Archived Content Contenu Archivé
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
ARCHIVED - Archiving Content ARCHIVÉE - Contenu archivé Archived Content Contenu archivé Information identified as archived is provided for L’information dont il est indiqué qu’elle est archivée reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It est fournie à des fins de référence, de recherche is not subject to the Government of Canada Web ou de tenue de documents. Elle n’est pas Standards and has not been altered or updated assujettie aux normes Web du gouvernement du since it was archived. Please contact us to request Canada et elle n’a pas été modifiée ou mise à jour a format other than those available. depuis son archivage. Pour obtenir cette information dans un autre format, veuillez communiquer avec nous. This document is archival in nature and is intended Le présent document a une valeur archivistique et for those who wish to consult archival documents fait partie des documents d’archives rendus made available from the collection of Public Safety disponibles par Sécurité publique Canada à ceux Canada. qui souhaitent consulter ces documents issus de sa collection. Some of these documents are available in only one official language. Translation, to be provided Certains de ces documents ne sont disponibles by Public Safety Canada, is available upon que dans une langue officielle. Sécurité publique request. Canada fournira une traduction sur demande. CHAPTER 6 COUNTERING 1. In our Second Report, Part III, Chapter 7, we described the operational technique known as "countering" . Because of the numerous possible interpreta- tions of this term, we limit our definition of "countering" in this chapter, as we did in our Second Report, to any positive steps that may be taken as a result of the collection and analysis of information, other than the mere reporting of intelligence to government . Here we deal with the extent to which senior government officials, senior R.C.M.P. members and ministers were aware of countering measures undertaken by the Force . 2. In our Second Report we noted that many perfectly lawful forms of countermeasures were well known in the Security Service and in the senior ranks of the R .C .M.P . generally . Disruptive tactics which included an element of illegality (such as some of the Checkmate operations), were not as widely known . Specific Checkmate operations, for example ; were usually known only to those directly involved in their planning and execution . While senior members of the Security Service were aware of some cases, there is no evidence that any Minister or public servant outside the R .C.M .P. knew of such occurrences, or were even made aware that unlawful methods might be used . Nor is there any evidence that any Minister or senior official let it be known that unlawful countermeasures would be tolerated . 3. In our Second Report, also in Part III, Chapter 7, we Also described a hybrid type of countermeasure - one that was lawful, yet inappropriate for a security intelligence agency . Examples of such activities included inducing employers to discharge subversive employees, leaking information to the media about the subversive characteristics of individuals or undertaking "conspicuous surveillance" of domestic groups . While our inquiry could not reach into the Cabinet room, except as to allegations of implication of Ministers in conduct not authorized or provided for by law, there is no evidence before us that senior government officials or Ministers knew of such activities . There is evidence that in the case of each of the last two activities mentioned, (we cannot say whether there were other instances), an operation was authorized by senior members of the Security Service . There is evidence that, at high levels within the Security Service and in the R .C .M.P . generally, and among Ministers and senior officials of government, there was acceptance of two further lawful activities : the `defusing' programme, in particular as a prelude to visits by certain foreign dignitaries and international sporting events held in Canada, and the Security Service's participation in publicizing security threats outside the ranks of government, at least in the form of addresses by the Director rPneral in oublic meetings and to private groups . 171 CHAPTER 7 PHYSICAL SURVEILLANC E 1. In our Second Report, Part III, Chapter 8, we discussed the legal and policy issues involved in the investigative practice known as physical su rveil- lance . Here we examine in detail the extent to which Ministers, and senior members of the R .C .M.P . were aware of, approved of and responded to the use of this technique and the legal and policy issues that arose from it . There was no evidence either through hearings or an examination of R .C .M .P. files that this technique was discussed with senior government officials . It is reasonable to assume, however, that some senior government officials who were closely involved with the R .C .M .P. were aware that the R .C .M.P . might have commit- ted violations of traffic laws and other provincial statutes in the course of physical surveillance . (See, for example, Mr . Robertson's comments quoted in Part II of this Report .) 2. The statutes which appear to have been violated in physical surveillance operations frequently have not posed consequences as serious as those which have been violated, for example, in undercover operations, which may have involved the commission of more serious criminal offences . Accordingly, awareness by senior R .C .M .P. members of illegalities arising from physical surveillance operations may be thought to have a lesser significance here than it does in other areas we have examined . Nonetheless, as we indicated in our Second Report, all practices that violate the law - even "minor laws" - should be a matter of concern to members of the R .C .M.P ., senior government officials and to those charged with the responsibility of accounting to Parlia- ment for the R .C .M.P . (a) The Honourable G.J. Mcllraith Summary of evidenc e 3. At the time of his appearance before us, Senator McIlraith appeared not to be aware of the meaning of the term "Watcher Service" . At one point he asked Commission counsel to explain the term to him (Vol . 120, p. 18801) . Senator Mcllraith told us that he had no knowledge of the registration by members of the Security Service or the R .C.M .P. in a hotel under a false name, although he admitted that this would be necessary if they were following someone . Even at the time of his testimony, he stated that he was unsure whether such registrations were illegal in all provinces (Vol . 120, pp. 18799-800) . Mr . Mcllraith told us he never gave any thought to the possibility that members of the Security Service violated traffic laws in the course of their duties (Vol . 120, p. 18801) . He also testified that the subject of "dummy" registration of moto r 173 vehicles was never discussed with him (Vol. 120, p . 18802) and he denied any discussion taking place with Mr . Starnes or anyone else regarding the use of false documents to establish a false identity for a member of the R .C.M .P. or a human source (Vol. 120, pp . 18804-5) . Mr . Starnes told us, however, that "certainly" Mr . Mcllraith would have been knowledgeable about the difficul- ties of the Watcher Service and "some of the things" that they might be required to do (Vol . 106, p. 16641) . Conclusion 4. Our experience in this inquiry leads us to infer that by and large practices we have referred to here were not regarded by members of the R .C.M .P. as being of much legal delicacy prior to our Inquiry . Therefore we do not think there was even any thought devoted to whether the successive Ministers should be made aware of the practices . Even in the case of a serious matter, such as using R .C .M .P. facilities to fabricate identity documents apparently issued by a province, we think it unlikely, based on the general evidence we have heard as to the relationship between the R .C.M .P. and the Solicitor General, that the question would have been raised with the Minister . In the absence of any specific evidence that Mr . McIlraith knew of any illegal activities of the R.C.M .P. in the course of physical surveillance, we conclude that it is unlikely that the problems were discussed with him or that he ever turned his mind to them . (b) The Honourable Jean-Pierre Goyer Summary of evidenc e 5 . Shortly after succeeding Mr . Mcllraith, Mr. Goyer visited a Security Service garage containing surveillance vehicles and associated equipment (Vol . C50, pp. 6838-40) . Mr. Goyer told us that it was possible that he had asked officials at the garage if their operations were conducted in accordance with the law, but he assumed that everything was done according to the law (Vol. C50, p. 6840) . He said that he was told there that licence plates were changed on the vehicles from time to time (Vol . C-50, p . 6852), but was not aware of any legal problem arising from this practice (Vol . C-50, pp. 6854-55) . When questioned if he knew about the use of false documentation by a member of the R.C .M .P. or a source employed by the R .C .M .P. (in this case, in order to allow the person to infiltrate a group more easily), Mr . Goyer replied that the matter had been discussed, but it had not been presented as a problem, and in fact, he had never thought of it as being a legal problem (Vol. C50, pp . 6853-4). Mr. Goyer told us that no one had presented to him as a problem the violation of rules of the road (Vol .