere gratitude goes to my mother, Siham Kassem, and my late father,

Mohammad Kassem, for all the they made and the unconditional love they gave. To them I dedicate this work.

vi PREFACE

This dissertation seeks to shed light on the issue of a Druze sub-national . Specifically it looks at how the state of Israel promoted a Druze identity in collaboration with Druze elites. When dealing with issues of nationalism and identity, several terms need to be defined, especially when they could possibly have more than one meaning.

The term Israel or State of Israel is used in this work to mean the post 1948 state of Israel. There are very few satisfactory definitions of the term “Arab.” The term Arab is used in this work to refer to the group of Semitic people with a common language and culture (other include Hebrew, and Amharic.) Arab identity is a combination of linguistic and cultural identity which excludes non-Arabic speaking such as the and

Kurds, and includes non-Muslim Arab speaking .

Circassians are non-Arab Muslim people of northwestern Caucasia. After Caucasia ceded to Russia in 1864, Circassians fled to other parts of the to escape Russian . Their language is similar to other languages spoken in the Caucus .

Bedouins are Arab nomadic herdsmen who live throughout the Middle East. Most have adopted the Islamic , although some practice other . They move from one place to another looking for water and pastoral lands so their animals can feed. Traditional cultural traits associated with Arab culture such as clannishness, hospitality, courage, and generosity are strongly associated with Arab roots. Bedouin poetry is regarded by some scholars as key to maintaining traditions, since poets have served as orators and historians, preserving the language, culture and history of their respective tribes.

Palestine is defined as a geographical region inhabited by Semitic people, including

Christians, Muslims and . It encompasses what is now the state of Israel, along with the

vii and . Although a Palestinian national state has never been established, at least not yet, there are those who identify themselves as . These are Arabs, including

Muslims and Christians, who regard themselves a part of the Palestinian . Those exact geographical boundaries are a matter of debate. It is also important to note that while Palestinians identify themselves strongly as Palestinians, they still regard themselves as Arabs. The two identities are not seen as mutually exclusive, but rather different levels of identity.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Abstract: ...... ii Acknowledgments ...... v Preface...... vii Table Of Contents:...... ix List of Photographs: ...... xi List of Tables:...... xi List of Graphs: ...... xi List of Maps:...... xii Chapter 1 ...... 1 Introduction: ...... 1 1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAJOR ARGUMENTS...... 1 1.2. METHODOLOGY ...... 18 Chapter 2 ...... 25 LITERATURE REVIEW:...... 25 Chapter 3 ...... 37 HISTORICAL, RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DRUZE: ...... 37 3.1. DRUZE IDENTITY:...... 38 3.2. ORIGINS OF THE DRUZE SECT 600-1021...... 46 3.3.THE DRUZE IN GREATER 1021-1948...... 52 3.3. THE DRUZE'S AND RELIGION ...... 57 3.4. THE IMAM LEGACY...... 61 Chapter 4 ...... 64 Israeli Political/Military/ and ECONOMIC policies :...... 64 4.1. THE DRUZE: A PREFERRED MINORITY...... 64 The Druze as Instrument of Sate Policy: ...... 73 4.2. CREATING OFFICIAL DRUZE IDENTIFICATION ...... 77 4.3. THE DRUZE SCOUTS...... 80 4.4. COMPULSORY MILITARY ...... 83 The Military as a Divisive Tool: ...... 92 4.5. ECONOMIC POLICIES/ LAND EXPROPRIATIONS ...... 95 Chapter 5 ...... 104 Israeli Cultural and Religious policies:...... 104

ix 5.1. SEPARATION FROM : SEPARATE DRUZE RELIGIOUS COURTS...... 104 5.2. CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND MILITARY MONUMENTS AND CEREMONIES: ...... 109 5.3. SEPARATION OF DRUZE EDUCATION, AND THE CREATION OF A “DRUZE CULTURE”...... 120 CHAPTER 6...... 133 Political, Economic and Social consequences of the State Druze policies...... 133 6.1. THE ARMY TRAP: CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY CONSCRIPTION IN THE IDF:...... 137 6.2. THE STATUS OF DRUZE EDUCATION ...... 142 6.3. LAND EXPROPRIATIONS: ...... 149 6.4. RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS: THE DRUZE INITIATIVE COMMITTEE...... 162 Conclusion ...... 171 Bibliography ...... 178 BOOKS: ...... 178 I. Books in Arabic: ...... 178 II. Books In English: ...... 178 PERIODICALS ...... 181 NEWSPAPERS ...... 182 Arabic Documents, and Newspapers...... 183 Appendix A:...... 184 Appendix B:...... 188

x LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS:

Photo 1: -Ben Gurion with the Druze Spiritual leader Amin Tarif, in center, on a visit to the Druze village of Julius in 1956...... 17 Photo 2: Aba Khoushy, labor leader and member of the , was welcomed by religious Druze leaders. Throughout his life, Khoushy was committed to developing and maintaining peaceful Druze-Israeli relations. Septmber1949...... 69 Photo 3: Former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on a visit to Amin Tariff with the head of the IDF...... 77 Photo 4: Israeli Druze Scouts Logo...... 80 Photo 5: Druze Soldiers in The IDF Holding an Israeli Flag with a Star of David...... 83 Photo 6: A Key chain commemorating the bravery of the Druze in the IDF And is the Symbol of the Sword Battalion, an exclusive Druze regiment...... 88 Photo 7: Makaam Nabi Shuayb adorned by Israeli flags as well as Druze flags...... 109 Photo 8: Druze Star and Druze Flag...... 112 Photo 9: Druze Flag with the Star of David...... 113 Photo 10: Shaul Mofaz, The head of the IDF in a visit to a Druze Museum...... 115 Photo 11: Current Israeli Prime minister at the Druze village of Kasra August 17th,2004 in a ceremony commemorating the 2nd annual Druze soldiers Day...... 118

LIST OF TABLES:

Table 1: Arab University Graduates by Degree and Religion. 1983 census percentages: ...... 148 Table 2: Breakdown of the Druze villages into regions...... 153 Table 3: ANOVA Table, Percentage of Land expropriated= the dependent variable, Village type(Druze or non-Druze) =the independent variable...... 156 Table 4: ANOVA table results...... 157 Table 5: ANOVA table for the Percentage of land as a dependent variable and the geographical region as a independent variable...... 157 Table 6: ANOVA results ...... 158 Table 7: Villages by region, type, and land expropriated...... 159 Table 8: Land Expropriations 1945-1962...... 188

LIST OF GRAPHS:

Graph 1: The bar labels correspond to the Druze population in Middle East...... 52 Graph 2: Minority group distribution in Israel in 1960. Actual numbers of the corresponding population in the bar...... 70 Graph 3: Minority group distribution in Israel in 1960. Actual numbers of the corresponding population in the bar. Graph is original by the author...... 71 Graph 4: Expropriated Land /village type. Original by the author...... 151 Graph 5: Expropriated land/ region. Original, by the author...... 153 Graph 6: Expropriated land per region and village type. (1= Carmel, 2= Lower and Western Galilee, 3= Galilee, 4= ). Original, by the author...... 154

xi LIST OF MAPS:

Map 1: Druze communities in the Middle East...... 37 Map 2: A detailed map showing the Galilee and the Carmel regions...... 95 Map 3: Map of Northern Israel showing the 4 different regions...... 152

xii CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

1.1. Research Questions and Major Arguments

Multiethnic states have traditionally attempted to discourage minority nationalist ideas and to de-emphasize ethnic identity. However, in the case of the Druze, the state of Israel has not only emphasized ethnic identity, but has also encouraged and even promoted separatism by a religious minority group. Separatist tendencies on the part of the sub-national minority were encouraged as a weapon against wider pan Arabism. Imagined nationalism was utilized in order to exploit the Druze estrangement from the larger Arab nation. Hobsbawm’s concept of

“invented traditions” as the basis for new nation state-building can be expanded to include sub- national minorities.

Kais Firro argues that the strategy of the Israeli state could be deduced from the fact that:

With the Arab defeat in 1948, the “importance” of the Druze minority in what was now the state of Israel only increased, since their “cooperation” could be used to achieve three main purposes: to alienate the from the other Arab communities in the new state and vice-versa and so create “good” Arabs and “bad” Arabs; through them to influence the relations the Druzes in Syria maintained with that country’s government; and to turn the Druzes into a show case for the world at large of the “benevolent attitude” the newly created was willing to adopt towards “non-hostile” minorities within its territory.1

The principal research questions proposed in this dissertation are as follows:

1. How did promote a Druze identity at odds with Palestinian Arab aspirations?

2. Did Druze leaders who cooperated with Israelis pursue personal self interest or sincerely

believe their choices would benefit their community?

1 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill, Page 4

1 3. Did Druze leaders’ choices—such as acceptance of mandatory military conscription—

actually benefit their community?

This dissertation examines the options and choices that the Druze leadership faced, in light of the policies advanced by the Israeli state. I argue that the Druze leadership allowed itself to be used as an instrument in manipulating Druze “imagined” ethnic identity. Druze elites were willing participants in this attempt and were instrumental in implementing state policies. The concept of imagined nationalism was being utilized by the state in order to disentangle the Druze from the larger Arab nation. I will also show how Hobsbawm’s concept of “invented tradition” can be expanded to include sub-national minorities, such as the Druze in Israel, while focusing on military policy as an instrument of ethnic invention, an area that was neglected by Hobsbawm.

The central argument of this study is that the Israeli policy makers, in cooperation with

Druze leaders, deliberately encouraged communal identity for the Druze through four types of policies: 1. Military 2. Educational 3. Cultural, and 4. Economic. The Druze leadership agreed to mandatory conscription in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which was used as an instrument for socializing a new generation of Druze soldiers loyal to the state. The Israeli state used the army to reinforce particularism among the Druze, who were targeted by the Israeli government for a policy of ethnicization. In other words, a special relationship was cultivated with the Druze in order to control and separate the Druze minority from the larger Muslim and Christian Arab group.

Following on the footsteps of the Gurkhas, in the context of British India, the Druze were and are still used for policing another Palestinian minority.

The Israeli government’s efforts at Druze ethnicization are an example of the “Gurkha

Syndrome.”2 Cynthia Enloe explains this syndrome as the use of small peripheral groups by colonial powers for military and policing purposes. Institutionalizing compulsory draft amongst the

2 “Gurkha syndrome,” or joining the conqueror's army, is a classic form of ethnic political adaptation (Enloe, 1980).

2 Druze is a means of separating them from the rest of the Arab community. Placing them in a position where they would be regarded as part of the enemy or occupation military machine would weaken their ties to the larger Arab community, therefore forcing them to regard themselves as being different from the rest of the Arabs. At the same time, the Druze were put in minority units not completely assimilated into the Israeli military apparatus. This is justified by what Harvard professor Alon Peled calls the “Trojan Horse Dilemma.”3 He argues that

A number of minority groups across the globe find themselves entrapped between their loyalty to the state and their cultural and blood-ties with kin across the in a potential enemy country. I will refer to this distrust gap between the government and the minority group concerning the of the latter as the ‘Trojan Horse dilemma’.4

In order for a state to deal with this dilemma, Peled proposes that they pursue a policy of phased integration, or implement confidence building stages. He argues

Phased integration is a policy that delineates special conditions under which minority soldiers will be recruited, trained and deployed, and may include introductory measures such as voluntary service within a conscript-based military, segregated units, and limited promotional avenues. Phased integration serves as a confidence-building measure between the state and its minority group and should gradually lead to greater inclusion of minority soldiers within the armed forces. Eventually, and usually after one generation (20 years), this policy is abandoned in favor of equal treatment of minority soldiers. Such a policy was successfully used in Israel for Druze and Circassians citizens.5

Peled argues that this was not the only reason behind the separate units; he contends that Ben-

Gurion imagined the new IDF as a “Jewish melting pot in which Jewish immigrant and native youth, blended together, would abandon ancient Diaspora identities and adopt new Israeli character. The army…would be the workshop of the new nation.”6 However, his vision of a new

3 Peled, Alon. 1998. A Question of Loyalty. New York: Cornell University Press. Page 1 4 Ibid, page 128 5 Ibid, page 129 6 Ibid, page 128

3 “nation building workshop” did not include Palestinian Arabs. The minority units were seen as a solution for maintaining the purity of the Jewish lifestyle.

The “trust gap,” however, doesn’t only occur between the so-called Trojan horse and the state; it will also simultaneously occur between this horse and their Arab kin. Being in Israeli enemy uniforms would automatically make the Druze outcasts among the rest of the Arabs. So this policy would serve to create trust and confidence building between the Druze and the new state while simultaneously eroding any trust between the Druze and the rest of the Arabs.

Along with military policies, the state used its control of the Ministry of Education as another tool of socializing a new generation of Druze into believing that they are in fact a separate . Creating a separate department that is in charge of Druze education within the Ministry of Education, helped separate Druze affairs from the rest of Arab affairs. A Druze cultural studies program was added to the curriculum taught in Druze school. This special program emphasized the particularism of the Druze and further highlighted their divisions from the rest of the Arabs.

Another policy which is complementary to the policy on education is the state’s cultural polices which included funding for Druze cultural centers and museums in most of the Druze villages. The state funded celebrations of exclusive Druze religious events and ceremonies and recognized them as official Druze holidays. It also encouraged the building of statues to commemorate the Druze special contribution to the state, particularly by those who served in the

IDF.7

Land expropriation was another policy that was utilized by the state to make the Druze almost entirely dependent on the state for their livelihood. This would only further strengthen the link between the state and the Druze community. Land expropriation and confiscation was used

7 An example of such include the house of the Druze martyr in the village of Dalayat el Carmel.

4 against all the Arabs as a means of acquiring land for the state after its creation in 1948. The

Druze were not spared by the policy of expropriation even though most of their leadership had been very cooperative with the authorities, believing that such cooperation would safeguard their land from expropriation.

All these policies combined were used effectively to invent a tradition for the Druze, to essentially create a new “imagined community” that severs its historical link with the larger Arab community. While the policies have largely succeeded in achieving their goals, recently they have met with some resistance. Druze intellectuals lamenting their socio-economic conditions have spearheaded this resistance to what they recognize as nothing more than divide and conquer strategies by the Israeli authorities

5 1.2. Historical Context:

Israeli policy makers, along with interested Druze elites, effectively constructed an imagined ethnic and political identity for the Druze in order to separate them from their

Palestinian Arab brethren. The Druze leadership perceived being classified as a separate minority, with some limited form of autonomy over religious matters, as the most effective way of maintaining or gaining power. Being Druze would mean more than just a religious affiliation; it would become an ethnic identity as well, an identity that ignores their pre-existing ethnic, cultural, and political ties to the rest of the Palestinian Arab population. A new “invented tradition” would be created by the state with the help of the Druze leadership in order to create a novel sense of identity. The “Druzification”8 of this minority would be accomplished through the combined efforts of Israeli policy makers as well as select members of the Druze leadership.

Throughout history, occupying powers have utilized various tactics to force occupied populations into submission. “Divide and conquer” tactics have proven to be particularly successful in facilitating control over native populations. Hans J. Morgenthau states that the maxim “divide and rule”

has been resorted to by nations who tried to make or keep their competitor weak by dividing them or keeping them divided. The most consistent and important policy of this kind in modern times is the policy of with respect to and the policy of the with respect to the rest of Europe. From the seventeenth century to the end of the Second World War, it has been an unvarying principal of French foreign policy either to favor the division of the German Empire into a number of small independent states or to prevent the coalescence of such states into one unified nation.9

This strategy has also been useful for colonial and occupying powers as a means of controlling the native people. The British playing off the and the Muslims against each

8 This term was used by the Druze Initiative Committee, (a committee of Druze who identify themselves as an integral part of the Arab nation and are protesting what they see as Israeli attempts at separating the Druze from the rest of the Arabs) implying an attempt at creating an ethnic identity for the Druze. 9 Morgenthau, Hans J. 1966. Politics among Nations. Fourth edition. New York: Alfred. A. Knopf, page 172.

6 other is a classic example of the divide and conquer strategies.10 Even during the mandate period in the Middle East at the conclusion of WWI, the British used divide and conquer as their tool in suppressing the natives. Fred Khouri argues:

The British grant of considerable autonomy to the various religious groups, along the lines of the Turkish system, worked against the development of a closely knit, organized Arab community. Separate Muslim, Christian, and Druze communities administered their own cultural, educational, religious and certain judicial affairs.11

The term “fifth column” has been used to describe the part of the native population co- opted into becoming instruments of the occupying powers.12 The fifth column is generally comprised of a disenfranchised group within the native population, such as a religious minority, which has not felt secure and assimilated among the general population. The occupying power capitalizes on these insecurities and, promising protection along with other incentives, manipulates these groups into working for the occupying power’s benefit. Chomsky discusses this traditional pattern where existing rivalries and hostilities are used by the colonialist power to get one group to work for them against the other.13

Such policies were particularly useful for the state of Israel. When the state was created in 1948, it had to deal with a sizable Palestinian population under its control. Even after approximately 800,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes, the new state still had to deal with a Palestinian population of 150,000.14 These remnants of the original inhabitants of mandatory , who had not fled in fear or were not forcibly evacuated by the Jewish fighters during the war, posed a dilemma for the newly created Israeli government.

10 Noam Chomsky gives a brief history of the use of “Divide and Conquer” strategies by colonialist powers. Chomsky, Noam. 1993. The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many. Berkeley, CA: Odonian Press. 11 Khouri, Fred J. 1985. The Arab Israeli Dilemma, 3rd edition. New York: Syracuse University Press, page 19. 12 Chomsky points out that 90% of the forces that were used to control India were Indian. 13 Ibid. 14 Morris, Benny. 1999. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist Arab Conflict, 1881-1999. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

7 As members of the defeated group, those Palestinians, referred to as “Israeli Arabs” by the new Israeli government, were suddenly reduced to minority status with the establishment of a majority Jewish state replacing a predominantly Arab society. As an Israeli controlled

Palestinian Arab minority with powers such as prevention detention retained from British mandate. In the early years of the Israeli state, these extra judicial powers were frequently used to silence voices of Arab and to prevent the emergence of an Israeli Palestinian leadership independent of the traditional leadership which had largely been co-opted by the

Israeli government and military apparatus. The Israeli Palestinians were officially denied employment in high governmental positions because they were considered a security risk, and the Israeli diplomatic corps remains today noticeably lacking any Arab members.15 In the last two decades, some of these security-oriented measures have been officially eased, but not completely abolished.

Israel chose to deal with the Palestinian Arab population by utilizing the classic strategy of divide and conquer. The native Palestinian population was divided into different groups,

Muslims, Christians, Druze and , and each group was assigned to its own ministry.

Since the founding of the state of Israel, the Druze were singled out for preferential treatment.

The Druze never amounted to more than 2% of the population, so they would have never been considered a threat to Israeli national security. With more than half living in , there are more than 136,000 Druze in Israel with Israeli citizenships and around 20,000 in the occupied

Golan who have refused Israeli citizenship. Arming a small number of Druze would not threaten the security of the state, and yet they could be utilized as a means to police the rest of the Arabs.

15 Wolkinson, Benjamin W. 1991. “Ethnic Discrimination In Employment: The Israeli Experience.” Journal of Ethnic Studies, 19, 3: 121-132. There has been a notable exception: Labor Knesset member Tarif, a Druze, became a minister without portfolio in a national unity government led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in March 2001.

8 Until the 1940s, most Palestinian Druze identified themselves as part of the larger

Palestinian people.16 This identification was never undermined by the tensions that existed between the Druze and Muslims, which resulted from mutual intolerance. The geographical isolation of Druze villages intensified these sentiments of prejudice, which were perpetuated by blind ignorance, as well as by the secretive nature of the Druze religion itself. Despite these political tensions between them and other Palestinian communities, the Druze saw themselves as

Arabs. Most studies of the history of the Druze suggest that the Druze never regarded themselves as a separate ethnicity from the rest of Arabs in the region, just a separate religious group.

Throughout their history, the Druze were never recognized as an independent legal community, which also impacted the way the Druze were viewed and how they, in turn, viewed themselves.

With the emergence of the state of Israel, the Druze self image, as well as the way the new state regarded them, changed. Druze particularism was emphasized by the new state in collaboration with the Druze elites.

Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of “invented tradition” can help us understand the process by which Druze particularism was created by the Israeli state. Hobsbawm uses this notion of

“invented tradition” in order to explain the construction process that is used by elites to invent a new sense of shared tradition. He argues that this “invented tradition” can be created through the means of universal education, nation wide ceremonies, and national monuments. Eric Hobsbawm argues that invented tradition includes, “both ‘traditions’ actually invented, constructed and formally instituted and those emerging in a less easily traceable manner with a brief and dateable period -- a matter of a few years perhaps -- and establishing themselves with great rapidity.”17

16 Kassem, Nabih. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 17 Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger, 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, page 2.

9 These “invented traditions” are a

Set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past… invented traditions are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition.18

Hobsbawm argues that recently created nation states in the Middle East are a perfect example of the function “invented traditions.” He refers specifically to Middle Eastern nationalism by arguing:

Israeli and or nations must be novel, whatever the historical continuities of Jews or Middle Eastern Muslims, since the very concept of territorial states of the currently standard type in their region was barely thought of a century ago, and hardly became a serious prospect before the end of .19

I would argue that the Druze leadership, with the cooperation and support of the Israeli state, invented a new tradition for the Druze community through the methods that Hobsbawm proposes. According to him, “invented traditions” have three innovations:

In terms of the invention of tradition, three major innovations are particularly relevant. The first was the development of a secular equivalent of the church- primary education, imbued with revolutionary and republican principals and content…the second was the invention of public ceremonies…The third was the mass production of public monuments.20

In the case of the Druze, education has also been a useful tool in creating a sense of unity with the state and a sense of distinctiveness from Palestinians Highlighting the heroic past of forefathers, who were always ready to pay the ultimate for their nation and their people, is an important element of this education. National monuments were testimonials to this long sense of shared history and symbols of national unity. The leaders of the Druze community were

18 Ibid, page 3. 19 Ibid, page 13. 20 Hobsbawm, Eric. 1994. “The Nations as Invented tradition.” In Nationalism. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford, New York: , page 77.

10 only too happy to have ceremonies celebrating Druze distinctiveness and particularism, highlighting their own relative importance to the community, and giving them legitimacy as its leaders. The state would play its part by commemorating special days associated with Druze religion as official Druze holidays. Druze community elites would erect monuments financed through grants from the state. The goal of all these tactics is to strengthen the notion of a separate

Druze community.

The state of Israel had the benefit of another institutionalizing tool at its disposal, not mentioned by Hobsbawm. This is the military or the citizens’ army. The Israeli Defense Force

(IDF) was utilized by the new state as an institutional tool of nation building. In the early stages of nation building the army was instrumental in building a sense of community for the Diaspora

Jews. At the early stages of nation-building, the state of Israel was mostly made up of new

European Jewish immigrants, with nothing much in common aside from religion. Few new immigrants knew Hebrew, a language most were were taught in intensive Hebrew schools. The citizens’ army was instrumental in socializing these new immigrants into becoming new Israelis.

If the military was a useful institutionalizing method for transforming Diaspora Jews into

Israeli citizens, could it be used for non-Jewish citizens like the Druze? This appears to be problematic because the “national” group includes groups that belong to a different religion from that of the nation, which is self-identified as a Jewish nation and therefore incorporates only

Jewish groups. However, if clear distinctions were made between state-building and nation building, a role for non Jews could be possible in this citizens’ army. While non-Jews cannot be involved in “nation building,” they can be involved in “state building,” which is normally a complementary process to nation building. Scholars of ethnicity and nationalism often associate nation building with ethnic nationalism and state building with civic nationalism. These two

11 types of nationalism are often perceived in the literature as mutually exclusive.21 The case of the

Druze in Israel is an example of a situation where the two types of nationalism, ethnic and civic, are intertwined. Since the Druze have historically belonged to the greater Arab nation, an alternative, or a Druze based nationalism that would allow the Druze as a group to be included in a community or a “nation” based on non-Arab culture, ethnic origin and a collective political identity would be far less threatening. If a Druze nation was accepted as an integral part of the

Israeli state, with rights and privileges that correspond to its special status in society, then it could only be to the benefit of the state of Israel. This inclusion would give the Druze a role in the state building of Israel as well as deal a blow to the threat of . Mandatory military conscription was utilized as an instrument to police the rest of the Arabs,22 which created hostility that cut at the heart of greater Arab unity among Israeli Palestinians.

Those who became citizens of Israel due to their physically being on its territory on May

15, 1948 have never been fully incorporated into Israeli society. The Arab sector is governed by separate ministries, in each of which they have a special department in charge of their affairs, such as a department in the Ministry of Education that deals with Arabs and Arab education.

Religious and personal affairs are conducted according to the millet system, developed under the

Ottomans and applied to the various in their empire. The state wasn’t the only party that had an interest in maintaining the separatism of the different ethnic groups; minority leaders were always trying to ascertain special status as a separate group in an attempt to enhance their personal power as leaders of a certain ethnic or religious minority. So what started out as a struggle on the part of elites to get special recognition for their role in the leadership of a

21 Liah Greenfeld’s work is perhaps the most prominent example of the use of these typologies. Greenfeld, Liah.1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge (USA) and London (UK): Harvard University Press. 22 Frisch, Hillel. 1993. “The Druze Minority in the Israeli Military; Traditionalizing an Ethnic Policing Role” Armed Forces and Society, 20, 1: 51-67.

12 religious or ethnic minority would be further exploited by the state for its own purposes. Whether the elites were motivated by personal gain and power or whether they were seeking to serve their respective communities by preserving their culture, tradition and laws is very difficult to determine. Minority leaders might have been co-opted by state officials in order to their clan of the necessity of being recognized as their own separate entity.

The millet system, also called the “confessional” system, allows each religion, denomination or sect to govern itself in matters of , education and personal relations. In most multi-ethnic states, having a recognized minority status and even a limited when it comes to religious practices is seen as an example of the tolerance of the state for its minority groups. However, a state can also take advantage of this situation and assign benefits, such as social and economic incentives, based on the individuals’ membership to a certain ethnic or religious group. 23 The state of Israel is a case in point. It has effectively used the millet system to reinforce divisions between groups. Some scholars have used the term “apartheid” to describe the system by which the state of Israel relates to its Palestinian Arab citizens.24 Azmi

Bishara, a Palestinian Arab who in 1999 ran for the office of prime minister, argues,

“Discrimination exists because Israel is not safe for all of its citizens…. Israel has still not defined the character of the state: should it be a state of Jews or a Jewish state?”25 Others suggest that a system of “separate but equal” is what the founders of Israel envisioned in the heyday of their utopian dream of the Jewish state that was to be a “light unto other nations.”26

23 Judy Dempsey writes in “fault Lines at 50” Financial Times Wednesday April 29, 1998: “ the Arabs remain second- class citizens… The reality is that Arabs are not treated the same as Jews. Arabs are banned from serving in the army. They are not given equal access to education or funding for their . And they face any number of restrictions when they want to build a home or buy a plot of land.” 24 Chomsky and Edward Said are among the most prominent. See Fateful Triangle, South End Press 1999. 25 Quoted in Judy Dempsey’s “fault lines at 50,” Financial Times April 29, 1998. 26 Early Zionist writers always made a reference to Israel being a “light unto other nations” referring to passages from the .

13 However, it is undeniable that Israeli Palestinians have also benefited from their association with the dominant Jewish society. Their exposure to Israel’s western style , albeit security minded, has inculcated in them values of personal and political freedoms seldom exercised by or allowed in other Arab countries in the rest of the Middle East.

Every Palestinian citizen is allowed to vote in every Israeli election and can even run for and be elected to high public offices such as mayor, city councilor or Member of Parliament-- the

Knesset.27 A highly developed Israeli entitlement system has assured every Palestinian citizen of adequate security in retirement, health care when needed, and temporary financial support if unemployed.

Nevertheless, true equality is still lacking, even for Druze who serve in the IDF.

Confiscation of Arab land and housing discrimination are some of the ways that Arabs are treated differently from Jews. The state allocates far fewer resources to the Arab sector. Arab municipalities, for example, receive much less funding form the government than Jewish municipalities. In many respects, Arabs in Israel remain second-class citizens. The Israel

Democracy Institute, a non-profit association based in , presented the results of a study of the quality of Israeli democracy and how it functions:

Chiefly, the Institute found that Israel “has not yet acquired the characteristics of a substantive democracy.” As regards rights, the study concludes: “For nearly every indicator, Israel places in the lower half of the list. Protection of human rights in Israel is poor; there is serious political and economic discrimination against the Arab minority; there is much less than in other ; and the socioeconomic inequality indicator is among the highest in the sample. As for the “stability and social cohesion” factor, the report cites that “only India ranks lower in social tensions and rifts between the various segments of society,”

27 Azmi Bishara is the latest example of a Palestinian Arab a candidate for the office of prime minister in 2000.

14 and that there has been a significant decline in, among other things, freedom of the press – where Israel ranked in the bottom ten. 28

In 2003 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its Concluding

Observations regarding Israel’s implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), expressed concerns regarding Israel’s treatment of its

Arab citizens as second-class citizens by discriminating against them in areas such as land ownership, education, the work force, and the building of the “Apartheid Wall.” The report concluded that “excessive emphasis upon the state as a Jewish state” was of concern to the committee, as it “encourages discrimination and accords a second-class status to its non-Jewish citizens.”29

Some have justified this unequal treatment because the Jewish citizens of Israel serve in the army and fulfill their responsibility to the state. They argue that with the entitlements and benefits of citizenship come responsibilities and obligations to society and to the state. Service in the military is one of the most fundamental responsibilities, which has been used as the benchmark to characterize and define loyalty of Israeli citizens and assesses their commitment to its society. But that service, while mandatory to almost all male and female Jews, male Druze, and male Circassians, is only optional to Christian and Bedouin Arabs, and forbidden to Sunni

Muslims. This unquestionably places in doubt the possibility of full citizenship for the majority of Israel’s Palestinian Arabs. But most importantly, it raises serious questions about divided and identity confusion especially regarding the Druze. Are the Druze Palestinians? Are they Arab? And if so, can they also be Israelis? This is the dilemma and therein lies the challenge: Can the Druze and Israeli state simultaneously preserve the unique Arabic culture of

28 May 22, 2003, the Israel Democracy Institute http://www.rescuemideastpolicy.com/Israeli_democracy.htm 29 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may 2003, page 3

15 this minority group while permitting it to continue its progress toward full functional integration in a constantly changing Israeli society? How has this been done since 1948? Whose interests are served by this cultural nationalist distinctiveness layered upon civic nationalist unity, and what have been the outcomes of this dual policy for the Druze themselves?

Sammy Smooha, in his study of Arabs in Israel, emphasizes how Palestinians identify themselves, as if national identities are simply self-generated. In this dissertation, I emphasize the role the Israeli government played in constructing the national identities of its citizens by classifying them into different categories.30 The Israeli authorities, along with some of the Druze elites and leaders, found emphasizing the distinctions between the Druze and the larger Arab community useful. The concept of creating an “invented tradition” isn’t novel to the Israelis.

They were able to create a Jewish Israeli identity for their citizens in 1948. Allon Peled argues that David Ben-Gurion “was determined to obliterate traditional Jewish identities in the quest to build a new Jewish identity. The dozen of Jewish Diaspora identities would be rooted out through an intensive assimilation campaign directed at the massive influx of Jewish immigrants who arrived in Israel after 1948.”31 Ben-Gurion recognized the prospect of an “invented tradition” that would unify all the Jews of the Diaspora by arguing, “The vast majority of our people, from the Jewish perspective, are nothing but human dust, with no language, no tradition, no roots, no linkage to normal state life, no habits of living in an independent society.”32

30 Smooha, Sammy. 1992. Arab and Jew in Israel. Jerusalem: West View Press. In this study, Smooha conducts a survey in which he allows the respondents to identify themselves as Non-Palestinian Israeli, Israeli Palestinian, or non-Israeli Palestinian. Smooha doesn’t take into consideration state defined identity for the respondents. 31 Peled, Allon. 1998. A Question of Loyalty; New York: Cornell University Press. Page 127. 32 Ibid

16 Photo 1: David-Ben Gurion with the Druze Spiritual leader Amin Tarif, in center, on a visit to the Druze village of Julius in 1956. 33

Inventing an “imagined tradition” for the Druze community would be even easier. The

Druze lived as a community, shared the same religion, and were disenfranchised by the majority

Sunni Muslims. This sense of alienation on the part of the Druze community facilitated the creation of an imagined separate and unique identity. But unlike the Jewish Israeli identity, the result of this form of imagined nationalism didn’t lead to unity, but rather to separation from the larger Arab nation. Both Hobsbawm and Anderson tell us that most nations create or imagine a national tradition for their own citizens. Unlike Anderson’s and Hobsbawm’s works, this case deals with an “imagined identity” not for a nation but for a subset of the nation. In this case, the subset is the Druze minority. The case of the Druze is also an example of the simultaneous cultivation of a cultural sub-nationalism and a unified civic nationalism, challenging theorists who typologize countries into distinct civic or cultural nationalist categories.

33 http://www6.snunit.k12.il/druz/9a.html (which is the Jerusalem University site). The first mandatory recruitment of military-age Druze males was implemented in May 1956.

17 1.2. Methodology

Various methods were used in answering the research questions proposed in this paper. A significant amount of the research focused on the policy of the Israeli government towards the

Druze in Israel. The policy of the state towards the Druze was interpreted by examining official government documents and statistics. In addition, face-to-face interviews were conducted with

Druze elites.

To answer the first research question-- how did Israel promote a Druze identity at odds with

Palestinian Arab aspirations-- I looked at actual Israeli policies. Using Hobsbawm’s model and focusing on how states were able to invent a national tradition for their citizens, I would be able to see if there were any parallels. Has the Israeli state tried to promote ceremonial aspects, such as monuments and holidays which would highlight the particularism of the Druze and help to create an invented tradition for them? Was the educational system as a socializing institution also utilized to further the idea of a separate Druze national tradition? I also looked at the military as a source of creating separations between the Druze and the rest of the Arabs.

To answer the second research question-- Did the leaders who cooperated with Israelis pursue personal self interest or sincerely believe their choices would benefit their community?--I weighed the conflicting testimony by Druze elites interviewed. Some of those interviewed had direct personal knowledge and were involved in the decision making process, while others were not only critical of these decisions and how they benefited the community as a whole, but were also suspicious of the motives of those involved. Another criteria used to answer this research question, is whether or not the particular elite continued to serve the policies of the state, even after that these policies are detrimental to the overall well being of the community as a whole.

Field interviews with pro-Arab and pro-Israeli Druze are used to help answer this question.

18 To answer the third research question—Did Druze leaders’ choices actually benefit their community as a whole?— I compared the status of the Druze community to those of the other Arab communities meaning the Christians and the Muslims. I looked particularly at education and land expropriation policies to assess how the Druze community fared in comparison to the other Arab communities. Land expropriation data, was provided through statistical abstracts, allows for statistical analysis methods such as Analysis of variance (ANOVA) to be used to analyze the variance that appears in the data.34

Field research:

Field research consisted of interviews conducted with Druze elites as well as interviews with villagers and soldiers from the Druze community. Field research was carried out over two periods: the first was during the summer of 1994, and the second between January and May

2002. Conducting the field research in 2002 was especially challenging due to an escalation of military confrontation which was marked by the complete reoccupation of the West bank by the

Israeli military. The city of Ramallah was constantly under curfew and closure, which made it difficult, and at times impossible, for me to travel. I could not get access to Israeli governmental archives, so I had to rely on secondary sources.

Primary Sources:

Elites are individuals who have unique knowledge about the subject and are sometimes experts on a specific topic; therefore, they require interviews that are not as structured as would normally be the case in a survey approach. In my interviews with them, few questions were pre- planned, and the conversation was more a free flowing. The interviews and questions were structured to provide for a calm and reflective time, where the respondents were not made to feel

34 Israeli Government Yearbook 5734 (1963/64) page 32 -38.

19 under pressure. Most questions were open-ended questions, which were set up to facilitate and encourage future conversation. Examples of open-ended questions are: Do you think Druze are

Arabs? Do you believe the Druze receive preferential treatment from the state? What is the status of the Druze community in Israel and how does it compare to other minorities in Israel? Some questions were tailor-made depending on the respondent’s direct personal knowledge. Since the interviews were often translated, quotations from interviews in the thesis have been written as exactly as possible, but should be considered very accurate paraphrases rather than direct quotations, unless specifically marked “verbatim”.

Threats to validity are always present in elite interviews. The respondent’s view of events can be too narrow, and his information inaccurate. He can also rationalize his actions, or intentionally lie. Whenever possible I have tried to address these validity concerns by treating what the respondents say as data, and not as the truth, that is, by not taking the respondents answers at face value. I have also tried whenever possible not to rely on a single respondent, but rather to seek ways to verify the answers, either through documents or accounts of others with access to the same information.

Another problem was one of access to these “elites.” Some refused, despite my persistent attempts, to make themselves available for interviews. To those who agreed to my request for an interview, I introduced myself as a student, noting that the information I gather will be used in my dissertation, and discussed with each respondent the broad purpose of the study. I tried to avoid giving detailed information about my research. The interviews for the most part took place in private, and mostly in the respondent’s office, with as little interruption as possible. All the interviews were conducted with one person at a time. Most interviews were in Arabic and

English whenever possible. I translated all Arabic interviews into English, some were translated

20 verbatim. Since most of the respondents were not comfortable being tape-recorded, I had to rely on my handwritten notes during the interviews.

Elite Interviews: (conducted during my field research January 2002- May 2002):

Pro-Arab Druze elites:

The Druze Initiative Committee was started in 1972, by Druze leaders, educators and spiritual leaders. They were mobilized by their opposition to compulsory military conscription, a separate Druze educational system and what they perceive as a calculated plan to create a separate Druze ethnicity. They insist that they are Druze only when it comes to religious faith and they are Arabs when it comes to national identity.

• Sheikh Jamal Maadi, president of the Arab Druze Initiative Committee.

Interviewed at his home at Yirka Village. June 1994 and March 2002.

• Suhil Kabalan, writer for the Druze Initiative Committee, interview in

village. June1994.

• Ghalib Seif, Secretary of The Initiative Committee and the Chairman of the

Educational Committee in the Druze villages. Interviewed at his home, at the

Yanouh village. June 1994.

Other Pro-Arab Druze:

• Nafaa, Secretary of the Communist Party. Interview at his home on

March 14th 2002.

• Samih Al-Kassem: is among the leading poets of the contemporary .

He is the editor of the daily newspaper Kol el Arab. Interview conducted at this

office in Nazareth, June 1994.

21 • Nabieh Al-Kassem: Is a high school teacher, and has written several books on

Druze in Israel. Interview conducted at his home in Ramyeh village, June 1994.

• Marzuq Halabi, a Druze journalist. Interview was conducted at his office on Jan

25th, 2002.

Pro-Israeli Druze:

• Sheikh Jaber Maadi: Former Knesset Member and one of the signatories of the

document which imposed compulsory military service on all Druze males. He was

elected to the 2nd Knesset in 1951, the 3rd Knesset in 1955, the 5th Knesset in

1961, the 6th Knesset (where he campaigned as a member of a newly created

Druze Party, the 7th Knesset in 1969, the 8th Knesset in 1973 and the 9th Knesset

in 1977. Interview was conducted at his home in the village of Yarka, on April 1st

2002.

• Mr. : A Knesset Member since 1988. He was elected to the 12th

Knesset in 1988, 13th Knesset in 1992 (became Deputy minister of Internal

Affairs in 1995 ), 14th Knesset in 1996, 15th Knesset in 1999 (in March 2001, was

appointed Minister without Portfolio, to become the first non-Jewish minister in

an Israeli government.) Interview was conducted at his office in Akka on March

25th, 2002.

• Dr. Salman Fallah: was in charge of Druze education in the Ministry of Education

in Israel and now holds the post of the ministry’s deputy director general. He won

the President’s award for voluntarism, the Teachers’ Union prize for his life’s

work and the Ministry of Education highest award in Israel (first time the award

22 was given to a non Jew). Interview was conducted at his office in on March

17th, 2002.

• Wahid Mouadi, the Head of the Druze Cultural Museum in Yirka Village.

Interviewed at the museum March 16th 2002.

• Suliman Tawel, journalist. Interviewed at his office in Haifa. March 19th 2002.

In addition to elite interviews, I attempted to conduct some face-to-face interviews with

Druze whenever possible. These open-ended conversations were not meant to be a scientific sample of the Druze population due to several limitations. The major difficulty with such research in the Middle East is that it is almost impossible to get a random scientific sample.

Since telephones are not available except to a small portion of the population, using them as a means of generating a list of a random sample or even conducting interviews by telephone wouldn’t be practical. The best that could be achieved was a face-to-face interview in a central location where it would provide for the maximum exposure to as many villagers as possible.

Since most villages have one main road, and most of the villagers walk through that road at one point or another, it was the best possible way of attaining as much of a scientific representative sample that can be attained under the circumstances.

Another difficulty in such a closed society is the trust factor. Because I was an outsider to all these villagers, it was very difficult and often impossible for them to trust me considering the type of questions that I was asking. In an attempt to alleviate some of the mistrust, I relied on my own relatives who had some contact with a Druze in neighboring villages. Through these contacts, I was able to have open-ended group discussions with invited members of the village.

There were about 50 people interviewed in all the Druze villages. Being interviewed by

23 someone the respondent is familiar with could also be problematic since these are sensitive political issues, some of the respondents might have been concerned with the anonymity of their responses. In order to alleviate some of these concerns, I did re-emphasize the fact that their identity would remain anonymous, and that this survey is purely for academic research.

Whenever possible, I conducted the actual interview alone with one respondent at a time, which did aid in the respondents being more forthcoming. Some of the respondents were not comfortable with me taking notes, so the interview took on a more informal exchange. Whenever possible notes were taken or were written down from memory shortly after the interview was conducted. Because of the extreme difficulty and the virtual impossibility of conducting an opinion poll that could be considered scientific, I decided to use these types of interviews as anecdotal evidence.

24

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review:

Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they did not exist…Nations as a natural, -given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political identity, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is reality.35 Ernest Gellner

Some scholarship in the nationalism literature deals with ways that elites invent nations.

Most have focused on the role of the elites in the process of inventing “nations” where none existed. Few have focused on the role of colonialism in this nation building process. One of those few is Crawford Young, who maintains “radical reorganization of African political space into various forms of the territorial colonial state had profound impact upon the cultural self- definition in the societies concerned.”36 In this case study, I will examine how, in a similar fashion, the state of Israel in its colonialist role took on a “sorting and labeling” of the indigenous

Arabs that fell under its rule. Although the Israelis did act in a way typical of the colonial state by dividing the indigenous population into sub groups and by constructing a Druze ethnic identity; this process is also unique. What diverges from the norm of a typical colonial state behavior is the way that the state of Israel tried to simultaneously encourage ethnic nationalism as well as civil or political nationalism. While the two types of nationalism are mostly regarded as mutually exclusive, this study shows that they can function in a complementary fashion.

35 Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 48-49 36 Young, Crawford. 1994. “The Colonial Construction of African Nations.” In Nationalism edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 225.

25 Moreover, this case demonstrates the role of the military as an institutionalized mechanism for inventing a national tradition. To better illustrate how this case study fills some gaps in the literature on nationalism, a brief literature review is needed.

Nation-statehood is crucial to the analysis of the Israeli Arabs’ dilemma of identity.

Emerging in the waning years of the nineteenth century in Europe, nation-statehood quickly found its way to the rest of the world. Many scholars of nationalism in different disciplines consider 1648 as the birth date of the nation-state, instituted by the treaty of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Year religious wars in Germany. In the seventeenth century, the “nation” part of this concept bequeathed to us the terms “” and “nationalism,” and one can argue that “citizenship” is logically derived from the “state” part of this same concept.

Nationalism is defined as a “political ideology built upon the central theme of identification with the nation. It involves a group’s perception of itself as distinct from others, and the awareness of its members as components of the group.”37 While there is considerable confusion as to the nature of this prominent feature of current politics, and there is no single definition that could satisfy everyone, it would be hard to argue that a reasonably acceptable understanding of the concept would not contain the essence of the previously stated definition.

Nationalism is one of the most influential forces in modern history, yet serious study of this powerful phenomena has until recently been relatively neglected. Sustained social scientific enquiry into nationalism as an ideology and a movement did not start in earnest until the beginning of the twentieth century. The study of the nationalistic phenomena has not been limited to a single discipline, a fact that did cause some difficulties, especially in agreeing on

37 Skidmore, Thomas and Peter Smith. 2001. Modern Latin America, 5th edition. New York/London: Oxford University Press, page 20.

26 specific terminology. The pioneers in the field were the historians; however, the complexity within the field has made it much more interdisciplinary.

Nationality often denotes an ethnic and cultural identity, based on common values. A state, on the other hand, is a political organization holding and exercising supreme power through its various agencies over a given people within a given territory, “and bestowing upon them the protection of its citizenship. A state may include a number of nationalities,” brought together by the common bond of citizenship.38 A nation-state, therefore, will contain the elements of statehood and citizenship, and the element of nationhood and nationality. Hutchinson and Smith state that

The concept of the nation has, in fact, been contested on two fronts: in terms of rival scholarly definitions and as a form of identity that competes with other kinds of collective identity. While it is recognized that the concept of a nation must be differentiated from other concepts of collective identity like class, religion, gender, race, and religious community, there is little agreement about the role of ethnic, as opposed to political, components of the nation; or about the balance between “subjective” elements like will and memory, and more “objective” elements like territory and language; or about the nature and role of ethnicity in national identity.39

Students of nationalism, who define the terms “nation” and “nationalism,” have tended to be classified into two general, yet distinct factions. Anthony D. Smith refers to them as the primordialists and the modernists. Modernists argue that national identity is constructed, that it is not a given, while primordialists, such as Anthony D. Smith, focus on the historical permanence of nationalism and ethnicity. For primordialists, national identity is a transcendent given.

Although the modern notion of nationalism itself is relatively recent, primordialists argue that ethnic identity is thousands of years old and that the modern concept of nationalism as self-rule is a modern articulation of the age-old concept of ethnic identity. Smith in the

38 Macridis, Roy C.; Hulliung, Mark. 1997. Contemporary Political : Movements and Regimes. White Plains, USA: Longman Publishing Group, page 198. 39 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. 1994. Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Page 4.

27 historical permanence of nationalism and ethnicity. According to him, “ethnic identity has existed for thousands of years, and nationalism can only be understood as its modern expression,”40 even though the modern concept of nationalism in the sense of popular rule is a fairly recent development. Primordialists, such as Smith, have a tendency to see nations as being essential units of social cohesion. According to him,

Peculiar to the social scientist this naturalistic spirit soon entered into the very definition of nationhood. Nations must be conceived as individuals outside the social bound, in the state of nature they exist only in the natural order. Indeed they share with God the attributes of existing before all things and of originating everything. In other words, nations are primordial; they exist in the first order of time, and by at the root of subsequent process and development.41

Walker Connor expands on the previous argument by specifying that “myths of kinship” and common origin, if not actual kinship and common origin, are crucial to the birth of nationalism.42

He places a great deal of emphasis on the concepts of land, youth, blood, and sacrifice.

Primordialists argue that:

Every person carries with him through life ‘attachments’ derived from place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, language, and social practices that are ‘natural’ for him, ‘spiritual’ in character, and that provide a basis for an easy ‘affinity’ with other peoples from the same background. These attachments constitute the ‘givens’ of the human condition and are rooted in the non-rational foundation of personality.43

Modernism, on the other hand, maintains that nationalism as a nation-building process and as an ideology and movement is relatively a modern phenomenon. The French represented a new ideology, as well as a new form of a community, which formulates a collective identity. Proponents of modernism first assert that nationalism as an ideology and movement is relatively recent, that nationalism is an innovation, and not simply an updated

40 Ibid 41 Ibid 42 Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethnonatonalism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 43 Brass, Paul R. 1994. “Elite Competition and Nation-Formation.” In Nationalism. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, page 83.

28 version of something far older. Nothing like it existed before. But, this rise of nationalism is not simply a matter of perennial movement of history; it is a phenomenon brought into being by a wholly new epoch and an entirely novel set of conditions. Nationalism, in short, is a product of modernity, nothing less.44

Modernists, furthermore, argue that nations, national states, national identities, and inter- national community are also modern concepts. Modernists claim that every “nation” has constructed for itself a sense of national identity, built to a certain extent on its observations and stereotypes of both its own people and of others. Over the centuries, these stereotypes are put through revisions and development, forming the network of collective myths and memories that make up the essence of national identity. Most modernists would agree to a great extent with this analysis; however, they may identify the concept of nationhood in the specific framework of modern society. Historically persistent and distinctive ethnic and cultural patterns may exist, but modernists do not perceive these patterns as nationalism in the modern sense. Modernists argue that nationalism and even ethnicity are only by-products of modernization. People may have maintained ethnic patterns throughout history, but not in the sense of ethnicity and nationalism as understood today.45 There is also a divergence on this idea within the modernist camp. The

“constructionist” modernist approach is most useful for this study of Druze identity building

Smith contends:

Constructionism is a rather different form of modernism in that, though it assumes that nations and nationalism are wholly modern, it emphasizes their social constructed character. Nations, according to Eric Hobsbawm, owe much to invented traditions, which are products of social engineering and are created to serve the interests of ruling elites by channeling the energies of the newly enfranchised masses. Benedict Anderson, on the other hand, views the nation as an imagined political community which fills the void left by the decline of cosmic religions and monarchies at the point where new conceptions of time and print

44 Ibid. 45 Connor, Walker. 1994.Ethnonatonalism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

29 capitalism made it possible to imagine nations moving through linear time. Despite their differences, these varieties of the paradigm of modernity share a in what one might call structural modernisms. There's no contingent modernism, no simple observation of an historical correlation between nationalism and modernity, but the belief in the inherently national, and nationalist, nature of modernity. It could not have been otherwise. In this view, modernity necessarily took the form of nations and just as inevitably produced nationalist ideologies and movements.46

Benedict Anderson, one of the leading modernists, maintains that the nation is essentially a modern creation, with hardly any roots in pre-modern times. Anderson sees the nation as an imagined political community.47 He argues that the convergence of capitalism and print technology and their impact on the masses and the diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, the modern nation. The boundaries of these communities were inherently limited, and at the same time, did not necessarily coincide with existing political boundaries “which were, on the whole, the high water marks of dynastic expansionism.”48 Anderson perceives ethnicity and nationalism as:

Fundamentally synthetic constructs, imagined communities that float out of the new forms of media that have spread with economic modernization... [the nation] is imagined, because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community… It is a community, because it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.49

The constructionists argue that nationalism is a way to construct identity that simply conceives chronological depth and a sense of internal integration. Elie Kedouri argues that

Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states. Briefly the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that

46 Anthony Smith. 2001. Nationalism . Cambridge: Polity Press, Page 48 47 Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. London and New York: Verso. 48 Ibid page 46. 49 Ibid page 6.

30 nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.50

The concentration here is on European origins and influences of nationalist ideology, nationalism’s religious element and its responsibility in breaking up empires and creating nations that never before existed.

Ernest Gellner is among the constructionist modernists who are predisposed to see nationalism as an event of deeper social mechanisms. For instance, he maintains “the need of modern industrial economies for a mobile and interchangeable workforce requires complex new skills and social formations beyond the resources of family and kinship ties.”51 He argues that modern societies had a need for a sense of cultural homogeneity, which was the catalyst for creating nationalism. Nationalism, he argues, “is thus sociologically rooted in modernity, but it itself is a relatively weak force, a product of the transition from ‘agro-literate’ societies, regulated by structure, to industrial societies, integrated by culture.”52 Important components of his complex explanation for the purpose of this study of the Druze include the unevenness of industrialization and economic development; the leading role of an educated intelligentsia in the invention of the nation; mass, public education; and the discrepancy between the romantic aspirations of nationalists and the utilitarian outcomes.53

While both Anderson and Hobsbawm argue that the concept of the nation is imagined,

Hobsbawm also demonstrates how it was used as a tool by the state-building elites in order to create a state and legitimatize their power. According to Hobsbawm, the political elite “invented

50 Kedourie, Elie. 1994. “Nationalism and Self-Determination.” In Nationalism. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 51 Gellner, Ernest. 1994. “Nationalism and Modernization.” In Nationalism. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 52 Ibid. 53 Smith, Anthony D. 1996. Nations and Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, page 12.

31 nationalism in order to counteract growing forces of democratization and revolution.”54 He discusses “the comparatively recent historical innovation, the ‘nation,’ with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation state, national symbols, histories and the rest. All these rest in exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative.”55

Hobsbawm argues that three innovations are utilized in order to achieve this imagined tradition.

The first was the development of a secular equivalent of the church, primary education. The second was the invention of public ceremonies, and the third was the mass production of public monuments. Anderson discusses the role of the census and museums as contributing to the sense of nationalism. However, although Anderson considers the phenomena of “tombs of unknown soldiers,” a symbolic aspect of the nation, both Anderson and Hobsbawm neglect the effect of the military on nationalism and the role of the citizen army in constructing a national identity. As will be further explored in this literature review, the Israeli example illustrates a classic case where the military has been used to construct a sense of nationalism.

The nationalism literature is further lacking in case studies involving a sub-national imagined identity. Although Hobsbawm provides a model of how traditions are invented for the purpose of constructing a national identity by the governing elites, he neglects to deal with situations where the state elites construct an imagined identity for a sub-national group.

Scholarship on colonialism offers useful theoretical insight into sub national imagined identities, insights on which this study builds. Partha Chatterjee’s work is useful in this regard for it demonstrates a colonial power’s conceptualization of its subjects as not constituting a single society. The British in India found it much more useful for their purpose to claim that the indigenous Indian population did not constitute a single society. The British colonial state treated

54 Eric J. Hobsbawm. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1070. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 55 Ibid. Page 13-14.

32 the native Indian population as a mixture of heterogeneous and conflict-prone communities, in order to gain a certain sense of legitimacy.56 In India, Chatterjee argues persuasively that

“contemporary communalism is rooted not in ancient history but in the governing politics and discourses of the British colonial regime which were appropriated by the nationalists to legitimate specific paths of elitist development.”57 The emphasis on the Druze identity by the

Israel state can be interpreted similarly. Partha Chatterjee focused his study on how the colonial government in India determinedly sought to categorically classify the Indian population into consistent castes that defied the complex and often “uncolonizable” voices of the Indian people themselves. Young goes a step further by arguing that “the state, confronted with a diverse set of colonial subjects, sets about the task of classifying them. The fruitful possibilities of sustaining divisions were not absent from the taxonomic calculus, the science of colonial domination require a process of sorting and labeling.”58 Having said that, Young doesn’t think that this tedious “sorting and labeling” process was done with the conscious purpose to dramatically alter the existing cultural identity of the societies concerned. He maintains that it was only in extreme cases that the colonial state

veritably breathed life into quite novel categories of identity…certainly in Anglophone Africa, what happened was the colonial regimes administratively created tribes as we think of them today… this is not, of course, to suggest that the colonial state, where its attachment to classification was strong, was engaged in a conscious process of fabrication of ethnic groups.59

The Israeli state has acted the role of the colonial ruler which, following the British example of divide and conquer, divides the indigenous population into several sub-groups. The Druze in

Israel seem to be a case for which the state has actively imagined or invented a national tradition

56 Chatterjee, Parta. 1994. The Nation and its Fragments. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Page 35 57 Ibid 220. 58 Young, Crawford. 1994. “The Colonial Construction of African Nations.” In Nationalism. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, page 225. 59 Ibid.

33 different and separate from the tradition of the major group of Arabs. What makes the example of Israeli construction of Druze ethnic identity distinct is the fact that the Israeli elites simultaneously encourage Druze particularism as well as attempt to reinforce the sense of obligation that is due to the state by all its citizens, including the Druze. In order for the state to achieve its second objective of making the Druze loyal, it enforces mandatory conscription of the

Druze and demands their complete loyalty to the state.

On the surface, this active encouragement of separatist tendencies among a minority could be seen as contradictory to the welfare of the state. However, it is important to note that

Israel, while encouraging ethnic nationalism that promotes a separate identity among the Druze, does not run the typical risks for territorial demands since the political and demographic realities of the Druze preclude any true territorial nationalist aspirations. The divide and conquer tactic is usually employed by colonial powers that have no interest in seeing the indigenous population unite. This divisive strategy, however, could be detrimental for a state which has a sizable ethnic group and which claims to be a liberal democracy in which nationalism is based on citizenship.

To deal with this tension, the state and the Druze elites encouraged two forms of nationalism: civic and ethnic. This study of the Druze will show that there are two different concepts of nationalism at work here. Anthony Smith states that:

While it is recognized that the concept of the nation must be differentiated from other concepts of collective identity like class, region, gender, race, and religious community, there is little agreement about the roles of ethnic, as opposed to political, components of the nation.60

This disagreement over the roles of ethnic and political components in national identity and in nationalism gives rise to a key classification in the literature. Some scholars argue that there are two types of nationalism, a civic and an ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is associated with

60 Ibid.

34 the western experience, and is based on citizenship rather than on ethnic linkages. The nation- state is seen as the core of civic nationalism. This notion of nationalism is defined by Gellner as:

The protector, not of a faith, but of a culture, and the maintainer of the inescapably homogeneous and standardizing educational system, which alone can turn out the kind of personnel capable of switching from one to another within a growing economy and a mobile society, and indeed of performing jobs which involve manipulating meanings and people rather than things.61

The main purpose of civic nationalism is to promote the principle that a society is united by the concept and importance of territoriality, citizenship, civic rights and legal codes transmitted to all members of the group. Those members of this society are equal citizens and equal before the law.

By contrast, ethnic nationalism is based on ethnicity. Ethnic nationalism draws its ideological bonds from the people and their native history. It relies on elements, which are considered purely unique to a group, such as collective memory, value, myth and symbolism. It is dependent on blood ties, bonds to the land, and native traditions. Ethnic nationalism represents that which is subjective within nationalism, while civic nationalism represents a more objective conceptualization. Ethnic nationalism is incarnated in the individual whereas in civic nationalism the individual can move around different national areas.62

Most scholars have treated these two types of nationalism as diametrically opposed to each other. Civic nationalism is typically seen as the “good’ form of nationalism embodying all the acceptable consequences, such as a more inclusive form of nation based on citizenship.

Ethnic nationalism is associated with more problematic consequences, and has a more restricted application, based on ethnic linkages. Both civic and ethnic nationalism are manifestations of the same political concept, and therefore can be viewed through either the modernist or the

61 Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. New York: Cornell University Press, Page 17. 62 Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Page.15-17

35 primodialist models. Whether ethnic nationalism is constructed or has historical roots, it is a powerful force nevertheless. Furthermore, although in the literature these two categories of nationalism seem mutually exclusive, this isn’t always the case in practice.63 A case in point is the Israeli encouragement of separatist tendencies among the Druze that emphasize their ethnic brand of nationalism but does not come at the cost of their civic nationalism. Since demographically the Druze will never represent a threat to Israeli stability, they are encouraged to express their particularism insofar as it prevents them from having any affinity to the rest of the Arabs, who do pose a demographic threat.64 This expression of their particular ethnic identity does not come at the expense of their civic and political obligations towards the state of their citizenship.

63 Liah Greenfeld’s work is a typical example of the use of these categories to create typologies of entire countries as having civic or ethnic nationalism. Liah Greenfeld. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 64 The Druze population in Israel is little more than one percent of the total population.

36 CHAPTER 3

Historical, Religious and Ideological Background of the Druze:

Map 1: Druze communities in the Middle East.65

65 Institute of Druze studies, http://www.druzestudies.org/druzes.html.

37

3.1. Druze Identity:

The origins of the Druze has been a controversial issue since the time of the earliest western travelers to the region. There have been several different theories about the true origins of the Druze people. Many academic studies have been conducted by Druze authors, and most affirm the Arab origin of the Druze. The Druze of Lebanon, Syria, and Israel have a distinctive and instrumental role in the Middle East. Theirs is a gripping and complicated story. For better or worse the literature offers no consensus when it comes to studies about the Druze. Some

Western scholarship viewed them through the Orientalists’ lens; “a manner of regularized (or

Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient."66 One representative of this group is T. E. Lawrence, who describes the Druze as

Heterodox Moslems and followers of a mad and dead Sultan of . They hated with a bitter hatred which, when encouraged by the Government and the fanatics of , found expression in great periodic killings. Nonetheless, the Druzes were disliked by Moslem Arabs and despised them in return. They were at feud with the Bedouins, and preserved in their a show of the chivalrous semi-feudalism of Lebanon in the days of the autonomous .67

This has been the prevalent view of the Druze throughout the Western World.68 The Druze of the Middle East were categorized by Western observers as a separate clan of people who were fighting for survival in a very torn and divided region. The Druze of the Middle East were conveniently classified differently in each state according to the interest of the ruling power.

Today, they are classified as a religious minority in Lebanon and Syria, while they are classified

66 Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: , 1978, page 202. 67 T.E. Lawrence.1926. Seven Pillars of . London: Anchor. 68 According to Ostovitz, Nina Landfield.1983-84. “ Who are the Druze? (Emphasis on Druze communities in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel).” World Affairs 146:272-276.

38 as an ethnic minority in Israel. Under the Ottoman Empire, the Druze were granted a limited form of autonomy in Lebanon; however, they were not given such privileges in Palestine. The

Druze were also treated differently under the British and French mandates in the region.

Robert Betts provides an alternative view of the Druze. In a general survey of the history, traditions, and society of this secretive Arab sect, Betts, who has spent a great deal of time with the Druze, combines his firsthand observations and a variety of primary and secondary sources, to provide a written account of the history of the Druze as well as an explanation of their political significance in today's Middle East. Betts asserts that:

The aspects of the Druze that most intrigued visitors from the West were their origins and secret practices. Little is known of the people who accepted the call to the Druze faith in the early eleventh Christian century other than that they were probably already adherents of Ismaili Shiaaism. Their racial background is obscure.69

Casual observers from western societies have often arrived at inaccurate conclusions regarding the origins and history of these people. There have been several alternative historical, orientalist theories proposed by a variety of people about the origin of the Druze. Most of these theories were based on myths and legends, and not the actual origins of the Druze. Some of these writers described them as of Persian, Hittite, Chinese, and Japanese ancestry.

Druze scholar Nabieh Al- Kassem, documents several attempts by different scholars at concocting different origins for the Druze. Al-Kassem demonstrates how far some of these scholars went in inventing a completely new and foreign ancestry for the Druze, as can be demonstrated by the claim of the French author Sabeer, who in 1734 argued, that the Druze were descendants of Frenchmen, who came during the 14th century ; they later failed to join their ships back home, so they settled in the mountains of Lebanon and Palestine.70 John Green,

69 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, Page 24. 70 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1976. Waka al Druze fi Israel. He discuses several other attempts to misguide the origins of

39 writing in 1736, was another advocate of the Druze’s French origin theory; he claims that they are the descendants of a French soldier known as "Count of the Dreux (b.1156).”71 Another theory linking the Druze with the Crusades had them related to the British. Richard Pococke gives the Druze an English origin; he asserts that, "If any account can be given of the original of the Druze, it is that they are the remains of the Christian armies in the Holy war and they themselves now say they are the descended from the English.”72 Pococke's theory was advanced at a time when the Druze were in need of a foreign ally against the Maronites who were being supported by the French. So it would seem that these early, so-called scholarly works were much more politically motivated and far from being purely academic pursuits.

Following in the footsteps of these Orientalist western scholars, some Israeli scholars have also gone out of their way to emphasize the particularism of the Druze. Even before the creation of the state of Israel, early Jewish scholars were trying to draw parallels between the Druze and the

Jews. Yitzhak Ben-Zvi states:

In fact, this nation ‘the Druze’ has special features and a special destiny that set it apart from other nations. In certain ways, it is similar to the Jewish nation because of a fundamental characteristic. Here, too, religion and nationalism are so united that it is difficult to separate between them. This nation is similar also to our Jewish nation in its Diaspora, and is astonishing how the Druze have succeeded in preserving their authenticity and , but there is another side which highlights the similarity between the Jews and the Druze, and that is the destiny of the two nations-a destiny of minorities.73

After the state of Israel was created, some Israeli scholars continued to emphasis the particularism of the Druze. An organized systematic attempt at detaching the Druze from their

Arab roots could be deduced from such scholarship. In the early 50s, Israeli scholar Haim Blanc

Druze. 71 Green, John. 1736. A journey from to Damascus. London: W. Mears. Page 14 72 Pococke, Richard. 1745. A Description of the East. London. Page 94. 73 Firro,Kais. 1999. Druzes in the State of Israel. Netherlands: Brill Page 2

40 discusses the issue of the origins of the Druze by asking the question “Are the Druze Arabs?” he decides that:

The distinctiveness of the Druze is, nevertheless, undoubted, and its origins must be sought in their region. The community was born and grew in a hostile environment; it therefore adopted the principal of taqiyaa, a sort of protective coloring with religious affiliation, to be Christian with the Christians, and Muslims with the Muslims… The most recent instance of this outward assimilation may be seen in present day Israel.74

Some Israeli scholars dismiss the issue of the origin of Druze as being irrelevant. Gabriel Ben-

Dor, who served as the head of an academic forum on the Druze, appointed by the Prime

Minister’s advisor for Minority Affairs, argues that:

The question of the “racial” origins of the Druze, discussed by Hitti and others seems completely irrelevant and uninteresting... The important point to bear in mind is that the belief in common origins, along with the strong sense of solidarity and distinctness as manifest in geopolitical isolation as well as the prohibition of conversion have attributed to the sense of people-hood among the Druze. Although they are demographically similar to their neighbors, the myths setting them apart have shaped their identity as a political community. In this light, the argument over actual racial origins appears trivial.75

Ben-Dor does state that there are a few Israeli Druze who firmly believe that the Druze are

Arabs, however he dismisses them as “losers and the disappointed who no longer wish to participate in the mainstream of Druze politics.”76 In the same work, those Druze who have chosen to cooperate with the , the major Jewish underground organization are described as “liberally minded.”77 Ben-Dor was the minister in charge of Druze affairs in the Israeli government; his argument is consistent with the stance of the Israeli government. The government has treated the Druze as a separate group, as demonstrated by the use of a separate ministry for Druze affairs. Robert Betts criticizes Ben-Dor's statements:

74 Haim Blanc, 1952. ‘Druze particularism: modern Aspect of an old Problem” Middle Eastern Affairs, 3: 315-521 75 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1979. The Druze in Israel: A political Study. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press. Note (42) page 45. 76 Ibid page 171. 77 Ibid page 172.

41 An Israeli author of works on the Druze, Gabriel Ben-Dor, makes a sweeping dismissal of the whole matter ...Such an approach, it should be pointed out, falls in line with Israeli government policy, which is aimed at separating the Druze from the rest of the Arabs and convincing them (and anyone else who will listen) that they are a race apart. But any serious observer must acknowledge the obvious fact that the Druze are Arab not only by language and culture but also in large part by racial origin. This is certainly the overwhelming view of the Druze themselves.78

The theory advocated by Ben-Dor has been the official premise of the Israeli government since

1948, which is aimed at preventing the Druze from embracing a larger Arab nationality. The

Israeli government has officially adopted the stance that the Druze are not Arabs, but a completely different ethnic group which became Arabized.79 The government has promoted several interpretations of history in schools to suggest that the Druze were more Jewish than

Arab. These lessons included fallacies such as Shuayb’s daughter’s to .

Betts contends that:

One of the more blatantly unhistorical theories favored by the Israelis is that a daughter of the Druze prophet Shuayb (identified with the Old Testament figure of ) was married to Moses, thereby establishing a blood link between the two communities. Other equally specious theories were suggested to convince the Druze that they were more Jewish than Arab, and that they spoke Arabic only because they had lived among Arabs for centuries, and that, like the Maronites, they had become Arabized. American Fundamentalist Christian groups, ever eager to discover modern links to the Old Testament, have likewise swallowed the Jethro fable. The Druze themselves point out that their Nabi (prophet) Shuayb did not have any children.80

Leading scholars of Arab history and Islam view the Druze through different lenses altogether. The most recent and well-documented theories of the origins of the Druze argue that they are ethnically Arabs.81 Princeton professor Philip Hitti asserts that the Druze are of Arab

78 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, Pages 24-25. 79 Through the government run and sponsored "Druze history" education programs, young Druze are being taught in schools that they are a separate ethnic group from Arabs. Druze secondary and high school students from Yirka village. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 80 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page 101. 81 Makarem, Sami Nasib.1972. The Doctrine of the Ismailis. : The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, Betts, Robert Brenton.1988. The Druze. Yale University Press. Abu-Izzeddin, Nejla. 1984. The Druzes. Although these

42 descent; however, they are a combination of several ethnic groups. Hitti concludes, "Racially, therefore, the Druze people were a mixture of Iraqis and Persianized Arabs.”82 However, Hitti’s study has been criticized for its under- representation of the dominant Arab stock in the region.83

Albert Hourani, affirms that the Druze are not only Arab in origin but were also instrumental in establishing one of the earliest Arab nationalist political parties, the Baath:

Its appeal was primarily to the new educated class, created by the rapid increase in education, who came from the less dominant classes in society, and to a large extent from communities outside of the Sunni Muslim majority: ‘Alawis, Druzes, and Christians. Its origins lay in the intellectual debate about the national identity of the , and their relations with the other Arabic speaking communities.84

There are those among Druze scholars who dispute the Arab origin of the Druze, some who go as far as trying to de-link the Druze from any Islamic roots. Salman Fallah is one of the most prominent of these scholars. Relying almost entirely on the work of the Israeli scholar

Blank, Fallah tries to argue that the principal of , pretending to assimilate, is the reason for any similarities of culture between the Druze and the Arabs, or the Druze and the Muslims. He claims that there are similarities between the Druze religion and any other religion, and when the need arises, the Druze can highlight those similarities just as a means of political survival.

However, this doesn’t explain the continuous resistance to assimilation by groups such as the

Druze Initiative Committee.85 If Druze act in accordance with the Taqiyaa principles, why would they resist against the strongest power in the state, and arguably the most powerful in the region?

Nissim Dana, another Druze scholar, suggests that although the Druze are no different from

Arabs when it comes to language, culture, food, music, literature or even clothing:

are widely accepted works in the scholarly community, certainly not all Druze themselves agree with them. 82 Hitti, Philip.1928. The Origins of the Druze. New York: Columbia University Press, Page 23. 83 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press. Betts points out the controversy over Philip K. Hitti’s study, page 24. 84 Hourani, Albrert. 991. A History of the Arab Peoples. MJF books. Page 404. 85 The Druze Initiative committee; Druze group which is working to end to compulsory military service for Druze youth, is discussed in much more details in section 6.4.

43 Nonetheless, it would be too simplistic to attach them to the Arab nation, because the principal foundation, on which Arab nationality is built, except for matters of culture, is not at all found in the Druze Weltanschauung. On the contrary, at times it even contradicts their outlook: The Druze do not accept the concept of Arab nationalism in the sense of an affinity to a specific territory that they view as a homeland…no Druze concentration was ever established on a nationalist ideological basis; it merely formed owing to chance circumstances.86

Dana continues to explain that any one attempting to alter their “nationality” designation from

Druze to Arab, does so for purely political motives. These include those young men who are hoping to avoid military service in the IDF, while others, he argues, will do it for personal political gains such as those involved in the Druze Initiative Committee.

Scholars affiliated with the Druze Initiative Committee, such as Nabieh Al Kassem, argue that they have not gained anything from affirming their Arabic roots, just the opposite. They point out that members of this committee have lost jobs, had their careers disrupted and even been imprisoned for their principles. They regard the Druze as an inseparable part of the

Palestinian people and of the Arab nation. The Druze Initiative Committee continues to call for

the cancellation of compulsory service for the Arab-Druze community because we are part of the Arab-Palestinian nation. We are an inseparable part of this people, and we support the struggle of our people for freedom and independence. Compulsory army service, which is imposed on Druze youth, is nothing but a scheme devised by the local Arab reactionary powers and authorities. Hundreds of Druze youth refuse to serve in the army and many have been imprisoned for that reason.87

Wafiq Ghazery is a Druze scholar who not only argues that the Druze are of Arab origins, but that there has been a systematic attempt at misrepresenting their Islamic and Arabic roots. He argues that according to reliable Arabic and Islamic historical resources, the Druze are of the

Arab Yemeni Thanukhen tribe. Druze scholars, such as Kais Firro, also affirm the Arab roots of the Druze. Firro has conducted an extensive study regarding the history of the Druze, and has

86 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page 108-109 87 Druze Initiative Committee pamphlet. 1990. Itihad. According to the Druze Initiative Committee, there were at least 500 Druze who refused serves in the IDF.

44 traced the relationship between Jewish and Druze elites prior to the creation of the Israeli state.

His access to official Israeli documents as well as personal records of Druze leaders is very informative and beneficial for any researcher concerned with the history of the Druze in

Palestine. Firro traces the roots of the collaboration between the agents of the Jewish state and the Druze elites from a historical perspective.

Through my research I intend to follow up on the research that was conducted by Firro and the theoretical implications of this well documented alliance between the state and the Druze elites. I will trace the actual means by which an invented tradition came into being for the Druze community in Israel. I will focus specifically on the way institutions, such as the military and the

Ministry of Education, were used as tools to invent a tradition. I will also examine how ceremonial aspects were utilized in the process of the invention of this tradition.

45

3.2. Origins of the Druze Sect 600-1021.

In order to understand the relation of the Druze to both the larger population of

Palestinian Arabs and to the Israeli state, it is important to understand their history as a religious group. For the following section I have mostly relied on the works of two prominent scholars in the field of Druze history and religion. Sami Makarem’s The Druze Faith (1974) is perhaps one of the most widely cited book in the field of Druze religion. Another equally prominent authority on Druze history is Robert Betts’s The Druze (1986).

Islam's inception occurred in the first half of the seventh century A.D. As the Muslims expanded into Syria, Egypt, , and Persia, they gradually came in contact with other cultures.

With time these different cultures started to influence some Muslim believers, and as a result of this exposure to new ideas, philosophies, and modern interpretations of the , along with sociopolitical factors, Muslim thinkers began to search for possible hidden meaning to the

Quran.88 There was divergence in opinions on the accurate explanations of the or Islamic law, and the will of Allah. Disagreements on the interpretations of the Quran became one of the major contributing factors to the divisions in Islam. The religion was split into two major : the Sunnis, who followed the literal translation of the Quran, and the Shiaa, who searched for allegorical interpretations of the Quran.89 The two factions were further divided over the subject of leadership of the Muslim Community. The Sunnis wanted the successor of the prophet to be elected, while the Shiaa argued that the successor couldn’t be just an ordinary man. The Shiaa believed that the Imam (successor) had to be "a divinely illuminated person whose divine insight

88 In Islam there is a concept of Ijtihad, or scholarship which allows for the interpretations of the Quran in light of new advances and discoveries, which ideally makes it relevant to the times. 89 Religious distinction was not the only cause the split; political causes resulting from the dispute over who is the rightful successor to the prophet were also a point of contention.

46 passes to him through the prophet.”90 After the death of Prophet Muhammad, the Sunnis declared

Abu Bakr as the first of the four elected Caliphs (the successor to the prophet). Abu Baker ruled the Islamic world as its political and religious leader from 632 till 634. The Shiaa, however, had always considered ibn Abi Talib, the fourth Caliph, to be the rightful Imam. Ali was a cousin of prophet Mohammed and was married to Fatima, Muhammad's only daughter. Ali did rule as the fourth Caliph of Islam from 656 until 661, when he was assassinated. As a result of the death of Ali Bin Abi Taleb in 661 A.D., the Muslim leadership was split. This division was also fueled by the inclusion of the Persians into the faith. Some scholars claim that the Persians had, however, entered Islam with the intentions of destroying it, which may explain why several divisions occurred after they joined. 91

After the death of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Imamate was first passed on to his older son Al-

Hasan, who abdicated the position in favor of his brother, Al-Hussein. This transition of power from one brother to the next was controversial. Some Sunni historians argue that Al-Hussein poisoned his older brother Al-Hasan. Al-Hussein also met an untimely death, when he was killed by the forces of the second Umayyad Caliph, Al-Yazid I (The Umayyad Sunni dynasty ruled from 661 till 750). Al-Hussein was killed on the tenth day of the Muslim month of Muharram, a day which is commemorated each year as the Ashura92. After the death of Al- Hussein, the

Imamate was passed on to his son Ali Zayn Al-Abidin. At this time the Shiaa were divided over who would be the rightful successor to Ali Zayn Al-Abidin. The Shiaa were now divided into the Zaidis, who believed that Ali Zayn Al Abidin's son Zaid was the suitable Imam, and the rest, who followed Ali Zayn Al-Abidin's other son, Muhammad Al-Bakir. Following Muhammad Al-

Bakir's death, his son Jafar as-Sadiq became the Imam for this faction of Shiaa. After his death

90 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1974. The Druze Faith .New York: Caravan Books. Page 10. 91 Ibid page 135. 92 Ibid page 3.

47 another split occurred. Some of the Shiaa followed Jafar as-Sadiq’s first son, Ismail, as their

Imam, and they would be later known as the Ismailis. The Druze are an offshoot of the Ismailis.

The other faction chose Ismail's brother Musa Al-Kazim as their Imam, and became known as the Musawis. As a result three Shiaa factions emerged, the Zaidis, the Musawis and the Ismailis.

These factions disagreed on more than just the succession of the Imamate. They were also divided on philosophical and theological aspects. The different factions were moving further from the main body of Islam, and in different directions.

The Ismailis were forced to act secretly because they followed a different Imam than the ruling Sunni Abbasids Imam (The Abbasids Dynasty overthrew the Umayyads, and continued to rule from 750 until 1245). The Ismailis were afraid of persecution because their belief diverged from mainstream Islam; consequently, they did not reveal their beliefs to anyone outside the religion. This also led the Ismailis to keep their Imams hidden. The Ismailis had three hidden

Imams: Abdullah ibn Muhammad, Ahmad ibn Abdullah, Husayn ibn Ahmad.93

With the coming of the next Imam, Al- Billah, the Ismailis went through a different phase. Al-Mahdi Billah escaped Abbasid persecution in Syria, and went to North

Africa where he assumed power, and created the Fatimid in 909 A.D. After Al-Mahdi

Billah came Al-Qaim bi-Amr Allah, then Al-Mansur Billah, and then Al-Muizz li-Dinialla. Al-

Muizz conquered Egypt, and later founded , which became the capital of the Fatimid

Dynasty. Under the Fatimids, the Quran was interpreted allegorically. After Al-Muizz, the

Imamate passed on to Al-Aziz Billah, and then to Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah. It was under this sixth Fatimid Imam, that the Druze belief came into being. Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah proclaimed

93 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1977. The Political Doctrine of the Ismailis. New York: Caravan Books. Page 104.

48 the launching of a new era, or the Dawa ( to true unitarian belief) on the thirtieth of

May 1017. 94

Over the next two centuries, the Fatimid Empire expanded into Palestine, Syria, and the

Arabian Peninsula.95. This group that broke away from mainstream Islam was the Muwahhadoon

(Unitarians), who adhered to the (), which is the absolute oneness of God and is the primary message of the Druze religion. Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah claimed to be the manifestation of God, a belief that is still held today by most Druze.96 He appointed Hamza ibn-

Ali ibn Ahmad Al-Zuzani as chief propagator of the new religion.97 Hamza, the leading disciple of Al-Hakim, was the proponent of the Druze faith from its inception. He also wrote many epistles in the Druze Canon. His four disciples were Ismail ibn Muhammad at-Tamimi,

Muhammad ibn Wahb Al-Qurashi, Salama ibn Abd Al Wahhab as-Samirri and Ali ibn Ahmad at-Tai. Hamza and the four disciples would constitute the five dignitaries, or Hudud, of the

Druze faith. This new era according to Makarem:

was the result of the intellectual ferment within the various philosophical and theosophical schools that merged in Islam...For more than four hundred years after the advent of Islam, the Message of Islam was being carried forward...The allegorical interpretation of the religious law paved the way to the true understanding of the divine message, namely the knowledge of the unity of God (tawhid)... in which the Druze believe, is the meaning of the divine Message...It is the Goal of all knowledge.98

With the declaration of the new era and the conveyance of the divine message, the task of the

Imam was complete. The followers of this divine message were no longer allowed to interpret the religious law allegorically, and with that Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah became the last Imam for the Druze.

94 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1974. The Druze Faith. New York: Caravan Books, Page 79. 95 Ibid 96 Ibid page 174. 97 Abu-Izzeddin, Nejla M. 1984. The Druzes: A New study of their History, Faith and Society. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 98 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1977. The Political Doctrine of the Ismailis. New York: Caravan Books, Page 45.

49 The new religion spread and developed in Lebanon and Syria with the help of a principle disciple Baha Al-Din. The fifth member of the Hudud, who was instrumental in establishing firmly the Druze Faith in Lebanon and Syria, wrote several epistles in the Druze Canon, exalted as the Imam deputy, or the Muqtana.99

Although the Druze faith was founded in Egypt, the faith thrived in ,

Syria, and Northern Palestine. Being a religious minority, the Druze never felt safe because of the hostile environment surrounding them, and consequently they kept their faith secret.

Unfortunately, this secrecy led to misinterpretations by other Muslims. These false impressions were a major contributing factor to the friction between the different Muslim sects.

The Druze derive their name from Muhammad Al-Nashtakin Al Darazi. Nashtakin is a

Turkish term meaning the son of a Turk from a non-Turkish mother. Al Darazi was an early convert to this new religion. The prominent Druze scholar Sami Makarem asserts:

The adherents to this faith call themselves the Muwahhidun (Unitarians), holding oneness of God as a central belief. Ironically, they derive their popular name from Nashtakin al-Darazi, an eleventh century heretic whose brazen and dissolute ways deflected others from the faith and led many outsiders to mistaken notions about the nature of this religious movement.100

Al Darazi fell out of grace with the leadership of the new faith because of confrontations with

Hamza over the question of religious interpretation and leadership. As a result of this continuous conflict between Al Darazi and Hamza, the former was executed in Cairo in 1019. Al Darazi is credited with having taken the message of the Druze faith to Lebanon where the new religion took firm roots. Before his death, AL Darazi, had gone to Wadi Al-Taym, a valley in southeast

Lebanon on the western slope of , a region that still remains a stronghold for

Druze. Al Darazi settled in that region in order to establish the new religious community.

99 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, Page 27. 100 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1974. The Druze Faith. New York: Caravan Books.

50 The small sect would later find a safe haven in Jabal Al Druze, a region of hills to the east of the Hawaran plain in southern Syria. Because of the lack of tolerance by other more

“orthodox” Muslims, the Druze were required to keep their faith secret.101 This helped them maintain their tight knit community, as well as their group solidarity. According to Samih Al-

Kassem this secrecy would facilitate the attempts to separate them from their fellow Arab

Muslims, who viewed them with suspicion and mistrust.102

In 1021, Al- was the ruler of the Fatimid dynasty. Al-Zahir, however, rejected the new faith of Tawhid immediately. He rebuffed his father's claims of being the embodiment of the “godhead” that had given rise to the Druze faith. Al-Zahir persecuted followers of the new faith and its messengers. In Egypt, the new faith completely disappeared without any traces.

However, Al-Zahir was not able to stop the religion of Tawhid from spreading into remote regions in Wadi Al-Taym, in present day Syria, where the Druze would later thrive.

101 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press. 102 Al-Kassem, Samih. 1994. Personal Interview. 20 June. Al-Kassem claims that “Because so many of the Arabs were ignorant when it came to the Druze, they characterized them as subhuman.”

51

3.3.The Druze in Greater Syria 1021-1948.

Graph 1: The bar labels correspond to the Druze population in Middle East.103

Throughout the history of the region, the Palestinian Druze have always held a unique position; they were always weaker and smaller than their counterparts in Lebanon and

Syria. Therefore, the Palestinian Druze historically never enjoyed autonomy or special rights, as compared to other Druze in the Middle East.

Treatment of the Druze was dependent on the particular interest of the ruling power at the time. They were used as tools to implement a certain agenda that the ruling power had set up.

During the period of the Ottoman Empire, the Druze were given different status that depended on

103 Based on census data provided Druze Studies institute. 2004. The Graph is original by the author.

52 their location. In Lebanon, they were given privileges under the Ottoman millet system of governing, by which each religious group in the empire was ruled by its own religious leaders, who in turn would have to answer to the sultan. In Lebanon the Druze were classified as a separate religious minority and therefore had limited autonomy when it came to their religious courts. The Druze in Palestine, however, were completely ignored by the Ottomans, and were not given the same privileges as their counterparts in Lebanon. In 1890, the Druze in Lebanon were granted the right to maintain a local judiciary division, to deal with their religious and personal legal matters. The Druze in Palestine had to wait until 1909 for special privileges, which were comparatively less than rights granted to . In Palestine, the Druze were given the right not to apply to the Muslim courts in religious matters, and a Druze judge was appointed by the Ottoman authorities. The judge appointed, Sheikh Muhammad Tarif, however, did not have the authority to establish religious courts, nor did he have jurisdiction over the Druze on religious issues. The Judge would only try cases if the disputants chose to take their problem to him. The

Palestinian Druze did not gain any more autonomy for their religious affairs under the British, who succeeded the Ottoman rulers. Under the British mandate, only religious minorities that were recognized during the Ottoman period retained some of their previous autonomous status.

As for the Druze, they were not given any more rights, despite several efforts on their part that were undertaken from 1919 until 1932.104 The Druze have historically been given distinct rights only to the extent that these rights protect the interests of the ruling power.

Although the Druze have never constituted a majority in any of the host nations, they have filled an important role in the Middle East. In Lebanon, they have played a vital role in the history of modern Lebanon. Today the Druze population in Lebanon continues to play a significant role in Lebanese politics. Betts maintains:

104 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press.

53 In Lebanon they were until 1975 the pivotal group that held the balance between the ruling Christian majority, declining in relative numerical strength since 1932, and the growing Muslim minority. For many years grudgingly supportive of the Christian (predominately Maronite) establishment, the Druze broke away at the outbreak of civil war in 1975, and they have continued to play a major role far in excess of their numerical strength in political developments that may one day lead to a restructured Lebanese political system in which they are certain to play an even greater part. 105

The Druze important political role has its roots in the past. During the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, the Druze were at the forefront of what became the Lebanese nation. They prospered the most in the area of Wadi Al-Taym in . The Druze of Lebanon were divided into two groups: the Qaysi (North

Arabs) and the Yemenis (South Arabs).106 The Qaysi group became Druze royalty, and produced glorious Dynasties such as the Manid dynasty. A Druze or Prince, Fakhruddin II, has been credited with being the founder of modern day Lebanon. Fakhruddin II (1585-1636) was an Emir from a long line of Emirs from the Manid family Dynasty. During the beginning of the seventeenth century, Fakhruddin II established an autonomous state in Lebanon, which was independent of foreign Ottoman rule. Fakhruddin II ruled over a considerable part of what later became modern day Lebanon. Under the Druze Emirs of the Tanukh Dynasty and their successors of the Manid Dynasty, the region prospered and was known for its .

The Yemeni faction was defeated by the Ottomans in the battle of Ayn Dara in 1711. As a direct result of this defeat, the Yemeni party immigrated to Syria, and their villages were then repopulated with Maronites. During the reign of the Druze Emirs, the Druze were constantly rebelling against foreign rule.

105 Ibid page xii 106 Ibid page 74-75.

54 The Druze also played a leading role in the political and social life of Syria. The Druze of Syria were perhaps most noted for their . In 1925, the celebrated Druze hero Sultan

Pasha Al-Atrash led a Syrian revolt against the French.107 During this revolt several Druze men lost their lives in the cause of the Arab nation. Robert Betts writes:

Sultan Al-Atrash found himself a hero not only to his own people but also to Syrian nationalists throughout the country, who had previously regarded the separatist Druze as the least likely source of a call to arms against French rule. The nationalist leaders in Damascus, notably Abd al Rahman Shahbandar, founder of the Hizb Al-Shab (the People's party), suddenly adopted the Druze forces as the vanguard of an independent Arab Syria, while Sultan Al-Atrash was hailed as a fighter for the nationalist cause.108

The Druze who were previously rejected as counter-revolutionary components of Arab nationalism, were now being accepted as allies in the struggle for independence from European rule. This also resulted in bringing the Druze out of their isolation, and into more collaboration with their Arab counterparts.

In Israel, the Druze have played an important, if controversial, role in the region. The year 1948 was a turning point for the Middle East region. The state of Israel was created, and as a result, the region was turned into a battlefield. The two opposing sides were the Arabs and the

Jews. The Druze, being Arabs, were expected to side with the Arabs; however, this was not always the case. In 1948, some of the Druze collaborated with the Jewish underground,

Haganah, by supplying them with weapons and vital information. The cooperation between

Druze and Jews is still evident today in Israel. The Druze are an important minority in Israel, and they are the only Arab minority required to serve in the Israeli armed forces. In the Arab world, there is a popular saying, which states that: "The Druze are always with the standing

107 Abu-Muslah, Hafiz. 1985. Thawrat Al-Druze wa Tamarod Dmusheq. ( the revolution of Druze, and the Damascus revolt) Beirut . 108 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, Page 88.

55 wall.”109 That is to say that the Druze have often allied themselves with those in power, from whom they can derive certain privileges. Several arguments have been formed to explain this controversial alliance. Some Arabs claim that the Druze saw opportunity in betraying their Arab brothers and siding with the Israelis. Ben-Dor also alludes to this by stating, " The career of the greatest Druze Emir (ruler) demonstrates the character of the Druze foreign policy: multiple, shifting alliances; constant search for new, stronger partners; intensive diplomacy.”110 Some

Druze, however, argue that they were mistreated by their fellow Muslims, and they saw a chance for a better life under the Israelis.111 Some Druze even claim that they are not Arabs, and therefore, they do not owe any allegiance to the Arabs. 112 Others claim that the Israeli

Government is manipulating them in order to implement its hidden agenda.113 Marzoq Halabi, a

Druze journalist argued

The Druze were often regarded by Muslims as traitors and their religion is characterized by modesty and caution, but not by secrecy. The state of Israel took advantage of tension that already existed between Druze and Muslims, co-opting the Druze and enlisting them in the Israeli army. There are different among the Druze. There are those who continue to try to be more accepted as Israelis. There is also an increasing return to religion as a means of evading military service. There remains an image of the Druze being loyal to the state and their army service is always pointed out as the indication of their loyalty, yet it is not commonly known that today fewer than half of the Druze men are actually mobilized into the army. Among the Druze there is an increasing move towards Palestinian nationalism despite the Islamic foundation of that nationalism today.114 (Verbatim)

Halabi arguing that although the Druze religion started out as a sect of Shiaa Islam, it has since broken away from anything that could be considered mainstream Islam.

109 This saying always came up, when I interviewed Arab (non Druze) about their views of Druze. Interviews were conducted in June 1994. 110 Ben-Dor, Gabriele. 1979. The Druze in Israel : A political Study. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press. June 1st 1995 page 4 http://www.jcpa.org/jl/hit06.htm Page 17. 111 Druze family from Sajour. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 112 Druze Solider from Daylat el Carmel. 2002. Personal Interview. 12 March 113 Druze Initiative Committee members. 2002. Personal Interview. 20 March. The implication here is that the Israeli design makers have a hidden agenda that aims at detaching Druze from the rest of the Arabs. 114 Halabi, Marzouq. 2002. Personal Interview. 25 January.

56

3.3. The Druze's Ideology and Religion

The Druze religion is a very secretive religion. Therefore, very little is known to outsiders about the true message of the Druze religion. According to Abdullah Al Najjar, the religion was a combination of different philosophies of the time that flourished under the Islamic civilization.115 Those philosophies also included ancient Greek philosophies such as those of

Plato and . Al Najjar argues that the new religion was a result of this combination.

Similar to mainstream Islam, this religion emphasizes that the body and are different, and that the soul does not die when the body dies. The belief in Tanasukh-- the belief in the transmigration of after death. According to this article of faith, upon the death of a Druze his/her soul is reincarnated in another Druze before birth. The Druze believe in the Holy Quran, and consider themselves to be Muslims. They follow all , but they place the most emphasis on the prophet Shuayb. He is believed to be a direct descendant of from his wife Quturah. Shuayb lived among the people of Midyan and Aykah, who lived in Sinai, present day Egypt.

Most scholars consider Druzism a sect of Islam. Captain N. Bouron writes that neither the

Druze themselves nor any one else regards Druzism as an independent and full-fledged religion like , or Islam. He argues that Druzism is a “sect in” and an “off shoot” of

Islam.116 As mentioned above, the Druze religion was mostly a consequence of the bitterness of partisans of Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Mohammed, after he failed to be appointed the Caliph. Captain Bouron goes on to describe the religion as a secret sect built up mainly

115 Najjar, Abdallah. 1973. The Druze: Millennium Scrolls Revealed. Translated by Fred I. Massey. Atlanta: American Druze Society; Committee on Religious Affairs. 116 Bouron, Narcisse. 1930. Les Druze: Paris. Page 213.

57 around mystical interpretations and exposition of the Quran.117 The Druze also consult a series of hand written books, called the Hikmah. These books are divided into two major parts: the first is the metaphysical, or the ordinance of faith, and the second is the ethical, or precepts for living.

The Druze do not have a formal system of religious rites, nor do they have a recruiting system, as they mainly accept those Druze who are born into the faith. The Druze have seven major articles called Al-Shurut Al-Saba;118 they are:

1. Truthfulness: This covers the three leading prohibitions, that is, one is prohibited from stealing, killing, or committing adultery.

2. Helping fellow Druze.

3. Rejection of other systems of religion and other , especially any pagan or

symbols.

4. Keeping the secret of the faith, not divulging the secret of the Lord and reverence for

his five ministers, and no contact with the evil one.

5. Belief in the unity of God.

6. Submission to God's will.

7. Resolution and surrender of oneself unto God in good fortunes and bad.

The essence of the Druze Doctrine is the absolute oneness of God. Abdullah

Najjar quotes from epistle thirteen of the Druze Canon:

Our Lord, sanctified by his name, is neither ancient nor eternal, for the two are created and He is their creator. His identity cannot be visualized by fancy or physical organ and cannot be determined by opinion or comparison... He resides in no Known place for He would then be restricted to that definite place out of all other places; nor can it be said that any place is outside His presence for that implies lack of power; nor is He first for a first must be followed by a last; nor is he last for a last must be preceded by a first; nor is He visible for that suggests invisible, nor is He invisible for He would then be shadowed by the visible. I

117 Ibid 118 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1974. The Druze Faith. New York: Caravan Books.

58 cannot say that He is life or soul for He would then be like his creatures and subject to addition and subtraction.119

With the termination of the Daawa, or spreading the word, in the year 1043, the Druze stopped accepting new converts to the religion. The true message of the religion was then passed onto a small number of people in each succeeding generation. This select group of people is referred to as the Aqila, or the enlightened, those who have been initiated into the secrets of the Druze religion. Members of the community who do not belong to this secret cult are referred to as the

Juhhal, or the ignorant, who are not among those initiated into the secrets of the Druze religion.

Only members of the enlightened group have access to the six holy books, as well as the knowledge of the secret message of the religion. The rest of the community is given a basic outline of the religion, as well as a code of moral and ethical behavior.

The Druze are not required to execute the . However, many Druze do.

The majority of Druze also celebrates Eid-al-Adha, a major Islamic feast that occurs at the end of the annual to . Bouron attributes this link between Druzism and traditional

Islam to the Druze principle of Taqiya, which was adopted to protect the Druze from persecution. Nina Landfield Ostrovitz states, "An outstanding feature of the Ismailiiya and the

Druze faith is the concept of Taqiya or dissimilation, whereby a persecuted believer may hide his religion and even profess another faith.”120 The Druze, however, regard themselves as being

“Islamic” even though they do not strictly abide by the five pillars or the practices of Islam.121

Wahbah Sayegh, a spokesperson for the Committee on Religious Affairs of the American Druze

Society, claims, “Our Tawhid Faith embodies the essence of Islam. It is not a separate religion,

119 Najjar, Abdallah. 1973. The Druze: Millennium Scrolls Revealed. Translated by Fred I. Massey. Atlanta: American Druze Society; Committee on Religious Affairs. 120 Ostovitz, Nina Landfield .1983-84. “Who are the Druze?” World Affairs, 146: 272-276. 121 Druze Initiative Committee Members. 1994. Personal Interviews. 21 June.

59 independent of Islam. It stemmed from and its roots are firmly anchored in Islam.”122 Sayegh notes the fact that Al-Azhar (the leading university of in the world) has issued a

Fatwa or religious announcement considering the Druze as Muslims.123

Nejla Abu-Izzedddin acknowledges that the Druze notion of combines all notions that were circulating at the time of the emergence of the new religion. Abu-Izzeddin states that:

The Druze faith is founded on the Quran as interpreted by the propagator of the dawa. It accepts the Old and New Testaments as divine books, in line with the attitude of Islam towards the two earlier monotheistic religions. It reaches beyond the traditionally recognized to earlier expression of man's search for communion with the One. Hence its reverence for Hermes, the bearer of a divine message, for , the ascetic who rose to the and came back to preach the unity of the Godhead, for the divine , and for , the influence of whose system is clear in the Druze Scriptures. The Faith sponsored by Hakim was preached to Muslims, specifically to Ismailis whom Hamza calls muqassira, those who lag behind, i.e. having passed from zahir [outward form] to [inner truth], from tanzil [literally, , or following the outward form of divine revelation] to tawil [carrying the inner interpretation of revelation to the extreme of denying the literal sense which is the outer law}, failed to go beyond tawil to the ultimate goal, tawhid [pure unitarian religion]; for Islam (zahir) is the door to iman (batin), and iman is the door to tawhid.124

In other words, outward form is the door to inner truth, and inner truth is the door to pure,

Unitarian religion. According to the founder of the Druze religion, this last step is the one

Muslims, including Ismailis have yet to take.

122 Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. "The Druze In North America." The LXXXI No. 2 (April 1991):28-56. 123 Ibid 124 Abu-Izzeddin, Nejla M. 1984. The Druzes: A New study of their History, Faith and Society. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

60 3.4. The Imam Legacy

In order to understand what role the Druze leadership might have played, their influence over the community has to be understood. In a tribal society where the leaders of the tribe generate a lot of loyalty from the rest of the tribe, it is to be expected that allegiance be given to the tribal leader. At the center of this almost blind allegiance of the Druze’s to their religious/tribal leader is their Shiaa tradition of attributing divine powers and characteristics to their religious leader. What I will refer to as the Imam legacy, is at the core of the complete obedience to their spiritual leader and other leaders. It is therefore important to discuss the imam legacy to account for the influence that these spiritual leaders have on their community. An example of the importance of the community leader among Druze is demonstrated by the special position that the ajaweed (the good), who are among the most knowledgeable of the Ukkal (the initiated).

One group receives its status as the result of being considered the most knowledgeable and devout of their community. Known as ajaweed, or “the good,” these individuals occupy the most honored position in Druze society. Whenever issues concerning the conduct of adherents of the sect arise, the opinions of this religious elite are highly regarded. Other members of the community listen when the ajaweed speak, act according to their directives, and stand respectfully when they walk away. The ajaweed not only provide exclusive authority on Druze religious doctrine, they also prescribe the accepted cultural norms of the community, shaping its character and reinforcing the members’ interactions within their families, villages, and with the rest of the world.125

One main difference between the Shiaa and the Sunni sects of Islam is their different regard for the political leader. While the Sunnis regard their religious/political leader the Caliph as an ordinary human being, the Shiaa associate special and almost divine attributes with their

125 Institute of Druze Studies website. http://www.druzestudies.org/druzes.html

61 leader or Imam. John L. Esposito supplies an explanation for the special status of the Imam in the Shiaa sect. For the Shiaa, leadership is vested in the Imam (leader) who must be a direct descendent of the Prophet Mohammed and Ali, the first Imam. Moreover, he is the divinely inspired religio-political leader and serves both as the communities’ political leader and the final authoritative interpreter of God's will and Islamic law.126

The religious leadership, consisting of , would inherit the power of the Imam.

These spiritual leaders had almost the same amount of influence as the Imam. While today this power is dwindling, traditionally the Palestinian Druze complied with every wish of the spiritual leadership. The Sheikhs were regarded as the ultimate authority in religious matters, as well as in everyday aspects of Druze life. 127

Being a small religious minority in Palestine, the Druze followed the guidance of their

Sheikhs. This spiritual leadership of the Druze was mostly illiterate and old. Although they were very well versed in the religious laws, they had little or no knowledge of the outside world.

Most of their time was dedicated to reading religious texts and observing religious activities.

They were mostly unacquainted with anything outside their village, and they had no political awareness. Being adamant about their religion, they had no use for nationalism and were particularly fearful of the influence of Arab nationalism on their young members. With the rise of these nationalistic feelings, the younger generation started to seek guidance from other sources, mostly young educated and nationalistic leaders.

Nabieh Al-Kassem contends that this fear of losing control of the younger generation led the religious leadership to make a deal with the Israeli authority.128 The Israeli authorities

126 John L. Esposito.1984. Islam and Politics. New York: Syracuse University Press. Page 11. 127 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1976. Waqa Al-Druze fi Israel. (The status of Druze in Israel) Jerusalem. 128 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. Al-Kassem is a teacher and a researcher, who has published several books on the Druze in Israel, June 1994.

62 promised to help the religious leadership regain the influence over their community, and for that purpose delegated to the Sheikhs leadership of their community. Thus the Sheikhs had control of the local government and its municipalities. The very few educated and politically aware individuals amounted to an insignificant opposition. The rest of the community, which had been succumbing to the will of the religious leadership since the beginning, did nothing to resist their leadership. So when the agreement between the Israeli authority and the Druze spiritual leadership was announced, no one (from the Druze community) questioned it. After all, if the religious leadership saw it as the best solution, the people saw no reason to challenge it.

However, all these attempts on the part of the religious leadership to retain control over the members of their faith eventually were in vain. As a result of modernizing factors, which were introduced by the Israelis, most Druze villagers started to drift away from religion and the influence of the religious leadership declined drastically. Today the religious leadership is just patronized by the majority of the Druze people. The declining authority of the spiritual leadership gave rise to questioning of their decisions to cooperate with the Israeli authorities.

More and more Druze are blaming their religious leadership for the predicament that they are in today.129

129 Druze villagers of . 1994. Personal Interview. 20 June.

63

CHAPTER 4

ISRAELI POLITICAL/MILITARY/ AND ECONOMIC POLICIES :

In the following section I will focus on the specific policies that were utilized in inventing these “traditions” in order to create a different communal identity for the Druze. These different tactics and procedures were used to separate them from any affiliation with Arab culture, as well as to emphasize the special union or link between the Druze and Jews. These policies overlap and therefore it is difficult to discuss one without mentioning the others.

However, for the sake of clarity I will first discuss political /military/and economic policies in the remaining part of chapter 4, followed by education/ cultural/ and religious policies in chapter

5.

4.1. The Druze: A Preferred Minority

The Druze of Palestine have played an important, controversial role in the history of that region. In Israel most Druze live in villages in the Western Galilee and on the slopes of Mount

Carmel, villages that are mostly isolated from other Arabs. Today they number little more than

131,000 people.130 After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 the majority of Druze did not leave their land. Some Druze scholars argue that this is due to the fact that the Druze have always been so attached to their land that it is traditional for them to die on their land rather than

130 According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics May 2003. The Druze make up 9 % of the Arab population within Israel. http://www.cbs.gov.il/engindex.htm. Refer to Graph 3 for a population distribution of the minority groups in Israel in 2004.

64 leave it.131 However, other Palestinians are equally devoted to their ancestral properties and native soil, as evidenced by the continued struggle of these Palestinians in pursing their to their native land. Robert Betts argues that “The fact is that the Israelis encouraged or outright forced the majority of resident Muslims to leave, whereas all the Druze and most of the

Christians were allowed to remain in the Galilee region that according to United Nations

Partition Plan of 1947 was to have been included in the Arab Palestinian state.”132 Betts line of reasoning seems to be a more plausible justification for the lack of a similar mass exodus by the

Druze. This leads to speculations as to the motives of the Israelis and the reasons for choosing to forcibly encourage some Arabs to flee while taking a more hands off approach with others. Some observers such as Nabieh Al-Kassem, have concluded that this is only one evidence that there was a plan to exploit the Druze.133

The Israelis would give what would seem like “preferential” treatment to a certain group or another. Betts affirms, "The Druze are most favored by an Israeli government ...Their (The

Druze) communal interests are carefully looked after, and any complaints or problems receive prompt attention.”134 Several Israeli scholars have also labeled the Druze the “good Arabs” to further demonstrate the strength of the relationship between Jews and Arabs.135 This preferential treatment would have its advantages and it disadvantages. It would allow the Druze to act as intermediaries between the Israeli authorities and the rest of the Arabs, as well as serve as a source of jealousy and tension. The privileged status of the Druze would allow them to mediate between their neighboring villages and the Israeli authority and in some cases even go as far as

131 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1974. The Druze Faith. New York: Caravan Books, page 3. 132 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page 100. 133 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. He argues that the relatively small number of the Druze as well as the historical tensions between them and the rest of the Arabs made them the perfect victim for Israeli exploitation. 134 Ibid 135 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1979. The Druze in Israel : A political Study. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press.

65 providing a refuge to neighboring villagers escaping violence. Maadi gives this as an example of how the benefits that the Druze derived as a result of their cooperation with the Israeli authority allowed them to provide or a safe haven to neighboring villagers who were forced to flee from their land.136

Being mostly small landowners, the majority of the Palestinian Druze worked in agriculture and thus their main source of income was derived from their land. Some argue that in order to remain on their land and not lose their only source of livelihood, the Druze of Palestine had to adopt an unresisting and passive attitude towards the Israelis.137 Recognizing that the

Arab governments at the time of the establishment of the Israeli state were not well prepared for war, the Druze had to adopt this passive attitude. Taking into account that prior to 1948 the treatment of the Druze minority in Palestine by their non-Druze neighbors was not altogether amicable, one can understand why it was easy for the Druze to initially avoid taking sides in the conflict. The majority of the Druze saw this at the time as a conflict of religion between Jews and

Muslims.138 This view, Firro argues, resulted in the Palestinian Druze's indifference towards whichever government was running the country. After the founding of Israel in 1948, the Israelis tried to capitalize on the apparent indifference of the Druze and soon started a policy of rapprochement towards them, attempting to further alienate them from other Arabs.139 Robert

Betts states:

In Israel, although they are the smallest of the country's three Arab communities, the Druze are the most favored by an Israeli government that considers them to be the only Arabs who can be trusted. Indeed the government has tried,

136 Maadi, Jaber. 2002. Personal Interview. 1 April. Maadi was a Druze Knesset member in 1976 and a signatory to the document, which required Druze males to serve in the IDF. Maadi recalls how the people of the nearby village of Kufur Yassif took refuge in the Druze village of Julius during the conflict in 1948. 137 Maadi, Jaber. 2002. Personal Interview. 1 April. 138 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill. 139 Ibid.

66 unsuccessfully, to create in the minds of the Druze the myth that they are in fact a race apart from their Christian and Muslim Palestinian neighbors.140

The Israelis would also portray their preferred treatment of this minority not as the exception but as an example of their ideal treatment of a minority group in order to appease world public opinion, which was becoming increasingly critical of Israeli policy towards its Arab citizens.141

Compulsory military service would be the final legal act that would co-opt the Druze and serve as the ultimate distinction between them and the rest of the Arabs.142

As stated above, prior to the creation of the state of Israel, there were historical tensions between the Druze and the rest of the Arabs. The reasons for this historical strain are several.

One is the geographical isolation of the Druze in Palestine, who lived in mountainous villages, isolated from their Christian and Muslim brethren. This state of seclusion contributed to a general Druze feeling of alienation. Second, they were mostly farmers, with virtually no formal education; their life was very limited to their villages, or the surrounding Druze villages.

Perhaps the major factor at the heart of this tension is the absolute secrecy surrounding the Druze religion itself. In a traditional Islamic society, where religious heretics were mercilessly suppressed, it is easy to see how the secretiveness of the Druze could be a natural cause of tension. Unlike Jews and Christians, who were treated well as the , Islamic heretics were seen as a much more severe threat. One has to only examine the historic tensions between the Sunnis and the Shiaa that still plague the Islamic world to understand the gravity of such conflicts. All of the above reasons combined contributed to years of suppression of the

Druze under the Sunni Ottoman rule.143

140 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page 101. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid 143 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1974. The Druze Faith. New York: Caravan Books.

67 A general sense of estrangement in the Druze community led to a prevalent sense of passivity among the majority. When the state of Israel was being created, many Druze were indifferent to their new rulers. Some saw the new Zionists in a more favorable light than previous rulers,144 while the few politically aware groups saw the as a nationalistic threat, and joined the various Arab forces that were fighting the Zionists. Fawzi Al- Qawaqji, a veteran of the Druze uprising of 1925, went to Palestine to recruit volunteers and to organize a

Druze battalion145 that was led by Shakib Wahab. The latter went on to fight in several battles against the Haganah (The Jewish underground army), the most famous of these battles was

Ramat Yohanan in 1947.146 Although unsuccessful, Wahab is considered because of his efforts among the most famous Druze heroes of all time.147

Even though this group of Druze who joined the Arab forces was by no means a representative sample of the majority of Druze, it was a source of concern to Jewish officials at the time. One such official was Josh Palmon, who would later become the Prime Minister’s advisor in Minority Affairs. According to Kais Firro, Palmon

considered one of the government officials singularly responsible for steering the country’s Druze community onto its own, separate course. The dominant role he played in the negotiations with the Druze battalion of Shakib Wahab and the subsequent recruitment of Druze volunteers into the IDF so as to forestall any ‘going back,’ the idea he was first to promote separating the Druze from other Arabs and the active support with which he rewarded the chiefs who were willing to go along his schemes and help him carry out his ‘Druze’ policy, all constituted the foundation upon which during the years 1956-1963 the status of the Druzes as a socio-cultural and religiously independent community would be built.148

144 Halabi, Rafik. 1982. The West Bank Story. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. He discusses throughout the book how some Druze, including his father, saw the Jews as a modernizing influence on their villages. 145 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill. 146 Ibid. 147 Al Kassem, Nabieh. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 148 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill, page151

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Photo 2: Aba Khoushy, labor leader and member of the Knesset, was welcomed by religious Druze leaders. Throughout his life, Khoushy was committed to developing and maintaining peaceful Druze-Israeli relations. Septmber1949.149

Another Israeli official who was concerned with the Druze community’s link with other Arabs was Amnon Lynn, the director of the Arab department of the Histadrut, Israeli labor federation.

He argued:

The state of Israeli has not learned how to exploit the progress and the change that have been introduced among the Druzes following the application of obligatory conscription. By failing to exploit the process, we are creating a dangerous consequence among the Druze youth. In order to counter the process of ‘Arabiazation’ that had already emerged among the youth, the state should develop an Israeli Druze consciousness.150

There are several probable reasons why the Druze were the “chosen minority group.”

The first was the relatively small number of the Druze. The population of the Druze was always small compared to those of the other minority groups, such as the larger Sunni Muslims or the

Christian Arabs as can be seen in Graph 2. Although they have gained on the Christians

149 http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/gallery/page09/page3/page09310.html 150 Ha’aretz,(Daily Israeli newspaper) 14 November 1966.

69 population, the Druze are still significantly less than the Muslims as can be seen by Graph 3.

Christians were also very prominent in the Arab nationalism movement. Most pan-Arab nationalist movement were founded by Christian Arabs.151

Arming a small minority group would never present a true security risk for Israel. In

1957, when the mandatory military service was imposed on Druze men, the total population of

Druze in Israel did not exceed one percent of the total population. Presently, the Druze military constitute a little over 1 percent of the Israeli army.152 The small number of eligible Druze young men would be easily controlled.

Graph 2: Minority group distribution in Israel in 1960. Actual numbers of the corresponding population in the bar.153

151 Most prominent among these is the founder of the Baath party . 152 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page 104. 153 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. 2004. http://www.cbs.gov.il/engindex.htm. Graph is original by the author.

70

Graph 3: Minority group distribution in Israel in 1960. Actual numbers of the corresponding population in the bar.154 Graph is original by the author.

Another factor that qualified the Druze to be selected as the “chosen” minority was their exclusively rural locations. The Druze lived mainly in the small villages in the Galilee region and in the mountainous villages of . These villages did not witness any battles in

1948 and were spared the devastation of war.155 Since their villages were isolated and were not attacked, the Druze did not flee. Consequently, the Druze did not have any refugees, and their families were not divided. The Druze initially did not suffer as much as other Arabs at the outbreak of war.

154 Israeli Central bureau of statisitics. http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2004/01_04_98e.htm#_ftnref3. 155 Makarem, Sami Nasib. 1974. The Druze Faith. New York: Caravan Books, page 3.

71 By giving preferential treatment to the Druze, the Israelis also had some far-reaching motives that they hoped would not only undermine the loyalty of the Druze in Palestine, as well as elsewhere in the Arab world, but also would result in some confrontations between the Druze minority on the one hand and the rest of the Arabs on the other hand. Any friction between the

Druze minority and the Arabs as a whole would possibly threaten general Arab unity. These tactics, which were especially targeted towards Syria, worked, as Betts affirms:

The Druze were viewed with distrust in Damascus, particularly after the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949, in which the Druze were seen by the Sunnis as having cooperated with the Israelis, at least tacitly, in the successful establishment of the Zionist state. Suspicions as to their loyalty became even more pronounced when Druze from the villages of Galilee, now part of Israel, began serving in the Israeli armed forces. During the regime of Adib Al-Shishakli (1950-1954), Druze rights in Syria were seriously curtailed.156

156 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page 93.

72

The Druze as Instrument of Sate Policy:

Since the Druze as a minority were considered the perfect choice for the role of the preferred minority because of the reasons discussed above, it is important to look at the steps that the state took in turning the Druze into instruments of state policy. These policies did not start with the creation of the state of Israel, but preceded it.

Contrary to the official Israeli narrative, Druze cooperation with Jews did not just happen spontaneously. Although there was existing tension between the Druze and the rest of the Arabs, the Druze still felt like members of the larger community and as such participated in popular nationalist . There has been ample evidence of Druze that have sacrificed their lives for the Palestinian cause as well as the Arab cause. Key Druze figures were instrumental in the Arab uprisings of the 1930s.157 The early Jewish agents realized that a concerted effort was needed in order to obtain cooperation from the Druze. It is evident that there was cooperation between the

Jewish underground and some Druze leaders long before the state of Israel was created. A patron- client relationship had to be developed between the Jewish officials and the Druze elites.

Rivalries between clans were exploited in an attempt to control clan leaders. Nabieh Al-Kassem argues that in these cases, Druze leaders and elites were co-opted into cooperating with the

Jewish agents and later with the Israeli state. Critics of these co-opted elites argue that “Those individual Druze were collaborating with the Jewish underground for purely selfish and greedy reasons. They were not concerned with the general well-being of the entire Druze community as they claim.”158 Some Druze claim that they have been manipulated and exploited in a scheme to

157 Sultan Pasha al Atrash is one of the most prominent Druze leaders to be involved in these rebellions. 158 Druze Initiative Committee members. 1994. Personal Interview. 29 June.

73 divide the Arabs of Palestine, and that they have been victimized more than any other minority group in Israel. 159

Some Druze elites argued that they had to capitulate to the greater powers of the state, since it was the only way to ensure that their community would get any rights. Oren Yiftachel identifies this type of ethnicity-based entitlements as a particular characteristic of what he refers to as an “ethnocracy.” He argues:

Israeli nation-and state-building have thus created what I have termed an “ethnocracy.” This is a regime governed by two main principles: (a) despite several democratic features, ethnicity (and not territorial citizenship) is the main organizing logic for the allocation of state resources; and (b) a dominant “charter group” enjoys a superior position over other ethnic groups; this group appropriates the state apparatus, and dictates the nature of most public policies. The combination of the two principles typically generates ethno-class stratification and segregation. Given these “ethnic rules of the game,” and given the dominance of the Ashkenazim as the Israeli “charter group,” the Israeli polity has been characterized by on-going practices of ethnic control over both Arab and Jewish minorities.160

The Druze leaders knew fully well that the allocation of resources in the Jewish state was based mainly on ethnicity. Therefore, if they were considered in a different ethnic group they could only gain greater benefits than those attained by Arabs. The Druze had to act as if they were of a different category than the rest of the Arabs in order for them to receive better entitlements from the state.

However, as non-Jews they can’t identify with the Zionist and Jewish ethnic identity of the state.

Not that the state officials were planning on completely assimilating the Druze into Jewish Israeli society, because that would threaten the Jewish character of the state. A more accommodating ethnic identity had to be invented for them, one that classified them as a separate group from the rest of the Arabs.

159Al-Kassem, Nabieh. Al-Kassem, Samih. and the Druze Initiative Committee members. 1994. Personal Interviews. 19 June. 160 Yiftachel, Oren. 1999. “Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine.” Constellations, 6, no.3: 364-390.

74 The Druze were the perfect choice for a fifth column to implement a policy of divide and conquer. But what are the specific strategies that an occupying power uses to create such a division and therefore a new ethnicity for the Druze? Eric Hobsbawm argues that nationalism is created through the use of education as well as ceremonies, which help create this separate sense of nationalism. Ceremonies that commemorate certain perceived accomplishments by the military are usually the highest symbols of nationalism. Although military conscription was the main institutional means that the Israeli administration utilized to cultivate a separate identity for the Druze, other institutional tools were also used. Those secondary tools were economic, educational, and social. Economically, there have been those who have benefited as a result of collaborating with the administration. Land confiscations from Arab villages, including those from Druze villages, served to further strangle the economic means of the farmers, leaving the military service as the only viable option for many to make a living. In the end, Druze men found themselves soldiers and jailers. Druze education was treated as a separate entity that falls under the authority and supervision of Druze elites, whose job is dependent on the fact that they are the only ones qualified to teach about the distinctiveness of Druze culture. Druze elites who have a lot to gain on an individual level from this heightened emphasis on their distinctiveness will do their best to perpetuate this cycle.

All these policies were used in a complementary fashion in order to deliberately encourage a communal identity for the Druze. Whether it is the military or the educational and other policies, they all worked in combination, as tools of institutionalization. The main function of this institutionalization is to create organizations and procedures that introduce accepted standards for social and political behavior. The Israeli policy makers, along with Druze elites, used institutionalizing facets to ultimately produce a new generation of Israeli Druze, with a

75 sense of loyalty to the state and with a corresponding ethnic identity that does not conflict with this new loyalty. This identity has no aspiration for self-determination and therefore cannot be associated with the more troublesome Arab nationalism. It is cooperative and benign enough to integrate into an Israeli state. For the Druze to be integrated successfully into Israeli society, they must have an identity based on invented traditions that are purely their own and separate from any association with Arab nationalism. They cannot be allowed to identify with the rest of the

Arabs, or to behave toward Israel as the Arabs would. Above all, they are not to be allowed to support the Arab side in the greater Arab–Israeli conflict.

In order for all this to be accomplished, a separate history of friendly relations between

Druze and Jews must be emphasized and embellished if needed. A narrative based on historical cooperation of the Druze as loyal soldiers and good citizens in the service of the state of Israel must be stressed. Monuments and museums celebrating this close relationship are an important facet in solidifying this bond. The educational system functioning in its institutionalizing role also serves a definite role in socializing new generations of Druze into their proper roles as loyal

Israeli citizens. So does the military, which creates new loyal soldiers willing to die in the service of the state of Israel. All these different facets work together in order to separate the Druze from the Arabs and to enable the Druze to play a constructive role in the protection and service of the state. For the Druze to be able to have a functioning role, they must first break all possible links with an Arab identity. However, since they cannot identify with the Zionist and Jewish ethnic identity of the state, a more accommodating ethnic identity has to be invented for them.

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Photo 3: Former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on a visit to Sheikh Amin Tariff with the head of the IDF.161

4.2. Creating Official Druze Identification

The efforts of the Israeli government were focused on creating a division in every aspect of

Druze life. The practices of the Israeli government have undermined the individual Druze's loyalty to his tribe, family, fellow Druze, fellow Arab, and fellow Muslim. Among the tactics the

Israeli authorities used to segregate the Druze minorities from their fellow Arabs is the authorities’ refusal to allow Druze to state as “Arab” their national origin and classification in their identification cards. The Israeli authority officially recognizes three groups of non-Jewish minorities in Israel: Arabs, Druze, and Circassians. The Druze are not permitted to classify themselves as Arabs. Imposing state defined identity on the Druze was a major step towards

161 Postcard Purchased by author at a Druze Souvenir shop. March 2002

77 changing Druze from a religious affiliation into an ethnic and national identity. Robert Betts maintains:

After 1970, Druze affairs were no longer handled by the governmental departments in charge of Arab minority matters, thus separating the Israeli Druze even further from the larger communities of Palestinian Muslim and Christian Arabs sharing Israeli Nationality. Such separation was very much encouraged by the Israeli government, which even went so far as officially to adopt the view that the Druze were not really Arabs at all but a separate ethnic entity that had somehow become Arabized.162

In justifying such actions, the Israeli authorities claimed that the Druze could receive preferential treatment only if they were completely separated from the other Arabs163 and that this can only be accomplished when the Druze have their own unique identity. The economic realities of Druze villages made the Israeli promise of preferential treatment enticing. However instead of receiving addition benefit, the Druze would quickly realized that the state gives and the states takes away. Certainly when it came to land acquisition law, the Israeli authorities confiscated the majority of land owned by Druze.164 In his own field research on the topic of land expropriation, Firro claims that:

As the expropriation of Arab-owned land through the state Laws was more or less completed by 1962, and no data are available after 1962....moreover, a survey I carried out in 1995 through the local council shows that today more than 40 percent of single-household families, apart from the plot on which they built their house, no longer own any land.165

Farmers by tradition, the Druze suddenly lost their major source of income. Unskilled and uneducated, most Druze had little choice but to cooperate with the government, which in return would provide them with job placements in the cities or a Kibbutz. Due to economic realities, the

Druze were coerced into accepting the fabricated identity, as well as military conscription.

162 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page 101. 163 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. Waqa Al-Druze fi Israel. ( the status of Druze in Israel) Jerusalem, 1976 164Israeli Government Yearbook. 1962. Refer to table 8 for village by village total land expropriation. 165Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in Israel. Netherlands: Brill, page 139.

78 One example that illustrates the connection between identity and state economic control is the identity cards requirement. In Israel, every person is required to carry some sort of identification. These identity cards are not only used at checkpoints and roadblocks but are often used when a person is applying for a job, a driver’s license or any service that is offered by the state. For Druze males to get a driver’s license, for instance, they have to prove that they are either serving their mandatory military service or have finished serving it. It is very difficult, if not impossible, in most cases for Druze males to obtain a driver’s license if they refused military service.166 Druze males who serve in the IDF are also granted special privileges when it comes to certain jobs. Considered a much lower security risk than the other Arabs, they are provided with many opportunities the defense service. This makes it clear how the economic opportunities improve when some one identity as a Druze rather than an Arab.

166 Nafaa, Said. 2002. Personal Interview. 14 March.

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Photo 4: Israeli Druze Scouts Logo.167

4.3. The Druze Scouts

The Druze Scouts Organization in Israel was established in 1954 mostly due to the efforts of

Salman Fallah. It was sponsored by the Israeli Ministry of Education. In 1955 the organization became an official member in the Israeli Scouts Association. Fallah was the head of the Druze

Scouts Association until 1964, when he had to leave his position to pursue his education in the US.

In 1975, the executive committee of the Druze scouts asked Dr. Fallah to return to his position as its leader, a position he still holds at the present time. Druze scouts operate within the school system, and each Druze school has its own scout troop. The activities of the scouts are geared not only to elementary and secondary students, but involve through its adult program most of high school students as well.

167 Picture taken from the cover of the Israeli Druze scouts manual.

80 Cynthia Enloe discusses the original intentions behind the founding of the Boy Scouts movement by Baden-Powell.168 She argues that

Robert Baden-Powell founded the Boy Scouts in 1909,because venereal disease, intermarriage of the races and declining birthrates were largely endangering the maintenance of Britain’s international power. Baden-Powell and other British imperialists saw sportsmanship combined with respect for the respectable woman as the bedrock of British imperials success…Baden-Powell’s original intention was to restore manly self control in white boys: in their hands lay the future of the empire.169

The purpose and goals of the Druze scouts are perhaps not very different from other scout troops through the world; however, one basic theme that runs across the objectives of all scouts in

Israel, and the Druze boy scouts in particular (no girls scouts exist), is the attention given to strengthening their civic duty towards their state and community. Special activities are planned and organized to establish links between the Druze scouts and their Jewish counterparts. Trips of Jewish scout troops are organized to visit Druze scout troops under the stated goal of greater cultural exchange between the communities. At these events, the particularism of Druze culture is emphasized as well as the history of the great ancient bond between the two nations. The Druze scouts are always involved in community service, and they always participate in the parades during the religious celebrations.

The Scouts are just another means of indoctrinating younger generations of Druze into believing that they constitute a separate nation. Focusing on the particularism of Druze culture through scouting is an additional means of constructing this idea of a different “tradition” and hence a unique “nation.” The Druze scouts are yet another part of the process of institutionalizing the young Druze. Other programs geared towards the younger generation included pre-army activities.

Nissim Dana describes these activities:

168 Enloe, Cynthia.1989. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. 169 Ibid page 50.

81 In 1982, after the army had decided to enable youngsters from the community to integrate into all units of the armed forces, an IDF cadet scheme began to operate. The pre-army activity is meant for high school students in grade 9-12, and has two principal aims: (a) taking care of disaffected youth by helping them find learning or work appropriate to their skills; (b) preparing youth for army service from the point of view both of motivation and physical fitness and community values, so that they are better prepared to cope with the problems they will face as soldiers, and as Druze soldiers in particular.170

It is not hard to see that “taking care of disaffected youth” is really a euphemism for .

In a similar fashion, the Israeli Druze Boy Scouts were meant to instill this “manly self control” and turn Druze youth eventually into proper soldiers who are willing to fight and die for their state. Nationalism, both ethnic and civic notions of nationalism, is imbedded in the philosophy of the Boy Scouts. Service and loyalty to country are among the main ideals that are promoted.

The Organization of Israeli Druze Scouts serves the policy of the state by promoting both the Druze particular ethnic strand of nationalism as well as reinforcing their civic nationalism and loyalty to the state. Ethnic nationalism is emphasized by having separate Druze scout, where Druze flags are used to distinguish them not only as a different scout troop, but also as members of a different nation, a Druze nation. This reinforces the Druze cultural studies programs at the schools and amplifies the Druze’s sense of distinctiveness. The Druze Scouts organization, like most other scouts groups, also emphasizes the individual’s sense of civic duty and loyalty to the state. This acts to reinforce all of the virtues of civic nationalism and eases the Druze youth transition into proper adult citizens who fulfill their duties by serving in the IDF. That these are the main objectives of

Israeli Druze Scouts is highlighted by the fact that there are only Druze boy scouts’ troops and no girl scouts. This exclusion demonstrates that the main objective of the Druze scouts is to prepare

Druze young males for their service in the IDF.

170 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page 112.

82

Photo 5: Druze Soldiers in The IDF Holding an Israeli Flag with a Star of David.171

4.4. Compulsory Military Conscription

The use of military conscription as a means of controlling a minority group has been the focus of several studies. One of the most prominent scholars in this area is Cynthia Enloe. She maintains that colonial powers have always sought “an available ethnic group that demonstrated natural ‘martial’ traits that lacked either the resources or the political sophistication to pose a challenge to the colonial administration, and that was economically deprived enough so that employment in the army appeared attractive.”172 Enloe argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, ethnicity can be used as a political tool by state authorities. The ethnic makeup of a state’s military can and does attain significance politically. Enloe asserts that “the effects of

171 Postcard Purchased by the author from a Druze souvenir shop. March 2002. 172 Enloe, Cynthia. 1979. Police, Military and Ethnicity. New York: Transaction Publishing, page 16.

83 certain recruitment patterns and certain military assignment…can prove important factors shaping a certain ethnic group’s self-perception, its citizenship claims, or the political outlook of its communal leadership.”173 This is exemplified by the Druze in Israel. Their role in the IDF has reinforced their imagined communal identity. This identification has undercut the larger Arab unity by having one Arab group attired in Israeli military uniform.

Allon Peled argues that for Israel the IDF was the only viable nation-building tool. He asserts that it was Israel’s only unified institution. The IDF was used to implant “national values” in the new Israelis when they were relatively young and impressionable. At the heels of what seemed a miraculous victory in 1948, the IDF was perceived to be able to do the impossible.

That would also include the creation of an imagined tradition and identity. The IDF, therefore, was used as the main instrument of forming identities and communal bonds for the new Jewish immigrants as well as of creating new communal identities to separate the Druze from the rest of the Arabs.

The military cooperation between the Druze and the Jewish authorities predated the establishment of the Israeli state and continued even before it became compulsory in 1956. Until then it was mostly based on the recruitment of Druze volunteers by state officials. This official attempt at recruiting wasn’t limited to the Druze. Kais Firro claims that

The enlistment order of 10 July (1954) was not restricted to their (Druze) own community but was addressed as well to the Muslims and Christian minorities…while the Israeli authorities assumed that the response would be minimal, if not nil, among the Arabs…Thus it came as somewhat of a surprise to the authorities when out of a prepared list of 4,520 names of Muslim and Christian youths most indeed showed up and wanted to be enlisted. None of these, of course, was recruited.174

173 Ibid page 24. 174 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill, page 153

84 Druze elites emphasized that the Druze were not the only ones volunteering to serve in the IDF; other Arabs, such as Christians and Bedouins, were trying to volunteer for military service.

Druze males were also volunteering for military service long before the conscription was mandatory; for this reason, some within the Druze leadership were willing to accept compulsory conscription for Druze males in 1956.175 However, in the beginning, the official spiritual leadership headed by Sheikh Amin Tarif did protest the recruitment of the Druze. In 1953 Tarif was under attack from state authorities for the perceived “hostile position” that he took against the recruitment of Druze in the IDF.176 Less than a year later, Tarif’s position would change and he would refrain from speaking against the recruitment of Druze men into the Israeli military.

This change of attitude is explained by Firro as the result of personal benefits acquired by Tarif and his family. Firro states that:

In October 1954, with a new enlistment effort under way, Sheikh Amin Tarif’s brother, Salman, asked Abba Hushi (prime minister’s advisor in minorities affairs) to mediate between them and the Ministry of Communication so that the Tarif brothers might be granted “permission” to buy a new car…It may have been coincidence that the request came at the time of the recruitment effort but the correspondence carried on between Tarif and other clan chiefs and Abba Hushi as of 1954 deepens the impression that increasingly the Druze chiefs were foremost looking out for their personal and clan interests, which the authorities encouraged as a reward for their support of the official policy vis-à-vis the Druze community.177

The recognition of separate Druze religious rights were quickly followed by compulsory military service required of all young Druze men. This is considered by some observers as the price that the Druze had to pay in return for gaining sovereignty over civil matters.178 There is still some controversy surrounding the Druze compulsory military service, as to whether the

Druze volunteered or were coerced to serve in the military. The official Israeli policy states that

175 Maadi, Jaber. 2002. Personal Interview. 1 April. 176 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill. 177 Ibid page 152 178 Enloe, Cynthia. 1979. Police, Military and Ethnicity. New York: Transaction Publishing.

85 the Druze religious leadership headed by Sheikh Amin Tarif requested to become subject to the compulsory military service.179 Some Druze sources claim the contrary, that Sheikh Tarif was forced to sign the document instituting Druze compulsory military service.180 One of the signatories of that document was Sheikh Jaber Maadi. In a personal interview that I conducted with Sheikh Maadi, he defended the decision as the only viable option to safeguard the interest of the Druze community.181 Maadi claimed that cooperation with the Israeli authorities was the only way to ensure that land wouldn’t be expropriated from Druze villages. He alluded to the intimate relationship between agents of the Israeli state and leaders in the Druze community, a relationship that, in his view, would protect the interest of the Druze. Maadi argued that after the creation of the state of Israel, neighboring non-Druze villagers would seek refugee in Druze villages because the Druze enjoyed some sort of reprieve from official Israeli policies that were threatening their neighbors. The Druze, therefore, had to do whatever was in their power to maintain the goodwill of the new leaders of the state. Taking into consideration that some Druze were already volunteering to serve in the IDF, Maadi justified his decision by arguing, “I saw this as a chance for free education, and gaining more collective rights for the entire Druze community; legal rights that would benefit the entire Druze community would be derived from mandatory conscription as opposed to the voluntary conscription of a few individual Druze.”182

Firro argues that internal dynamics within the leadership of the Druze community also had something to do with the leaders’ decision to support mandatory conscription. He argues that the state capitalized on the intense internal competition between different factions of the Druze

179 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1979. The Druze in Israel : A political Study. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press. 180 According to The Druze Initiative Committee, the Sheikh was coerced into signing the papers; some Druze affirm that Sheikh Amin never actually signed the document. Maadi, Jamal. 1994. Personal Interview. 23 June. 181 Maadi, Jaber. 2002. Personal Interview. 1 April. 182 Ibid.

86 community in order to get them to agree to the mandatory military conscription of Druze males.

Firro describes the election held the year prior to the start of mandatory conscription for Druze:

Acceptance among the Druze chiefs of the conscription law was clinched with the intense competition that broke out between Salih Khnayfis and Jabr Muaddi around the general elections of July 1955. As before the Druze villages were split into two camps, both with allegiance to the same party. The difference was that this time the two candidates, in addition to manipulating the clan dispute, were able to take advantage of economic factors to mobilize voters. Thus, Jabr Muaddi could use the Histrudrut office in Haifa and Acre to find employment for people promising to support him, while Salid Khnafis established his own personal employment office, each of them relying on their Jewish “patrons” to mediate and come up with the required number of jobs.183

Using the intense rivalry between the different Druze elites was a way for the authorities to get their policy forward, the Israeli authorities promised support to the candidate who supported their policies, which would lead one candidate, Maadi, to agree to mandatory conscription. This competition between Druze elites, and this electoral competition specifically, were manipulated by the authorities through patron-client relationships; this manipulation would ultimately lead to mandatory conscription for Druze males.

Some justify this singling out of the Druze for military service by referring to Druze particularism. Salman Fallah claims that there is “A Druze tradition of bravery in battle and therefore the Druze always made great soldiers.”184 Fallah maintains that the Druze believe in fate, and that a man’s destiny is already predetermined since birth, therefore a Druze will surrender to the will of God. For God alone knows when a person will die and that date is already set, nothing could be done to change it; therefore a faithful Druze doesn’t fear Death, and he does not fear danger because there is nothing he can do to change his fate. This not only explains the exceptional courage of Druze men but also explains why they are predisposed to

183 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill, page 153 184 Fallah, Salman. 2002. Personal Interview. 17 March.

87 military careers and completely willing to face all the dangers associated with it.185 This only contributes to the idea of the Druze belonging to a military culture.

Photo 6: A Key chain commemorating the bravery of the Druze in the IDF And is the Symbol of the Sword Battalion, an exclusive Druze regiment.186

Fallah, however, ignores the fact that the belief in fate is not something unique to the Druze.

Muslims also believe that their fate is predetermined, and that when a person is born, God has predetermined when this person will die. In fact, most monotheistic traditions believe this in some form or another. Yet it is evident that there is a concentrated effort to create this “tradition” of the brave Druze solider. The idea of using stereotypes of culturally predisposed communities, such as the “martial races,” to military service has been widely studied as a tool manipulated by colonialists.187 Philip Constable contended, “repeatedly in Indian recruitment handbooks and army histories of the late ninetieth and early twentieth centuries, self sufficiency, physical and moral resilience and orderliness and hard work, fighting tenacity, and above all a sense of courage and loyalty were characteristics attributed to the Indian martial races.”188 Arguing that bravery and

185 Ibid 186 From an Israeli Military surplus store. http://www.israelarmysurplus.com/index.php/cPath/39?osCsid=464328bde5c067325fb35bbe9452665c 187 Most prominent among such studies are Cynthia Enloe’s. 188 Constable, Philip. 2001. “The Marginalization of a Dalit Martial Race in late nineteenth- and Early Twentieth- century Western India.” The journal of Asian Studies. 60,2 :439-478. Page 439

88 loyalty to the tribe and family is an essential tradition of the Druze doctrine and philosophy and emphasizing these “traditions” through any possible institutionalizing tool, such as school, scouts, or the military are the means by which these traditions are created.

However, the military cooperation between the Jewish state and the Druze wasn’t an instant success. In addition to the Druze resistance against cooperating with the Israelis, some

Israelis had reservations about cooperating Arab armies in 1948. The fear of what Peled refers to as the “Trojan Horse syndrome” was caused by instances of fighting between Druze and Jews.

Peled elaborates:

One Druze battalion fought with the army of Fawzi Kaukji against Israel though it retreated early after its failure in the battles of (April 12-17, 1948). In the worst incident between Druze and Jews during the 1948 War, the people of Jat and Yanuh (two Druze villages under the occupation of Kaukji's Army) betrayed their oral promise to cooperate with the Jews and slaughtered a mixed Druze-Jewish IDF unit that was approaching their villages (October 28, 1948). After the war, Israel imposed military rule over its Arab and Druze villages. Like other Arab villagers, Druze needed special licenses to travel within Israel. Thus, the conditions for the development of a full-fledged Trojan Horse syndrome between the Jewish state and its Druze minority were present at the very beginning of the state. But there was one crucial aspect in which Druze differed from other Israeli Arab communities: some Druze soldiers served in the IDF during and after the War of Independence.189

Peled explains conditions that led to the development of a “Trojan Horse syndrome,” including the fact that the absorption of the Druze into the IDF wasn’t as smooth as has been historically reported by Israeli officials. Peled points out that the early stages of the relationship between the

Druze and Israeli officials were dominated by conflict. He claims:

In 1953 the Minority Unit faced a crisis instigated from within the Druze community. At the time, the reserve battalion-size unit (Unit 300) kept losing its old soldiers (due to age or medical reasons) while no new Druze volunteers were available to replace them…Only two hundred Druze volunteered to serve in mid- 1953.190

189 Peled, Alon. 1998. A Question of Loyalty. New York: Cornell University Press. 190 Ibid

89 Confidence building took a long time; in fact, it took almost twenty years for Druze soldiers to be completely integrated into the IDF. Even after mandatory conscription was imposed on Druze soldiers in 1956, they remained in their own separate units, and were not allowed to participate in combat roles during the wars of 1956 and 1967. Full integration into all the units of the IDF came in the 70s:

During the 1970s, long held suspicions and old barriers began crumbling down for rank-and-file Druze as well. In February 1972, the army decided to allow a limited number of Druze soldiers into all of its corps except for the air force and the intelligence corp. In March 1978 the Minority Unit was given, for the first time in its history, an independent role during the Litani Operation in Lebanon. The unit also fought in the Lebanon War. In 1982 the IDF began posting many more Druze conscripts among different Jewish units. In April 1991 Moshe Arens, the Defense Minister, finally declared all of the IDF units open to every Druze. Presently, new Druze draftees are given a choice: to serve with their fellow Jewish conscripts or in a special Druze Unit.191

Peled claims that the phased integration into the IDF is the main reason for the old barriers to crumble. Granting Druze soldiers more rights and opportunities for advancement in the military might explain the crumbling barriers between the soldiers and the Israeli state. This, however, provides little explanation for the suspicions of the rest of the Druze community. And it does not explain why Druze men constitute the highest percentage of people who stay in the military or security related-fields.

The Druze units and soldiers would prove to be useful to the Israeli state and its never- ending conflicts. Once loyalty was guaranteed, the Druze, following on the footsteps of the

Gurkhas in British India, would be an invaluable tool to be used in the West Bank and as border police. For example, before the Intifadah of 1989, the Israeli rule in the occupied territories was facilitated by the use of Palestinian collaborators.192 The collaborators would be known in the occupied territories because of their special and good relations with the Israeli authorities.

191 Ibid 192 Intifadah is the Palestinian uprising that was started in Israeli occupied territories against Israeli occupation.

90 Ordinary Palestinians would employ the collaborators to facilitate certain requests from the government; in return the collaborators would use their newfound prestige and influence in

Israel's interest. Israel Shahak writes of:

Moshe Dayan's time, from 1967 to 1974, when the so-called “notables,” those figures influential in Palestinian society even before the conquest, played this [collaborator] role. Between 1981 and 1983, Ariel Sharon demolished the power of the notables and tried to replace them with his “Village League,” often composed of the dregs of society. After the start of the Intifada, however, this method failed. Israel had to undertake the task of ruling the Palestinians on every level by use of its own manpower. This form of direct rule was much less efficient and more corrupt and burdensome. The Israeli establishment has wanted for quite some time to restore the old method of indirect rule, especially in the Gaza strip, on Israeli terms. 193

193 Shahak, Israel. 1991. Washington's Report on the Middle East. June issue.

91

The Military as a Divisive Tool:

The Druze Initiative Committee and other Druze argue that the mandatory military conscription was one of several political tools used to create divisions between the Druze and their fellow Palestinian Arabs. According to the Druze Initiative Committee, "since 1948, it has been the unofficial policy of the state of Israel to divide the Arabs into distinct groups or sects.”194 Jamal Maadi, the president of the Druze Initiative Committee argues that mandatory military conscription has been one of the main tools in its attempt to create divisions between the

Druze and the rest of the Arabs.195 Druze are placed in separate units and are placed in positions where they have to come into direct contact with Palestinians from the occupied territories. The

Druze solider as a member of the border police, or a init that is deployed to enforce the military occupation of the occupied territories, is placed in a position where he has to act as the representative of a brutal occupation and a defender of it. No matter the individual soldier’s personal beliefs regarding the occupation, or his feelings of kinship or lack of them, he is forced into a situation where he is wearing a uniform representing an occupation and therefore regarded as an enemy by Palestinians in the occupied territories. The solider by virtue of his insecure position in a virtual war zone, and motivated by pure self-preservation if nothing else, will treat

Palestinians as a threat. This inevitably leads to generalizations such as that all Druze are soldiers and protectors of Israeli occupation, and therefore they are regarded as much as an enemy as the rest of Israeli soldiers. While Druze villagers might be united by a sense of camaraderie co with

194 Watheqa "Al Sawlaa". September 1991. Publication of the Druze Initiative Committee. 195 Maadi, Jamal. 1994. Personal Interview. 23 June. Maadi is the head of the Druze Initiative Committee.

92 Israel Jews Just for the fact that their loved ones in the IDF are potentially risking their lives from a common threat posed by an occupied Palestinian people.

Jamal Maadi argues that

The Israeli authorities forcibly imposed mandatory conscription upon our Druze children, based on orders from the then defense minister David Ben Gurion in 1956. This was done for pure political motives, which would serve the colonialist Zionists policy. Their strategy is not only aimed at the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, but also at the rest of the Arabs in the Middle East. Their aim is to ignite the flames of sectarianism and ethnic tensions among the Arabs in order to serve their imperialist goals. Imposing mandatory conscription to divide the children of our Arab nation serve and facilitate the Israeli authorities goals of creating divisions among us based on sectarianism.196

Maadi argues that the policies of the authorities are not only aimed at creating divisions between the Arabs in Israel, but seek to create divisions between the Arabs in the entire Middle East region. Considering that there is a significant proportion of Druze in Syria and Lebanon, casting suspicion on the corresponding Druze communities cannot be conducive to the greater sense of

Arab nationalism.

Several scholars have alluded to this far-reaching aspect of Israeli policy. Ben-Dor argues that this division was used as a necessary precaution in order to abate any security threat, which would arise from arming the Druze. He argues that

It is true that an overriding sense of solidarity would normally overcome internal family divisions in times of emergency or war. However, in more “normal” times extreme internal factional divisions allowed a certain degree of permeability and penetrability of the Druze power structure, a method always attempted by the authorities to counter the strength of the Druze armed forces.197

The state’s policies are not only aimed at creating divisions between the Arabs that live in Israel, but it also has another Druze population of concern, which is the Druze populations of the occupied Heights. So far the Druze of the Golan region have refused to carry Israeli

196 Ibid 197 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1979. The Druze in Israel : A political Study. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, page 71.

93 Identifications, and have continue to cling to their connections with the Syrian nation. Druze in the Golan for example, continues to vote in Syrian elections. The Golan Druze don’t have a mandatory conscription policy as their Palestinian Druze counterparts. Barring an implausible agreement with Syria, which would require the return of the Golan Height, the state of

Israel will still have to deal with the majority Druze population there. Having Druze serving in the IDF will help alleviate some of the fear and resentment that the Golani Druze would have towards the state of Israel. Having a Druze unit in the IDF could also provide an example for

Golani Druze as to a potential role in the future relationship with the state. The long-term ramifications of this allegiance with more than one community of Druze with the state of Israel would be very clear. The loyalty of Druze in general, anywhere in the Middle East would be severely undermined.

94 4.5. Economic policies/ Land Expropriations

Map 2: A detailed map showing the Galilee and the Carmel regions.198

198 Detailed map fromhttp://www.focusmm.com/israel/is_mp_1.htm.

95 Once the state of Israeli was created, a “land redemption” doctrine was put in place, which not only took the land from , but also extended its scope to cover the land owned by Arabs who remained. A law of “Abandoned Territories” was established in 1948 to “regulate the legal status of the abandoned areas.”199 As a result of this law, it is estimated that more than 1 million dunums (I acre= 4 dunums) of land belonging to the Arabs that remained was expropriated by the state.200 Land was expropriated through a common policy towards all

Arabs. Firro argues that in

June 1949, after consultations with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Zalman Lifshitz, an official of the Jewish National Fund, called together a number of officials from various departments and institutions involved in “minorities” and land affairs in order to formulate ‘one common policy on the acquisition of lands from the Arabs.’ 201 In 1950, the Absentees’ Property Law, as a result all those refuges that fled to their land would ultimately loose it.202 However even the remaining Arabs would lose some of their land as a result of the Absentee’s Property Law. David Kertzmer claims that the definition of “Absentee” was given such a wide definition , that it even applied to Arabs that remained on their lands,

75,000 according to Kretzmer. The term was defines in Section 1 of the law as:203

“absentee” means

1. (1) a person who, at any time during the period between the 16th Kislev, 5708 (29

Novemeber 1947) and the day on which a declaration is published, under section 9(d) of

199 Ibid page 83. Land was often labeled as abandoned even if the owners of the land where there, just by the government official challenging the validity of land deeds? or if the owner was unlucky enough to be absent during the surveys. Firro argues that in order for some Druze to avoid paying Taxes to the Ottomans, they had put their land under the names of influential Feudal lords (who lived in districts capitals such as Damascus). Under Israeli authorities this would backfire, and as a result some Druze lost ownership of their land. See Firro, Kais M . 1999. The Druses in the Jewish State. Netherlands :Brill. 200 Ibid page 81. 201 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill page 129. 202 The actual numbers of Palestinian refugees fleeing their homes is a matter of controversy, Some put the numbers as high as 800,000. Morris, Benny. 1999. Righteous Victims. New York: Alfred. A. Knopf 203 English translation of Hebrew was taken from David Kretzmer, 1987. the legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press.

96 the Law and Administration Ordiance,(5708-1948) that the state emergency declared by

the Provisional Council of the State on the 10th of Iyar, 5708 (19th Mqy, 1948) has ceased

to exist, was the legal owner of any property situated in the area of Israel or enjoyed or

held it, wether by himself or through another, and who at any time during the said

period—

(i) was a national or citizen of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi-Arabia, Trans-

Jordan, Iraq or the or

(ii) was in one of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside the area of

Israel or

(iii) was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine

(a) for a place outside Palestine before the 27thAv,5708 (1 September 1948);or

(b) for a place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought to prevent the

establishing of the State of Israel or which fought against it after its establishment;

(2) a body of person which , at any time during the period specified in Paragraph (1), was

a legal owner of any property situated in the area of Israel or enjoyed or held such

property, wheter by itself or through another, and all the members, partners, shareholders,

directors or managers which are absentees within the meaning of paragraph (1) or the

management of the business of which is otherwise decisively controlled by such

absentees, or all the capital of which is in the hands of such absentees.

This according to Kretzmer made the remaining Arabs “present absentees.” This law was promptly followed by the Land Acquisition Law, this was to validate the de facto land

97 acquisition that resulted from military expansions, or from the expansions of Jewish settlements.

Kretzmer translates the law as follows:204

2. (a) Property in respect of which the Minister certifies by certificate under his hand—

(1) that on the 6th Nisan,5712 (1 April 1952) it was not in the possessions of

its owners; and

(2) that within the period between the 5th Iyar,5708 (14 May1948) and the

6th Nisan, 5712(1April 1952) it was used or assigned for purposes of

essential development, settlement or security; and

(3) that it is still required for any of these purposes—

shall vest in the Development Authority and be regarded as free from any

charge, and the Development Authority may forthwith take possession

therefore.

The Israeli authorities also utilized laws from previous colonizers/ occupiers of the land. Using a

British Mandatory ordinance of 1943, which legalized land acquisitions for “public purpose,” the

Israeli government authorized the Ministry of Finance to acquisition land under the justification of needing it for public development projects. 205 From the Ottomans the Israeli authorities borrowed the 1928 Land ordinance,

making it possible to register in the name of the state any land for which no claimant had come forward. The State Property Law of 1951 turned into state ‘national’ land all properties of those villages that had registered their lands in the name of the British high commissioner who was to function as a temporary custodian, i.e., until their proper registration could be completed. The 1948 war intervened, and those lands were transferred to the state of Israel—without the stipulation ‘on behalf of the village X.’206

204 Kretzmer, David. 1987. the legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press. 205 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill 206 Ibid page 132.

98 Firro goes on to argue that the entire Galilee region was specifically targeted for land expropriation in an attempt for the “Judaization of the Galilee,” which was characteristically

Arab.207 In order to break a possible “nucleus of Arab Nationalism within the Jewish state,”

David Ben-Gurion had proposed to create a Jewish majority by establishing as many Jewish settlements as possible. 208 The man responsible for acquiring land for these new Jewish settlements in the Galilee was Yosef Nahmani, who had been working since the early 1930s to establish ties between the Jewish underground organizations and the Druze elites. Based on his good relationship with Druze elites, Nahmani would go out “of his way to assure the Druzes that the Jews had no intentions to infringe upon the Druze ownership and that because of their friendly relations with the Zionists they could count on special treatment.” 209 However, counter to his promises Nahmani would utilize his connections with co-opted Druze elites to proceed with the “Judaization of the Galilee” as its principal architect. Firro discusses how the achievements of Nahmani were celebrated in the Knesset, and as a result of his tenure as the person in charge of expropriation of Arab land in the Glailee, Firro adds that “by April 1954, lands affected by the Israeli land laws in the villages inhabited by Druzes amounted to about

28,480 dunam. Bait Jan, Hurfaysh, and Sajour, which are entire Druze, lost 18,590 Dunam (Bait

Jan 13,000, Hurfaysh 2,950, and Sajour 2,640.”210 Firro goes on to describe the strategies used by Nahmani to acquire the land,

Still today, villagers recount vivid stories about how they lost their lands through the active interference of Nahmani. The case of the village of Buqay’a is a good example of the way Nahmani went about his land acquisitions at that period. In a leaflet addressed to ‘public opinion in Israel,’ the inhabitants of the village

207 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill page 134. The Galilee in this context means almost the entire region of the Galilee including upper, western Galilee, encompassing most of what is today referred to as northern Israel. This section was designated as part of the Arab state according to the UN partition plan of 1947. Refer to UN Partition resolution 181, November 29th 1947. 208 Ibid. 209 ibid page 134. 210 Ibid page 135.

99 protested …soon after, however, as villagers of Buqay’a claim, some of those who had signed the leaflet were found to have made a deal with Nahmani and in return for land he took from them for his new Jewish settlement to have accepted ‘absentee property.’ By putting their signature to the common protest (as those who could write and read) they had automatically come into Nahmani’s sight, who whereupon signaled them out for treatment-while some remained immune, inevitably there were others who fell victim to his carrot- and-stick schemes and began collaborating with him.211

Ben-Dor admits that the Druze were not spared from the catastrophic loss that befell all of the indigenous people of Palestine. As in the case of their Muslim and Christian counterparts, they lost their land due to the land expropriation policies by the state of Israel. He refers to

“many Druze complaints...because of the policy of the Israeli Government, encouraging large- scale Jewish settlement in the Galilee, and ensuring land for that purpose.”212

To most Arabs, land is an invaluable wealth; in an agriculture-based community where the majority of the population are farmers, it is considered the only viable source of livelihood.

Attachment to the land is found among all Arabs. Ben-Dor alludes to the importance of land to the livelihood of the Druze, “They have subsisted on a rural economy, but land in the mountains is scarce, making it difficult to support their families.”213 Land to the Druze is not only their livelihood; it is also their life. Jamal Maadi elaborates on the importance of land to the Druze community:

Land is an integral part of a Druze’s life. The Druze are traditionally farmers. In 1948 almost 90 % of the Druze were farmers. As a consequence of the creation of the state of Israel, land was confiscated throughout the Palestinian villages. The Druze villages did not escape this disaster; as much as 80% of land was confiscated from Druze villages. There was proportionally more land confiscated from Druze villages than from any other Arab villages. The Israeli authorities confiscated land from all the nineteen Druze villages. 214

211 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill page 135-136. 212 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill page 110. 213 Ibid page 2 214 Maadi, Jamal. 1994. Personal Interview. 23 June.

100 The Israeli authorities had several reasons for this large-scale land confiscation. The first is perhaps the most obvious one, which is to create new Israeli settlements on the confiscated land. Almost all Jewish settlements were built on confiscated Palestinian land. The Druze's land was especially prone to this loss because of the mountainous location of the villages. The isolated Druze land made perfect strategic locations for new Jewish settlements.

Second, the location of Druze villages in mountainous, secluded areas, also made them particularly vulnerable to confiscation because they made ideal locations for weapons storage facilities. The storage facilities would be remote from major centers of Jewish population. This would spare the authorities from having to deal with widespread demonstrations against the location of these military storage facilities near population centers. The Druze, as well as the general population, would not be enlightened about the contents of the storage facilities, in order for the authorities to minimize any protest from the Druze population, or those of the surrounding areas. When entering some Druze villages, these storage facilities are quite evident, for there is always maximum security around them.

The third and much more concealed objective of land confiscation fits into the state’s larger, long-term strategy for the Druze in Israel. The state can use the confiscation of Druze land to persuade Druze young men to abandon farming and serve as border police or prison guards.

After Israel confiscated most of the Druze lands, 90% of Druze had to work as laborers, police, and prison guards.215 Land expropriation wasn’t always used for new Jewish settlement, as can be seen by a 1963, Law of national Parks.216 This law which was set up to create national parks, or nature reserves effect several Druze villages in the upper Galilee and the Carmel. Firro argues that

215 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1976. Waqa Al-Druze fi Israel. Jerusalem. 216 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill.

101 Bait Jan again lost another 16,000 dunam because of the land laws and successive regulations, while future 26,000 dunam were affected by the Law of National Parks of 1963, which set out to create a number of natural reserves. It so happened that the areas selected for the ‘national’ parks directly affected the Druze in the upper Galilee and the Carmel. In other words, Bait Jan is now in the heart of a national park and Buqay’a, Ayn al Asad and Hurfaysh are on the edges, while and Daliat al Carmel are surrounded on all sides by the national park… Although the private lands within these areas remain legally in the possession of their holders, the National Parks law prohibits any kind of building to be carried out and restricts cultivation within these areas. 217

Whether the land was taken for the purpose of being a closed military zone, as mentioned earlier, or for the purpose of a national park, the strategy is clear; land was taken from the Druze villages even when not needed for new Jewish settlements, but for the reason of enforcing the economic dependency of Druze villages on the state.

The authorities stripped the Druze of the source of their traditional livelihood, their land, so that the majority had no better recourse than to work with the IDF. The Druze had little or virtually no educational background, so they were not able to fall back on anything else. In order to make a living and survive, the majority had no choice but to play right in to the hands of the

Israeli authorities.

As a result of the Druze having to give up land that they had owned for generations, there existed an imbalance between the population and the area of land. To remedy the situation, the state of Israel came up with a solution for Druze areas. This solution is what Ben-Dor terms a

"transition to a more diversified economy, relying partially on industry and services, either inside or outside the village...rather than exclusively in agriculture.”218 This policy coincided with a shortage in the labor force of Israel. The government made jobs readily attainable for Druze, especially those in the army. These benefits, however, were not without a price. The most

217 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill page 138. 218 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1979. The Druze in Israel : A political Study. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, page 111.

102 important repercussion was the complete Druze dependence on the government for their economic survival.

Another consequence of losing the land was the massive migration of workers to the cities. Druze villagers had to find alternatives to their traditional means of livelihood. Farmers had to move to the cities to seek jobs. This move from the village to the city had a drastic effect on the Druze. Ben-Dor explains, "The geographic and psychological distance of some workers from the village tends to weaken somewhat their sense of belonging to a kinship group.”219

Depriving the Druze community from their traditional livelihood by land expropriation was one tool that was utilized by the state in order to make the Druze community more economically dependent on the state. Land confiscations, along with the inadequate education system, did limit the options young Druze men had for upward social mobility. Serving in the security industry, whether in the military or the police force, provided an option for young Druze for economic viability as well as a chance for social mobility. This, in fact, would lead the Druze community in general to be more dependent on the state for survival.

219 Ibid page 114

103 CHAPTER 5

ISRAELI CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS POLICIES:

5.1. Separation from Islam: Separate Druze Religious Courts

As stated above, there were already preexisting tensions between the Druze and other

Muslims. Albert Hourani writes:

While Iblad and Zaydi doctrines and Laws were not very different from those of the Sunnis, among the Druzes and Nusayris the divergences reached a point where they were regarded by Sunni jurists as lying at best on the very margin of Islam, and under the there was a period when they were persecuted.220

Even with all this tension, until fairly recently, the Islamic roots of the Druze religion were never disputed.221 (See chapter 3 for a detailed exposition of the Islamic roots of Druze faith). Most

Druze Ukal (initiated) would even argue that not only are the Druze Muslim, but they are the keepers of the true message of Islam.

Ruling powers would capitalize on such divisions in order to prevent the development of a closely-knit society that could rival their power. Although the Israeli authorities were not the first to use such divisions and even highlight them, I would argue that they went the furthest in actually inventing a tradition for the Druze.

When it came to cultivating an “invented tradition’” for the Druze, religion was to be the fundamental foundation. Nissim Dana argues that:

The Druze have no national affinity beyond the realm of religion, whose value cannot be imparted to all members of the community. Similarly they have almost no special culture of their own, since there is no great difference between them and the Arab society insofar as language, dress, food, or even literature, popular art, or any other cultural areas are concerned.222

220 Hourani, Albert. 1991. A history of the Arab Peoples. London: MJF Books, page 186. 221 See Sami Makarem, Wafiq Ghazery, Adel Taqey el –Din, Mohamad ali Zughbi, Abas abu Muslih. 222 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page 108.

104 This argument highlights the fact that religion is the main aspect of the invented Druze identity.

In order to create a unique identity for them, the Israeli state saw that it is essential to separate them from Islam. De-linking the Druze religion from Islam is a necessary step for separating the

Druze altogether from their Arab brethren.

Today, some Druze, such as Salman Fallah, who was in charge of Druze education, go as far as to argue that there is no special bond between the Druze religion and Islam. Fallah claims that the Druze religion is really based on the metaphysical and modern philosophical interpretations of classical Greek philosophies. He argues that there is no stronger link between the Druze religion and Islam than there is between the Druze religion and Christianity or

Judaism. According to him, the Druze regard Muslims as they regard Christians and Jews.223

Another Druze, who is quoted on the official web site of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claims that

The Druze consider their faith to be a new interpretation of the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, . For them, the traditional story of the Creation is a parable, which describes not as the first human being, but as the first person to believe in one god. Since then, the idea of monotheism has been disseminated by "emissaries" or prophets, guided by "mentors" who embody the spirit of monotheism. The mentors and prophets come from all three religions, and include Jethro and Moses, and of Nazareth, and Salman the Persian and Mohammad all of the same monotheistic idea. In addition, the Druze hold other influential people -- regardless of their religion -- in great esteem, as the advocates of and belief in one god. These include the Egyptian Akhenaton, the Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and Alexander the Great.224

It is clear that the author is trying to dismiss any special connection between the Druze faith and

Islam.

There are counter arguments to this as well, and they are represented by the Druze

Initiative Committee. Nabieh Al Kassem argues that there was an organized attempt by some of

223 Fallah, Salman. 2002. Personal Interview. 17 March. 224 Dr. Naim Aridi ;”The Druze in Israel”. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs official web site http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa

105 the co-opted Druze elites to misrepresent and even deny the Islamic origins of the Druze religion.

He argues that this is another example of trying to de-link the Druze from their Arab and Islamic roots.225 In order to accomplish such a deed, the Israeli authority found it necessary to establish a separate entity to deal with the Druze’s civil affairs.

In 1959, the Israeli state took a step in this direction by separating the Druze religious courts from the Islamic religious courts. The state recognized the Druze as a separate religious community, with their own religious courts that had jurisdiction in civil affairs. In other words, the Druze started to enjoy the same rights that the Druze in Lebanon had already enjoyed for years

Some Druze, specially the religious leadership, perceived this autonomy of their religious courts as an advantage. They had almost complete control of issues pertaining to the civil affairs of the Druze community. This autonomy would also provide the religious leadership of the

Druze community with an added source of power over their community. Having these separate religious courts, which were presided over by religious leaders, gave these leaders an added sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Although the state of Israeli prides itself on being a secular democracy, the only such one in the Middle East, it nevertheless still grants jurisdiction to these religious courts when it comes to civil matters concerning Druze. Indeed, it is unusual for religious and spiritual leaders to have such power, especially within the confines of a secular democratic state.226 Some critics might argue that this is the benefit that was reaped by the religious leadership as a result of their cooperation with the Israeli authorities. The

225 Based on author’s interview with Nabieh el Kassem, and members of the Druze initiative committee 226 India, another secular democracy, too recognizes religious civil laws for several religious communities but applies them through regular courts. For a comparison of the Israeli and Indian systems, see the chapter by Galanter And Krishnan in Gerald Larson (ed.) Religion and Personal Law in Secular India. Bloomington: University Press.

106 cooperation allowed them to survive as the leaders of the community with their powers intact in the state, rather than becoming obsolete or retaining very limited power within the community.

The Druze Initiative Committee asserts that during the 1950s the Israeli authorities created special religious courts filled with appointed Druze agents who were loyal to the state.

The authorities appointed three judges: Sheikh Kamel Tarif, Atef Al Asaad, and Naser El

Deen. These appointments are seen as an attempt by the Israeli authorities to interfere with every aspect of Druze life, especially the religious. The Druze Initiative Committee claims that these courts are being manipulated in order to impose their own agenda on the Druze population.

The authorities have abolished Eid-al-Fitter () as a Druze religious holiday and instead declared the annual visit to prophet Shuayb's tomb, which used to be a minor affair, as an official

Druze holiday. These tactics clearly seem to be aimed at creating a detachment of Druze from

Islam.

A more recent attempt at further separating the Druze faith from any Islamic association is the changing of the thousand-year-old traditions of the religious burial ceremony. In 1989, appointed Druze religious Judges, headed by Amin Tarif, changed the official ceremony and service. The changes were made to remove any terms or phrases that could show similarities with an Islamic service.227 A key phrase that was omitted from the older version is:

“you are at the burial of a Muslim man/woman.”228 While the original prayer included references to the prophet Mohammad as the last and final prophet, the more recent prayer took away that phrase all together replacing it with a phrase refereeing to Mohammad as a master. Nowhere in the new prayer is any reference to Mohammad as a prophet. While the early cohorts of

Mohammad received some acknowledgment and respect in the original prayer service, they were

227 Refer to the Appendix. The original versions of the official prayer for the dead as well as the newer adopted version are shown. 228 Ibid.

107 completely omitted from the recent one. The Fatihia, which used to be recited out loud in the original burial ceremony, was now supposed to be read only by each person to himself..

A few years later, a group calling itself the Zionist Druze movement published an article calling for altering further the for the dead that are performed during the religious burial service for Druze.229 They were calling for an end to the custom that was being followed by the

Druze community of placing the head of the deceased in the direction of Mecca, followed by recital of Koranic verses. The group’s main objection was that the “current burial services leaves the impression that the Druze are Muslims, which isn’t true.”230 Their argument was that the

Druze community, fearing persecution, utilized the principals of Takhyah in order to conform to the Islamic burial procedures; however, in a democracy such as Israel, where freedom of religion is encouraged, the Druze should practice their own burial ceremony.231

This attempt at altering the burial procedures drew protests from several individual religious Druze. Sheikh Farhad Kassem Farhad wrote:

It is amazing that those who would proudly refer to themselves as Zionist Druze would call for the changing of the Burial prayers that the Druze community has been using since its establishment. How dare they say that the brave Druze who have faced off against such powerful enemies such as the colonial British rulers, could change their prayer service because of the principal of Takhyah.232

Turki Amer is even more severe in his criticism. He asks the Druze spiritual leadership to expel

Dr. Jaber Abu Rukon, along with those referring to themselves as the Druze Zionists, from the community all together.233

229 Al-Sonarah, February 21, 1992 Dr. Jaber Abu Rokon. 230 Ibid. Translation by the author 231 Ibid 232 Authors translation, Al Sindayanah publication of the Druze Initiative committee 1993. page 30 233 Ibid.

108

5.2. Cultural, Religious, and Military Monuments and Ceremonies:

Photo 7: Makaam Nabi Shuayb adorned by Israeli flags as well as Druze flags.234

• A Separate Druze Holiday:

The separation of religious courts was the first step in the attempt at severing the connection between the Druze and the rest of the Arabs and Muslims. A more observable indication of the real motivation of the authorities can be seen in their attempt to impose purely

234 Postcard purchased by the author from a souvenir shop at the Makaam Nabi Shuayb. March 2002.

109 Druze holidays. The Druze community, for instance, was forced by the authorities in 1956 to choose between celebrating the Nabi Shuayb Day, which is a commemoration of the Druze prophet Shuayb, or to continue to celebrate Eid-al-Fitter with the rest of the Muslims.235 Druze elites chose the visitation to the tomb of the prophet Shuayb, which became an exclusive Druze holiday. Druze celebrate the visitation to the burial site on April 25 every year. The site had been the cause of a historic controversy between the Druze religious leadership and the high

Muslim council regarding the ownership and the registration of the burial site. Once the state of

Israel was created, the property rights to the site were given to the Druze leadership.236 Nissim

Dana highlights the Israeli government’s financial contribution to improving the site: “many improvements were added with the help of government institutions: a road leading to the was paved, electricity and water were installed.”237 Ensuring that this important religious site has proper running water and electricity in some cases came long before these same indispensable services were extended to many Druze villages. Some Druze villages are indeed still without these services.238 This is indicative of the Israeli policy to co-opt Druze elites through religious symbolism rather than meeting all the needs of the Druze population.

The visitation to the burial ground of the Nabi Shuayb is marked along with a week of festivities celebrating Druze cultural week. Elaborating on these ceremonies, Nissim Dana states:

“Today, it is customary to conduct festival annually on April 25. The state has even acknowledged the four days (April 25-28) as an official Druze holiday.”239 During these celebrations, military processions are always conducted and are usually attended by a delegation of high-ranking military officers from the IDF as well as some representative of the Israeli

235 Salman Taweel, Journalist. March 2002 236 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press. 237 Ibid page 29 238 Ben-Dor The Druze Minority in Israel in the mid 1990s Jerusalem center for public affairs. 239 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page30.

110 leadership. Thus the week accentuates the distinctiveness of the Druze religion as well as their distinct military status.

111

• From A Star to a Flag:

Photo 8: Druze Star and Druze Flag.

Druze buildings and monuments are always adorned by Israeli flags as well as a religious

Druze flag. Israeli flags are commonly flown atop houses in all Druze villages, something that is very rare among the other Arab villages, aside from official governmental buildings. The Druze have always had a star associated with the religion. The five colors associated with the star represent each of the ministers under Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, the founder of the Druze religion in 405 of the Islamic calendar. The colors are: green, representing the first head of the religious community, Imam Hamzah; red, representing the second Hakim, Tamimi; yellow, representing the third Hakim, Mohammad Bin Wahab; blue representing the fourth Hakim,

Salama bin Wahab Al Samarai and white, representing the fifth Hakim, Ali bin Ahmad Al- Taay.

Among the Druze in Israel, the Druze star became much more than a , and it was converted into a flag, which represents the Druze as a sub-national group. This use of the Druze Star parallels the Star of David’s transformation from a religious symbol to a national

112 symbol on the Israeli flag. In a similar way, the Druze star was transformed into a flag representing the Druze as a separate nation. This flag would first be used as the flag of the Druze regiment in 1959. Flags are usually considered the most basic symbols of separate national identity. The IDF Druze unit uses the flag as a symbol of their unit with a Star of David incorporated in the flag, to highlight the bond between the Druze and the Jewish state. This flag demonstrates the combination of separate Druze cultural nationalism combined with loyal Israeli civic nationalism that the Israeli state cultivates among the Druze.

Photo 9: Druze Flag with the Star of David. 240

Some Druze groups have come up with alternative symbolic meanings to the five colors of the star. These new representations attempt to de-emphasize any link to the Islamic origins of the star. Newer, more Christian and western influenced interpretations of the colors, are emphasized. This could be only interpreted as an attempt to de-link the Druze from any association with Islam, and focus on a more western connection. According to the Israeli Druze society, the five colors of the flag represent the five wise prophets of Al-Mowahideen

(Unitarians):

240 http://www6.snunit.k12.il/druz/catalog.html

113 1) Green (Al-Akl) symbolizes “the mind,” Christ's consciousness, the pristine

mirror of truth, Plato's sun whose light makes knowledge of the truth possible.

2) Red (Al-) symbolizes “the soul,” the moon (the gentle reflector of the sun)

the receiver of the light, and the shaheed of the truth in every age.

3) Yellow (Al-Kalima) symbolizes “the word”, who's the mediator between

Plato's realm of eternity and Aristotle's realm of material existence. “The word,”

after all is the purest form of expression and the softest embodiment of the truth.

4) Blue (Al-Sabik) symbolizes the potential, the mental power of the will to be-

come.

5) White (Al-Tali) symbolizes the actualization of the potential, the be-coming of

the blue power, the full materialization of Plato's world of forms in the world of

matter.241

Although these Druze flags are commonplace in Israeli Druze villages, they are non-existent in

Druze communities outside Israel. This association of the religious star with a flag as a national symbol is something completely unique to the Druze communities living in Israel.

241 Israel Druze society http://www.geocities.com/Baja/Outback/9277/d5.htm

114

Photo 10: Shaul Mofaz, The head of the IDF in a visit to a Druze Museum. 242

• Museums and Cultural Centers

In almost every single Druze village in Israel, a Druze cultural center or a museum for

Druze heritage exists. These cultural centers seek to “reinforce and deepen the Druze -Jewish relations.”243 These cultural museums were not centers of ongoing cultural activities and events, but more ornamental in purpose. Most are only open for a few days during the year and only for special ceremonial activities. This explains why it was hard for me to visit them during my field research despite my many attempts. Journalist Deborah Rosenbloom ran into similar problems when she tried to visit the Alamir Museum of Druze heritage in the village of Horfish, which she found closed. All these museums and monuments are mere political decorations seeking to reinforce the communal identity of the Druze.

242 Postcard purchased by author at a souvenir shop, March 2002. 243 Debrah Rosenbloom, The source Israeli online magazine. http://www.thesourceisraeli.com/issue40/article.shtml?tour

115 I was able to get in contact with Wahid Maadi, the director of a Druze cultural center in le Mughaar. Mr. Maadi was kind enough to open the cultural center and allow me in. The contents of the museum consisted mostly of a collection of his father’s, Marzouk Maadi, correspondence with Jewish officials, which predate the creation of the state of Israel, as well as pictures of Marzouk Maadi with prominent Israeli officials. A few daggers and swords also adorned the museum.

In an interview with the San Diego Jewish Press-Heritage in Jan 15, 1999, in an article significantly entitled the “Friendly Arabs of Daliyat el Karmil,” the mayor of the village, Ramzi

Halaby, discusses the proposal for a new Druze cultural center in his village. Halaby is quoted in the newspaper as having said, “I think we can market our special, traditional food, and the stories about our village, and the way that we make the pita bread and the lamb.”244 The mayor also added, “we have to develop more systems and an information center and a museum and other things that a tourist would like to see here. Right now the closest hotels are in Haifa, but if bed and breakfast establishments are developed within this village of 13,000, tourists will be able to spend more than a few hours here.”245 This provides us with an insight as to the real motivations behind the cooperation of Druze elites with these policies. The purpose of these cultural centers is not to document, or even display, the cultural heritage of the Druze. Rather these centers have purely politically decorative purposes: they serve the interest of the state by creating a sense of separate Druze culture, and they serve the interests of the Druze elites who benefit in the form of potential tourism.

The house of the Druze martyr in Daliyat el Karmil is perhaps the most prominent symbol of Druze–Israeli cooperation. It was set up as a museum to commemorate the fallen

244 Donald Harrison .Jews & Druze: The 'friendly Arabs' of Daliyat al Karmil San Diego Jewish Press-Heritage Jan. 15, 245 Ibid

116 Druze soldiers who lost their lives while serving in the IDF. For its efforts in serving the state, the Druze unit was awarded the best battalion award for the year 2001. Captain Halabi Rafaat, a

Druze serving in the IDF, argues that “The Druze are educated from a young age that they are an integral part of Israeli society, and thus, they must contribute to the IDF, like every other Israeli citizen and provide service to their country.”246As in the simultaneous celebration of Druze religious holidays and military pomp, this commemoration of Druze military service through a museum illustrates the calculated blending of distinct cultural nationalism and unified civil nationalism among the Israeli Druze.

246 IDF spokesperson jan 28, 2003 Kokhaviv publications http:///www.kokhavivpublications.com/2003/israel/01/0301281504.html

117 • Druze Soldiers Day:

Photo 11: Current Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon at the Druze village of Kasra August 17th,2004 in a ceremony commemorating the 2nd annual Druze soldiers Day.247

Druze Soldiers day was first commemorated in August 2003. One of the more recent invented tradition, was set up as a tribute for the contributions of Druze soldiers to the state of

Israel. This is yet another ceremony to highlight the special bond or “blood link” between the

Druze and the Jews as comrades in arms, both fighting, sacrificing in protecting the state of

Israel. Describing the Druze soldiers are “brothers in arms” Sharon describes the long relationship between the two people by saying

the inhabitants of the state of Israel owe the Druze Sector a debt of gratitude. Druze fighters operated in the Jewish underground movements even during the riots of 1936-1939, and during the War of Independence, Druze fighters from villages in the Galilee joined the IDF. Since then, the Druze soldier – whose courage and contribution to the state is being honored today – has served as a cornerstone of all branches of the Israeli security system.248

247 The official website of the Prime Minister’s office; http://www.pmo.gov.il/nr/exeres/9F1E3FD9-54CC-4651- B774-C2A4F7096018.htm. The Israeli Prime minister is standing in front of an Israeli flag and a Druze flag. 248 Ariel Sharon’s speech from the official website of the Prime Minister’s office; http://www.pmo.gov.il/nr/exeres/9F1E3FD9-54CC-4651-B774-C2A4F7096018.htm

118 Sharon proceeded to reaffirm the gratitude to not only those in the military, but the entire Druze community as a whole

Druze Soldier Day is a day on which we should not only pay our respects to soldiers, but to the entire Druze sector, a sector whose internal cohesion, pride and nurturing of its unique legacy can serve as an example to other sectors in Israel. In praise of your sector it will be said that, in addition to preserving your traditional values, you also look to the future.249

Sharon’s praise for the entire community is indicative of the state’s continuous emphasis on the

“unique legacy” or distinction from the rest of the Arabs. This ceremony, like many others serves as another instance to celebrate tributes for the distinctiveness of the Druze as a separate culture, and a commemoration of the special bond or blood ties between the two people. Sharon states

The state of Israel was the first to recognize the Druze in Israel as a separate sector. Before then, during the Turkish and British periods, the authorities refused to recognize the religious and cultural uniqueness of the Druze.250

Sharon expressing the consistent Policy of the state that the Druze constitute a “separate sector.”

Therefore they are not Arabs and owe no loyalty to the Arabs, but rather due to the special

“blood pact” are connected to and dependent on the state of Israel. For only under the state of

Israel are they recognized as a “separate sector.”

249 Ibid 250 Ibid.

119 5.3. Separation of Druze Education, and the Creation of a “Druze Culture”

Hobsbawm argues that “Indeed, more often than not the discovery of popular tradition and its transformation into the “national tradition” of some peasant people forgotten by history, was the work of enthusiasts from the (foreign) ruling class or elite.”251 Hobsbawm is referring to the creation of national traditions by the elites. It can be argued that in the case of the creation of a Druze tradition, the Druze elites were helped, and even coerced, through this process by the Israeli rulers.

In 1949, the newly created state of Israel assigned Dr. H. Hirschberg to write a report on the status of the non-Jewish population in the state.252 This was part of an inter-ministerial committee, which was set up to provide guidelines for dealing with the non-Jewish population.253

Hirschberg was to come up with recommendations on how to integrate the Arabs into the Jewish state. Looking at political, economic, judicial and educational polices and how they could be utilized to facilitate such a task, he concluded that the priority should be to prevent Arab minorities from forming a single group which would “be Arab in its national identify and

Muslim in its religion.”254 Hirschberg argued that the main tool in preventing this unity would be education. He argued that if all the minorities would fall under a single Arab system, this would be a “dangerous step fostering one Arab block and giving birth to Arab nationalist feelings among its youth…We should give every ethnic community its own school system in order to

251 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1980 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990) page 102. 252 Israeli State Archives (Jerusalem), State papers of the Foreign Ministry /2402/28 Dr. H. Hirschberg to Palmon, 18th October 1949. 253 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill. 254 Ibid, page 102

120 prevent them from feeling as one Arab entity.”255 The only way to counter that unifying identity,

Hirschberg argued, would be to divide them into different independent groups.256

Hirshberg recommended as early as 1949 that a Druze curriculum be created which is separate from the Arab curriculum. The authorities didn’t see urgency for this until the 1960s.

Until then, Arab nationalist voices protesting from within the Druze community could be controlled by the appointed community leaders and co-opted sheikhs. During the 1960s there was a rise in Druze intellectuals protesting the authority of the tribal chiefs and the policies of the state of Israel. During this period, the authorities felt a need to re-evaluate the current Druze educational system. The Education Ministry highlighted three areas of concern when it came to

Druze education: “the lack of separate Druze secondary schools; the predominance of non-Druze teachers in Druze schools, and the lack of a special curriculum for Druzes.”257 Using these areas of concern as justification, the Ministry of education, decided to

build a first Druze school, between Yarka, and , in the western Galilee, and to turn the school in Isfiya into a comprehensive one, projects were specifically aimed at reducing the number of Druzes in the Arab Orthodox college in Haifa and the secondary school in Kufr Yassif (both considered to be producing Arab Palestinian Nationalism).258

A greater sense of urgency was felt after 1974, when the protest of Druze intellectuals, spearheaded by the Druze Initiative Committee, which was founded in 1972, came to a peak.

Druze loyalty was put into doubt as a result of events which, on 25th of April, 1974, culminated in Amin Tarif, spiritual head of the Druze community in Israel, “agreeing to recognize Eid-al-

Fitter as well as promising to restore it as an official Druze holiday the following year. There

255 Ibid. 256 Ibid. 257 Ibid, page 226 258 Ibid.

121 were also promises made to officially recognize the Druze as Arabs.”259 The authorities decided it was time to deal with the problem that is undermining the loyalty of the Druze community towards the state. As a result, two committees were set up to come up with proposals to deal with the Druze community. The office of the prime minister’s advisor for minority affairs appointed

Gabriel Ben-Dor as a head of acommittee to study and recommend a policy, which would facilitate the integration of the Druze into Israeli society more completely. The other committee was made up of Knesset members headed by Avraham Schecterman.260 This committee, in its report to the Knesset in 1975, put greater emphasis on the role of the IDF as a means of facilitating integration of the Druze community into Israeli society. The argued for

the common fate and the identification of the Druzes in the country with the state of Israel. The blood partnership is a thorn in the eyes of our enemies who are conducting insolent in order to harm it. This matter needs urgently to be dealt with in order to overcome their destructive influence, which could threaten the achievements of dozens of years.261

The Ben-Dor report, presented in November 1974, focused more on the educational program as a means to integrate the Druze community into Israeli society. The report placing a much greater emphasis on the role of education in reaffirming “Israeli-Druze consciousness” by stating:

The committee believes that the state of Israel has underestimated the necessity of the education for the Israeli-Druze consciousness and that [the state] has done little to educate and inculcate the Druze youth with Israeli-Druze consciousness. This has done damage to the state and its image. When the compulsory conscription’s law was applied on the whole Druze community, the state should have realized it needed also to encourage the intellectuals, to develop the foundation of Israeli-Druze consciousness as an ideological- cognitive basis that could provide Druze youth with a logical explanation of and psychological background to his complete identification with the state and his readiness to fight for its cause, and to preserve meanwhile his Druze particularity. The committee believes that the present curriculum in the Druze schools and the way of imparting it to the Druze child and teenager does not contribute to the deepening of Druze-Jewish brotherhood…preparing an independent Druze curriculum with

259 Nabih Al Kassem, author’s interview 1993. 260 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill. 261 Ibid page 214-215

122 its own texts is of crucial significance, and will serve the continuation of the community’s particularist existence.262

The Israeli authorities justified starting the Druze education program by arguing that the traditional Arab studies program paid little attention to Druze leaders, poets, and other important

Druze figures and therefore provided no role models for the Druze students at the primary and secondary level. The authorities wanted to establish a separate system of education, with emphasis on Druze history and tradition. Ben-Dor justifies the actions of the government by stating

Education also emphasizes and sharpens another set of imbalances and strains, those relating to identity, citizenship, religion and language. Druze children go to Israeli schools, but many of them are in classes containing a sizeable proportion of Arab children. Since they are Arabic-speaking, they are subject to the same curriculum as Arab children, a curriculum that gives rise to numerous complaints as to the lack of a Druze content in terms of history, literature, not to mention the generally lower standards of the Arab schools as compared to their Jewish counterparts. In many Druze villages, a movement has arisen to replace Arab teachers with Druze ones, and in 1968-1969 the Ministry of Education organized a teachers' training course for Druze veterans, in order to satisfy the demand for Druze teachers. Several Druze intellectuals initiated the writing of a textbook of Druze history. The Ministry of Education, encouraged by some Druze leaders, offered to initiate the teaching of the Druze religion in schools, either in the school-building or in the Kilwas, under the direction of Druze religious leaders.263

The state argued that the education in the Druze sector was lacking because Druze students and

Druze schools were dependent on Arab teachers. The state decided to increase the number of

Druze teachers who were much more qualified than Arabs to teach Druze culture and who, the

Ministry of Education asserted, would be more capable of teaching Druze students in general.264

The state argued that Druze teachers formed only 38% of all the teachers in the Druze villages.265

262 The Knesset Report, as quoted in Firro page 227. 263 Galeb Saif, in the Initiative Druze Committee publication" Al Zytoonah" Jan 1992, page 23, gives specific examples from several government authors’ text books, (which are being utilized in teaching Druze education of history) which contain several errors, or fallacies, about the history of the Druze people. One such example is having geographical regions in reverse of their actual geographical order. 264 Ibid. 265 The development of education in the Druze community in Israel, 1948/9- 1968/0 as quoted in Firro. 1999. The

123 To remedy the problem, the Ministry of Education, decided to replace non-Druze teachers by

“giving teaching jobs to discharged army veterans and women with high school certificates and within one year the percentage of Druze teachers rose from 38 to 45new teachers selected from the army veterans were screened by the (Israeli domestic branch of the secret service).”266 The consequence of this action is that non-Druze qualified teachers were replaced by much less qualified Druze.

The need for the Druze to be more knowledgeable about their particularism and their own identity as a people was used by the government to justify creating a completely fraudulent

Druze history program.267 This program would give the new generation of Druze a new but false identity, which has no link to its Arab origins and bonds.

Gabriel Ben-Dor was instrumental in separating Druze education from the Arab sector.

He justifies the need for a separate Druze education curriculum as follows:

In the past, most Druze schools, where the language of instruction is in Arabic, used the modes and materials of the Arab sector, which obviously did not contribute to the integration of the Druze into the mainstream of Israeli culture. The only difference as compared with the Arab system used to be a small weekly course of instruction in Druze cultural and religious heritage, which was quite insufficient. If the recommendations of the commission, which have been accepted by the Minister of Education, are truly implemented, the newly reformed system will feature a set of ideas and materials, which are basically identical to the Jewish system, only with differences in language. However, the main idea is to follow the pattern of education in the mainstream of Israeli society as closely as possible, hence creating a standard of being Israeli, while allowing for a different language and cultural-religious background.268

Ben–Dor was proposing that the Druze be included in the state-building process because as non-

Jews they couldn’t be involved in the nation building. In order for them to participate effectively

Druzes in the Jewish State; page 226. 266 Ibid. 267 Mayer, Egon. 1975. "Becoming Modern in Bayt al-Shabab," The Middle East Journal 29: 279-94; p. 293. 268 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1995. “The Druze Minority in Israel in the Mid-1990s.” Jerusalem center for public affairs June 1 : 4 . http://www.jcpa.org/jl/hit06.htm

124 in the state-building process they have to be socialized into the “standard for being Israeli” through the institutionalizing mechanism of a state run educational system. He argues that there needs to be “an Israeli super-identity, incorporating Druze history and tradition as well as citizenship in a modern nation-state.”269 Ben-Dor admits that this ultimate goal is still elusive; however, he maintains that this effort is

A modest attempt to create a situation where in practice Jews and Druze will learn more or less the same things, hence not only preparing them for life to a more equal extent, but also equipping them with more similar pieces of knowledge and heritage than ever in the past (and all this without destroying the unique heritage of each). If this particular effort is successful, perhaps the ideas of equality and integration will receive a substantial boost because they will finally be proven feasible in practice.270

This is seen from his perspective as a test case of integration into Israeli society. However, similar attempts were not made with any other group. Equality and integration alone do not justify the need for removing Druze education from that of the Arab sector, since ideally, if complete integration is the ultimate goal for all the Israeli citizens, why not just unify the educational system and impose the same standards on all the citizens?

Dr. Salman Fallah, who became the first Druze in charge of Druze education at the

Ministry of Education in 1979, maintains that the Druze themselves asked that Druze education be separated from the ministry for Arab education.271 Fallah argues that the status of Druze education was relatively inferior to their Muslim and Christian counterparts. He points to the fact that since the creation of the state of Israel until the 1966-67 school year, only 11 Druze completed their university education. Concerned with this appalling condition of Druze education, the community started to blame the ministry of Arab education. Fallah argued that the community’s criticism of the Arab ministries of education coincided with a growing politicized

269 Ibid. 270 Ibid. 271 Fallah, Salman. 2002. Personal Interview. 17 March.

125 Druze movement among the younger generations. Fallah further argued that there was a consensus among Druze that a separation from the Arab Ministry of Education was the solution.

Fallah pointed out that this new politicized Druze awareness didn’t just occur in the fields of education, but it also occurred in every field and area that was related to governmental agencies or ministries. Fallah argues that these were the main reasons behind the two committees that were set up to study the situation of Druze education in the Israeli state.272

Fallah claims that ever since Druze education was separated from Arab education, the status of

Druze education has improved considerably.

The new ministry of Druze education would also start a new program of teaching Druze culture. To that end, Druze teachers would receive a special training, a feature that wasn’t available when the Druze education department was under the ministry of Arab education. The purpose of teaching Druze students about their community’s history, or their valuable “Druze heritage,” was regarded by Fallah as necessary for strengthening their special consciousness as

Druze. This new consciousness can only be strengthened at the expense of their Arab consciousness.

Some Druze skeptics point out that Salman Fallah was co-opted by the Israeli state and that he was very accommodating as far as the larger scheme designed by the authorities. These critics point to the fact that Salman Fallah gained a lot personally and professionally in return for furthering Israeli objectives.273 He was the first non-Jew to be awarded the distinction of being the Israeli educator of the year in 1990, an honor that hasn’t been granted since to any other non-

Jew. It is also interesting to note that during the ceremony, the award was actually presented to

Sheikh Amin Tariff, the spiritual leader of the Druze community, with Salman Fallah present.

272 The two committees were discussed earlier as a response to the increasingly politicized Druze resistance movement headed by the Druze Initiative Committee. 273 Druze Initiative Committee Members. 2002. Personal Interviews. 25 March.

126 The symbolism is obvious: the award seemed to be given to the entire Druze community. In several Druze villages, parallel celebrations that were attended by the Minister of Education, along with Salman Fallah and other dignitaries from the Druze community, also took place.274

Muhammad Nafaa, the secretary of the Communist Party in the village of Ynauh, claims that there are a lot of these Druze leaders who are co-opted by the Israeli authorities.275 It is also important to note that a publishing company that is associated with the Israeli Ministry of

Defense published Salman Fallah’s most recent book on the Druze in the Middle East.

Other noteworthy Druze who were instrumental in carrying out the plan of creating a separate “Israeli -Druze consciousness” established what they called a “Druze league” on

January 15th 1967. The goals of this league are: the struggle “for full equality among the citizens of the state,” furthering the “particularistic Druze character and its friendly relation with the

Jewish people,” and “providing the Druze youth with Israeli-national education…meanwhile teachers in the league together with some students had began a campaign against the “Arab departments.”276

The league would propose a program in order to accomplish these goals in ten years. In this program they demand the “introduction of the subject of the ancient and newly established ties between the Jewish people and the Druze community in the curricula of the Hebrew and

Druze schools.”277 What is perhaps more interesting is the list of members of this Druze league, among them the Druze representative of the Teachers Trade Union, Amal Nasser Al-Din, who would become in 1973 a member of the Knesset in the Likud Party. Another important member of this league, Zaydan Atashi, would later become the Israeli Consul to the . Farhan

274 FEY el torath wa tarbeyah12 edition September 1991. 275 Nafaa, Mohammad. 2002. Personal Interview. 14 March. Nafaa is the Secretary of the Communist Party. 276 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill, page 187. 277 Ibid.

127 Tarif, the father of Salih Tarif and member in the Knesset since 1984, was also a founding member of this Druze league. These are just a few examples of Druze elites who have benefited from cooperating with Israeli authorities in promoting an “Israeli-Druze consciousness.”278

Perhaps the most important aspect of this attempt is the production of textbooks in order to reinforce the idea of a “blood-link” as well as the “friendly ties” between the Druze and the

Jewish people. To emphasize the particularism and the uniqueness of the Druze as a people to a young generation of Druze children, textbooks that reflect this idea were published. The importance of school textbooks is highlighted by Arnon Groiss:

Textbooks in general, particularly in primary schools, play a socializing role in the spirit of the values prevalent in a given society. Textbooks also serve other purposes. For instance, in non-democratic societies they are used by the leadership as a means to promote values it deems important, and also as a means to strengthen the ties between the governing authority and its subjects.279

In the case of the Druze, the impact of such textbooks are much more drastic. Since the younger generation cannot have access to the sacred text, they are just given a superficial introduction to their faith. Therefore, the socializing effect of these textbooks plays a very important role in the creation of a Druze identity. Most books about Druze heritage that are authorized by the ministry of education for the purpose of teaching Druze culture and heritage had an introduction written by Salman Fallah. One such book is written by Attaa Halabi, The

General Characteristics of Druze villages. 280 In the opening pages, Halabi suggests that the

Druze geographical and national committee, whose members include Salman Fallah, approved the book. Nayef Salim, a member of the parents associations, was concerned when he read the book and as a result a study was appointed by the organizations of parents associations in several

278 Ibid. 279 Groiss, Arnon. 2001. “The Significance of the new Palestinian Textbooks.” Center for monitoring the Impact of Peace;held jointly by CMIP and the Truman Institute, Hebrew University, January 4, 2001 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/texts2002.html 280 Halabi, Attaa. 1985. Al qaryah al durziyah, malameh aama. Jersualem.

128 villages including Yarka, al akyah, and Abu Snan. The study recommended that this book be banned. The study gave several examples of how the book often erroneous assertions were mostly dedicated to the idea that the Druze are a separate diverse people from their Arab neighbors. Here is a sample of Salim’s critique of the Halabi study:

on page 16 of the book, Attaa [Halabi] writes that “all Druze villages are similar whereas they are distinctly different than the other villages of the other minorities.” and he follows that by arguing on page 38 that ”we see in the other minorities’ villages in our area large buildings which are very apparent, such as churches, or mosques, or other unnatural buildings; however, these buildings don’t appear in our Druze villages.” Following this in the questions section, on page 39, Attaa poses the following questions “What are the main characteristics of the Druze village? How can you distinguish between a Druze village and a Muslim village? How can you distinguish between a Druze village and a Christian village?” There is also a description of the different kinds of Druze villages, which on page 19, Attaa classifies according to the percentage of Druze residents. He lists villages as belonging to the following categories” Druze villages, Muslim villages, Christian villages, Sharkasian villages, and Jewish villages. This is followed up in the questions sections by questions such as “What is the population of our village?” or, “Divide the population along religious affiliation?”281 (Translated by the author)

What was even more shocking was the fact that a book about the geography of the Druze villages had several mistakes about the geographical regions of the Druze villages. One such example appears on page 17, where Halabi claims that “Druze villages are widespread in Israel from the Carmel region in the north then to the region and then the western and upper Galilee region and then on to the .”282 Salim argues that it is obvious that this is a mere propaganda book, more concerned with implementing the policies of the state of

Israel rather than with giving an accurate description of the geography. Such major blunder as mixing south with north shows that the main concern isn’t for academic accuracy but rather for the policy of creating a falsified separate identity for the Druze.283 Such blunders also bring into

281 Nayef Salim. 1987. Min waqana. A Druze Initiative Committee Publication. page 12. 282 Ibid. 283 Ibid.

129 question the qualifications of these supposed experts who are in charge of educating generations of young Druze.

The systematic attempt of distinguishing Druze from the rest of the Arabs in Israel is evident in the goals set by the Ministry of Education for each. Official Israeli documents set separate and different aims for students depending on religion and ethnicity. A document issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture specifies the educational objectives for Jews, Arabs and Druze.

• For Jews the objectives are as follows:

1) To help youth build a Jewish identity that is complete, independent, and in harmony with the heritage of the Jewish people and their destiny… 2) To completely identify as a Jew…and to define who is a Jew… 3) To completely learn the connection between the people of Israel and of his country with the Jews of the world… 4) To fully recognize the common destiny with his people and his responsibility towards them… 5) To instill Jewish cultural values by teaching the Jewish tradition, both theoretical and practical, as experienced by the Jewish people throughout history and until the present, at home and in the Diaspora… 6) To acquire all the above through acquainting oneself with the best of tradition and culture of other people and of the culture of the Arab minority…

It is clear to see that the Ministry of Education was used for socializing Jews of the Diaspora as well as Jews born in Israel into having one unified identity. The means to accomplish such an objective is to “instill Jewish cultural values by teaching Jewish tradition.”284

• For Arabs the objectives are as follows:

1) To base education on Arab culture and tradition, on educational achievement, on peace between Israel and its neighbors, on the love of the homeland shared by all citizens of the state, and on loyalty to the state of Israel… 2) This is achieved by emphasizing their common interests through maintaining the unity of the Arabs in Israel and gaining knowledge of Jewish culture…

284 From the objectives for the Ministry of Education. Quoted in Majid al Hajj

130 • For Druze the objectives are as follows:

1) Basing education on the Arab language and Druze cultural values, on educational achievement, on the love of peace between Israel and its neighbors, and on the love of the homeland shared by all citizens of the state… 2) Loyalty to the state of Israel and contributing to its building and defense… 3) Emphasizing the special and common interests between all citizens… 4) Nurturing the unique relationship between the Jews and the Druze and knowledge of Hebrew culture… 5) Nurturing and developing the Israeli Druze entity and rooting the Druze youth in the tradition of the sect and on the common destiny between all the members of the sect in all countries…285

Cognitive goals would follow from the general ones according to Firro:

Through the school system (1) the pupil will come to understand the past, the culture and the particularity of the Druze community in the and the world; (2) learn the central values of the Druze Tradition; (3) become acquainted with the main religious and historical figures in Druze history; and (4) accept the traditional connection of the Druze and the Jews in the past present and the special relation of the Druzes with the state of Israel.286

If the fact that there exist separate aims for Druze and Arabs is not by itself enough evidence of the state’s attempt to create divisions and to encourage Druze particularism, a comparison of the state’s educational objectives for the Druze and the Arabs demonstrates a clear, institutionalized attempt at emphasizing “Israeli Druze entity” at the cost of a greater Arab identity. The Druze will be taught not to only be loyal to the state, but also to contribute to “its building and defense.” The stated objectives are also clear indicators that the Ministry of Education has a role in “nurturing and developing the Israeli Druze entity.”

Education is often used as a tool to promote the state’s political agenda. It is not very difficult to discern the political intentions of the Israeli Ministry of Education which publishes books such as “ biology for Druze” and “geography for Druze.” In the very least, this kind of policy creates a narrative in which, the Druze are unique enough and

285 As reported in Majid Al- Hajj’s study Education, Empowerment, and Control 1995 286 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill. Page 234.

131 particular enough that they merit their own mathematics book. Accepting this state- imposed narrative meant that young Druze would disconnect from a history in which most of their forefathers saw themselves as a part of the larger Arab community and culture.

132

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATE DRUZE

POLICIES

What have been the consequences of the Israeli policy towards the Druze since the creation of the state of Israel? Did the community as a whole benefit from the long-term collaboration and cooperation between its leaders and the Israeli authorities? In this chapter I will look at some of these consequences, and compare the Druze situation to that of other Israeli

Arabs. I will focus mainly on two important areas: land and education. One of the main justifications given by the Druze leadership for agreeing to mandatory conscription in the military was to safeguard Druze land from expropriation. Did the continued cooperation with the Israeli authorities and the military service of Druze men prevent their land from being taken over by the state? Education is another area that is often mentioned as having benefited from the state’s special policies. In the following pages, I will examine the status of Druze education to see whether it has indeed improved in comparison with the rest of the Israeli Arab population.

The current status of Druze villages is summarized in a recent article. It claims that all the Druze villages in

Galilee and Mt. Carmel score extremely low on socioeconomic indicators. Unemployment is at 38 percent and the education system ranked lowest in 2002 for achievement in matriculation exams. Educators from the sector estimate that fewer than 1 percent of high school graduates enroll in higher education institutions without the army's support. The Druze local government is in a state

133 of collapse, and the villages suffer from a severe shortage of jobs and land for 287 development.

How is one to explain this state of affairs in the Druze community? Most Druze elites would argue that the main reason for their complete cooperation with the Jewish state was to safeguard their land from being expropriated by the state. In return for their undivided loyalty to the state, the Druze were promised preferential treatment and an exclusion from land expropriations that the other Arabs suffered at the hands of the state. However, the facts are that the Druze suffered just as much due the state’s land expropriations policy, as did the rest of the Arabs. Land expropriations have been mostly for the purpose of giving land to new Israeli settlers, however for the Druze it will also serve another purpose in Israeli staraetgy. Land expropriations were the first step in a strategy designed to make the Druze community as a whole much more dependent on the state and therefore tie its survival to the survival of the state. Without land, these traditional farmers would have to seek an alternative source of income.

The military would provide this source of income. Mandatory military conscription would ultimately lead to a creation of new form of livelihood for Druze men. Most Druze men were no longer farmers as their forefathers had been; they were now mostly employed in the security industry. Since this industry was dependent entirely on the stability, security of the state, the livelihood and survival of these Druze was also dependent on the state. A new “warrior culture” or tradition was invented for Druze men. For a young Druze accepting such a narrative meant that he is almost genetically predisposed to be a solider and not really suitable for any other profession.

This narrative is reinforced by an educational system which teaches Druze culture and history. Thus young Druze are taught about the bravery and loyalty of their forefathers. The

287Yair Ettinger “Druze soldiers are pampered, their civilians hampered” Haaretz, Wed., December 22, 2004

134 focus on teaching Druze culture would be paramount in importance, and, therefore, the criteria for a good Druze teacher was that he would be able to indoctrinate students about Druze culture.

Since this was the most important qualification for Druze teachers, other qualifications, such as being competent in other areas of the curriculum, were neglected. This educational focus on the particularism of Druze culture would result in the Druze lagging far behind all other groups in the state when it came to any academic indicators.

The educational policies seem to have failed on another front as well. For despite the educational objectives emphasizing peace, common interests and a unique relationship between the Druze and , the Druze are not allowed to be completely integrated into Israeli identity. Sammy Smooha explains the “limits of the Israelization” of Arabs and other non-

Jewish minorities:

As long as Israel remains Jewish and Zionist, full Israelization of the Arabs is impossible because complete equality cannot be granted to the Arabs. It is very difficult to accord Arabs first- class citizenship in a state that is officially the state of and for the Jews.288

The Druze continue to loyally serve the state of Israel. One of their major complaints is that they have yet to be granted full and equal rights to their Jewish counterparts.

Sammy Smooh attributes this failure of full integration to the persistence of mistrust, or even racism, on the parts of Jews in Israel. In a 1995 survey he conducted, he found that

As many as 30.9 % of Jews were in favor of denying Israeli Arabs the right to vote in Israeli Knesset elections. 59.9% thought that a Jewish majority should decide the decision-involving territorial withdrawals and Arab votes shouldn’t be considered… 36.7 % thought the state should use any opportunity to encourage the Israeli Arabs to leave the country. 43.8% refused to have an Arab as a superior on the job. 59.2% thought that Jews should be given preference in employment in the civil service, or only Jews should be admitted to the civil service. 85.9% thought that according to their religious convictions, it is forbidden to appoint an Arab as Israeli president. Choosing between 2 undesirable possibilities, a minority

288 Smooha, Sammy. 1999. “the advances and limits of the Israelization of Israel’s Palestinian citizens” in Israeli and Palestinian Identities in history and Literature edited by Abdel-malek Jacobson, 1999; page 21.

135 of 41.9% opted for a non-Jewish democratic state, while a majority of 58.1 % chose a Jewish non-democratic state.289 state officials such as Ben-Dor have argued that the Druze have served the state loyally and therefore they deserve special treatment. Moreover, since they are not really Arabs, and most don’t even identify themselves as being Arabs, which is ultimately what is important, they shouldn’t be treated as Arabs. The state’s dis-ease with its Druze citizens underlines factor the complaints of most Druze, the fact that the state sees them as Israeli Druze when it comes to their obligation toward the state, yet they are treated as Arab Druze when it comes to entitlements.

These complaints have developed into active resistance on the part of some groups from within the Druze community. To protest against military conscription, the dreadful condition of the Druze education and other policies aimed at ethnicization the Druze minority, some Druze formed grassroots movements. The most active of such groups is the Druze Initiative Committee.

Activists in this group maintain that the Druze community in general hasn’t benefited from these state policies but has been rather harmed. Policies dealing with the Druze minority, they argue, are responsible for the deteriorating conditions of the Druze community.

All of the above are considered direct consequences of the actions of the state of Israel towards the Druze community. Although some individual Druze did benefit from their cooperation with the authorities, the Druze community on the whole has suffered. In the following sections I will examine the effects of the Israeli Druze policy in detail.

289 Ibid

136 6.1. The Army Trap: Consequences of Mandatory Conscription in the IDF:

As a result of Israeli state policy, the Druze community evolved into a military culture.

By confiscating most of the land from the Druze, who are mostly farmers, the authorities robbed the Druze population of their major source of income. The security industry became a community business. The military conscription policy prevented young Druze men from continuing their education directly after high school. After the mandatory service, there was no real incentive and often no financial resources to go back to school for most Druze men. Thus remaining in the military, and in the security industry generally, provided immediate financial gratification. Since the majority of males in the household worked in the same industry, it seemed inevitable that most Druze men would choose to remain in this sector. A recent article on the Druze community in the Israeli daily Haaretz states that

The local authority says that 75 percent of the men of working age are employees of the security forces: the IDF, Police, Border Police, or Prisons Service. The village's pride are its hundreds of officers, among them success stories like Hassein Fares, who was appointed commander of the Border Police this year. 290

Socialization at school about the unique braveness of the earlier generations of Druze soldiers and the inherent predisposition of the Druze to military career invented a cultural rationalization to this economically driven military culture. Jamal Maadi argues that

There is little doubt that the main cause of our dilemma (I mean the Arab Druze in Israel) is the compulsory conscription in the Israeli defense force. Ever since the Druze were forced to serve in the Israeli military, even though there was a lot of opposition to the idea, the fate of the community has proceeded in a way that is counter to its real destiny and history.291

290 Yair Ettinger. “Can Druze Identity Survive its Neighbors” Dec 23, 2004 Haaretz 291 Watheqa, publish by the Druze Initiative Committee September 1991

137 As a result of this policy, the majority of young Druze became continuously dependent on government resources, a policy that guaranteed that most would be loyal to the government.

To most young Druze, the army and the government were their sole source of income; therefore, they were very protective and loyal to these two institutions. After three years of mandatory service in the army, the Druze soldier found himself with no skill, no qualifications, no education, and no other means of making a living. So typically the Druze soldier continued with government employment in special units of the border police, or as a prison guard, or by reenlisting in the army or in the secret police, which would promise bigger salaries and rewards.

These Druze soldiers are mostly deployed in the worst possible positions, performing dangerous missions, or doing the authorities’ dirty work. Nissim Dana reports that:

One out of every three Druze soldiers inducted makes the army a career. One of every six Druze soldiers conscripted becomes an officer in the regular army. As of 2000, more than 280 Druze soldiers had been killed while serving in the army or one of the security forces. There are villages in which the percentage of fallen soldiers relative to the population exceeds that of Jewish settlements.292

Druze men must serve in the IDF or suffer the consequences. 293 Nafaa argues that young

Druze men who cooperate benefit while those who resist are penalized. He offers the experience of his three sons as an example of such punishment; all three men refused to serve their mandatory term in the IDF and as a result were jailed. Nafaa claims that the punishment didn’t stop there, for all his sons were forbidden from getting their drivers’ licenses because of their

“criminal” record and spending time in prison for refusing to serve in the IDF. They are not eligible for any of the social benefits, including health care, which the government provides its citizens.

292 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page111. 293 Nafaa, Said. 2002. Personal Interview. 14 March.

138 Not that those who serve escape manipulation. The authorities, through their own controlled media, constantly attempt to smear the reputation of Druze soldiers who serve in the border police. The media is very quick to publicize any wrong doing perpetrated by Druze soldiers. Israeli Media has always publicized the Druze identity of any IDF solider accused of brutality. A recent incident in which a 13-year-old Palestinian school girl in Gaza was shot by the company commander, who then proceeded to empty his machine gun magazine in the girl’s fallen body, made international news. The Israeli media was quick to publicize the Druze identity of the solider, and some even wrote about other incidents in which

Palestinians accused Druze soldiers of maltreatment. 294 Nabieh Al-Kassem, a Druze educator, argues that this smearing of the reputation of Druze soldiers is an army policy:

There were several incidents where the Israelis would send Israeli Jewish soldiers who spoke fluent Arabic down to the West bank and Gaza strip; these soldiers would be merciless and brutal; the people of the occupied territories would then be led to believe that these ruthless soldiers were Druze.295

Nabieh Al-Kassem further maintains that there was one incident in which a massacre was mistakenly blamed on Druze soldiers. The massacre was committed on April 26, 1990 in

Jabaliaya refugee camp in the West Bank. That day happened to coincide with the annual visit to the prophet Shuiab's tomb, an official Druze holiday. Druze soldiers would have been off duty that day. The Israeli media nevertheless did cast the blame on the Druze soldiers. 296 The authorities also prevented an aid shipment of clothes and food from reaching the Jabalia refugee camp. That shipment was collected from all of the Druze villages.297 The authorities also prevented a delegate from the Druze Initiative Committee from entering the refugee camp.298

294 Yair Ettinger. Can Druze identity survive its neighbors Dec 23, 2004 Haaretz 295 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 296 Maariv April 27, 1990 297 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 298 Member of the Druze Initiative Committee. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June.

139 All this illustrates that the Government is utilizing its powers in order to create a false and ruthless image of the Druze soldier.

Unfortunately, the government’s attempts are succeeding, and as a result the people of the occupied territories are much more fearful of a Druze soldier than a Jewish soldier. This is still evident today, especially in the West bank, where Druze soldiers have a merciless reputation, and are treated accordingly with great suspicion by the people of the West Bank.299

Rabah Halabi, a Druze professor at the Hebrew University's School of Education describes

Druze soldiers in the IDF as "mercenary soldiers lacking a moral compass." 300 She argues that

Israeli authorities use instances of Druze soldiers’ brutality to indicate to the critics of Israeli occupation that “It's not us, these are not the values of the Jewish army.”301 Halabi argues that historically the crimes committed by these Druze soldiers aren’t unique to the Druze but are a consequence of being out in a position where they have to do the policing function for a colonial state. She argues, “Some of the Druze in the army have lost all restraint and behave wildly to prove their mettle. We know this from other historical cases, like the Algerian soldiers in the

French army, who behaved savagely. This is the tragedy of mercenaries, which is, after all, what the Druze are."302 Placing Druze soldiers in positions where they are the prison guards for the state is why these tensions are created. This ultimately leads to mutual distrust and suspicion and eventually to resentment between the Druze soldiers and the people of the occupied territories, creating a vicious cycle of division and violence.

Other consequences of the militarization of Druze society are detrimental to the Druze community in general. The Israeli authorities distributed arms to the small and poor families in

299 Yair Ettinger. “Can Druze Identity Survive its Neighbors Dec 23, 2004 Haaretz 300 Yair Ettinger “Druze Torn in Their Relationship with the State, Dec 19, 204 Haaretz 301 Ibid 302 Ibid

140 order to destroy the existing power structure. This resulted in total anarchy at the tribal level, with several small families fighting for power. The Israelis then favored whichever family would cooperate with the authorities;303 people who became agents for the state headed the Druze tribes. Consequently, the Israelis also made sure that several families were armed, in order to maintain the continued dependence of tribes’ leaders on the support of the Israeli authority, as well as to assure the loyalty of their agents. These “divide and conquer” tactics were very well established and documented throughout Israeli rule.304

Even after serving in the IDF loyally, Druze veterans face discrimination from state agencies. There have been several complaints by these discharged soldiers of not being adequately compensated relative to their Jewish counterparts. Nissim Dana argues that:

Discharged officers are not given proper treatment, or suitable compensation. At times, looking for work, a discharged Druze solider finds himself being handled by an Arab clerk who managed to acquire a vocational or academic education while the Druze was doing his three years of service.305

Dana argues that the Arabs who didn’t serve the state are relatively better off, since they could take advantage of the three years to get an education, while the Druze had to serve for three years.

303 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill. 304 Ibid 305 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page 112.

141

6.2. The Status of Druze Education

The Druze in Israel are taught “Druze Cultural Studies.” Some critics regard this as an attempt by the Israeli authorities to obscure the history and the origins of the Druze. These attempts have had a lasting impression on some. Today, some of the younger Druze have demonstrated their puzzlement over issues of their identity. When asked about their identity, some responded by saying “I am a Druze", while others responded "I am an Israeli Druze."306

However, there were plenty of young Druze, especially in the village of Y,307 who identified themselves as Arabs, or Palestinian Druze.308 Samih Al-Kassem attributes these inconsistencies to the efforts of the Israeli government. He contends: “These young people have been indoctrinated in school, from an early age, that they are Druze, as if it is a separate ethnic identity. The Israelis do not want us (the Druze) to associate with our true Arab identity.”309

Since the founding of the state of Israel, the educational system in the Arab villages has been in disarray. The authorities have made no serious attempts at remedying the situation; as a result, students are being put under the guidance of unqualified and, at times, incompetent teachers. This serious condition is evident in the Druze village schools. Over the past fifty years, there have been numerous complaints from students and parents about the quality of education in Druze villages. Most Druze students resent the fact that the system is dependent on old sheikhs and judges, most of whom are illiterate. The majority of the Druze spiritual leaders

306 According to interviews, I conducted with Druze villagers, June 1994. 307 The name of the village has been changed to protect the anonymity of the people Interviewed. 308 Druze from Yarka.1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 309 Al-Kassem, Samih. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June.

142 are very old and uneducated; however, the authorities appoint and thus designate them as the ultimate authority on Druze education. Most students resent the imposition of blatantly incompetent judges in their educational system.

Concerned parents have formulated parents groups in several villages in an effort to remedy the situation of the Druze educational system. Galeb Sayef, the president of the Fathers’

Association for Druze Elementary Schools in the village of Yanoh, argues:

In Israel, Druze educators who have cooperated with the authorities have gained a high salary and great influence in their village; in return for implementing the government plans and objectives, these collaborators were given good positions and good paying jobs. These government agents have been in charge of interpreting or creating documents and books, which smear the history and heritage of the Druze people. These agents have cooperated with the authorities in creating a completely fabricated history of the Druze People.310

Druze Parent Associations claim that the criteria for appointing schoolteachers is not based on merit, but rather on the degree to which they will implement the policies of the government.311 According to such groups, as well as to the Druze Initiative Committee, the

Druze who cooperate with the authorities are rewarded with key positions in education, the media, and the religious courts, while those Druze who refused to participate in the authorities’ campaign to create a counterfeit Druze history, have incurred the wrath of the authorities. The

Druze individuals who have refused to help the spread of the false Druze history continue to be under constant harassment by the authorities; they are constantly being followed by their Druze tails, and questioned by the secret police. Many of these people have been imprisoned or have had their publications confiscated by the authorities.312 The deteriorating status of Druze education has led to growing concerns of the Druze people, which resulted in several studies by

310 Sayef, Galeb. 1990. “Al Mouka.” Druze Initiative Committee Publication October 1990. 311 Halabi, Rafik. A Druze journalist for Israel television, presented a special movie "I am a Druze" broadcast on Israeli television December 29, 1991. The film tried to reinforce the idea that the Druze are not Arabs. 312 The Druze Initiative Committee as well as the Parents Association on Druze education. Personal Interview. 19 June.

143 Druze social scientists. Dr. Jamal Hassoun conducted one such study. The study concludes, "all along history we were (meaning the Druze) at the peak of human civilization, but now we are at the bottom.”313 Galeb Sayef declared in a meeting that:

For years we were bringing the awareness to this fact, but now it has become the issue among many groups of people even some that are wet with the authorities; and this section of the population meaning our sect and the misleading party, led by the authorities made people including the Druze believe that the situation of education are in good status; which we found in reality that the Facts are opposite: the Druze in the country are 66,000 making up 1.5% of the total population of the country; and 10.5% of the Arab population, 80% of them are born after 1948, and 56% are bellow 19 years of age. In other words this group of the Arab population is within the age of learning and gaining knowledge. Naturally this should reflect on the Druze sect and raise its status and improve its educational level. But all research done on the topic show exactly the opposite is true, and prove that we are going more backward day by Day.314

The field research done by Hassoun and Mansour further validates the statements made by Sayf.315 The researchers found that Druze with college degrees numbered only 374. Only thirty of these were women. The number of college graduates included 246 who had earned a

Bachelor’s degree, 11 who had earned Master’s degrees, and 47 medical doctors; the figures also included 40 engineers, 26 lawyers, and 4 PhD’s. These figures are insignificant when compared to the 15,000 total Arab college graduates. To further emphasize the point, Hassoun and

Mansour looked at the village of Essifya, whose population is 78% Druze, 17% Christian, and

5% Muslim. In Essifya, there are 30 total college graduates who are Druze while there are 51

Christian college graduates. Hassoun and Mansour found that the ratio of college students to the population was much lower in the Druze population than any other minority group in the country; the ratio was 1.9 per 1000 Druze, and 6.5 per 1000 for the rest of the Arabs in the

313 Hasoun, Jamal. 1990. “Al Mouka.” Druze Initiative Committee Publication October 1990. 314 Sayf, Galeb. 1990. From the minutes of the August 8, 1990, meeting of the Fathers Association on Druze Education in the village of Yanouh. 315 Mansour, Fadel and Jamal Hasson. 1990. “Al Mawka” Druze Initiative Publication. October 1990. Fadel Mansour is the first Israeli Druze to obtain a PhD in 1977.

144 country (including Muslims and Christians). The general ratio for the whole country was 15 per

1000, with Jews having the highest ratio.

Druze groups blame the problems of Druze education on the authorities and their imposed program, which is being implemented by the Ministry of Education through the Druze superintendent of the secondary schools, Salman Fallah.316 He spearheaded the establishment of a Druze educational program, which would teach Druze culture, history, and religion to Druze students. Petitions and complaints against this new program, which started partially in 1968,317 were submitted and signed by thousands of Druze, among them the late spiritual leader Sheikh

Amin Tarif and the esteemed judge Labib Abu Rukon. All these protests were in vain. The complaints were to stop the teaching of this false Druze history and culture. Sayef claims that the most serious problem that

the Druze face now is that the authorities, with the full cooperation of their Druze agents at the Ministry of Education, published several books about the Druze heritage, culture, religion and origins, which are full of lies and falsifications. These revisions are being taught to our children to change and alter the origins and history of the Druze people. Their ultimate goal is to create the concept of an ethnic Druze Israeli Identity, which has no link to their Arab lineage.318

Some Druze scholars have blamed the Druze themselves for the relative lack of education of the Druze youth. Nissim Dana argues that:

In the area of education, most Druze youth tend to take the easy way out and find a job with one of the security services, and refrain from contending with either high school or higher education. This has led to a slow but continual regression in the education of the community in comparison with other communities. In 1983, only 3% of the Druze families had someone with an academic degree, compared to 4.3% among the Muslims families, 8.3% among Christian families, and 13.4% among Jewish families. The relatively tiny number of those who go to higher

316 The Druze Initiative Committee Publication. 1992. “ Al Zytoonah” Januaray 1992. 317 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill, page 227. 318 Sayf, Galeb. 1990. “al Mawka” published by the Druze Initiative Committee in October 1990. He also expands on this idea in later publications like the January publication " Al Zaytoonah", which also contains a copy of a letter, which was signed by Shiekh Amin Tarif, asking for the cancellation of the Druze educational program.

145 education is due to the Druze families’ poor economic situation, early marriage (customary in this community), or restriction on girls leaving the village.319

Salman Fallah agrees with this assessment and goes further by placing the blame on the traditional Druze culture itself.320 He maintains that although there have been marked advancements in Druze education, especially since its separation from the Arab education program, it is still relatively weak. The main obstacle to Druze education, Fallah argues, are the traditions the Druze values, which don’t appreciate educational attainment as much as other groups. He argues that two main reasons for the slow advancement of Druze education are directly related to the conservative traditional and rural culture of the Druze. Lack of awareness in this traditional conservative society prevents young Druze from aspiring to a college education. Traditional culture particularly disapproves of women’s education. Fallah argues that women in the traditional patriarchal Druze society are not allowed to venture out of the village, a restriction that limit their access to schools outside the village.321However, Fallah does not explain why Druze education lags behind that of Muslim and Christian Arabs, especially those living in villages and rural areas that are just as conservative, traditional and patriarchal as Druze villages. Since the same traditional hurdles are also there for other Arabs, blaming the inferior condition of Druze education on the traditional cultural values doesn’t provide a convincing explanation.

To alienate the Druze from their true origins has proven to be a difficult process, as Egon

Mayer points out, quoting a young Druze man as saying: "We are actually Arabs. Anyone who says otherwise is a liar. Some Druze intellectuals who work for the government have tried to

319 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page 114. 320 Altorath wa al tarbyah . a cultural and educational publication. 12 edition September 1991 321 Fallah. Salman. 2002. Personal Interview. 17 March.

146 prove that we are not really Arabs, but they are liars...we do not dislike the Jewish people; but the Israeli government is no good for us.”322

According to Alshoola, a newsletter that was published by the Druze Initiative

Committee in September of 1991, in a meeting of the Druze religious leadership, headed by

Sheikh Abu Yousef Ameen Tariff (the spiritual leader of our Arab Druze Sect) that took place on the 28 of May 1991, at the Yaafouri Makam, the leadership unanimously decided on the need for the following:

1. To discontinue the teaching of “Druze culture” in the schools.

2. To refuse to allow the creation of a research institute which would specialize in “Druze

affairs" at Haifa University or anywhere else.

The group at the meeting had other issues of concern with this new modern educational system.

They opposed the greater emphasis on individuality and the more western oriented understanding and value system that placed greater importance on individual freedom as opposed to collective rights. They were also opposed to different ceremonial practices that were perceived as being uniquely Druze as well as to honorary ceremonies that pay tribute to the special contribution of

Druze soldiers to the state of Israel.

In his study of the sociology of education of Arabs in Israel, Majid Al Haj asks the following questions: “Does education shape society or is it shaped by society? Does education form an asset for development or is it a mechanism of social control? Does it benefit society as a whole or does it exclusively serve the dominant group?” His findings are summarized by the following table:

322 Ibid

147 Table 1: Arab University Graduates by Degree and Religion. 323 1983 census percentages: DEGREE MUSLIMS CHRISTIANS DRUZE TOTAL B.A. 62.9 % 32.8% 4.3% 100

M.A. and PhD 39.9 % 57.6% 2.5% 100

% of Total University Graduates 57.0% 39.1% 3.9% 100

% of Total (Arab) Population 76.8% 13.6% 9.6% 100

The table above clearly demonstrates that educational disparities exist within the Israeli Arab population in Israel. The Christian Arabs are the most privileged, while the Druze are the least.

Majid Al-Haj’s study highlights this educational gab between the different religious groups. He concludes that

the percentage of university graduates among Christians is three times their percentage in the total Israeli Arab population, whereas the percentage of the Druze graduates is less than half their share of the total population. Muslims are ranked in between and constitute 57 percent of the Arab graduates, compared to 76.8 percent of the Israeli Arab population.324

Al-Hajj, however, focuses on the disparities between Muslims and Christian Arabs, excluding the Druze for lack of statistical significance.325

323 Israeli Central Bureau of statistical population and housing Census 1983; SAI 1993, page 43. 324 Al-Haj, Majid. 1995. Education, Empowerment, and Control. New York: SUNY Press; page 197. 325 Al- Haj conducted a multivariate analysis, where the number of Druze respondents was insufficient to conduct such a statistical method. So he was content to compare the Muslims and Christian Arabs.

148 6.3. Land Expropriations:

Has the Druze community benefited from its special relationship with the state of Israel?

The Druze after all are considered the “good Arabs” and they do serve in the IDF just like their

Jewish counterparts. So where are the benefits for being good citizens? There has been a long history of a close association between the Druze leadership and Israeli officials, dating back to the days before the creation of the State of Israel. One of these Druze leaders, Jaber Maadi, claims that he chose to collaborate with Israeli officials because of the advantages that could be acquired as a consequence of this collaboration. 326 Maadi argued that at least their valuable land wouldn’t be taken away from them. Maadi explained that land has twofold significance: “ard wa

3ard” (land and honor). Therefore, a man without land is without honor, and he must do anything in his power to protect his land. According to Maadi, the Druze elites were promised that they would not lose their valuable land.

The Druze did reap immediate benefits from this alliance; only one Druze village had its inhabitants expelled on June 5th, 1949.327 The Israeli Army and police did expel the inhabitants of the Druze village of Yanuh to the neighboring Safad area. This is insignificant when it is compared to the 45% of Arab (non Druze) villages that were lost in the same time period.328

Leaders such as Maadi assumed that the continuation of Druze collaboration with the Israeli authorities, and especially the conscription of male Druze in the IDF starting in 1956, would ensure that their favorable treatment would continue, if not improve.

326 Maadi, Jaber. 2002. Personal Interview. 1 April. 327 Jiryis, Sabri. 1976. The Arabs in Israel . New York: Monthly Review Press, page 81. 328 Ibid page 79, Jiryis claims that 374 Arab towns and villages were demolished and their land given to Jewish settlers. The Israeli Government Yearbook 5719(1958):235, puts the number of these villages at a maximum of 350.

149 Sheikh Amin Tarif, hoping he could monopolize on the special relationship between the

Druze community and the Israeli authorities, requested that , a Sunni Muslim village that was evacuated, be given over to the Druze. Tarif, in a letter sent in 1949 to Israeli Prime Minister

Ben Gurion wrote:

Because we are aware that the government of Israel is going to settle the abandoned (Palestinian) villages with other (Jewish) inhabitants and since among the abandoned villages there is the village of Hittin…which was inhabited by Muslims, but where there is the of our honored prophet Jethro, which was a sanctuary for the Druze community, and since in the Minorities Unit of the IDF there are many Druze youth from Israel and, in particular, from the Jabal al-Duruz in Syria to where they cannot return, for those reasons we request of you to allocate this abandoned village to Druze discharged soldiers, notably those whose origin is Jabal al Duruz in Syria. Such action by the Israeli government will give us great satisfaction because the sacred site will then be settled by the Druze who can provide the adequate and deserved guard.329

Israeli authorities attempting to consolidate ties of the Druze community with the IDF responded to the request by giving the site of the shrine to the Druze community. But the land of the village of Hittin was given to Jewish settlements. This shrine continues to be a symbol of the close ties between the Israeli authorities and the Druze community. High-ranking IDF personnel are always on hand during the annual visiting of the shrine.330

Was this a true reward to the Druze community for its “positive” attitude toward the

Jewish state, or was it just a symbolic gesture? How much Druze land was safe guarded against expropriations? Was there land expropriated from Druze villages, and if so how did it compare to the land expropriated from the other Arab villages? Were the Druze really given special treatment in light of their cooperation with the Israelis or were they no better off than the rest of the Arabs? In order to answer these questions, I compared the percentage of land expropriated from Druze villages to non-Druze villages.

329 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill page 113. 330 The visit or Ziyara to the shrine of Jethro (Shuayb) always included a military parade of the Druze unit in the IDF, which reinforces the close link between the Druze community and the State of Israel.

150 Testing the Hypothesis:

In order to find out if there are any differences in the amount of land expropriated from

Druze villages as opposed to non- Druze villages, I first looked at simple descriptive statistics.331

Just by comparing the average percentage of land expropriated from the Druze village and the average percentage of land expropriated from non-Druze villages , which can be seen from

Graph 4 that it is clear there is not a noticeable difference. It actually appears that the average amount of land expropriated from non-Druze villages is relatively less than the average amount

Land Expropriated by Village

100

80

60

Druze Non-Druze 40

20 Average Expropriated Land (%) Average

0 0123 Village Type

Graph 4: Expropriated Land /village type. Original by the author.

of land expropriated from Druze villages.

331 Israeli Government Yearbook 5734 (1963/64) page 32 and 38.

151 I then looked at differences in regions. Using the state’s District divisions (map 3); I looked at the differences in the average percentage of land expropriated per region as represented by Graph 5. I proceeded to compare the average percentage of land expropriated between Druze and non Druze villages per region. This did not show differences in the average proportions of land expropriated from Druze villages when compared to non-Druze villages as can be seen in

Graph 6. Table 7 has a breakdown of the Druze villages by region.

Map 3: Map of Northern Israel showing the 4 different regions. (1= Carmel, 2= Lower and Western Galilee, 3= Galilee, 4= Upper Galilee)

152 Table 2: Breakdown of the Druze villages into regions.

Region Name of Village

1.Carmel Daliyat el Carmel Isifya 2. Lower Galilee and Western Galilee Julis Yarka Abu Sinan Kafer Yasif Shefaamr 3. The Galilee Sajar Rama Ayn AlAsad Mughar 4.Upper Galilee Bayt Jann Jathth Yanuh Buqaya Kafar Sumay Kisra Hurfaysh

Graph 5: Expropriated land/ region. Original, by the author.

153 Expropriated Land

100 Druze Non-Druze

80

60

40 Expropriated Land (%) Land Expropriated 20

0 012345 Region

Graph 6: Expropriated land per region and village type. (1= Carmel, 2= Lower and Western Galilee, 3= Galilee, 4= Upper Galilee). Original, by the author.

To get a more statistically accurate analysis, I used an Anova analysis of variance to find if there are any statistical significance to the means of the land exported from the Druze villages and the non-Druze villages. A two way Anova was also done, in order to find if there are any statistically significant variations when looking at the Druze and non-Druze villages in a specific region.

The null hypothesis is that the average land expropriated from Druze villages is not significantly different from land expropriated from non-Druze villages. I obtained a list of the

Arab (Druze and non Druze) villages listing the amount of land (in dunums) that was

154 expropriated between 1945 and 1962.332 The analysis of variance will allow me to compare the means for all the groups.

There are two independent or predictor variables that I will be dealing with. The first independent variable is the village Type (Druze and non Druze). The second independent variable is the location of the village. Each village was given a score, which corresponds to its location in a particular district. The location variable was important in order to account for the possibility that one particular location could have experienced an above average amount of land expropriation for any reason. Comparing averages of villages that were close geographically will minimize the possibility that variances could result from something other than the Type of village.

A factorial ANOVA was used as the best possible statistical test in this case since there are two categorical independent variables and a single normally distributed interval dependent variable. This will also account for possible interactions between the two independent variables.

This test focuses on F-tests of significance of differences in group means. Using ANOVA will allow me to see if the difference in sample means is enough to conclude the real means do in fact differ between the two groups. Factorial ANOVA is used in instances with more than one independent variable, and is used to evaluate the relative importance of various combinations of independents. Using the data (from table 2) I will look at the % of land expropriated (Land) as the dependent variable and Village type (1=Druze, 2=non Druze) and Village location as independent variables, and we will include an interaction of village Type and location.

The results of the analysis show strongly that there is no difference when it comes to the

Israeli authorities expropriating land from Druze villages and those of non-Druze villages. There was also no significant difference when I took into consideration the different regions. The main

332 Ibid.

155 effects, which are defined as the unique effects of the categorical independent variables, show that the independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable. In order to conclude that the independent variable does have an effect on the dependent variable, the probability of F has to be less than .05 for any independent variable.

Table 3: ANOVA Table, Percentage of Land expropriated= the dependent variable, Village type(Druze or non-Druze) =the independent variable.

I will deal with each independent variable’s main effects on the dependent variable separately at first. In this case when looking at the effect of the independent variable (village type) has on the dependent variable (% of land expropriations), the F value is 0 .506, well above the 0.05 mark that will allow us to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore the null hypothesis can not be rejected.

This means that that village type has no effect on the percentage of land expropriated. The significance value is 0.479, which exceeds 0.05, indicating tat the village type doesn’t not have group differences, or differences that couldn’t be just random.

156 Table 4: ANOVA table results.

With fewer than 3 groups, or values in the village types, linearity measures can’t be completed. In this case there are only 2 possible values for the village type variable, either

1=Druze, or 2=non-Druze. So under these conditions the Eta Squared is preferred to the R squared for looking at the proportion of variation accounted for by difference among groups.

From the SPSS table of results, the measures of association for the Village type and the

Percentage of land expropriated, the Eta Squared value is .007. This means that the difference between the village type account for 0 .7% or less than 1% of the variation in percentage of land expropriated.

Table 5: ANOVA table for the Percentage of land as a dependent variable and the geographical region as a

independent variable.

When looking at the second dependent variable (region) and its effect on the independent variable (% of land expropriated), the F value is 2.224, much higher than the value of 0.05.

157 Therefore, the null hypothesis can not be rejected. This means that that village type has no effect on the percentage of land expropriated. The significance value is 0.092, which exceeds 0.05, indicating tat the village type doesn’t not have group differences, or differences are just random.

Table 6: ANOVA results

From the SPSS table of results, the measures of association for the Village type and the

Percentage of land expropriated, the Eta Squared value is .083. This means that the difference between the village type account for 8.3% of the variation in percentage of land expropriated.

The results of the one way- Anova, looking at differences between land expropriated from Druze villages as opposed to non- Druze villages showed that there was a lack of statistical significance. When looking at the results of the 2way- Anova, to see if the region has any statistically significant effect, the results showed that in this case as well there was a lack of statistical significance.

In conclusion, the amount of land expropriated from Druze villages is statistically insignificantly different than the amount of land expropriated from non-Druze villages. The

Druze did not receive a preferential treatment when it came to land expropriations, their land was expropriated at the same level with the other non-Druze.

158 Table 7: Villages by region, type, and land expropriated.333

Land in Percent expropriated Region Village type Village Land in 1945 1962 land Carmel Druze Dalyet al Karmel 19741 13026 34.02 Isfyeah 16811 9632 42.70 Non-Druze Ablin 16019 10206 36.29 Aksal 13666 4396 67.83 Al Jdadidah 5215 1728 66.86 Beit Naqubah 1958 807 58.78 Dahi 3011 2029 32.61 Jatt (Triangle) 9623 5415 43.73 Makr 8661 3884 55.16 Mazra'a 3116 298 90.44 Muqiblah 2687 2196 18.27 Na'urah 5535 3482 37.09 Nin 3737 1887 49.50 Sulim 2358 1629 30.92 (Acre) 30549 14489 52.57 Tar'an 13104 7150 45.44 Tuban (Heib Bedouins) 13684 1772 87.05 Zalfa 1285 807 37.20 Lower & Western Galilee Druze Abu Sinan 12871 5434 57.78 Juless 12835 6010 53.17 Kafar Yasif 6729 4581 31.92

333 Ibid.

Shafa Amr 58725 10371 82.34 Lower & Western Galilee Druze Yarka 30597 10701 65.03 Non-Druze Ailbun 11190 3772 66.29 Beisan 13594 9000 33.79 Daburiya 13373 2974 77.76 Lower & Western Galilee Non-Druze 15350 5090 66.84 Jaljuliya 11873 2237 81.16 Kabul 10320 5345 48.21 Kafar Kana 18869 7868 58.30 Kafar Manda 12703 4998 60.65 Kawkab 2134 1235 42.13 Mashhad 9852 4236 57.00 Mi'lya 19136 2997 84.34 Qalansuwa 17249 6620 61.62 Ramana 1485 271 81.75 Rihaniya 6112 1607 73.71 Tamra (Nazareth) 3604 1269 64.79 Tayba (Nazareth) 7127 2135 70.04 Tira 26803 8599 67.92 Galilee Druze Ain Al Assad 12000 1204 89.97 Maghar 45590 12227 73.18 Rama 23701 7322 69.11 Sajour 8172 1533 81.24 Non-Druze Ar'arah/ Arah 29537 7269 75.39 Arava 30852 18421 40.29 Baqa al Gharbiaya 21116 8228 61.03 B'einya 6793 1882 72.30 Bi'na 14839 3679 75.21

160 Deir al Asad 8366 2251 73.09 Galilee Non-Druze Elot 10891 2359 78.34 Kafar Barra 3956 1816 54.10 Kafar Kama 8395 6338 24.50 Kafar Kara 14543 2618 82.00 Majid al Kurum 17828 4237 76.23 15654 4454 71.55 Rineh 15899 5880 63.02 Sachnin 70181 25775 63.27 Sandala 3217 1255 60.99 Tayba (triangle) 32750 13343 59.26 Yafa al Nasra 16521 4887 70.42 Upper Galilee Druze Beit Jan 45650 6000 86.86 Buqai'eh 10276 3500 65.94 Harfish 14623 5254 64.07 Jatt (Galilee) 5907 1727 70.76 Kafar Samai 7150 2436 65.93 Kisra 10,600 7800 26.42 Yahnuh 12466 1343 89.23 Non-Druze Azir 764 566 25.92 Ein Mahil 8268 2576 68.84 Frideis 4220 1595 62.20 12430 2026 83.70 Jizer al 2531 309 87.79 Kafar Kassem 12718 3924 69.15 Kafar Masr 4629 1889 59.19 Nazareth 12599 8325 33.92 Umm al Fahm 68311 12006 82.42

161 6.4. Resistance Movements: The Druze Initiative Committee

Some Druze have argued that the Israeli state has used a carrot and stick approach with the Druze. In other words, it has generously rewarded those who help implement its policies, while severely punishing those who oppose it. Kais Firro argues that, for example,

Until 1948 the living standard of the Druze chiefs had never differed much from that of ordinary people. Starting in 1953, however, their economic situation improved considerably, turning them gradually into a separate “upper class.” Some chiefs now owned whole new cattle farms, others became affluent as employment brokers for Jewish employers and one even held shares in the Israeli Dead Sea factories where many hundreds of Druze had been given jobs.334

Firro argues that this, in turn, allows the Druze chiefs to have power over the rest of the community. It is difficult to prove that these individual and personal gains were the price that was paid to these traditional elites in return for their cooperation with the policies of the state; however, when one looks at the treatment of those who didn’t fully cooperate with the authorities, the cost is clearly identifiable. One such example of the authorities’ “stick” approach to those who oppose their policies is the experience of some Druze teachers who tried to protest what they saw as the “intervention of the Ministry of Education in Druze religious affairs.”335

The teachers had organized themselves into a committee to deal with educational issues concerning the Druze community, and one of their main concerns was the issue of reinstating

Eid-al-Fitter. As I had mentioned in a previous chapter, celebration of Eid-al-Fitter was abolished from Druze schools and for Druze state employees, and recognized as a Muslim-only holiday.

For expressing their opposition to the Israeli policy the teachers paid a high price when at the beginning of the new school year four of them were fired from their

334 Firro, Kais M. 1999. The Druzes in the Jewish State. Netherlands: Brill page 153. 335 Ibid page 155

posts…thereafter, Druze teachers restricted their activities “to improving education within the Druze villages” and left politics alone.336

In addition to this committee, there had been several attempts by educated young Druze to discuss issues and concerns within the Druze community; however, this movement was always suppressed, one way or another, by the Israeli authority.337 In the early years of the state

(when the Arab citizens of the state where under military rule), and until the early 70's, the Israeli authorities officially rejected and banned any political and ideological parties. After the 70's the

Israelis were very strict in granting permits for clubs or committees. When a Druze organization was founded by Dr. Hamad Saaeb, the authorities and their Druze agents stifled the organizations. Members of the organization claimed that Dr. Saaeb was bribed by an Israeli- issued grant to study in London338. The Ard (land) organization was also suppressed by the

Israeli authority; most of the members were arrested, and all of its branches around the country were shut down. Thus, one cannot find any independent club or committee, except those that have been formed by the authorities or their agents, such as the Druze-Israeli scout organization and the Art club in Eisifiah. These clubs do not have an explicit political agenda. The authorities did, however, allow a pseudo-political organization by the name of the Druze

Organization; nevertheless, this group is closely monitored. The organization’s sole purpose is to reinforce Israeli policy as well as create a false sense of democracy. These above mentioned organizations and groups have been isolated by many Druze in spite of the great efforts rendered by the authorities and their agents.

Then, came the birth of the Druze Initiative Committee in 1972. The leadership of this organization was constantly being harassed, questioned and imprisoned. This organization

336 Ibid 337 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1976. waaqa el Druze feey Israel. Jerusalem. 338 Ibid

163 represents young, politically aware youth as well as spiritual leaders and members of the Druze intelligencia. The majority of Druze welcomed it because they shared and believed in similar goals and objectives. This committee was organized in 1972, when thousands of Druze people met in Hitteen village, where the holy grave of the Prophet Shuayb is located. The conference, which was attended by most of the Druze leaders and educators from all over the country, focused on the situation of the Druze as a minority in Israel. Those present aired their fears and dissatisfaction with the present miserable conditions of the Druze from educational, economic, religious, and civil rights perspectives. During the discussion and the exchange of ideas and insights, the people concluded that the Israeli authorities intentionally committed substantial violations of the Druze human rights. Those attending the conference unanimously approved the formation of the Arab Druze Initiative Committee for the purpose of educating their fellow

Druze about the many injustices that have befallen them, as well as to fight for the rights of the

Druze in Israel. The committee has published a series of booklets and pamphlets, explaining the rights of all Israeli citizens, Arabs and Jews alike, and asking for their support. The committee also sent letters and petitions to the Israeli Knesset, as well as to the office of the Prime Minister and to the appropriate ministries, demanding the following:

1. To revoke the law requiring compulsory military service for the Druze.

2. To terminate the confiscation of Druze lands, and to be adequately compensated for

any land previously confiscated.

3. To halt the interferences of the Israeli authorities in matters of religion, culture, and

heritage of the Druze community.

4. To establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

164 5. To cease teaching the false and fabricated subjects about Druze religion and heritage to

Druze students 339

today Sheikh Jamal Maadi, who operates from its headquarters in the village of Yerka, heads the Committee. Sheikh Maadi maintains that the Druze have suffered perhaps more than any other minority in Israel.340 He asserts that the largest proportion of land confiscated by the

Israelis was land belonging to the Druze. Sheikh Maadi declares:

As President of this committee, I promise to struggle together with my colleagues and

supporters, from both Jews and Arabs, to write more and more about our miserable

situation ... and to protest and to make contacts with world leaders in order to make them

aware of our miserable situation, and the kind of democracy Israel has; there is a

democracy for Jews, but others are excluded from most civil benefits and all national

rights.341

In its first publication, The Druze Initiative Committee exposed the plans of the Israeli authorities. It accused the authorities of planting a spirit of hatred among the young Druze who serve in the army against all other Arab communities, Muslim and Christian. The authorities capitalized on the dissension between the Druze and their fellow Arabs. 342

The main goals of the Committee have been to end the mandatory conscription in the military, and to that end activists have organized countless demonstrations and protests. Nissim

Dana, commenting on their role as the leaders of the resistance against military conscription, writes:

The Druze initiative committee carried on with its struggle against compulsory military service. On December 30, 1990, it coordinated with MK Muhammad

339 Druze Initiative Committee Member. 1994. Personal Interview. 24 June. 340 Ibid 341 Maadi, Jamal. 1990. Ittihad. Druze Initiative Committee Publication. December 26, 1990. 342 Ibid.

165 Nafaa the organization of a demonstration opposite the Prime minister’s office. Speakers at this demonstration …emphasized that the demonstration was against the compulsory service law, which was ‘a loathsome law that stood in complete contradiction to all Arabs… and was a degrading attempt to dissociate the Druze form the Arabs.343

Jamal Maadi in his speech at the event was quoted as saying that he saw the demonstration as a sign of the rejection by the Druze community of the distortion of their identity, saying that they refuse to act as “the whip in the hands of the oppressor.”344

The Druze initiative committee continues to work towards strengthening the affinity between the Druze and the rest of the Arabs not only by protesting military conscription, but by also trying to end the teaching of what they regard as the “fabricated Druze culture” in Druze schools. They are also still trying to strike the word “Druze” from the nationality section on

Israeli identity cards and substitute it with “Arab”.

In October 1990 a group of Druze intellectuals met to discuss “the Druze: their status and their identity”. The meeting was sponsored by the Arabic studies institute in Gaafat Habeeba.

The meeting was organized in light of the political development s on the ground in the country and specifically the occupied territories. The main motivation behind this gathering was to discuss the systematic covert and overt policies of the state of Israel that aims at destroying the

Arab identity among the Druze, detaching them from the rest of the Arab nation, and distorting the image of the Druze by equating it with that of the border police (although the Druze that serve in the border police units make up less than 10 % of the all the Druze that serve in the

IDF). The meeting was also deemed necessary in view of the significant movement among the

Druze population at the grass root level.

343 Dana, Nissim. 2003. The Druze in the Middle East. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, page 122. 344 Maadi, Jamal. 1990. Ittihad. Druze Initiative Committee Publication. December 26, 1990

166 The recommendations that were drawn form the gatherings centered on one main conclusion, which was that the political, educational and socio economic status of the Druze is something that needs to be addressed. They concluded that the Druze are regarded by the authorities as “Druze when it comes to their obligations towards the state, and Arabs when it comes to their rights”; that the blood pact that is used as lip service by those in power didn’t materialize in any concrete benefits on the ground.; and that all the promises made by levy

Ashkol and all the successive Israeli leadership about the equality of the Druze have not been fulfilled.

Kais Firro argued that the state has a choke hold over all the Druze who work with the

IDF. They are ineligible for any other job because they lack the proper education or training, and so they find no other source of income except to work in the state’s defense industry especially after most of their farm lands have been expropriated. A Druze has no choice but to be completely loyal to those who control his livelihood and is completely paralyzed unable to think, let alone to resist.

This truth sheds light on the identity and the mentality of those people that are paralyzed by their complete dependence on the state for their survival and the survival of their families and through that were turned into unswerving tools in the hands of the state. They were convinced that any criticism directed towards the state would result in their termination and their addition to the figures of unemployment, therefore threatening their source of revenue. Deeming themselves completely under the mercy of the state, they became willing participants in the policy of the state.

Nabieh Al-Kassem, sums up the consequences of the state policy towards the Druze by saying”

167 In my opinion, the danger isn’t limited to the current time and this generation, but represents a growing danger that would engulf the future generations of Druze men. What are the implications for young Druze who not only see their fathers but all the other men in their society in a military uniform? How will they be able to face life if they have never heard a word of descent or criticism, just slogans and “the party line.”345

Members of the Druze Initiative Committee claim that the divisions created between Druze and non-Druze Arabs were the ultimate goal of Israeli policy and not a mere consequence. They contend that Israelis capitalized on the existing divergence that resulted from previous foreign rule, first under the Turks and later the British and French. Betts affirms that “mistrustful suspicion of the majority, however, helped keep the Druze isolated from their neighbors and fiercely loyal to their own group. It also made them an ideal target for the French, British, and later Israeli occupying forces seeking to undermine Arab nationalism and its quest for Arab unity in the wake of the Ottoman collapse after World War I.”346 The Druze Initiative Committee contends that in order to facilitate their control of the Arabs, the Israelis benefited from further dividing the Arabs.347 They claim that the Israelis led a calculated and well-organized plan to further segregate the Arabs.348 They dealt with them separately as Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Bedouins.349

The Druze did receive preferential treatment as opposed to the rest of the minorities.

However, as some critics of Israeli policies would argue, there are also disadvantages that come with this preferential treatment. The privileged treatment that the Druze received from the leaders of the new state would then consequently create friction and tension between the groups.

The Druze were especially susceptible to such treatment because of initial hostility and

345 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1994. Personal Interview. 19 June. 346 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page 88. 347 Druze Initiative Comittie Member. 1994. Personal Interview . 19 June. This is also the opinion of several prominent Druze, such as Nabieh Al-Kassem, and Samih Al-Kassem, according to my interviews with them in June 1994. This unofficial policy is also indirectly referred to by the Israeli author Ben-Dor. 348 Al-Kassem, Nabieh. 1992. Al-Sonara Newspaper January 1992. 349 Betts, Robert Brenton. 1988. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press, page Xiii.

168 ignorance of other Arabs. This friction between Druze and other Muslims would also be used as means of antagonizing Druze against their fellow Muslims. Israeli officials and researchers would constantly persist in bringing up this point of dissension in discussing Druze history.350

The Israelis, however, have taken every opportunity to profess the good intentions of the government towards the Druze. Ben-Dor states: “This relationship of mutual understanding has endured, (and is emphasized today more than ever, for obvious political reasons, in Israel).”351

Some Druze, however, see this special treatment by Israel as purely opportunistic.

Nabieh Al-Kassem argues that:

the Israelis would choose to deal with the Arab minorities as Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Bedouins at one point, and then would deal with them as Arabs, Christians, Druze, and Bedouins, and yet at other times would deal with them as Arabs, Druze, and Bedouins, while other times they would deal with them as Arabs, and Druze.352

According to Al-Kassem, the Israelis took several steps in their campaign to segregate the Arabs into groups, focusing especially on detaching the Druze from their Arab lineage.353 The first step in the process of separation was to impose in 1956 mandatory military service on all Druze men.

This was accomplished through coercing several leading Druze religious figures, including

Sheikh Amin Tarif, the spiritual leader of the Druze community since 1928. The Druze leadership was led to believe that the mandatory military service would be beneficial to the entire

Druze community.354 This claim is supported by the fact that most of the Druze leaders themselves believed that their cooperation with the Israeli authority would lead to greater benefits to the entire Druze community. Sheikh Maadi argues that the well-being of the entire

350 Books written by Israelis such as Ben-Dor, Aharon ben-Ami, are constantly referring to what ben-Ami refers to as " a small society, surrounded by hostile and numerically superior enemies." Aharon Ben-Ami, Social Change in a Hostile Environment: The Crusader’s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), page 185. Ben-Dor The Druze in Israel Jerusalem, 1979, the Hebrew University Press. 351 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1979. The Druze in Israel : A political Study. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, page 99. 352 Nabieh Al- Kassem, Al-Sonara newspaper January 1992. 353 Ibid 354 Al-Kassem, Samih. 1994. Personal Interview. 23 June.

169 Druze community was the main motivation for such close cooperation between the Druze community and the Israeli authorities.355 The Israelis also tried the same strategy on the other small minority groups, the Christians and the Bedouins, by encouraging them into volunteering for military service.356 Muslim Arabs, who constitute the largest group of Arabs, on the other hand, were often discouraged from attempting to volunteer.

The Druze Initiative Committee argues that since the creation of the state of Israel, authorities have attempted to create divisions between the Druze living in the Galilee region, and those living in the Carmel region.357 The Israelis would play one region against the other. The

Israelis would declare that the Galilee Druze leadership is representative of all the Druze in

Israel; and then the Israelis would declare the Carmel Druze leadership as the representatives.

This would, therefore, create some resentment between the two regions, thus obstructing any would be union between all the Druze in Israel. This divisive policy is demonstrated through allocations for the municipal budget for each region. The more loyal the region and its leadership to the state, the more budget allocations and therefore the service to the citizens of the corresponding municipalities.358 The Carmel region with the highest percentage of Druze males working in the defense sector also has the best-paved roads and municipal facilities. In other words, the municipal leadership is put in a position where they must prove ultimate loyalty to the state and its policies in order to attain the sufficient resources to operate the municipality. The state is the final arbitrator as to who is the leader of the Druze community in Israel. This is yet another example of the patron-client dynamic that characterizes the relationship of Druze elites with the state of Israel.

355 Maadi, Jaber. 2002. Personal Interview. 1 April. 356 The Initiative Druze Committee has cited growing numbers of Arabs, volunteering for army service in IDF. 357 Druze Initiative Committee Member. 1994. Personal Interview. 20 June. 358 Ibid.

170

CONCLUSION

How did Israelis promote a Druze identity at odds with Palestinian Arab aspirations? In answer to this, my first research question, this dissertation describes how the state of Israel, with the help of Druze elites, not only reinforced Druze sectarian distinctiveness, but established a separate ethnic identity for the Druze in Israel that distinguished them from Palestinian Arabs.

Hobsbawm argues that recently created nations in the Middle East, such as Israel or

Jordan, must be novel. In most instances, these new nations and the nationalism that goes along with them have been constructed through what Hobsbawm refers to as “invented traditions.” One important nation-building tool, especially in the Middle East, is the military. Along with the traditions that Hobsbawm highlights, such as education and national ceremonies, the military traditions are especially important for creating a sense of shared identity in Israel. These

“invented traditions” not only worked to cement together an Israeli Jewish sense of identity, they were also utilized to create a sub-national identity for the Druze. The state of Israel, with the cooperation of the Druze elites, has attempted, with some success, to construct through its policies an ethnic identity for the Druze separate from their Arab identity. The policy of the state of Israel was to encourage the Druze to distinguish themselves by facilitating their imagining of a Druze ethnic identity. Israeli and Druze elites fashioned this identity through distinct military, economic, and cultural policies for the Druze. The need for inventing a sub- national identity for the Druze arose from the state’s interest in dividing the Arabs along sectarian lines, in order to facilitate their control. Thus the Druze were no longer just a different sect but also ethnically differentiated from Arabs. This is an example of a classic strategy that has been used by colonial

171 states to subdue native populations, commonly known as “divide and conquer.” What is perhaps unique to the Israeli situation is how the state tried to simultaneously encourage ethnic nationalism as well as civic nationalism among the Druze in Israel. In other words, the state encouraged Druze ethnic nationalism to thwart Palestinian Arab national aspirations, while cultivating Israeli civic nationalism among the Druze, most notably through their military service. This case study demonstrates that these two nationalisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

When the Jewish state was recognized by the United Nations as a result of the Partition resolution, members of the Jewish community of Israel wrote a declaration. This declaration stated that the state of Israel would be based on freedom, justice and peace; it would ensure complete social and political rights for all its inhabitants regardless of religion, sex, or race. In accordance with international human rights, as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights of 1948, the new state would guarantee freedom of religion, expression, and speech; it would safeguard the holy places of all religions, and it would be faithful to all the principles of the charter of the United Nations. After the declaration, sixteen Druze leaders met with Prime

Minister David Ben Gurion, congratulated him on his declaration and volunteered to serve in the army, just to prove their loyalty to this new state. Despite the pledges of the declaration, and in spite of the genuine attempt of the Druze to cooperate with the authorities, a system of racism and discrimination soon was established in all areas of Israel against Arabs, including the Druze community. The Israeli authorities specifically targeted the Druze community by creating disputes among Druze families and tribes. Some Druze elites found it to their advantage to remain loyal to the authorities, and they were rewarded both politically and economically.

172 The Israelis have also gone a step further by declaring that the Druze are not really Arabs, but are a separate ethnic entity that had somehow became Arabized. The Israeli authorities have also sponsored texts about Druze history, which are full of distortions of their history. These textbooks are now being used as school textbooks in Druze villages. All these attempts are aimed at detaching the Druze from their Arab identity.

The Druze Initiative Committee asserts that the Druze have suffered and paid a heavy price under the state of Israel. These Druze contend that since 1948, the state of Israel has manipulated the Druze minority to implement its hidden agenda, which is mainly aimed at segregating the Druze community from the rest of the Israeli Arab population. The Druze

Initiative Committee cites several substantiations to verify their accusations; these include land confiscations, mandatory military service, and the creation of separate Druze ministries. These issues, along with the creation of a “Druze Heritage Education” program, do justify the suspicions of these Druze.

The Israel authorities have plans for the Druze beyond giving them an identity crisis. A

Druze who no longer can identify with his/her Arab identity will be seeking a new Israeli identity. With this new identity comes new responsibilities, which include participating in defending the new identity, along with participating in its construction by implementing state policies. The government has taken a carrot and stick approach, rewarding villages that abide by its guidelines, and punishing villages that do not comply with its policies. At first glance, it was apparent that the villages in the Carmel region, where there is little or no descent to Israeli policies, are much more affluent looking, than villages in the Galilee region, where descent is more common. However in general Druze villages tend to look, at least at the superficial level, much more organized with more paved roads than neighboring Muslim or Christian villages.

173 In order for the state to succeed in promoting a Druze identity that is at odds with

Palestinian Arab aspirations, it needed the cooperation of the Druze elites and their spiritual leadership, the subject of my second research question. Did Druze leaders who cooperated with

Israelis pursue personal self interest or sincerely believe their choices would benefit their community? This is perhaps the most difficult question to answer, because individuals rarely admit the real motivations behind their actions. It is possible, however, to deduce from the continuation of an action, as well as the personal benefit that the individual has gained, what motivations they might have had. Perhaps the actions that are most revealing about the motivations of certain Druze elites is their continued cooperation with state policies once they must have known the detrimental effect these policies were having on their community as a whole. I document these detrimental effects, most notably land expropriations. The personal power and influence that some elites have gained through this collaboration with state officials can also help shed light on their motivations. I conclude that although some Druze leaders may have been motivated by concern for their community initially, the continuing collaboration of many must be largely motivated by self interest.

The Israeli authorities created a system where grievances could only be solved through their agents in the Druze leadership. These individuals cultivated power and prestige by maintaining a good relationship with the state. Individuals who held their personal well being and fortunes above those of the community were often the ones who would implement the policies of the state. By controlling these chosen few from the traditional leadership, the state was able to control the entire Druze community.

Ultimately the most important research question as far as the well being of the Druze is concerned is whether or not they as a community benefited from these policies. Did Druze

174 leaders’ choices—such as acceptance of mandatory military conscription—actually benefit their community? Based on the evidence presented in chapter six, looking at the consequences of state polices relating to education as well as land expropriation, I have concluded that the Druze community did not benefit as a whole from state policies.

There are wider implications of this study for debates over minority rights. Is it often beneficial for a minority to be granted some autonomy when it comes to expressing its “cultural traditions.” The right to limited autonomy, such as the Druze’s distinct educational and legal status, has been a right sought after by several minorities. Religious minorities have historically struggled for their rights, and most have called for some sort of autonomy when it comes to religious affairs.

This study shows that such distinctions maybe a mixed blessing, especially when cultural boundaries (such as Druze religion) are reinforced by state-designed boundaries (such as Druze

“ethnicity.”) Distinct polices are even more problematic when unequal for different groups (as in the IDF service requirements). Granting a group special treatment can ultimately arouse resentment from other groups. Such policies, particularly when originating due to colonial

"divide and conquer" strategies, have had devastatingly tragic consequences, as demonstrated in

Rwanda by the Tutsi and the Hutu. The situation of the Druze has fortunately not escalated to this level, yet the resentment by some Palestinian Arabs towards Druze has been certainly reinforced.

When is recognition of distinctiveness dangerous in a multiethnic society? Perhaps religious rights can be guaranteed as well as the ability of a group to express its distinctiveness in a multi-ethnic society without arousing resentment from other minorities in a multiethnic state where all minorities are granted equal rights. However, this is problematic when a distinct ethnic

175 identity is state invented. As far as the Druze are concerned, being granted autonomy when it comes to religious affairs is beneficial; however state emphasis on their particularism as far as ethnicity could be problematic. I have found no reference to a Druze desire for having their own state. A goal for most Druze does seem to be peaceful coexistence with their neighbors, whether they be Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Syrians, or Lebanese. Ultimately if the Druze are not empowered through this emphasis on their particularism, but rather resented, it would be much more conducive for their goal of peaceful coexistence to reinforce their Arabism as opposed to their Druzism.

Throughout this research, intriguing questions and possibilities for future research emerged. Perhaps the most intriguing potential future project is one which would compare the

Israeli state policy toward the Druze in the occupied Golan Heights to those of the Druze in

Israel. Why has there been more success and ultimately more cooperation from Druze in Israel as opposed to Golani Druze? And how much impact did the consequences of state policies towards the Druze in Israel have on the apparent resistance of Golani Druze to state policies? And although this research focused on the Druze within the state of Israel, due to personal limitations, a more regional comparison of the status of the Druze as minorities in the other countries in the region (Lebanon and Syria specifically) would be more of a comparative study into the treatment of minorities in multi-ethnic states. Other future research could look specifically at how the different minorities in Israel, compare when it comes to other socio-economic indicators. Those with more access to Israeli archives and state data could construct a more detailed picture of the status of the different minorities in Israel.

Although this research was somewhat limited in scope, it does illustrate how “invented traditions” along with the military serve as institutional tools to construct a sense of sub-national

176 identity. For the Druze in Israel, the state has invented a national tradition different and separate from the tradition of the major group of Arabs. By simultaneously encouraging two forms of nationalism: civic and ethnic, the state with the help of Druze elites, serves to demonstrate how nationalism in many different forms and types are ultimately tools used in pursuit of state interest. In the larger paradigm debate on nationalism, this case study will not only add to the constructionist model, but also provide additional tools, such as the military, to give a more complete list of means to “invent a tradition.”

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183 APPENDIX A:

The Prayer for the dead (original prayer based on a 1961 published version):359

There is no God but God. Allah! There is no god but He, the Living, the Self-Subsisting, Eternal.

There is no god but He: That is the witness of Allah, His , and those endowed with knowledge, standing firm on justice. There is no god but He, the Exalted in Power, the Wise.

Capable of all and everything, God and his angles send their blessings, onto the prophet.

For all of you who are faithful, pray for the prophet. Our God sends his blessings for the most honorable of nations, The masters of the Arabs and the Persians.

In front of Mecca and zamzam, The and its mosque, the master of light and the lantern in the darkness, the last of the prophets and the generous messengers, our prophet Mohammad.

God made him more generous, more honorable and bestowed upon him greatness, and magnificence. Pleased by him, God blessed him and gave him a status higher than our masters, the friends of the prophet.

May God have mercy on whoever looked with insight, was ordered and fulfilled his duty, showed patience and virtue.

Wait oh ye faithful for the Imam (wali) of the gates, Al-Hakim-be-emir Allah – the solitary the endower. With you the funeral of a Muslim man from the Unitarians clan, the holders of the truth and the proof, he is turned over in death to the mercy of God. May God have mercy on him and allow him passage to .

((this prayer would be followed by the AL-Fatiha (the opening) Which is identical to the opening Chapter of the Koran.)) In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and

Sustainer of the worlds; Most Gracious, Most Merciful; Master of the Day of Judgment. Thee do

359 Translated by the author from the 1961 version which was published by The library of the Druze religious leadership; as it appeared in Al Sindyanah 1993 Druze Initiative Committee.

184 we , and your aid we seek. Show us the straight path, the path of those upon whom Thou hast bestowed favors. Not (the path) of those upon whom Thy wrath is brought down, nor of those who go astray.

Original Funeral Prayer (published in 1961)

185 The new Prayer for the dead:360

There is no God but God. Allah! There is no god but He, the Living, the Self-Subsisting,

Eternal.

There is no god but He: That is the witness of Allah, His angels, and those endued with

knowledge, standing firm on justice. There is no god but He, the Exalted in Power, the

Wise. Capable of all and everything, God and his angles send their blessings, onto the

prophet.

For all of you who are faithful, pray for the prophet. Our God sends his blessings and

greetings, increasing his bounty, blessing and protecting with all his magnificence upon

the most honorable of nations, The masters of the Arabs and the Persians.

In front of Mecca and zamzam, The medina and its mosque, whomever obeyed him with

the sword and pen, with the greatest of virtue, and the best of sprit, the generosity, and

greatness as our master Mohammad. May God grant him and bestow upon him to be

more generous, more honorable and bestowed up him greatness, and magnificence.

May God have mercy on whoever looked with insight, was ordered and fulfilled his duty,

showed patience and virtue. Wait oh ye faithful for the Imam (wali) of the gates, Al-

Hakim-be-emir Allah – the solitary the endower.

With us the funeral of a member of the Unitarian clan, the holders of the truth and the

proof, he is turned over in death to the mercy of God.

May God have mercy on him and allow him passage to heaven.

AL-Fatiha (the opening) (each one praying it to themselves not out loud)

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and

Sustainer of the worlds; Most Gracious, Most Merciful; Master of the Day of Judgment.

360 Ibid.

186 Thee do we worship, and your aid we seek. Show us the straight path, the path of those

upon whom Thou hast bestowed favors. Not (the path) of those upon whom Thy wrath is

brought down, nor of those who go astray.

New version of the Funeral Prayer (1989)

187 APPENDIX B:Table 8: Land Expropriations 1945-1962

Land in Land in Percentage land Village 1945(dunam) 1962(dunam) Expropriated Harfish 14623 5254 64.0703 Jizer al Zarqa 2531 309 87.79139 Jish 12430 2026 83.70072 Na'urah 5535 3482 37.09124 Abu Sinan 12871 5434 57.78106 Ain Al Assad 12000 1204 89.96667 Juless 12835 6010 53.17491 Jatt (Galilee) 5907 1727 70.7635 Kafar Samai 7150 2436 65.93007 Kisra 10,600 7800 26.41509 Sajour 8172 1533 81.24082 Yahnuh 12466 1343 89.2267 Yarka 30597 10701 65.02598 B'einya 6793 1882 72.29501 Bi'na 14839 3679 75.20722 Al Jdadidah 5215 1728 66.86481 Jaljuliya 11873 2237 81.15893 Deir al Asad 8366 2251 73.09347 Kabul 10320 5345 48.20736 Kawkab 2134 1235 42.12746 Majid al Kurum 17828 4237 76.23401 Mazra'a 3116 298 90.43646 Makr 8661 3884 55.15529 Nahf 15654 4454 71.54721 Nin 3737 1887 49.50495 Sulim 2358 1629 30.91603 Sachnin 70181 25775 63.27354 Ablin 16019 10206 36.28816 Frideis 4220 1595 62.20379 Beit Jan 45650 6000 86.85652 Kafar Yasif 6729 4581 31.92153 Maghar 45590 12227 73.18052 Rama 23701 7322 69.10679 Jatt (Triangle) 9623 5415 43.72857 Daburiya 13373 2974 77.76116 Dahi 3011 2029 32.61375 Deir Hanna 15350 5090 66.84039 Zalfa 1285 807 37.19844 Tuban (Heib 13684 1772 87.05057 Bedouins)

188 Table 8 (cont.)

Land in Land in Percentage land Village 1945(dunam) 1962(dunam) Expropriated Tayba (triangle) 32750 13343 59.25802 Tayba (Nazareth) 7127 2135 70.0435 Tira 26803 8599 67.91777 Tamra (Nazareth) 3604 1269 64.78912 Tamra (Acre) 30549 14489 52.57128 Tar'an 13104 7150 45.43651 Yafa al Nasra 16521 4887 70.41947 Kafar Barra 3956 1816 54.09505 Kafar Kama 8395 6338 24.50268 Kafar Kana 18869 7868 58.30198 Kafar Manda 12703 4998 60.65496 Kafar Masr 4629 1889 59.19205 Kafar Kassem 12718 3924 69.14609 Kafar Kara 14543 2618 81.99821 Mi'lya 19136 2997 84.33842 Muqiblah 2687 2196 18.27317 Mashhad 9852 4236 57.00365 Nazareth 12599 8325 33.92333 Arava 30852 18421 40.29236 Ar'arah/ Arah 29537 7269 75.39019 Rineh 15899 5880 63.01654 Ramana 1485 271 81.75084 Shafa Amr 58725 10371 82.33972 Buqai'eh 10276 3500 65.94005 Dalyet al Karmel 19741 13026 34.0155 Isfyeah 16811 9632 42.70418 Aksal 13666 4396 67.83258 Umm al Fahm 68311 12006 82.4245 Baqa al Gharbiaya 21116 8228 61.03429 Beisan 13594 9000 33.79432 Beit Naqubah 1958 807 58.78447 Azir 764 566 25.91623 Ailbun 11190 3772 66.29133 Elot 10891 2359 78.33991 Ein Mahil 8268 2576 68.84373 Sandala 3217 1255 60.9885 Qalansuwa 17249 6620 61.62096 Rihaniya 6112 1607 73.70746

189