Negotiating with North Korea

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Negotiating with North Korea

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has provoked much apprehension in the international community in recent years. The Six Party Talks were convened in 2003 to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. They brought together the US, China, Russia, Japan as well as North and South Korea in the eﬀort to negotiate a multilateral resolution of North Korea’s nuclear program but the parties had widely diﬀerent views and approaches. This book will examine the Six Party Talks as a study in multilateral negotiation highlighting the expectations vested in them and their inability to develop a common approach to the issue. It holds out some important lessons for multilateral negotiation, diplomacy and dealing with North Korea.

Leszek Buszynski is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the National Security College at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. He is also co-series editor of the Routledge Security in Asia Paciﬁc Series. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Routledge Security in Asia Paciﬁc Series

Series Editors Leszek Buszynski, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, and William Tow, Australian National University

Security issues have become more prominent in the Asia Paciﬁc region because of the presence of global players, rising great powers, and conﬁdent middle powers, which intersect in complicated ways. This series puts forward important new work on key security issues in the region. It embraces the roles of the major actors, their defense policies and postures and their security interaction over the key issues of the region. It includes coverage of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, the Koreas, as well as the middle powers of ASEAN and South Asia. It also covers issues relating to environmental and economic security as well as transnational actors and regional groupings.

1 Bush and Asia 7 Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons America’s evolving relations with Bhumitra Chakma East Asia Edited by Mark Beeson 8 Human Security in East Asia Challenges for collaborative action 2 Japan, Australia and Asia-Paciﬁc Edited by Sorpong Peou Security Edited by Brad Williams and 9 Security and International Politics Andrew Newman in the South China Sea Towards a co-operative 3 Regional Cooperation and Its management regime Enemies in Northeast Asia Edited by Sam Bateman and The impact of domestic forces Ralf Emmers Edited by Edward Friedman and Sung Chull Kim 10 Japan’s Peace Building Diplomacy in Asia 4 Energy Security in Asia Seeking a more active political role

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Edited by Michael Wesley Lam Peng Er

5 Australia as an Asia Paciﬁc 11 Geopolitics and Maritime Regional Power Territorial Disputes in East Asia Friendships in ﬂux? Ralf Emmers Edited by Brendan Taylor 12 North Korea’s Military- 6 Securing Southeast Asia Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008 The politics of security sector reform Narushige Michishita Mark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy 13 Political Change, Democratic 20 Nuclear Power and Energy Transitions and Security in Security in Asia Southeast Asia Edited by Rajesh Basrur and Mely Caballero-Anthony Koh Swee Lean Collin

14 American Sanctions in the 21 Human Security and Climate Asia-Pacific Change in Southeast Asia Brendan Taylor Managing risk and resilience Edited by Lorraine Elliott and 15 Southeast Asia and the Rise of Mely Caballero-Anthony Chinese and Indian Naval Power Between rising naval powers 22 Maritime Challenges and Edited by Sam Bateman and Priorities in Asia Joshua Ho Implications for regional security Edited by Joshua Ho and 16 Human Security in Southeast Asia Sam Bateman Yukiko Nishikawa 23 Ten Years After 9/11 – 17 ASEAN and the Rethinking the Jihadist Threat Institutionalization of East Asia Arabinda Acharya Ralf Emmers 24 Bilateralism, Multilateralism and 18 India as an Asia Pacific Power Asia-Pacific Security David Brewster Contending cooperation Edited by William T. Tow and 19 ASEAN Regionalism Brendan Taylor Cooperation, values and institutionalisation 25 Negotiating with North Korea Christopher B. Roberts The Six Party Talks and the nuclear issue Leszek Buszynski Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Negotiating with North Korea The Six Party Talks and the nuclear issue

Leszek Buszynski Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016

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LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 Leszek Buszynski The right of Leszek Buszynski to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Buszynski, Leszek. Negotiating with North Korea : the six party talks and the nuclear issue / Leszek Buszynski. pages cm. – (Routledge Security in Asia Pacific ; 23) Summary: "The North Korean nuclear threat has created an enormous amount of apprehension in the international community in recent years. In 2003, the Six Party Talks brought together the US, China, Russia, Japan as well as South and North Korea to negotiate a multilateral resolution of this nuclear issue. This book examines this multilateral attempt, and will look at the Six Party Talks as a study of multilateralism, differentiating it from empirical studies on the Korean peninsula"– Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Nuclear arms control–Korea (North) 2. Nuclear nonproliferation– International cooperation. I. Title. JZ6009.K7B87 2013 327.1'747095193–dc23 2012047863

ISBN: 978-0-415-68273-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-69419-0 (ebk) Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books Contents

Acknowledgements viii Abbreviations ix

Introduction 1

1 Bargaining and negotiation theory 5

2 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 18

3 The formation of the Six Party Talks 53

4 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 78

5 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 111

6 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 140

7Eﬀorts to revive the Six Party Talks 164

Conclusion 184

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Bibliography 197 Index 205 Acknowledgements

In a book of this nature which deals with great complexity and diplomatic nuance there are many acknowledgements to make, not all of which can be recorded here. I would like to thank Charles Pritchard for sitting down with me over coﬀee in Seoul and Stockholm and sharing his experiences of the Bush Administration’s dealings with the Six Party Talks. Ambassador Cho Tae-yong was a member of the South Korea delegation to the Six Party Talks and his experiences were invaluable and fascinating. Others deserving thanks include Ambassador Lim Sung-nam, who is South Korea’s present envoy to the Six Party Talks, Hideshi Takesada, who explained the Japanese position, Viktor Larin for arranging interviews with Russian scholars in his institute in Vladivostok, Shin Chang-hoon and Bong Young-shik of the Asian Institute in Seoul, Shin Beom-chul and Lee Ho-ryung of the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis. There are many others to whom I am grateful for their ideas and insights on the topic. Some I met at academic conferences, others at various receptions. Most had clear views when the subject of North Korea turned up and in view of their oﬃcial status would prefer not to be named in any case. I also want to thank Yonas Tariku Metafaria for his diligence in acting as research assistant in the formative stages of the project, and Russell Mcaskie for carefully reading the text and for his comments and very helpful suggestions. Needless to say, any errors of fact or interpretation are my own. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Abbreviations

ABM Anti ballistic missile APEC Asia Pacific Economic cooperation BDA Banco Delta Asia CBM Confidence Building Measure CVID Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement DMZ Demilitarized Zone DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea GNP Grand National Party HEU Highly Enriched Uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency KCNA Korean Central News Agency KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization LDP Liberal Democratic Party LWR Light water reactor MW Megawatts NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSC National Security Council PSI Proliferation Security Initiative WMD Weapons of mass destruction Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Introduction

This is a study of bargaining and negotiation, though it does examine other issues related to the security of the Korean Peninsula. It analyzes the conduct of negotiations with North Korea and shows how the process of negotiation shapes the outcome. The conceptual literature on negotiation has been a useful starting point for this study and in particular I. William Zartman’s concept of the structure of negotiation. Zartman observed that negotiations do not just reflect the distribution of power between the parties but how they relate to each other over issues that concern them. No matter which states are involved and despite their best intentions, once started, negotiations may go in unforeseen and surprising directions. As one diplomat with considerable experience ruefully noted, negotiations become like an “animal” with a life of its own. It is as though a living being is created which may be tame and compliant or violent and uncontrollable, raising demands of its own and constantly requiring attention. No doubt, this does not happen in every situation, as most negotiations, those that deal with functional and household issues between states, proceed with bureaucratic regularity and reach expected conclusions. Those negotiations that deal with critical security issues and involve antagonistic states with opposing positions are a different story. In these cases the act of coming together in negotiations creates a structure which is defined in terms of the interaction between the parties and the positions they assume. A superpower like the US would normally adopt a dominant position defining the agenda and expecting the result to conform to its interests. Some

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 parties may be supportive as they join the dominant player, others may some become openly confrontational, while others may feign cooperation but actually work to a very different agenda. The interaction between them then shapes the negotiations as positions are expressed and then reformulated according to feedback received in an ongoing process of mutual adjustment. In some situations the interaction may result in a satisfactory convergence and agreement. In other cases, however, interaction may intensify the suspicion and mutual antipathy resulting in a polarization of positions and deadlock. This study focuses on the Six Party Talks which were an attempt by the US, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to negotiate the termination of North 2 Introduction Korea’s nuclear program. They began in August 2003 and were last held in December 2008, when North Korea withdrew. They were called into being because the Bush Administration refused to negotiate directly with North Korea over its nuclear program in the way the Clinton Administration did before it. The Bush Administration expected the other parties in the talks to join it in pressing the North to surrender the nuclear program. Very high expectations were aroused by the talks which polarized opinion, not only in the US but in South Korea as well, and deteriorated into partisan politics. Critics chastised the neoconservatives of the Bush Administration for resorting to an aggressive posture that, they argued, undermined the Six Party Talks and compelled the North to develop nuclear weapons in response to the fear of an American attack. As they saw it, the way forward was to engage North Korea in dialogue. In their view the North had shown a willingness to abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework which terminated the first nuclear crisis of 1993–94 and it was likely to respond to a similar effort at dialogue. It was obvious to them that the Bush Administration was to blame and they thought that if engagement were given a chance, the situation would be resolved. Yet others thought that North Korea was ruled by reasonable men who were led astray by the exigencies of their condition and the American threat. It seemed clear to them that if North Korea were offered assurances that the US would not attack it, as well as economic aid to boost its weakened economy, it would surrender its nuclear weapons program. However, supporters of the Bush Administration’s approach to North Korea regarded it as a pariah state and it seemed obvious to them that the North was bent on obtaining nuclear weapons whatever the cost. As they saw it the North would hardly respond to any incentives that the US could offer, and what was required were disincentives and punitive measures since the regime would understand nothing else. In South Korea a similar polarization was noted given the extensive expectations attached to the Six Party Talks by supporters of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, which was in office from 2003–9. This Administration raised great hopes amongst its supporters that brotherly relations could be established with the North, which would spill over into the negotiations over the nuclear program and induce the North to surrender it. The view was that South Korea could tame the North through economic engagement and the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 establishment of regular government and family interaction, and that a process of gradual change would set in which would bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification. They pinned their hopes on an exhilarating and breathtaking leap into the establishment of a “peace regime” in Northeast Asia that would engage all the major players and finally remove tensions and conflicts. Rather than immediately dealing with the nuclear issue, they called for a “peace regime” which would establish the conditions for the North’s nuclear disarmament and the removal of all the other problems on the Korean Peninsula. The supporters of the Grand National Party, now the Saenuri party, were not persuaded by what they regarded as delusion and saw the North as a continuing threat. They noted that every attempt to come Introduction 3 closer to the North resulted in a provocative incident as the regime saw the South as a threat to its legitimacy. They also pointed out that the “peace regime” espoused by the proponents of engagement would undermine the alliance with the US, which they regarded as the foundation of the South’s security. Much has been written on the negotiations with North Korea from the perspective of these polemical debates. In the desire to appeal to their audience, assumptions were taken for granted like universal truths that all would accept, and the implications of their positions were not for the most part analyzed. Those who called for engagement did not follow through and identify how it could resolve the issue of the North’s nuclear program. The literature on the North from South Korean sources reflects the views of a generation of scholars which has been influenced by the hope and expectation of “peace regime” formation, but what this meant in practical terms was left vague. Some proponents of engagement called for dialogue and discussion as though that was enough, others demanded that various incentives be offered to North Korea to obtain its compliance. While the general notion was appealing, the issues it stimulated never settled. What incentives could be offered and what price would the North demand to surrender the nuclear program? How were the incentives to be related to the disablement of the nuclear program? Which would come first, the incentives or the termination of the nuclear program? How would the North respond to the incentives and was it really interested? Those in the US who called for isolation and expected the North Korean regime to collapse never really examined the impact of their approach upon the regime and its supporters. They had difficulty understanding the extent to which the US was dependent upon other powers, China in particular, to denuclearize North Korea, and could not command them to do its bidding over North Korea. They failed to realize how much the regime was supported by China and that it could survive at low levels of economic activity for some time. They could not appreciate until much later that isolation allowed the regime to develop its nuclear weapons program, and the threat of American attack worked to strengthen it in the way that external threat solidifies oppressive regimes. The polemics that surrounded the negotiations with North Korea stimulated untested and unfulfilled hopes, derived from expectations that were for the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 most part unrealistic at the outset. Some have argued that if the US had done things differently, if the right concessions had been given to the North, if the Bush Administration could understand what the North Koreans really wanted, things would have been different. Others have argued that if there had been an international coalition against, if China had cooperated with the US and enforced sanctions, US efforts would have been suitably rewarded and so on. Despite everything North Korea went on to develop its nuclear program and conducted two nuclear tests, in October 2006 and May 2009. This book will not deal with lost opportunities as perceived by any of the advocates of the above views and is intended to be an analysis of the Six Party Talks in terms of their role, function and contribution to the security of the 4 Introduction Korean Peninsula. It is written from a non partisan perspective, one that is disentangled from any of the partisan positions that have been adopted over the subject of North Korea, both in the US and South Korea. The author’s approach is to match the facts with the interpretations that were current at the time, to identify what governments and diplomats engaged in the talks expected, and what actually happened, particularly after the North’s nuclear tests. It will trace these interpretations through the nuclear tests and will test their validity. The analysis will speak for itself and will not require an advocate of the kind that a partisan approach demands. It will have certain implications for policy which have been outlined in the conclusion. It will identify certain pertinent lessons for negotiation that should become clear as the text proceeds. The approach adopted here may not be welcomed by those who are emotionally tied to a particular view, or who defend their government’s record during the negotiations, or whose views are shaped by their national position. They may object that policy is more important than analysis, and that it is not enough to understand a difficult situation but to know how to extricate ourselves from it. This author’s response is that, one way or another, the foundation for effective policy has to be sound and competent analysis, without which policy becomes directionless and hostage to the populism of the day. In the age of the internet and the personal blog, populism increasingly infects academic discourse, and judgment is made bewildered by the shifting sands of ill informed opinion beneath it. Academic works on this contentious subject often take their cue from diplomatic self-images, or how governments like to portray their national position. This is evident from the focus of these academic works and, even more important, in what they avoid. American publications are strongly influenced by the expectation of a global partnership with China that would deal with a broad range of issues, security as well as economic. They focus on China’s role as mediator in the talks and tend to depict China as a supporter of US aims. They gloss over China’s close support for the North Korean regime and the extent to which that support prevented the realization of America’s aims. In South Korea supporters of the “peace regime” approach avoid mention of the North’s provocations and see them as minor hiccups on the path to reconciliation. They do not examine the extent to which the peace regime

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 vision triggers those provocations from the North and exacerbates the dilemmas that the North faces in dealing with the South. One way or another, the intention of this analysis is to examine all these issues, those that are avoided as well, for the task of laying the foundation for eﬀective policy. 1 Bargaining and negotiation theory

Introduction How are negotiation outcomes explained? Why is it that powerful parties cannot always get their way in negotiations? A commonly accepted idea of negotiations is that the strongest party wins. Nonetheless, power as defined in terms of the usual indicators of national power may not always result in a capacity to prevail in negotiations for various reasons. In multilateral negotiations, parties come together with various objectives, not all in agreement with the stronger party; some will be opposed while others will swing from one side to another. With a sufficient number of parties involved each adopting different functions, balancing and bargaining become necessary, and it becomes much more difficult for stronger parties to impose their will on the proceedings. Power alone may not prevail in this situation and the way the negotiations are conducted will very often impact on the final result, and in some cases may even decide the outcome. The interaction that develops between the parties shapes the pattern of negotiations, influences expectations, modifies bargaining positions, and eventually leads to an outcome. The result can be a considerable departure from what the stronger party had intended, and its negotiating position may be weakened and undermined as a result. If the US comes into negotiations with a number of small states or allies that are dependent upon it we can generally foresee how the negotiations will develop, and we may predict the outcome. But if the US enters into negotiations with a mixed group of powerful states such as China and Russia Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 as well as allies, the outcome of the negotiations becomes uncertain and is very much dependent on the process, how the negotiations are structured and how they are conducted. Interaction within negotiations is the key concept of this study

Power and the structure of negotiations Power is a slippery concept. National power can be quantified according to economic and military indicators. It is not an inherent quality or element but is a relational concept based on an ability to bring about a desired outcome. 6 Bargaining and negotiation theory Power has been defined in various ways as the ability to get results, or to achieve objectives, or to ensure outcomes.1 Power may be understood in terms of an ability to have others endorse and accept one’s viewpoint, to draw up and control the agenda in negotiations, and to have the outcome accepted. It is relational because it very much depends upon the perceptions of others, their willingness to cooperate with intentions, or their inability or reluctance to oppose them. Power may entail the use of force, which is direct physical pressure, or influence being a derivative form of power which is suggestive of power as the capacity to persuade others to cooperate. What counts is the ability to get one’s way which may not correspond to power rankings in international affairs. When a strong power, that is, one that is rated highly according to the indicators of national power, is unable to prevail in negotiations for whatever reason we have a definitional problem. We can argue that the strong power becomes a weaker, or is unable to apply its power during negotiations, or it is hamstrung by all kinds of constraints and limitations. This is telling us, however, that the ability to get one’s way in negotiations is something else and not automatically assured by national power. A more convenient way of dealing with this problem is to separate national power from negotiating strength, which is evident when a strong power is unable to apply its power during the course of negotiations. What is important for this study is the format of negotiations, the parties involved, the particular functions they adopt and the way the negotiations are conducted. Negotiation is a process according to which conflicting positions are combined to form a common decision, when parties stipulate the terms of their cooperation and give priority to common over conflicting interests.2 Nego- tiation theory examines the format and conduct of negotiations or what Zartman calls structure to explain why power does not always determine outcome.3 Structure is defined in terms of the factors that influence the process of interaction such as the number of the parties to the negotiations, their assessment of the value of potential outcomes, and tactical possibilities.4 Negotiation theory identifies the roles of the parties and the positions they adopt, the differences between public positions and their bottom line positions, the outcome they expect and press for, their relations with each other, the negotiating coalitions they may form, the tactics they will adopt to reach their

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 objective, and their commitment to the final result. An analysis of the structure of negotiations will help us to understand that new dynamics are created between the parties when they sit down to discuss a particular issue, which would influence the final outcome. Not every structure will shape the outcome of negotiations and in many cases the positions are clear and the results are largely predetermined. The US may assume a leadership position in negotiations when it is supported by smaller powers dependent upon its resources or diplomatic leverage. As leader and framer of the consensus, the US role may be accepted and uncontested for the most part, and it will act to coordinate the views of others in a largely predetermined outcome where the major issues have been defined by it in advance. In complex multilateral negotiations Bargaining and negotiation theory 7 where issues are contentious, and where parties are divided in their expectations, the outcome becomes much more uncertain and may even work against the stronger party.

Negotiation as interaction The structure of negotiations is largely shaped by the interaction of the parties. Indeed, interaction is the key to understand how negotiations proceed in complex cases and the results obtained. When a strong power such as the US goes into negotiations with parties of opposing positions, a dynamic of interaction is created as they react to each other. As the US brings its influence to bear over the negotiations new power relationships are created that may constrain and limit its options and which frustrate its intentions. When the US seeks to act with great powers that dispose of resources and apply diplomatic leverage of their own, it would then be obliged to negotiate with them to obtain their willing participation. Should a strong power have an overweening sense of omnipotence and a belief that it can decide outcomes on its own, and should the other parties be determined to resist it, a complex pattern of interaction is created. The stronger party may be committed to a particular view of the common purpose, one that it regards as the most important objective of the negotiations or the raison d’être of their meeting, but which is not necessarily shared by others. The other parties may join for other reasons for which they hope to obtain the support of the strong party. They may plan to steer the multilateral effort towards their own concerns, or they may also value the multilateral effort for the relationships formed and the opportunity to work with others. They would, however, express their public intention to support the common purpose as understood by the strong power. Their true intentions, however, may be elsewhere, and their public and true negotiating positions will be very different. They would tend to regard the common purpose as defined by the strong party as a restriction on their freedom of action, to which they may react in various ways. Some states may resort to the tactics of opposition and frustration while others may appear to support the stated goals of the multilateral effort but will pursue other priorities during the negotiations, which are regarded primarily as a means to promote them.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Interaction is a learning process as each side attempts to gauge and test the commitment of the others in various ways and to push them to change or adjust their positions. Negotiations therefore are about a mutual adjustment of expectations in an action–reaction process which is intended to reach a final outcome.5 States have the expectation that a bargaining position may be improved, or protected through negotiation which motivates their entry into the process. The adjustment of expectations is essential to the negotiating process as negotiators test the waters and discover that their demands have been excessive, or that those of others cannot be supported. Negotiators bring in their as yet untested expectations into the negotiations and maneuver to have them accepted and endorsed by the other parties. Negotiators also have 8 Bargaining and negotiation theory expectations of how other parties would respond to their own positions and negotiate in conditions of uncertainty, not knowing exactly what the other parties will accept. They will test the field with proposals or trial balloons intended to draw a response in the hope that the bargaining positions of others would be exposed. States may harbor certain bottom-line positions which they cannot compromise, and come into negotiations with deliberately imprecise bargaining positions that will allow them to maximize the opportunities which present themselves. The process of negotiation ultimately defines the positions and interests of the parties more clearly and reveals what is possible under the circumstances, and what may have to be surrendered. A process of interaction is created as the parties react to each other’s positions, sometimes being drawn closer as they realize that they have common interests, while on other occasions pulling away as they understand what divides them. Interaction unleashes new dynamics between negotiating parties as they learn more about each other’s bargaining position, and the difference between what is said and what is actually demanded. Interaction reveals the discrepancies between public and actual bottom-line positions which are not understood at the time of entry into negotiations. Interaction will translate interests which are broad policy positions into specific negotiating positions related to the issue in hand, and will separate what is possible from what is not. Non vital positions are dropped along the way if they obstruct the process of negotiations and may be sacrificed as a necessary quid pro quo to get the negotiations moving. They may be held for some time and pushed aggressively in the hope of obtaining equivalent concessions, until the limits are realized. States will protect their core position or their bottom line which may be reformulated according to a policy reassessment or reinterpretation brought about by a continuing and frustrating deadlock. When no progress is made and a party has a strong commitment to a positive outcome to the negotiation, there may be a reassessment of its bargaining position to avoid the prospect of a break down in negotiations. The interactive process com- prises three phases: first there is the pre-negotiation phase where the issues are identified and the positions clarified before actual negotiations begin and commitments are made. The agenda and the format for negotiations are laid out at this stage. Once the issues have been clarified, the parties move into the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 testing phase. During this phase the parties test the permissible negotiation range by making new demands or withdrawing from previous positions as they attempt to establish the boundaries for the negotiations. Once they have clarified what may be possible in negotiations they then enter the final stage when they move to secure an agreement.6 Negotiations are often understood according to the theory of utility maximization. This assumes that negotiations have the purpose of maximizing tangible benefits for parties which are achieved through tradeoffs and concessions. It assumes that negotiation generates feedback according to which positions are adjusted and gradually there is convergence towards an acceptable agreement which maximizes the benefits for all involved.7 Utility Bargaining and negotiation theory 9 maximization may be applicable to dyadic negotiations where the parties seek to maximize tangible gains within a limited time framework. It assumes reasonability in negotiation in that the parties share a commitment to the outcome and will avoid deliberately obstructionist activities. This may be the case in negotiations over trade, market access, or arms control where the benefits are identifiable. The difficulty is applying the theory to cases where intangibles are involved, or where the benefits are unidentifiable or in dispute. In these cases there may be no adjustment of expectations or convergence towards agreement because of an absence of a consensus on how to proceed. The tactics used may depart considerably from those expected according to the logic of utility maximization. Willful caprice may be the means to induce indulgent attitudes from others and the appearance of irrational and unpredictable action can be a way of extracting concessions from them. There may be a learning process as the positions of the parties are understood more clearly but there is no assurance of a favorable outcome, or indeed, much progress. States enter into negotiations with certain interests which are long-term policy objectives. They then devise suitable bargaining positions which are the tactical means to secure interests. Interaction is a process of testing bargaining positions against interests to determine what is possible and acceptable. If common points are discovered with others well and good, the negotiating position is fleshed out in greater detail and given greater definition. Agreement should rapidly follow. However, if resistance or downright opposition is encountered a feedback loop is created back to the decision makers who will be required to decide whether the negotiating position should be adjusted, and whether the adjustment will continue to reflect their interests. Interaction reveals the external constraints to policy and decides what is feasible and what will be retained, and what is overly ambitious or unrealistic and should be discarded. In this sense, interaction contributes to the for- mulation of policy and resolves disputes and dilemmas that cannot be resolved domestically. In some cases, however, the feedback loop may be aborted for various reasons and the adjustment to external constraints may not always take place. When interests or policy objectives outrun the ability of a bargaining position to secure them no adjustment would be acceptable.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Decision makers may suffer from ideological rigidity and prioritize unrealistic goals in which case change is rejected. Alternatively, they may face interagency conflict or hostile public opinion, in which case their negotiating position is characterized by inflexibility. Negotiators concerned will then become locked into futile positions which needlessly prolong the negotiations for no good purpose.

Negotiating tactics Negotiators will resort to various tactics based on assessment of their relative strength to achieve their objectives, and to include their own position in the 10 Bargaining and negotiation theory ﬁnal outcome, or to prevent others from gaining a particular advantage. Negotiation theory outlines a process of mutual concession-making in which a compromise is achieved. Making fair concessions is regarded as an optimal strategy as it would oblige the other side to reciprocate and would create a pattern of convergence. It can be seen as a “social exchange” and has “strong potential for creating lasting bonds of friendship.”8 Negotiators start with opening bids and exaggerate their demands expecting them to be reduced under pressure of negotiation to something closer to their basic position. According to this approach, negotiators must be “scrupulously fair” and “avoid the temptation to take advantage of the opponent.”9 Insisting on a harsh position that is disadvantageous to the opponent may result in concessions in the short term, but would create resentment in the longer term and may result in the undoing of an agreement. It could provoke a tough response in turn, prolonging and complicating negotiations and breaking the trust that may have been built up between negotiators. These generalizations were drawn from the experience of US–Soviet negotiations over strategic arms limitation talks in the 1970s. As these negotiations were dyadic other parties were not involved to complicate the picture, and moreover both sides had an interest and a shared responsibility for the outcome. This example would not apply to a situation where the commitment of the parties is uncertain at best and where expectations are deliberately left ambiguous. In this situation concession-making and scrupulous fairness would be the tactic of a loser. It would entail giving away concessions with no assurance of reciprocity, and could encourage an opponent to increase his or her demands. How do we know the expectations of parties? Negotiation tactics can be an important indicator of intentions though they may not throw light on the content of negotiating positions. In the US–Soviet case, the two parties after much rivalry realized that to avoid the risk of conﬂict they had to cooperate over strategic arms control and crisis management, they communicated their intentions accordingly. They adopted explicit bargaining tactics which entails the open communication of intentions, demands, and concessions. Should parties adopt explicit bargaining they would signal that they have a commitment to an agreement but are negotiating the terms and conditions. They may begin with issues of principle but they would then clarify the details of their negotiating

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 position to send a signal to the other side that an agreement is possible. They would then move to the next step which involves testing the intentions of the other side and mutual concession-making, in a process of reciprocal adjustment. The negotiations over strategic arms limitation between the US and the Soviet Union, known as SALT I and II, and free trade agreements where benefits were tangible were conducted in this way. This approach, which depends so much on mutual concession-making, may resolve a territorial or trade dispute where resources can be shared and where compromise is logical. There are issues of principle, however, over which mutual compromise would be constrained by the nature of the issue and would create an undesirable precedent that concerned parties would wish to avoid. The application of Bargaining and negotiation theory 11 Jus Cogens in international law, which embraces the prohibition on genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, racial discrimination, piracy, and torture, cannot be subject to compromise or mutual concession-making in negotiations. Nuclear proliferation may not come under Jus Cogens but difficulty similarly arises in the negotiation of agreements to prevent it. The US has taken upon itself the task of defending the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has regarded it as an issue of principle that should not be compromised in a process of mutual concession-making, particularly in the cases of North Korea and Iran. In Asia, however, concessions and compromise are regarded as a normal approach to dispute resolution, something dictated by common sense, and Asian governments have had difficulty understanding what they regard as the unwavering American insistence on principle. For them compromise and concessions are the only way to reach agreement over nuclear proliferation but for the Americans this approach would undermine the NPT, and would create an unwelcome precedent for other potential nuclear powers. Negotiations involving nuclear proliferation may be divided by the need to uphold principle and the demand for mutual concession-making for these reasons. On the other hand, communication in tacit bargaining is ambiguous and conducted in terms of hints, signs, and veiled intimations.10 Tacit negotiation has the advantage of not defining a negotiating position clearly which allows for change and escalation of demands according to the situation. It may be intended to firm up a weak hand in the face of an opponent that is clamoring for an agreement. It can also be an effort to avoid agreement and to gain time for some other purpose by stringing the negotiations along. A series of vague proposals could be offered at various times and then dropped to avoid the need for explanation. They will excite the interest of the opponent who will clamor for clarification which is never forthcoming. The opponent may become persuaded that a genuine agreement is possible and will be tempted to offer concessions to get the negotiations moving. Tacit negotiation avoids the process of mutual concession-making when positions are clearly understood and attempts to manoeuver the other side into offering unilateral concessions. Tacit bargaining can be a powerful tactic on the part of weaker powers in dealing with impatient and harried Western negotiators who are under pressure from their governments and their media for results. It creates an impression of what is

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 wanted, without actually saying anything clearly that could be interpreted as a commitment, and encourages the other side to guess the real demands of its opponent. Cultivated ambiguity is its strength as it draws out the other side and stimulates competing interpretations of its demands which will be tested in negotiations. If an interpretation of its intentions is off the mark or unsuitable it will be denied, and another will be encouraged until the desired concession is offered. This form of bargaining takes place when trust is lacking and the parties are deeply suspicious of each other. Alternatively, it may be the style adopted when a government is undecided because of interagency conflict or disagreement in which case negotiators would resort to deliberate ambiguity 12 Bargaining and negotiation theory to gain sufficient time for a position to be clarified. Negotiators from authoritarian or autocratic systems may adopt this style when fear of error or rebuke from the top prevents open communication with the other side. It may also be characteristic of Asian cultures which are loathe to declare their positions openly and communicate in terms of innuendos. Japanese and Chi- nese negotiators may resort to this tactic when their own domestic position is uncertain and when there is no clear consensus to support negotiations. Western democracies, where negotiations are conducted in the full glare of the media, have great difficulty coping with tacit bargaining. The pressure from political parties and the media to exploit every opportunity for an agreement would limit the options for negotiators who would be compelled to demonstrate progress at every turn. Sometimes negotiations require time for a situation to clarify itself, or for the other side to reveal its intentions, but this is not an option that a Western democracy can easily choose, or explain to the media or to the public. Tacit bargaining creates a pattern which confers bargaining advantage to the seemingly weaker side, and correspondingly places the much stronger opponent in a weaker position of constantly hankering after an agreement. The apparently weaker party will refuse to clarify its negotiating position since that would create pressure for concessions which would detract from its maximum demands. It would cloud its negotiating position with ambiguity which would draw out its opponent into making blind concessions without the obligation on its part of making reciprocating gestures to secure an agreement. Any concessions made in the hope of locking in the negotiators using this approach into a process of reciprocation could be rejected as being insufficient without explanation, leaving those who drafted them perplexed and frustrated. There would be even greater pressure to offer still more concessions in a situation where negotiator anxiety about the continuation of the negotiations would be stimulated. Should the responses not be satisfactory tacit negotiators can then threaten to break off contact which would heighten the pressure on the other side to rush to an agreement. In this way the weaker side would control the agenda of the negotiations as well as their pace. It could decide whether agreement was desired after all and when it would take place. Brinkmanship and coercive threats can also be used when faced with much

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 stronger opponents in negotiations.11 Not all states are able to use such tactics since it requires a capacity to threaten either by nuclear weapons or terrorism as well as a leadership whose threats would be taken seriously. Brinkmanship can be an effort to shock the other side into accepting maximum demands, and to avoid the regular process of negotiations when these demands are scaled back in mutual concession-making. It can also be a forceful attempt to break with negotiations and to compel other parties to bestow elevated status upon those who resort to it. Like terrorism the effect of brinkmanship depends on the fear that the perpetrator has the freedom to strike at will, or to repeat a dangerous action which demands an immediate response. Should negotiators facing such tactics hold firm and resist what they clearly perceive Bargaining and negotiation theory 13 as blackmail they may be faced with strong domestic opposition which would respond to each act of brinkmanship with the demand for concessions.12 Brinkmanship can only be conducted sparingly and it can continue only as long as fear and alarm can be stimulated as repetition destroys its effect. This means that over time the alarm-creating effect is reduced and the perpetrator must either up the ante or cease. If the perpetrator is unable to increase the pressure by further acts of brinkmanship its options are exhausted.

Structural analysis Structural analysis examines the structure of negotiations and the interaction within them to understand the outcomes that may arise. It considers international bargaining as a process that engages both the power resources as well as the abilities of the parties to negotiate and to make the best of a situation. Power is situational and depends not only on the way resources can be employed to further a particular purpose but upon the factors that may constrain its use. In multilateral negotiations the number of parties, the roles they assume, their interests, bargaining positions and their ability to promote them will shape the conduct of negotiations and their eventual outcome. Initially, negotiations are called into being by a dominant player or a great power, one that has the diplomatic authority and national power to initiate negotiations and is suﬃciently concerned about the issue to commit itself to the proceedings. It may attempt to direct the negotiations towards its own objectives and will push for an outcome on its own terms using diplomatic and other forms of leverage to hustle others in the negotiations to its side. However, should the dominant player require the cooperation of others to resolve the issue it will be constrained by them in what it can do. The particular roles adopted by other parties and whether they are supportive, resistant, or swinging from one position to another will shape the negotiations and the eventual outcome. One role that would be critical for negotiations is that of the pivotal player whose cooperation is required to resolve the issue. The pivotal player can be a major power autonomous in its own right and dis- posing of resources or diplomatic leverage that it can use to bring about a

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 resolution. Should the pivotal player cooperate with the dominant party the path to resolution would be smooth and the outcome would be predicted. Should it withhold cooperation from the dominant player because it seizes the opportunity to promote its own objectives, tensions would immediately arise and the negotiations may stall. If we understand power as the ability to get others to do what one wants them to do then it is possible that a pivotal party can wield power over more powerful parties and obtain the result it seeks in negotiations.13 Power reflects situations of dependence and a powerful state may be hamstrung from achieving a desired result in negotiations because of its situational dependence. 14 Bargaining and negotiation theory Aside from dominant and pivotal players there are the supporting parties which lack the resources and the diplomatic leverage to resolve an issue, but their presence is necessary for the negotiations to proceed. They may support the dominant player but should they react against it they may form alignments with others similarly opposed to head off any pressure they face. Negotiating coalitions are then formed which can complicate the task of the dominant player compelling it to bargain for support to achieve a satisfactory outcome. When supporting states join a pivotal player a loose coalition of a kind is formed whose purpose is to resist the dominant player and prevent it from overriding the others. One of the parties may assume the role of a swing state or the holder of the balance in the negotiations as it swings from one group to another depending on its assessment of the situation, and changes in government and the leadership. Should the negotiating coalition be evenly balanced then the swing state may have an important role in moving the negotiations forward. Indeed, alignments triggered during negotiations reduce the ability of the dominant player to employ its resources and limit the leverage it may bring to bear on the situation. When negotiations are linked with external issues over which there is considerable rivalry they become an extension of these rivalries which then prolongs the process. External rivalries can motivate the formation of negotiating coalitions in which case the negotiations will not move forward and may collapse. Moreover, when negotiations are intended to target a specific state to ensure that it abide by a rule or to desist from some action, and if that state is included as a party to negotiations there could be no end to difficulties.14 A successful example of the inclusion of a target state in negotiations is the Congress of Berlin which met in 1878. It was convened by Bismarck and included the major European powers, France, Britain, Austro-Hungary, and Italy, all which were alarmed by Russian territorial gains in the Balkans after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78. Russia was the target state and was compelled to surrender its gains under the combined diplomatic pressure of these European powers which were united over the issue.15 Unity was the key factor in the success of the Congress but if that were absent in negotiations and a target state is present, a very different situation arises. Without unity a target state may exploit asymmetries in power relations by aligning with one group

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 or another and may extract concessions from them in a variety of ways. It may adopt a deliberate strategy of sabotage in which the rivalries between parties may be exploited and supporters played off against opponents by resorting to tacit bargaining techniques. It may engage in diplomacy by charade to present a false face to parties in negotiations which are persuaded that an agreement is possible with little additional effort. False starts can be staged which would stimulate expectations and hopes that progress would be made, an agreement may be accepted and then later repudiated in an seemingly endless process that tests the patience of all concerned. A target state may refuse to implement agreements it has accepted or otherwise create difficulties intended to exacerbate divisions within the group. Should exasperated Bargaining and negotiation theory 15 members call for pressure or sanctions to enforce agreement, a target state can then count on supporters to protect it thereby widening existing divisions. If a target state maintains a closed political system, it can conceal its bargaining strategy and create impressions which others are obliged to take at face value for lack of evidence to the contrary. It could also resort to brinkmanship or deliberately unpredictable behavior which work in favor of a target state, particularly in a multilateral situation where fear of the consequences would push other parties to agree to its terms. Brinkmanship would become effective in a situation where there are anxieties about the stability of a target state and apprehensions that its collapse would trigger massive refu- gee flows across borders or conflict. A target state may engage in a form of blackmail by exploiting the fear its own collapse, and once this pattern has been set it could control the pace of negotiations and hold negotiations hostage to its own behavior. The conceptual framework outlined above is intended to illustrate the dynamics of the Six Party Talks, how they functioned and why they failed to fulfill expectations. Once North Korea agreed to join the talks expectations were stimulated that a resolution of its nuclear program was brought closer. In South Korea it was hoped that the talks would pave the way to a broader regional organization which would embrace Northeast Asia. To explain the failure of the Six Party Talks the concept of structure will be employed and the various roles assumed by the players will be analyzed. The dominant player was the US as the most powerful state in the negotiations but it was unable to utilize its power advantage to direct them towards its desired aim, which was the immediate denuclearization of North Korea. It required the cooperation of the pivotal party, China, to use its influence over North Korea to achieve this objective. The pivotal state, however, had other aims besides the denuclearization of the North and used the negotiations to further its own objectives. Russia acted as a supporter for China and similarly resisted the dominant player’sefforts to steer the negotiations towards its objective. South Korea acted as the swing state, and though an American ally, it swung behind both China and Russia in the negotiations as they sought to deflect US pressure for a resolution of the issue on its terms. The sixth party Japan had rendered itself ineffective as an American ally because of its insistence on the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 resolution of the abduction issue which was of no concern to the others. The inclusion of North Korea as the target state complicated the negotiations for the US in the absence of any unity as to how to proceed. The alliance between the target state and the pivotal player China was crucial and prevented any unity amongst the parties in relation to the American goal of denuclearization which became a divisive issue. From the start unity was absent and though there were valiant attempts to bring about agreement between the parties their disparate interests would not allow it. The interaction between these players largely determined the course of negotiations in the Six Party Talks and explained the difference between the initial hope and the final reality. 16 Bargaining and negotiation theory Conclusion The process of interaction in negotiation can define the positions of the parties more clearly and can separate what is desired from what is practical and feasible under the circumstances. Parties may hold particular views of an issue based on the ideological dispositions of their leadership or the interests of established agencies in the decision-making system, and enter into negotiation expecting to obtain endorsement of their positions. A dominant party like the US would in many cases expect to bring others on board by forceful persuasion or in some situations overriding the positions of others. In many cases the outcome of negotiations would reflect more or less the position of the dominant party, particularly if other parties were considerably weaker or beholden to it for security or economic reasons. In certain circumstances, however, the powerful do not prevail and are obliged to adjust their positions to accommodate others for which an explanation based on the structure of negotiations is required. Furthermore, negotiation outcomes do not always reflect the distribution of power between the parties particularly in complicated situations where there are multiple parties assuming different roles according to whether they are pivotal, supporting or target states. Where a dominant party is dependent upon the cooperation of a pivotal player which is firmly allied to the target state in the negotiations, and should the other parties not offer their support, it cannot expect to get its way. The Six Party Talks were an unusual case of multilateral negotiations in which the dominant player was hamstrung by its inability to attract support for its objectives. The conduct of the negotiations demonstrated that power may not always achieve results and much depends upon the relationships between parties in the negotiations, their commitment to the process and their expectation of benefit.

Notes 1 On the concept of power see K. J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,” Background, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1964), pp. 179–94; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization, (2005), 59: pp. 39–75. “ ’ ’ ”

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 2 I William Zartman, Two s Company and More s a Crowd, in I William Zartman (editor) International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity, Josey-Bass, San Francisco, California, 1994, pp. 1–4. 3 I William Zartman, “Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Pro- cess,” Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1988. 4 I William Zartman, “The Structure of Negotiation,” in Victor A. Kremenyuk, (editor) International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California, 1991, p. 66. 5 John G. Cross, “Negotiation as a Learning Process,” in I William Zartman, (editor) The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications, Sage publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1978, p. 51. 6 James A. Wall Jr. Negotiation: Theory and Practice, Scott, Foresman and Com- pany, Glenview, Illinois, 1985, pp. 8–9. Bargaining and negotiation theory 17 7 Alan Coddington, Theories of the Bargaining Process, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968, pp. 12–13. 8 Otomar J. Bartos, “Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View,” in I William Zartman, (editor) The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications, Sage publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1978, pp. 26–27. 9 Otomar J. Bartos, pp. 23–24. 10 James A. Wall Jr. Negotiation: Theory and Practice, Scott, Foresman and Com- pany, Glenview, Illinois, 1985. 11 James A. Wall Jr. p. 65. 12 Fen Osler Hampton with Michael Hart, Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade and the Environment, Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti- more, maryland, 1995, pp. 8–11, 16–17. 13 Christophe Dupont, “Coalition Theory: Using power to Build Cooperation,” in I William Zartman (editor), International Multilateral Negotiation, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California, 1994, pp. 151–55. 14 William Zartman, “Two’s Company and More’s a Crowd,” p. 4. 15 W.N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement, 1878–1880, Methuen, London, 1938. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 2 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players

Introduction The Six Party Talks were a process of interaction in which positions were declared, defended, and then adjusted according to the opportunities revealed and the reactions of others. They were called into being by the US, which refused to negotiate directly with North Korea over its nuclear program, and required a multilateral format to deal with the issue. As the main player the US regarded nuclear proliferation as the central issue for negotiations and expected that the other parties would join it in pressing the North into surrendering its nuclear program. The Bush administration assumed that it could orchestrate multilateral pressure against North Korea as the target state by involving China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. It sought the denuclearization of the North while the other parties, though they understood the dangers of a nuclear North, sought to establish, maintain or expand their position on the Korean Peninsula in preparation for eventual reunification. As the pivotal player in the talks China’s interests were considerably different from the American; its main concern was supporting the North and preventing its collapse as an ally on the Korean Peninsula. It joined the talks expecting that the issue would be resolved expeditiously, and that the US and the North would come to an agreement which would preserve its ally. Russia was a supporting state for China and although the two may have different interests on the Korean Peninsula, Russia worked with China to prevent the US from resorting to harsh measures against the North. South Korea was the Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 swing state; the Roh Administration believed it could develop a close relationship with the North to remove the threat it posed and to prepare for eventual reunification. It sided with China to head off American pressure on the North but it could never allow its alliance with the US to deteriorate, and so vacillated. Japan was the outsider in the talks though it did not begin this way. It had intended to forge an independent relationship with the North but this effort was derailed by the abduction issue which effectively cast Japan to the sidelines. The parties were variously motivated by an effort to position themselves for the end game on the Korean peninsula and to ensure themselves a place of influence in the event of reunification. For China, Russia, Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 19 and South Korea the negotiations over the nuclear issue were linked to long-term strategic interests in Northeast Asia to ensure that rivals would not benefit. This factor prevented them from wholeheartedly siding with the US over the nuclear issue, and motivated them to maintain some kind of relationship with the North which would offer them influence over the Korean Peninsula.

The dominant player: the US US priorities in relation to the nuclear issue were global as it had assumed responsibility for the NPT on the basis that its forces and allies would be threatened by its breach. It had a fear that if the North were allowed to get away with a nuclear program, for whatever reason, it would encourage other aspirants for nuclear weapons, such as Iran and Libya, which would “reap awards for bad behavior” at the expense of the US.1 The US wanted to bring the North back into the NPT and expected it to fulfill its obligations under the nuclear safeguards agreement which it had signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January 1992, and the 1991 North–South denuclearization agreement.2 The US came into the Six Party Talks expecting to prevent the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but its belligerence transformed the talks from a multilateral forum into an adversarial gathering, in which the other parties, China, Russia, and South Korea resisted American pressure. It reshaped the positions of the other parties to the point where resisting a forceful American approach assumed greater priority during the negotiations and became an aim in itself. US pugnacity affected the other parties and made them even more determined to avoid the prospect of conflict or war, and to search for dialogue with the North. Why did the Americans come into the negotiations with such belligerence? Could they not perceive that China was determined to preserve its own relationship with the North, even at the expense of progress over the nuclear issue? Diplomacy would teach that aggression would invite deliberate resistance from those whose cooperation was most required, yet the US ignored this basic lesson. One reason was that the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration were convinced that in a unipolar global order they could be largely oblivious to the concerns of others. Another reason was that the decision-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 making system that flourished under the Bush Administration allowed the neoconservatives unbridled influence over policy, even when they had no formal responsibility over the issues. Vice President Dick Cheney, Under- secretaries of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton and his successor Robert G. Joseph wielded greater influence over policy than the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretaries, and the National Security Advisor, because their views had the support of the president.3 Those without immediate responsibility for the negotiations often become more extreme in their demands, and in this case they pushed the administration’s policy towards unsustainable belligerence that undercut support for the American position. 20 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players The Clinton administration had compromised with the North over the nuclear issue when it concluded the Agreed Framework on October 22 1994.4 In February 1993 the North rejected IAEA requests to inspect two suspect nuclear waste sites and explain discrepancies arising from six earlier inspections. The North on March 12 1993 announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT and in May 1994 it reprocessed 8,000 fuel rods at the 5-MW reactor at Yongbyon, removing and storing the plutonium, a violation of the safeguards agreement it had signed with the IAEA. Clinton notes in his memoirs that he considered sanctions and “refused to rule out military action.”5 Clinton discussed an operation similar to the Israeli strike on the Osirak reactor in Iraq in June 1981, and prepared a draft resolution for graduated sanctions in the UN in order to jolt the Chinese into action and get them to push the North to negotiate.6 In late May 1994 the Pentagon presented a detailed contingency plan for bombing the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and was preparing it for presidential approval on 16 June.7 According to Ober- dorfer, on June 16 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili was explaining the contingency plan when it was announced that ex-president Jimmy Carter was in Pyongyang: it was like “a bombshell” in the cabinet room.8 Wit and Poneman wrote that but for the Carter mission the US would have launched an attack on the North.9 In a momentous event which changed the course of events Carter met Kim Il-sung on June 16. He then relayed the North’s willingness to negotiate in a telephone call to Washington from Pyongyang, and also in a declaration on CNN. As a result of this interven- tion the Clinton Administration was maneuvered into bilateral negotiations with the North at Geneva, which resulted in the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework was considered a treaty because it imposed binding obligations on the parties, but the Clinton Administration was concerned about the Senate’s reactions and called it a “framework” instead.10 Its essential feature was the North’s promise to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities, and the postponement of verification and inspections until a later unspecified time. It established a body called the Korean Economic Development Organization (KEDO), which was to fund and construct two light water reactors (LWRs) that were to replace the North’s aging graphite reactors. The US agreed to supply the North with 500,000 tons of heavy

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 heating oil annually to compensate for the loss of energy pending completion of the LWRs. The freeze was to begin when the North received US assurances as to the provision of the LWRs and the supplies of heavy oil. Verification would commence “when a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before the delivery of key nuclear components.” Other provisions called for the full normalization of political and diplomatic relations between the US and the North, and the US would also provide the North with formal assurances that it would not threaten it with nuclear weapons.11 The Agreed Framework polarized American opinion. Supporters of the Clinton Administration argued that postponement was better than war and they believed that the imminent collapse of the North Korean regime justified Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 21 it. They saw it as the “best of a bad situation” which would prevent the North from producing more plutonium. The North had by 1994 produced sufficient plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons, and the 8,000 spent fuel rods contained enough plutonium for another for four or five. Because of the Agreed Framework the IAEA could place the 8,000 fuel rods in a safe storage cooling pond and have them monitored. Without this agreement, it was argued that the North could have produced sufficient plutonium for at least 30 nuclear weapons.12 The Administration also argued that it had prevented a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, as Japan and perhaps South Korea would have been provoked to go nuclear themselves; it reduced the incentive for the North to engage in the proliferation of nuclear technology, and provided an opportunity for the North to break out of its isolation which would create an external environment of reduced hostility and would encourage economic reform and cooperation.13 Critics of the agreement were particularly severe. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger called it “one of the worst examples of appeasement by our government,” since it allowed the North to maintain its nuclear weapons program. He saw the postponement of verification to the distant future as inexcusable and declared that the agreement amounted to a “waiver of NPT requirements” and gave North Korea “everything they have said they want and more”14 These criticisms became the basis of Republican attacks on the Clinton Administration in the highly charged and polarized political situation which reduced the debate over policy to bitter and rancorous polemics, when complex positions were simplified into slogans which replaced cool analysis. American policy could not rid itself of the distorting effects of these polemics when negotiations would be subject to partisan attack and the threat of veto by an angry Republican Congress. Democrats and supporters of the Clinton Administration rallied around the idea of engagement to fend off pressure from the Republicans but they were unclear of what this really meant. Engagement could mean keeping the diplomatic channels open and negotiating with the North without specifying the content of the negotiations any more clearly. Engagement could also mean coming to an agreement with the North that would resolve the immediate problem. It could also mean giving the North what it ostensibly wanted which was an assurance of its security and eco-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 nomic aid. Opponents and critics called for isolation and punishment of an odious regime but they could not explain how this would resolve the issue. Their confident belief that the regime would collapse in time may have been a comfort to them, but for neighbors of the North it was a nightmare scenario. The Agreed Framework was the only option available to the US if it was unwilling to resort to a military strike on the North. It set the parameters of possible negotiations with the North, and anything that the US might agree with the North in the future would one way or another follow it as a precedent, despite the hostility it met in Republican circles. Former Defense Secretary William Perry visited Pyongyang in May 1999, the highest ranking US official to do so since the Korean War, and in October he conducted a 22 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players review of policy towards the North which advised an extension of the Agreed Framework. The Perry Review called for “complete and verifiable assurances” from the North that it had no nuclear weapons program, and would not test, deploy, or export ballistic missiles beyond the range permitted by the Missile Technology Control Regime. In return the US would normalize relations with the North and gradually relax the sanctions that had been imposed on it as a state sponsor of terrorism.15 Verification experts from the IAEA thought that the agreement created an anomaly by placing North Korea in a “permanent state of non compliance” with the NPT, and that the postponement of IAEA inspections would make it impossible for later inspectors to retrace the development of the North’s nuclear program.16 Supporters of the Agreed Framework argued that the North had cooperated with the IAEA and KEDO and had kept to the agreements it had reached with them. They argued that North Korea should be taken out of its isolation by allowing it to join international financial institutions like the World Bank which would create a favorable environment for the resolution of the nuclear and other issues.17 Under the Agreed Framework the US was to install critical components for the light water reactors while the North was to reveal all processing records of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. It quickly broke down however. Charles Pritchard who was the US representative to KEDO said that “we got close” to an eventual resolution of the issue but two major hurdles emerged. The first was procedural as the North demanded delivery of the components before providing the processing records, while the US insisted on receiving the records first. Secondly, and perhaps more important, before the US could supply the critical components congressional approval was required, and as Pritchard observed ruefully it was a constant battle to obtain funding for KEDO from a hostile Republican Congress. Benjamin Gilman, Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs said that the North was the US’s “most favoured rogue state” and demanded short notice inspections of its nuclear sites.18 The Republicans also opposed shipments of heavy fuel oil to the North which resulted in delivery delays and then the eventual repudiation of the arrangement by the North. As Pritchard complained this was “inappropriate distribution of a promised good.”19

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Proponents would argue that if the US had kept to the agreement and supplied the components for the light water reactors and the heavy fuel, the North might have responded with verification of its nuclear sites and a full accounting of its nuclear past. In the closing days of the Clinton Adminis- tration there was the hope of a breakthrough when the President considered visiting Pyongyang in a dramatic gesture similar to Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972. The North searched for some way to revive negotiations with the US when Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the second most senior official in North Korea, visited Washington and met Clinton on October 10 2000. Jo presented a letter to Clinton from Kim Jong-il which promised to deal with all outstanding issues.20 Clinton sent Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang in Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 23 November and despite repeated attempts to identify the agenda for the talks, Kim Jong-il told her that it would be revealed only when he met with Clin- ton. Albright did not recommend that Clinton carry out the visit as the risk was too great and the results uncertain, but Clinton was intrigued nonetheless and felt that he could not pass up this opportunity.21 On 28 December 2000 he declared that “We’ve made a lot of progress with the North Koreans” and that his efforts had “opened an opportunity to reduce if not eliminate the threat posed by North Korean missile development and exports.”22 However Clinton had run out of time as he was already heavily involved in the Camp David talks between Ehud Barack and Yasser Arafat over the Middle East and the matter was dropped.23 Clinton and William Perry had intended to pursue a comprehensive and integrated approach towards the North, and had expected to resolve all issues including the ballistic missile and the nuclear programs in one grand gesture, which appeared enticing. Whether the North would have responded in kind is another matter as its intentions were unclear. It could have conceded the ballistic missile issue to obtain a further postponement of verification, but it was unlikely that it would have surrendered the nuclear program. The Bush Administration’s initial approach was to maintain continuity with the policy of the Clinton Administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell told Clinton administration officials that that “we will pick up where you left off.” Robert L. Gallucci who was the US negotiator for the first nuclear crisis over 1993–94 outlined the US position in a Senate hearing in 2001. Gallucci declared that the US aim was the engagement of the North in negotiations to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, to reduce the risk of a war on the Korean Peninsula, and to prevent the North from testing, producing, deploying or exporting ballistic missiles or ballistic missile technology. The key point emphasized by Gallucci was that the US would work to preserve the 1994 Agreed Framework and that it should pursue “the long-term objective of reducing tensions on the Peninsula and contributing to a process that would lead to reunification.”24 The Bush Administration conducted an interagency review of policy towards the Korean Peninsula over March–May 2001 which involved Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and James Kelly, who were all members of the elder Bush Administration. They drafted President

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Bush’s concluding statement of June 6 in which he declared that the US had adopted a “comprehensive approach” towards the North that would include ballistic missiles, conventional as well as nuclear forces. The President claimed that if North Korea took “serious steps” to improve relations, the US would reciprocate and would ease sanctions, and take other practical steps to respond.25 Colin Powell on June 7 announced that the US would initiate negotiations with the North “without preconditions” and that everything was negotiable.26 US envoy Charles Pritchard revealed that after the President’s statement he made an effort on June 13 to hold bilateral meetings with Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan through what was called the New York channel. 24 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players The State Department wanted to send Charles Pritchard to Pyongyang to initiate the dialogue but there was resistance within the Administration from Undersecretary of State John Bolton, whose hard line attitude towards the North was well known. Further progress was prevented by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 9 2001 which transformed the attitude of the Administration towards “rogue” states like North Korea. Bush in his State of the Union Address of January 29 2002 included North Korea along with Iran and Iraq in the “axis of evil” as countries sponsoring terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bush has been described as a man whose “instincts are almost his second religion,” and who had a “blind faith in instincts.” He let his heart rule his head and is reported to have said “I loathe Kim Jong-il” and “I feel passionate about this.”27 On April 30 2002 the North indicated that it was prepared to begin negotiations but by then the Bush Administration’s attitude had hardened. On May 6 and August 29 John Bolton publicly attacked North Korea and indicated that a shift was taking place in the administration towards a hard line policy.28 The State Department sent Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs James Kelly to the North over 1–3 October 2002 to clarify troubling reports it had received about a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) nuclear program.29 Kang Sok-ju North Korea’s First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs was shocked when the American delegation confronted him with evidence of the HEU program and he offered to terminate the program if the US promised not to attack it.30 The admission that the North had indeed such a nuclear program was a breach of the Agreed Framework and had a dramatic effect upon the Administration. At first there were doubts about the accuracy of the report which was made public in US Today on October 16 2002. Initially it was thought it could have been a mistranslation where the right to the program was confused with actual possession, but the reports were cross checked and error was dis- counted. This admission of the existence of the HEU program revealed that the North had little trust in the Agreed Framework anyway despite the Clin- ton Administration’sefforts to make it work. It had prepared a fallback position where the plutonium-based nuclear program would be sacrificed for a deal with the US while it would retain the HEU program as ultimate card

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 in case the US reneged on the deal. Clinton wrote that in 1998 he had learned that the North had begun to produce HEU in a laboratory in violation of the Agreed Framework.31 Very much later reports emerged about the North’s receipt of centrifuges from the A. Q. Khan network in late 2000, around the time when Clinton had considered a breakthrough visit to the North. Later, reports circulated within the Bush Administration that the North was developing clandestine HEU facilities and in 2001 the CIA observed the North’s purchase of related equipment.32 The result was that the Bush Administration decisi- vely broke with the Clinton Administration’s approach and condemned the North as a pariah state with which there could be no further dialogue. It renounced the Agreed Framework, terminated American participation in KEDO, and Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 25 stopped delivery of the promised heavy fuel oil to the North. Within the Admin- istration the North was regarded as a “proven violator of agreements” which included the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards agreement, the North–South De-Nuclearization Accords, as well as the Agreed Fra- mework.33 The Bush Administration demanded that the North surrender its nuclear program and agree to full verification before there could be any further negotiations. Official contact with the North was banned and there would be no discussion of economic aid or other incentives for the North until it agreed to these demands. As the neoconservatives in the Bush administration gained influence over policy, the State Department became progressively marginalized. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s position was repeatedly undercut by the neoconservatives, particularly after his speech to the UN Security Council on February 5 2003 when he claimed that that there was evidence of WMD in Iraq. State Department officials were proscribed from meeting with their North Korean counterparts unless Defense Department officials and representatives from the Vice President’s Office were present.34 NSC advisor Condoleezza Rice was sidelined by both Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and was known to be singularly ineffective in this position.35 Bush did little to clarify the decision-making system which undermined accountability and allowed the neoconservatives to influence policy without taking responsibility themselves.36 In many respects Bush was hostage to his own appointees and allowed them to make policy which he subsequently endorsed. It was even reported that Cheney and Rumsfeld would undermine presidential decisions they opposed by instructing their subordinates to do otherwise, which indicated an alarming lack of respect for the President.37 According to Colin Powell, Bush was usually influenced by the last person who saw him which illustrated a particularly impressionable nature, one who compensated for his inability to understand complex situations by resorting to tough language and emotional vehemence. Unwilling to engage North Korea directly in negotiations over the nuclear issue the Bush Administration searched for a united front to compel the North to surrender its nuclear program. The Bush Administration stumbled into multilateralism over the Korean Peninsula for which it was unprepared. A combination of ideological conviction, based on what was then America’s

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 “unparalleled” military strength and economic power, as well as shattering external events triggered an assertive unilateralism in the US. The Adminis- tration’s understanding of multilateralism was evident in its attitudes and public statements and included trusted allies and friends as necessary support for America’s unilateral initiatives. In this respect the Bush Administration turned its back on the broader and overarching theme of multilateralism that had motivated earlier administrations in building inclusive institutions such as the UN. It focused upon a narrower and exclusive form of multilateralism that was an instrument and extension of its security policy, and one that could be controlled by it. The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been announced on September 17, 2002 stressed the 26 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players importance of coalitions to support its “proactive counterproliferation efforts.”38 In regard to the Korean Peninsula the US-sponsored Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meetings with Japan and South Korea served to coordinate policy during the North Korea policy review process in early 2001.39 The TCOG continued to serve the purpose of coordinating policy between allies during the Six Party Talks. The Bush administration also sponsored trilateral security dialogue with Japan and Australia, which followed US– Australia defense talks in July 2001. However, multilateralism did not extend to competitor states such as China and Russia, though the Bush Administra- tion did acknowledge the need to work with them to defuse regional conflicts. Ill prepared to work with China and Russia, the Bush Administration was obliged to seek their cooperation to prevent North Korea from realizing its nuclear weapons program. Simply by standing tough the US could not prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons unless it was ready to resort to a dangerous military strike with unpredictable consequences. While the Bush Administration was developing military strategies and boosting its military power to counter the rise of China it expected Chinese cooperation over this issue, based on the assumption that China shared the same concern about nuclear proliferation, and that America and China were equally committed to a nuclear-free Korea. Despite the Administration’sefforts to counter China militarily Chinese compliance with American aims over the Korean Peninsula was never seriously questioned. The fact that China had other aims on the Korean Peninsula, and that US military strategies directed against China would reduce Chinese support for American objectives was not taken into account at the policy level. The US could not bring about the denuclearization of the North without China’s cooperation and publicly maintained the view that China was supportive. In doing so it fell into a diplomatic trap produced by its own unrealistic expectations. It created the image of China’s willing cooperation and consistently claimed that China was working with the US to prevent nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula, despite that fact that Chinese behavior suggested otherwise. The US was well aware that China would not cooperate with UN sanctions in regard to North Korea. Even before the Agreed Fra- mework was concluded Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis was asked about

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 the Chinese position during Senate hearings in March 1994. She said that Chinese refusal to cooperate in imposing sanctions on the North was “not the oﬃcial position” of the Chinese government and that the Chinese were “par- ticipating and supporting our overall goal.”40 China had communicated its opposition to sanctions and to that extent was not supporting this American goal but the US was obliged to declare otherwise. No doubt the public face the Chinese Foreign Ministry projected to the Americans was one of willing cooperation and in name of diplomatic expedience the Chinese told the Americans what they wanted to hear. The Foreign Ministry, however, did not represent Chinese policy over North Korea, which was the preserve of the Party. The US was faced with a dual task which it did not acknowledge Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 27 openly, it had to persuade China as well as the North to cooperate fully with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and it failed in both tasks.

The pivotal player: China As the pivotal player, China’s cooperation was essential for the goal of eliminating the North’s nuclear program. China is linked with the North through the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and maintains a special relationship with the North Korean regime, one that has been reinforced by the North’s economic dependence. The Americans assumed that the Chinese shared their apprehension over the development of the North’s nuclear program and would use their leverage in the Six Party Talks to bring it back into the NPT. The Americans were encouraged in their view of China by the attitudes of what the International Crisis Group (ICG) called the strategists, otherwise called reformers who are Foreign Ministry officials in the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, US and international relations experts in the top universities and think tanks who have experience of the West and have been educated there. For this group North Korea is a strategic liability and cooperation with the US in multilateralism is important to prevent the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast Asia.41 In their view a nuclear North Korea could push Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan toward nuclear weapons which would severely affect China’s security.42 They see policy towards North Korea as an extension of China’s relationship with the US, and an opportunity to develop a closer relationship with the Americans. Cooperation with the US over North Korea would allow China to demand a more cooperative attitude from the Americans over issues that concern them such as Taiwan, and also Japan.43 The strategists or reformers, however, do not control policy towards North Korea which has been in the hands of what the ICG has called traditionalists, otherwise called conservatives. The relationship with North Korea has been conducted by the Party’s International Liaison Department on a part-party basis in which ideological ties have been stressed. The traditionalists or conservatives are found in the party, the PLA and its think tanks, as well as the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 editorial boards of various conservative and newspapers. For these party officials, China sacrificed blood to defend the North Korean regime during the Korean War and this sacrifice created a special relationship between them. They are deeply distrustful of the US and regard it as a challenge to China in the Western Pacific and see little reason to cooperate with it. For them North Korea is China’s only remaining ideological ally which demands constant economic and political support, and its survival is China’s priority for two reasons. The first is strategic as the North is regarded as an ally against the American military presence in Northeast Asia and also Japanese influence on the Korean Peninsula. These party officials do not share American concerns about global nuclear proliferation and habitually regard this as an American 28 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players distraction. In their view the Korean nuclear issue has obscured a deeper competition for influence over the Peninsula and Northeast Asia between China and the US.44 The relationship with the North is also a means of ensuring influence over the reunification of the Korean Peninsula to ensure that it would not immediately fall under American and South Korean control. The second reason is the fear of North Korea’s collapse which would bring chaos to the Peninsula and the possibility of American and South Korean troop deployments in the North to secure the nuclear facilities and to maintain order. Regime collapse would bring hordes of refugees across the Chinese border extending the chaos to China’s Northeastern provinces. The Chinese have been very sensitive to the revival of ethnic Korean nationalism in an extensive region bordering North Korea which the ancient Korean states of Koguryo˘, unified Silla and Balhae claimed as their own. There are an estimated 2 million Koreans in these border regions, which include Liaoning, Jilin, and Shandong Provinces.45 In June 1995 ethnic nationalists from South Korea visited these border regions and called for the return of this territory which they claimed was Korean.46 There is a division of labor in the Chinese decision-making system so that the Foreign Ministry works with the US and the international community while the International Liaison Department nurtures and cultivates the special relationship with North Korea.47 The Foreign Ministry may stress cooperation with the US over North Korea but it is essentially the public relations branch of the Party and has become progressively marginalized over decision- making.48 Friction may arise between a ministry that values the relationship with the US and the party organs which stress the importance of the North, but there is more cooperation than division based on a shared concern with China’s interests. Outside the decision-making circle there are prominent academics, depicted as strategist or reformist, who have complained bitterly about the general direction of Chinese policy over North Korea but they do not represent government or party. Western press reports can give a distorted view of Chinese decision-making when English-speaking Foreign Ministry officials and academics with experience of the West appear in public and speak at international conferences on Chinese policy creating an impression of Chinese support for multilateralism over North Korea. The conservatives

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 in the party and military do not often appear in the international press or at conferences and their views are not familiar to external observers. In a political system where a free press is absent they are able to work behind the scenes and are known by their impact upon events. China joined the Six Party Talks to mediate between the North and the US and to bring about resolution of the nuclear issue that would stabilize the Korean Peninsula. Since 1993–94 China had regarded the nuclear issue as a bilateral problem between North Korea and the US and one that did not involve it, but the Bush Administration’s belligerence prompted it into a mediatory effort for the first time.49 The Chinese invested heavy diplomatic capital in the talks to ensure they would succeed in bringing the US and the Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 29 North to a deal that would defuse the situation. Their immediate goal was to head off the pressure from within the Bush Administration for a military strike on the North, which after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was a possibility that was taken very seriously. They wanted the US to desist from demanding the North’s nuclear disarmament as an immediate step and sought to lock in the US behind an agreement that would satisfy the North’s demand for security against American attack. The Chinese attempted to manage both the US and North Korea and to lead both to “peaceful denuclearization,” which would fend off aggressive American pressure and allow them to maintain their position of influence over the North.50 This meant working with the Americans in the Six Party Talks, assuring them that China shared their goals, arranging the negotiation rounds and preparing the agendas together with draft proposals. They had to convince the Americans of their desire to resolve the nuclear issue, yet they also had to avoid siding with the US which could undermine their relationship with the North. The Chinese played a classic double game during the Six Party Talks which depended on the American belief that China had influence over the North and would bring about the results the US wanted, while assuring the North that this influence would not be used against them. The fact that the Bush Administration turned towards China to arrange the Six Party Talks indicated the extent to which the Americans held this belief and explained why they repeatedly pressed the Chinese to use their influence with the North to come up with the desired results. In 2003 when the talks began, the Chinese were persuaded that a resolution was possible, and that the US and the North could be brought to an agreement.51 What the Chinese expected from their mediation was to nudge the US and the North into a compromise resolution which was preferable to instability and the risk of conflict that would arise if the US insisted upon confronting the North. The Chinese approach sought to separate the nuclear issue from the issue of the stability and the security of the Korean Peninsula. China’s intention was to stabilize the Korean Peninsula first and to postpone the nuclear issue until a propitious time in the future when conditions would be more favorable for a resolution of the issue. A compromise agreement with the North over the nuclear issue would remove the hostility that had clouded American relations with the North since the Korean war, and would prepare

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 the regime for a soft landing rather than a hard and unanticipated crash. The North would receive international economic aid on a scale which would reorient its priorities from paranoiac defense to economic development and foreign investment. With an economy saved from collapse by international assistance North Korea would become more dependent on the external world. Pressure from the international community for a full accounting of the nuclear program would then make much more sense. Despite the logical appeal of this approach there were several practical difficulties inherent in the Chinese approach. One was that for the Americans nuclear non proliferation was a matter of principle and compromise with the North would set a dangerous precedent for other powers with nuclear programs 30 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players such as Iran. The second was that the North was a militarized regime under a ruling dynasty that had been isolated for all of its existence and any effort to open it up to the external world would threaten it. The regime had no incentive to follow the Chinese path of economic reform and any reforms which were attempted were quickly reversed. A third was that the Chinese approach could avoid one danger, which was the collapse of the regime and resultant chaos, by bringing about another, that is a North Korea in possession of nuclear weapons. Even if the North could reform and survive there was no assurance that the regime would surrender its nuclear weapons program once it had started in this direction, and that the end result would be a reformed and strengthened North with nuclear weapons. The Chinese themselves were anxious that if their efforts succeeded too well the US and North Korea would come to a deal to China’s detriment. The idea may seem preposterous to Americans but there was genuine concern in China that the US may switch policy and seize the opportunity to engage the North as a means to curb Chinese influence on the Korean Peninsula.52

The target state: North Korea Kim Il-sung apparently had an “obsessive” desire for nuclear weapons when he saw Japan surrender after the atomic bombing in 1945.53 The North produced plutonium from its Yongbyon reactor over 1993–94 for its nuclear weapons program but the plutonium program was frozen by the Agreed Framework. The North’s acceptance of this freeze has been regarded as a willingness to surrender the nuclear program, and evidence that its intention was to use it as a bargaining chip for American security assurances, economic aid and other tangible beneﬁts. Placed in context, however, the freeze was really a means to commit the US to an agreement that would remove the threat of force against the North and allow it to pursue a nuclear program in another way. The North developed a HEU program, the technology for which was obtained through the A. Q. Khan network. This proliferation network was encouraged by supporters in the Pakistani military who saw it in Pakistan’s national interest to reduce the dominance of the US by assisting

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 more countries to develop nuclear weapons, and to create a multi-polar world.54 A. Q. Khan was impressed by the test flight of the Nodong missile in May 1993 and proposed that Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visit North Korea to obtain the missile technology. Benazir Bhutto visited North Korea in December 1993 and arranged a deal whereby Pakistan would receive Nodong ballistic missile designs in exchange for $40 million, but because Pakistan could not pay it offered HEU technology instead.55 Pakistan tested five nuclear devices on 28 May 1998 and another two days later on 30 May, witnessed by North Korean technical teams. The US intelligence community noted that five HEU devices were tested on 28 May and Pakistan was known to have a developed HEU program. On 30 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 31 May, however, Pakistan tested a plutonium nuclear device and it was not known to have a plutonium program while North Korea did. For US intelligence, the conclusion was that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device on North Korea’s behalf.56 Later in 1998 Khan flew to Pyongyang on a Pakistani Air force Boeing 707 carrying five crates of P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, technical detail, drawings and uranium hexafluoride.57 Pervez Musharraf who denied all knowledge of the network in his memoirs nonetheless admitted that Khan transferred “nearly two dozen” P-1 and P-2 centrifuges to North Korea, with a flow meter, and special oil for centrifuges. North Korean engineers visited top centrifuge plants in Pakistan and were given secret briefings on centrifuges in the Khan Research Laboratories.58 On February 2 2004 A. Q. Khan admitted selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, obliged to do so after the IAEA had received evidence about the extent of his network; the sales began in 1989 and continued for ten years.59 The accusation that the US did not live up to the Agreed Framework, and did not take seriously the North’s repeated declaration that it would give up its nuclear program if the Americans stopped treating it as an enemy, is unconvincing. North Korea had already an established plutonium nuclear program and was actively collaborating with Pakistan over the HEU program well before the breakdown of the Agreed Framework.60 By developing the HEU program the North had indeed violated the Agreement and provoked the US into open renunciation. This fact changes the discussion about the North’s motives and what could have been accomplished before the Bush Administration came to office in 2001. The North has often justified its nuclear program as a response to the threat of the US, which breaks down when the sequence of events is examined. Indeed it was the nuclear program which attracted the American threat over 1993–94 and the danger of an American military strike which both North Koreans and Chinese feared. The North was developing its HEU program even after the Agreed Framework was signed when the threat to the North had diminished under the Clinton Administration. This reveals that there were other motives. Under the Agreed Framework the North would accept a freeze on its plutonium program as a necessary price to allow the HEU program to continue. It was important for the North to have Clinton visit Pyongyang before he stepped down as pre-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 sident to extend the Agreed Framework and protect it against the incoming Republican Administration. Clinton had hoped for a breakthrough in making a grand gesture in visiting the North but he was saved by lack of time from a monumental blunder. All he could have done under the circumstances was to obtain a further freeze on the plutonium program without a commitment to verification and inspections, while the HEU program would have remained outside the agreement. Clinton would have cheerfully declared victory and announced the triumphal resolution of the North Korean problem but the real issues would have been postponed yet again, this time with more fateful consequences since the HEU program would have been allowed to reach completion. 32 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players A related argument is that the North wanted bilateral talks with the US to obtain formal assurances of American non aggression which would make them feel secure, and could obviate the need for the nuclear program. The North sought assurances and reassurances of non aggression from the US during bilateral talks in June 1993 and in August 1994.61 The US responded by offering formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the North in the Agreed Framework. During the Six Party Talks the North demanded a non aggression pact with the US which was something more formal and wider in its implications. The US could not agree to a formal treaty since it would require ratification by a hostile Senate which the Administration wanted to avoid, but it was prepared to offer security assurances to the North. It is difficult to accept, however, that American security assurances could have eased the North’s fears to the extent that it would have given up its nuclear program. A paranoiac state that has to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for its survival would be most unlikely to trust paper guarantees of its security, let alone verbal assurances. The North may have calculated that a formal American assurance of its security would free it to engage in provocative acts against the South and Japan while constraining an American response. It would have the effect of undermining the US commitment to its allies in certain circumstances by assuring the North of American special treatment. Certainly special treatment for the North would alarm the South and Japan. During the negotiations for the Agreed Frame- work in September 1994 when the US negotiated directly with the North, the Kim Young-sam government was concerned about its exclusion and feared a deal behind its back. The South became much more wary of US intentions as a consequence.62 There was also the view that were two contending groups in the North Korean leadership, the hawks and the moderates, and that if the US had crafted a policy of engagement that would have appealed to the moderates the nuclear program could have been scrapped. This notion was popularized by Selig Harrison who claims that there was intense policy debate between the moderates and the old guard, and Kim Jong-il played a mediating role between them.63 There is ample evidence of internal conflict in the North as revealed by several events including Kim Jong-il’s decision to return US

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 warrant officer Bobby Hall against the objections of the military after he had strayed over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in a helicopter on December 17 1994. Hwang Jang-yop’s defection in February 12 1997 in Beijing has been often cited as evidence of this conflict between moderates and hardliners. Hwang had married a niece of Kim Jong-il and was well connected with the ruling family. He was the foremost authority on the party ideology juche, one of 11 Central Committee secretaries in the party in charge of foreign policy, and was also chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly. He was rated as twenty-fourth in the party hierarchy and was the highest ranking member to defect from the North to avoid a purge by the hardliners. His explanation for his defection was that after Kim Il-sung’s Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 33 death there was a shift of power to the military and “red banner” ideology which stressed revolutionary martial spirit began to supplant juche. In February 1996 Hwang advocated Chinese market style reforms to revive the deteriorating economy when he understood that he was being targeted by the hardliners.64 Technocrats were purged in this period including the Premier Kang Song San who had called for closer economic relations with South Korea, Former Deputy Premier Yon Hyong-muk, State Vice President Kim Pyong-shik and Party Secretary for South Pyongan province So Yun-sok. Kim Jong-il stood behind the hardliners in the military who were identified as Marshal Ri Ul-sol commander of Capital Garrison Command, which pro- tects ruling family and Pyongyang, Air Force Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok, and Army Vice Marshal and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Kim Yong-chun.65 Nonetheless, the evidence does not point to contending groups of moderates and hardliners within the leadership since as Hwang attested, one of those groups was eliminated during the period of famine over 1995–98. There was a consolidation of power by the leadership allied to the military which has since controlled the country.66 There have been times when the leadership would constrain the hard liners in the military as when Kim Jong-il overrode their objections to the Agreed Framework and ordered the release of Bobby Hall, but since that time there have been fewer such cases. The market reforms that were introduced in July 2002 had the strong support of Kim Jong-il himself who had been pressed in this direction by the Chinese. They were terminated as they created too many difficulties for the system of control that had been established.67 The main driving force for the reforms was external rather than internal and they were not indicative of a group of techno- cratic moderates that could challenge the hard liners. The picture that emer- ges of the North is one of tight control from the top and a ruling dynasty that has of necessity become more dependent upon the military for its survival. The Bush Administration, with its call for regime change, its consigning of the North to the “axis of evil” and its unveiling of the strategy of preemption in September 2002, threw the North into a crisis.68 The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 made the prospect of an American attack very real to North Korea which could never free itself from the “nagging fear of American military might.”69 It was under these conditions that the Six Party Talks were

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 convened, though initially the North had little interest in them and demanded bilateral talks with the US. Eventually, because of American insistence and Chinese pressure, it conceded. From 2003 there were two concurrent processes in North Korea; one was the diplomatic process where negotiations to eliminate the nuclear program continued in the Six Party Talks; the second was the development of both the plutonium and HEU nuclear programs which by all accounts were accelerated after the invasion of Iraq. The results of these programs were witnessed three years later when North Korea detonated its first plutonium nuclear device. One view is that they represent autonomous tracks, and the diplomatic track was conducted as a shield against an American attack and to buy time for the nuclear weapons program to reach completion. 34 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players Another view is that the two tracks intersected and that with sufficient political will diplomacy could have headed off the nuclear track with a resolution of the nuclear issue. The difficulty was that the North Korea’s bargaining tactics during the Six Party Talks revealed little interest in reaching a deal over the nuclear issue that would produce anything other than a return to the Agreed Framework. This was not a resolution of the nuclear issue but a postponement which suited the North’s purposes very well. The North was the target state in the Six Party Talks and theory would suggest that it would have been placed in a disadvantageous position. The American expectation was that it would be subject to the concerted pressure of all the parties and compelled to comply with their demands. However, the negotiation pattern that developed in the talks was more complex in a way that gave the target state certain unanticipated advantages. The North discovered that it could depend on Chinese, Russian and also South Korean support against the aggressive demands of the US and turned the tables on the Americans. It engaged in negotiation tactics to ensure that the parties would remain divided and resorted to unpredictable behavior including delaying tactics which exasperated the Americans as well as the Chinese. The taunting unpredictability of the North’s behavior, the capricious swings and changes of position, and the outbursts of rancor and hostility were all tactical responses to its position as a target state which feared that the others would combine against it. It dangled the prospect of agreement and quickly removed it, and by it keeping the Americans in a state of perpetual hostility, it would draw Chinese and Rus- sian support. In this way it could exploit the divisions between the US and China and could entangle the talks in issues which were really peripheral to the nuclear issue, but which were taken seriously by the other negotiators. The most striking aspect about the North’s negotiating behavior was its consistent unwillingness to explain its position in any detail. As negotiation theory proposes, tacit bargaining can be indicative of several things; it could be an effort to extract maximum advantage from the negotiations, or it could indicate a lack of interest in the negotiations and an intention to prolong them indecisively. The North’s negotiators diligently followed instructions given to them and reported regularly to headquarters, unsure of their bottom line.70

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 They had to keep their options open by avoiding agreement or commitment which could be later repudiated by their leadership.71 Various proposals were raised, sometimes it was the demand for a LWR, or deliveries of heavy oil, or security assurances from the US but then they were dropped just as quickly.72 The North’s diplomats would put on displays of outrage and walk out of the negotiations while other parties scrambled to get them to return. By agreeing to return to the negotiations, they demanded and expected concessions. They would leave negotiation sessions without specifying a date for their resumption which would shift the purpose of the negotiations from the nuclear issue to simply ensuring their presence at the negotiations.73 They avoided any agreement to which their capricious leadership might object stimulating the other Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 35 parties to formulate proposals which could be rejected at will. In this way they exploited the anxiety of their opponents who were eager for an agreement and willing to read into the North’s behavior their own hopes. The calculated vagueness of the North’s negotiating tactics placed great pressure upon democratic governments in the US and South Korea, where diplomacy is conducted through a very public process and critical nuances are glossed over in the demand for immediate results. One salient case of tacit bargaining was the North’s demand that the US terminate its hostility as a condition for the elimination of the nuclear program. It never explained what this meant and left it open to interpretation which allowed it to pose as an unfortunate victim of American malice. This posture gave it the advantage of being able to reject proposals while always appearing to be committed to negotiations. What did the end of US hostility to the North mean? If it meant American security assurances, the North lost interest when the US was willing to oblige. If it meant avoiding all public recriminations and criticisms of the North, then it was beyond the ability of a democracy to control the media or to suppress free expression. If it meant that the US should offer diplomatic immunity to the North for its human rights violations as well as its nuclear program, and become a protector of the its ruling dynasty to ensure its survival, then it was fantasy. Demands were deliberately and tantalizingly kept vague to give the North a seemingly legitimate reason to avoid agreement. This was not the negotiating behavior of a state that wanted to surrender its nuclear program for economic benefits or a security guarantee, or even to identify the terms and conditions by which this would be possible. The demands for LWRs and heavy oil deliveries were peripheral and even if they had been met, the nuclear problem would not have been resolved. For the North the Six Party Talks served a dual purpose, they provided camouflage for the development of the nuclear program and entangled the US in negotiations that would divert it from considering a military strike on its nuclear facilities. For this reason it refused to spell out clearly what it wanted and it resorted to tacit bargaining and tortuous negotiating tactics to divert pressure for clarity from the other negotiating parties. The talks were also used to maneuver the US into an agreement on the North’s terms, or something similar to the Agreed Framework based on a freeze and the promise of ver-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 ification in the future. This was achieved in the 19 September 2005 agreement. For this agreement the North was prepared to freeze the plutonium program, but not the HEU program, and promise that it would be open to verification in the future. As a result, US pressure on the North would be eased and the danger of a military strike would be removed. If the US resisted the desired agreement, then the North would rapidly move ahead with the nuclear program and conduct a nuclear test which would change the nature of the negotiations and its relationship with the US. To implement this strategy the North kept its nuclear program in being until it was compelled to decide whether to move forward to the test stage, or to accept a freeze. That time came with the breakdown of the September 2005 agreement when the North 36 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players withdrew from the Six party Talks and prepared for its first nuclear test in the following year.

Russia: the supporting player Russia attempted to compensate for its virtual exclusion from the Korean Peninsula since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was linked with the North through the 1961 Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation, which gave it a foothold on the Korean Peninsula. President Yeltsin in his emotional repudiation of the Soviet past wanted to break the connection with North Korea in order to expand the relationship with the economically progressive South. The South demanded that Russia renounce the treaty with the North so Russia renegotiated the treaty with the North but without Article One which committed Russia to the North’s defense. Without any viable inﬂuence in the North, South Korea lost interest in Russia and turned to China which had established a key position on the Korean Peninsula by having relations with both Koreas.74 To its great consternation Russia discovered that it was marginal to the negotiations over the North’s nuclear program, which were conducted bilaterally between the North and the US.75 To overcome its marginalization on 24 March 1994 the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed an international conference to devise a comprehensive solution to the Korean peninsula. This multilateral forum would deal with the nuclear issue and provide guarantees to both Koreas, and discuss the normalization of relations between Pyongyang, Japan, and the US. Eight parties were to be included: Russia, the US, China, Japan, the two Koreas, the IAEA, and the UN Secretary-General. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Panov tried to strike a deal with the Americans and said that Russia would support the US in the Security Council if the US supported its proposal for an international conference. The Clinton Administration had no interest in what was called Russia’s “tried and tested technique” to gain entry into negotiations from which it felt excluded.76 Russians resented their exclusion from the Agreed Framework since they had hoped to supply the North with LWRs under its terms.77 Subsequently Russia was also excluded from the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Four Party Talks that were held over April 16 1996 to August 1999 which were convened by the US and South Korea to discuss the nuclear issue. Russia believed that this exclusion was deliberate policy on the American side and that the US took the opportunity to ensure that Russia would be consigned to the sidelines of any negotiations over the Korean Peninsula.78 To strengthen their position on the Korean Peninsula, the Russians moved to revive their relationship with the North. When the Soviet era academic and bureaucrat Yevgenni Primakov took charge of foreign policy, an effort was made to renew relations with former Soviet allies including North Korea. A new treaty was agreed with in Pyongyang in March 1999, without the auto- matic response obligation in Article One.79 By the time Vladimir Putin Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 37 emerged as Acting President in December 1999, the first steps towards upgrading the relationship with the North had been taken. Putin understood that Russia’s major card was this relationship, the absence of which had hampered Russia’seffort to become a key player on the Korean Peninsula. For this reason Putin visited Pyongyang over July 19–20 2000 in an effort to develop the relationship but he found Kim Jong-il too erratic and unpredictable. Russia attempted to develop its own policy over the Korean Peninsula and seized the opportunity when the North searched for a means to counter US pressure. Kim Jong-il reciprocated Putin’s visit by traveling to Moscow in an armored train over a total of 24 days in July–August 2001. The North Korean leader sought a common interest with Russia when he declared that the Bush Administration was “out to isolate” the North, indicating that the US plan for ballistic missile defense “brought us together.”80 Putin met Kim Jong-il for the third time in Vladivostok in August 2002 when the North Korean leader traveled through the Far East by train. The Russian President saw that his task was to remove the North from the “axis of evil,” and to encourage it to change without pressure or condemnation. Russians assumed that they had particular advantages in befriending the North which would allow them to act as its international sponsor. One assumed advantage was that the North was a product of the Stalinist system which the Russians had experienced and understood well. After meeting Kim Jong-il Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov claimed that the North was ready for constructive dialogue with the US and Japan without preconditions, but Russia’sefforts to act as a sponsor of the North were distrusted by the Bush Administration.81 A second assumed advantage was that a weakened Russia was an alternative to China and would not be in a position to dominate the Peninsula. Kim Jong-il could use Russia to bargain for greater freedom of maneuver and better economic terms with China, and also to avoid becoming a Chinese dependency. Putin succeeded in cultivating personal relations with Kim Jong-il and had offered Russia as a means to reduce the North’s isolation as well as its dependence upon China. Russia had exaggerated expectations of the relationship claiming that it was based on “shared geopolitical interests,” that the North saw Russia as a “desirable developmental model,” and relied on “Russian global influence to deflect and diminish the US military pressure, and

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 to check the ambitions of other great and middle powers on the Peninsula.”82 Despite these claims, the North looked to China as a developmental model and for protection against the US in the UN Security Council. A personal relationship with Kim Jong-il was no basis for enduring influence on the Korean Peninsula, and yet to maintain the pretense of a relationship with the North, Russia was obliged to endorse and excuse its behavior. This was evident in October 2002 when the North admitted the existence of a HEU program to American Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. The Russians supported the North and claimed that it did not admit to any nuclear program, and that the American accusation was a “lie.”83 Pique and mounting resentments against the Americans for ignoring Russia’s interests in the 38 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe resulted in the loss of Russian flexibility over the Korean issue to the point where Russia simply followed and supported the Chinese. On the basis of these considerations Russia went into the Six Party Talks with several goals. Its immediate intention was to prevent American military action against the North’s nuclear facilities which could threaten the Russian Far East with a nuclear catastrophe.84 Russia’s Far East indeed felt the dangers more keenly than did Moscow, which was eight time zones away, and was more anxious about events on the Korean Peninsula.85 Of all the players Russia was the most conscious of the end game and attempted to maneuver itself into a favorable position in preparation for reunification. It attempted to convert the Six Party Talks into a permanent regional grouping that would prepare it for reunification. Influence with a united Korea would allow it to break free of the constraints imposed by its relationship with China and to press Japan to accept that the Northern Islands, which are in dispute with Russia, will never be returned. Indeed, some Russians believe that a united Korea would strengthen Russia’s role in Northeast Asia, and that it would be a “natural partner” of Russia as they would both share concerns about China and Japan.86 For the end game Russia required a relationship with the North which Putin had attempted to consolidate but failed as Russia could not match China’s importance for the North. The problem for Russia was that it pursued conflicting objectives. It supported the American goal of ridding the North of nuclear weapons but was strongly opposed to the Bush Adminis- tration’s approach to the issue. It wanted to stave off American pressure on the North but it was obliged to work with China, which undermined its efforts to develop an independent position on the Korean Peninsula. Despite all its efforts Russia could not escape its role as a supporter of China and the limitations it imposed upon its policy.

The swing state South Korea The Korean War and numerous provocations by the North had turned the South into a staunch ally of the US, but the unfortunate division of the country stimulated a longing for closer ties with the North and reuniﬁcation.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 The alliance with the US was a matter of necessity and survival but the North represented the possibility of making Korea whole again. Deep emotions were roused by the division of the Peninsula, the separation of families and the feeling of being victimized by fate and the surrounding great powers. Every South Korean leader has voiced a desire for closer relations with the North even in the midst the provocations perpetrated by the Northern regime. Under the dictators, Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo the South suppressed the attraction of the North and the venera- tion of Kim Il-sung amongst student circles which threatened their legitimacy. When the opposition leader and critic of the dictators Kim Young-sam became the South’s ﬁrst democratically elected president in December 1992 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 39 this sentiment could no longer be repressed. Democracy released the constraints on the expression of conciliatory policies towards the North and politics in the South became strongly polarized between the conservatives, who sided with the Grand National Party (GNP) and insisted on the alliance with the US, and those who sought reconciliation with the North. This dilemma was faced by Kim Young-sam during the American negotiations with the North which led to the Agreed Framework. President Kim opposed the American proposal to impose sanctions on the North which was reiterated by subsequent leaders. South Korea was vulnerable to Northern attack and the urban conurbation Seoul which accounted for half of the South’s population was within 40 kilometers of the DMZ, and could be devastated by the North’s short range missiles.87 Kim, however, was alarmed by the possibility of a deal between the US and the North which would come at the South’s expense. This dilemma was evident when on 13 October 1993 the Clinton administration agreed to a “comprehensive approach” to the North. After having opposed sanctions on the North Kim Young-sam was concerned that the US was being too conciliatory. During his visit to Washington on 23 November 1993 Kim raised his objections to Clinton’s policy directly and because of his opposition, the “comprehensive approach” was changed into a “thorough and broad approach.” Kim was also insistent that Exercise Team Spirit, which the Americans wanted to postpone so as not to provoke the North at a delicate time, should not be cancelled. This left the Americans with the impression of an erratic ally.88 Most disturbing for the South was the Agreed Framework from which the South was excluded while it was expected to fund the LWRs that were to be given to the North. President Kim wanted to repudiate the deal and claimed that the US was being duped by the North, and it was only after the entreaties of Foreign Minister Han Soon-joo that he accepted the agreement. The Agreed Framework widened the ﬁssures between the US and the South and raised doubts about the value of the US alliance. It demonstrated that the US could not strike a bilateral deal with the North without undermining the relationship and the alliance with the South. On September 18 1996 when a North Korean submarine ran aground near Kangnung on the East Coast of South Korea, Kim Young-sam demanded an immediate apology and

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 punishment for those responsible as well as a pledge from the North that it would never infiltrate the South again. With its new relationship with the North, the US wanted to calm the waters and on October 12 sent Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord to Seoul with the task of moderating President’s Kim’s anger against the North. Kim was incensed by the US action which he called “appeasement” and refused to continue participation in the Four Party Talks until the North apologized.89 Fortunately the North apologized for its action and in a two sentence statement agreed previously by the US it expressed “deep regret for the casualties caused by the submarine incursion.90 The event demonstrated that the US could not move forward in a relationship with the North without impairing the alliance with the South and 40 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players that by calling for closer relations with the US, the North could drive a wedge between the two allies. Kim Dae-jung who was elected President on 18 December 1997 expressed the emotional longing in South Korea to reunify the country, he proclaimed his Sunshine Policy of approaching the North as a step in this direction. As the Ministry of Unification explained, the Sunshine Policy entailed an improvement of intra Korean relations and “peaceful coexistence” to create an appropriate atmosphere for eventual reunification.91 In one of his first moves on 27 March 1998 President Kim Dae-jung removed restrictions for South Korean companies interested in investing in the North and the prohibition on visits to the North by South Koreans. The difficulty was that South Korea could not create the conditions for coexistence with the North on its own. If it wanted to reduce the North’s obsession with external threat, it had to obtain American support. The Sunshine Policy would not succeed in isolation. To obtain the support of the major powers Kim Dae-jung visited Tokyo in October 1998, Moscow in May 1999, Washington in September 2001, and Beijing in October 2001.92 In Feb- ruary 1999 he announced what he called a “package deal” which was intended to turn the North into a responsible member of the international community. International agencies would provide food aid to the North, the US and Japan would terminate sanctions on the North and would normalize relations with it, while the North would cease the production of WMD.93 The Sunshine Policy, however, created wide fissures in South Korean politics that the president had not foreseen. First, the price for the Sunshine Policy was government tolerance of human rights violations by both the North and China whose cooperation was required for its implementation. The Sunshine Policy was unveiled at a time of famine in the North when some 100,000–300,000 refugees streamed across the border into China, many of whom were forcibly repatriated by the Chinese.94 In September 1998 the North declared a “shoot to kill” policy to deter the flow but many made the crossing into China by bribing North Korean border guards. South Korea did not want to jeopardize relations with the North and with China by raising the issue of refugees with them. The South Korean Embassy in Beijing even turned away defectors from the North which became a scandal. Secondly, the Sunshine Policy did not deter the North from engaging in provocations

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 against the South which raised doubts as to its effectiveness. In June 1999 an eight day naval clash occurred in the West over the Northern line that was drawn by UN command in 1953 and was never accepted by the North.95 One Northern patrol vessel was sunk prompting the North to demand an apology and compensation from the South. This clash took place at a time when talks between the two Koreas were being conducted in Beijing over family reunions and highlighted the inherent risks of the “Sunshine Policy.” South Korea’s opposition leader Lee Hoi-chang claimed that there was no reciprocity and bitterly denounced the “Sunshine Policy.” Strong opposition to the Sunshine Policy from the conservatives resulted in a number of bizarre incidents where some officials from the Agency for Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 41 National Security Planning (ANSP) or the intelligence agency were implicated in a smear campaign against the President.96 Thirdly, the Sunshine Policy resulted in what the opposition GNP chairman Suh Ching-won claimed was a cover up of the North’s HEU program and the centrifuge purchases which the Defense Ministry had known about by 1999.97 Kim Dae-jung’s summit with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in June 2000 was a great achievement for the Sunshine Policy, but it required a total payment to the North of $800 million by Hyundai. There was little progress over the South’s demands which included a military hotline and military confidence-building measures. Inter- Korean defense talks were held in September 2000 but without results.98 Without the desired progress, a crisis in South Korean politics ensued when the Unification Minister Lim Dong-won was accused of making too many concessions to the North and on September 3 2001 he was forced to resign by the National Assembly. He had authorized a visit by 300 peace activists to the North to celebrate the anniversary of the end of Japanese rule; during the visit some of these delegates unwittingly endorsed the North’s confederation proposal. On September 4 the entire South Korean cabinet resigned.99 A second naval clash occurred in the West Sea in July 2002 and Lee Hoi-chang again blamed the Sunshine Policy.100 Elected president on 19 December 2002, Roh Moo-hyun vowed to continue with the “Sunshine Policy.” Roh represented the so-called 386 generation in South Korea, those in their thirties, who were born in the 1960s and educated in the 1980s. They had not experienced the Korean War, and did not share their parent’s gratitude to the Americans for saving the country and were given to strong criticism of the US. The revival of the Sunshine Policy took place in South Korea when both the US and Japan had lost their enthusiasm for it. The Bush Administration had already adopted its hard line position against the North, particularly after the North had admitted the existence of the HEU program. The Japanese, moreover, had swung against the North after Kim Jong-il had admitted kidnapping Japanese citizens which inflamed Japanese public opinion. Without great power support the new President could make little headway with his policy yet he persisted in formulating great plans and sketching out visions which he could not realize. In his inauguration speech in February 2003 Roh called upon the South to assume a “pivotal

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 role to realize a regional community in Northeast Asia.”101 Roh’s vision of a Northeast Asian regional community galvanized his supporters and gave them the hope that the South could be an important regional actor, but his aims were beyond South Korea’s reach. The regional community he visualized required American support but the anti-Americanism of many of his followers alienated the US.102 Roh talked about the South’s “balancing” role in the building of cooperative security in the region but by then he had confused rather than clarified his intentions.103 He had hoped to promote dialogue with the North but to do so he also required Chinese support. The alliance with the US, however, placed strict limits on this approach.104 Indeed, despite its aspiration for an autonomous role the South could never 42 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players shake off its dependence upon the US, or its need for Chinese cooperation to approach the North. Under Roh, the South came into the Six Party talks as a swing state. The talks were an opportunity for Roh and his supporters to implement their policy of dialogue with the North, which they hoped would bring about family reunions, closer economic ties and eventual reunification. Their first priority was dialogue and engagement with the North which in their view would lead to changes in North Korean policy and would then make nuclear disarmament possible. They were frustrated by the Bush Administration’s insistence on nuclear disarmament first, which in their view closed off the possibility of meaningful engagement of the North and perpetuated existing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. These aspirations brought South Korea closer to China and Russia with which the Roh administration shared concerns over the direction of US policy under the Bush Administration, and alarm over American bellicosity. During the Six Party Talks the South swung over to China and Russia but it remained an American ally and could not escape the constraints of the alliance. These external constraints had their counterparts in domestic politics as the Grand National Party in opposition was bitterly opposed to Roh’s policies and concerned about their impact upon the alliance with the US. The South may have entered the Six Party Talks on the crest of a popular wave with one President, but in the face of lack of progress with the North and the North’s deliberate provocations it would swing back to a tougher position with Roh’s successor.

The peripheral player: Japan The Japanese had not intended to be peripheral players but this was the outcome of the conflicting influences on their policy. The Korean Peninsula was of major strategic concern to the Japanese who wanted to prevent it from falling under the influence of any hostile power which could threaten them. Russian penetration of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria had triggered the outbreak of the 1904–5 war with Japan which has been very sensitive to great power maneuvering there ever since. The Japanese were disturbed by the Chinese role on the Peninsula and thought that China was too close to North

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Korea to act as mediator. They feared that China would use the Six Party Talks to strengthen its position there against Japan, and suspected that China would tolerate a nuclear North Korea giving rise to the nightmare scenario of a reunited Korea with nuclear weapons. Koreans and Chinese would then come together with their shared grievances against Japan. The Japanese were also troubled by the prospect that the Americans would rapidly tire of the situation and negotiate a deal over the Korean Peninsula with the Chinese. Japanese and American strategic perspectives in relation to the Korean Peninsula differed as the US could always walk away while for the Japanese proximity made the issue crucial. They attempted to devise their own approach towards North Korea which would give them some influence over Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 43 the situation and a favorable position for the end game of reunification. Japanese efforts in this direction were hijacked, however, by domestic opinion after the North admitted to the abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Public outrage meant that progress towards normalization of the relationship with the North was terminated. In the Six Party Talks, Japan’s priority was a resolution of the abduction issue which was more immediate than the nuclear issue. Japan’s concerns were domestic and of little interest to the other parties which simply resulted in its relegation to the sidelines. The Japanese had long been aware of their vulnerability in relation to the Korean Peninsula and had attempted to normalize relations with the North earlier but without success. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader Kanemaru Shin visited Pyongyang and initiated talks over 1991–92 during which the Japanese insisted on a resolution of the abduction issue. The North demanded an apology for the period of Japanese colonization and compensation which the Japanese then resisted.105 One factor slowing down the normalization efforts was South Korea’s suspicion that Japan wanted to keep the Peninsula divided.106 Several events spurred the Japanese to renew their efforts to normalize relations with the North; one of which was Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung visited Tokyo from 7 to 10 October 1998 revealing that the South no longer opposed Japan’s moves towards the North and that he wanted Japanese endorsement of the Sunshine Policy. He agreed with the Japanese that the Agreed Framework and KEDO were the “most feasible and effective” mechanisms to stop North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.107 A second event was the North’s launching of a Taepodong missile over northern Japan on August 31 1998. The launch galvanized the Japanese and hardened attitudes towards the North, particularly among the younger generation of Diet members. This event prompted the Japanese to strengthen defense cooperation with the US particularly over ballistic missile defense (BMD) which accelerated in subsequent years.108 Japan temporarily froze economic assistance and food aid to the North as of September in that year. Revelations about the intrusion of North Korean spy vessels into Japanese waters to pick up spies in March 1999 also troubled the Japanese.109 Hardening attitudes towards the North, particularly within conservative circles of the ruling LDP, threatened to derail any attempt by the government to improve relations with the North.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Nonetheless, the Japanese Foreign Ministry again attempted to renew the dialogue with the North after the missile launch, this time offering food aid and also insisting that the North resolve 10 cases of abductions.110 Again the North laid down its conditions when Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun, in a speech to UN General Assembly in September 1999 demanded an apology for Japanese colonization and compensation. Talks between Japan and the North were resumed in Beijing over December 21–22 1999. While the North demanded $5–10 billion in compensation, the Japanese offered economic aid up to $9 billion but would not allow it to be called compensation, nor would they offer a public apology.111 Talks continued in August and October 2000 when the Japanese again offered economic assistance to the North which the 44 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players North rejected without satisfaction of the earlier demands.112 It was in this context that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang in Sep- tember 2002 at a time when Bush Administration attitudes towards the North were deteriorating. Koizumi’s intention was to break the logjam in negotiations with the North over the normalization of relations and the abduction issue, as well as to get the North to agree to an extension of the moratorium on ballistic missile testing. As an independent initiative it was carefully prepared by Hitoshi Tanaka who was Director-General of the Asian and Ocea- nian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and encouraged by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda. Tanaka had hoped that normalized relations with the North would give Japan a position of influence over both China and the South and would bring about Japan’s “geopolitical revival.”113 The visit was, as some have argued, an unprecedented opportunity for Japan to take a “leadership position” in negotiations with the North.114 If the strategy were successful Japan’s isolation on the Korean Peninsula would be overcome and Japan’s idea of a multilateral regional grouping for Northeast Asia would be closer to realization115 When Koizumi met Kim Jong-il on September 17 2002; the North Korean leader admitted to the abductions, which had been previously denied with such vehemence. Why he did so has been the subject of much speculation. Some Japanese claim that the admission was an effort to break with the past and to begin a new relationship; others say that this was yet another example of Kim Jong-il’s erratic behavior and capriciousness which conflicted with his interests. Others have argued that this was an attempt to draw Japan away from the US into separate negotiations with the North, but if this was the case it had the opposite effect in a very dramatic way.116 According to Jiji Press, which cited a document issued by the Korean People’s Army Publishing House in October 2002, Kim Jong-il boasted to senior military officials that Koizumi’s visit was a “gesture of subservience.”117 The North revealed that 13 Japanese had been abducted, 8 had died, and five were allowed to return to Japan on 15 October for two weeks. All chose to stay in Japan and were not returned against their will. Kim Jong-il claimed that he did not know about the intrusions into Japanese waters by North Korean special missions units and told Koizumi that they would not reoccur.118

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 With this revelation, a political storm erupted in Japan. The Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) and the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN) had always accused the government of ignoring their cases, and it was only in 1988 that the Japanese authorities had admitted that North Korea was implicated.119 The families of the abductees went public to give vent to their frustrations and emotions, appearing regularly on television news programs expressing their grief in a way that attracts much sympathy in Japan. Japanese politicians took up the cause of the abduction families and demanded a harder line towards the North. Both Hitoshi Tanaka and Fukuda wanted to send the five abductees back to North Korea since it was agreed that their stay in Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 45 Japan would be temporary but this was opposed by Deputy Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe and Shotaro Yachi in the Prime Minister’sOffice.120 When this became known it fueled public vituperation of the Foreign Ministry and the so called “Korean school” in the ministry was blamed for negotiating the deal with the North. Hitoshi Tanaka and the Foreign Ministry were publicly vili- fied and humiliated.121 The Japanese government could not proceed against this public outburst and the initiative was stymied. Koizumi made one more effort to visit Pyongyang in May 2004 but the damage had been done and no further progress could be made. The Japanese position hardened after the failure of the Koizumi initiative. North Korea must have realized the error because in November it resorted to intimidation when it warned Japan that it would resume ballistic missile testing.122 On the Japanese side Defense Agency Chief Shigeru Ishiba pushed for closer cooperation with the US over BMD. Construction progressed on American anti-ballistic missile radar sites in the Northern Tohoku region and in Okinawa. Japan, which had previously been prepared to offer economic assistance and food aid to the North, now began to demand the dismantling of the North’s nuclear program as a pre-condition.123 Japanese foreign ministry officials were greatly distressed by the loss of initiative over this issue which made them appear as traitors before the people. Some Japanese have argued that but for this issue, Japan would have been able to create a special relationship with Kim Jong-il giving it influence over the nuclear issue. They argued that had this been possible, Japan could have emerged as the main player on the Korean Peninsula and not China.124 As it was, Japanese officials were obliged to demand that the abduction issue be placed on the agenda of the Six Party Talks which was resented by the Americans and the South Koreans.125 Japan wasregardedasa“spoiler” and the Americans in particular were irritated by their efforts to take the attention away from the nuclear problem and to highlight an issue they considered unimportant.126 It added to that tendency amongst Americans to dismiss Japan as an ineffectual power and to rely on China for a resolution of the nuclear issue. Japan failed to prepare a position for itself in relation to the eventual reunification of Korea and dealt itself out of the negotiations in the Six Party Talks.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Conclusion From the beginning there was no common strategy for resolving the nuclear issue and the inclusion of the North as the target state was a result of a fundamental inability to agree on one. The deep divisions that existed between the parties at the outset gave the North the opportunity to use the Six Party Talks to pull the Chinese and the Russians, who were alarmed by the belligerence of the Bush Administration, to their side. The US as the main player was perhaps the most clear about its bargaining position. It came to the talks expecting to obtain six party endorsement of its hard line policy over the North’s nuclear program. It sought multilateral endorsement of its own 46 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players position over the issue and assumed that other parties shared the same sense of urgency about the nuclear program. As the pivotal player, China was in the key position of making the talks succeed or fail; its links with the North gave it some leverage over Pyongyang but it became alarmed about American intentions and saw the Six Party Talks as an opportunity to moderate and reshape the US negotiating position away from force and belligerence, and towards a deal with the North. It sought American endorsement of the survival and security of the North which would secure its own interests on the Korean Peninsula, and place it in a dominant position there. The divisions between the US and China were particularly wide and their public positions and declarations indicated a commonality that was not supported by their interests. The Bush administration discovered that it could not influence the North on its own and that it had few levers of influence over Pyongyang, and that it was compelled to seek Chinese support over the nuclear program. This situation gave China the opportunity to demonstrate its importance to the US and to ensure influence over the Korean Peninsula, and any regional arrangements that may be negotiated there. For China the nuclear program was not the main issue and it could be dealt with subsequently, but getting the Americans involved in negotiations which were expected to moderate its position was the immediate priority. Other parties took various positions in support of these positions. Russia had intended to stake out an autonomous position on the Korean Peninsula but the Bush Administration’s hard line approach pushed it into the role of a supporting party for China. South Korea was the swing player; it was torn between its desire for an autonomous role in relation to the North and its need for American alliance support as a deterrent of the North. Japan was the peripheral player but it began with the highest of expectations of establishing a relationship with the North which would ensure it of influence over the end game on the Korean Peninsula. Domestic politics, however, undermined diplomatic strategy when the abduction issue erupted and thereafter determined Japanese policy over the issue.

Notes 1 Statement by Senator Robbs, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, Hearing before ﬁ ﬀ

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 the Subcommittee on East Asian and Paci cA airs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, 2nd session, March 3 1994, p. 3, 24. 2 Statement by Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and PacificAffairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, 2nd session, March 3 1994, p. 14. 3 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul 16 May 2011. 4 In Russia, Japan and China there was “little enthusiasm for even the most mildest set of sanctions,” Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Cri- tical The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2004 p. 318. 5 Bill Clinton, My Life, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2004, p. 602. Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 47 6 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 325. 7 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 317, 323–24. 8 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, pp. 317, 323–24. 9 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 221–41. 10 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 356–57. 11 Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 21 1994, The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.or,=g/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf. 12 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, pp. 356–57. 13 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci p. 390, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on the national emergency regarding proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” November 9 2000, William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 2000–2001, Book III-October 12 to January 20 2000, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2002. p. 2509–10\. 14 Statement of Hon. Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense, US–North Korea States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, January 19 1995. 15 Dr. William J. Perry, Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Find- ings and Recommendations, Office of the North Korea Policy Coordinator, United States Department of State, October 12 1999, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ publication/2017/review_of_united_states_policy_toward_north_korea.html. 16 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times, Henry Holt, New York, 2011, p 45. 17 Donald P. Gregg, and Mitchell B Reiss, “Washington Should Try Engagement with Pyongyang” International Herald Tribune, March 12 1999. 18 International Herald Tribune, March 20 1999. 19 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011, Stockholm August 24 2011 The communiqué from the visit said that neither government would have hostile intent toward each other” and both governments “would redouble their commitments and their efforts to fulfill their obligations under the Agreed Framework.” “letter to Congressional Leaders on the national emergency regarding proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” November 9 2000. William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 2000–2001, Book III-October 12 to January 20 2000, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2002. p. 2509. 20 Interview Charles Pritchard Seoul, May 16 2011, Stockholm August 24 2011. 21 Interview Charles Pritchard. 22 William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 2000– 2001, Book III—October 12 to January 20 2000, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 2807, 2811.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 23 Albright visited Pyongyang over October 23–24 and was convinced that if Clinton visited Pyongyang a deal over ballistic missiles could be negotiated. Clinton wrote “although I wanted to take the next step I could not risk being half way around the world when we were so close to peace in the Middle East.” Bill Clinton, My Life, p. 938. William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 2000–2001, Book II—June 27 to October 11 2000, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 2057. 24 Statement of Hon. Robert l. Gallucci, Dean, Georgetown University, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC, U.S. Policy toward North Korea: where do we go from here? Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate One Hundred Seventh Congress First Session, May 23 2001. 25 C. Kenneth Quinones, ‘Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003, p. 210. 48 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 26 Statement of Charles l. Pritchard, special envoy for Korean peace talks, U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, U.S. Department of State, U.S.–North Korea relations after the policy review, hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh congress, First session July 26 2001. 27 Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House history, 2006–2008, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2008, pp. 431, 432. 28 C. Kenneth Quinones, “Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy,” p. 213. 29 Kelly visited as part of the State Department’s “bold approach” to transforming the relationship with US from hostility to cooperation and engagement, provided that the North met US concerns over this and other issues; Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 378. 30 Adrian Levy, Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, Walker, New York, 2007, p. 338. 31 Bill Clinton, My Life, p. 625. 32 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 375, 379. 33 Howard M. Krawitz, “Resolving Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for China,” Strategic Forum, No. 201, Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, August 2003. 34 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal,” The New York Times 16 February 2007. 35 Father Bush said that “Condi Rice was not up to the job” she was a disappointment. Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, part II, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, p. 420. 36 Bush had little interest in ordered and systematic decision-making anyway Bush was described as a unilateralist, and said that “we will never get people to agree,” and that international coalitions and the UN are not the way to deal with rogue states. See Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House history, 2006– 2008, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2008, pp. 431, 432. 37 Interview Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011, Stockholm August 24 2011. 38 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_sep2002.pdf. 39 Statement of Charles l. Pritchard, special envoy for Korean peace talks, U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, U.S. Department of State, U.S.–North Korea relations after the policy review, hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh congress, First session July 26 2001 serial no. 107–39, Washington, DC, 2001. 40 Statement by Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for International Security

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and PacificAffairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, 2nd session, March 3 1994, p. 36. 41 Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder and John S. Park, “Chinese views on North Korea,” The Japan Times, February 14 2008. 42 Shi Yinhong, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Problem” in Guoguang Wu, Helen Landsdowne (editors), China turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, Routledge, London, 2008. 43 Shi Yinhong, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Problem, p. 178; Fei-Lang Wang, “Stability with Uncertainties: US–China Relations and the Korean Penin- sula,” in Tae Hwan Kwak, Seung Ho Joo, The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006. Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 49 44 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp. 124–25, 130. 45 Howard M. Krawitz, Resolving Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for China, Strategic forum, No 201, Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, August 2003. 46 Shim Jae Hoon, “Darkness at Noon,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10 1996. 47 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four, 2006. 48 The Foreign Ministry’s Department of North American and Oceanic Affairs, Department of Asian Affairs, Office of Korean Peninsula Affairs, Delegation to the UN and Department of Arms Control have different views on the Korean issue. Ibid, pp. 6, 7. 49 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald May 28 2008. 50 Dr. Pang Zhongying, The Six-Party Process, Regional Security Mechanisms, and China-U.S. Cooperation: Toward a Regional Security Mechanism for a New Northeast Asia? the Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, March 2009. 51 Interview with Cho Tae-yong, Deputy Head of South Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks, Canberra, April 24, May 30 2012. 52 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald 28 May 2008, also Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder and John S. Park, “Chinese views on North Korea,” The Japan Times 14 February 2008. 53 Han S. Park, “The Rationales behind North Korean Foreign Policy,” Linus Hagström and Marie Söderberg (editors), North Korea Policy, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 38. 54 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb, Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Cornell, Ithaca, New York, 2010, p. 142. 55 Adrian Levy, Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, Walker, New York, 2007, pp. 248–49, 256. 56 Adrian Levy, Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “North Korea and Pakistan: a joint nuclear test?” International Herald Tribune, 28 February 2004. 57 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb, Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Cornell, Ithaca, New York, 2010, p. 278. 58 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Free Press, New York, 2006, pp. 288–90. 59 Matthew Pennington, “Pakistan Nuclear Expert Gave Info to Iran,” Associated Press, February 2 2004 http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/P/PAKISTAN_N UCLEAR_DETENTIONS?SITE=DCTMS& section=HOME.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 60 Leon V. Sigal, “North Korean Nuclear Brinkmanship, 1993–94 and 2002–3,” in Byung Chul Koh (editor) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy, Kyungnam University Press, Seoul, 2004. 61 Byung Chul Koh, “Understanding North Korean Foreign Policy: An Overview,” in Byung Chuk Koh (editor) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyon- gyang’s Foreign Policy. 62 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1997 p. 358. 63 Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disen- gagement, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2002, Chapter 4. 64 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A contemporary History, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 399–406. 50 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 65 Shim Jae Hoon, “Dancing in the Dark,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March 1997, The Japan Times, 15 April 1997. 66 Byung Chul Koh, “Understanding North Korean Foreign Policy: An Overview,” in Byung Chul Koh (ed.) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy,pp.31–32. 67 Christopher D. Hale, “Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002 Economic Measures,” Asian Survey, vol. 45, no. 6 (November/December 2005). 68 North Korea’s behavior can be understood in terms of starts, stops, and then a final lunge towards nuclear weapons according to threats perceived in the external environment and available opportunities. According to this view the North began with the intention of becoming a nuclear power but the program was suspended after the Agreed Framework was signed. When the Bush Administration came to office; however, the suspension was lifted and the North accelerated its efforts to achieve nuclear weapons status as quickly as possible. Han S. Park, “The Ratio- nales behind North Korean Foreign Policy,” Linus Hagström and Marie Söder- berg (editors), North Korea Policy, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 40–41. 69 Byung Chul Koh, “Understanding North Korean Foreign Policy: An Overview,” in Byung Chul Koh (ed.) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy. 70 Interview with Cho Tae-yong, Deputy head of South Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks, 2004–6, Canberra, April 24, May 30 2012. 71 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 382, 72 Interview with Cho Tae Yong, Deputy head of South Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks, 2004–6, Canberra, April 24, May 30 2012. 73 Chuck Downs, “Discerning North Korea’sIntentions,” in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard Ellings, (eds), Korea’s Future and the Great Powers,NationalBureauofAsian Research/University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, 2001, pp. 102–4. 74 Gennadi Zardeev, “ Rossiya gotovitsya k podpisaniyu dogovora s yuzhnoi Korei,” [Russia is preparing to sign a treaty with South Korea], Izvestiya, August 13 1992. 75 Evgeny Bazhanov, “The Russian Response: The Nuclear Crisis,” in Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 194–95. 76 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 156–58. 77 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 29 1994. 78 Alexander Vorontsov, Current Russia-North Korea Relations: Challenges and Achievements, The Brookings Institution, Centre for Northeast Asian Policy Stu- dies, Working Paper Series, February 2007 www.ciaonet.org/wps/bi9952/bi9952. pdf; Aleksander Vorontsov, “Chem nam dorog Pkhen’yan,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 23 2002.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 79 Article 2 of the 1999 treaty said that “in the event of the emergence of the danger of an aggression against one of the countries or a situation jeopardizing peace and security, and in the event there is a necessity for consultations and cooperation, the [two] sides [will] enter into contact with each other immediately,” Seung-ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak, “Military Relations Between Russia and North Korea,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 15, No, 2, Fall/Winter 2001, pp. 297–323. 80 “My dorozhim Koreisko-rossiskoi druzhboi,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, July 27 2001. 81 Karen DeYoung, “N. Korea Eager for Talks, Russian Says,” The Washington Post, July 30 2002, 82 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Kim Jong-il Re-embraces the bear, looking for the morning calm: North Korea’s policy toward Russia since 1994,” in Byung Chul Koh (editor) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy, pp. 283–84. Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 51 83 See comment by Deputy Director of First Asia Department of the Russian For- eign Ministry Georgi Georgii Toloraya, “Yadernyi poker v Koree,” Centre for the Study of Contemporary Korea, Far Eastern Institute, Moscow 9 December 2004, http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_o_i/a9628.shtml. 84 “Severokoreiskaya ugroza i ee potentisal’nye pokypateli,” Politicheskii Zhurnal Arkhiv No. 6 (57) February 21 2005, www.politjournal.ru.preview.php?action=Ar ticles&dirid=40&. 85 Interview with researchers Vladivostok 2009. 86 Evgeny Bazhanov, “; “The Russian Response: The Nuclear Crisis,” in Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 212. 87 “Kim, Roh Urge Bush to Show Restraint on NK,” The Korea Times, December 30 2002. 88 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2004, pp. 110–11, 114. 89 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas pp. 387–88, 391. 90 The Japan Times December 31 1996. 91 The North Korea Policy of the Kim Dae-jung Administration, Ministry of unification, Republic of Korea, 1998, p. 5. 92 Shin Yong bae, “Kim Wins major powers’ support for N.K. policy,” The Korean Herald, October 20 2001. 93 International Herald Tribune, February 25 1999. 94 Famine deaths over 1995–98 vary according to the sources; 220,000 according to the North’s State Food Damage Rehabilitation Committee, 270,000 according to the South’s statistical office, 2 million according to a US Congressional estimate, 3 million according to South Korean intelligence and 3.5 million according to a South Korean Buddhist NGO, The Japan Times, May 11 1999. Out of 24 million the percentage varied from 1 to over 10 percent of the population. 95 Terence Roehrig “The Northern Limit Line and North Korean Provocations” in Suk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig and Bernhard Seliger (editors) The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations, McFar- land & Co., Jefferson, North Carolina, 2011. 96 Kim Dae-jung accused the former Korean CIA, now the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) of plotting with North Korea to prevent the opposition from coming to power. He claimed that the North had sent troops into the DMZ before the 1996 National Assembly elections, to shift support away from the opposition. It was reported that members of the GNP met North Korean agents in Beijing in November 1997 and called for North Korean cooperation against Kim Dae-jung for which a payment $3.6 million was made. Another report

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 claimed that the South offered the North $100 million in food aid if it portrayed Kim Dae-jung as its supporter and staged incidents along the border. See The Japan Times, March 21 1998; The Straits Times March 18, 24 1998. 97 Hwang Jang jin, “Seoul Criticized for sweeping information on North Korean nukes under carpet,” The Korea Herald, October 22 2002. 98 Sah Dong-seok, “Little Progress on Miltary Issues: Critics,” The Korea Times, 26 September 2000. 99 International Herald Tribune, September 4 2001. 100 Kim Hyung-jin, “Kim’s Sunshine Policy under attack” The Korea Herald,July2 2002. 101 Lim Wonhyuk, “Regional Multilateralism in Asia and the Korean Question,” in Michael J. Green, Bates Gill, Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, and the Search for Community, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 83–84. 52 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 102 Robert J. Fouser, “Anti Americanization of South Korea,” The Korea Herald,23 October 2002. 103 Lim Wonhyuk, “Regional Multilateralism in Asia and the Korean Question, p. 93. 104 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 128. 105 David E. Sanger, “Japan Ends Talks with North Korea,” The New York Times May 26 1991. 106 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 71. 107 The Japan Times October 9 1998. 108 The Japan Times March 5 1999. 109 The Japan Times 25, March 26 1999. 110 Takeshi Sato, “Tokyo, Pyongyang bending to renew ties,” The Japan Times January 3 1998. 111 Victor D. Cha, “Hypothesis on History and Hate: Japan and the Korean Penin- sula,” Yoichi Funabashi, (editor) Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2003, pp. 53–56. 112 Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan and the recurrent nuclear crisis,” in Linus Hagström and Marie Söderberg (editors), North Korea Policy, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 22. 113 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis, pp. 149–50. 114 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism,” in Kent E. Calder, Frances Fukuyama (editors) East Asian Multilateralism: Pro- spects for Regional Security, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 2008, p. 183. 115 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, pp. 8, 67. 116 ‘“Pyongyang overtures,” The Japan Times, January 5 2003. 117 “Kim Jong-il ‘s Illusions of Grandeur,” The Japan Times, May 14 2003. 118 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, pp. 5, 6. 119 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism,” in Kent E. Calder, Frances Fukuyama (editors) East Asian Multilateralism: Pro- spects for Regional Security, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 2008, p. 184. 120 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism.” 121 Hitoshi Tanaka was in 2002 promoted to Deputy Foreign Minister for his efforts where he remained until August 2005 when he resigned. He then joined the Japan Center for International Exchange as a commentator on Japanese foreign policy. 122 Howard W. French, “North Korea Says it May Restart Missile Tests after Talks Fail,” The New York Times, 6 November 2002. 123 James Brooke, “A Missile Shield Appeals to a Worried Japan,” The New York Times, November 11 2002.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 124 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism,” p. 186. 125 Japan’s negotiating position in the Six party Talks was no normalization of relations or economic assistance unless the abduction issue was fully resolved; compensation was also demanded for the crime; The North was also to terminate the nuclear program and cease all other aggressive behavior such as sending armed vessels into Japanese waters for illegal missions. See Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Cross Roads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty First Century, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2003, pp. 89–90. 126 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 191. 3 The formation of the Six Party Talks

Introduction Since the ﬁrst nuclear crisis of 1993–94 the North had insisted that its nuclear program was a matter for bilateral negotiations with the US. The Agreed Framework was a result of bilateral negotiations which had defused the crisis and provided a precedent for subsequent eﬀorts to deal with the North. The Clinton Administration was willing to negotiate bilaterally with the North, not only over the nuclear program but over the ballistic missile program as well. Why then was there a need for multilateralism? The search for an appropriate form of multilateralism to engage the North was a result of dissatisfaction with bilateralism for two reasons. One was that the Republicans in the US saw the Agreed Framework as a sell out and after the HEU revelations of September 2002 rejected bilateralism with the North which they regarded with distaste. Secondly, US bilateralism with the North had excluded other players who sought to be involved to secure their interests and whose cooperation was required to ensure that the negotiations would succeed. The question was which parties should be involved and what issues would be on the agenda? Four Party Talks, which involved the two Koreas, the US and China, had been conducted during the 1990s to support inter-Korean negotiations, but they made no progress. In 2003 Three Party Talks were attempted which included China as the facilitator with the US and the North but these were unsatisfactory for the Americans. The US wanted a broader format to avoid being maneuvered into bilateral negotiations with the North and to Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 share responsibility for the outcome. The result was the Six Party format which would include all external parties that had interests on the Peninsula.

Four Party Talks Four Party Talks were the first attempt at multilateralism on the Peninsula since the Korean War and were conducted in six plenary sessions over 1997–1999. They were proposed by Kim Young-sam during his national day speech on August 15 1995 to rectify South Korea’s exclusion from the Agreed Frame- work and to insert itself directly into the negotiations over the Peninsula.1 54 The formation of the Six Party Talks This proposal was for a “two plus two” format with the South negotiating directly with the North, supported by the US and China, to replace the 1953 armistice agreement with a peace treaty. President Kim obtained US endorsement of his proposal when he met Clinton in Cheju Island on April 15 1996. The North, however, was indifferent and had no interest in involving the South since it did not sign the armistice agreement. It was already engaged in bilateral US–North Korea negotiations over ballistic missiles, and saw little purpose in two plus two negotiations. The negotiations over ballistic missiles had begun on April 20 1996 in Berlin and continued for seven rounds in Kuala Lumpur until November 2000. These talks were limited by the US to the aim of negotiating the termination of the North’s Nodong and Scud ballistic missile programs, and its exports of Scud missile technology. The North demanded that the agenda for the bilateral talks be widened to include a peace treaty with the US as a replacement for the 1953 armistice, as well as the withdrawal of US forces from the South which it declared was a condition for its participation in the talks.2 The US countered with the Four Party Talks proposal, which as Clinton explained, would be a “framework within which North and South could talk, “the goal being a “final peace agreement.”3 The Americans would not accept negotiations over the replacement for the 1953 Armistice agreement without the South and resorted to the two plus two format to ensure that Seoul would be included. The North requested a briefing from the US on the purpose and agenda of the Four Party Talks proposal; this was conducted on March 7 1997 in New York. At the outset, the Americans made it clear that progress in relations between the US and the North required parallel progress in relations between the North and South.4 The Americans insisted that they would not allow the North to turn the proposal for two plus two negotiations into a bilateral negotiating session. The North then agreed to participate in the preparatory three party meeting in Columbia University, New York, in March 1997 despite its initial conditions; this was the first time that North and South Korean delegations had met since 1972 but they did not speak to each other. Three meetings of three party talks were held. The North used the occasion to press for bilateral talks and a peace treaty with the US, and stressed that the danger of war on the Peninsula would be removed when the US gave up its “hostile policy”

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 towards the North. The US was interested in recovering the remains of American servicemen who went missing during the Korean war and opening a liaison office in the North for this purpose.5 It was only in the following June that the North agreed to continue with the negotiations, and attend preparatory meetings to determine an agenda for the plenary four party meetings when substantial issues would be discussed.6 Over August 5–7 1997 the first preparatory four party meeting was conducted in New York, this time with China despite its reluctance to get involved. At first China had little interest in the negotiations and stressed bilateral dialogue between the North and the South. Only when the North indicated a willingness to accept three party negotiations with the US did The formation of the Six Party Talks 55 China decide to participate.7 The parties could not agree on an agenda and negotiated at cross purposes. The North insisted on the withdrawal of Amer- ican forces from the South and argued that a peace regime could not be established on the Peninsula otherwise, while the US pressed for tension reduction measures including CBMs.8 This basic conflict over the agenda was never resolved and continued throughout the talks. Kim Jong-il was quoted as saying that “we have no intention of regarding the US as our eternal sworn enemy … we hope to normalize the Korea–US relationship,” and he called on the US to give up its “hostile policy” towards the North.9 Two more rounds of preparatory meetings were conducted in September and November before the Four Party Talks opened in Geneva over December 9–10 1997. Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth declared that this was the first major international conference on the Korean Peninsula, but it stumbled over the agenda. Roth explained that the US stood by its refusal to put troop withdrawals on the agenda in the face of the North’s insistence that troop withdrawals and a peace agreement with the US were fundamental demands.10 A total of six plenary sessions were held without progress on the agenda; the second was held over March 16–21 1998, the third over October 21–24 1998, the fourth over January 18–22 1999, the fifth over April 24–27 1999, while the sixth and final session was held over August 5–9 1999.11 In October 1998 the parties had agreed to form two subcommittees relating to the establishment of a “peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula and tension reduction which was as far as they went. In the final session the parties agreed to meet again but the North refused to attend further meetings as it saw greater benefits in Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of engagement. The US was exasperated by the absence of progress and lost interest.12 The Four Party Talks revealed the tensions and dynamics that would arise in any subsequent attempt at multilateral negotiations involving the North, the Six Party Talks in particular. First, the North came into the negotiations with impossible demands that the US could not possibly meet and refused to accept a common agenda. It clearly was not interested in what the US and the South proposed and used the talks as a sounding board to make its views known. It used these impossible demands to prevent the Americans from raising proposals such as the reduction of conventional forces and CBMs to

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 which it objected. Aside from the bilateral missile talks that were conducted with the US the North had no other contact with the US. If it could sabotage multilateral negotiations in this way it could bring the Americans to the bilateral negotiations it wanted without the South. Secondly, China did not play a major role in these talks as it had little interest in multilateralism at this stage. It feared that multilateralism would be dominated by the US and wanted bilateral US–North Korea or direct North–South negotiations. Thirdly, the South expected to be a major player in the talks but was virtually side lined by the North whose intention was to negotiate directly with the US. However, there were two benefits from the Four Party Talks which showed that they were not simply a wasted effort. First, they provided a model as to 56 The formation of the Six Party Talks how inter-Korean relations could be conducted for Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. The Kim Young-sam proposal was to have the two Koreas and two external players together in the dialogue. Kim Dae-jung separated them so that inter-Korean dialogue would come first, the results of which would be endorsed by external players subsequently. The Sunshine Policy was to bring the two Koreas together to building upon the 1991 agreement on reconciliation and non-aggression. The intention was to use the Four Party Talks as a “vehicle to expand cooperation with neighboring countries as well as with the international community, and to create a durable peace on the peninsula.”13 When the Four Party Talks were deadlocked, inter-Korean negotiations carried on and reached their culmination in the summit of June 2000. Secondly, the Four Party Talks acted as a precedent for the Six Party Talks. They had excluded Japan and Russia, who both had major interests on the Korean Peninsula and pressed for their inclusion in the negotiations. The Russians felt their exclusion keenly and again proposed a multilateral conference along the lines of their 1994 proposal. Japan had not raised the issue of its exclusion when Four Party Talks were proposed, but North Korea’s launching of the Taepodong long range ballistic missile over northern Japan on August 31 1998 made it imperative that Japan become involved in these negotiations. Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi first raised the proposal for Six Party Talks as a means to address Northeast Asian security when he met Clinton in New York in September 1998. The American response was not reassuring and though they could accept Japan’s inclusion they were very skeptical about Russia.14 Obuchi raised the proposal again when Kim Dae-jung visited Tokyo on October 8 1998 to obtain Japanese support for the Sunshine Policy, and during Jiang Zemin’s visit on November 25 1998.15 Neither was interested at that stage and the Chinese were particularly dismissive. Nonetheless the Japanese Foreign Ministry continued to promote the idea of Six Party Talks.16 The appropriate occasion came in late 2002 after the North admitted the existence of its HEU program.

The end of the Agreed Framework This admission was a deﬁning moment for negotiations with the North but

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 there were doubts about what North Korea’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju had told James Kelly on October 2 2002. There was some discussion that it could have been a translation error, and that “entitled to own” nuclear weapons may have been mistaken for “come to own.” South Korea’snews agency Yonhap noted that the North used the phrase “has come to own” in the past which was translated by the North’s Central News Agency as “entitled” rather than actual possession. Three Korean language experts in the US delegation could not clarify the situation as the North Korean’s language was unclear and it seemed that Kang deliberately chose an expression which could mean “right to possess” or “come to possess.”17 Nonetheless the US delegation had the view that the resort to deliberate ambiguity indicated that it was The formation of the Six Party Talks 57 an admission of the existence of the HEU program.18 At first the revelation was kept quiet by the Bush administration until it was leaked to US Today on October 16. On October 25 the North’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement to the effect that it was “entitled” to have nuclear weapons.19 The North attempted to deny the existence of the program through diplomatic channels which strengthened the view that an admission had indeed been made. James Kelly thought that the North realized its error and tried to correct it through later denials and by claiming that it meant entitlement and not ownership.20 The Americans were puzzled by the event which, together with Kim Jong-il’s admission of abductions during the meeting with Koizumi one month earlier, was characterized as “diplomacy by confession.”21 This innovative style of diplomacy was understood to have the purpose of keeping the US engaged and to prompt South Korea and Japan to place pressure on the US to negotiate with the North.22 The Chinese were not impressed and the admission made no sense to their way of thinking.23 Condoleezza Rice thought that the North wanted to persuade the world that it had changed and would break out of its economic isolation, but others thought that it was intended as an act of brazen defiance of the US.24 Considerable differences between the US, South Korea, and Japan emerged as to what the North’s intentions were and how best to respond to them. South Koreans desperately struggled to prevent the Sunshine Policy from being derailed, and cajoled the US into dialogue and away from confrontation. They claimed that the North had disclosed its HEU program to prod the US to negotiate a comprehensive agreement over all issues, and to pressure it into lifting economic sanctions. Senior Presidential Secretary for For- eign Affairs Yim Sung-joon declared that the admission indicated an intention for serious negotiations with the US.25 The Korea Herald opined that the North wanted to up the ante to the maximum and to push the US into a deal whereby economic aid would be exchanged for the North’s concessions over the nuclear program.26 When the North’s Kim Yong-nam, who was head of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, told the South Koreans during the inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang that the North would settle the nuclear issue if the US abandoned its hostile policy toward it, this was positively reported in the South and was seen as vindica-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 tion of their approach.27 The South seized upon the North’s declaration of 25 October, which called for a non-aggression pact with the US and an Amer- ican promise that it would recognize the North’s sovereignty, to show that Pyongyang was serious about negotiations.28 When American and South Korean officials met on 11 November to discuss a common response, differences emerged over heavy oil deliveries to the North which the Americans wanted to terminate immediately, while the South wanted to continue the shipments until January when the worst of the winter would be over.29 On November 14 KEDO announced that these shipments were suspended and would be resumed only if Pyongyang were to take “concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly-enriched uranium program.”30 KEDO’s 58 The formation of the Six Party Talks Executive Board included the US, as well as South Korea and Japan both of whom pressed the US not to close the door on the North; the US, however, was insistentoverthisissue.31 On November 21 the North declared that the Agreed Framework was dead, and that a non-aggression treaty was the only “realistic solution” to the nuclear issue.32 The North began to disrupt the monitoring equipment at the Yongbyon nuclear facility that had been installed there by the IAEA earlier and ejected IAEA inspectors on December 31. Finally, on January 10 2003 the North withdrew from the NPT for a second time. In the face of this deteriorating situation what were the options for the Bush Administration? It was preoccupied with the Iraqi crisis and was unprepared to back up its neo conservative hard line rhetoric with military action at that stage. Unlike the situation in 1994 when the Clinton Administration considered a military strike on the North’s nuclear facilities, the Bush administration wavered.33 South Korea’s President Roh Moo-hyun in a TV interview in December 2002 said that high level US officials had discussed the possibility of a military strike on the North but had settled on a peaceful resolution of the issue.34 The US could not ride out the situation as time would allow the North to bring its nuclear weapons program to completion without hindrance. Indeed, the North began to activate the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and had threatened to reprocess the plutonium produced by it.35 According to a CIA assessment distributed to Congress, reprocessing the spent reactor fuel then kept in storage in Yongbyon would provide sufficient plutonium for several nuclear weapons.36 According to projections at the time, the North would be able to develop nuclear weapons by 2004.37 Some estimates claimed that the North had already developed two nuclear devices and could bring the number to five to seven by July 2003.38 Accurate intelligence about the North’s nuclear program was lacking, however, but it was certain that the North had recovered plutonium sufficient for several nuclear devices, and without IAEA monitoring would be able to develop some more. Whether the North had the technical capacity to construct a nuclear device including nuclear fuel and detonators remained a matter of conjecture. There is an argument that the Bush Administration should have held the North to the Agreed Framework and its refusal to do so was a missed

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 opportunity to restrain the development of the North’s nuclear program. A corollary of this argument is that the North would have been willing to abide by the Agreed Framework and that the US undermined it when it failed to live up to its side of the bargain by not delivering the LWRs.39 The North had been preparing to develop a “nuclear hedge” in the form of the HEU program since 1998 in case the plutonium program had to be sacrificed for such a deal. The Americans could have ignored the HEU program and pretended that it did not exist but that would have emboldened the North in its deceptive practices. The US could have could have insisted that the HEU program be specifically included in the Agreed Framework but the North denied its existence. The Bush Administration could have replaced the Agreed The formation of the Six Party Talks 59 Framework with a comprehensive agreement that would remove some of its deficiencies. This would have entailed incentives for the North to surrender the nuclear program including economic aid and security reassurances, which would be staged over five to seven years according to the North’s willingness to accept inspections.40 Any agreement of this kind would require a major political volte face for which the Bush Administration was unprepared. It had come into office with a neoconservative agenda with powerful proponents such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld who had resolved to deal with this and other issues on the basis of the unilateral application of American power, and it would not change at this stage.

The need for allies When the Bush Administration discovered that the North Korean problem could not be resolved by confrontation, and realizing that it was sliding into a conflict with Iraq, it had little choice but to seek out allies and supporters to form a coalition that would be willing to press the North over its nuclear program. The Bush Administration, in its anger and sense of betrayal at the North’s duplicity, demanded verification and inspections up front. It was psychologically incapable of dealing with the regime otherwise, but its need for allies and supporters softened its approach. The US required support from China and South Korea but they were particularly resistant to American truculence and called for incentives as a first step to engage the North. In the closing month of his administration, Kim Dae-jung was determined to remedy South Korea’s exclusion from the Agreed Framework by conducting trilateral diplomacy with both China and Russia in an effort to steer the US into dialogue with the North. South Korea sent diplomatic envoys to Beijing and Moscow to sound out their views.41 Both Kim and the President-elect Roh publicly urged the US to avoid punitive measures against the North, concerned as they were about reprisals against the South and the capital Seoul.42 Roh said that he wanted to present a compromise solution which would require concessions from both sides, and not just one.43 Roh devised a five-year plan according to which South Korea, Japan and China would finance the rebuilding of the North’s economy.44 Japan conducted its own

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 diplomacy but for the purpose of resolving the abduction issue which had first place on the Japanese agenda. Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi met her Russian counterpart Ivan Ivanov and urged Russia to press the North over the abduction issue as well as the nuclear program.45 Within the Bush Administration at this critical time there were serious differences about how to proceed. President Bush sharply distinguished Iraq from North Korea and said that Saddam Hussein was facing his day of reckoning, but the North Korean issue would be resolved peacefully. None- theless, the neoconservatives pressed for “tailored containment” which entailed the slow economic strangulation and eventual collapse of the North. The normally bellicose Republicans were divided; Senator John McCain 60 The formation of the Six Party Talks criticized Bush for not considering military action echoing views in the party that force would be the only way to prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons. Republican Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Richard Lugar called for incentives for the North to negotiate, which revealed how opinion was shifting.46 US intelligence estimates fared no better with North Korea than they did with Iraq and could not decide as to whether the North wanted time to develop nuclear weapons, or wanted to negotiate the termination for the nuclear program in return for the right deal. The State Department sought a cooperative resolution of the issue and spokesman Richard Boucher declared that “it’s a diplomatic issue, not a military issue and we’re working on all fronts.”47 The State Department announced that a regular working group on North Korea composed of diplomats from the US, South Korea and Japan would meet in Washington to forge a common position, and then the US would reach out to China. In view of the various pressures on the Administration and its preoccupation with Iraq, Bush tilted towards a moderation that was imposed upon him by circumstances. He adopted a surprisingly moderate response which reflected the indecision of his administration and the reluctance to resort to a hard line. In a speech on January 14 2003 Bush declared that the US would offer incentives to the North in the form of energy and agricultural support to induce it to dismantle its nuclear program.48 Bush sent James Kelly to Seoul over January 13–14 2003 to bring the South Koreans on board and to assure them that a military strike was not being considered. Kelly met members of the National Assembly Committee on National Reunification and told them that the US could offer the North a security guarantee which they had previously demanded.49 Kelly then moved on to Beijing with the same message. During this visit the Chinese offered to host talks between the US and the North which was the first intimation of a Chinese interest in facilitation. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Tokyo and on 17 January said that the US was considering a “comprehensive deal” with the North which would cover the HEU program and the full range of WMD including chemical and conventional weapons. Armitage said that the deal would include a written assurance of non-aggression effected by an exchange of let-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 ters or official statements if the North agreed to dismantle its weapons programs. The US wanted to avoid the idea of a treaty which would require ratification by an unreceptive Senate and preferred the idea of security assurance.50 Armitage announced that “we are desirous of also having discussions” with the North Koreans over WMD which angered Bush and the neoconservatives who had demanded no contact with the North, and insisted that negotiations be conducted in a multilateral context.51 Discussion then turned to an appropriate multilateral “forum” to deal with these issues.52 The Bush Administration latched on to the idea of a security assurance or guarantee for North Korea but the details and the implications were never examined. It was an untested proposal which was intended to get the The formation of the Six Party Talks 61 negotiations moving but it could not be realistically implemented for several reasons. If it could not be a treaty because of US ratification procedures, it would have to be an executive agreement. Paper assurances were easy to make but why should North Korea trust an American executive agreement which could be easily revoked by another administration? If the North had any interest in an American security assurance or guarantee it was probably for different reasons. Guaranteeing the security of a regime that threatens allies such as the South and Japan would be a risky business for the US. It could give carte blanche to the North for an attack on the South and would also allow the North to threaten Japan with its ballistic missile capability without fear of an American response. If these cases were inserted in the agreement by the Americans as exclusion clauses the usefulness of a non-aggression agreement for the North would diminish considerably. Moreover, the Americans had to consider the impact of such an agreement upon allies as the Japanese were disturbed that it could undermine the US alliance. As it was US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had to assure the Japanese that the US would not make any arrangement with North Korea that would weaken the alliance with Japan.53 The second part of Bush’s response was to sound out China which had already offered to facilitate negotiations between the US and the North. On February 8 2003 Bush telephoned Jiang Zemin and told him that China had a responsibility to prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons.54 US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 24 February visited Beijing and called for Chinese support in resolving the issue, but Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan insisted that the US should deal directly with the North.55 The Chi- nese attitude at this stage was one of indifference to US entreaties and they refused to send a delegation to the North to deal with the issue.56 Their view was that the US should resume negotiations with the North on the basis of the Agreed Framework which suited them well. The Chinese told the Amer- icans that they had “limited” influence over the North and that North Korea was basically an American problem. Nonetheless, divisions within China appeared as to how to deal with the North. Younger officials particularly in the Foreign Ministry wanted China to assume greater responsibility in international affairs while party conservatives demanded that the North be sup-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 ported as a buffer state. Tang Jiaxuan, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other Foreign Ministry officials met their North Korean counterparts in Beijing and stressed Chinese concerns over the nuclear issue.57 These officials made the case in Beijing that a nuclear North Korea could destabilize the Korean Peninsula and the wider region, and that China had more at stake in preserving peace on the peninsula than in supporting the regime. Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership resorted to standard indifference in brushing off the Americans. Colin Powell subsequently attended the inauguration of Roh Moo-hyun on February 25 2003 and found him opposing economic sanctions and any form of military action against the North. Roh called for an economic community to bring the two Koreas together and even 62 The formation of the Six Party Talks talked about guaranteeing the North’s security.58 The view surfaced in the South that a nuclear armed North Korea would be a better alternative than collapse and chaos on the Peninsula, and the US should draw the line at nuclear proliferation which would be easier to police. Roh’s inauguration indeed portended trouble for the US alliance. China could not stand aside for too long and its pretense that this was an American problem was becoming increasingly transparent. China was beyond the point where it could feign indifference to the situation in view of the fear that the Bush Administration might be tempted to resort to a military strike against the North if all else failed. When Bush spoke to Jiang Zemin by telephone he stressed that all options were on the table including military force. To show that the US was serious, Rumsfeld ordered the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson from the west coast to Japan to replace the Kitty Hawk which was moved to the Persian Gulf for the Iraqi scenario.59 The military option received much publicity in the American press which reported that circles around Cheney, Rumsfeld and in the NSC were examining surgical strikes by Tomahawk cruise missiles, sledgehammer bombing, and even the use of tactical nuclear weapons.60 It was also reported that 12 B-52s and 12 B-1 bombers were sent from the mainland US to Guam to be within striking distance of the North. Rumsfeld intended to deal with simultaneous crises and to provide some insurance against North Korean attacks on the South as the US was becoming embroiled in Iraq.61 Reports appeared that the North was preparing to restart the Yongbyon reactor, and US spy satellites detected the movement of nuclear fuel out of storage without any effort at camouflage.62 Japanese Chief Cabinet secretary Shinzo Abe declared that the North restar- ted the Yongbyon reactor in late February, and since it already had enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear weapons it would soon be able to increase the number.63 Reports from Canberra from sources close to the US indicated that the Pentagon had produced detailed plans to bomb the Yongbyon reactor if the North went ahead with the reprocessing of plutonium. The plan included air strikes against the North’s heavy artillery above the DMZ to destroy its ability to retaliate by shelling Seoul.64 Nonetheless, the State Department pressed for an alternative to head off the military option and called for measures such as economic sanctions and the diplo-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 matic isolation of the North to bring international opinion on its side. If the US drew back from the crisis China, Japan and Russia might be galvanized into supporting a tougher position after all.65 Various proposals jostled for attention within the Bush Administration but the very uncertainty was unsettling and had its effect upon the others.66 The North’s re-starting of the Yongbyon reactor in February was ominous and it was interpreted in two ways. The Roh government in South Korea thought that the North was preparing to negotiate the nuclear program for economic aid and a security guarantee and chastised the Americans for not agreeing. The problem with this interpretation is that it was the North’s nuclear program which drew the American threat to itself and for which it The formation of the Six Party Talks 63 required a security guarantee from the Americans. To remove the American threat, the termination of the program would be sufficient. Moreover, if the North were serious about negotiating, it would bargain over concrete issues, the extent of the economic aid, how the security guarantee would be worded, and it would put a high price on its nuclear program but it showed little such inclination. On the other hand if the North’s intention was to bring the nuclear program to completion as rapidly as possible, then its bargaining strategy in negotiations would be different. It would have little interest in negotiation and would adopt tacit bargaining tactics to avoid defining concrete issues. It would use the negotiations to buy time for the completion of the nuclear program and when completed, it would withdraw from the negotiations. The North had to be pushed into negotiations by the Chinese and joined the talks reluctantly. It did not bargain over concrete issues as the Chinese and South Koreans had hoped, and resorted to tacit bargaining and avoided agreement in each situation. Such behavior did not indicate an intention to surrender the nuclear program for the benefits mentioned at this stage. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight it seems that preparation on the North’s nuclear program was accelerated at this time.

The Three Party Talks Alarm at the turn of events prompted the Chinese to bring pressure to bear upon the North to join negotiations over the nuclear issue. They feared that the North intended to develop nuclear weapons which would provoke a military response from the US.67 Despite what the Chinese had told Colin Powell in late February they had been active in pushing the North to negotiate. Chinese envoy Dai Bingguo, who was also head of the Party’s International Department, met Chief negotiator for North Korea Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in January 2003, a meeting described as a “decisive event” in the change of China’s attitude towards the crisis. The North insisted on bilateral negotiations with the US which the Bush Administration rejected. Colin Powell brought with him a proposal for ten party multilateral talks when he visited Tokyo in late February, but it was unacceptable to the Japanese and the Chinese. Powell also told the South’s Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 that the US wanted a “multilateral approach” and mentioned Six Party Talks plus “other countries” which were not identified. Neither North Korea nor China wanted Japan or Russia involved in negotiations and insisted that their interests were not directly related to the Korean Peninsula.68 The Japanese, however, insisted on the Obuchi six party format and Press Secretary Hatsu- hisa Takashima said that Japan favored Russia’s involvement, and that Japan was in close contact with Russia over the issue.69 For a while the North called for the involvement of the EU in the negotiations in the hope that its economic largesse could be tapped; the South called for a two plus four format, that is the two Koreas plus the US, China, Russia and Japan which was a variant of the Obuchi proposal for six party talks.70 The North refused to join the talks 64 The formation of the Six Party Talks unless China was the only additional party and was adamant that the South and Japan be excluded.71 Hu Jintao then proposed three party talks, with China, the US and the North. Bush initially baulked at the exclusion of Japan and South Korea but went ahead with the Chinese proposal, calling Koizumi and Roh to apologize for their exclusion.72 The Americans and the Chinese viewed the three party format as temporary, and both had promised South Korea’'s newly appointed Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan that the South would join in the next round and that Japan and Russia would also be included.73 The three party format was a temporary measure intended to bring the North into negotiations while the final format would be Six Party Talks. The US wanted to include its allies, South Korea and Japan, while the Japanese were working to bring in Russia. Once multilateral negotiations were initiated they naturally moved to a six party format because of the relationships which linked the players and their interests on the Korean Peninsula. What was most interesting about the events that led up to the Three Party Talks was China’s involvement and the pressure it brought to bear on the North to join the negotiations, the first time this had been attempted. The Chinese warned the North against its provocative behavior after it fired a short range missile into the Japan/East Sea on 10 March. China interrupted oil supplies to the North for three days claiming technical problems in the oil pipeline running from Liaoning in Northeast China to North Korea which was interpreted as pressure on the North to participate in the talks. As the main supplier to the North, Chinese oil deliveries were then estimated at 1 million tons a year which was 90 percent of its needs so the temporary inter- ruption would have some effect.74 At the same time China prevented the US raising the issue of the North’s withdrawal from the NPT at the UN Security Council and would not join in public condemnation of the North.75 The incident revealed that China could press the North when it wanted to and its protestations to the contrary were intended to mask its close support the regime. It showed that any pressure the Chinese would use against the North would be balanced by a defense of its interests in the UN Security Council and elsewhere. China would then turn to the US and claim that it had acted as expected, and to the North, it could point to its continuing support. China had more leeway in pressing the North than it admitted since without Chinese

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 support the North had nowhere else to turn. The problem lay in the diffusion of power in Chinese decision-making and the unwillingness of the political leadership to test their strength and to take the lead over this issue. Bush was upbeat about the prospects for the talks and declared that “I believe that all of us working together have a good chance of convincing North Korea to abandon her ambitions to develop nuclear arsenals.” Despite this optimism, on April 18 the North indicated that it was ready to reprocess the spent fuel rods, which the Americans considered provocative, before the talks were to begin.76 The event triggered interagency conflict within the Bush Administration as a secret Rumsfeld memorandum revealed when it was leaked to the press on the same day that James Kelly left for Beijing for The formation of the Six Party Talks 65 the talks. It demanded inspections of the nuclear facilities and was opposed to any economic assistance which would keep the North Korean regime afloat. The memorandum proposed working with China to remove the regime, a perspective which revealed little understanding of China’s goals and motives. Nonetheless, Colin Powell was able to head off the pressure from Rumsfeld and obtained Bush’s agreement for a “carrot and stick” approach for the talks, involving security assurances and threats to withhold aid and investment.77 The Chinese had their own problems with the North Koreans whose attendance at the talks was still uncertain. North Korea’s first Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Vice Marshal Chi Myong- nok visited Beijing on April 20 2003, two days before the Three Party Talks were scheduled to begin and called for Chinese support. The Chinese were obliged to assure North Korea of security from an American attack but on condition that it dismantled its nuclear weapons program, engage the US in dialogue and that it did not present a threat to either the South or Japan.78 The Chinese were confronted with a difficult dilemma and in the effort to get North Korea to the talks they had to give assurances of protection which would allow the North to become even more intransigent. To keep the Americans interested in the talks, they had to assume the public face of a mediator who would press the North Koreans into an agreement. How- ever, as long as they feared an American attack on the North, the Chinese would be tied to the North, and obliged to protect it against American demands. The Three Party Talks were conducted in Beijing on April 23–25 2003. They were notable for the fact that this was the first time that China had moved to a mediator’s position in any conflict which revealed the extent to which the Chinese had been troubled by the issue. The Chinese had to reconcile the North Korean demand for bilateral negotiations with the American insistence on multilateral negotiations. They had assured the North that there would be bilateral negotiations with the Americans within the context of the Three Party Talks, while they told the Americans that the negotiations would be multilateral. With this classic diplomatic ruse the negotiations could continue. From the outset, the US delegation led by James Kelly sought “irre- vocable verifiable dismantlement” of the nuclear weapons program. The

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 North demanded a step-by-step process according to which it would receive oil shipments, food aid, security guarantees and economic benefits first, after which it would dismantle its nuclear programs.79 On the first day the three parties met but the North demanded a separate meeting with the Americans. James Kelly called Washington for instructions and was told to reject all direct contact with the North. During a break on the first day of the talks, the head of the North Korean delegation Li Gun took James Kelly aside and told him that North Korea had nuclear weapons and would not dismantle them, stating “it is up to you whether we do a physical demonstration or transfer them.” Li also told Kelly that North Korea had just completed the reprocessing of 8,000 fuel rods producing plutonium sufficient for two or three nuclear 66 The formation of the Six Party Talks bombs.80 Since this comment was made on the side of the Three Party Talks the Americans were puzzled and asked for clarification which was not forthcoming. On the second day of the talks separate negotiating sessions with North Korea were conducted and a short plenary meeting was held for a few a minutes to meet the American demand for multilateralism.81 The Chinese were disappointed by the outcome and the inability of either side to move beyond its stated position. They were particularly disturbed by the North Korean comment to James Kelly outlined above which seemed to make the negotiations futile.82 The first result of the talks was that the Chi- nese realized that mediation could not be a one off event, and that greater effort was required over the nuclear issue that had become critical to them. An absence of consensus continued to hinder Chinese efforts. Hu Jintao who had pushed meditation had not consolidated his power as Jiang Zemin remained chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC) until March 2005. This made it difficult for Hu to develop a new policy on North Korea.83 China could not let tensions rise between the North and the US which could tempt the Bush Administration into a military response and was compelled to continue with its efforts.84 The American neoconservatives believed that the US had to become even more belligerent to press the Chinese to become more active in pushing the North to surrender its nuclear program. There was much shadow-play in relation to the negotiations over North Korea which was intended to influence negotiating positions. The North resorted to rhetoric and provocations while the Americans countered with press leaks of an intention to resort to military force. The result was to push the Chinese and also the Russians into becoming more supportive of the North, which made American efforts to seek the dismantling of the North’s nuclear program much more difficult. A second outcome was that the Americans were pushed into a tougher position and were less inclined to offer concessions of the kind for which the Chinese had been angling. Colin Powell was particularly angered by Li Gun’s provocative remarks at the Three Party Talks which indicated that American moderates were becoming more hardline over North Korea. Before the For- eign Operations Sub Committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on 29 April, Powell asserted that the US would not be intimidated by threats,

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 “we will not be blackmailed.” He rejected the idea put forward by the Chi- nese and South Koreans that the North would give up its nuclear program if the US abandoned its “hostile attitude” toward the North, and in exchange for diplomatic relations, economic aid and a security guarantee.85 How would a “hostile attitude” be defined? The sheer ambiguity would allow the North to interpret anything as hostile. It served as a convenient device to cover the North’s negotiating position and to elicit further protection and support from China and South Korea. On this occasion it was the North’s remarks that had provoked the US, and if it required a demonstration of American hostility to draw out the negotiations, or to scare China, Russia and South Korea into demanding concessions from the US, the North could resort to the same The formation of the Six Party Talks 67 tactic whenever it pleased. A third result was that the US would never accept three party talks again. Bush told James Kelly that South Korea and Japan would have to be involved in future talks to increase the pressure on the North and to avoid any chance of direct contact between it and the US. To sum up, the North accepted the three party format in the expectation that they would serve as a cover for bilateral negotiations with the US.86 The Three Party Talks were the first step towards dialogue over the nuclear issue, one which satisfied no one. The Americans were infuriated by the North’s provocative comments about its nuclear program which made them doubt the value of continuing. The Chinese had been bitterly disappointed as instead of mutual concession-making they had presided over a polarization of positions that could derail the whole process. The North was pressured and cajoled into the talks with the promise from the Chinese that they would have direct negotiations with the Americans. The unsatisfactory conclusion to the talks spurred efforts towards a continuation but this time with an expanded format which would, it was hoped, resolve the imbalances associated with three parties. The US convened a Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in Honolulu on June 13 2003 to prepare a coordinated approach to multilateral negotiations with the North which would ensure the participation of both South Korea and Japan in a five party format. The Americans had intended to obtain the support of its allies for Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) which became the US position over the nuclear issue in later negotiations. The Koreans, however, demanded that this should be done through “peaceful, diplomatic means.”87 America and South Korea were moving in different directions which complicated the task of coordinating a response to the North. The South under Roh Moon-hyun craved a more prominent role which undermined US intentions to orchestrate a coalition of allies that would support it in negotiations with the North. Kim Dae-jung’s government had reacted differently to the revelation about the North’s HEU program than the US and regarded it as an opportunity for negotiations. Roh who hailed from Kim Dae-jung’s party campaigned in the presidential elections on the basis of continuing Kim’s Sunshine Policy. He declared that the South should assume a “leading role” to resolve the issue and proposed a two-staged package deal

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 with North Korea. According to his proposal the US would first drop its “hostile stance” towards the North which would then freeze its nuclear programs. In the next stage the South, the US and Japan would provide financial assistance to the North in exchange for international inspections of its nuclear sites.88 A human rights lawyer with no experience of national security, Roh was elected President on 19 December 2002 and declared in his first press conference that he would “open the age of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.”89 He placed the establishment of a “peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula at the top of his agenda, and proposed the economic integration of Northeast Asia, in a way which would place South Korea up front. He also talked about equality in the relationship with the US and mediation 68 The formation of the Six Party Talks between the Americans and North Korea.90 In his attempt to elevate South Korea into a leading role he rode on a wave of support from the younger generation of voters in their 20s and 30s whose sentiments had turned against the US, which was seen as preventing Korea’s rise and threatening war with the North. Roh declared that he would differ from the US position over the issue if that would prevent an attack on the North which would engulf the entire peninsula.91 The US regarded Roh as the most “anti-American” Korean president in history and preferred the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang during the 2002 elections. In the American view he would have been more willing to support the Bush administration in adopting punitive measures against the North.92 Rather than the most anti-American president Roh was perhaps the most confused of South Korea presidents, and as his Korean critics have stated, out of his depth in security issues. Like a surfer he rode on a wave of voter support which took him in directions he did not understand, resulting in embarrassing contradictions which obliged him to scramble about to make sense of what he may have proposed earlier. He talked about an independent policy for the South and whipped up expectations amongst his youthful followers who had anticipated great things under his presidency. Some of those supporters accepted what was called national cooperation theory according to which the US was a foreign country while the North was a long lost brother and threatened by the Americans.93 Roh advocated the withdrawal of American forces from the South and called for an independent defense capability. Nonetheless, he demonstrated support for the alliance with the US in other ways. He later declared that US troops were a “stabilizing factor” and affirmed support for the US troop presence in the South.94 In May 2003 Roh sent a small contingent of medics and engineers to Iraq which in February 2004 was followed up by the dispatch of 3,000 troops, overwhelmingly approved by a vote in the National Assembly. He visited Washington and met Bush on May 14 2003 where he affirmed the importance of the alliance with the US three times. He agreed with the US president that they would not allow the North to have nuclear weapons and that they would use peaceful means to eliminate its nuclear program in a verifiable way.95 In June, Roh called upon Koizumi in Tokyo to obtain support for dialogue

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 rather than confrontation and said that ‘I conveyed my determination to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue through dialogue and rule out the possibility of using force or other means that could destabilize regional security.”96 The Tokyo joint statement dated June 1 however carried a different emphasis; Koizumi declared that both dialogue and pressure upon the North were necessary and that both would consider countermeasures. Roh saw the key to the resolution of the issue in China and wanted it to press the North to join the negotiations, and also to expand the format of the negotiations to five or six parties which would include the South.97 He visited Beijing over July 7–10 2003 and pressed the Chinese requesting support for his proposal for Northeast Asian regionalism with the South at the hub. The formation of the Six Party Talks 69 The Chinese demurred in regard to the framework of negotiations with the North but did at least agree with Roh that a resolution of the issue should take into account the North’s security concerns.98 Roh discovered that negotiating with the major players was not as easy as he had thought and that the South did not carry the diplomatic weight to influence their positions over the issue. In his summit diplomacy he had hoped to have the South’s independent position endorsed by these players but ended up accommodating their positions and confusing his own.99 Through its efforts to build closer rapport with the Chinese over the issue, the South would weaken the Bush Administration’s insistence on its negotiating position. It would give China greater confidence in handling the negotiations and in managing the US, eventually to bring it around to a less confrontational posture. In contrast, Japan was moving in the opposite direction and hardening its attitude towards the North. Pyongyang resorted to threats after Koizumi’s visit in September with the intention to force the Japanese into concessions. On November 5 2002 the North warned Japan that that unless relations were normalized it would resume ballistic missile testing.100 At that time the North had around 100 medium-range Nodong missiles which could target most of Japan within their 1,000-kilometer range so the Japanese regarded the threat seriously. Japan then demanded that the North dismantle its nuclear weapons program before receiving economic aid, previously it had been vague about the issue.101 Deputy Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe and Katsuya Suzuki, who was special envoy to normalization talks with the North, demonstrated a tougher attitude. Suzuki stressed that the military option should not be excluded as this would have a “persuasive effect” upon Pyongyang. The Director of the Defense Agency Shigeru Ishiba raised eye- brows with his remark that Japan should prepare for preemptive strikes against missile sites in the North should they be readied for launching against Japan.102 Ishiba’s comment reflected the thinking amongst younger officials in Japan, who were less constrained by the past, to resort to a military response. In any case, it was unclear how Japan could launch such strikes as it did not have the capability to respond and, moreover, there were legal implications for the peace constitution that the Japanese would have to resolve. Ishiba attempted to pull the South Koreans closer to the Japanese view when he visited

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Seoul in March 2003 and met his South Korean counterpart Defense Minister Cho Young-kil. He stressed that the North must not possess nuclear weapons and that South Korea and Japan should maintain solidarity over this issue.103 As an eﬀort to undercut Roh Moo Hyun’s approach to the issue, it attempted to play upon the South Korean military’s resentments against Roh’s line.

Six Party Talks The Three Party Talks were intended to be a one-off event but the lack of progress obliged China to become more involved in the search for a resolution 70 The formation of the Six Party Talks of the nuclear issue. In May 2003 Hu Jintao made the decision to assume the role of a mediator in the nuclear issue in what has been described as a “defining moment” for Chinese diplomacy.104 China moved into the position of pivotal player in the negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, one whose presence was required for the negotiations to make any progress. It was the first time that China had taken this role upon itself which was an indication of Chinese concern over the Bush Administration’s aggressive behavior after the invasion of Iraq in March. What troubled the Chinese was that the North’s nuclear program would tempt the Americans into a military strike with devastating consequences for the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the border with China. Hu Jintao visited Moscow in May 2003 to coordinate policy with Russia over North Korea. He agreed with Putin that the Korean Peninsula should be non-nuclear and that the North should return to the NPT, but the resolution of the nuclear issue by force was unacceptable. They also agreed that the North should be offered a security guarantee and economic support.105 Both China and Russia stressed that the American threat to the North prevented the resolution of the issue. Its removal would free the North from its obsession with its security and would allow it to return to the NPT. This strategy reduced the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but it also removed the pressure for the North to comply with the NPT. There was always the danger that the North would be encouraged in the development of its nuclear weapons program, which would make it more difficult to reverse at a later date. China, Russia and South Korea shared similar views of the negotiations with the North which they had adopted as a response to the confrontational policy of the Bush Administration. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visited Pyongyang on July 12–15. He met Kim Jong-il and presented a letter from Hu Jintao which most likely outlined the approach agreed with the Russians as a way of enticing the North back into the talks.106 Afterwards Dai Bingguo told South Korean officials that the North was ready for talks. It had accepted an extension of the three party format with Chinese assurances that negotiations with the US would be possible in a multilateral format. At that stage five parties were envisaged but then the North, called for Russia’s inclusion to prevent the US and its allies

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 from forming a bloc against it, which expanded the five party format to Six Party Talks. The value of Six Party Talks was that they included not only the two Koreas but external players with a stake in the security of the Korean Peninsula. Previous efforts to negotiate with the North fell short in this respect and the six party format promised to be more enduring. In preparation for the talks the North insisted on a nonaggression treaty from the US during working level meetings with the US and its allies, South Korea and Japan, in Washington earlier in July.107 After meeting with allies Secretary of State Colin Powell dropped his previous resistance and shifted towards a more accommodating position. Powell consulted with the President and later told the press that the Administration was considering providing “a The formation of the Six Party Talks 71 written assurance” to North Korea instead of a formal treaty which would require Senate ratification. On 6 August the Secretary of State raised the idea of a Congressional resolution if the Six Party Talks would support one.108 Powell thought that a Congressional resolution was a better option since it would require a majority vote in both houses of Congress while a treaty would demand a two thirds vote in the Senate. In view of Congressional antipathy towards North Korea it is difficult to imagine that this path would have been any easier, particularly as the Republicans controlled Congress until 2005. Powell’s remarks had an uplifting effect in South Korea as The Korea Herald opined that a resolution of the nuclear issue was near.109 They made it easier for the North to attend the Six Party Talks which it agreed to do on 31 July when its Ambassador to Russia delivered his government’s formal acceptance to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Nonetheless, it became clear that the Secretary of State could not carry the Administration with him, and that the neoconservatives had exerted influence to scotch the notion of a written security guarantee for the North. South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan was more restrained when he told the press not to expect a quick resolution of the nuclear issue, that the talks would be the first step in a long process of negotiation.110 In its capacity as mediator China arranged the Six Party Talks in the Dia- oyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing over August 27–29 2003. Despite the optimism that Colin Powell’s talk of security assurances had stimulated little progress was made. The US delegation demanded the complete, verifiable and non-reversible elimination of the North’s nuclear program and insisted that diplomatic relations, security assurances and economic assistance would only follow if the North took this step. The North proposed a “package” solution based on “simultaneous actions” which meant that it would dismantle its nuclear program while the US would phase in its commitments at the same time.111 This approach appeared reasonable to the Chinese and Russian delegations who were demanding a compromise but it blurred the issue of verification which the Americans regarded as the core of the issue. Simulta- neous actions could not be effectively verified and it would be possible for the North to receive the benefits it demanded without completely dismantling its nuclear program. North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong-il told the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 assembled parties at the talks that the North had developed nuclear weapons and would conduct a demonstration test. He also said that the North would dismantle its nuclear program if the US dropped its hostile policy, suggesting that the “benchmark” or indicator of American hostility towards the North was its willingness to conclude a legally binding non-aggression treaty with it.112 Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov had proposed that Russia and China could offer security guarantees to the North if the US was unprepared to do so. This was an attempt to forge a collective security arrangement to assuage the North’s security concerns in a way that would make a resolution of the nuclear issue possible. However, it was meaningless for the North which focused only on the US and which had Chinese and 72 The formation of the Six Party Talks Russian support in the UN Security Council in any case. The Americans insisted that there would be no separate and formal meetings with the North Koreans but Assistant Secretary James Kelly did speak to Kim Yong-il for about 35 or 40 minutes during a plenary meeting. The Japanese delegation came to the talks with the abduction issue in top place on their agenda. Japan’s representative to the talks Mitoji Yabunaka talked with Kim Yong-il for about ten minutes on the sidelines of the talks. He called for the return to Japan of the families of abduction victims and a full investigation of the issue.113 The only thing the parties could agree upon was to continue the talks at a later date.114 The US demands were the same as they were during the Three Party Talks and the North opposed them in the same way. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed that all the parties had agreed to resolve the nuclear problem peacefully through dialogue, and “in a manner that is phased and synchronized or parallel in implementation.”115 What that meant was that there was some discussion about the incentives that could commence once the North began the process of dismantling its nuclear program, which would continue until it achieved its full and complete elimination. For the Americans the principle was that the North should begin the process in a verifiable way before it would take any of the other steps. In any case the North’s view was that both processes should begin together, which the US strongly opposed. After the talks had concluded the Bush Adminis- tration grasped at incentives to encourage the North to surrender its nuclear program, revealing the extent to which it had been influenced by China and South Korea. It proposed a new multilateral peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula to replace the 1953 armistice, and offered a written security guarantee to the North, provided that the North surrender the nuclear program.116 The bottom line for the Americans was that the North should commit itself to the elimination of the nuclear program first, which the North resisted.

Conclusion The basic bargaining positions of the parties were made clear by the time of the ﬁrst round of the Six Party Talks, positions which were retained through

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 subsequent rounds. The US joined the talks with the expectation that the other parties would pressure the North over the nuclear issue and would uphold the principle of verifiable disarmament, only to discover that that it was pressed to modify its position. China, South Korea and also Russia formed a negotiating coalition within the Six Party Talks that exerted pressure on the US to offer incentives, such as a security guarantee and economic support to encourage the North’s compliance. For them the priority was getting an agreement with the North in a way which would remove the immediate danger created by what they regarded as the American propensity to resort to force. The North continued to insist upon a non-aggression treaty which it knew the Americans could not provide, and called for a legally The formation of the Six Party Talks 73 binding agreement when it had no trust in legalities. It insisted that the US drop its “hostile” attitude which was a vague and indefinable demand and allowed it to shift the blame for the lack of progress in negotiations to the US which would appear rigid and unbending. It demanded the incentives be offered first and it claimed that disarmament would then follow, a sequence that the Americans rejected. The North edged towards a compromise when it proposed simultaneous actions in the talks which meant that the dismantling of the nuclear program would take place at the same time as the US would provide the desired incentives to the North. Compromise was expected by the Chinese and the South Koreans but the Americans could not engage in mutual accommodation over the NPT without undermining it and turning its mandatory requirements into bargaining chips. This proposal left out the issue of verification and inspection which, for the Americans, would be an important part of any agreement with the North, and upon which they insisted. It would place the North’sefforts to possess nuclear weapons at the same level as the US effort to uphold the NPT, which the US could not accept. The North was either putting a very high price on its nuclear program, which the Chinese, Russians and South Koreans believed to be the case, or it was protecting the nuclear program by fending off all proposals that would terminate it. In any case, further rounds of the Six Party Talks were required to clarify its intentions.

Notes 1 David E. Brown, “No Thanks Expected: America’sEﬀort to Nurture a ‘soft landing,’” in Wonmo Dong (editor) The Two Koreas and the United States: Issues of Peace, Security, and Economic Cooperation, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2000, pp. 191–92. 2 The Japan Times September 9 1996, March 6, 7 1997, The Japan Times April 17 1996, also USIS May 10 1966. 3 Bill Clinton, My Life, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2004, p. 707. 4 U.S. Department of State Daily Press Brieﬁng March 3, 1997, briefer: Nicholas Burns www.fas.org/news/dprk/1997/msg00066d.htm. 5 The Japan Times, March 6, 7 1997. 6 Steven Lee Myers, “North Korea Agrees to Join 4-Party Talks,” The New York Times, July 1 1997.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 7 Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, “Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing Asymmetrical Interdependence,” in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee (editors), North Korea and Northeast Asia, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 2002, p. 120. 8 See The Japan Times, August 7 1997; Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Korean Peace- Building Process: Problems and Prospects,” in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo (editors) The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003, pp. 18–19. 9 The Japan Times, August 24 1997. 10 “Transcript: Roth Statement, Briefing on Korea Four-Party Talks,” USIS, Washington file December 10 1997. www.fas.org/news/dprk/1997/97121003_epo.html. 11 Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Korean Peace-Building Process: Problems and Prospects,” in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, (editors) The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003, pp. 18–19. 74 The formation of the Six Party Talks 12 For the report of the Sixth Session see; “Korea Four Party Talks August 9 Joint Press Statement,” USIS Washington File, August 10 1999 www.fas.org/news/dprk/ 1999/990809-dprk-usia1.htm. 13 The North Korea Policy of the Kim Dae-jung Administration, Ministry of Uni- fication, Republic of Korea, 1998, pp. 9, 11, 12. 14 “U.S. negative toward Japan-proposed 6-way talks,” Kyodo September 29 1998. 15 “Press Conference by the Press Secretary 26 November, 1998,” Ministry of For- eign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/11/1126.html; The Japan Times October 15 1998. 16 Kuniko Ashizawa, “Tokyo’s Quandary, Beijing’s Moment in the Six Party Talks: A Regional Multilateral Approach to Resolve the DPRK’s Nuclear Problem,” PacificAffairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, (Fall, 2006), pp. 411–32. 17 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, The Brookings Institution, Washigton, DC, 2007, p. 107. 18 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011. 19 “North Korea may or may not have claimed to have nukes,” The Japan Times, November 20 2002. 20 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 107. 21 Howard W. French, “North Korea’s admission’ a sign of a desperate leadership?” International Herald Tribune, October 21 2002. 22 Brian Knowlton, “North Korea arms pact is now dead, Powell says,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, October 21 2002. 23 George Gedda, “North Korean Weapons Program Prompt,” The Washington Post, October 18 2002. 24 Brian Knowlton, “North Korea arms pact is now dead, Powell says,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, October 21 2002. 25 Kim Ji-ho, “Seoul, Washington view NK nuclear threat differently,” The Korea Herald, October 21 2002; Seo Hyun-jin, “North hopes for package deal with US,” The Korea Herald October 19 2002. 26 Editorial Crisis or Opportunity,” The Korea Herald October 19 2002. 27 Seo Hyun jin, “North ready to talk about nukes,” The Korea Herald, October 22 2002. 28 Seo Hyun-jin, “N.K. floats non aggression pact,” The Korea Herald, October 26 2002. 29 Martin Nesirky, “US, S. Korea Disagree Ahead of N. Korea Meeting,” The Washington Post, November 12 2002. 30 Paul Kerr, “KEDO Suspends Oil Shipments to North Korea,” Arms Control Association www.armscontrol.org/print/1169. 31 Kim Ji ho, “Seoul, Washington still at odds on oil shipment to North Korea,” The Korea Herald, November 11 2002. 32 Howard W. French, “citing US Hostility, North Korea says pact is dead,” Inter- national Herald Tribune, November 22 2002.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 33 Glenn Kessler, “No support for strikes against N. Korea,” The Washington Post, January 2 2003. 34 “US considers security deal with North Korea,” The Japan Times, January 20 2003. 35 “Kim slams N. Korea for moving nuclear fuel rods,” The Japan Times, December 28 2002. 36 “N. Korea has ‘plutonium for more weapons,” The Japan Times, November 24 2002. 37 “N. Korea tipped to get nukes by 2004,” The Japan Times, November 21 2002. 38 James T. Laney, and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 March/April 2003. 39 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times, Henry Holt, New York, 2011, p. 47. 40 James T. Laney, and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 March/April 2003. The formation of the Six Party Talks 75 41 Seo Soo-min,” Seoul’s trilateral diplomacy” The Korea Times, 30 December 2002; James Brooke, “China ‘looming large’ in South Korea as Biggest Player, Repla- cing the US,” New York Times, January 3 2003. 42 “Kim, Roh urge Bush to show restraint on NK,” The Korea Times, December 30 2002. 43 ‘Concessions will ease Korea tension: Roh,” The Japan Times, January 5 2003. 44 John Larkin, “New Leader, new Crisis,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 9 2003. 45 “Russia to help press North Korea,” The Japan Times, December 20 2002. 46 Glenn Kessler, “Bush Team Spilt on N. Korea move,” The Washington Post, January 11 2003. 47 Glenn Kessler, “Bush Stresses Iraq, N. Korea differences,” The Washington Post, January 3 2003. 48 Susan V. Lawrence, Murray Hiebert, Jay Solomon, Kim Jung Min, “Time to Talk,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 23 2003. 49 Seo Hyun-jin, “US envoy sees possible N.K. Security Guarantee,” The Korea Herald, January 15 2003. 50 “US considers security deal with North Korea,” The Japan Times, January 20 2003. 51 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Secret, Scary Plans,” The New York Times, February 28 2003. 52 Doug Struck, “US signals it won’t seek sanctions against N. Korea; at talks in Seoul Pyongyang’s delegates appeal for unity,” The Washington Post, January 23 2003 “US considers security deal with North Korea,” The Japan Times, January 20 2003. 53 “Rumsfeld Reassures Japan Over any N. Korea Deal,” The Washington Post November 14 2003. 54 James Dao, “Bush urges Chinese President to press North Korea on Arms,” The New York Times, February 8 2003. 55 “China refuses to help solve N. Korea crisis,” The Japan Times February 13 2003. 56 John Pomfret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s reluctance on N Korea Irks US,” The Washington Post, February 4 2003. 57 David Lague, “Beijing’s tough Korea Call,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 6 2003, John Pomfret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s reluctance on N Korea Irks US,” 58 Howard W. French, “North Korea Crisis Straining Washington’s Asian alliances,” International Herald Tribune, February 25 2003. 59 James Dao, “Bush Urges Chinese President to Press North Korea on Arms,” New York Times, February 8 2003. 60 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Secret, Scary Plans,” The New York Times, February 28 2003. 61 David E. Sanger, “US begin deploying bombers within easy range,” International Herald Tribune, March 6 2003. 62 “North Korea likely moving nuclear fuel rods: paper,” The Japan Times, February 2 2003. 63 “Abe: N Korea has enough Plutonium to make 1 to 2 bombs,” Nikkei, March 10 2003.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 64 Greg Sheridan, “US Plan to Bomb North Korea,” The Australian, April 22 2003. 65 Doug Struck, Glen Kessler, “Foes giving in to N. Korea’s Nuclear Aims,” The Washington Post, March 5 2003. 66 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 278–79. 67 Ibid pp. 263, 278–79. 68 “Seoul urges flexibility on N. Korea,” The Japan Times, March 31 2003. 69 “Press Conference, 15 April 2003,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 15 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2003/4/0415.html. 70 “N. Korea, China want Japan, Russia out of talks, paper says,” Kyodo News International, April 15 2003, also same reference in Japan Today, April 15. http// find articles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2003_April_21/ai_100443205/print. 71 “US, China Cooperate on N Korean Issue to avert crisis,” Nikkei, April 17 2003. 72 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 272–73. 76 The formation of the Six Party Talks 73 “Korean crisis talks breakthrough made,” The Japan Times, April 18 2003: “US wants Japan, S Korea in Nuclear agreement,” Nikkei, April 18 2003. 74 “China leans on North Korea,” The Japan Times, April 2 2003, “China cuts oil supply to warn off North Korea,” The Straits Times, March 29 2003. 75 John Pomfret, “China urges N. Korea dialogue; Beijing sees risk of losing influence in Area,” The Washington Post, April 4 2003. 76 “Bush Sees ‘Good Chance’ that N Korea will go non-nuclear,” Nikkei, April 21 2003, the English translation of the North Korean Statement of April 18 said that it had started reprocessing while the Korean version said that it was ready to begin reprocessing; Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “China Talks on Korea,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1 2003. 77 David Rennie, “Rumsfeld calls for regime change in North Korea,” The Daily Telegraph, April 22 2003. 78 Ching Cheong, “China offers North Korea security from any US attack,” The Straits Times, May 3 2003. 79 Joel Brinkley, “US Rejects North Korean Proposal,” International Herald Tri- bune, April 30 2003. 80 Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea says it has Nuclear Arms,” The Washington Post, April 25 2003. 81 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011; Glenn Kessler, John Pomfret, “North Korea’s Threats Prod China Toward US,” The Washington Post, April 26 2003. 82 Glenn Kessler, John Pomfret, “North Korea’s Threats Prod China Toward US.” 83 Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “Powell says ‘No,’” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 8 2003. 84 Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “China Talks On Korea,” Far Eastern Eco- nomic Review, May 1 2003. 85 “Powell says N Korea Threatened to Make Nukes, Export them,” Nikkei, 1May 2003: Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “Powell says ‘No,’” Far Eastern Eco- nomic Review, May 8 2003. 86 “N Korea Opposes Japan, S Korean participation in Nuke Talks,” Nikkei, April 22 2003. 87 “Joint Press Statement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 13 2003 www. mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/nt/joint0306.html. 88 Kim Hyung-jin, “Lee, Roh differ on how to resolve nuke issue,” The Korea Herald October 25 2002. 89 “People chose progressive reform,” The Korea Times, December 20 2002. 90 Change in Foreign Policy,” The Korea Herald, January 15 2003. 91 “President elect opposes military option against N. Korea,” The Japan Times, February 21 2003. 92 Editorial “A mature alliance,” The Korea Herald, January 13 2003; “55% of S

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Koreans want US troops to stay’ Survey” The Korea Times, December 23 2002. 93 “the Truth behind “We are One,” Digital Chosun Ilbo, September 1 2003. 94 Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh calls for greater self defense ability,” The Korea Herald, April 21 2003. 95 “US, S Korea move to repair relationship,” Nikkei, May 16 2003. 96 Hwang Jang Jin, “Roh says force not an option on NK,” The Korea Herald, June 11 2003. 97 Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh, HU agree on peaceful solution to NK nuke issue,” The Korea Herald, May 3 2000; “Roh arrives in Beijing to Enhance Ties,” China Daily, July7 2003, www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–7/07/content_243667.htm; Kim Young Sae, Seoul fails to get support for multilateral talks,” The Straits Times July 10 2003 Chua Chin Hon, “Beijing, Seoul push for end to N. Korea The formation of the Six Party Talks 77 nuclear dispute,” The Straits Times, July 2003 8, “Seoul looks to Beijing to break nuclear impasse,” The Straits Times, July 5 2003. 98 “Roh’s Nuclear Diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, July 11 2003. 99 Editorial “Roh’s Nuclear diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, July 11 2003. 100 Howard W. French, “North Korea says it may restart missile tests after talks fail,” The New York Times, November 6 2002. 101 James Brooke, “A Missile shield appeals to a worried Japan,” The New York Times, November 11 2002. 102 “Oﬃcials seek hard line on North Korea,” The Japan Times, May 14 2003. 103 “N Korea must not possess Nuclear Weapons’ Japan Defence Chief,” Nikkei, March 29 2003. 104 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security,issuefour,2006. 105 Mikhail Petrov, “Sotrudnichestvo-priortetny kurs RF i KNDR,” Itar-Tass, 27 May 2003. 106 Benjamin Kang and John Ruwitch, “China in Overdrive to Restart N. Korea Talks,” The Washington Post, July 15 2003. 107 Seo Hyun-jin, “Talks on nukes seem back on track,” The Korea Herald, August 2 2003. 108 Seo Hyun-jin “U.S. move brightens prospects for N.K. talks,” The Korea Herald August 9 2003. 109 “Peace deal on horizon,” The Korea Herald August 11 2003. 110 Seo Hyun-jin “Seoul expects minor gains in talks; Foreign minister cautions Beijing parley on N.K. only beginning,” The Korea Herald, August 21 2003. 111 “Six Party Talks on the North Korea Nuclear Crisis, Beijing, August 27–29: Statements and Comment,” The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/ 0308/doc10.htm. 112 ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry On Six-way Talks, Pyongyang, August 30, 2003,’ Korean Central News Agency, September 1,” The Acronym Institute op cit. 113 “Tokyo, Pyongyang agree to talk about abductions,” The Japan Times, August 31 2003. 114 “North Korea threatens nuclear tests,” The Japan Times August 31 2003. 115 “Six Party Talks on North Korean Issues (Overview and Evaluation),” Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of Japan, September 2003, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/ n_korea/6party0308.html. 116 “US Proposes New Peace Framework on Korean Peninsula,” Nikkei,November5 2003. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 4 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement

Introduction The two tracks in the North’s policy became clearer after the first round of the Six Party Talks. It joined the talks under Chinese pressure and South Korean encouragement but it also continued with the development of its nuclear program and eventually declared that it had manufactured a nuclear capability. The South Koreans and Chinese believed that the North’s nuclear track was a bluff intended to maximize concessions from the US in a complicated process of bargaining. What the Chinese and South Koreans wanted was an agreement which would bring an end to the tensions on the Peninsula for which they blamed the US. Chinese involvement became more frantic, spurred by the fear that the US may fail to take the opportunity to come to a deal with the North. South Korea pursued its goal of dialogue and reconciliation with the North which it believed should provide favorable conditions for the elimination of the North’s nuclear program. Both South Korea and China assumed that with the right incentives the North would surrender the nuclear program and to this end they pressed the US to adjust its position. In the third and fourth rounds of the talks the US agreed to offer a security guarantee as well as energy incentives to the North, without giving up its demand for dismantlement of the nuclear program up front. The differences were seemingly irreconcilable until September 2005 when agreement was reached as the culmination of the efforts to resolve the nuclear issue. This agreement seemed to vindicate the South Korean and Chinese position that the North’s Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 nuclear program was indeed negotiable, and that there was nothing inevitable about its development.

South Korea’sdifferences with the US The Bush Administration’s approach pushed the Roh Moo-hyun administration in the South to devise an independent policy towards the North, one which would point to an alternative and more promising path towards the resolution of the nuclear issue. Roh’s supporters in the Uri party argued that the improvement of inter-Korean relations through the offering of economic South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 79 incentives would create the conditions for it to reform and if sustained would bring about an agreement over the nuclear issue. The Roh government popularized the notion that the North would surrender its nuclear program in return for security assurances and economic aid and sought to influence the Bush Administration in this direction. Roh wanted to elevate the South to a more prominent role and was unsatisfied with the secondary position of just being an American ally. He declared that he wanted to place the South on an “equal footing” with the US, but his ambitions exacerbated the divisions within the South, with the conservatives in the GNP and also within his own Foreign Ministry. Roh discovered that his Foreign Ministry was not supporting him, its North America Affairs Bureau criticized his presidential aides when they called for greater independence from the US. The President was particularly angry with his Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan for opposing his plan for the relocation of US bases in Seoul.1 Yoon was removed as Foreign Minister on January 16 2004 and replaced by Ban Ki-moon. Senior presidential aide Jeong Chan-yong criticized the Foreign Ministry for its inability to shake off its dependence upon the US, and for not understanding the “new spirit of independence” that had emerged in the country.2 Roh threatened to “shake up” the Foreign Ministry which had the Japanese worried as they feared that the Six Party Talks would be affected.3 Despite the nationalistic posture that Roh and his supporters adopted they faced opposition in the country. Roh had no party but was associated with the Uri or “our” party that was supported by young liberal and nationalistic reformers. Uri was formed in 2003 by defectors from Kim Dae-jung’s Mil- lennium Democratic Party and in the legislative elections of April 15 2004 it won 152 of 299 seats and 38.3 percent of the vote. Its supporters demanded greater independence from the US and were opposed to the US occupation of Iraq.4 Despite their zealous liberal and nationalist supporters Uri leaders were subject to diverse and contrary pressures which tempered their enthusiasm and resulted in a frustrated nationalism. Like the Foreign Ministry they strongly criticized, they themselves could not quite break free of the US. The discrepancy between party leaders and members widened as a result. Chairman of the Uri party Shin Ki-nam declared that the US was South Korea’s most important diplomatic partner while a survey of rank and file Uri lawmakers

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 in April 2004 noted that while 60 percent considered China the South’s most important diplomatic partner, only 26 percent chose the US.5 By August in the same year opinion in the party had shifted considerably. A survey of National Assembly members conducted by The Korea Herald newspaper conducted between July 20 and August 12 elicited responses from 237 of 299 members; 195 respondents regarded the US as more important to South Korea than China. Within the Uri party 72 percent of members or 94 of 123 members agreed, while 17 members thought that North Korea was the South’s main priority, and significantly only 12 chose China. Within the GNP all but four of its 96 lawmakers chose the US as the South’s most important ally.6 80 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement Views within the Uri party had changed because of China. In January 2004 the Chinese expressed their claim to the ancient kingdom of Koguryo˘, which was one of three kingdoms into which ancient Korea was divided until 668 AD. At its greatest extent Koguryo˘ ruled over the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, a part of Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula in China. Con- troversy arose when Chinese scholars contributing to the Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Sciences claimed that Koguryo˘ was a Chinese vassal state which paid tribute to China, that two-thirds of the kingdom was in China, and that the people of the kingdom constituted one of the many minorities which were absorbed into Chinese nation. The dispute broke out in earnest in 2004 when the Chinese moved to list the cities and tombs of the ancient kingdom as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The Koreans were incensed by the Chinese action as they regarded Koguryo˘ as an independent kingdom. Ban Ki-moon reflected public anger when he declared that Koguryo˘ was the “root of the Korean nation.” South Korean Foreign Ministry representatives met with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi but reported that the Chinese were indifferent to the South’s requests to correct these “historical errors,” and some even called for countermeasures against China.7 An editorial in The Korea Herald declared that South Korea “is not a Chi- nese satellite state that can be bullied around or even forcibly annexed like Tibet.”8 The Koguryo˘ controversy had serious implications as Koreans feared that China might claim parts of the Korean Peninsula should the area become unstable as a result of regime collapse in the North.9 The Northeast Project, some Koreans suspected, was a “pretext” for expanding China’s borders by co-opting Korean history and redefining ancient borders in a way that would justify present day claims.10 A second reason for the change of views within the Uri Party was the threatened reduction of US forces in the South. If the young liberals of the Uri party had been consistent in their thinking they would have welcomed US plans to withdraw these forces as a demonstration of independence. Their attitudes, which had been formed in the heady presidential campaign of December 2002, had changed somewhat as they became more aware of the constraints on the South. After months of preparation on June 7 2004 the US announced a plan to withdraw 12,500 of its 37,000 troops from South Korea

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 by the end of 2005. The 3,600 troops of the 2nd infantry division which was deployed along the DMZ were to be sent to Iraq and replaced by South Korean forces. The plan was submitted to a Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative meeting (FOTA) with the South’s Defense Minister Chi Young-kil on 5 June. The South Koreans demanded that the plan be shelved until 2007 to allow the South to expand its defense capability and to avoid a security vacuum. The Americans, however, insisted on going ahead with the reductions as part of their Global Defense Posture Review.11 South Korean views of the US were indeed complicated; while Uri supporters called for greater independence from the US they did not want a rapid drawdown of US forces before the South would be able to build up its own South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 81 capability to compensate for the reductions. They also opposed the removal of the 2nd infantry division from along the DMZ on the basis that it acted like a “tripwire” and a restraint on the US. Without American troops in the ﬁring line the US could be tempted to resort to aggressive or provocative action in relation to the North with immediate consequences for a very vulnerable South. They also expected a more equal and cooperative relationship with the US and objected to the American proclivity for unilateral decision- making. They demanded of the US that it avoid confronting the North and that it encourage inter-Korean rapprochement as a way of dealing with the security of the Korean Peninsula including the nuclear issue.12 To be sure, the GNP was highly critical of the Uri party’s policies and a party spokesman declared that as a result of these developments the US no longer considered the South as a “true ally,” and may not share intelligence with it.13 President Roh illustrated the dilemma that South Koreans felt in relation to the US when he declared that the South would continue with self-defense while strengthening the alliance with the US, and that the alliance with the US was the “cornerstone” of the South’s independence rather than a violation of its sovereignty. Roh announced that South Koreans had to “get over the naïve dichotomy between alliance and independence” which were complementary concepts and not mutually exclusive.14 The Roh Administration wanted rapprochement with the North with the cooperation of the US and Japan. In this context it thought it could remove the source of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and create those conditions that would encourage the North to respond. When Kim Dae-jung pursued his Sunshine Policy the Clinton Administration and Japan had been supportive, but with a suspicious Bush Administration and a sulky Japan those favorable conditions were removed. Roh was angry with the Bush Administration but denied that anti-Americanism was an ideology in the South and explained that it was an “expression of opinion in relation to certain issues.”15 In this he was essentially correct as the South could not be really anti American while its security depended upon the US. The issue for Roh was not so much the alliance with the US but the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to support his desire for closer relations with the North. Roh’s anger was also vented against Japan for its lack of support for his policy towards the North and he was not

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 above whipping up popular anger against the Japanese. After Shimane Pre- fecture designated 22 February as Takeshima Day, Roh declared ‘diplomatic war’ on Japan for what he said was its record of defending its colonial rule over Korea as well as its claim to the Dokto/Takeshima Islands, a very emotional issue in Korea.16 Roh made an effort to build closer relations with the North by forging dialogue between the two militaries. On May 26 2004 the first general-level meeting between the Southern and Northern militaries was held at Mt. Geumgang which is on the Northern side of the DMZ. The meeting was intended to implement the North–South declaration of June 15 2000 which was the main result of the first summit between the two Koreas. On June 3 82 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement after repeated requests by the South representatives of the two militaries met again at the Mt. Seorak resort in the South. The intention was to discuss and resolve the problem of the northern sea border on the Western side of the Peninsula where naval clashes had occurred in 1999 and 2002. The meeting resulted in a number of agreements which encouraged the South to pursue dialogue with the North further, and to broaden it to include other areas. The North agreed to hold working level talks at Gaesong to deal with the differences over the northern limit line, and to cease propaganda broadcasts along the DMZ.17 Both parties also agreed that their navies would use the same radio frequencies so they could contact each other in a crisis, they also agreed to a military hotline, and strict measures to keep their naval vessels from engaging in conflicts.18 This was the first time an agreement had been reached between the Northern and Southern militaries although it was very limited and did not resolve the troubling issue of the northern line in the western sea. A major breakthrough in terms of easing tensions on the Peninsula had eluded Roh. Nonetheless, the North revealed a willingness to be minimally cooperative which was some kind of achievement. By responding to Roh’s overtures even in a limited way the North could separate the South from the US and encourage the Roh Administration to press the Bush Administration into a more conciliatory policy towards the North. The North skillfully played upon those expectations in the Roh Administration by making concessions over minor issues to an extent sufficient to allow the South to claim success and to arouse interest in further dialogue and negotiation. The South then could claim a success which it could use to press the US to soften its position during the preparations for the third round of the Six Party Talks. This round, however, had few results which could justify the effort. When the North lost interest in the talks the South was spurred to further efforts to encourage the North to rejoin them. Simply by playing hard to get, the North could shift the blame for lack of progress onto the Bush Administration and could entice the South to work on the US to soften its position. Roh declared that the North would indeed surrender its nuclear weapons program if it was assured of its security, and that it would reform and open up if it were given international assistance to overcome its current hardships. In his first message to

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Bush after his re-election as US President in November, Roh stressed that neither military force nor economic blockade was necessary against the North and that there was no other way but dialogue.19 He repeated his views on a visit to Brasilia in the same month when he debunked the idea that the North had adopted delaying tactics to buy time for the development of its nuclear program. He demanded that the US accept the North as a dialogue partner.20 Significantly, The South’s Ministry of National Defense declared that it would remove the designation of the North as “main enemy” from the 2004 Defense White Paper to be published on February 4 2005. It had been designated as the main enemy since 1995 and from now on would be regarded as just a “military threat.”21 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 83 Roh’s South Korea moved close to the Chinese position in this period which strained the alliance with the US considerably. This swing towards China was influenced by the prolonged suspension of the Six Party Talks over 2004–05 and the fear that the Bush Administration had little interest in an issue that vitally concerned the South. Roh scrambled to make the South’s voice heard in the face of what he and followers regarded as US indifference, which prompted his attempt to position the South as a “balancer” in North- east Asia. Roh first raised this idea on February 25 2005 when he said that the South’s military could be a “balancer in Northeast Asia.” In a speech to the Korean Air Force Academy on March 8 he declared that the South Korean military would “work to build close cooperation with the neighboring nations,” but he added that this would be done “on the basis of the U.S.- South Korea alliance.” He then announced that the South was fully capable of defending itself against the North and that the US would not be able to deploy forces from the South without his approval, which was intended to prevent them being deployed to Taiwan against China.22 Roh repeated these ideas on 22 March at a graduation ceremony at the Korean Military Acad- emy, and on 30 March when the balancing role was again linked to the alliance with the US. Later, Roh added that South would act as a “peacemaker” between the US, Japan and China which was understood to mean that in the event of conflict in the region the South would not take sides.23 The South’s balancing role had a wider meaning as it was intended also to dispel what Uri supporters claimed was the “Cold War mentality” on the Peninsula whereby the “northern triangle” of China, Russia, and the North was pitted against the “southern triangle” of South Korea, Japan and the US.24 Much later Roh also connected the South’s balancing role with the proposal for a multilateral security regime which would have to include China. He criticized what he called South Korean–Japan–US trilateralism to counter China and called for an effort to move beyond “Cold War confrontation.”25 To act as a balancer the South would have to demonstrate distance from the US, yet Roh and other Uri leaders had affirmed the importance of the alliance for the South and its central role in the South’s security. Roh thought he could lessen dependence on the US by reducing the South’s contingent in Iraq from 3,600 to 3,360, and by decreasing the South’s contribution to the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 cost of US forces based in South Korea by 8 percent. However, he could not escape the US alliance which was, as his government had reiterated, “still the foundation of Korea’s national security.”26 Defense Minister Yoon Kwan- gung, wanted to give the idea of a balancer some substance by increasing military exchanges with Beijing and elevating military cooperation with China to the level of that with Japan.27 While Roh’s Uri supporters regarded this idea as an expression of their hopes and aspiration for a greater regional role, GNP spokesman Park Jin said it was dangerous.28 Others in Korea’s security circles thought it was unbridled fantasy. Senior administration officials thought it meant that the South should find a place in a new Northeast Asian security community, or play the role of a go-between to stabilize the 84 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement Peninsula while anchoring its balancing role in the US alliance. An opinion survey noted the various interpretations; some thought it meant raising the South’s independent voice in regional affairs, others thought it meant shifting from dependence on the US to expanded cooperation with China, while others thought it meant countering Chinese and Japanese hegemonism.29 China, however, supported the idea and Ambassador Li Bin echoed Roh’s remarks by saying that there would be no prosperity on the Peninsula if the regional actors were trapped in a “Cold War mentality.”30 The Roh Government conceived the idea of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula which would lead to a broad process of reconciliation between the two Koreas and eventual reunification. For Roh the peace regime would create the conditions for the North’s denuclearization by reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, as dialogue with the North would come first and denuclearization later. Roh’s government adopted various measures to kick start the inter-Korean dialogue process. It promised to deliver 200,000 tons of fertilizer to the North, and proposed the establishment of liaison offices in Seoul and Pyongyang which would act as dialogue channels to reduce tensions between them.31 It also proposed a multinational development program which would include the Northeastern parts of China, Siberia and North Korea and create a “region of peace and prosperity.” As a step towards this goal Deputy Prime Minister and Finance-Economy Minister Han Duck-soo proposed at the 12th APEC Finance Ministers meeting that North Korea be invited to join as a special guest conditional on the success of the Six Party Talks.32 South Korea had already proposed North Korea’s membership of the IMF and the World Bank but other members of these bodies thought it was premature. South Korea also promoted a more specific proposal for the modernization of the North Korean economy under a scheme called the “Korean Peninsula’s peace and economy initiative,” which was intended to prepare the way for reunification. According to this initiative the South would provide energy, logistics and telecoms infrastructure to the North, again contingent on the success of the Six Party Talks.33 Uri party leaders including Chairman Moon Hee-sang had raised the idea of another inter-Korean summit to bring reconciliation to the peninsula which would follow on from the last summit of June 2000.34 The difficulty was that inter-Korean dialogue could not proceed indepen-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 dently of the denuclearization of the North which was demanded by the US and Japan as a ﬁrst step. To achieve its aims Roh’s government was compelled to make the Six Party Talks a success.

The second round The first round of the talks had been indecisive though the parties did agree to meet again in December 2003. Yoon Young-kwan spoke to the UN Gen- eral Assembly on 23 September 2003 and called for tangible proposals that would allay North Korea’s security fears, which was an appeal to the US to soften its position accordingly. He claimed that all parties in the first round had South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 85 agreed on the need to address the North’s security concerns, and declared that “We strongly hope that the security concerns of the North, along with the nuclear issue, will be dealt with in more detail at the next Six Party Talks.”35 North Korea was not prepared to meet in December and was not persuaded that the US would take its security concerns into account at this stage. Fu Ying, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Department, revealed that China had consulted with the North on December 25–27 and pressed it to rejoin the talks as soon as possible. The North’s Foreign Ministry stressed again that it would break with the talks unless the US abandoned its “hostile policy” toward it.36 The US was buoyed by the example of Libya which on 19 December 2003 declared that it would dismantle its WMD programs and accept immediate and comprehensive inspections. The declaration included all chemical and nuclear weapons programs, and all ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer range with a payload of 500 kilograms which was the limit imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime of 1987. It stated that all nuclear activities would be reported to the IAEA, and that it would accept international inspections to ensure Libya’s complete adherence to the NPT.37 The Libyan declaration was a culmination of a decade of international pressure on the country and its timing may have been related to the US capture of Iraqi dic- tator Saddam Hussein, as it came several days after his capture near his hometown of Tikrit on December 13.38 The Libyan example held out the prospect of a similar capitulation by North Korea if pressure were sustained by all parties. Libya, however, had no great power protector like China and it had already suffered punitive air strikes from France and the US in February and April 1986 respectively, against which it had few defenses. On December 23 in an interview with Nikkei Richard Armitage said that if North Korea followed the Libyan example it “would very rapidly find herself integrated into the vibrant community of East Asia,” but he admitted that this was unlikely. To clear the path for the next round of talks he declared that the US was not seeking regime change in North Korea, would discuss the North’s long-term energy needs under KEDO, and was willing to offer the North a security guarantee of some kind.39 On October 30 2003 The North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 announced that the North would join the Six Party Talks if they offered a package solution based on “simultaneous actions.” It also dropped the demand for a non aggression pact with the US but it did not specify what it wanted, nor did it define what it meant by “simultaneous actions.” President Roh was buoyed by the announcement and expressed confidence in a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue.40 Some clarification of “simultaneous actions” came later when Li Gun, who had led the North Korean delegation to the Three Party Talks, explained the North’s bargaining position at the Center for National Policy in Washington. First, the US should resume shipments of heavy oil and greatly expand food aid to the North while the North would renounce its intention to be a nuclear power. Then the US would provide 86 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement security assurances in writing and energy compensation to the North which would in exchange freeze its nuclear facilities and allow inspections. The North would only dismantle its nuclear program after it had received the LWRs. Its missile program would be dismantled only after US and Japan established diplomatic relations with the North.41 According to this approach the North had no intention of quickly surrendering its nuclear program as a result of the Six Party Talks, and needed to preserve it for as long as possible. James Kelly explained that for the North a nuclear arsenal was a “core not a peripheral element” of its national defense strategy.42 The direction of the North’s diplomacy was to shift the Bush Administration from its key demand for the dismantling of the North’s nuclear facilities as a first step. The North wanted the dismantling of the nuclear program and the provision of incentives to be concurrent processes, as verification and inspection would be postponed to some later date, while the HEU program would be forgotten in the process. From the US perspective this approach would allow the North sufficient time to bring its nuclear program to completion and to emerge as a closet nuclear power, with US diplomatic recognition and a security guarantee. The North’s bargaining strategy depended on it convincing the US that it had a “nuclear deterrent,” or was on the way to getting one. It could then bargain with the US, the South and Japan as a nuclear power and one entitled to concessions over a range of issues. The North was taking a different direction from Libya as it regularly announced its intention to reprocess nuclear fuel rods and to acquire a nuclear capability. The North’s Foreign Ministry on 2 October 2003 declared that it had finished reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon announced that the North now possessed “nuclear deterrence.” The CIA claimed that the North had diverted 9–10 kilograms of plutonium over 1993–94 for at least one or two nuclear weapons and the reprocessing of the fuel rods on this occasion would bring the total to four or five.43 US intelligence was groping in the dark when it came to North Korea as it did not know with certainty how much plutonium was produced over 1993–94, or how much plutonium the North would require to produce a nuclear device, or the number of fuel rods that had been reprocessed.44 In any case this was the third time that the North had declared that it had reprocessed nuclear fuel, the other occasions

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 being in December 2002 and April 2003.45 American officials were unsure what to make of these declarations and surmised that their intention was to increase Chinese and South Korean pressure on the US to come to an agreement with the North. Clearly, the North had not persuaded Americans that it had a “nuclear deterrent” and invited a US delegation to visit Yongbyon in January 2004 to see for itself. The US delegation was headed by Professor John W. Lewis of Stanford University, and included Charles Pritchard then with the NSC, Siegfried Hecker who was former head of the Los Alamos National Labora- tory in New Mexico, and various officials and congressional aides. The delegation visited the 5-MW reactor at Yongbyon on January 8. The North South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 87 Korean News Agency (KCNA) reported that the delegation had seen first- hand that the North had recently reprocessed plutonium and had a “nuclear deterrent.”46 Siegfried Hecker’s report on the visit, however, was somewhat different. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the visit he explained that a “nuclear deterrent” would require three things; the ability to produce plutonium, the ability to design and build a nuclear device, and the ability to build a delivery system which could carry the device to a target. The North could produce plutonium but he thought that there was no evidence that that it could produce a nuclear device, let alone a delivery system.47 Hecker’s report confirmed American suspicions that the production of plutonium alone would not constitute the nuclear deterrent that the North was so anxious to obtain. If the US disbelieved the North, then it would have to prepare for a demonstration of its nuclear capability in a test, but that would take time and considerable preparation. The Chinese thought it was possible to interdict the nuclear program at this stage if a suitable agreement could be reached at the Six Party Talks. This meant offering the North sufficient incentives to give up the program and shifting the US from its insistence on dismantlement of the nuclear program up front. The US was prepared to grant the North a security guarantee for what it was worth, but the Americans would not budge from their position on the removal of the program first. Still, if the purpose of the North’s nuclear program was to bargain for economic aid and American security assurances, this would have been the opportune moment for the North to accept an agreement, and the fact that it did not indicates that there were other motives. To ensure success at the second round China attempted to get US and Korean agreement in advance on the text of a statement that would be issued after the talks. The Chinese attempted to forge a compromise between the North’s demand for simultaneous actions and the US demand for the dismantling of the nuclear program first. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the Americans that the North was willing to freeze all its nuclear activities as a step towards total abolition.48 In this they were frustrated by the refusal of the Americans to move from their stated position since there were many issues that required clarification, including which programs would be frozen and when verification would begin. James Kelly on February 13 averred that

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 he expected the North to follow the Libyan example and make a “fundamental decision” to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. He declared that “we insist on the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea’s nuclear programs.” He particularly stressed that the US could not live with a solution that was not verifiable and irreversible and which would allow the North to resume its nuclear threats.49 The Americans negotiated a proposal with Japan and South Korea that would incorporate their own demand for up front elimination of the nuclear program with the simultaneous actions as demanded by the North. They agreed to provide a security guarantee for the North if it agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program. While freezing and dismantling its nuclear program, the North could be 88 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement offered a “temporary” security guarantee which would not take effect until the nuclear program was entirely eliminated and verified through inspections. This process would take several years and in the meantime if the North reneged on the deal both sanctions and military options could be invoked.50 How a temporary security guarantee would differ from a full guarantee was unclear in any case as the obligations and conditions would be the same. The Americans were buoyed by revelations of the contributions that A. Q. Khan had made to the North’s HEU program which justified their position. On February 4 2004 on Pakistan television Khan confessed that he had operated a nuclear proliferation network which would, so the Americans thought, dispel doubts that the other parties in the talks had about the existence of the HEU program.51 Both Japan and South Korea called for clarification of the HEU program, China which had consistently doubted its existence feared that taking up the issue would create needless difficulties.52 The Chinese continued to deny the existence of the HEU program and Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong said later that the Americans had not provided convincing evidence. The Americans in turn claimed that they had fully briefed the Chinese and speculated that the Chinese adopted a position of feigned disbelief over the issue to assist their mediation prospects with the North Koreans.53 The South proposed a three stage formula described as a “perfect road map” to get around the impasse. In the first stage multilateral security assurances would be offered to the North in exchange for a freeze of all nuclear programs. In the second stage there would be verification of the dismantling of the Yongbyon reactor, the third stage would require a “probe” into the HEU program with simultaneous economic aid.54 The Japanese again wanted to raise the abduction issue at the Six Party Talks. Vice Foreign Minister Ichiro Aisawa asked the Chinese to help arrange contact with the North on the sidelines of the talks to discuss the issue.55 The Japanese insisted that the abduction issue be included in a comprehensive solution in relation to the North and without that Japan would not be part of any solution involving economic cooperation with the North.56 The Chinese made a heavy investment in the talks and reportedly had to pay the North $50 million to ensure its attendance, though on what terms can only be a matter of speculation.57 The second round of the Six Party Talks

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 were held on February 25–28 2004 which once again was an occasion for the parties to restate their positions. The Chinese delegate Wang Yi explained that the North offered to freeze its nuclear activities as a step towards the full elimination of its nuclear program, and demanded compensation in terms of energy. The nuclear freeze the North insisted would apply to its nuclear weapons program and not the civilian program. China and Russia supported the proposal for a freeze and the Russians together with South Korea agreed to offer energy aid to the North as compensation.58 Kelly, however, stressed that the nuclear issue had to be resolved first before there could be discussions over a wide range of issues that could lead to an improvement in relations.59 The North refused to admit the existence of its HEU program. South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 89 Kim Kye-kwan revealed that the North had sold missiles to Pakistan to acquire foreign currency but said that “I want to make clear that we do not have enriched uranium, that we do not have the facilities, scientists or experts related to HEU.”60 The US did not supply evidence at the talks so the skepticism surrounding this program remained, despite the US hope that A.Q. Khan’s earlier revelations would have dispelled them. The US and Japan rejected a draft statement prepared by China because it did not mention the need for the North to dismantle its nuclear program first. China pressed for a joint statement that would meet the positions of both sides but the differences were not resolved. Indeed, on the last day of the talks, Saturday February 28, the closing ceremony was delayed for three hours because North Korea wanted to change the wording of the statement by including mention of “differences” between the sides. Instead of a joint statement the Chinese issued a chairman’s statement because of what Wang Yi described as an “extreme lack of trust” between the parties.61 The Chairman’s statement mentioned that the discussion was “beneficial and positive” and that “differences remained.62 Kim Kye-kwan, however, said that the talks had no “positive result” for which he blamed the Americans. The parties agreed at least to continue the talks and to hold the third round of the Six Party Talks in Beij- ing no later than the end of the second quarter of 2004. The one positive result of the second round was the creation of a working group of officials to deal with the issues and to prepare the agenda for the next round.63

The third round The third round followed on from the second as the same issues were raised and the same differences surfaced. In May 2004 China convened the working group created in the second round in Beijing which revealed that the differences had become irreconcilable. The North Korean delegate Pak Myong-kuk declared that the North would not continue with the talks unless the Amer- icans dropped their demand for the complete dismantling of its nuclear program. The US, however, continued to insist on CVID and would not give way.64 There were signs, however, of emerging differences within the Bush Administration which were undermining the confidence of the neoconserva-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 tives. Vice President Dick Cheney’soffice, Donald Rumsfeld and the Penta- gon, and John Bolton held sway over policy towards North Korea and dictated the bargaining position to the American delegation at the talks. They insisted on CVID, the isolation of the North and its collapse, a position from which the other parties China, the South, and Russia naturally resiled with alarm. The first two rounds demonstrated that negotiations were going nowhere, and that they gave time for the North to develop its nuclear program. It was obvious that the more the US pressed the North the greater the counter pressure from China, Russia and the South for a negotiated resolution of the issue, that would in some way accommodate the North’s security and economic concerns. Doubts were raised within the State Department and 90 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement in some parts of the NSC about the wisdom of continuing with this line while the US was heavily embroiled in Iraq. Some called for a softer position in relation to the North which would stress the incentives to surrender the nuclear program rather than focusing on the disincentives.65 Immediately before the third round began President Clinton’s negotiator with the North, Robert Gallucci, gave expression to this frustration in an interview with the BBC. He declared that the Bush Administration’s policy towards the North was “going nowhere,” and that the main threat from Pyongyang was the proliferation of nuclear technology which the Bush Administration was doing little to stem. He called in question the multilateralism of the Six Party Talks as a case of the US “sub contracting” North Korean policy to China which had very different strategic interests from the US. Gallucci revived the call for direct negotiations with the North which is what the North and China had demanded in the first place.66 Gallucci had made a case for the return to the Agreed Framework which he had negotiated, the very mention of which was anathema to the Bush Administration. During the third round which was held over June 23–26 2004 the US outlined a seven page modified proposal which was intended to break the log jam and move the negotiations forward. It was drafted in consultation with the South and incorporated ideas from both China and Japan who had pressed the US to offer economic incentives to the North. It was described as a “turning point” in the negotiations by a member of the South Korean delegation.67 It called upon the North to disclose its nuclear program completely, submit to inspections, and then pledge to eliminate both the plutonium and HEU nuclear programs after three months. In exchange the North would receive shipments of heavy oil while the US would provide it with a provi- sional security guarantee, and would also consider taking the North off the list of states sponsoring terrorists. The US would also begin direct talks over sanctions imposed earlier on the North. Japan’s chief delegate Mitoji Yabunaka offered to provide energy aid to the North if it froze its nuclear program, which was a departure from the American proposal where the nuclear program was to be dismantled first.68 China, Russia, the South and Japan were willing to provide fuel oil to the North which demanded at least 2,000 MW of power annually in exchange for the freeze.69 The other parties however,

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 were willing to offer energy aid as compensation for a freeze of the nuclear program which indicated significant differences from the Americans, particularly on the Japanese side. The Bush Administration had softened its approach to meet the concerns of the other parties by avoiding mention of CVID but otherwise its policy had not changed in essence. The key point was that the US would not phase in any of the incentives until the North agreed to dismantle the nuclear program and allow inspections. As the US representatives noted CVID was still the goal but its constant repetition in the Six Party Talks had inflamed the situation and it was therefore downplayed.70 If the North expected to bargain with its nuclear program for a special deal, could it do better? The North countered with its own proposal which South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 91 showed it was attempting to move the negotiations towards a freeze of the nuclear program which would avoid the issue of verification. Kim Kye-kwan said that the goal was the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that the North was ready to present its own proposal for compensation for freezing its nuclear program. He stressed that its main condition was that the US drop its demand for CVID.71 North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 27 2004 explained that the North had proposed a “package solution” based on the notion of a “reward for freeze.” The North proposed to freeze all its nuclear facilities and the US would in return abandon its “hostile policy,” which meant that the US would drop the demand for CVID, lift its economic sanctions and its “blockade” of the North. It would also remove the North from the list of “state sponsors of terrorism,” and would participate in compensation of energy worth 2,000 MW. Choe added that the freeze would be the first step towards eventual dismantlement of the nuclear program and would be followed by “objective verification.”72 CVID was for the Americans the bottom line in the negotiations and a return to the Agreed Framework which this proposal represented was unacceptable for the Bush Administration. The North was rapidly losing interest in the Six Party Talks which it had attended this time largely because of Chinese insistence. In dealing with the American delegation Kim Kye-kwan invoked the idea of a factional struggle in the North as a way of demanding concessions. He claimed that hardliners in the military and diplomats within the Foreign Ministry were struggling for influence in Pyongyang, the hardliners wanting to develop the nuclear program while the diplomats were willing to come to agreement with the US. Kim told James Kelly that to persuade the hardliners to desist from the nuclear path was not an easy task and it required a justification.73 The North Korean delegation told the Americans that the hardliners wanted to test a nuclear weapon if the talks did not come up with results.74 There may have been reformers in the economic and trade ministries in the North but it was a great leap of imagination to say that they were in a position to influence policy over the nuclear program, or that they could counter the military. Even if the Amer- icans had made the desired concessions to the North in the belief that the moderates would be strengthened and the hardliners weakened, it is doubtful

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 if the North would have changed its position. It was too far along the nuclear path to reverse course. Three rounds of talks had demonstrated that the differences were irreconcilable, and that the ability of either side to compromise in the way the Chinese had hoped was constrained by institutional and policy considerations. The record shows that the North had embarked on the development of its nuclear program earlier and required more time to conduct a demonstration test which would alter the situation entirely. It had seen the balance of forces within the Six Party Talks tilt against the hard line position of the Bush Administration and had learned that it had the superior hand. Its attendance at the talks could be a matter for negotiation that would require maximum 92 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement diplomatic exertion and some pecuniary incentives from the Chinese. Simply by withholding attendance it could raise the pressure on the Americans to offer incentives or make concessions. By threatening to develop nuclear weapons and conducting a test it could create alarm amongst others, who would demand that the Americans do something to prevent this from occur- ring. When the Americans held fast to their bargaining position in demanding the elimination of the nuclear program they attracted the opprobrium of rigidity and were blamed for the impasse. Other parties in the talks were prompted to offer incentives to the North which undermined the American position and the insistence on CVID. The North could appeal to the Chinese, the Russians and the South Koreans with the prospect of modifying the American position. A fourth round had been planned for September 2004 but the North blamed the US for its “hostile attitude” and refused to return to the negotiations until July 2005. One reason was that the North had hoped that George Bush would lose the presidential elections of 2 November in which case a democratic administration under John Kerry might return to the Clinton Admin- istration’s policies.75 Kerry had expressed the Democrats’ frustration with the Bush Administration over North Korea and had declared that he would conduct bilateral talks with the North alongside the Six Party Talks, which the North wanted.76 A second reason for delay was internal dissension in the North as there were reports of considerable discontent within the military over the market reforms which were introduced in July 2002. Under pressure from the Chinese, Kim Jong-il pushed the reforms to stave off economic collapse. Markets arose throughout the country and prices and exchange rates were allowed to float. The result was the creation of a class of very rich people in the North while the urban population became impoverished. The South’s former Unification Minister Chung Se-hyun claimed that people became less loyal to the regime, military discipline and cohesion were undermined and as defections increased more border patrols were introduced to stop defectors crossing over into China.77 In November 2004 Kim Jong-il purged his brother-in-law Jang Song-taek, who reportedly opposed the reforms. Jang had married Kim’s younger sister, he was a Central Committee member with security responsibilities and was considered a possible successor to Kim Jong-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 il himself. He clashed with Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju who was in charge of the economic reform program and who presided over a major reshuﬄe of the Worker’s Party to remove party obstructionism.78 Director General of the Japanese Public Security Intelligence Agency Ohizumi Takahashi said that the reforms could be destabilizing for the regime as they were introduced piecemeal, the widening gap between rich and poor created “social destabili- zation.” A similar rift was observed in the military as high ranking oﬃcers pursued personal gain.79 The military pilfered humanitarian aid donated by the US, Japan and South Korea and sold it on the open markets. On October 1 2005 the reforms were partially halted when the sale of rice and grain at private markets was banned, public distribution centers were re-introduced for South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 93 these commodities.80 With the suspension of the reforms Jang Song-taek res- urfaced in March 2006, and after Kim Jong-il’s stroke in August 2008 he was reportedly governing the country.81 If conditions in the North had been more suitable the reforms may have succeeded, and the engagement policy approach promoted by China and South Korea may have led to a favorable resolution of the nuclear issue. As it was, however, the North’s attitude towards the talks hardened.

The North declares it has nuclear weapons On February 10 2005 the North’s Foreign Ministry declared that the North had “manufactured nuclear weapons,” and it would withdraw from the Six Party Talks.82 A few days earlier Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan told visiting US Congressman Curt Weldon that the North’s nuclear development program had been completed.83 The North had often threatened to develop nuclear weapons so this announcement was déjà vu. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon had done so in October 2003 and before the UN General Assembly on 27 September 2004 announced that the Bush Administration had left the North with “no other option but to possess a nuclear deterrent”84 The US believed that the North had one or two nuclear weapons while the South’s Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck declared that the North would have eight nuclear weapons if all 8,000 rods had been reprocessed.85 Director of the IAEA Mohammed El Baradei said that he was certain that nuclear material from the 8,000 rods had been converted into fuel for four to six nuclear weapons, which was more than what the US had admitted in public.86 Nevertheless, on March 31 the North claimed that the situation had changed and that it would now negotiate as a “nuclear power,” and would not return to the Six Party Talks. It demanded the removal of the US nuclear threat to the region, and the upgrading of the Six Party Talks into comprehensive disarmament talks in which the other parties would participate as equals to achieve the de nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.87 This sentiment was echoed by the South Korean newspaper Hankyorae which claimed that the North wanted “dialogue and not disrup- tion” and that the South should advise the US on the need for “mutual

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 compromise.”88 The North wanted to change the format of the Six Party Talks which had, up to this point, proceeded on the basis that it was the target state and therefore rightfully subject to the demands of others. If the North were no longer the target state the Six Party Talks would be turned into nuclear disarmament negotiations in which the US would be obliged to accept a compromise. CVID would be dropped, and the dismantling of the North’s nuclear program would require equivalent concessions from the US in relation to its military presence in the South and its nuclear umbrella. The North had learned that it was possible to obtain nuclear weapons if they are developed quickly enough so that the international community had little time to respond. Libya was 94 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement caught before it was able to so, but India and Pakistan were able to take the US by surprise with their nuclear weapons tests in May 1998. North Korean representatives would often refer to India and Pakistan implying that if the US got used to a nuclear India and Pakistan it could get used to a nuclear North Korea as well. It was a calculated risk as the North was not certain of the US response and it had made too many threats in the past to be taken seriously this time. Many thought at the time that the North was engaging in its usual brinks- manship intended to gain an advantage in the Six Party Talks. The South’s Uni- fication Minister and National Security Advisor Chung Dong-young revealed skepticism and thought that the announcement meant that the North had a claim to nuclear weapons, and not a claim to be a nuclear weapons state.89 The North had to undertake a test of its nuclear weapon to convince the world that it was not bluffing, but it required more time for this demonstration. The first American reaction to the North’s declaration was to take the issue to the UN Security Council, a move which was strongly opposed by the South.90 The Chinese made yet another effort to re-start the talks in the face of North Korean resistance and sent Wang Jiarui, who was Chairman of the Party’s International Department, to Pyongyang.91 America’s new representative to the Six Party Talks as from February 14 was the Ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill who replaced James Kelly. On April 26 Hill asked the Chinese to cut off the oil supply to the North as a “technical inter- ruption” to press it to return to the talks. Condoleezza Rice had made the same request in 2003 which the Chinese rebuffed. There were signs of a debate in China about the efficacy of such pressure upon the North as some in Beijing argued that cutting off food aid would have an immediate effect on the North. Reports indicated that China was considering a ban on certain exports to the North to press it to rejoin the talks.92 Publicly, however, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman opposed any suggestion that China should reduce economic support for the North.93 South Korea similarly made an effort to entice the North back into the talks by offering economic incentives. On July 12 Roh announced that the South would build power lines across the DMZ to provide the North with 2,000 MW of electricity as well as 500,000 tons of rice, the largest ever rice shipment promised to the North. South Korea also proposed setting up assembly industries in the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 North for garments, footwear and soap.94 Chung Dong-young announced that seven new enterprises would be created in the North in relation to energy cooperation, the modernization of railways, tours to Mt. Baekdu, the upgrading of Nampo port, the reforestation of the North, the joint development of farmlands and river usage. The plans would be placed on the agenda and would be implemented once the nuclear issue was resolved. Fertilizer would also be delivered to the North and for the first time since 1984 a Northern vessel docked at a Southern port to pick up 200,000 tons of fertilizer as a gift.95 With these incentives the Unification Minister announced that the “right atmosphere” had been created for dialogue in the Six Party Talks.96 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 95 The fourth round The Chinese and the South Koreans managed to entice the North into parti- cipating in the fourth round of the Six Party Talks which was conducted from July 26 to August 7 2005. They were the longest on record and went on for 13 days. The Chinese made a major effort to ensure that this round would succeed, with 200 officials mobilized from nine Foreign Ministry departments to work on the negotiations.97 In the fourth round the North was offered what the South Koreans thought it wanted in terms of economic aid and American security assurances but they were not important for the North. It was on its way to becoming a nuclear power and wanted to prolong the negotiations to avoid premature agreement, but it was still constrained from withdrawing from the talks because of fears of a forceful American response. The Chinese yet again attempted to mediate between the North and the US and tabled a draft joint statement for the first time which reflected a sense of urgency. The North objected to the demand that it abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs and insisted on its right to a civilian nuclear program. Chris Hill had been instructed by Robert Joseph to demand that the North surrender all nuclear programs, civilian as well.98 The Chinese draft also included non aggression assurances from the US, economic incentives and energy aid, it made provision for the normalization of relations with the US and Japan and implementation of the 1991 joint declaration between the two Koreas.99 In response, the North demanded that American nuclear protection of the South be included in the agenda as the issue in its view was the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Americans demanded that the North include the HEU program while the North yet again denied its existence.100 The Chinese representative Wu Dawei expended much effort to persuade the North to cooperate but it refused and strung the talks out for as long as possible, prompting Chris Hill to warn that the US would walk out from the talks if there was no progress. After 13 days the talks were terminated.101 Wu Dawei said that “profound discord” had prevented agreement which was a big disappointment for China.102 The biggest stumbling block during the negotiations was the North’s civilian nuclear program. By all accounts the North latched onto this issue because it would keep the Six Party Talks preoccupied and deflect attention Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 from its nuclear weapons program. The North could expose rifts between the US and its ally in the South, and also within the South, and it could benefit from the various proposals raised to assist it with the provision of energy. The South’s Chung Dong-young supported the North’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy on condition that it joined the NPT and allowed inspections from the IAEA.103 On July 12 2005 Chung announced that the South would supply the North with 2,000 MW of electricity annually if it agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The proposal was intended to encourage the development of inter-Korean relations but its cost for the South was prohibitive. The plan was that supplies would begin in 2008 until 2018 for which transmission 96 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement lines would be built putting the total cost up to $11.5 billion.104 Roh’s supporters were struggling to encourage the development of inter-Korean relations and thought that public opposition to the US over this issue would help them gain the trust of the North. As though to accentuate the differences Chung said publicly that “we think differently from the US.” Chris Hill expressed the American objection to the North’s civilian nuclear program commenting that this is a country that “had trouble keeping peaceful nuclear energy peaceful.” The South’s proposal to supply the North with electricity made it unnecessary for it to have nuclear power in any case.105 Different nuances were observed in the South from officials who downplayed the differences with the US and stressed the commonalities. Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said that the North could develop peaceful nuclear energy if it dismantled its nuclear programs and complied with IAEA demands.106 The US and the South also discussed the idea of a forum separate from the Six Party Talks which would address the issue of a peace treaty as a security guarantee for the North, as well as a security structure for the Korean peninsula.107

The breakthrough: the September 19 2005 agreement Despite the apparent failure of the July–August talks, the fourth round was re-convened over September 13–19 because of a new ﬂexibility in the US position. This was credited to Chris Hill who demonstrated independence from the neoconservatives. He supported the South’soﬀer to provide electricity to the North and agreed to place the issue of the LWRs on the agenda. Hill ended the North’s “propaganda advantage” which it had obtained over the US because of the Bush Administration’s rigidity.108 With characteristic optimism Ban Ki-moon thought that the North was ready to surrender its nuclear program, that a “breakthrough” in negotiations was likely and that they had entered a stage of “real and substantive negotiations”109 In the September talks, the Bush Administration allowed China to mediate directly with the North, and shifted its position as a result of both Chinese and South Korean pressure when it accepted the North’s right to LWRs. The South proposed to provide the North with 2,000 MW of electricity in exchange for the elimination of the nuclear program; it also declared that it would recog-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 nize the North’s right to civilian nuclear energy despite American objections.110 Some reports claim that the South Koreans “threatened” to re-think their commitment to the US alliance if the Americans refused to make concessions to the North.111 During the talks the US resorted to tough tactics to obtain an agreement and was prepared to walk out without one. It threatened sanctions and a freezing of the North’s international assets if one did not eventuate. Agreement came just as US delegation was packing its bags.112 The American acceptance of the North’s right to LWRs made possible the first substantial agreement which was reached on September 19. The agreement stated that the North had the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which was not contested by the US, and that the “parties agreed to discuss at South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 97 an appropriate time the provision of LWRs to the North.” The time was left open. China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US also “stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the North,” while the South reaffirmed its proposal to supply it with electricity. In return, the North declared that it would abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return to the NPT, and to IAEA safeguards. To assuage the North’s concerns, the Americans accepted a formula whereby the US and the North agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty, to exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations. The US also declared that it had no intention of attacking or invading the North with nuclear or conventional weapons.113 As a demonstration of optimism, the agreement mentioned that the “directly related parties” would negotiate a “permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum,” a proposal promoted by the South. The creation of this separate forum would be contingent upon success in the Six Party Talks, which seemed close. With this expectation in mind the parties agreed that the next round of talks would be held in November. It seemed that South Korean and Chinese views of the North were justified and that with the right incentives the North would accept a deal over its nuclear program. Chris Hill called the agreement “one of the best examples of multilateral diplomacy in this part of the world,” but he admitted that implementation of the agreement was a further step.114 It was regarded as a “significant victory” for China’sefforts at mediation and a demonstration of what it could do to bring the principal antagonists together. Chinese chief delegate Wu Dawei thought that the agreement was the most important since the Six Party Talks began.115 The South Koreans were equally effusive and claimed that the agreement was made possible by their “unprecedentedly active role.”116 Unification Minister Chung Dong-young called the September agreement “the triumph of South Korean diplomacy,” and claimed that “without the South Korean government’s creative ideas and persistent negotiating efforts, reaching the agreement of the Six Party Talks would have been very difficult.” Chung thought that the success was largely his doing as he had visited Pyongyang in June for the anniversary of the June 2000 summit. He claimed that he persuaded Kim Jong-il to re-join the Six Party Talks which resulted in this agreement.117 The Korea Herald opined that “the parties have

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 a shared interest in the fulfillment of the commitments accompanied by a certain level of trust,” and it also claimed that “the communist regime has exhibited adaptability to the norms of international society”118 The Amer- icans attributed the success of the agreement to Chris Hill who brought flexibility to the American negotiating position and ended America’s “diplomatic isolation” over the issue which had bedeviled the Bush Administration since the talks began. Chris Hill had entered the talks stating that the North’s demand for LWRs was a “nonstarter” for the US which could not allow it to have any nuclear facility, as it could transform an electricity-generating LWR into a facility which could make weapons-grade plutonium.119 Despite this initial position the Americans eventually accepted the South’soffer to provide 98 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement electricity to the North and agreed to place the LWRS on the agenda in the talks.120 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained that “We debated long and hard as to whether or not we wanted to agree to that draft.” The deciding point was that all parties had accepted the position that the North would receive the LWRs only after it had dismantled its nuclear weapons program.121 Nonetheless, the problems with the agreement were immediately apparent. It made no provision for timing and scheduling and did not stipulate when the disarmament would begin; it did not identify whether the provision of the LWRs would follow or precede disarmament, a critical point which became one of the reasons for its breakdown. According to the Chinese, these issues were to be discussed when the talks reconvened in November. The Bush Administration had made a major concession in agreeing to the provision of LWRs and dropping its insistence that the North had no right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Chris Hill said that Bush did not want any mention of the LWRs, but the Chinese had included it in the draft and obtained the agreement of the other parties. The Chinese then told the Americans that they were isolated over this issue and that if the Americans rejected it, they would go to the press to say that the US was to blame for destroying the accord. The issue triggered a debate within the Bush Administration as it was already heavily embroiled in Iraq, faced difficulties with Iran’s nuclear program and encountered domestic fallout from Hurricane Katrina. It conceded that the North Korean problem had to be postponed and accepted the agreement.122 Under its terms LWRs would be provided at an “appropriate time” which was vague enough to create new disputes. The American interpretation of an “appropriate” time was, as Chris Hill said, when the North had visibly and verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons program. Hill insisted that the North had to return to the NPT and comply with the IAEA before it can expect delivery of an LWR.123 Even then the Americans stressed that they would only allow the LWRs to produce electricity for the North under stringent circumstances.124 The Japanese supported the Americans and Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura agreed that only when the North gave up its nuclear weapons program could it receive an LWR.125 The South Korean response was again divided. Deputy Foreign Minister and chief delegate to

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 the talks Song Min-soon argued that there was a “window of opportunity” for the North to have its LWRs. Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon during a speech at Harvard University told the Americans that the LWR issue would be discussed only when Pyongyang returns to the NPT and to the IAEA safeguards.126 Unification Minister Chung Dong-young adopted an approach reflecting his position in the Uri party when he thought that an “appropriate time” for the provision of the LWRs could be negotiated.127 The Chinese were silent over this issue though Chris Hill claimed that all the parties were agreed that the North should not receive LWRs before it had abandoned its nuclear weapons program.128 On Tuesday September 20, the North’s Foreign Ministry declared that the US “should not even dream of the issue of the South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 99 DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs” which was described as “our just and consistent stand as solid as a deeply rooted rock.” It reiterated that “we will return to the NPT and sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and comply with it immediately upon the U.S. provision of LWRs.”129 At this point it is worth asking whether the end of the North’s nuclear weapons program was in sight. It seemed that the North had put forward reasonable demands that could be easily met, and that the provision of LWRs should not have caused so much dissension. Why could the US not seize the opportunity to dismantle the North’s nuclear weapons program? The first problem was the issue of scheduling and when the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program would take place. The North insisted that this would occur after the LWRs had been constructed which would postpone the issue to ten or 15 years into the future. Chris Hill, however, demanded dismantlement within three years.130 Another problem was the HEU program which was not specifically mentioned in the agreement though the Americans insisted that it covered “all” nuclear programs.131 Still, the North had not admitted to the HEU program and neither China nor the South was willing to accept American claims as to its existence, or to question the North’s motives deeply. A third difficulty was that the North’s declaration of September 20 was conditional which was glossed over in the euphoria that followed the agreement. In that statement, the North’s Foreign Ministry said that “we will feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if the DPRK–U.S. relations are normalized, bilateral confidence is built and we are not exposed to the US nuclear threat any longer.”132 The North had reserved for itself an escape clause which allowed it to be the judge of when there would be “bilateral confidence” in the relationship, and when it would no longer be exposed to the “US nuclear threat.” It could be, as some have surmised, that the North’s declaration was a product of different inputs which linked the reasonable demand made by the Foreign Ministry in regard to the LWRS to the undefined and unlimited demand made by the military. Alternatively, it could have been the North’s intention to play the parties along with a tantalizing agreement and then impose the escape clause at the end. The US also had its own reservations about normalizing relations with the North which indicated that

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 it would be a prolonged and complicated process. South Korean and Chinese pressure on the US to make concessions to the North was resented by the neoconservatives of the Bush Administration and the Republican members of Congress who thought that the US was giving away too much. Chris Hill said on 6 October that normalization of relations with the North would be “subject to resolution of our longstanding concerns” which the US had to discuss with the North such as “human rights, biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missile programs, proliferation of conventional weapons, terrorism and other illicit activities.”133 There were still too many details to negotiate which would test the North’s willingness to go through with an agreement and, moreover, both sides had their deeply rooted reservations about dealing with each other 100 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement that were a product of decades of hostility. Such mutual antipathy would not vanish as a result of just one agreement.

What happened to the breakthrough? The fifth round A fifth round of talks was required to negotiate the details of the September agreement but to ensure the North’s attendance, the State Department sent New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson to Pyongyang for four days in Octo- ber and provided him with an Air Force plane. Richardson was US Ambas- sador to the UN while Clinton was president and had developed contacts with the North Koreans. In the North on October 18–21 Richardson met Kim Yong-nam, who was President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and second only to Kim Jong-il. He also met first Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju. He toured the Yongbyon nuclear facility and was given a full briefing by its director. Upon his return to Tokyo, he declared that North Korea was “fully committed” to return to the talks and was showing “flexibility” on the LWR issue. He said that “they were very clear about adhering to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, very clear,” and “it was the most positive tone I have seen.”134 He stressed that the North Kor- eans “were very specific to me that they were prepared to dismantle all their nuclear weapons, consistent with the statement of principles (of the 19 Sep- tember agreement).”135 Hu Jintao made his first state visit to the North over 28–30 October in a similar effort to press the North Koreans to turn up at the next round. Chinese officials reported that Kim Jong-il told the Chinese Pre- sident that he was committed to ending the North’s nuclear weapons program and that he would push forward with multinational negotiations on the matter.136 The Chinese encouraged the North to continue with the Six Party Talks by offering $2 billion in long-term economic aid, and to prevent it backsliding on the economic reforms that were introduced in 2002.137 Expectations had been heightened by the September agreement. Ban Ki- moon said that they would hold talks on how to schedule the compensation that would be offered in exchange for the North’s nuclear dismantlement. According to Ban “While the fourth round of talks produced word-for-word agreements, the fifth round of talks is even more important as it will be dis-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 cussing an actions-for-actions agreement.”138 The South Koreans were concerned about timetabling the actions-when the North Koreans would finish the task of dismantlement, when the shipments of heavy oil would resume, the possibility of constructing LWRs, the coupling of the North’s dismantlement with the normalization of diplomatic relations between the North and the US and Japan and so on.139 The fifth round was held over November 9–11, this time for a shorter period. The Chinese declared that the talks would adjourn after three days to let everyone attend the APEC forum in Busan. Chris Hill, told the parties that they should first agree on what specific steps North Korea must take to disarm, while the benefits it would receive would be left until later. The North Koreans, however, repeated their demand for an LWR South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 101 before the dismantling of the nuclear program and reverted to an issue that the other parties thought had been resolved. The North Koreans were angered by Bush’s remark in Brazil when he called Kim Jong-il a “tyrant.” They raised the issue of the sanctions imposed by the US Treasury Depart- ment on North Korean companies accused of proliferating WMD technology and on Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a Macau bank that was accused of laundering money from the North’s illicit activities. The North Koreans were particularly incensed by these sanctions and claimed that they violated the 19 September agreement.140 The American delegation insisted that the financial issue was separate from the nuclear problem that they were discussing at the Six Party Talks. This issue then became the main stumbling block in the Six Party Talks for the next 18 months for reasons that will require explanation. Rather than the expected progress, deadlock ensued. The Chinese drafted the chairman’s statement which called the talks “serious, pragmatic and constructive” but there was no date set for their resumption, the statement simply stated that discussions will resume “at the earliest possible date.”141 The US had long been concerned about the North’s shadow activities such as drugs trafficking and counterfeiting. The North had been cultivating opium poppies since the late 1970s and had been producing heroin for distribution by companies and diplomats.142 The North was also involved in the counterfeiting of US currency and produced nearly flawless intaglio printed hundred dollar “supernotes” which first appeared in December 1989.143 The US Treas- ury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Center claimed that North Korea earned as much as $500 million annually from counterfeiting, and another $100–200 million annually from narcotics trafficking.144 The counterfeit money was put into circulation by the Banco Delta Asia while the earnings from narcotics were used for a variety of purposes. One was to purchase luxuries for Kim Jong-il and presents for his high-ranking military officers, another was to pay for equipment from Japanese companies that could be used for the manufacture of WMD. Suspicions were aroused when in April 2003 an electrical power supply unit which could be used to enrich uranium was purchased from Japan and exported to North Korea via Thailand.145 With this money North Korea could develop the technology to process uranium using components and equipment which, it was suspected, had been purchased

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 from Japan or Europe.146 President Bush on 29 June 2005 issued an Executive Order which targeted the financial and trade dealings of eight North Korean agencies suspected of involvement in the purchases of this equipment. While the Six Party Talks were proceeding, on September 12 the Treasury Depart- ment designated BDA as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the Patriot Act which would prevent American financial institutions from having any dealings with the Bank.147 On September 15 the Treasury Department announced its findings publicly and declared that the Bank had been a “willing pawn” for North Korea. It was accused of accepting “large deposits of cash” from North Korea, including counterfeit US currency, and agreeing to place that currency into 102 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement circulation.148 The result was that the bank closed all the North Korean accounts which contained some $25 million. US Treasury sanctions on BDA were declared on 15 September but the North went ahead and signed the September 19 agreement. The North probably did not at first realize the significance of the Treasury announcement which did not penetrate the decision-making system until later. The North Koreans could not accept that one agency in government could act indepen- dently of another which had struck a deal with the North. To them it seemed that the Bush Administration had arranged it this way so that the talks would be torpedoed. The North could have refused to attend the fifth round in protest but the fact that it did return indicated a commitment to see them through. Both South Korea and China were disturbed by the US sanctions which to them had closed the window of opportunity that they had perceived. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met President Roh at the ASEAN plus three meeting in Kuala Lumpur, they shared their fears that US financial sanctions would damage or delay the Six Party Talks.149 The South Koreans were particularly angry with the American action and though they publicly supported the US Treasury Department’s action in dealing with counterfeiting as an illegal activity, they did not want it to be linked with the Six Party Talks. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young was incensed. During the inter- Korean ministerial talks which were conducted in Cheju over December 13–16, Chung said that “We emphasized that those issues are not to be linked with the Six Party Talks.” He also said that this was a bilateral issue between the US and the North which should not concern the others, and that “our government has maintained that such bilateral issues should be separated from the six nation talks, as it would be difficult to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula when the six nation talks stumble every time such issues surface.”150 The irony was that the American delegation at the talks agreed with the principle that the South Koreans had expressed, their position being that financial sanctions were a law enforcement issue and unrelated to the nuclear standoff in which case the problem lay with the North Koreans who made the connection.151 The South Koreans struggled to revive the talks in January 2006 and hoped that they could obtain Chinese assistance in this matter. Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon was anxious that the pro-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 spect of an agreement with North Korea was being undermined by the sanctions. The South Koreans had hoped that preparatory talks could be convened on Cheju Island in December which would then pave the way for the resumption of full negotiations in Beijing in January.152 By this time however, President Roh lost conﬁdence in his grand vision for the Korean Penin- sula after the Uri party suﬀered a severe setback in the National Assembly by- elections on April 30 and October 26, which were described as “crushing defeats.”153 When President Roh met with George Bush on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Busan in November he fell behind the American line. Bush declared that they presented a “united front” over the North and agreed that LWRs would not be provided until the North disarms.154 While Chung South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 103 Dong-young was talking about doubling economic aid to the North and achieving economic union with it in 15 years, Bush rejected the idea of economic aid before it disarmed.155 The South’s role as a swing state in the Six Party Talks was coming to an end.

Conclusion The North pursued two tracks in its policy towards the US; one was the nuclear program which was developing in two forms, the plutonium and the HEU programs; the other was the diplomatic track in the Six Party Talks. The relationship between these two tracks had been the subject of much speculation amongst the parties. If the North had intended to develop nuclear weapons come what may, then the Six Party Talks were futile, a dalliance for the North and a means to keep the US occupied while it was preparing the nuclear program for the tests which were to follow. South Korea and China both rejected this interpretation and insisted that the second track was more important to the North, and that the nuclear program was a bargaining chip which would be sacrificed if the right incentives were offered in the negotiations. Upon this basis, South Korea and China prevailed upon the US to modify its position in the second and third rounds to offer incentives to the North to accept an agreement. The September 2005 agreement was the culmination of these efforts when the US eased its demand that the North dismantle its nuclear program first and accepted vaguer terms which glossed over the time when the dismantlement of the nuclear program would begin. This agreement was possible because the US softened its public position but unresolved difficulties remained in relation to the sequencing of the incentives and the phasing out of the nuclear program. This shift on the part of the US made the September 2005 agreement possible and allowed South Korea and China to announce that a “breakthrough” had been reached. The real issues were postponed for the next round which was aborted because of the issue of American financial sanctions. In the meantime, however, the North was preparing for the missile and nuclear tests which were to change the nature of the negotiations.

Notes Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 1 Anthony Faiola, “S. Korean Foreign Minister Resigns After Dispute over US Ties,” The Washington Post, January 15 2004. 2 Hans Greimel, “S. Korean Gov’t Divided over US Ties,” The Washington Post, January 15 2004. 3 Kim So-young, “Yoon’s exit not to aﬀect NK talks,” The Korea Herald, January 17 2004. 4 Choi Soung-ah, “Uri dominance may shift foreign policy,” The Korea Herald, April 21 2004. 5 Kim So-young, “US remains most important ally: new Uri leader,” The Korea Herald, May 19 2004. 6 Choi Soung-ah, “Uri Members lean more to US than China,” The Korea Herald, August 16 2004. 104 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 7 Yoo Dong-ho, “Roh Orders Study of Regional history,” The Korea Times, August 8 2004. 8 The Chinese have become “impertinent, insolent really, in dealing with their neighbours,” and “arrogant and nauseatingly overbearing toward others” Editorial “China: a Giant with a Pygmy mentality,” The Korea Herald, January 25 2005. 9 Ryu In, “Seoul to ask China to clarify Koguryo report,” The Korea Times, 7May 2004; “China, S. Korea row over ancient history,” The Japan Times, February 4 2004. 10 Editorial “What China’s Northeast Project Is All About,” The Chosun Ilbo 30 September 2009 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/05/30/20080530 61001.html. 11 Shim Jae-yun, “Seoul Seeks to Delay Pullout,” The Korea Times, June 8 2004: “South Korea to bolster its defence capability,” International herald Tribune, June 8 2004. 12 Lee Sook-jong, “Anti US sentiment roils alliance,” The Korea Herald, June 10 2004. 13 “Park speaks of growing US antipathy to Seoul,” The Korea Times, May 30 2004. 14 Ryu Jin, “Self Defence, Alliance to be pursued together: Roh,” The Korea Times, June 6 2004. 15 Shim Jae-yun, Roh Says NK will give up nukes if given compensation,” The Korea Times, November 17 2004. 16 Park Song-wu, “GNP Hits Roh’s Diplomacy on Japan,” The Korea Times, March 24 2005. 17 Ryu Jin, “2 Koreas strike package deal to avoid naval clash,” The Korea Times, June 4 2004. 18 Joo Sang-min, “Koreas agree to ease tensions,” The Korea Herald, June 5 2004. 19 Seo Hyun-jin, “Roh appeals for softer Bush stance toward N. Korea,” The Korea Herald, November 15 2004. 20 Shim Jae-yun, Roh Says NK will give up nukes if given compensation,” The Korea Times, November 17 2004. 21 Yoon Won-sup, “‘Main Enemy’ to be removed from Defense White Paper,” The Korea Times, January 28 2005. 22 Richard Halloran, “Roh publicly belittles alliance with US,” The Japan Times, March 20 2005. 23 Jung Sung-ki, “‘Power Balancer’ policy faces criticism,” The Korea Times, April 5 2005. 24 Ryu Jin, “Where is Roh Steering the Korean Ship?” The Korea Times, April 7 2005. 25 Ryu-Jin, “Roh seeks N-E Asian Security Regime,” The Korea Times, October 21 2005. 26 Editorial “Cracks in the alliance,” The Korea Herald, April 12 2005. 27 Jung Sung-ki, “‘Power Balancer’ policy faces criticism,” The Korea Times, April 5 2005. 28 Jung Sung-ki, “‘Power Balancer’ policy faces criticism.” 29 Editorial “Roh’s ‘balancer’ idea,” The Korea Herald, April 12 2005.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 30 Ryu Jin, Yoon Won-sup, “China supports S. Korea’s Balancing Role,” The Korea Times, April 6 2005. 31 Annie I. Bang, “Seoul proposes liaison offices in Koreas,” The Korea Herald September 2005. 32 “Finance Minister Han Invites NK to Next APEC Meet,” The Korea Times September 9, 2005. 33 Lee Joo hee, “Seoul prepares ‘Korean Peninsula initiative,” The Korea Herald, October 31 2005. 34 “Inter-Korean summit,” The Korea Herald October 20 2005. 35 “NK Security Fears Must Be Addressed: Yoon,” The Korea Times September 27 2003. 36 Seo Hyun-jin ‘N.K. agreed to reopen 6-party talks early next year,’ The Korea Herald, December 30 2003. South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 105 37 Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, April 22 2004. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 32007.pdf. 38 Seo Hyun-jin “‘Libya may be good reference for N.K.’; Minister says six-party talks may take place without prior agreed statement,” The Korea Herald, December 27 2003. 39 “Armitage Urges North Korea to Follow Example of Libya on WMD,” U.S. Department of State, December 23 2003, www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/ department_state/briefings_speeches_testimony/179.pdf. 40 “Roh Confident of Peaceful Settlement of Nuclear Crisis,” The Korea Times November 1 2003. 41 Glenn Kessler, “N Korea Displays ‘nuclear deterrent,’” The Washington Post January 11 2004. 42 Ensuring a Korea peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs. Remarks to the Research Conference-North Korea: Towards a New International Engagement Framework, U.S. Department of State, February 13 2004. 43 Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Claims Nuclear Advance,” The Washington Post, 3 October 2003 Martin Nesirsky, “N. Korea says it reprocessed Atomic Fuel Rods in June,” The Washington Post, October 3 2003. 44 Murray Hiebert, “The North Korea Mystery,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 21 2004. 45 David E. Sanger, “Intelligence Snarl over North Korea,” International Herald Tribune, October 15 2003. 46 Glenn Kessler, “N Korea Displays ‘nuclear deterrent,’” The Washington Post January 11 2004. 47 “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea” Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory University of California, January 21 2004 www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf. 48 “N. Korea Tells China It is prepared to Abolish Nuclear Program,” Nikkei,Feb- ruary 23 2004; Glenn Kessler, “N Korea Displays ‘nuclear deterrent,’” The Washington Post January 11 2004. 49 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs Remarks to The Research Conference, “North Korea: Towards a New Interna- tional Engagement Framework” Washington, DC February 13 2004 The Acro- nym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01. 50 “Japan, US., S Korea Agree on N Korea Security Guarantee Proposal,” Nikkei, February 24 2004. 51 Murray Hiebert and Donald Greenlees, “An Alliance under Stress,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 26 2004.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 52 “N. Korea Tells China It is prepared to Abolish Nuclear Program,” Nikkei,23 February 2004. 53 “China View on Arms in North Korea puzzles US,” International Herald Tribune, June 10 2004. 54 “Saving the North’s face,” The Korea Herald, February 24 2004. 55 “N. Korea Tells China It is prepared to Abolish Nuclear Program,” Nikkei,Feb- ruary 23 2004. 56 Press Conference 27 February 2004, with Press Secretary Hatsuhisa Takashima, Japan Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Acronym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/ docs/0402/doc26.htm#01. 57 Murray Hiebert and Donald Greenlees, “An Alliance under Stress,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 February 2004; David E. Sanger, “Behind Bush step lies Asian Pressure,” International Herald Tribune, June 25 2004. 106 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 58 ‘Three Features and Five Advancements,’ Wang Yi Commenting on the Second Round of Six Party Talks in Beijing, February 28 2004, The Acronym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01. 59 “Opening Remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs,” March 24 2004 The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01. 60 “Kim Kye-gwan, North Korea’s vice foreign minister and chief delegate to the talks, at a news conference in North Korea’s embassy after the talks.” The Acro- nym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01. 61 “Talks on North Korea nuclear program end,” the Associated Press, MSNB.com, February 2004 28, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4365670/ns/world_news/t/talks-north- korea-nuclear-program-end/. 62 Chairman’s Statement for The Second Round of Six Party Talks, February 28 2004, The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01. 63 Jack Kim and Teruaki Ueno, “N. Korea Nuclear Talks Plagued by Contra- dictions,” The Washington Post, February 27 2004. 64 Jack Kim and John Ruwitch, “US Must Back Down on Nuclear Demands, N Korea Says,” The Washington Post, May 14 2004. 65 David E. Sanger, “Behind Bush step lies Asian Pressure,” International Herald Tribune, June 25 2004. 66 Jonathan Marcus, “Bush’s Pyongyang policy ‘futile,’” BBC News, June 22 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3831231.stm. 67 Ryu Jin, “US N Korea Raise Hope for Breakthrough,” The Korea Times, 24 June 2004; “US offers incentives for N Korea to Freeze, Scrap Nukes,” Nikkei, June 24 2004. 68 “Japan offers to give Energy aid if N Korea nuke Freeze confirmed,” Nikkei, June 24 2004. 69 David E. Sanger, “Behind Bush step lies Asian Pressure,” International Herald Tribune, June 25 2004. 70 Joseph Kahn, “US makes overture to North Koreans,” International Herald Tri- bune, June 24 2004. 71 Ryu Jin, “US N Korea Raise Hope for Breakthrough,” The Korea Times, June 24 2004. 72 “North Korea: H.E. Mr. Choe Su Hon, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, September 27” in “UN General Assem- bly General Debate, September 21–September 30, 2004: Excerpts on Disarma- ment, Non-Proliferation the Acronym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0409/ doc22.htm#dprk. 73 “Threat Reveals N. Korea power Struggle,” The Japan Times, June 27 2004. 74 Ryu Jin, “AP Reports on NK Threat creates [sic] Stir,” The Korea Times, June 25 2004. 75 “Pyongyang’s Deceptiveness: Show sincere attitude to end nuclear standoff,” The

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Korea Times, November 15 2004. 76 Masayuki Kitano, “US Says N Korea Miscalculating by stalling on Talks,” The Washington Post October 12 2004. 77 Joo Sang–min, “NK Preoccupied with controlling regime: experts,” The Korea Herald, November 17 2004. 78 In the reshuffle three of the 22 bureaus of the Central Control Committee Secre- tariat were eliminated and Secretariat staff were reassigned to other duties. Soyoung Kwon, Glyn Ford, “Foggy North Korean Shuffle,” The Japan Times January 28 2005. 79 Teruaki Ueno, “North Korea crumbling under reforms,” The Japan Times, March 26 2005. 80 “N Korea rolls back economic reforms,” The Japan Times, October 5 2005. South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 107 81 Kim Sue-young, “Kim Jong-il’s Brother-in-law Plays Bigger Role in N. Korea: Report,” The Korea Times, November 9 2008. 82 Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Declares Itself a Nuclear Power,” The Washington Post, February 10 2005. 83 “N Korea Official admits Pyongyang has nuclear Arms: US Congressman,” Nikkei, January 28 2005. 84 Choe added that “The nuclear deterrent of the DPRK constitutes a legitimate self-defensive means to counter ever-growing US nuclear threat and aggression against the DPRK and reliably defend sovereignty, peace and security of the country.” See “North Korea: H.E. Mr. Choe Su Hon, Deputy Minister for For- eign Affairs, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, September 27” in “UN General Assembly General Debate, September 21–September 30, 2004: Excerpts on Disarmament, Non-Proliferation The Acronym Institute www.acronym.org. uk/docs/0409/doc22.htm#dprk. 85 “N. Korea claims it has nuclear weapons,” The Japan Times, September 30 2004. 86 David Sanger and William J. Broad, “N. Korea said to expand Arms drive,” International Herald Tribune, December 7 2004. 87 “North Korea Wants comprehensive Arms Talks-Yonhap,” The Washington Post, March 31 2005. 88 “Make the Mood make for peace on the Peninsula,” Hankyorae, February 12 2005. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/10183.html. 89 “North Korea not yet a nuclear Weapons State: Seoul,” The Washington Post, February 13 2005. 90 Lee Joo-hee, “Government, Uri oppose UN option on N Korea,” The Korea Herald, April 21 2005. 91 Joseph E. DeTrani, “Six Party Talks and China’s role as an intermediary in the process,” US Department of State, March 10 2005, www.state.gov/p/rls/rm/2005/ 42347.htm. 92 Glenn Kessler, “China Rejected US suggestion to cut off Oil to pressure North Korea,” The Washington Post, May 7 2005. 93 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese rule out sanctions on North Korea,” International Herald Tribune, May 11 2005. 94 “Seoul Drives North’s Diplomatic Engagement,” The Japan Times July 27 2005. 95 Lee Joo-hee, “7 Point economic aid offer to NK devised by Seoul,” The Korea Herald, June 29 2005. 96 Ryu Jin, “Koreas agree on Nuclear Free Peninsula,” The Korea Times, June 32 2005. 97 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald May 28 2008. 98 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Stockholm August 24 2011. 99 “Focus on N Korea Response as 6 way talks enter 10th day,” Nikkei, August 4 2005.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 100 “China Mediates between US, North Korea as talks reach critical stage,” Nikkei, August 3 2005. 101 Lee Joo-hee and Kim Man-Yong,” US, China Show off newfound Partnership at Six party Talks,” The Korea Herald, August 5 2005. 102 Edward Cody, “North Korea Nuclear Talks Adjourn Without Agreement,” The Washington Post, August 7 2005. 103 Bill Sammon “Seoul Nuke stance blindsides US,” The Washington Times, August 13 2005. 104 “NK Energy Aid May Top $12 Bil.” The Korea Times, September 22 2005. 105 Reuben Staines, “S Korea, US Feud Over NK Nukes,” The Korea Times, August 12 2005. 106 “NK appears willing to drop nuclear programs, Ban says,” The Korea Herald, August 23 2005. 108 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 107 Lee Joo-hee, “Ban: NK Peace Treaty after Six Party Talks,” The Korea Herald, August 22 2005. 108 Larry A. Niksch “The Six Party Statement: Is it a Viable Roadmap or a Road to Nowhere?” in Larry A. Niksch, Jong Chul Park et al., Implementing the Six Party Joint Statement and the Korean Peninsula, The Korea Institute for National Uni- fication, Seoul 2005, pp. 16–21. 109 “NK appears willing to drop nuclear programs, Ban says,” The Korea Herald, August 23 2005. 110 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korean Draft Pact Suggests Big Shift By US,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, September 21 2005. 111 Remarks by Derek Mitchell of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, “S. Korea Pushed US to Give Into NK,” The Korea Times, September 29 2005. 112 Joseph Kahn, “North Korea says it will abandon Nuclear efforts,” The New York Times, September 19 2005. 113 “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks Beijing,” September 19 2005, US Department of State, September 19 2005. Also: Full Text of Joint Statement of 6-Way Nuke Talks,” Nikkei, September 19 2005. 114 “North Korea Agrees to Abandon its nuclear Weapons Program,” US Depart- ment of State, September 19 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/utils/printpage.html. 115 N Korea backtracks on nuke deal,” The Japan Times, September 21 2005. 116 Lee Joo-hee, U.S. holds contacts with North Korea; For discussions about Nov. six-way talks The Korea Herald October 6 2005. 117 Annie I. Bang, “Two Koreas make substantial progress,” The Korea Herald, December 26 2005. 118 Editorial, “Real task begins now” The Korea Herald, September 21 2005. 119 “NK Demand for Reactor Is Nonstarter,” The Korea Times September 16 2005. 120 Larry A. Niksch “The Six Party Statement,” pp. 16, 18, 21. 121 “US Prepared to Discuss Light-Water Reactor: Rice,” The Korea Times, Sep- tember 22 2005. 122 Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, “US-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open,” The New York Times, September 20 2005. 123 “North Korea Agrees to Abandon its nuclear Weapons Program,” US Depart- ment of State, September 19 2005 http://usinfo.state.gov/utils/printpage.html. 124 N Korea backtracks on nuke deal,” The Japan Times, September 21 2005. 125 “Japan gives Guarded welcome to Joint 6-Party Statement,” Nikkei, September 19 2005; “North’s Demand for reactors before disarmament unacceptable: Japan,” Nikkei, September 20 2005. 126 “US Prepared to Discuss Light-Water Reactor: Rice,” The Korea Times, Sep- tember 22 2005. 127 Lee Joo-hee, “US, NK hold different stances on light water reactor issue,” The

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Korea Herald, September 21 2005. 128 “US Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill on the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme, October 6, 2005,” Disarmament Documentation, The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/docs/0510/doc07.htm. 129 ‘The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs’, North Korea on the Six Party Talks, September 20, 2005,” Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK, The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0509/doc05.htm. 130 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Congressional Research Service, October 5 2006, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 74904.pdf. 131 Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, “US-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open,” The New York Times, September 20 2005. South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 109 132 “The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing the LWRs?” See “North Korea on the Six Party Talks, September 20, 2005,” Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK, The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0509/doc05.htm. 133 “US Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill on the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme, October 6, 2005,” Disarmament Documentation, The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/docs/0510/doc07.htm. 134 James Brooke, “North Korea Ready for Talks, U.S. Envoy Says,” The New York Times October 21 2005. 135 Cameron McLauchlan, ‘DPRK won’t set conditions on 6-way talks’ The Daily Yomiuri, October 22, 2005. 136 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Upbeat After Talks With North Korea,” The New York Times, October 31 2005. 137 “NK, China fortify economic ties,” The Korea Times, October 30 2005. 138 Lee Joo-hee, “U.S. holds contacts with North Korea; For discussions about Nov. six-way talks,” The Korea Herald October 6 2005. 139 Lee Joo-hee, “U.S. holds contacts with North Korea; For discussions about Nov. six-way talks,” The Korea Herald October 6 2005. 140 Choe Sang-hun, “N. Korea talks to end of US sanctions,” International Herald Tribune, December 6 2005. 141 “Disappointment in Beijing,” The Japan Times November 17 2005. 142 June Victor Cha and Chris Hoﬀmeister, “North Korea’s Drug Habit,” The New York Times, June 3 2004. 143 Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” The New York Times, July 23 2006. 144 Dianne E. Rennack “North Korea Economic Sanctions,” CRS Report for Con- gress, updated October 17 2006 http://wayback.archive-it.org/1078/2008060521301 0/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf. 145 “Macau Bank tied to DPRK WMD projects/Funds sent from accounts to Japan in ‘02,” The Daily Yomiuri, November 4 2006. 146 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Tests Said To Tie Deal On Uranium To North Korea,” The New York Times, February 2 2005. 147 Dianne E. Rennack “North Korea Economic Sanctions,” CRS Report for Con- gress, updated October 17 2006 http://wayback.archive-it.org/1078/2008060521301 0/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf. 148 “Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under the US Patriot Act,” US Department of the Treasury, September 15 2005, www.treasury.gov/press-centre/press-releases/Pages/js2720.aspx. 149 Ryu Jin “Seoul, Beijing Worry Over US Sanctions,” The Korea Times, December 13 2005. 150 Seo Dong-shin, “No ROK-US Discord Over NK Counterfeiting,” The Korea Times, December 28 2005.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 151 Reuben Staines “NK, US Feuding Over Sanctions,” The Korea Times, December 5, 2005. 152 Reuben Staines “NK, US Feuding Over Sanctions.” 153 “Ruling Party Leaders Resigns,” The Korea Times, October 29 2005. 154 Bush and Roh agreed that a nuclear armed North would not be tolerated and that it should eliminate its nuclear program “promptly and verifiably,” Bush insisted that LWRs would be given at the appropriate time, after the North had verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons program. Lee Joo-hee, “Roh, Bush press North Korea for prompt nuke dismantlement,” The Korea Herald, November 18 2005; also Ryu-jin, “Allies Agree on Korea Peace Regime,” The Korea Times, November 17 2005; Peter Baker, Anthony Faiola, “U.S., S. Korea Find Unity Against North’s Nuclear Arms Program; President Roh, 110 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement With China’s Leader, Had Earlier Taken Softer Line,” The Washington Post, November 17 2005. 155 David E. Sanger, “Bush and Roh Agree to Differ,” International Herald Tribune, November 17 2005. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 5 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement

Introduction Regarded as a triumph for Chinese mediation the September 2005 agreement seemed to portend a resolution of the nuclear issue. The details of the agreement were left for later negotiations which were not held because of the American imposition of ﬁnancial sanctions on the North. The North withdrew from the Six Party Talks and in the following year resorted to missile and nuclear tests to demonstrate that it had the capability to be treated seriously. The nuclear test revealed that the nuclear program was not just a bargaining chip for negotiations, but a step in the development of nuclear weapons that had been long planned. Because the North went ahead with the test despite Chinese warnings it also revealed that China’s ability and willingness to inﬂuence the North was constrained by its relationship with it. The nuclear test changed the situation in many ways as the US realized that it could not rely upon China to press the North into eliminating its nuclear program. The US agreed to conduct direct negotiations with the North in a major change of policy for the Bush Administration. The result was the downgrading of the Six Party Talks as they became less important for the negotiation of the nuclear issue.

After the September 2005 agreement After the September 2005 agreement the North refused to return to the Six Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Party Talks unless the US lifted the sanctions imposed on Banco Delta Asia. Much hope was attached to Kim Jong-il’s visit to China in January 2006 in the expectation that the Chinese would press him into returning to the talks. South Korean Vice Unification Minister Rhee Bong-jo thought that the out- look for the resumption of the talks was “very bright” and that there was a developing consensus among the parties involved.1 It seemed that the North Korean leader was seeking a way out of his economic difficulties and that the Chinese would link their economic support to the North’s return to the talks. The logic was that economic reform would never succeed in the North unless the country was opened up to the outside world and attracted support from 112 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement international institutions, for which a breakthrough in the Six Party Talks was required. The South Koreans noted that when Kim visited China in 2002 economic reforms in the North were announced in July of that year, and it seemed likely to them that the same would occur this time.2 Vice Unification Minister Rhee thought that ‘Kim had “strongly indicated” his commitment to opening up the economy and had “reaffirmed continuous cooperation with China to make progress in the Six Party Talks.”3 A second reason for optimism was that the Chinese had arranged a meeting between Chris Hill and Kim Kye-kwan in Beijing in an effort to break the deadlock.4 This was the first time that US and North Korean representatives met directly outside the context of the Six Party Talks, which meant that the prospects for the resumption of the talks looked encouraging. China proposed that the talks be resumed in the second week of February otherwise the momentum for the negotiations would be lost.5 The problem was that the North refused to comply while the US continued with its financial sanctions which were creating a “sharpening divide” between China, the South and the US.6 President Roh again attacked the US for its inflexibility over the issue, particularly as the Americans pressed for wider support from within the region over financial sanctions. US Treasury officials called on the South to take punitive measures against the North which Seoul resisted.7 On Jan- uary 23 US Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Daniel L. Glaser called upon Korean officials in Seoul. The US Embassy subsequently issued a press release indicating a proximity of positions, which the South Koreans denied. According to The Korean Herald the “distrust between Seoul and Washington seems to have reached a dangerous level.”8 In exasperation Roh declared that the US had wrecked the 2005 agreement by imposing financial sanctions on the North at the most inopportune time in the negotiations in what he thought was a “prearranged game.”9 He blamed the neoconservatives in the Bush administration and declared that if the US were to continue in this way “there will be friction and disagreement between South Korea and the US.”10 Indeed, to the other members of the talks it seemed that American intransigence was again blocking progress and that the US had to be diverted from its destructive course. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing in March 2006 and

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 with his host Hu Jintao he called for greater flexibility over the financial sanctions issue. In their joint statement, they called upon the members of the Six Party Talks to engage in negotiations with a “constructive” attitude for a peaceful resolution of the dispute and for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.11 The US, however, had other ideas. The Bush Administration expected China to assume a greater role in pressing the North to return to the talks and to use its influence to resolve the nuclear issue. Before Hu Jintao’s first visit to Washington over April 18–21 2006, Deputy US Secretary of State Robert Zoellick told the press that China should play a “more assertive role” in breaking the deadlock in the Six Party Talks. He declared that China The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 113 should be more than a mediator and should become a participant in the process of reaching a resolution of the issue. “They need to be a participant that recognizes that they have an interest in trying to solve this problem and this relates to the nuclear issue.”12 President Bush once again expected China to use its leverage over the North as the chief supplier of food and energy to the regime. The Chinese President, however, reiterated his call for greater flexibility from both the U.S. and the North.13 American officials had various interpretations of Chinese behavior and why Beijing would not press the North over the nuclear issue in the way they wanted. One view, which was evident in US intelligence circles, was that China was indulging in duplicity, saying one thing to the North and another to the US to be on the best terms with both. According to this view China promoted the North against the US as part of its strategy of meeting the American military threat in Northeast Asia while remaining on good terms with the US which it could not afford to alienate. The Bush Administration acted, however, on the basis that it was not in China’s interest to have the nuclear issue unresolved, and that it had a common interest with the US.14 Nonetheless, this left open the question as to why the Chinese could not use their leverage on the North. Time and time again, the Bush Administration had appealed to the Chinese to use their influence with the North to bring about a more favorable outcome to the talks and on every occasion the Chinese response was much the same—it is too difficult, pressure on the North will not work, and patience is required to deal with it. Two events occurred in 2006 which provided a clearer insight into the Chinese relationship with the North and why it could not influence the regime.

Ballistic missile tests On July 5 2006 the North launched seven missiles, two Nodong-2 missiles with a maximum range up to 2,000 kilometers, one Scud C with a range up to 550 kilometers and one three-stage Taepodong-2 (known in North Korea as Paektusan-2) intercontinental missile with an estimated range up to 6,000 kilometers; it was unclear whether the other three missiles were Scuds or Nodongs. Two Taepodong-2 missiles were transported and assembled at the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 site which gave rise to reports that two were launched; in fact the second was not launched.15 Preparations had been detected by the US since late May as the liquid fueled Nodongs and the Taepodong were transported to the sites, loaded onto their launch pads and fueled from large tanks; the launches were initially predicted for 18–19 June but were delayed, apparently for technical reasons.16 Six missiles were launched from the Kitaeryong missile base over a four hour period while the Taepodong was launched from another site in Musudan-ri in North Hamkyong province.17 The Nodongs and Scuds fell into a designated sea zone 300–400 kilometers northeast from Kitaeryong which is on the northeastern coast. Less than 500 kilometers from the launch site the Taepodong exploded 40 seconds after launching.18 The US claimed 114 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement that the launching was detected by American early warning satellites within seconds and that all seven missiles were tracked.19 Some Americans were impressed with the progress the North had made in developing its missile capability. Commander of US troops in the South, General Burwell Bell told the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee that the North’s solid fueled short range missiles had improved and were a “quantum leap forward’ from its previous capabilities. He thought that the North was developing the technological capacity to develop ballistic missiles that could reach the US mainland.20 The July test of the Taepodong, however, was regarded as “inept” and revealed that the North had not been able to overcome the technical problems in constructing a long-range missile. To increase the range of the Taepodong, North Korean engineers had weakened its structure and reduced its weight which made it liable to break up in flight.21 The North declared that the missile tests were intended to test its capacity for self defense, and were an “exercise of a legitimate right as a sovereign state.” After the test of the Taepodong-1 on August 31 1998, the North had agreed to a moratorium on missile tests in negotiations with the Americans in September 1999. It now announced that it was not bound by past morator- iums because the US and Japan had broken their agreements with the North.22 What was the North’s motive? One view was that the North wanted to signal to the US that it would repudiate the Six Party Talks unless it changed its “hostile policy” toward it. Another was that Kim Jong-il wanted to demonstrate “xenophobic defiance” to show that would not yield to pressure or persuasion.23 The North Korean leader was adept at resorting to unpredictability as a tactic to shock his adversaries and supporters alike into greater indulgence of his behavior. To some, it revealed a “frightening suicidal mentality” which would not hesitate to resort to WMD in order to create the desired shock effect.24 Others saw a more practical purpose in that the North wanted to press the Americans into bilateral talks over the nuclear issue.25 President Bush rejected the idea of bilateral talks with the North and declared that if that was Kim Jong-il’s aim “he blew it.”26 Governor of New Mexico and a former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson, who had visited Pyongyang the previous October, claimed that missile tests were a protest against the American crackdown on BDA. This was, he claimed, a “major

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 factor” contributing to Kim Jong-il’s posturing.27 Most likely the shock effect of the action was intended to knock off balance not only the US, but China which had been pressing the North to return to the talks. China suffered the embarrassment of seeing the North ignore it which raised questions about the nature of their relationship. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen claimed that China had taken “unprecedented” actions to convey its apprehensions to the North over the missile tests.28 Earlier on 28 June, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had called upon the North to stop the test launch, an appeal which was “unprecedented” for the Chinese leadership since it had never before reacted in this way, even when the North withdrew from the NPT. Chinese scholar Zhu The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 115 Feng wrote that China was “deeply frustrated” by the North which had dis- played contempt for China’s security interests in Northeast Asia. Of most concern to China was the impact of the missile launch upon both Japan and the US. The test launch of the Taepodong 1 in August 1998 resulted in Japan’s development of anti-missile defenses with close US support and encouragement. This new action by the North promised to bring Japan and the US even closer in terms of security cooperation in the Western Pacific. Japan would accelerate its military modernization program with the result that China’s position in Northeast Asia would become more difficult.29 It is commonly assumed that a great power is able to influence and when necessary control its smaller ally, and it was expected that China would bring North Korea into line. However, the North’s relationship with China was a case of small power manipulation of a great power. North Korea understood that Beijing would not be willing to resort to punitive measures against it, and that it was effectively prevented from acting against it by its own interests on the Korean Peninsula. While the North was seen as China’s strategic buffer against the US and Japan in Northeast Asia, Beijing would be most loath to take action against it. Kim Jong-il had tested the relationship with China in various ways by refusing to join the Six Party Talks, withdrawing from the NPT and acting obstructively in general, while China had held its hand. China resisted American entreaties to press the North and continued to support it with fuel and grain deliveries. China had used pressure against the North in February 2003 to get it to join the Three Party Talks but this was done ambiguously. An oil pipeline to the North was turned off for three days with the Chinese citing technical reasons and denying that this was intended as pressure. Since that time there were no similar instances pointing to Chi- nese reluctance to resort to open pressure against the North. Kim Jong-il had discovered in this way that the North had leverage over China because of its strategic value, and also because of the Chinese fear that the collapse of his regime would have unpredictable consequences for the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese feared that in the event of a regime collapse not only would there be a flood of refugees from the North but that they could lose their position on the Peninsula to South Korea and the US, which would move in rapidly to restore order. Paradoxically, the greater the economic difficulties and the more

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 dire the predictions about the future of the regime, the more the Chinese were obliged to support the North. China was also constrained by another factor in its relationship with the North. The Chinese were wary about the North’s ultimate objective in the negotiations in the Six Party Talks, and although they wanted the US and the North to resolve their differences in a way which would stabilize the Korean Peninsula, they did not want that relationship to go too far. On occasion, the North Koreans presented themselves to the Americans as a means of counterbalancing China. This was their supposed attraction to the US and an incentive for the Americans to agree to a special deal with Pyongyang over the nuclear issue. American tolerance of India’s nuclear weapons 116 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement program was illustrative. The Bush Administration had ignored India’s refusal to sign the NPT when it concluded the Civil Nuclear Agreement with it in July 2005 because of its geopolitical value to the US, particularly in relation to China. Similarly, the North characterized itself in terms of geopolitical value and an asset for the US in Northeast Asia. When Kim Kye-kwan met Henry Kissinger in March 2007, he asked him whether the US was interested in “strategic relations” with North Korea to counterbalance China.30 The North Koreans had intimated to the Chinese that they could embrace the United States if China were to exert pressure against it. Zhu Feng wrote that Pyongyang probably believed it held a ‘trump card’ over Beijing for this reason.31 For the Americans, a close relationship with Pyongyang was absurd. The Chinese, however, would recall how close Clinton came to visiting Pyon- gyang in late 2000, and there was no way of knowing what would happen in the fluid and unpredictable world of Washington politics. If ever there was an opportunity for China to vent its anger against the North, it was after the missile tests when it could have joined the US in condemnation. Thomas Christensen thought that China had now realized that its own interests were aligned with the stakeholders meaning the US, but there was always a good deal of wishful thinking in American public statements about China.32 Beijing avoided siding with the US over the issue and continued to maintain a balance in its policy between the North and the US. The immediate effect of the missile launchings was that Japan and the US turned towards the UN to seek a toughly worded resolution against the North. The Japanese Ambassador to the UN, Kenzo Oshima, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council, sponsored by Britain, France and the US. Drawn up under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which dealt with threats to international peace and security, it included a number of contentious measures calling for an end to all ballistic missile development and the prohibition of all financial support relating to ballistic missile development and purchases of ballistic missiles from the North.33 The US representative John Bolton declared that the North’s provocative missile tests demanded a Chap- ter VII resolution under articles 41 and 42 which would entail a number of forceful options including economic sanctions, sea blockade and armed force. President Bush telephoned Hu Jintao and Putin and called on Security

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Council members to send a unified message to the North.34 The North, however, insisted that it had a sovereign right to test ballistic missiles and that there was no international law or international agreement against it. Accord- ing to strict legality, the North was correct but the circumstances of the situation and the fears of the neighboring states overrode a concern for legal literalism. The Security Council spent two days in emergency session. The Chinese representative, Wang Guangya, opposed the Japanese draft claiming that it might have “negative reactions in the region.” Behind closed doors Wang was quite forceful on the issue and told reporters afterward that “If this resolution is put to vote, there will be no unity in the Security Council.” Wang explained The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 117 that he had instructions from his government to veto the Japanese draft if necessary because it would prevent a Chinese diplomatic mission in Pyon- gyang from negotiating the revival of the Six Party Talks.35 The Russian representative Vitaly Churkin, was very subdued over the issue, and left it to the Chinese to argue for a non binding statement from the President of the Security Council instead of a resolution. Such a statement would urge countries voluntarily to impose a ban on trade in ballistic missiles and related technology to North Korea.36 The South Koreans were similarly disturbed by the Japanese draft which included measures that would be taken against countries committing serious terrorist or illegal military activities. They were also alarmed by the discussion in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency for preemptive action against the North, as Japan struggled with a way to respond to the North’s missile threat.37 In a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement the Japanese draft was called an “overreaction” to the North’s missile tests. It said that reviving the Six Party Talks was more important than punishing the North and that this should be the main objective. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yi said that “we think the response should not be an overreaction that would further intensify the problem. We think all measures should be conducive to resolution of the situation through dialogue.”38 China and Russia withdrew the demand for a non binding statement and circulated their own draft resolution in the Security Council to head off the Japanese draft which was gathering support. The China–Russia draft expressed “serious concern” over the missile launches and said that they had “a negative effect on the peace and stability” of East Asia; it avoided mention of Chapter VII and called upon UN members voluntarily to ban the trade in ballistic missiles and related technology to North Korea; it also urged the North to return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions.39 China also demanded that US Treasury financial sanctions be lifted if the talks were to resume but the US, at this stage, had no such inclination. Chris Hill declared that the sanctions would not be eased until the North dismantled its nuclear weapons program and ended its and long-range ballistic missile program, a demand not raised by the US before.40 UN Security Council Resolution 8778 of July 15 2006 was the result of these discussions. The resolution adopted exhortatory language and nothing

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 was binding or mandatory for UN member states. It condemned the missile launches, demanded that all related activities be suspended, and strongly urged the North to return to the Six Party Talks. Member states were required to “exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items” from being transferred to the North.41 Both China and Russia praised the outcome. Wang Guangya said that that China had adopted a “responsible attitude” and “firmly opposed” a draft resolution that would have aggravated the situation and “created enormous obstacles for the Six Party Talks and other important diplomatic endeavours.” Vitaly Churkin noted that the resolution was a “compromise” and “confirmed that the Council was able to react effectively and in a spirit of unity to complex international challenges.”42 But 118 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement what kind of compromise was it? Mandatory language was different from hortative appeals for cooperation that could be safely ignored, and the cross over from one to the other is not a compromise but a fundamental change. The Korea Times thought that the international community had acted prop- erly by condemning the North’s “adventurism” and opined that sanctions were sure to follow.43 John Bolton said that the resolution included “firm, clear unambiguous action” when it was anything but that.44 Bolton was being uncharacteristically diplomatic about an issue he felt passionate about for a particular reason. The Americans were caught in their habitual dilemma in managing relations with China. They had to praise and encourage the Chi- nese to act out their role as mediator in the Six Party Talks because only the Chinese had access to the North, and only they could cajole or otherwise press the North back into the talks. Chinese involvement in this way ensured that the US did not have to engage the North in bilateral negotiations which the Bush Administration had opposed. American public statements masked a deep frustration with the Chinese and their unwillingness to use their leverage with the North. They were intended to encourage China to continue with its mediation efforts in the talks and to push them along. The Resolution fell short of what the Americans had wanted but they expected the Chinese to move rapidly to the next step and convene the Six Party Talks.

Nuclear test

After the ballistic missile tests it became clearer that the North was preparing for a nuclear test. It declared that it had nuclear weapons on February 10 2005, and on May 11 the North claimed it had removed 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor to bolster its nuclear arsenal. Satellite photos indicated that the North had removed and repacked earth in an underground tunnel in a remote location at Kilju which could have been preparation for a nuclear test. On the other hand it could have been bluﬀ. According to nuclear specialists, storing, cooling and reprocessing the fuel rods would take at least 18 months so that the North would not be ready for a test until later in 2006. In this they were correct.45 The Japanese were disturbed by the North’spre- parations and two leading politicians from the Democratic Party of Japan

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 (DPJ) Yoshito Sengoku and Seiji Maehara, travelled to Beijing to obtain Chinese assurances against a North Korean nuclear test. They met Wang Jiarui, who was head of the Party’s International Department, and who told them that “If such a thing happens, China will react strongly through diplomatic routes,” and that “there is no country that does not oppose North Korea’s nuclear tests.”46 Speculation about the prospect of a North Korean nuclear test continued in that month when on 19 May the US Senate Republican Policy Committee published a short paper entitled “Anticipating a North Korean Nuclear Test: What’s to Be Done to Avert a Further Crisis.” The Republican Committee was concerned about the impact upon Japan and the pressure on that country The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 119 to go nuclear in response. The policy paper advised Washington to persuade the Chinese to press the North to desist. Dan Fata, the Republican Party policy director for national security and trade, declared that “the key to preventing a nuclear test lies primarily with China,” and indeed many hopes were pinned on the Chinese.47 According to Japanese reports, the Chinese notified the North that a nuclear test would be a “diplomatic red line” and would not be tolerated, which raised the prospect of China’s acceptance of sanctions.48 In September 2006, prominent Japanese politician and Liberal Democratic Party elder Taku Yamasaki met Xiong Guangkai, president of the Institute of Strategic Studies and a former deputy head of the PLA general staff. Xiong told him that China was “absolutely” against a nuclear test by the North which would, he claimed, destroy the Six Party Talks.49 Wang Guangya warned the North Koreans that if they went ahead with a nuclear test “they have to realize that they will face serious consequences.”50 At 10:36 p.m. local time on October 9 2006 the North conducted its first nuclear test in Hamgyong province. North Korea gave China one hours notice of the test, though some Russian reports say the Chinese only had twenty minutes notice. The Chinese then contacted the US Embassy in Beij- ing which quickly informed Washington.51 Most reports indicated a sub kiloton test with a yield considerably less than the 22-kiloton yield of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The Korean Earthquake Research Centre in Seoul reported a 3.58 magnitude tremor from the test area or a yield of 0.8 of a kiloton of TNT: American reports from the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Columbia University estimated a yield between of 0.4 and 2 kilotons, with a 90–95 percent chance that it was below 1 kiloton.52 Only the Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov estimated a higher yield of 5–15 kilotons.53 Initially US intelligence agencies thought that the North was engaged in a bluff since low seismic readings indicated the possibility of a non nuclear test.54 Several hundred tons of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO), a high explosive mixture used in the Oklahoma city bombing in 1995, could have had the same effect when exploded in a mountain tunnel. Later, however, US military WC-135 aircraft flying off the coast of North Korea detected signs of radiation, and confirmed that it was a nuclear test, and that the fuel was plutonium.55 The question was why was the yield so

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 small? One persuasive explanation was that the test was a fizzle or a plutonium device that failed to detonate correctly. After all North Korea had told the Chinese that a 4-kiloton test was on the way but it only achieved a sub-kiloton blast.56 US intelligence agencies later claimed that the test was a result of a partial implosion of plutonium, which was not compressed sufficiently and instanta- neously to trigger the required explosion. They also thought that the test had been conducted in a horizontal tunnel with a vertical drop at the end, which would reduce the chance of radiation leaking into the air.57 This would explain why the initial reports doubted that the test was nuclear. A second explanation was that the North had deliberately tested a low yield or 120 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement miniaturized device which could be used as a warhead on its ballistic missiles. If the North aimed for a yield of considerably less than the Hiroshima bomb this may have been the intention.58 US officials were concerned that the North may have obtained small warhead designs from the A.Q. Khan network, and that Iran and Libya may have obtained similar designs.59 None- theless, it was unlikely that the North had developed the technology to miniaturize a nuclear device or that it could leap to the stage of testing a miniature device with its existing nuclear technology. Banners were unveiled in Pyongyang and crowds gathered to celebrate North Korea’s arrival as a nuclear state-a matter of great pride for the regime. The nuclear test was proclaimed as a symbol of juche, the regime’s ideology of self reliance, which would be used to strengthen regime credibility against domestic discontent that had surfaced as a result of economic failures.60 The Chinese, however, after assuring troubled neighbors that the nuclear test would not occur, were disturbed. Zhang Liangui of the Party School of the Party’s Central Committee, who was one of Beijing’s top North Korea experts, said that the North was China’s biggest foreign policy failure in the last 50 years.61 Zhang argued that China was the “biggest loser” from the test after having repeatedly promised to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and that its image as a responsible power had clearly suffered. A nuclear North Korea would impact upon the Northeast Asian security situation in two possible ways, both to China’s detriment. It could have the effect of stimulating Japan and possibly South Korea and Taiwan to go nuclear themselves, or alternatively it could prompt these countries and Japan in particular to move closer to the US to seek American nuclear protection against the North. If China had regarded the American military presence and the alliances with Japan and the South as a threat then the North Korean nuclear test would make that threat more real.62 Zhu Feng wrote that the North was genuinely indifferent to China’s continuous opposition and warnings against its nuclear program. Beijing, he claimed, had become “fully dis- illusioned” about the North and that its policy of “nuclear appeasement” of Pyongyang should be ended.63 Chinese leaders and intelligence agencies held several crisis meetings after the test to assess options. Some officials called for a reduction of critical

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 supplies of oil and food to the North, a policy option long advocated by critics of China’s policy towards the North.64 Li Wen of the Institute of Asia- Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences advocated this response but there was little support for this move amongst decision makers.65 Party conservatives, however, thought that China would benefitfroma nuclear North which would counterbalance the American military presence in Northeast and the US alliance with Japan.66 External observers of China thought that the test strengthened the position of the reformers and critics who called for a tougher line against the North, and that China would, as a consequence, line up with the US as a result. South Koreans noted what they regarded as a shift of opinion in China in that the critics who were a minority The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 121 in the past became a majority with a stronger voice after the test.67 None- theless, Zhang Liangui observed that a nuclear North Korea would demand to be treated as a nuclear power and would adopt a tougher position in relation to China.68 China may have become critical of the North but at the same time its influence over Pyongyang and its ability to influence the leadership had weakened. Chinese policy towards the North was characterized by an essential inertia and not even a significant event such as a nuclear test could jolt the country out of it. Zhang Liangui thought that China had to make a clear stand against the test but he admitted that China was “cornered diplomatically.”69 It did not want to take action against the North which would strengthen the US and Japan, nor could it simply accept the situation which would detri- mentally affect China in the way outlined above. China’s inertia before the North led some US officials like John Bolton to believe that the Chinese were secretly protecting the North while claiming to cooperate with the US.70 Japanese officials had similar feelings, and some thought that the Chinese were not averse to a nuclear North which would be an ally against Japan. South Korea faced a similar predicament. The Roh administration had insisted that trade and economics would change the North, and would wean its leaders away from adventurism into a more responsible relationship with their brothers in the South. The test raised doubts about the wisdom of this policy. The South Korean reaction was one of outrage. The South Korean National Assembly on 12 October passed a resolution condemning the nuclear test and urged the North to return to the Six Party Talks, by a massive 150 to 18 vote with 16 abstentions.71 Roh convened an emergency security meeting and afterwards the president’soffice issued the following statement; “North Korea’s action unilaterally annulled and destroyed the inter-Korean joint statement of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula agreed between the two Koreas in 1991.”72 Reactions from the press were similar and Hankyorae commented that the North’s test was not aimed at the South but rather was a response to American financial sanctions. None- theless, it would contribute to the deterioration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula which would directly affect the South, and could lead to a larger crisis which could be “our worst nightmare.”73 The test intensified the polarization of South Korean politics between the supporters of the Roh Admin-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 istration and its GNP critics. The father of the Sunshine Policy Kim Dae-jung similarly condemned the test but said that the Bush Administration was responsible because of its annulment of the 1994 Agreed Framework and its refusal to conduct bilateral negotiations with the North. The Six Party Talks, he declared, had become “futile.”74 Critical commentaries blamed the Roh Administration for its naiveté in attempting to build better relations with the North in a way which could jeopardize the alliance with the US. Dong-A Ilbo said that the test “drove us into the worst emergency ever since the Korean war.” The Sunshine Policy promoted by the Roh administration was seen to have “failed completely” and was pursued out of “ignorance” of the North. The September 2005 122 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement statement issued by the Six Party Talks intended to encourage the North to give up its nuclear program “ended up in vapor.”75 Some commented that the Roh administration’s “propaganda campaign” had successfully improved the North’s image in South Korea to the extent that popular opinion felt that a Korean nuclear weapon would make the country strong against Japan.76 Various courses of action were discussed to deal with the new situation. Supporters of the Roh administration thought that South Korea should work with China and Russia to ensure that that the US and Japan would not consider an attack on the North. Critics from the GNP demanded that South Korea strengthen the alliance with the US and cease attacking the Americans over their policy towards the North. The Korea Herald predicted that China and Russia would veto a tough Security Council resolution so it was up to South Korea, the US and Japan to “explore individual and collective measures against the North.”77 American neoconservatives, however saw the test as a “clarifying event” that would end the debate within the Bush administration and crystallize support for tough action against the North.78 They thought it could also shock both China and Russia into supporting the American and the Japanese call for sanctions in the Security Council. Certainly there was hope that this time, both China and Russia would come on board. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso told the press that he expected the Security Council to reach a “unanimous decision” over the issue, and that their response would be “far more severe” than it was in the case of the missile launchings. Japan, he said, had a Chapter VII response in mind.79 President Bush contacted the other parties in the Six Party Talks and claimed that all agreed that the North’s test was a “provocative act” and deserved an “immediate response.” John Bolton told the press that Security Council members were unanimous in their disapproval of North Korea’s actions, and said that “no one’s defending it,” and that “no one came even close to defending it” in the preliminary meetings.80

Security Council Resolution

For the US the time seemed propitious to press for a Chapter VII response. The Chinese indicated their willingness to support a punitive approach if not

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 sanctions as they were outraged by North Korea’s actions. China’s critic of the North Zhang Liankui declared the Six Party Talks were a colossal failure and opined that “If peaceful means can’t stop North Korea from conducting a nuclear test, then there should be other means.” The means were discussed in the Security Council with Japan proposing that trade with the North should be banned, and its vessels and aircraft prohibited from arriving in foreign countries. The US was initially in support of the Japanese proposal but John Bolton wanted to exempt food, medicine and other humanitarian goods for civilians. The Chinese had a very different approach and Wang Guangya insisted that sanctions should target North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, a proposal which reduced the scope of the The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 123 discussions considerably. The Chinese also insisted that the resolution should exclude any possibility of force against the North, which prompted State Department spokesman Sean McCormack to declare that the US had no intention of attacking North Korea, or of forcing a change of regime there.81 The US draft resolution called for a total embargo on North Korea’sarms trade including materials or technology that could be used for its nuclear program, financial controls as well as a ban on luxury goods. The US demanded mandatory searches on the high seas of vessels entering and leaving the North’s ports and the seizure of any weapons or goods that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.82 The US draft included a 30-day deadline for the North to reverse course or face further penalties. China and Russia opposed such wide and extensive measures. The Chinese delegation called for a response under Article 41 which listed measures short of actual armed force, and steered the discussion away from Article 42 which included armed force, blockade and similar operations.83 On October 14 the Security Council finally agreed to a resolution but only after the US, UK and France accomodated last minute objections by China and Russia which were apprehensive that the US may consider military action. Resolution 1718 called on the North to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” In terms of sanctions, it imposed an embargo on the supply, sale or transfer to the North of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems. The US wanted a wider ban on the sale of conventional weapons to the North, while both China and Russia wanted to limit it to specific weapons systems.84 Also prohibited was the provision of large-scale arms, nuclear technology and related equipment to North Korea as well as luxury goods. All UN member states were requested to take cooperative action to inspect cargo to and from the North in accordance with their respective national laws. States were also required to freeze funds, financial assets and economic resources which provide support for the North’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs.85 The Americans were pleased that the Security Council agreed on sanctions. John Bolton said that “today we are sending a strong and clear message to

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 North Korea,” that the consequences of pursuing WMD would be serious.86 The Americans also were very concerned about the impact the resolution would have upon other potential proliferators, in particular Iran. John Bolton stressed the point when he said that “I’m sure they’re watching in Tehran what we do on this North Korea resolution and I hope they watch closely.”87 Russia’s Vitaly Churkin said that Moscow was pleased with a “strong” resolution which would prevent the further escalation of tensions.88 The Resolu- tion had great publicity value in showing that the Security Council could express an opinion in a critical situation which Bolton described as one of the gravest threats to international peace and security that the Council had to face. The Resolution prohibited the supply or sale of goods or technology 124 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement which could enhance the North’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs but the means to do so were left voluntary and dependent upon the laws of each country. Unless the resolution was made mandatory and binding it would be observed by some states, circumvented and ignored by others and there would be no end of difficulty. Wang Guangya added his comment to the Security Council resolution that China “did not approve” of the practice of inspecting cargo to and from the North and urged the countries concerned to refrain from taking any provocative steps.89 Subsequent reports of Wang Guangya’s comments on inspections were more assertive: The New York Times claimed that he said that China would not conduct searches at sea, would not stop ships and board them for ballistic missiles or bomb making equipment.90 The Washington Times reported that Wang had said that the inspections of cargo and the boarding of vessels remained unacceptable to Beijing and China would not carry out inspections.91 Nikkei also reported and that China refused to agree to inspections on the high seas of cargos entering North Korean ports.92 Moreover, the Chinese regarded the ban on luxury goods as unenforceable because the Resolution did not provide a definition of what was meant.93 The Japanese were disappointed by the Resolution as they saw differences emerge over its implementation. Kenzo Oshima declared that Japan would impose its own sanctions on the North which included a prohibition on North Korean vessels from entering Japanese ports, the banning of imports from the North and entry by North Korean nationals into Japan.94 Would it have been possible to prevent the nuclear test? One argument was that the test represented a failure of the Bush Administration’s policy and that if it had not imposed financial sanctions, the September 2005 agreement could have served as a basis for a resolution of the issue. However, the North’s preparations for a test began well before that date as its nuclear program had been under development for over two decades. An agreement in 2005 would not have settled the issue since details and schedules had to be negotiated in subsequent meetings. In the meantime, the nuclear program would have been developing and the North would have had time to confront the world with a nuclear fait accompli. Another question is whether China facilitated the development of the North’s nuclear program and made the test possible by being exceptionally tolerant of Pyongyang’s behavior. Had the Chinese agreed

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 to a tougher resolution in July in response to the North’s missile tests, perhaps it would have hesitated to go ahead with the nuclear test in October. While the Chinese had made it one of their objectives on the Korean Peninsula to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by the North, their refusal to consider tough action against it defeated their purpose. The test was indeed a failure of Chinese diplomacy which Beijing was loath to admit. The North learned that it could exploit Beijing’s tolerance and that it could rely on China’s veto in the Security Council to protect it against the US and Japan. In any case the end result was a change in the game plan of the Six Party Talks as the North would now demand that it be treated as a nuclear power and an equal of the US. The Chinese claimed that they had wrested a pledge The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 125 from the North not to conduct a second nuclear test and intimated to others that the North had expressed regret for the first test, but did not apologize.95 Since the first nuclear test was only a partial success, it was very likely that the North would conduct another test to overcome the technical problems. The North could readily rely upon Chinese support and the two UN resolutions showed in any case that there were no real penalties for defying Beijing. Condoleezza Rice and John Bolton said that China should shoulder the main responsibility of enforcing sanctions and without China’s cooperation sanctions would be ineffective.96 What could be expected of China when its views on sanctions were well known? The Americans thought that as the nuclear test was a humiliation for China, it would be prompted to side with the US, and that the UN resolution would be a convenient cover for China to act against the North by enforcing sanctions. The four state-owned Chinese banks froze their North Korean accounts and financial transactions. The Chinese Central Bank regulator Liu Lianke affirmed that China was coop- erating with the UN sanctions to block illicit bank transactions with the North.97 Nonetheless, trade continued as normal across the Chinese–North Korean border without inspections of cargo entering or leaving the North, although there were reports of inspections by the Chinese at the Border town of Dandong.98 Condoleezza Rice met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to obtain Russia’s cooperation in this task but found the Russians reluctant. Russia had an 18-kilometer border with the North and goods were transported through the border town of Hasan where inspections of cargo were not implemented.99 The Americans had hoped to deal with the North through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which was created by the US in May 2003 to stop the trafficking of technology and materials related to WMD. In the American view the PSI could be a more effective mechanism than UN sanctions for interdicting shipments of WMD material if its membership were expanded. The problem was that any effort to enforce sanctions against North Korea would require China’s cooperation and China was opposed to the PSI. Even South Korea dithered over joining the PSI and did so only under a GNP president in May 2009. The Roh Administration was caught in a difficult dilemma again as the US expected South Korea to enforce the UN Resolution as an ally, while its own

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 policies demanded that it make every effort to reach out to the North. The South’s economic projects with the North came under fire as Chris Hill, with some irritation, declared on October 18 that they were designed to fund the North’s nuclear weapons development.100 In response, the South Korean government countered that there was no evidence that these funds went into the nuclear program but the suspicions were strong. GNP lawmaker Choi Kyoung-hwan had the figures and he declared that $3.7 billion had been sent to North Korea since 1998 as income from the Gaesong industrial and Mt. Geumgang projects; in addition there was the $480 million payment for the 2000 summit and $7.22 million in payment as salaries to North Korean workers between 2003 and August 2005.101 The Korea Herald supported the 126 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement GNP and argued that there was no sense in continuing humanitarian and economic aid to the North after the nuclear test.102 Despite the attacks on the projects, they were in no danger of being terminated as they were the South’s only major connection with the North and if anything, the hope was that they would be expanded in future years. They were supported by the Uri party chairman Kim Geun-tae and both the MOFA and the Unification Ministry insisted that the economic projects were not specifically covered by the UN resolution and would continue.103 Powerful business interests were involved as Hyundai took advantage of cheap North Korean labor for the production of goods that were becoming too expensive to produce in the South. The Roh administration could not just ignore the UN resolution so it announced that economic projects would continue, but with “improvements” that were not explained. The National Security Advisor Song Min-soon said that Seoul was still reviewing the appropriate level of participation in the UN resolution, and that adjustments to the projects would be made at the operational level.104 Soon afterwards on 1 November, in a move interpreted as rejection of US pressure, President Roh reshuffled his cabinet and appointed new foreign, defense unification and intelligence chiefs. All but the defense chief were supporters his North Korea policy. Most controversial was the appointment of Song Ming-soon as Foreign Minister since he was an outspoken critic of the Bush Administration and its approach to North Korea.105 Roh declared that despite the nuclear test, South Korea would be on friendly terms with the North and that “we won’t put anything above peace.”106 The Americans had seen China and Russia dilute the force of two UN resolutions relating to the North’s ballistic missile launches and its nuclear test. Resolution 8778 was simply an expression of collective outrage that the North could brush off. Resolution 1718 was somewhat more serious but its implementation was left to states that had no intention of complying, mindful as they were about the North’s reactions. It was disingenuous of the Amer- icans to rejoice over a toothless resolution, and then to claim that the main responsibility for its implementation lay with China when they knew very well that the Chinese had no such interest. Condoleezza Rice said that she expected most searches to take place at ports, and that the US would not rush to interdict vessels on the high seas going to North Korea.107 The Americans

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 expected the Chinese, Russians and the South Koreans to enforce sanctions while they themselves were unwilling. If the hope was that others would do their job for them, even though they had shown no disposition to do so themselves, then the Americans were greatly mistaken. If the hope was that the US could somehow press the other parties to comply with the resolution on the basis of its supposed legal status then they were misled yet again by their own expectations. A former State Department oﬃcial Joel Wit thought that sanctions would not force the North to change course and it would simply weather the storm. In his view the Six Party Talks had failed to deal with the situation and the US had to devise a “new diplomatic strategy.”108 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 127 America’s options

What new diplomatic strategy could the Americans adopt? China had failed them yet it had been the fulcrum of US policy in relation to the North Korean nuclear program. The Americans continually assumed that the Chi- nese shared their interest in this issue and that they would prioritize the objective of denuclearization of the North above all else. They failed to recognize that the main Chinese priority was to prevent the Americans from destabilizing the situation by resorting to sanctions or force. The Six Party Talks were an arena for this veiled contest between the US and China over which objective had priority in the collective deliberations. Both Americans and Chinese agreed that they had to maintain the momentum of the talks which became a goal in itself as no one wanted to accept responsibility for their failure. While the US attempted to swing the Chinese to their side and to press the North into compliance, the Chinese sought to involve the US in bilateral talks with the North, which was for them a solution to their dilemma in dealing with the North. If the US could be induced to accept bilateral talks, the only feasible outcome would be a return to the Agreed Framework which would allow the US to proclaim victory while preserving Chinese interests on the Peninsula and the relationship with the North. China would enjoy the benefits of a negotiated solution without the need to pressure the North which could give rise to resentment and difficulty in the relationship. Basically, the Chinese wanted the Americans to save the situation for them and their careful maneuvering was intended to put the US into a position where it saw no other option. When Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met Condoleezza Rice on 20 October in the aftermath of the test, the differences in their positions became clearer as they were moving in different directions. The Chinese wanted to appease the US by showing that they were genuinely working for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.109 State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan visited Pyongyang to press the North Koreans over the nuclear issue and told the Secretary of State that his visit was “not in vain.”110 After Rice met Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Tang, she then declared that China had given a “strong message” to North Korea. Press reports of the meeting indicated that the US and China spoke in a “unified voice” to call for the resumption of Six Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program and that China had adopted a tougher approach over the issue. The Chinese intimated that they would be prepared to impose their own sanctions on the North if it continued to develop its nuclear program, or if it refused to return to the talks. The raft of sanctions mentioned included the reduction of oil supplies in the way the Americans had earlier insisted.111 Why did the Chinese not consider this before the nuclear test was conducted? If indeed they had resorted to a tougher position over the issue well before these events had occurred, perhaps there would have been a different outcome. Chinese intimations of tougher sanctions after the event were unconvincing. 128 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement The Chinese motive was to prevent a breakdown in the relationship with the US over the Six Party Talks and to keep the Americans in a position of dependency on Beijing over the Korean Peninsula. To reach their objective of a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue they had to keep the Americans involved in the talks and to restore American belief in their ability to bring about results. Moreover, the fear that the Americans would resort to force never left the Chinese and they had every incentive to prevent this. Rice said that she intended to allay fears that the US would regard the situation as another “Cuban missile crisis,” where the US would resort to a naval blockade of the North.112 Despite Rice’sefforts to soothe fears the Chinese were disturbed by reports that the Pentagon had stepped up contingency planning for a military strike on the North after the nuclear test, which would include a tomahawk cruise missile or B-2 attack on Yongbyon. US Special Forces would conduct a joint operation with their South Korean equivalent to destroy the nuclear facilities hidden in underground facilities in the moun- tains, including the HEU program.113 The South Korean military was also working on its own plans for a surgical strike on the North which would involve F-15K fighters dropping JDAM satellite guided-bombs on the nuclear facilities, or the use of short range missiles and Cheonryong land attack cruise missiles.114 The military option was a risky one as there was no assurance that all targets could be located let alone destroyed. Whether the US command or the South Koreans had accurate knowledge of the location of these nuclear facilities including the HEU program was an open question, yet in the absence of such intelligence, the US could only achieve the destruction of visible targets such as the Yongbyon reactor. Hidden nuclear facilities about which little was known would still permit the revival of a nuclear weapons program. Any such plans for a military strike on the North were nonetheless constrained by the ever present fear that the North would retaliate against the South in a barrage of artillery and missile firings, which would devastate Seoul and trigger another Korean war.

US concessions and moves to bilateral talks

When Rice met Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Tang Jiaxuan the Chinese

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 demanded that the Americans lift the financial sanctions to allow the Six Party Talks to resume, and that they conduct bilateral negotiations with the North. Rice reiterated that the North should return unconditionally to the talks and that financial restrictions would not be lifted just to entice the North back to the negotiations.115 Chinese demands placed the Americans in a difficult position. The test had given the North the confidence to behave as a nuclear power, in which case the talks would no longer focus on the termination of the nuclear program but on mutual nuclear reductions with the US. If the Six Party Talks resumed the North would predictably stand its ground and reject all the demands that had been raised in previous rounds. It had tested not only a nuclear weapon but the Chinese response and had found that China The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 129 was unwilling to join the Americans in joint condemnation, and indeed had protected it against stiff sanctions in the Security Council. For the US, the move to bilateral talks with the North was fraught with grave political risks as not only had the Bush Administration consistently rejected the notion but it would be tantamount to a reward to the North. It would signal to the North that it obtained what it had wanted for so long by staging the provocative act of a nuclear test. It would confirm for the North that provocation was a tactic by which a relatively small power could manage both China and the US and embarrass their leaders into getting what it wanted. In this way the North would learn that provocative acts would succeed and the necessary means to stage those acts in the form of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons would not be negotiated. On November 1 the North agreed to return to the Six Party Talks despite the fact that the US had not lifted the financial sanctions that it had demanded. The North Korean Foreign Ministry declared that it would re-join the talks on the basis that the resolution of the financial sanctions issue would be on the agenda.116 The North had made a concession over the financial sanctions issue for various reasons. One was that the US had shown flexibility over the issue as demanded by the Chinese. The US ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow had said that the US would create a working group to examine the issue of financial sanctions within the Six Party Talks which held out the prospect that they would in time be lifted.117 There were reports that Macau’s monetary authority was lifting the freeze on the North’s accounts which was regarded by the North as an American concession to entice it back into the talks, although this was fiercely denied at the time.118 A second explanation was that Chinese pressure on the North had worked and that Pyongyang wanted to repair the relationship with Beijing by at least acceding to its demand to return to the talks. A third explanation was raised by Takashi Ohizumi, the Director General of Japan’s the Public Security Intelligence Agency, who claimed that sanctions were having a considerable impact upon the North Korean economy and compelled it to return to the talks.119 A fourth explanation was that the North wanted to return in triumph to the Six Party Talks as a nuclear power equal to the US and wanted to convert them into negotiations over US nuclear protection of the South and

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Japan.120 The most likely explanation and one that was borne out by subsequent events was that the North wanted the US to lift the financial sanctions and had to return to the negotiations for this purpose. The North may have had ambitions to be recognized as a nuclear power and to transform the Six Party Talks in the way suggested but financial sanctions were a pressing urgency which had to be addressed and removed. Trilateral meetings between Chris Hill, Kim Kye-kwan and Chinese officials were held in Beijing over Novem- ber 28–29 in preparation for the Six Party Talks. The Americans had shifted from their previous demand for up front disablement of the North’s nuclear program to a freeze which was a considerable concession to the North and 130 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement recognition of its new status. They also offered to work towards the lifting of financial sanctions but they were unwilling to do that until the counterfeiting issue was resolved.121 The Americans were also willing to offer a written security guarantee and a detailed package of economic, food and energy assistance for the North as an incentive for it to surrender its nuclear weapons program. These were to be staged so that if the North accepted the freeze and allowed inspections by the IAEA, it would be rewarded with energy, food, and economic aid. However, the Americans expected the North to demonstrate good faith by dismantling some facilities even before joining the talks. These concessions were of some embarrassment to the Bush Administration after it had insisted on the elimination of the nuclear program as a precondi- tion before anything else could be negotiated. Chris Hill told the press that negotiations were reaching a “fork in the road” but there was little to justify this optimism.122 After a hiatus of 13 months, the Six Party Talks were held over December 18–22 2006. The North demanded that the US lift financial sanctions before it would discuss the freeze of the nuclear weapons program. Kim Kye-kwan said that US wanted “too much” in exchange for the lifting of financial sanctions and told the press that even this would not automatically result in a freeze of the nuclear program.123 The North insisted that when “circumstances matured,” it would abandon its nuclear weapons program and also freeze the Yongbyon reactor when “certain conditions are met.”124 Again there were no results and resolution of the nuclear issue remained distant. Hankyorae reported that the North’s attitude was unchanged, and that its negotiating strategy was based on sheer obstructionism in the expectation that others would give way. This time, however, the US was seen to be flexible.125 The difficulty for the Americans was that the North had achieved its ambition and had become a nuclear power of a kind, and it was hardly motivated to accept the proposals which were being offered which were, in any case, overtaken by events. South Korean commentaries noted that the North expected to be recognized as a nuclear power during the Six Party Talks, and wanted to transform them into a nuclear disarmament conference involving the US.126 The North Koreans could simply hold out with Chinese tolerance and wait for the Americans to come around to their position. The Americans had already indicated that they would conduct bilateral talks with the North and

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 were under pressure to do so from both China and South Korea.127 Chris Hill had been meeting with Kim Kye-kwan regularly so this was not a radical proposal. Informal meetings intended to set the agenda for the Six Party Talks would give way to more formal bilateral meetings, the results of which would be endorsed by the Six Party Talks. Despite the determination of the Bush administration to resist this outcome and to have the Six Party Talks as the main negotiation forum with the North, the Americans had little alternative. China had failed the Americans as they had misjudged its position, thinking that there was a greater commonality with Beijing than there was in reality. The Americans discovered to their chagrin that the other members of the Six Party Talks would line up with China fearing as they did that the The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 131 Bush Administration would destabilize the Korean Peninsula. Their one ally, Japan, was under the leadership of the neoconservative Shinzo Abe who had championed the abduction issue and already dismissed the Six Party Talks. The Daily Yomiuri declared that the Six Party Talks “served only as a tool for North Korea to buy time so that it could carry out a nuclear test,” and they “went round in circles and got nowhere.”128 Nonetheless, some Japanese Foreign Ministry oﬃcials persisted in seeking dialogue with the North in the way Koizumi had attempted in his visit to Pyongyang in 2002. One such oﬃcial was Deputy Foreign Minister Tsuneo Nishida who was, however, removed from his position and sent to Canada as Ambassador.129

The Berlin talks

By the time the US met North Korea in bilateral talks in Berlin over 16–18 January 2007 the Bush Administration’s position had changed considerably. Not only could the US not rely upon China or South Korea to deal with the North, but heavy involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan had limited American options severely. The neoconservative tide which was so trium- phant at the initial stages of the Bush Administration was waning as the dismal results of over commitment in the war against terrorism became manifest. Public dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration’s wars was expressed in the November Congressional elections with a landmark victory for the Democratic Party which won both the House of Representatives and the Senate. On December 9 2006 John Bolton resigned as US representative to the UN and he was followed by Donald Rumsfeld on December 18. Robert Joseph, who was the last remaining neoconservative who shaped policy towards North Korea on a day to day basis, held out until January 24 2007. The way was clear for the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had been previously marginalized by the neoconservatives, to follow up on the informal talks that Chris Hill had been having with the North Koreans during and on the side of the Six Party Talks in Beijing. Instead of accom- panying the Six Party Talks and resolving deadlocks arising from them, bilateral talks could now actually be conducted before the Six Party Talks. Direct talks between the US and North Korea would set the agenda which

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 wouldbesubsequentlyaffirmed by the Six Party Talks, a significant development. The change of venue to Berlin was propitious, as the US and the North had conducted negotiations there over the ballistic missile program in 1999. This was the first occasion that the talks would include the nuclear issue on the agenda. In Berlin, Chris Hill told Kim Kye-kwan that if the North surrendered its nuclear programs the US would engage in “a bilateral process” to establish “a normal relationship” with it.130 The details of the negotiations were not released until much later but Chris Hill raised hopes by saying that it was a “substantive discussion,” and that “the proof of the pudding will be when we all sit down together in the six-party negotiations.”131 On 17 January Condoleezza 132 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement Rice joined Chris Hill who gave her a one page outline of the negotiations; the Secretary of State then briefed the President and the National Security Advisor Steve Hadley. Bush agreed to proceed and urged her to continue with the talks, which was official approval of the bilateral meeting with the North that he had vowed to avoid.132 The Americans, however, insisted that this meeting did not contradict the Administration’s refusal to hold bilateral talks with the North. The Secretary of State explained that “we’re not going outside the six- party framework to bilateralize our discussions with the North Koreans,” and that “we will use bilateral contacts with the North Koreans when they are useful to prepare for the six-party talks and we’ve done that several times before.”133 Despite its frustration with the process the US was still bound to the Six Party Talks and had to continue with them. The Americans had to be willing to reconsider their position on financial sanctions to make an agreement possible and reports of the Berlin Talks indicated flexibility over the issue.134 After the talks US Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser met his North Korean counterpart in Beijing on January 30. The US began to review the North’s accounts with BDA to determine which accounts were linked to legitimate businesses and could be unfrozen. Details of the talks were not released. But it was later revealed that the US had accepted a freeze of the Yongbyon reactor at the Berlin Talks and in exchange, would provide the North with energy and humanitarian assistance.135 The North Korean reaction was positive as the Foreign Ministry stated that there was “certain agreement” with the US at Berlin.136 The South was similarly optimistic as Foreign Minister Song Min-soon thought that the North was showing flexibility in response to the US proposal.137 South Korea was also heartened by the talks which had been conducted by US Treasury officials with the North, and indicated that “a major hurdle” in negotiating with the North over the nuclear program was being removed.138 The Japanese remained skeptical however, The Yomiuri noting that while the North may obtain a partial lifting of US financial sanctions it would “flimflam” on the key issue of denuclearization, and would find reasons to prolong the process as it had done in the past. According to The Yomiuri it was “obvious that Pyongyang is buying time to become a nuclear nation by fait accompli.”139 The Japanese attempted to obtain Chinese and South Korean support to place the abduc-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 tion issue in the agenda for negotiations with the North, but this was rejected by both. The outlines of the North’s negotiating position became clearer in early February after Joel Wit had visited Pyongyang. He met Kim Kye-kwan and others and in an interview with The Yomiuri revealed that the North was prepared to freeze activity at the Yongbyon reactor and it would accept inspections from the IAEA. In exchange, it demanded more than 500,000 tons of fuel oil annually, an American written promise to lift ﬁnancial sanctions and its removal from the list of countries supporting international terrorism. It also demanded LWRs as a condition for the ﬁnal surrender of the nuclear program.140 The Chinese had set February 8 as the date for the convening of the Six Party Talks to discuss the agreement reached between the US The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 133 and the North. To many it seemed that the critical breakthrough had been made at last.

Conclusion The North’s nuclear test revealed the limits of China’sinﬂuence over the regime. Since the talks began in 2003, it had been assumed by the Americans that China was the pivotal player in the negotiations. They had expected that the Chinese would press the North into nuclear disarmament and deliver the desired results. China’s experience with the North revealed how dependent regimes may actually entrap their supporting great powers into positions from which they cannot escape. The North was too important for China as an ally against the US and Japan for the relationship to be jeo- pardised and though the Chinese may have reacted in anger to the North’s tests, they ensured that UN Security Council resolutions would be diluted over the issue. The North could get away with the missile and nuclear tests because it understood that the Chinese were hamstrung by their need for an ally and ensnared by their own strategic interests. Conspiracy theorists in the West believed that China was deliberately encouraging the North against the US which is why it was unwilling to take action against it. It would be more accurate, however, to characterize the Chinese position more in terms of helplessness. In their unbounded optimism the Americans believed that the China would come around, and in time rise to the occasion bringing a resolution of the kind they wanted. China’s helplessness before the North’s tests was a revelation in many senses and indicated to the Americans that if they wanted any kind of resolution of the issue, they had to deal with the North directly. Embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a public swing against the Republicans in the Congressional elections of November 2006, the Bush Administration had no alternative but to do what it had sworn not to. With the resignation of several major neoconservatives in the administration the way was open for the moderates in the Administration to push for bilateral talks with the North. The alignment between Condoleezza Rice and Chris Hill was most important in bringing the Administration out of a policy dead-end and to open up other opportunities. This was attempted in the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Berlin talks of January 2007. The significance of the move could not be missed. The shift to bilateral talks demanded that the US drop its previous insistence on disablement of the nuclear program before a resolution could be negotiated which was a concession of major proportions. To entice the North into the negotiations, the US was obliged to promise the North that the financial sanctions that it had imposed earlier would be lifted. Although the Americans would not admit it this shift of position was an admission of weakness before a North which held the trump cards. Not only did the North have a protector in China that could be relied upon to fend off pressure against it, but it had achieved nuclear status in the face of American efforts to prevent it. 134 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement Could the September 2005 agreement have prevented the North from going ahead with the nuclear test? President Roh gave vent to the feeling that the September 2005 agreement was undermined because of American financial sanctions, and that an agreement was on hand which was destroyed by the US Treasury Department. American financial sanctions did not prevent an agreement over the nuclear program since the North’s lunge towards nuclear weapons had started much earlier. The ballistic missile and nuclear tests were set to a long-term schedule in the North and were not tied to the fleeting and ephemeral results of negotiating rounds in the Six Party Talks. It is doubtful that the development of the nuclear program would have been interrupted by an agreement that promised fewer benefits to the North than nuclear power status. Moreover, the details of the September 2005 agreement were to be negotiated in subsequent rounds and at any stage the North could have raised difficulties and problems which would have held up the negotiations, providing time for the completion of its nuclear program.

Notes 1 Ryu Jin, “Seoul Upbeat Over NK Nuclear Talks,” The Korea Times, January 21 2006. 2 Editorial “Kim Jong-il’s China visit,” The Korea Herald January 20 2006. 3 Seo Dong-shin, “Seoul Eyes Reform in North After Trip,” The Korea Times, January 20 2006. 4 Ryu Jin, “Seoul Upbeat Over NK Nuclear Talks,” The Korea Times, January 21 2006. 5 Ryu Jin, “China Offers Nuke Talks Next Month,” The Korea Times, January 21 2006. 6 Choe Sang-hun, “Roe warns US over N. Korea,” International Herald Tribune, January 25 2006. 7 Lee Tee Jong, “Roh warns of brewing conflict with US over North Korea,” The Straits Times, January 26 2006. 8 Editorial “Seoul-Washington Rift,” The Korea Herald, January 27 2006. 9 “US wrecked previous agreement with N Korea, says Roh,” The Straits Times, December 23 2006. 10 Editorial “Seoul-Washington Rift,” The Korea Herald, January 27 2006. 11 “China, Russia urge flexibility on N.K. nuke: Joint statement calls for ‘constructive’ attitude for denuclearized Korean Peninsula,” The Korea Herald, March

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 23 2006. 12 “N. Korea on agenda at Bush-Hu summit,” The Korea Herald, April 19 2006. 13 Joseph Kahn and Christine Hauser, “China’s Leader Makes First White House Visit,” The New York Times, April 20 2006; “A less than satisfying visit,” The Japan Times, April 25 2006. 14 Tom Plate, “China unlikely to double-deal over Korea,” The Japan Times,May8 2006. 15 “N Korea may have removed Taepodong-2 Missile from Launch site,” Nikkei, August 4 2006. 16 “N Korea may be preparing for Taeopoding-2 launch,” Nikkei, May 19 2006. “North Prepare to fire missiles,” The Japan Times, June 19 2006. 17 Bill Gertz “North Korea launches missiles,” The Washington Times, July 5 2006. 18 “Taepodong Missile Exploded in Midair,” The Korea Times, July 31 2006. The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 135 19 Bill Gertz “Missile defence tested briefly in rockets failure,” The Washington Times, July 6 2006. 20 “North Korea missiles take ‘leap forward,’” The Japan Times, March 12 2006. 21 Thomas Ricks and Anthony Faiola. “Inept N Korea is shown up by ‘ridiculous’ test,” The Washington Post, August 7 2006. 22 Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea matches tough US stance on tests,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, July 7 2006. 23 Tong Kim “Missiles: Kim Jong-il’s Calculation,” The Korea Times, August 5 2006. 24 Tong Kim “Missiles: Kim Jong-il’s Calculation.” 25 Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea matches tough US stance on tests,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, July 7 2006. 26 Joseph Curl, “Bush hits direct N. Korea Talks,” The Washington Times, July 6 2006. 27 Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” The New York Times, July 23 2006. 28 Christopher Carpenter, “China walks a fine line with North,” The Korea Times, August 4 2006. 29 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four, Autumn 2006. 30 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald, May 28 2008. 31 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea.” 32 Christopher Carpenter, “China walks a fine line with North.” 33 “Pyongyang must join informal six party talks,” Hankyorae, July 11 2006; Warren Hoge and Norimitsu Onishi, “China Fights Sanctions To Punish North Korea,” The New York Times, July 8 2006. 34 Joseph Curl, “Bush urges N. Korea Restraint,” The Washington Times,July7 2006. 35 Warren Hoge and Joseph Kahn, “U.N. Asked to Consider New North Korea Resolution,” The New York Times, July 12 2006. 36 Warren Hoge and Norimitsu Onishi, “China Fights Sanctions To Punish North Korea,” The New York Times, July 8 2006. 37 “Pyongyang must join informal six party talks,” Hankyorae, July 11 2006. 38 Edward Cody, “China Critical of U.N. Draft on N. Korea,” The Washington Post, July 12 2006. 39 Edward Cody, “China Critical of U.N. Draft on N. Korea.” 40 Warren Hoge and Joseph Kahn, “ U.N. Asked to Consider New North Korea Resolution,” The New York Times, July 12 2006. 41 Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Missile Launches, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006) Security Council SC 8778, July 15 2006, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm. 42 Ibid.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 43 Editorial “Deeper into Isolation,” The Korea Times, July 30 2006. 44 Betsy Pisik, “UN Council condemns North Korea,” The Washington Times, July 16 2006. 45 James Brooke, “North Koreans Claim to Extract Fuel for Nuclear Weapons.” The New York Times, May 12 2005. 46 “China to ‘React Strongly’ to N Korea Nuke Test: Lawmaker,” Nikkei,May13 2005. 47 “U.S warns of Asian nuclear arms race,” The New York Times, June 4 2005. 48 “China Views N Korea Nuke Test as Crossing ‘diplomatic Red Line,” Nikkei, June 5 2005. 49 “China ‘Absolutely Against’ N Korean Nuke Test: Japan Lawmaker,” Nikkei, September 2 2006. 136 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 50 David Lague, “China Joins with Critics of N Korea,” International Herald Tri- bune, October 6 2006. 51 David E. Sanger, “Test follows warning from UN,” International Herald Tribune, October 9 2006. 52 Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel, “A Technical Analysis: Decon- structing North Korea’s October 9 Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Association www. armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/tech. 53 “Scientists hold fire over whether it’s blast or bluff,” Business Times (Singapore), October 10 2006. 54 Bill Gertz, “US doubts Korean Test was nuclear,” The Washington Times, Octo- ber 10 2006. 55 Bill Gertz and Betsy Pisik, “US Finding indicates Nuclear Test,” The Washington Times, 14 October 2006; Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger, “North Korean Fuel identified as Plutonium,” The New York Times, October 17 2006. 56 Bill Gertz and Betsy Pisik, “US Finding indicates Nuclear Test,” The Washington Times, October 14 2006. 57 Dafna Linzer, Walter Pincus, “US Detects Signs of Radiation Consistent with Test,” The Washington Post, October 14 2006. 58 Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel, “A Technical Analysis: Decon- structing North Korea’s October 9 Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Association www. armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/tech. 59 Bill Gertz, “US doubts Korean Test was nuclear,” The Washington Times, Octo- ber 10 2006. 60 Cheon Seong-whun, “N.K. nuke policy aims to withdraw U.S. forces: The North is highly likely to conduct a second test to demonstrate its nuclear bomb capability,” The Korea Herald, January 31 2007. 61 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea,” The Japan Times, October 23 2006. 62 Zhang Liangui, “Coping with a Nuclear North Korea,” China Security, issue 4, 2006. 63 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four, 2006. 64 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea,” The Japan Times, October 23 2006. 65 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea.” 66 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four, 2006. 67 “China Envoy Meets with N.K. Leader,” The Korea Herald, 20 October 2006. 68 Zhang Liangui, “Coping with a Nuclear North Korea,” China Security, issue 4, 2006. 69 Zhang Liangui, “Coping with a Nuclear North Korea.”

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 70 David Lague, “China Joins with Critics of N Korea,” International Herald Tri- bune, October 6 2006. 71 Kim Ji-hyun, “Policy rift deepens over North Korea,” The Korea Herald, October 13 2006. 72 Lee Joo-hee “North Korea defies the world,” The Korea Herald, October 10 2011. 73 “From the North: Shock and poor judgment,” Hankyorae, October 10 2006, http://english.hani.co.kr/art/english_edition/e_editorial/163208.html. 74 Ryu Jin, “Kim Dae jung blames US for Nuke crisis,” The Korea Times, October 11 2006. 75 “State of Emergency,” Dong-A Ilbo, October 10 2006. http://english.donga.com/ srv/service.php3?biid=2006101048748&path_dir=20061010. 76 Choe Won-jin and Jack Kim, “The Logic behind South Korea’s big embrace of North Korea Nukes,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 10 2005. The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 137 77 Editorial “What NK can Expect,” The Korea Herald, October 10 2006. 78 Glenn Kessler, “Reported test ‘fundamentally changes the landscape’ for US officials,” Washington Post, October 9 2006. 79 “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Aso”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 9, 2006. www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2006/10/1009.html. 80 David Stout and John O’Neil, “North Korea’s Claim Is Met With Doubt and Anger,” The New York Times, October 11 2006. 81 Colum Lynch and Maureen Fan, “China Says It Will Back Sanctions On N. Korea,” The Washington Post, October 11 2006. 82 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea,” The Japan Times, October 23 2006. 83 Yochi J. Dreazen, Evan Ramstad, “WSJ: Powers are split over how to punish Pyongyang,” Nikkei, October 12 2006. 84 Edith M. Lederer, “UN Imposes trade embargo on N. Korea,” The Washington Times, October 15 2006. 85 Security Council condemns nuclear test by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, unanimously adopting Resolution 1718 (2006), Security Council, October 14 2006, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm; “UN Sec Council Mulls Trade, Financial Sanctions against N Korea,” Nikkei, October 14 2006. 86 “UN imposes sanctions on NK,” The Korea Herald, October 16 2006. 87 “UN imposes sanctions on NK.” 88 Edith M. Lederer, “UN Imposes trade embargo on N. Korea,” The Washington Times, October 15 2006. 89 Resolution 1718 (2006), Security Council, October 14 2006. 90 Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger, “North Korean Fuel identified as Plutonium,” The New York Times, October 17 2006. 91 Edith M. Lederer, “UN Imposes trade embargo on N. Korea,” The Washington Times, October 15 2006. 92 Yochi J. Dreazen, Evan Ramstad, “WSJ: Powers are split over how to punish Pyongyang,” Nikkei, October 12 2006. 93 Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “China-North Korea relations,” in Suk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig and Bernhard Seliger (eds) The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations, McFarland & Co., Jefferson, North Carolina, 2011, p. 134. 94 Resolution 1718 (2006), Security Council, October 14 2006. 95 Nicholas Kralev, “China Wrests N. Korea Pledge,” The Washington Times, October 21 2006; “N Korea leader says sorry to China over nuke test,” Nikkei, October 20 2006. 96 Brian DeBose, “US expects China to lead on Sanctions,” The Washington Times, October 16 2006. 97 “China moves to stem N Korea money flows,” The Japan Times, November 3

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 2006. 98 Jim Yardley, “China’s Border stays open,” International Herald Tribune, October 27 2006: “China on NK Bomb,” The Korea Herald, October 18 2006. 99 Kenichi Ogata, “Russia treads softly, softly over sanctions,” Yomiuri Shimbun,23 October 2006. 100 “US needs to back off from inter-Korean projects,” Hankyorae, October 19 2006, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/165656.html. 101 Jin Hyun-joo, “GNP attacks N Korea exchanges,” The Korea Herald, October 18 2006. 102 Editorial “What NK can Expect,” The Korea Herald, October 10 2006. 103 Norimitsu Onishi, “Questions Grow over UN Curbs on North Korea,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, October 16 2006. 138 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 104 Lee Joo-hee, “Seoul urged to get tough on N. Korea,” The Korea Herald, October 19 2006. 105 Jung Sung ki, “Roh defies Bush on North Korea policy,” The Korea Times, November 4 2006. 106 “US to rethink financial curbs on North: envoy,” The Japan Times November 4 2006. 107 Norimitsu Onishi, “Questions Grow over UN Curbs on North Korea,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, October 16 2006. 108 Joel Wit, “Pyongyang regime could collapse under international pressure,” The Korea Herald, October 31 2006. 109 China wants to pull strings in N-crisis,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 22 2006. 110 Takashi Sakamoto and Tetsuya Suetsugu, “DPRK urged to return to talks Tang tells Rice meeting in Pyongyang was ‘not in vain’,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 21 2006. 111 Thom Shanker and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. and China Call for North Korea to Rejoin 6-Nation Talks on Nuclear Program, “ The New York Times, October 21 2006. 112 Glenn Kessler, “China Gave ‘Strong Message’ To North Koreans, Rice Says, “The Washington Post, October 21 2006. 113 “US Speeds N. Korea attack contingency plan: report,” Reuters, November 3 2006. http://today.reuters.com/misc/PrinterFriendlyPopup.aspx?type=topNews&st oryID-2006–1: also Bill Gertz “US speeds attack plans for North Korea,” The Washington Times, November 3 2006. 114 Jin Dae-woong, “Military works on nuclear defense plans,” The Korea Herald, October 28 2006. 115 “China wants to pull strings in N-crisis,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 22 2006; Takashi Sakamoto and Tetsuya Suetsugu, “DPRK urged to return to talks Tang tells Rice meeting in Pyongyang was ‘not in vain’,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 21 2006; Thom Shanker and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. and China Call for North Korea to Rejoin 6-Nation Talks on Nuclear Program, “ The New York Times October 21 2006. 116 Lee Joo-hee, “Seoul optimistic of early resolution to US financial sanctions on NK,” The Korea Herald, November 2 2006. 117 “US to rethink financial curbs on North: envoy,” The Japan Times November 4 2006: Reiji Yoshida, “Sanctions pain or nuclear confidence?” The Japan Times, November 12 2006. 118 “Macau denies lifting freeze on N. Korea cash,” The Japan Times, November 23 2006. 119 Teruaki Ueno, “North Korean Regime feeling some sanctions heat,” The Japan Times, November 4 2006. 120 Lee Joo-hee, “Seoul optimistic of early resolution to US financial sanctions on

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 NK,” The Korea Herald, November 2 2006. 121 Helen Cooper, David E. Sanger, “US offers N. Korea aid, with restrictions,” International herald Tribune, December 6 2006. 122 “N. Korea arms talks ‘at fork in road’: Washington, Tokyo,” The Japan Times, December 19 2006. 123 “Japan, US plan hard line/Will demand North Korea scrap N-Program,” The Korea Herald, December 26 2006. 124 Lee Joo-hee, “US, N Korea Lay groundwork for further talks,” The Korea Herald, December 22 2006. 125 ‘North’s strategy of failure at the 6 party talks,” Hankyorae, December 23 2006. 126 “Choice of the North,” The Korea Herald, 3 January 2007 Nam Sung-wook, “‘South-North relations will be more turbulent’: Expert says N.K. nuclear issue The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 139 and South’s presidential election will affect bilateral relations,” The Korea Herald, January 13 2007. 127 ‘North’s strategy of failure at the 6 party talks,” Hankyorae, December 23 2006. 128 “Remove taboo from debates over Japan’s national security,” The Daily Yomiuri January 1 2007. 129 Takashi Oda “Abe over focused on abduction issue,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 26 2007. 130 Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Open to Bilateral Talks on Ties With N. Korea,” The Washington Post January 18 2007. 131 Mark Landler and Thom Shanker, “North Korea and U.S. Envoys Meet in Berlin,” The New York Times, January 18 2007. 132 Helene Cooper and Jim Yardley, “Pact with North Korea draws fire from a wide range of critics in the US,” The New York Times, February 14 2007. 133 “U.S. denies Berlin talks are policy shift,” The Korea Herald, January 20 2007. 134 “US Mulls easing on NK funds,” The Korea Herald, January 23 2007. 135 Donald G. Gross, “Unexpected Progress on All Fronts,” Comparative Connec- tions; A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/ 0701qus_korea.pdf. 136 Lee Joo-hee, “Six-party talks to resume soon: North Korea claims agreement reached with U.S. in Berlin,” The Korea Herald, January 20 2007. 137 Lee Joo-hee, “Song says N. Korea shows flexibility,” The Korea Herald, January 25 2007. 138 “Cautious optimism,” The Korea Herald, February 2 2007. 139 “North Korea must agree to scrap N-program,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 31 2007. 140 “North Korea may offer trade-off at 6-party talks,” The Daily Yomiuri February 5 2007. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 6 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks

Introduction The Berlin talks led to the February 2007 agreement and seemed to portend an end to the nuclear issue based on a freeze of the existing nuclear program, and a promise to dismantle all nuclear facilities in return for energy, economic aid, security guarantees, and the normalization of diplomatic relations with the US and Japan. The agreement was similar to the Agreed Framework, which the Bush Administration had severely criticized, the essence of which was a freeze and the later surrender of the nuclear weapons program. Any agreement between the US and the North could only be a variation of the earlier Agreed Framework since other possibilities were closed off by the North’s opposition. At no other time was there greater optimism that the end was in sight. Nonetheless, subsequent negotiations would revive the same issues that were raised earlier in relation to verification, inspection and their scheduling with the benefits that the North was supposed to receive, which deflated the high hopes that had been raised earlier. Though it was prepared to freeze the existing program the North would not include in the agreement its stock of plutonium or its HEU program, and it refused to accept standard verification procedures which it regarded as intrusive. Verification was the critical issue which prevented final agreement. The result was eventual deadlock and the Six Party Talks met for the last time in December 2008 leaving the nuclear issue hanging. Despite its promises the North was not prepared to surrender its nuclear program entirely and created difficulties when the Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Americans insisted that it follow up on their agreement.

The February 13 agreement: America concedes Prospects looked bright when Kim Kye-kwan declared on arrival in Beijing that the North was prepared to discuss the first steps towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, based on whether the US would renounce its “hostile policy” and accept “peaceful coexistence” with the North. Chris Hill in an optimistic mood told the press that he had sensed a “real desire” for progress by the North Koreans at the talks.1 South Korean delegate to the From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 141 talks Chun Yung-woo thought that one of the most difficult issues would be deciding who would provide the aid to the North in view of Japan’s open opposition. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared before the talks that without progress on the abduction issue Japan would not be involved in any multinational plan to help North Korea economically. Foreign Minister Taro Aso said that “We have our own special situation. We have repeatedly said so both to the United States and China.” Nonetheless, Japanese officials appeared to temper this hard line stance by de-linking the abduction issue from the nuclear quandary. Some called for the return of one or two abductees as a pre-condition before Japan would become involved in an aid program for the North; others wanted to de-link the issues entirely reducing their demand to substantial progress on the nuclear issue.2 This indeed was a problem. If the Japanese would refuse to get involved because of the abduction issue, then the economic burden would fall on the others. China would argue that it was already assisting the North, Russia would plead poverty while the US would be most reluctant to provide aid on a large scale to a country that had confronted it; that would leave South Korea. China had drafted a written agreement based on the results of the Berlin Talks, and was ready to circulate this at the Six Party Talks which had been scheduled for 8 February 2007. That draft contained the key point that the North would close its Yongbyon reactor, freeze its nuclear program and allow the return of IAEA inspectors within 60 days, in return for energy assistance and diplomatic relations with the US and Japan.3 In that draft, China also proposed the establishment of five working groups to oversee various facets of the issue; one group would deal with the denuclearization process, the second would deal with normalization of ties between the US and North Korea, the third would examine the normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan, the fourth would cover economic issues and energy cooperation, while the fifth would examine the prospects for the negotiation of Northeast Asia Peace and security mechanism. Chun Yung-woo told the press that he was optimistic and that the draft was “good as a basis for negotiations.”4 The Chinese had hoped that the talks would end with an agreement based on their draft on February 9, an event for which they had planned a press conference. They were dismayed when the negotiations were prolonged by the North’s

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 demand for huge shipments of fuel oil and electricity in advance before it would agree to surrender its nuclear weapons program. The Chinese draft said that “conventional energy assistance will be determined by the working groups and will be commensurate with the steps” the North would take to fulfill its commitments. The North demanded an annual energy package of 2 million tons of fuel oil, 2,000 MW of electricity, and an immediate shipment of fuel oil as a reward for shutting down the Yongbyon reactor, which was considerably more than it received under the Agreed Framework. Under that agreement it was allowed 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for heating purposes annually as well as two LWRs. Given that Japan had declared that it would not be involved in economic or energy assistance, the burden would have to 142 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks be shared by the others, who were not particularly enthusiastic. The initial optimism was deflated somewhat as the negotiations reached an impasse, for which Chun Yung-woo blamed the North and its inflated demands for energy assistance.5 President Bush had to cancel a congratulatory telephone call to South Korean President Roh which was to come with the expected conclusion of the talks. It was obvious that the North was resorting to its usual diplomatic tactic of throwing up obstacles at the last minute to extract maximum concessions from those clamoring for an agreement. At this stage, rare unity was found amongst the other five members of the talks who pressed the North to accept the draft document and to drop its exorbitant demands. They then countered the North’s tactic by signaling disinterest in the outcome; Chris Hill visited the national museum in Beijing and some Russian delegates went shopping. The American, Russian and Japanese delegations declared that February 12 would be the final day for the talks. The North held out for as long as possible and after a 16-hour negotiating session, agreement was eventually reached in the early morning of February 13.6 The agreement basically followed the outlines of the Chinese draft that had been circulated during the Talks. It stated that the purpose was to implement the September 19 2005 agreement and that “the parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the joint statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘action for action.’” The US was concerned that unlike the Agreed Framework the benefits for the North should not be “front- loaded,” and that they would commence as the North carried out its share of the agreement. For this reason the agreement covered only the initial phase with other steps to follow. In the first or “initial actions” phase the North would shut down and seal the Yongbyon reactor and invite IAEA inspectors back to monitor and verify the shutdown within 60 days (that is by April 14). The North would receive an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil from a total of 1 million tons promised to it, more than the Agreed Framework but less than the North demanded. Five working groups were established according to the Chinese proposal above and they were to meet within 30 days and report to the Six Party Talks. In the second phase, the North would prepare and submit a list of all its nuclear programs and account for the plutonium extracted from its used fuel rods. It would also

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 irreversibly disable and seal the Yongbyon reactor and receive the rest of the promised 950,000 tons of fuel oil. The US and the North would initiate bilateral talks and move towards full diplomatic relations while the US would begin the process of removing the North from the list of countries supporting terrorism. The next or sixth round of the Six Party talks was scheduled for March 19 2007.7 The operative part of the first step was the North’s commitment to shut down the Yongbyon reactor and to accept inspectors within a certain time frame, and for that it would be rewarded with shipments of heavy oil. The North’s concession to make the deal possible was to drop the demand for LWRs but otherwise it did not concede much else. The agreement mentioned From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 143 but did not deal with the remaining issues which were left for the second stage when negotiations would be renewed. When would the North submit a list of all its nuclear programs and when would they be dismantled? When would the North clarify the amount of plutonium it had produced and stockpiled? What about the HEU program which was not mentioned in the agreement? The Americans had been downplaying the HEU issue and some had thought that they may have overstated their case or misread the intelligence and it was left to the second phase of the process.8 The creation of the working groups was intended to speed up the negotiation process so that the issues would be clarified and even agreed beforehand. But the North’s delegations had no power to decide, however, which would render these groups redundant in any case. The agreement was an astonishing reversal of policy for the Bush Admin- istration which had vowed not to negotiate with the North or to be involved in another Agreed Framework, which it had attacked so virulently. This reversal was only possible because Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice worked with Chris Hill and NSC advisor Stephen Hadley to reach the Pre- sident directly. The Secretary of State sidestepped decision-making procedures that would have engaged the neoconservatives in the administration. Nor- mally there would have been an interagency process to decide upon a negotiating position and that would have included Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, the Defense Department and other agencies which had resisted any proposal to reward North Korea before the US committed itself to any agreement.9 As it was, they had little opportunity to block the agreement. US officials told the press that Bush, who was preoccupied with the situation in Iraq and the Middle East, wanted an agreement with the North which would allow him to say that it would no longer produce nuclear fuel and was on the way to disarmament.10 Bush explained that the deal was possible because he had obtained full Chinese cooperation after he told Hu Jintao that a nuclear North Korea was a greater problem for China than the US.11 Savage attacks on the agreement were unleashed by the neoconservatives and their allies within the Administration for what they regarded as betrayal of a cause. Officials in the Administration objected to removing the North from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism without evidence that it had

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 ceased this activity. Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams was one of those officials who demanded to know why North Korea should be rewarded before it was removed from this list. Abrams was involved in America’s promotion of democracy abroad and not only was he alarmed by this provision, but he was angered by the way in which it had been reached, without interagency vetting as a standard procedure. Robert Joseph was similarly vehement in his opposition to the agreement but he had in any case announced his resignation from the Administration in January. John Bolton who had resigned from the Administration in December 2006 called it a bad deal that “violated the principles that were closely held in the beginning of the Bush administration.” This policy said Bolton was “exactly right” as it 144 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks brought North Korea to the negotiating table and should not be changed.12 The neoconservative journal The National Review asked “when exactly did Kim Jong-il become trustworthy?” It argued that if agreement had required the North to shut down the reactor and destroy its existing nuclear arsenal before receiving the benefits “it would have been worth signing.” As it was the US “won a promise from a liar.”13 John O’Sullivan in the same journal expressed the fear that if the agreement were successful, it would be a “powerful incentive to nuclear proliferation worldwide.” He complained that any potential proliferator could initiate a nuclear program and be rewarded with “bribes” to close it down.14 On the other side of the political spectrum, Clinton Administration supporters demanded to know how this agreement differed from the Agreed Framework, and why the Bush Administration wasted so many years when it could have had a similar deal earlier. This question was most troubling for the Bush Administration because the answer would be an admission of the futi- lity of the approach the neoconservatives had adopted towards security and foreign policy. The Bush Administration claimed that this agreement was different from the Agreed Framework in three ways; first there was no mention of LWRs which was the most important incentive offered to the North in the Agreed Framework, and secondly this agreement was not just a freeze of existing nuclear programs which was the North’s most important obligation under the Agreed Framework since it aimed at their removal entirely. Thirdly, this agreement would be endorsed and approved by the Six Party Talks and would become a multilateral agreement while the Agreed Framework was a bilateral agreement between the US and the North.15 Chris Hill told the press that this agreement went “well beyond” the Agreed Framework,” and he was “not too worried whether something might look like the Agreed Framework because we are only looking at part of what we are aiming at.”16 In one way, this agreement achieved less than the Agreed Framework because it did not cover all of the North’s nuclear programs or its nuclear fuel. The Yongbyon reactor could be shut down but still there was the HEU program and other installations. When the Agreed Framework was signed there was only the Yongbyon reactor and related installations to monitor and inspect and it could be effectively covered in the agreement. In another way, the agreement

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 achieved more than the Agreed Framework by having the Six Party Talks support it. The anomaly of Chinese, South Korean and Japanese exclusion was rectified in this agreement and these countries would take greater responsibility for the outcome. The most important issues were left to the second phase when troublesome details would have to be negotiated. The Yongbyon reactor could be shut down quickly but its dismantling would take at least a decade and in the meantime there was the possibility of reversal. Moreover, what would happen to the spent nuclear fuel which would have to be kept in storage somewhere, either sealed in dry cask containers or placed in fuel rod storage pools? The North would expect to sacrifice the Yongbyon reactor, which was outdated From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 145 anyway, and receive the agreed benefits without accounting for the HEU program, its stockpile of plutonium and the other nuclear facilities. For President Bush, a deal with the North was required to get this festering issue off his back and if it postponed the most difficult part, it allowed him to focus upon the more immediate issues of the time: Iraq and Afghanistan. The way in which the deal was reached revealed that Bush had realized that his policies had been highjacked by the neoconservatives and had led him into a dead-end. He had been buoyed along by the neoconservative movement which had boosted his popularity initially, but the realization eventually dawned that its appeal to an American audience could not be translated into diplomatic results in the case of North Korea. The Americans indeed were torn between upholding non proliferation norms and a pragmatic compromise that would defuse the current nuclear issue with the North. The Bush Administration and its neoconservative supporters had stressed that policy towards the North should be guided by the non-proliferation regime and that agreements should be assessed according to whether or not they weakened or strengthened this regime. The idea of adjusting demands to obtain the North’s agreement was anathema to them as it would set a precedent to potential proliferators such as Iran. If it weakened before North Korea, the US would never be able to hold the line against other aspirants for nuclear weapons and every case of compromise would detract from the non-proliferation regime and render it useless. While these were valid concerns there was little else the US could do under the circumstances. The North had become a de facto nuclear power and there was no rolling back the program short of a devastating military strike which was plainly not on the cards. The US could not resort to the UN Security Council where both China and Russia would veto any aggressive action, and hemmed in by these powers in the Six Party Talks the US had few alternatives open to it. The American neoconservatives had reached their moment of triumph in the Bush administration in a unipolar world when it seemed that there were no limits to what the US could do. The realization that they could not enforce their will on North Korea and that they were obliged to scale back their demands brought considerable anguish as the limits to American power were reached.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 In South Korea there was a similar polarization of opinion but with less intensity. Diplomats from the South claimed that they had made the agreement possible when they modified the Chinese draft to allow for a two-step approach, the first being the closing of the Yongbyon reactor and the second the elimination of all nuclear programs. They claimed that they had proposed that the North be granted 1 million tons of heavy oil with an initial shipment of 50,000 tons which would be made by the South.17 According to The Korea Herald the agreement was “no small achievement” since the possibility of military action against the North had “dramatically diminished.”18 One South Korean concern was how to finance the deal since the Japanese had opted out. The heavy oil shipments would cost the South at least $55 million 146 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks and 2,000 MW of electricity annually would add another $900 million to the bill. In addition, the South was committed to provide LWRs under the Sep- tember 2005 agreement. This was a heavy burden on the country. None- theless, President Roh was ecstatic and declared that the agreement would pave the way for permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and help raise Korea’s economic credit rating because of the reduced security threat.19 For the South Korean President and his supporters, the agreement would revive their efforts to engage the North as a step towards their aim of a multilateral security regime on the Peninsula. Roh had opened secret contacts with the North in an attempt to arrange a second summit but he was prevented from moving ahead by the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests in 2009. For- eign Affairs and Trade Minister Song Min-soon, said that this agreement had met some of the preconditions for an inter-Korean summit which the Pre- sident so dearly wanted.20 The opposition GNP was less than impressed. Its chairwoman Park Guen-hye sided with the American critics who said that the agreement would only create the same conditions which discredited the Agreed Framework.21 GNP member Park Jin claimed that the US government now viewed the North as a nuclear power and was discussing ways of limiting its nuclear arsenal and not necessarily removing it entirely.22 Pre- sidential elections were scheduled for December 2007 and with the GNP gal- loping ahead in opinion polls it looked as though it would take the presidency. Koreans, it seemed, were tired of an engagement policy that was not reciprocated by the North. The Japanese reaction was critical. Nikkei regarded the agreement as “deeply flawed and full of loopholes.” It feared that the US was making “costly concessions” without the assurance that the North would disarm, and that changes in US policy would “undermine the credibility of the Bush administration toward North Korea, and only serve to help North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il achieve his goals.”23 Japanese officials had specific criticisms of the provisions of the agreement as well. It had no timetable for the abandonment of the nuclear program and, since it did not address this issue, the North could use it as a bargaining chip to gain even more concessions.24 Others thought that the interpretation of key phrases may become a key issue. The term “disablement” which was mentioned in the agreement could be

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 interpreted by the North to mean a temporary or emergency stoppage of operations at the nuclear facility.25 The North’s record of observing agreements did not create much conﬁdence and there were doubts about how far this agreement could be implemented. Moreover, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reiterated that Japan would not normalize relations with the North until all abductees were returned, and that the abduction issue would not be sidelined by the denuclearization agreement.26 Given that the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the North was one of the provisions of the agreement, this was a veto of an important part. Nonetheless, there were other voices in Japan that stressed the importance of normalizing relations with the North and sought to ensure that the momentum generated by From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 147 Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang would not be lost. Former Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party Taku Yamasaki visited Pyongyang in January 2007, with the aim of paving the way for a third visit to the North by Koi- zumi. Both Shinzo Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki condemned Yamasaki’s visit as undesirable for a Diet member and a breach of the sanctions imposed on the North since its nuclear test.27 The Japanese were also concerned that the US would remove the North from the terrorism list before it resolved the abduction issue. Bush telephoned Abe after the agreement was concluded to mollify him and to obtain his support but the Japanese were resentful that their concern was not included.28 Indeed, the Japanese feared that as the Americans edged towards the North to resolve the nuclear issue, they would ignore the abduction issue. When Chris Hill visited Pyon- gyang for bilateral talks later in June, he did not inform the Japanese of his plans though he stopped oﬀ in Tokyo.29 Japanese anxiety was stimulated.

Implementing the agreement A negotiating sequence had been established that would continue with the efforts to implement the agreement. Bilateral US negotiations with the North which were intended to resolve the outstanding issues would precede meetings of the Six Party Talks. The American public position was that bilateral talks were necessary to establish contact with the North and to draw up an agenda, and that the Six Party Talks would retain their importance. In reality as these bilateral negotiations dealt with the key issues, the Six Party Talks were stea- dily marginalized. They were convened when it was necessary to obtain the approval of the other parties to a bilateral agreement and they became a means for the Bush Administration to deflect criticism from its supporters over its turnaround in policy. If the Six Party Talks endorsed the agreement then the Administration’s actions were justified, even if they had not satisfied its critics. Moreover, the Chinese had always insisted that the nuclear issue was an American problem and had nudged the US towards bilateral talks. The Roh Administration saw US bilateral negotiations with the North as furthering the engagement policy and encouraged them as long as the results were tabled at the Six Party Talks. This in itself created a certain tension for

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 the Americans. They could not forego bilateral negotiations because without them there would be no progress, but the deeper they become involved, the greater the risk of an embarrassing breakdown which would be yet another humiliation for them. The most immediate issue after the February agreement was the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor, which was the subject of the next phase of the Six Party Talks which were held over 19 to 22 March 2007. The talks broke down when the North refused to continue until the disputed $25 million was transferred from the BDA in Macau. The US on 19 March announced that the funds would be released prompting Bush to remark that it was similar to returning money to a thief.30 The problem was that no bank wanted to receive 148 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks the funds as it would be subject to US sanctions for handling tainted funds, and while this issue was being resolved, the April 14 deadline passed. Conflict between the State Department and Treasury over the release of the funds delayed the matter; the State Department wanted an American bank to transfer the funds to a third bank but the Treasury baulked. Eventually the State Department requested Wachovia bank to transfer the funds to its branch in Hong Kong since it had often dealt with BDA. To do this, Treasury had to issue a written assurance that would exempt it from sanctions under US law for handling the funds.31 A Russian bank in the Far East called Dalkombank, which had dealt with the North, was selected as the receiver of the funds for final transfer to the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea.32 On June 21, the Russians announced that the transfer had been made. For the first time since the September 2005 agreement, it seemed that progress was possible. The Japanese were guarded and thought that the ease with which the North could use the financial sanctions issue to delay the convening of the Six Party Talks indicated that it could derail that progress at any time and over any technical issue. Nonetheless, the surprise was that matters went smoothly without any sudden change of heart from the North. On June 20, the North invited the IAEA to send inspectors to the Yongbyon site to monitor the shutdown of the reactor and related facilities. The South on July 12 arranged for the first shipment of 6,200 tons heavy oil to the North with later shipments to be spread out over a month. On July 18 the IAEA confirmed that all five nuclear facilities at Yongbyon had indeed been closed, an event which was marked by the dramatic demolition of the reactor’s cooling tower. On that day, of the Six Party Talks were convened in Beijing to discuss ways of implementing the second and more difficult part of the February agreement. The talks decided that when the North completed the disablement of its nuclear complex in Yongbyon, the parties would deliver the remaining 950,000 tons of heavy oil. They also discussed ways of verifying the North’s nuclear programs including its stock of plutonium, anticipating that the North would produce a declaration of all its nuclear programs by the end of October. The five working groups were to meet by the end of August and was to report at the next round of talks which was scheduled for September.33

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 One issue which had disturbed the Americans was the HEU program, the discovery of which in 2002 triggered convulsions within the Bush Adminis- tration and resulted in the termination of the Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration had promised that never again would the US conclude a similar agreement with a country that had cheated so blatantly. By the time of the February agreement five years later doubts emerged amongst the Amer- icans about the existence of the program and the original intelligence which revealed it. If US intelligence was at fault then what could be trusted? If the US downplayed the HEU program to encourage the North into an agreement then did it deliberately sensationalize the original report in 2002? Chris Hill said it was unclear if the North had mastered the technology to enrich From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 149 uranium and that a committee should be set up to examine this issue. Chief intelligence officer for North Korea in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Joseph DeTrani, told Congress that there was only limited confidence that a HEU program existed because procurement of relevant material and equipment had ceased over the past two years.34 Joel Wit thought that the program was beset by “uncertainties and controversy” and called for a “detailed intelligence assessment” of the status of the program.35 Despite the shift in the American assessment, the South Korean intelligence chief Kim Man-bok thought that a secret HEU program did exist which should be raised at the Six Party Talks.36 US officials discussed the merits of actually purchasing the centrifuges obtained from A. Q. Khan network by the North in a deal similar to the Nunn–Lugar program according to which nuclear equipment was purchased from the former Soviet Union.37 A deal of this kind would work if the North had forgone the desire to develop the HEU program and was stuck with centrifuges that it could not use, but there was uncertainty about this as well. The Americans decided that instead of a HEU program they would refer to it as a uranium enrichment program (UEP) to encourage the North to admit to it without losing face.38 The North might refuse to own up to the HEU program but might grudgingly admit to a UEP.

Bilateral talks and the move to a resolution It seemed that the end was approaching as the main obstacles in the ﬁrst part of the agreement had been removed, one way or another. The observable progress had created a sense of euphoria that the North would come around to comply with the process of denuclearization and that the worst would be left behind. The Bush Administration was close to the triumph it sought over the North Korean issue, now that it was released from the constraints imposed by the neoconservatives, and could devise a more ﬂexible approach. To stimulate progress over the second part of the agreement, Chris Hill met again with the North Koreans when the working group on US–North Korea normalization of diplomatic relations was convened in Geneva over Septem- ber 1–2. Chris Hill declared that the North Koreans would provide “afull

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 declaration of all of their nuclear programs and will disable their nuclear programs by the end of this year 2007,” which would include the HEU program as well.39 This was the first deadline that the North had accepted and the relief was tempered by the uneasiness that something unexpected may happen yet again. The North signaled a qualification when Kim Kye-kwan in a press conference affirmed the North’s commitment to the process, but omitted mention of the end of year deadline.40 The results of the US–North Korea bilateral meeting in Geneva were tabled at the Six Party Talks from September 27 to October 3 2007. Israel had attacked and destroyed the Syrian nuclear reactor on September 6 which was constructed with North Korean assistance. The Israeli attack confirmed the 150 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks North’s worst fears about the US and the danger that it could suddenly resort to an airstrike.41 The Chinese draft for the meeting included all the points mentioned in the Geneva meeting with the addition of an American intention to remove the North from the list of terrorism sponsoring states. The draft did not deal with the plutonium the North had produced, nor did it specify the steps required for the disablement of the nuclear facilities.42 The joint statement from the talks which was issued on October 3 said that the North was to disable all existing nuclear facilities including the 5-MW experimental reactor, the reprocessing plant and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication facility, all at Yongbyon, by December 31 2007. The US was to lead the disablement activities and provide the initial funding. The North agreed to provide a “complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” also by December 31 2007. The US agreed to begin the process of removing the North from the list of state sponsors of terrorism “in parallel with” North Korea’s denuclearization actions.43 Gordon Johndroe who was Deputy Press Secretary and a spokesman for the NSC told the press that the action for action approach was working and that “we feel like the North Koreans are taking the right steps in living up to their obligations under the agreements.”44 Pre- sident Bush encouraged the North to continue in this direction and ordered a shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil to the North which was worth $25 million; this was the first American shipment of fuel to the North since 2002 when supplies were terminated because of the HEU program. The North was also expected to declare the amount of plutonium it had accumulated from the Yongbyon reactor which Chris Hill had estimated at 50 kilograms. This point, however, was not included in the joint statement and indicated a loophole that the North could later exploit. Neither was there specific mention of the HEU program though the Americans did insist that it was covered by the agreement which mentioned “all” nuclear programs. During the talks the North demanded that the US commit itself to a deadline to remove it from the list of terrorism sponsoring states, which the Americans were reluctant to do at that stage because of the anticipated reactions of Congress. The North was placed on that list on January 20 1988 because of the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 on November 29 1987 in which 125 passengers and crew perished as result. It was subject to the restrictions of the

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Export Administration Act of 1979 the main one being that the North was prevented from applying for membership in the World Bank and the Inter- national Monetary Fund.45 The North had consistently pressed for its removal from the list in bilateral meetings with the Americans. It was raised when Chris Hill met Kim Kye-kwan on November 28–29 2006, and during the Berlin Talks of January 2007. Chris Hill told the North Koreans during the February 2007 and September 2007 talks that the US would indeed remove the North Korea from the terrorism sponsorship list if it dismantled its nuclear programs.46 Joining these two international financial agencies was important for the North’seffort at economic reform, as promoted by the Foreign Ministry and the reformers. It made sense while the North was From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 151 introducing economic reforms under Chinese pressure after July 2002. Since then they had been halted, and many private markets had been closed as the party conservatives initiated a crackdown on free market activity. One explanation was that the Foreign Ministry and the reformers had hoped that membership of these bodies would act as a lever to promote internal economic reform despite the crackdown. Another explanation was that that the North’s leaders had expected that the economic benefits of membership in these bodies would compensate for the economic losses arising from their crackdown, and that they would receive economic support from these international agencies without the need of reform. With nuclear weapons they could draw attention to themselves and expect priority treatment. Nonetheless, getting the North off the terrorism sponsors list was not easy. The State Department claimed that North Korea “was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987.” Chris Hill declared that the North had “come clean” about its proliferation activities and deserved to be removed from the list. Four Republican senators, Sam Brownback, Chuck Grassley, Jon Kyl, and independent Joseph Liberman submitted a draft resolution imposing various conditions. They argued that the North had engaged in other terrorist activities since 1987, contrary to what the State Department claimed, by providing arms to Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers. They demanded that the North resolve the Japanese abduction issue, and shut down Central Commit- tee Bureau 39 of the Korean Workers Party which was responsible for printing counterfeit money. They also demanded that the North fully disclose its assistance to Syria’s nuclear reactor before it was bombed by Israel.47 Con- gress was not prepared to move on this issue just yet, which meant that the North was not ready to meet the end of year deadline to close down the Yongbyon reactor, and to declare a full list of all nuclear facilities. President Bush sent a letter to Kim Jong-il dated December 1 promising normalized relations with the North if it disclosed all its nuclear programs and dismantled the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. It was an extraordinary change of heart for a president who had called the North Korean leader a “tyrant” and a “pygmy,” demonstrating the length he would go to reach an agreement with the man he had loathed. The letter was addressed “Dear Mr. Chairman” and was delivered to Kim Kye-kwan in Beijing by Chris Hill.48 As the deadline approached

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Chris Hill and Condoleezza Rice said that it was not rigid, but an indication only.49 The North indeed missed the deadline and on January 4 issued a declaration claiming that it had already disclosed everything that was necessary in November, which the US had said was incomplete anyway. Within the Bush Administration the conﬂict between the neoconservatives and the State Department erupted again. While Dick Cheney’soﬃce demanded a tougher response to the North’s obvious stalling tactics after its role in developing the Syrian nuclear reactor became known, Chris Hill and Con- doleezza Rice defended their approach and urged that the Six Party Talks be allowed to continue. Both neoconservatives and liberal human rights advocates lined up on the same side in relation to the North which was another 152 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks embarrassment for the Bush Administration. The US envoy for North Korean human rights Jay Lefkowitz sounded like John Bolton when he declared that the North was not “serious” about nuclear disarmament and that a new approach was required.50 Short of repudiating the Six Party Talks and confronting the North, no one could identify what that new approach could be.

The dispute over verification It was not until June 26 2008 that the North submitted a 60-page declaration of its nuclear facilities to China, a delay of half a year. It listed 15 nuclear facilities, including the Yongbyon facilities and various universities, which the State Department prematurely declared as complete and without gaps. State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack said that the declaration covered both the plutonium and HEU programs and included information on the North’s nuclear proliferation to Syria.51 However, IAEA director Mohamed Elbar- adei wrote that the North’s nuclear declaration was incomplete as it did not include all past or present nuclear activity and did not mention the HEU.52 The North did at least it declare that it had produced 30 kilograms of plutonium on three occasions, in the 1990s, 2003 and 2005 and had used 2 kilograms in its nuclear test in October 2006. From this document, the Americans estimated that the North had about 44 kilograms of plutonium which would be sufficient for quite a number of nuclear devices if the report was correct.53 On the same day Bush announced that he was notifying Congress of his intent to “rescind North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terror in 45 days,” that is by August 10. With this submission, China arranged for the next round of the Six Party Talks to be held over July 10–12 2008 to complete the process of denuclearization. On the agenda was an examination of the North’s declaration, the verification and monitoring regime for the North’s declared nuclear facilities and the disablement of Yongbyon.54 The US submitted a four page draft of procedures for the verification of the North’s nuclear program, which was largely crafted by the State Department’s arms control and verification experts who had based their approach on their experience of Iraq and Libya. It included the demand for “full access to all

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 materials” to any “site, facility or location” that was relevant to the nuclear program, including military facilities. It also would allow inspectors to take photographs and make videos, to remain on site as long as necessary, and to make repeated visits as well as to collect and remove samples of nuclear material for testing. IAEA sampling in 1992 revealed major discrepancies between the North’s declarations and its actual plutonium production. Chris Hill thought that it was asking too much of the North Koreans but he was overruled by arms control experts who regarded it as a test of the North’s intentions. When the draft was tabled at the talks the North’s response was predictable; the North accepted some of the American demands but drew the line at visits to undeclared facilities and the taking of samples, which the From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 153 American experts regarded as crucial for any effective verification regime.55 The American draft also demanded that the North clarify its role in nuclear proliferation and its assistance to the nuclear programs of other countries. It wanted detailed information on the North’s production of plutonium, its exports and imports of nuclear materials and nuclear-related equipment, the transfer of personnel involved in Pyongyang’s nuclear programs, the storage containers and vehicles used.56 The Americans insisted that the removal of the North from the terrorism sponsors list would depend upon an acceptable agreement on verification of its nuclear programs. Verification, once again, was at the heart of the dispute between the US and the North. The Chinese and the South Koreans pressed the US into a resolution of the issue that would, one way or another, suspend verification as did the Agreed Framework. In their approach, verification would come in some vague way as a product of tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula and tied to the promised incentives in an action by action plan. The US could not make allowances in the case of North Korea without undermining the global non-proliferation regime, which was so critical for international security. Nonetheless, the verification procedures spelled out in the US-IAEA “Additional Protocol,” which served as guidelines for the US in dealing with North Korea and Iran, allowed for flexibility in responding to a state’s declaration of nuclear facilities. The Protocol was not to be applied “mechanistically or systematically” and would allow access to nuclear sites declared by a state “on a selective basis.” At undeclared sites, however, the IAEA would have “circumscribed access rights” and only in the event of “inconsistency related to the state’s declarations” would it have the right to demand access to a site. The protocol mentions that the “range of activities that the IAEA may carry out at undeclared locations is narrowly restricted.”57 The IAEA’s role was preventive in nature and not created for the dismantlement of an existing weapons system, which demanded much more intrusive inspections than its own guidelines would permit.58 What the Americans wanted in the North Korean case was a verification regime that went beyond these guidelines. This may have been necessary in view of the North’s record of not keeping to agreements but it was infeasible politically. Verification agreements had to be negotiated with states jealously defending

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 their sovereignty and their agreement was required for some of the most challenging provisions. Ideally, the IAEA should have the right of access to all suspected nuclear sites and the power to resort to challenge inspections when required, but state sovereignty would not allow that. The Six Party Talks did agree on a verification mechanism but it fell far short of what the Americans had demanded. There was a great discrepancy between what was required for the task of effective verification that would leave no doubts about the North’s nuclear program, and what the parties could actually agree upon. For a start, verification was to be conducted within the framework of the Six Party Talks which meant that teams of experts from the parties would be involved. Thus the conflicts which inhibited progress 154 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks during the talks would impede and endlessly delay the verification process, and little would be decided. The North rejected the involvement of the IAEA and its role was limited to “consultancy and assistance” when required, which reflected the North’seffort to keep it at arm’s length. Verification would include “visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures unanimously agreed upon among the six parties.” The parties did not decide which sites to visit and when to visit them, or how samples of nuclear material would be collected and when and to what extent the IAEA would become involved. These details were left to the working group on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that was established under the February agreement.59 The parties also agreed to establish a monitoring system, but at the North’s request this also was limited to the Six Party Talks framework and was to consist of the heads of delegation of the six parties. Director of the IAEA Mohamed Elbaradei rejected this proposal since it would compromise the IAEA’s authority and simply would not be credible.60 The idea of verification by the Six Parties indicated how far the resolution of the nuclear issue was departing from international and therefore credible standards to accommodate the North. The talks set a new deadline for the North’s disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the end of October 2008. They also agreed to supply the North with heavy fuel oil to the North in parallel with the disablement of Yongbyon. The North had received 150,000 tons already and another 850,000 tons were to be shipped by China and South Korea by the end of August, and by the US and Russia by the end of October.61 With an agreement seemingly close at hand Japan had no intention of blocking progress which would have provoked resentment from the others; it indicated its willingness to take part without a resolution of the abduction issue.62 The details of the verification regime had been consigned to the working group on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula where the North stalled. The deadline of August 10 passed as the talks were deadlocked. The US expected the North to accept a modified draft of its demands while the North awaited its removal from the terrorist sponsors list. The North accused the US of violating their agreement but the Americans insisted that there was no written document linking North Korea’s acceptance of verification to its

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 removal from the terrorist sponsor list.63 On August 14 Kim Jong-il suffered a serious stroke which partially incapacitated him. As a result, North Korean decision-making was suspended. Chris Hill later told the press that the US was ready to be flexible “on format,” but not over what was required for verification of the nuclear issue. What Hill had in mind was removing expressions that the North would object to, and eliminating some items if North Korea gave its verbal consent to the implementation of the final agreement.64 How the US could be flexible in a way that would break the deadlock without undermining the verification regime is difficult to imagine. The impression created was one of an administration that was abruptly caving in for the sake of an agreement with the North. Former CIA officer Art From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 155 Brown was highly critical of the direction of the negotiations as they were going against what the Administration had previously thought necessary in dealing with the North. The North, he argued, was “getting exactly what it wants” because the HEU program was not included, nor was there any mention of the North’s proliferation of nuclear technology to countries like Syria. He noted that the North would be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and would receive one million tons of heavy fuel oil. America’s alliance ties with Japan would be weakened because the abduction issue was excluded. For this, all the North had to do was to demolish the cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor which was a “publicity stunt” as the reactor was dilapidated anyway.65 Nonetheless, the Americans accepted the result of the talks and the ineffective verification provisions as they knew that little more was realistically possible. The Bush Administration was pressing for an agreement over the issue and was obliged to work within the parameters of the Six Party Talks given that it resisted the call to resolve the issue bilaterally. The Japanese were disturbed. They believed that they had a commitment from the US that it would not remove North Korea from the terrorism sponsors list until there was progress over the abduction issue. They were alarmed by the Bush Administration’s excessive eagerness to come to an agreement with the North. The Yomiuri Shinbun opined that the Bush Administration had taken a 180- degree change from the time when Bush included North Korea in the “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq and refused to deal with it bilaterally. The North “accurately read the state of U.S. impatience to achieve results” and exploited Chris Hill’s weak diplomatic position by stalling. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda reiterated the Japanese government’s position when he insisted that the nuclear issue had to be resolved simultaneously with the abduction problem.66 North Korea resorted to its usual tactics to prod the Americans. In late September 2008, the North demanded that the IAEA remove cameras and seals from the Yongbyon reactor, which had been placed there in June 2007, and expelled the agency’s inspectors. It also publicly declared that it had begun to restore the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon as a way of indicating its displeasure at the American tardiness in removing it from the terrorism

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 sponsors list.67 The US responded by dispatching Chris Hill to Pyongyang over October 1–3 to seek the North’s cooperation over the verification issue. The pattern was repeated. If the US dug its heels over an important issue, the North would move to activate its nuclear reactor and the Americans would then arrange bilateral talks to defuse the issue, usually with the obligatory concessions. As a result, on October 11 the Bush administration announced that the North had been removed from the terrorism sponsors list without significant progress over the verification issue, a diplomatic victory for the North. What had been achieved? Chris Hill obtained the North’s tentative agreement for access to registered nuclear facilities only, leaving the issue of unregistered sites open. The State Department said by way of explanation 156 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks that inspectors would be allowed access to sites where nuclear activity was suspected on the basis of “mutual consent.”68 State Department officials did not make the agreement public and claimed that the North had made three concessions. It allowed “potential access” to undeclared nuclear facilities and accepted the need for sample taking, it had also agreed that Japanese and South Korean inspectors could be included in the verification team.69 The agreement revealed the extent to which the Bush Administration was willing to surrender key positions that were sacred to its neoconservatives. It was strongly criticized by officials in the State Department’s Verification, Compliance and Implementation Bureau (VCI) who had drafted the Amer- ican submission to the July Six Party Talks, and who regarded the verification procedures subsequently agreed as unacceptable. This Bureau was not informed of the details of the agreement until one day before the North was removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list on October 10 when a meeting with Chris Hill and Condoleezza Rice was convened. On that night the President approved it and went ahead with the de-listing.70 The main concession was that access to undeclared sites required “mutual consent” which allowed the North ample room to cover its tracks. Moreover, the agreement did not specially mention sample taking but resorted to vague language calling for “the use of scientific procedures, including sampling and forensic activities.”71 The State Department claimed that it had an “oral understanding” with the North about this issue which was unlikely to inspire confidence. There was also a concern as to whether American inspectors would be allowed to take samples of nuclear material laboratories outside the North for analysis.72 US officials admitted that inspectors would not have permission to visit the site of the 2006 nuclear test or any military facilities involved in the nuclear program, but only to Yongbyon and some academic institutions.73 This raised another problem. What good was sample testing if the inspectors were barred from visiting suspected nuclear sites? The right to sample testing which the State Department claimed to have obtained was nullified by the “mutual consent” requirement to visit nuclear sites. Victor Cha has claimed that despite all its shortcomings and weaknesses, the Bush Administration would leave his successor “the remnants of a work- able nuclear disablement process rather than a full-blown crisis.” He wrote

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 that US and international nuclear experts would be “on the ground in North Korea learning more about Kim Jong-il’s nuclear secrets while slowly dis- abling and degrading his nuclear capabilities.”74 However, it is difficult to see how these nuclear secrets could be uncovered if the verification regime did not allow it, or if the “mutual consent” requirement prevented it. Could the US have done better? Probably not. The verification experts could legitimately point to the North’s chicanery and its record of deceit as a reason for a strict verification regime according to their draft submitted to the Six Party Talks. However, Chris Hill and Condoleezza Rice felt that the US was in no position to impose an extensive verification regime on the North, nor could it appeal to the Six Party Talks or to the UN to enforce a regime that was From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 157 opposed by the North. The UN had imposed a strict verification regime on Iraq but this was after its defeat in the 1991 Gulf War which left the country prostrate before the victors. In this case the North, however, was already a nuclear power and could claim sovereignty rights to protect itself against the most intrusive inspections. Moreover, the Bush Administration was working to prevent another crisis with the North which could push it to resort to a third nuclear test before its term of office expired.75 As the Bush Adminis- tration worked to avert another crisis with the North, it left an unworkable nuclear disablement process for its successor. The South Korean government praised the agreement; chief envoy to the Six PartyTalks Kim Sook thought that it would help put the talks back on track and eventually lead to the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs.”76 The agreement was seen to pave the way for the normalization of inter-Korean relations which had deteriorated since the GNP leader Lee Myung-bak became president.77 Inter-Korean projects had been suspended since 11 July 2008 when a South Korean tourist was shot and killed by a North Korean soldier at the Mt. Geumgang resort. The North reduced contacts with the South and imposed new restrictions on travel and access to the Gaesong Industrial Complex. In this situation GNP members criticized the American de-listing of the North without accounting for the bombing of Korean Airlines flight 858 in November 1987.78 South Korean liberals and supporters of Roh Moo-hyun thought that the South had lost its mediator’s position to bridge the gap between the US and the North Korea and had come too close to Japan.79 The impact upon the Japanese was predictable as the removal of the North from the terrorism sponsors list was seen as an example of American indifference to the abductions issue that had captivated the Japanese public. The Japan Times opined that the delisting of the North was an American concession and the agreement with the North contained “worrisome elements.”80 The Japanese were concerned also by the way the Americans went about the agreement. In the October 11 agreement with the North, the US placed the verification issue in an appendix to the main document which had less binding power. This gave rise to fears on the Japanese side that the US was letting the verification issue slide for the sake of an agreement with the North. The

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Japanese were also concerned that their linkage of the abduction issue with economic assistance to the North reduced their options in dealing with the North. Japan had earlier refused to provide its share of the promised heavy oil shipments to the North for this reason. Should the Six Party Talks come to agreement, the US would turn to other countries such as Australia to fill the gap. Japan would lose its position in the negotiations and the opportunity of influencing the North over the abduction issue.81 There was concern that Japan had taken the abduction issue too far but could not override it because of its emotional appeal for the Japanese public. Chris Hill met Kim Sook and Japanese chief negotiator Akitaka Saiki in another trilateral meeting to coordinate positions between the allies before the Six Party Talks. They 158 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks agreed that sample testing of specific nuclear facilities should be included in a written document to avoid misunderstanding over the verification procedures. The Japanese representative Saiki was particularly insistent that there should be a clear commitment in writing to allow sample testing.82 The final meeting of the Six Party Talks was convened over December 8–11 2008 to endorse the agreement over verification made bilaterally between the US and the North. North Korean officials had earlier indicated that they wanted to keep the verification process off the agenda of the talks and focus on the disablement of the Yongbyon facilities, the removal of nuclear fuel rods from the reactor, and the delivery of the promised heavy fuel oil.83 The talks quickly came to a standstill as verification was the main issue for the other parties. The Chinese circulated a four page draft proposal of the verification protocol which made mention of the contentious issue of the sampling of nuclear material. The oral agreement to sample testing which the Americans claimed to have reached with the North was refuted by Kim Kye-kwan who said that the North had a different view of the issue.84 This time, five parties including China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the US lined up against the North over sample testing.85 Kim Sook said that they agreed upon a schedule for the second phase of the denuclearization process by March 2009. The US, the South, and Japan wanted to link verification with the economic and energy incentives, a proposal which the North rejected.86 The five parties agreed that energy assistance, which was to be provided in parallel with the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and a schedule for the delivery of the remainder of the promised heavy oil, would be determined later.87 The chairman’s statement said that South Korea agreed to convene a meeting of the Working Group on the Economy and Energy Cooperation to “coordinate the relevant issues concerning assistance to the DPRK.”88 The Parties agreed to hold the next Six Party Talks at an early date but they failed to meet. Condoleezza Rice told the press afterwards that the Bush Administration’s efforts were not wasted as the Yongbyon reactor had been shut down and no further plutonium had been produced since the September 2005 agreement.89 These were temporary achievements that could easily be reversed, however, as the North had avoided a commitment to anything that would tie its hands over the nuclear issue. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016

Conclusion Why did the North allow the Six Party talks to collapse? The Bush Admin- istration had given the North the best possible deal under the circumstances and had made concessions for the sake of an agreement that no one would have predicted. The North drew back at the final step and would not accept a verification regime that would have satisfied the parties at the talks. The sample testing of nuclear material was not the most critical issue as the US, in its desire for agreement, had allowed the North a veto over inspections of nuclear sites when it accepted that “mutual consent” was required. Inspectors From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 159 could not take samples of nuclear material if their visits to suspected sites were blocked. The North was hoping that the incoming Administration in the US would be easier to deal with, and that a President Obama would return to the policies promoted by the Clinton Administration. The Obama Adminis- tration could not improve on the deal unless the North fantasized about a presidential visit, immediate diplomatic recognition and massive amounts of aid, which were unlikely. The reasons for the North’s behavior go deeper as the North had achieved what it had aimed for in its first nuclear test. It was obliged to continue with the Six Party Talks to entice the Americans to lift financial sanctions and to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but when that had been achieved it could let the talks lapse. Moreover, the party conservatives, who had reasserted control over policy since Kim Jong-il was incapacitated by a stroke, had little interest in negotiations and sought to strengthen their nuclear and ballistic missile capability. The economic reforms of July 2002 were rolled back by 2007 under Kim Jong-il’s brother in law, Jang Song-taek who was elevated to First Vice Director of the Korean Workers’ Party with responsibility for the police, the judiciary, and internal security.90 Under the party conservatives and military, the North was preparing for a second nuclear test to rectify the technical problems of the October 2006 test. As a nuclear power, the North had outgrown the Six Party Talks. What did the Bush Administration expect by repudiating its previous negotiating position and making a series of concessions to the North? After the October 2006 test the North had become a de facto nuclear power and there was no rolling back the program short of a devastating military strike against the North, which was plainly not on the cards. The Americans had expected Chinese support in pressing the North over the nuclear issue but China had worked to its own agenda and had urged the US to accept pragmatic compromise. The US could not resort to the UN Security Council where both China and Russia would use their veto and it was constrained by these powers in the Six Party Talks, the US had few alternatives left. Bush could have avoided the issue and left it for the incoming Obama Adminis- tration to resolve while maintaining the neoconservative principles of his administration but that could have worsened the situation. A refusal to

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 negotiate with the North could have prompted it to engage in more ballistic and nuclear tests that would threaten its allies, Japan and South Korea, with the consequent deterioration of security in Northeast Asia. Bush was then obliged to repudiate his previous position over the issue in recognition of new realities that his policies had failed to prevent. He allowed his Secretary of State and chief negotiator for North Korea to devise a negotiating strategy in dealing with the North that required a series of concessions from a position that could not be defended anyway. The Americans had hoped that if the momentum of the Six Party Talks could be maintained, and if the right economic incentives were oﬀered, the North might be enticed into a continuing process of negotiation that would give it no reason to go ahead with the 160 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks development of its nuclear program. Further ballistic missile and nuclear tests could be prevented. However, the party conservatives who had reasserted control over the North had other plans.

Notes 1 Lee Joo-hee, “N.K. shows flexibility at talks,” The Korea Herald, February 9 2007. 2 Reiji Yoshida, “Japan talking tough over abduction issue,” The Japan Times, February 7 2007. 3 Park Song-wu, “Pyongyang wants diplomatic ties with Washington,” The Korea Times, February 9 2007. 4 “China proposal boosts optimism at nuclear talks,” The Korea Herald, February 10 2007. 5 Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger, “North Korea talks near collapse over Pyon- gyang energy demands,” International Herald Tribune, February 11 2007. 6 Park Song-wu, “Nuke drama opens ‘2nd Act’s 1st Scene,’” The Korea Times, February 13 2007. 7 “North Korea-Denuclearization Plan,” Office of the Spokesman, US State Department, Washington DC, February 13 2007, www.State.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/ February/80479.html: “Text of the Agreement,” International Herald Tribune,13 February 2007. 8 ‘North Korean uranium recedes as issue for US,” The Japan Times, February 14 2007. 9 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal,” The New York Times February 16 2007. 10 David E. Sanger, “Outside Pressures broke Korean Deadlock” The New York Times, February 13 2007. 11 David E. Sanger, “Outside Pressures broke Korean Deadlock.” 12 Glenn Kessler, “Conservatives Assail North Korea Accord,” The Washington Post February 15 2007. 13 “Agreeing to the Same Framework,” The National Review, February 14 2007, www.nationalreview.com/articles/219974/agreeing-same-framework/editors. 14 John O’Sullivan “North Korea Comes Back for Some More: The deal just keeps getting better for Kim Jong-il.” The National Review, February 23 2007, www.nation alreview.com/articles/220069/north-korea-comes-back-some-more/john-osullivan. 15 Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger, “Tentative nuclear deal is set with North Korea,” International Herald Tribune, February 12 2007. 16 Lee Joo-hee, “Nuke talks to resume Feb. 8,” The Korea Herald, January 31 2007. 17 Park Song wu, “6 way talks make breakthrough,” The Korea Times February 13 2007. 18 Editorial “No small achievement,” The Korea Herald, February 15 2007. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 19 Lee Joo-hee, “Nuke pact will pave way to peace: Roh,” The Korea Herald, Feb- ruary 15 2007. 20 Ryu Jin, “Roh open to Inter-Korean Summit,” The Korea Times, January 23 2007; Ryu Jin, “Stepping stone laid for inter-Korean Summit,” The Korea Times, February 13 2007. 21 David R. Sands, “S. Korean dissenter warns of nuke deal,” The Washington Times, February 16 2007. 22 Lee Joo-hee, “100 days and nothing to show for Six Party Breakthrough,” The Korea Herald May 23 2007. 23 Editorial: “Don’t Allow N Korea to take lead in Six Party Talks,” Nikkei, 20 March 2007. From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 161 24 Motohiro Ikeda, “N Korean Deal only 1st step in long path to denuclearisation,” Nikkei, February 14 2007. 25 “Interpretation of N Korean Nuclear pact could affect compliance,” Nikkei, February 14 2007. 26 “Abe reassures abductees’ kin: No ties with N Korea Until all return,” Nikkei, February 20 2007. 27 Hiroko Nakata, “Yamasaki’s Pyongyang trip draws flak,” The Japan Times, Jan- uary 10 2007. 28 Glenn Kessler, “Conservatives Assail North Korea Accord,” The Washington Post, 15 February 2007. 29 David E. Sanger, “US to hold direct talks in North Korea on arms,” International Herald Tribune, June 21 2007. 30 “US-NK, feud over BDA ‘fully resolved,’” The Korea Herald, 19 March 2007; “Mission Accomplished on NK fund release: White House,” The Korea Times,20 March 2007; Maureen Fan, “Six Party Talks Break Down as N. Korea Balks on Funds,” The Washington Post, March 23 2007. 31 Lee Joo-hee, “100 days and nothing to show for Six Party Breakthrough,” The Korea Herald, May 23 2007. 32 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Receives Funds and Says It Will Shut Down Its Main Nuclear Reactor,” The New York Times, June 26 2007. 33 “North Korea’s nuclear programs,” The Japan Times, July 16 2008. 34 Glenn Kessler, “New Doubts on Nuclear efforts by North Korea,” The Washington Post, March 1 2007. 35 Joel S. Wit, “Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 2, Spring 2007. 36 “North has ‘secret nuclear program,’” The Japan Times, February 22 2007. “Seoul believes N. Korea has Uranium Program,” The Chosun Ilbo, February 20 2007; Jung Sung-ki, “Nuke Talks to address Uranium Program,” The Korea Times, February 16 2007. 37 David E. Sanger, “US to hold direct talks in North Korea on arms,” International Herald Tribune, June 21 2007; “US may consider N. Korea nuclear equipment buyback,” The Japan Times, June 25 2007. 38 Lee Joo-hee, “getting N. Korea to admit to its HEU program,” The Korea Herald, June 27 2007. 39 “N. Korea to disable nuke programs,” The Associated Press, September 2 2007. 40 David E. Sanger, “Nuclear Pact Broadening, North Korea and US say,” The New York Times, September 3 2007. 41 “Bush rewards N. Korea with fuel oil, lauds progressive steps,” The Japan Times, October 1 2007. 42 Lee Joo-hee, “Nuke envoys reach common agreement,” The Korea Herald, October 1 2007.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 43 “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 3 2007 www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/ n_korea/6party/action0710.html; “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, 3 October 2007, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t369084.htm. 44 “N. Korea to disable Yongbyon,” The Japan Times, October 5 2007. 45 Dianne E. Rennack, “North Korea: Economic Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 17 2006, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL31696.pdf. 46 Larry Niksch, Raphael Perl, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal? CRS Report for Congress, December 11 2007, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA474951 47 Lee Joo-hee, “US not ready for broad NK engagement,” The Korea Herald, December 14 2007. 162 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 48 Helene Cooper, “A New Bush Tack on North Korea,” The New York Times, December 7 2007. 49 Ibid. 50 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Sees Stalling by North Korea on Nuclear Pact,” The New York Times, January 19 2008. 51 “NK Nuclear Declaration Is Completed,” The Korea Times, July 3 2008. 52 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception, Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2011, p. 107. 53 The estimate of 44 kilograms included the 30 kilograms extracted previously, 8 kilograms in spent nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon, 4 kilograms of residual plutonium inside the nuclear facilities and 2 kilograms of nuclear waste stored at the facilities. Yoshiharu Asano, “2 kg of plutonium used in N-test, N. Korea’s report to China shows that 30 kilograms were extracted,” The Daily Yomiuri, July 3 2008. 54 Lee Joo-hee “China proposes 6-way nuke talks on July 10,” The Korea Herald July 2 2008. 55 Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal; Demands Began to Undo Nuclear Accord,” The Washington Post, September 26 2008. 56 Takeo Miyazaki, “N-probe also eyes DPRK’s help to others; Inspection dispute may delay delisting,” The Daily Yomiuri August 7 2008. 57 Susan F. Burk, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, “U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Washington, DC, Department of State Archive. January 29 2004, http://2001–9. state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/29249.htm. 58 Philip D. Neill Jr. Verification in an age of insecurity: the future of Arms Control Compliance, Oxford, 2010, p. 75. 59 “North Korea’s nuclear programs,” The Japan Times, July 16 2008; Takeo Miya- zaki, “N-probe also eyes DPRK’s help to others; Inspection dispute may delay delisting,” The Daily Yomiuri, August 7 2008. 60 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception, p 106. 61 “Press Communiqué of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six Party Talks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan July 12 2008 www. mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/press0807.html. 62 “North Korea’s nuclear programs,” The Japan Times, July 16 2008. 63 “Nothing new, really,” The Korea Herald, September 27 2008. 64 Takeo Miyazaki, “U.S. ‘flexible’ on N. Korea N-report verification,” The Daily Yomiuri, September 12 2008. 65 Art Brown, “North Korea’s Stacked Deck,” The New York Times, July 15 2008. Art Brown was the head of the Asia division of the CIA’s clandestine service from 2003 to 2005. 66 “North Korea’s nuclear threat; North Korea exploits impatience of lame-duck Bush administration,” The Daily Yomiuri, July 2 2008.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 67 Jin Dae-woong “N.K. asks IAEA to remove seals,” The Korea Herald, September 23 2008. 68 Choe Sang-hun and Helene Cooper, “North Koreans Confirm Pledge to Disable Plant,” The New York Times, October 13 2008. 69 Glenn Kessler; “U.S. Drops North Korea From Terrorism List,” The Washington Post, October 12 2008. 70 “Delisting concerns U.S. officials,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 22 2008. 71 Ibid. 72 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List,” The New York Times October 12 2008. 73 Glenn Kessler; “U.S. Drops North Korea From Terrorism List,” The Washington Post, October 12 2008. From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 163 74 Victor Cha, “Gaining A Yard on Pyongyang,” The Washington Post, October 13 2008. 75 Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal; Demands Began to Undo Nuclear Accord,” The Washington Post, September 26 2008. 76 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List,” The New York Times, October 12 2008; Kim Tae-woo, “North Korea wins another round of nuke diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, October 30 2008. 77 “Seoul hopes for thaw in inter-Korea ties,” The Korea Herald October 13 2008. 78 Choe Sang-hun and Helene Cooper, “North Koreans Confirm Pledge to Disable Plant,” The New York Times, October 13 2008. 79 Jin Dae-woong, “Nuclear talks stuck on verification as Bush term ends,” The Korea Herald December 15 2008. 80 “U.S. ‘gave ground’ to North Korea,” The Daily Yomiuri November 2 2008. 81 Satoshi Ogawa, “U.S. eyes oil aid sources for N. Korea Replacements sought for Japan assistance,” The Daily Yomiuri October 22 2008. 82 Jun Hongo, “North nuke verification must be in writing: Saiki,” The Japan Times, December 4 2008. 83 “N. Korea ‘cool toward written verification’,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 30 2008. 84 “Action for Action,” The Korea Times, December 12 2008. 85 “Failure of latest round,” The Japan Times, December 13 2008. 86 Jin Dae-woong, “Nuke talks zero in on China’s draft protocol: Beijing circulates proposal for verification details,” The Korea Herald, December 10 2008. 87 “Failure of latest round,” The Japan Times, December 13 2008. 88 “Chairman’s Statement of the Six Party Talks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 11 December 2008, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/state0 812.html. 89 “Rice diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, December 24 2008. 90 “Conservatives are reasserting in N.K.,” The Korea Herald, December 18 2008. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 7Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks

Introduction Understanding the psychology of power in North Korea is important to explain why the North’s behavior deviated so often from what the other parties in the talks had expected of it. It was often assumed that the North could bargain away its nuclear program for economic aid, and that it would then reform itself and become integrated with the economies of Northeast Asia in a way which would remove the problem of its existence. Those that made such judgments had little understanding of the dynamics of a system that was so different from their own, and simply projected their own reasonable and well- meaning expectations onto a regime that operated on different, if not perverse principles. The final round of the Six Party Talks ended in December 2008 with few prospects for their revival in the near future. The North was no longer interested in them and could let them lapse quietly. After his stroke in September 2008 Kim Jong-il moved to strengthen his dynastic hold over power by having his third son Kim Jong-un recognized as successor by the military. Critical for the succession was the demonstration of the dynasty’s power to the outside world to boost the new and inexperienced leader’s credibility before the military and security apparatus which ruled the country. Regime survival demanded the reaffirmation of the founding myths of the Kim dynasty and continual demonstrations of power since there were no other sources of legitimacy. Near economic collapse and the desperate plight of the people propelled the regime not to open up to the world as expected by Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 well meaning foreign observers, but to stage another round of ballistic missile launchings and a second nuclear test in 2009. The dynamics of regime survival dictated major provocations against the South which shattered any hope that the parties had for a renewal of the Six Party Talks.

The psychology of power and the succession issue Kim Jong-il was not expected to last very long after his stroke so the search for a successor became an urgent preoccupation. French neurosurgeon Dr. Francois-Xavier Roux revealed to the press that he had been flown urgently to Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 165 North Korea to examine Kim Jong-il after he had collapsed of a stroke on August 14 2008. He reported that the North Korean leader was in a “life- threatening situation.”1 His left side was partially paralyzed and he could move his arm or leg only with difficulty; he also suffered from diabetes, high blood pressure and kidney failure that required regular dialysis.2 On January 15 2009 the South Korean news agency Yonhap reported that Kim Jong-il’s third son Kim Jong-un had been nominated as successor which was totally unexpected for party officials in the North. Kim Jong-il had reportedly issued a directive to this effect to the Party around 8 January.3 His eldest son Kim Jong-nam was disqualified after his bizarre attempt to visit Tokyo Disneyland on a forged passport in May 2001, while second son Kim Jong-chull was described as too feminine. In view of his health problems it was critical for Kim Jong-il to arrange a smooth succession and to ensure the loyalty of the party which would regard the inexperienced youth, who was 25 at the time, as an upstart. Rites of passage for an aspiring leader in the North demand demonstrations of power to justify the regime’s mythology of omnipotence despite the economic disasters into which it had led the country. North Korea has been described as a “family state” in which Stalinism has been engrafted upon Confucian familialism, but its moral failure in providing for its people blatantly contradicts this self image and threatens the regimes legitimacy.4 Open displays of power against the external world and provocations against the South impose an enforced unanimity around the regime intended to arrest any tendencies that would question the regime’s role and performance. Pro- vocations would trigger hostile reactions and anger from the world which would reinforce the country’s isolation as a condition of regime survival. Elaborate and oppressive controls instituted over the population are justified by what is portrayed as external hostility which in turn confirms the regime’s position as supreme protector of the nation, demanding absolute obedience from it. Rational minded diplomats in the West, South Korea, and China who attempted to engineer a soft landing for the North through a program of economic aid and assistance seemed not to understand the terrible dilemma that it would pose for the regime. What the regime feared most of all was loss of control and the opening up of the economy and society to the outside world which would threaten its survival. The regime was a product of brutal

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 control intended to impose a siege mentality upon the population, the parameters of possible change were severely restricted. It was normal and rational to expect that a country would want economic progress and prosperity for its people and would surrender the nuclear program for the sake of economic assistance and aid. This understanding of rationality often appeared in news reports which latched on to the North’s demand that the problem was American hostility, and if that were ended, rapid progress in negotiations would follow. It was never understood that the North needed that hostility and could never part with it because it validated the regime’s isolation and ensured its continued survival. This would provide a justification for the nuclear weapons program. 166 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks The North lost interest in the Six Party Talks which were originally limited to denuclearization whereas one way or another it wanted recognition of its nuclear status. The North intended to remove what it had regarded as the anomaly of the Six Party Talks which placed it in the position of target state, subject to the demands of others. Nuclear weapons, in the North’s view, gave it the right to be seated with the US and China as an equal, in which case the tenor of the negotiations would change accordingly.5 After a visit to Pyon- gyang Selig Harrison noted how the North’s bargaining position had hardened during this period. Because of his ill health Kim Jong-il had allowed his brother in law Jang Song-taek to manage the country on a day-to-day basis and had conceded control over security to the National Defense Com- mission which was made up of hardline generals. He reported that the North expected that the US would deal with it as a nuclear power like Russia or China, in which case negotiations would be about arms limitations and not denuclearization. The North also demanded inspection rights of US bases in the South if it was to agree to inspections of its nuclear facilities as part of a verification regime.6 The North was also preparing for another display of power to assert its new relationship with the outside world in the knowledge that there were few penalties that could be levied against it. On previous occasions China and Russia softened the impact of UN resolutions against it and there was no reason to believe that they would do otherwise this time. In early 2009 the North began to issue belligerent statements which seemed to presage dramatic events. On January 17 it threatened “all out confrontation” against the South and on 30 January announced that it would repudiate all agreements with the South, including those over the northern line limit reached in the past. US and South Korean intelligence noted that the North was constructing a new launch site at Dongchang-ri, which was larger than the main missile base in Musudan-ri, and was to be used for launching longer range ballistic missiles.7 On April 5 the North launched a long range ballistic missile which it called an Unha-2. It was basically a Taepodong-2 missile used to launch what the North called communications satellites. The distinc- tion was important since the North maintained that it had launched a “communications satellite” which was acceptable internationally, and not a ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead which would be con-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 demned by the international community. The test was once more a failure which again revealed that the North had not overcome the technical problems of constructing long range ballistic missiles. The missile’s third stage failed to separate and fell into the sea with its payload some 3,850 kilometers from the launch site.8 The test contravened UN Resolution 1718 of October 12 2006 which demanded that the North “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.” However, both China and Russia again protected the North and claimed that it was a legitimate attempt to launch a communications satellite which would not be a violation of Resolution 1718. The US and Japan insisted that the launch violated the resolution because ballistic missile technology was used. China’s draft resolution condemned the Eﬀorts to revive the Six Party Talks 167 launch without reference to whether it was a missile or a satellite launch.9 The US and Japan called for stricter measures to implement Resolution 1718. Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso demanded a new UN resolution on the North which China and Russia opposed.10 Instead, China pressed for a non binding statement to be issued by the President of the Security Council who was then the French Ambassador.11 On this occasion, because of Chinese and Russian insistence, no resolution resulted but only a president’s statement which gave even less cause for Northern anger. The President’s statement of April 13 noted that the launch was in contravention of Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) and demanded that the North “not conduct any further launch.”12 The statement was a very weak response to the North’s act which simply added nothing to Resolution 1718, nor did it call for penalties for the breach of the resolution. The US, British, and French delegations claimed that a Security Council presidential statement was binding and had the legal force of a resolution, while others argued that that it was declaratory and only a resolution under Chapter VII would be binding on all members. The South Koreans were worried because if the North directed further provocations against them, the UN would be prevented from responding by China and Russia. As The Korean Herald stated “It was sheer nonsense for Beijing and Moscow, while acquies- cing to Pyongyang’s lies about launching a non existent space vehicle, to call for restraint from Seoul.” It called for “unreserved cooperation” between the South and the US in relation to the North.13 The Japanese were similarly disturbed. Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura called the missile launch a “grave provocative action,” anddeclaredthatJapanwouldextendsanctionson the North for one year and would discuss the imposition of new sanctions. Japan was ready to test its ballistic missile defense system (BMD) against the North. Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada announced that aegis-equipped destroyers Kongo and Choukai would be sent to the test area and PAC-3missile systems would be alerted to intercept North Korean missiles if they threatened Japan.14 It would be interesting to speculate who would make the decision to respond to a North Korean missile launching in view of the well known Japanese penchant for avoiding such decisions. The North had declared that if Japan did so it would be an act of war.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 The North reacted angrily to the Security Council President’s statement but some kind of criticism, if not condemnation, was foreseeable. The North could not be surprised at the Security Council’s reaction in view of Resolution 1718 and the unanimous condemnation of the previous round of missile tests. On April 14, the North’s Foreign Ministry denounced the UN President’s statement despite its anodyne content, and said it would boycott the Six Party Talks and activate the Yongbyon reactor. The North announced that it would expel IAEA inspectors from the reactor, who had been stationed there since November 2007, and demanded that all surveillance equipment be removed. The statement added that the Six Party Talks had become “useless” and that the North “would never participate in the talks any longer nor would it be 168 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks bound by any agreement of the Six Party Talks.”15 This supercilious declaration was the North’s practiced way of dealing with condemnation as it placed the onus on the others to come bearing gifts if they wanted dialogue and engagement to continue. On April 29 the North declared that it would start a uranium enrichment program if the UN did not lift sanctions. A Foreign Ministry spokesman called the UN Security Council “a tool for the U.S. highhanded and arbitrary practices,” and that the North would “take additional self-defensive measures” unless the Security Council apologized immediately.”16 The second nuclear test followed on May 25. The North declared that the test was safely conducted “on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control.”17 It was more powerful than the first test in October 2006, the tremor measuring 4.4 to 4.7 whereas the 2006 test measured around 3.6. The North also launched three short range ballistic missiles after the test which was regarded as an attempt to keep US surveillance aircraft at bay.18 The test had three purposes. The first was to overcome the technical difficulties of the October 2006 test, which was only a partial success, and by all accounts this goal was achieved. The second purpose was to demonstrate the North’s status as a nuclear power, once and for all, and to put the world on alert that it should be treated as one. North Korean officials told Chris Hill that they wanted the status of a nuclear power, like India or Pakistan, and that talks between North and the US should focus on mutual nuclear arms reductions between two nuclear powers, as was the case with the US and the Soviet Union.19 They refused to subject themselves to inspections or verification which meant that negotiations with the North could not be based on the Six Party Talks, where it was the target of collective pressure to denuclearize. They had to be based on equality with the US and the other parties. The third purpose was to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s position as the heir and to ensure that the military would pledge loyalty to him.20 This in itself indicated the nature of the system; if the leader of the North had to resort to forceful displays of power before he would be accepted by the military, it revealed the extent to which violence had been built into a militarized system. As a long-term objective, the North was working towards a “hostage strategy” which required miniaturized nuclear warheads and long-range bal-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 listic missiles capable of striking the west coast of the US. If North Korea were able to do this, it would hold the US hostage and would be treated with more respect as a nuclear power in its own right. The North, however, had a long way to go to overcome the technical problems involved. The clear violation of UN Resolution 1718 should have provoked strong condemnation from the international community but the North had become inured to watered-down resolutions that carried little force. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi contacted his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov and both agreed that they wanted a “convincing response” to the North’s latest nuclear test. Lavrov stated that ignoring previous UN resolutions was inad- missible. They also emphasized that the issue had to be resolved Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 169 diplomatically through the resumption of the Six Party Talks, and by meeting the North’s justified security concerns.21 This meant that despite the outrage experienced by both the Chinese and Russians, their approach towards the North would not fundamentally change. Chinese and Russian protection had shielded the North from the ire of the international community and from the US and Japan in particular. Unfortunately it revealed the ineffectiveness of international institutions in disciplining miscreant regimes which had great and powerful patrons. The North indeed could rely upon its great and powerful patrons in China and Russia for protection against UN sanctions, and could proceed with ballistic missile and nuclear tests with some impunity. The dilemma for China had become acute, particularly after it was understood that the North intended to become a nuclear power and had little intention of giving up its nuclear program. Hu Jintao reportedly was considering a tougher response to the second test and indicated that a “thorough revaluation” of policy towards the North was in the offing. Korean expert Zhang Liangui said that the North’s objective of becoming a nuclear state would threaten China and undermine the security of Northeast Asia. The Chinese were concerned that the test would push Japan’s neoconservatives to revise the 1947 constitution resulting in Japanese rearmament on a large scale. Critical Chinese demanded that China teach the North a lesson, abro- gate the 1961 treaty with it and reduce trade and aid with the regime.22 The sense of outrage that was expressed by these scholars was balanced somewhat by commentaries that followed the party line. They stressed that while the North may be a burden for China it was also “an important strategic resource” against US attempts to contain China, and also against the US– Japanese alliance, which the Chinese saw as a threat.,23 China did at least suspend government exchanges with the North and Chen Zhili, who was Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress, had his visit to Pyongyang postponed.24 The North had brazenly ignored China in its conduct of two nuclear tests and two rounds of ballistic missile launchings, yet the Chinese could not bring themselves to do anything which could harm the relationship. While China claimed that it had attempted to prevent the North from becoming a nuclear power, its opposition to sanctions and its unwillingness to

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 adopt harsher measures against the North had made this possible. The North was able yet again to exploit the Chinese position and took advantage of its tolerant policies towards it in its drive to nuclear power status. Without Chi- nese protection in this way, it is doubtful it the North would have gone very far in its nuclear program. The US response was predictable. The Obama Administration wanted to organize a stronger response to the second test than had been the case in October 2006 but, once again, it was hamstrung by Chinese and Russian resistance. The Bush Administration had reversed policy towards the North but had little to show for it and the North had continued as though nothing had changed on the American side. After the second test, the US and Japan 170 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks drafted a new U.N. Security Council resolution which was intended to strengthen Resolution 1718. This draft included five American demands; a total arms embargo on North Korea, mandatory cargo inspections of North Korean vessels, mandatory reporting by UN members on the results of cargo inspections, a ban on banking transactions with North Korea, and a ban on loans or grants to the North except for humanitarian reasons. At the behest of Japan and France, it also included the targeting of specific North Korean organi- zations and individuals engaged in proliferation. The Chinese insisted that the resolution should contain a provision suspending sanctions if the North began to comply with UN resolutions. Compliance was then understood as a pledge by North Korea that it would not conduct another nuclear test, accept IAEA inspectors, and return to the Six Party Talks and the NPT.25 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1874 on June 12 2009 which tightened existing sanctions against the North, blocked funding for nuclear, missile and proliferation activities by adopting “targeted sanctions on additional goods, per- sons and entities, widening the ban on arms imports-exports, and calling on Member States to inspect and destroy all banned cargo to and from that country – on the high seas, at seaports and airports.”26 The provision for inspections built on Resolution 1718 but they were voluntary, the resolution included the words “if they (the member states) have reasonable grounds to suspect a violation.” The difficulty was that the inspection of shipping had not been enforced since it was included in Reso- lution 1718 in October 2006 and few member states were willing to risk a confrontation with the North to do so.27 If a Northern vessel refused inspection there was no provision for the use of force. Moreover, at Chinese insistence, Article 32 was inserted in the resolution which allowed for a continuous review of the North’s behavior. If necessary the measures adopted by the resolution could be suspended or lifted if the North demonstrated compliance which was not defined in the resolution. Financial sanctions were included in Resolution 1874 which were intended to target banking transactions relating to the weapons trade.28 These transactions were managed by Bureau 39 inside the Korean Workers’ Party building in Pyongyang which controlled 120 foreign trade companies and obtained foreign currency for the regime through foreign business ventures. Funds obtained by Bureau 39 were

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 used by Kim Jong-il to purchase gifts such as luxury cars, expensive cognac and electronic goods for high ranking officials and military personnel.29 The difficulty with the financial sanctions was obtaining the information necessary to trace the complicated and sometimes deliberately deceptive trail of links. This required a major intelligence effort for which not all members were equipped, and some were plainly not interested. In a demonstration of support, the South gave the US information about 10–20 foreign accounts held by the North in China and Switzerland that could be used for money trans- fers and counterfeiting.30 Sanctions did not deter the North from its course and it continued to find ways of evading them. Although the sanctions made it more difficult for the Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 171 North to make money from arms exports, they could not eliminate the trade altogether. The Security Council established a Panel of Experts to examine UN members’ compliance with UN sanctions in resolutions 1718 and 1874. It issued its report in May 2010 but, because of Chinese opposition, it was not made public until the following November. The report revealed the difficulties of applying sanctions on the North which depended upon the voluntary compliance of UN members. As of April 30 2010, 73 states submitted their national implementation reports as required by Resolution 1718, and 48 members had done so under Resolution 1874; this left 112 out of a total of 192 states that had either not submitted their reports or were late in doing so. The Panel noted that North Korea had trade relations with many of those states that had not yet reported. It also highlighted the North’s continuing involvement in “nuclear and ballistic missile related activities” in Iran, Syria, and Myanmar. It noted that the North “continued to provide missiles, components, and technology to certain countries including Iran and Syria” since the resolutions were passed. The North circumvented sanctions by resorting to direct cargo flights which carried arms exports to Iran. It also engaged in elaborate ways of concealing cargo shipped by sea by-using false description and mislabeling the contents of containers, including the use of “multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions.”31 In the first seizure of a North Korean shipment under the sanctions, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) notified the Security Council in August 2009 that it had interdicted a vessel carrying North Korean munitions, detonators, explo- sives and rocket-propelled grenades destined for Iran. The vessel was owned by an Australian subsidiary of a French company and sailed under a Baha- mian flag. It was carrying 10 containers of arms disguised as oil equipment.32 The North also shipped “knock-down kits” which could be assembled by local staff or by North Korean technicians. The report estimated that the North’s arms and missile exports amounted to $100 million annually.33 Pre- vious estimates of the North’s earnings from arms and missile sales were between $500 million to $1 billion, which may have been considerably inflated. Defectors from the North claimed that some of the revenue from this trade went to Kim Jong-il’s personal account while the rest was directed to the military.34

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 While going though its leadership succession the North had little interest in the reactions of the outside world to its ballistic and missile tests, and the outrage and anger they provoked served the regime well in terms of demonstrating and consolidating its power. Reports indicate that the tests were originally scheduled for September but were rescheduled earlier in the year because of concerns about Kim Jong-il’s health, and also to strengthen the internal authority of his successor.35 On April 26 Yonhap reported that Kim Jong-un had been assigned to the National Defense Commission in March when Kim Jong-il visited the State Security Department and told officials to regard his son as their leader.36 After the nuclear test on May 25 the South’s intelligence agency had intercepted messages to the North’s missions abroad 172 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks which demanded that diplomats pledge loyalty to Kim Jong-un.37 In June Kim Jong-un was reportedly appointed as acting chairman of the National Defense Committee. His rise was accompanied by what Japanese intelligence sources described as a purge of people close to his eldest brother Kim Jong- num including schoolmates and close aides.38 Reports circulated that there was a plot to assassinate Kim Jong-num in Macau and when the Chinese heard about it, they placed him under police protection.39 The purge resulted in the removal of senior officials who had been involved in negotiations with the Roh Administration, which was interpreted as an effort to isolate the North from southern influences. Officials in the United Front Department and Asia Pacific Peace committees which supervised the Gaesong and Mt. Geumgang projects were also targeted. Unpardonable admiration for the South was discovered amongst these officials who had dealt with the South in these projects, and who had negotiated the receipt of food and fertilizer aid. According to Yonhap the North’s chief negotiator with the South, Choe Sung-chol, president of the National Economic Cooperation Committee Jong Un-op, and Cabinet Secretary for inter-Korean dialogue Kwon Ho-gyong were removed.40 After the purge, military hardliners moved in to control both projects and seized the South’s assets at the Mt. Geumgang tourist site and expelled officials from the South.41 The Gaesong industrial venture was allowed to continue, however, as a source of revenue for the North. On June 2 Southern intelligence confirmed that Kim Jong-un was made the heir apparent. Thereafter, the North assumed a belligerent posture as it threatened reta- liation against UN sanctions, declaring that it would weaponize all available plutonium in its stocks and develop more nuclear weapons. After denying its existence for so long the North also admitted to the existence of the HEU program. During the September 2008 meeting in Geneva, Kim Kye-kwan told Chris Hill that North Korea had indeed procured material for centrifuges.42 In response to the Security Council resolution of June 12, the North issued a statement on the following day, declaring that it could indeed enrich uranium and that it would start doing so henceforth.43 The North later revealed the extent of the HEU program to Siegfried Hecker when he visited the Yongbyon complex on November 12 2010, he was shown a small recently

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 completed uranium enrichment facility and an experimental LWR under construction. Hecker wrote that he was “stunned” by the sight of 2,000 centrifuges and “amazed by the scale and sophistication” of the HEU program.44 Clearly, the program had excited a sense of pride in the North not only because of the technical achievement involved but because of the artful way it managed to deceive all who had believed that its existence was just an American fabrication. The Americans themselves doubted their earlier intelligence reports about the program’s existence and debated whether to ignore it for the sake of an agreement over the nuclear issue. The North’s pride in deceit was revealed on this occasion which showed the extent to which deception was a natural part of the North’s bargaining strategy. The incident Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 173 raised serious questions about whether the North would have adhered to an agreement over the nuclear program without strict verification provisions. It also challenged the wisdom of obtaining an agreement first and postponing verification until much later as advocated by the South Koreans and Chinese. The North had learned from the last tests in 2006 that displays of power would provoke international outrage, but there would be a diplomatic scramble to negotiate and to restart dialogue. This time, however, the North’s actions pushed the South closer to the US. The Lee Myung-bak administration in the South came to office largely because of an electoral backlash against Roh Moo-hyun’s policy of engagement of the North which had remained unreciprocated. Under President Lee the South finally joined the PSI as a full member on May 25 2009. The South dithered after the April 5 missile test because of differences between the Foreign and Unification ministries but the nuclear test decided the matter.45 The North declared that this was a “declaration of war” and that it would “immediately and effectively respond with military strikes against any attempts-including inspections and crackdowns-to inspect our ships.”46 President Lee visited Washington in June to affirm the alliance with the US, which demonstrated the extent to which positions against the North had hardened both in the South and the US. President Obama condemned the nuclear test as a “grave threat to the peace and security of the world” and pledged that the new sanctions would be aggressively enforced. At the Lee-Obama summit on June 16 a “joint vision for the ROK-US alliance” was declared which included the extension of the American nuclear umbrella to the South. The Obama Administration was obliged to accede to the South’s demands for nuclear protection and to fore- stall the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the region which could include Japan. The joint vision also allocated the leading role for the defense of the Korean Peninsula to the South, which would allow the US to focus on a broader regional strategy.47

Attempts to restart the Six Party Talks The Obama Administration wanted to restart negotiations with the North but in what form? The North had withdrawn from the Six Party Talks and direct

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 talks with the North would have exacerbated relations with allies who were looking for a strong lead from the Americans in response to the North’s provocations. The Japanese had been disturbed by the Bush Administration’s unexpected shift into direct talks with the North and feared that a bilateral deal between the US and the North would leave it high and dry. The Obama Administration had to decide how to proceed in dealing with the North without repeating the errors of the past. On 20 February, Obama had appointed Stephen Bosworth as his Special Representative for North Korea. Bosworth was ambassador to the South from 1997 to 2000 and as the former director of KEDO was familiar with Korean affairs. He saw that his task was to open contacts with the North and to renew the dialogue after the collapse 174 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks of the Six Party Talks in December 2008.48 On April 25 Obama nominated Kurt Campbell to replace Chris Hill as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacificaffairs; Campbell opted for the revival of the Six Party Talks. Gary Samore, who was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterproliferation strategy at the White House, regarded the Six Party Talks as ineffective and supported direct negotiations with the North as long as they took place within the Six Party framework. Direct negotiations with the North could not be separate from the Six Party Talks as Bosworth discovered when he visited Japan and South Korea in May. Both allies were apprehensive about his intention to engage the North in direct talks, and insisted that the US maintain the Six Party framework and consult with them before and after the talks.49 For America’s allies, the Six Party Talks offered some insurance against an American bilateral deal with the North, one that could come at their expense. The Chinese, however, engaged in top level mediation to bring the North back to the Six Party Talks. While simply bringing the North back to the Six Party Talks would be no immediate solution to the problem, the Chinese looked at the long-term and hoped that the talks would agree on economic incentives for the North which would make denuclearization possible later. The North, however, had other ideas. It had demonstrated that it was a nuclear power and was not interested in negotiations that called for its own denuclearization, and demanded recognition of its own nuclear status. After the tests on July 26 the North returned to its demand for direct talks with the US. The North’s Foreign Ministry stated that it would agree to bilateral negotiations with the US over the nuclear weapons program as “a specific and reserved form of dialogue that can address the current situation.” The statement stressed that the North was not interested in the resumption of the Six Party Talks. In response, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated the Obama Administration’s position that it would accept direct talks with the North only if it agreed to revive the Six Party Talks.50 Hu Jintao’s right hand man for foreign policy Dai Bingguo visited Pyongyang to persuade the North to rejoin the Six Party Talks. On September 18 he met Kim Jong-il and handed him a letter from Hu reiterating China’s position that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized. Kim told Dai Bingguo

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 that the North Korean leader would be willing to discuss its nuclear program in “bilateral or multilateral” meetings.51 On October 5 when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, the North Korean leader said that he was ready to discuss the nuclear program at the Six Party Talks, “depending on the outcome” of bilateral talks with the United States. He also said that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the “dying instruction” of his father Kim Il-sung.52 In Beijing the Chinese Premier said that the North was eager to improve relations with the US, Japan, and South Korea, and that he was optimistic about the early resumption of the Six Party Talks.53 What could the North achieve through direct negotiations with the US? It demanded an end to the “hostile relationship” with the US and nuclear arms Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 175 reduction talks with the US and other regional powers.54 South Korean For- eign Minister Yu Myung-hwan affirmed that the North wanted respect as a nuclear state and expected nuclear arms reduction talks to include the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.55 The Obama Administration was as insistent as its predecessor that it would not accept the North as a nuclear power, and no American administration would consider the withdrawal of forces from the South under pressure from the North. One plausible explanation for the North’s demand for direct negotiations was that it continued to hope that the US would regard it as a nuclear counter to China and would support the regime by lifting or not enforcing the UN sanctions imposed on it. This would require that the US surrender its alliances with the South and Japan and backtrack on its non proliferation and human rights policies, a very unlikely prospect. A deal with the US was Kim Il-sung’swish and as the founder of the regime and eternal President, his wishes were to be implemented by his son Kim Jong-il as a demonstration of filial piety to the great leader. In repressive regimes the top leadership works in isolation from the external world and is fed information that conforms to its assumptions. A closed political system that has created a personality cult and a regime mythology that glorifies the father-son dynasty would not permit contra- dictory views or uncomfortable information from the external world to circulate. It remains imprisoned in a self-created mindset that bears little resemblance to reality and which requires continual isolation for its suste- nance. From this perspective, the North’s demand for direct talks with the US was simply repeated again and again because the key decision makers did not see the situation clearly and had little understanding of the US. The North’s diplomats may have had no such illusions but theirs was not to reason why, and they simply carried out instructions given to them by their leadership. There was much delusion in the North’s desire for direct negotiations with this US. The most significant step made by the Obama Administration towards the resumption of talks with the North was Stephen Bosworth’s visit to Pyon- gyang over December 8–10 2009. According to the media the visit “signalled a new phase” in US diplomacy towards the North but it also provoked criticism from the Lee Myung-bak government in Seoul which called for sanc-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 tions to take effect to weaken the North, to make it more amenable to negotiation.56 Positions had indeed been reversed since the previous administration in the South had been urging the US to approach the North directly. In Pyongyang, Bosworth met Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju who raised the issue of “permanent peace arrangements” to replace the 1953 armistice and called for discussions on normalizing relations with the US. The North Koreans told Bosworth that the absence of a peace treaty was a reflection of US hostile policies and that they would not pursue denuclearization unless the US dropped its hostile policy towards it.57 Bosworth, however, insisted that the Six Party Talks should be convened first and when the parties had gained “significant traction” on denuclearization, the issue of a peace treaty would 176 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks be discussed.58 Bosworth claimed that he had reached a “common understanding” with the North on the necessity but not the timing of the Six Party Talks but said that “it remains to be seen when and how” North Korea will return to talks.”59 Expectations had been elevated by the visit said that there were no concrete results. The North raised demands that had not been heard since the early rounds of the Six Party talks relating to the replacement of the armistice, the normalization of relations with the US and the termination of the “hostile policy” of the US. All this had been said before and indicated that the top leaders in the North, meaning Kim Jong-il, had not decided how to proceed and as a result the Foreign Ministry repeated its old demands. The North was going nowhere in its demand for direct talks with the US but it would not accept a revival of the Six Party Talks. Lee Myung-bak proposed Five Party Talks without the North when he met Obama in Washington in June 2009. The Americans, who had become skeptical that any progress could be possible in the Six Party Talks, were interested.60 Five party Talks without the North would turn the negotiating forum into strong pressure group in which the US and its allies, South Korea and Japan, would have a majority. Nonetheless, there was no assurance of Chinese support and every indication that they would insist on the inclusion of the North in any negotiations affecting it. South Korea raised the proposal with the Russians who expressed curiosity but soon after dropped the idea.61 The South Korean President then called for a “grand bargain” with the North which would include economic aid and a security guarantee from members of the Six Party Talks if the North surrendered its nuclear weapons program in exchange. He also proposed a third summit with the North in 2010.62 Offi- cials from both the North and the South met in Singapore to discuss the third summit in October 2009 so it seemed possible. The South Korean Foreign Ministry declared that it wanted to revive the Six Party Talks together with inter-Korean negotiations so that the nuclear issue would be raised in both dialogues.63 Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan thought that the Six Party Talks could resume as early as mid-February 2010.64 In this, however, the South Koreans were disappointed as the North refused.

North Korea’s provocations Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 The attempts to reconvene the Six Party Talks had reached a dead end for various reasons. The North failed to obtain the recognition as a nuclear power it sought from the US. It wanted direct negotiations with the Amer- icans to signify its new found status and sought to change the purpose of the negotiations from its own nuclear disarmament to mutual nuclear reductions. The return to the Six Party Talks would have been a significant climb down for the North in view of the effort expended to develop a nuclear capability to achieve that status. The North repeated that it would not return to the Talks unless the US agreed to a peace treaty and lifted UN sanctions, which the Americans were not disposed to do under the circumstances. US sanctions Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 177 had been lifted anyway by the Bush Administration but UN sanctions were multilateral and subject to specific procedures that required a demonstration of compliance from the North before they could be eased. At that stage Kim Jong-il was engrossed in the succession and staged new provocations against the South to ensure its success. On November 10 2009, just as the US announced the Bosworth visit to Pyongyang two Northern patrol vessels crossed the contested northern line in the West Sea and in an exchange of fire with Southern naval vessels one was hit and set alight.65 Since the 2002 naval clash in the same area the South had changed the rules of engagement to allow the local commander to retaliate without obtaining approval from Seoul, which made the northern line much more conflict prone.66 More incidents were reported in January 2010 as artillery shots were exchanged over the northern line indicating that the North was becoming more aggressive in the area.67 On March 26 2010 the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan occurred with the loss of 46 sailors. The North initially denied involvement but a multilateral investigation team comprising South Korea, the US, Australia, and Sweden concluded that a Northern Korean midget submarine fired the sonar tracking torpedo that had sunk it. Fragments of the torpedo’s propulsion system and steering gear were found which confirmed its North Korean ori- gins.68 South Korean and US intelligence agencies determined that the North’s reconnaissance bureau, which conducts espionage activities against the South and was headed by hard liner General Kim Yong-chol, was responsible.69 A Japanese view was that the sinking was an attempt to strengthen unity in the regime which showed signs of fragmenting as Kim Jong-il’s health deteriorated.70 The transfer of power to a young and inexperienced leader could be a perilous affair in a regime that was built on power and violence and demonstrations of power were required to affirm leadership credentials in this system. Kim Jong-il himself was associated with terrorist attacks over two decades in an effort to obtain his father’s approval and the support of the military, an unfortunate rite of passage for a new leader in the North.71 Chinese support was also necessary for the continuation of the ruling dynasty and despite pressure brought to bear upon them, the Chinese refused to condemn the North. South Korea’s director of National Intelligence Won Sei-hoon reported that Kim Jong-il visited Beijing and asked for Chinese

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 protection in the UN Security Council against the fallout from the sinking.72 That visit took place over May 3–7 ostensibly to obtain Chinese economic support for the regime. The Chinese wanted to build good relations with the new leader and defended the North and, in spite of the evidence, they declared that the North had nothing to do with the sinking. The South Kor- eans wanted to take the issue to the UN Security Council. In this they had Japanese support but it was clear that the Chinese would not cooperate.73 At the third annual trilateral summit held in Cheju Island, the Prime Ministers of South Korea and Japan, Chung Un-chan and Yukio Hatoyama, pressed their Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao over the sinking but he avoided any condemnation of the North.74 Wen Jiabao visited Tokyo in June when the 178 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks Japanese wanted joint condemnation of the sinking but the Chinese leader again refused.75 Once assured of Chinese protection, the elevation of the raw and callow Kim Jong-un to the leadership could take place. On September 21 a Workers Party meeting was convened, the largest in 30 years. It reappointed Kim Jong-il as leader who then made his son a four star general and appointed him as a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. He was also made a member of the party’s Central Committee.76 Kim Jong-il’s youngest sister Kim Kyong-hui who was head of the party’s light industry department was also made a four star general. She was the wife of Jang Song- taek, who as director of the party’s administration department, was understood to be the power behind the scenes.77 These appointments were greeted with disbelief by outside observers. The Japanese Mainichi newspaper exclaimed that it was “an absurd idea from a common sense point of view” and that the international community was taken by surprise at these “apparent nonsensical appointments.”78 There may have been logic behind these appointments but to the outside world they seemed like a desperate attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty that could easily unravel and leave chaos in its wake. On November 23 2010 there was a second major provocation. Northern artillery shelled the South’s Yeongpyong Island which is very close to the Northern line limit and 12 kilometers from the North. Four people were killed: two marines, and two civilians. KCNA carried a statement from the North’s military that the shelling was a response to the joint South Korean–US annual Hoguk exercise that was being conducted in the area at the time.79 If the North wanted to punish the Lee Myung-bak government for refusing to continue the dialogue that its predecessor had developed, the result was an explosion of anger in the South that would put off any thought of dialogue. The shelling showed that the North was willing to sacrifice the prospect of an improvement in relations with the South for the sake of a demonstration of power necessary to consolidate domestic succession.80 President Lee called the provocation an “inhumane crime” and said that the military would strike the North’s missile base if it engaged in another provocation.81 In December the South staged live fire exercises on Yeongpyong and other islands to demonstrate its resolve. This prompted the North’s Minister of the People’s Armed

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Forces Kim Young-chun to declare that the North was ready to launch a “sacred war based on our nuclear deterrent.” Despite this truculence, however, KCNA later issued a statement that it was “not worth reacting” to the exercise.82 China’s role over the Yeongpyong island shelling showed once again that its relationship with the North carried greater weight than relations with the South, and that despite the hopes vested in it by the US, it would not restrain the North. Rather than condemn the North for its provocations, the Chinese called for a special meeting of the Six Party Talks, which was proposed by China’s delegate Wu Dawei on November 28. Dai Bingguo visited Seoul over November 27–28 and in a supercilious manner urged that a new round of Six Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 179 Party Talks be held.83 Dai also phoned Hillary Clinton for the same purpose but was told that China had to show that it would not tolerate provocations from the North.84 The US, South Korea, and Japan saw no point in convening the Six Party Talks unless the North was willing to drop its confrontational posture, and expected the Chinese to use their influence with the North to prevent further provocations. Within China, however, the generals within the PLA reportedly had attained greater influence over policy towards the US and were “adamant” supporters of North Korea. “Growing dissonance” was noted in the Chinese system between the PLA conservatives and civilians including the reformists who had struggled to maintain a balance in policy.85 Zhu Feng in a poignant comment pointed to this dissonance when he warned that China’s “coddling” of a dangerous, nuclear-armed state was creating a Japan–South Korean–US axis against Beijing. China’s policy towards North Korea, he claimed, was shaped by an “obsolete ideology” and bureaucratic inertia to the point where Beijing could not see its own interests clearly.86 China, indeed, had swung behind the North which put paid to its role as mediator in any negotiations with the North. Without the Chinese in the role as mediator the Six Party Talks made no sense.

Conclusion After its second test in May 2009 the North had no need of the Six Party Talks as it expected to be treated as a nuclear power. It demanded direct talks with the US which would shift the negotiations away from its nuclear disarmament to mutual nuclear reductions and an American withdrawal of forces from the Korean Peninsula. It was embarking on a transfer of leadership to a young and inexperienced son of Kim Jong-il which required asser- tions of power and staged provocations to obtain the loyalty of the military and party. What was striking about this period was the extent to which the Chinese would go to support the North and to protect it from condemnation. The North ignored China when it engaged in its 2006 ballistic missile and nuclear tests, and continued to ignore China when it conducted a second round of missile and nuclear tests in 2009. The North had learned that it could get away with provocative acts and that it was too important to China

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 to be subject to restraint. The North’s value to China had increased as the influence of hardliners in Beijing became more noticeable. A comparison of China’s attitude in the early and late Hu Jintao periods reveals an internal shift towards greater assertiveness in policy. A rising China, in which nationalism had been kindled by economic success and a sense of frustrated entitlement, regarded the North as a strategic asset in its rivalry with the US and had no intention to censure it. The American conviction, so often expressed during the time of the Bush Administration, that China would press the North to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was discredited as it became clear that China, despite everything, could live with a nuclear North and would maintain its relationship with it. As a result, China 180 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks had lost its main qualification to act as mediator in any negotiations with the North and had undermined the viability of Six Party Talks. Without a mediatory China, the Six Party Talks would simply reflect the divisions between the US and its allies on one side, and China Russia and North Korea on the other, and would be deadlocked.

Notes 1 “Doctor tells of secret stroke” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 20 2011. 2 Jae Soon Chang, “Kim Jong-il Had Stroke, Brain Surgery, May Be Paralyzed, Reports Say,” The Huffington Post, September 11 2008, www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2008/09/11/kim-jong-il-had-stroke-br_n_125713.html “Chronic kidney failure pla- guing Kim: Think Tank,” The Japan Times, March 26 2010. 3 “Kim Jong-il picks successor: report,” The Japan Times, 17 January 2009. 4 Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 2012, pp. 18–33, 177. 5 Han S. Park “Military-First (Songun) Politics: Implications for External Policies” Gilbert Rozman, “Multilateralism and Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy Strategy,” Victor D. Cha, “Challenges for North Korea’s Endgame,” in Kyung-Ae Park (editor) New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, pp. 106, 146–47, 188–91. 6 Selig Harrison “Living with a nuclear armed North Korea,” The Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online 09–015A: February 24 2009. http://nautilus.org/napsnet/ napsnet-policy-forum/living-with-a-nuclear-north-korea/. 7 Jin Dae Woong, “NK preparing to test Taepodong-2,” The Korea Herald,4 February 2009. 8 North Korea has nuke warheads: analyst,” The Japan Times, April 2 2009; “North Korean rocket’s launch second, third stages separated in flight,” The Japan Times, April 11 2009; William J. Broad, “North Korean missile launch was a failure, experts say,” The New York Times, April 6 2009. 9 Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “UNSC to rap North Korea over missile; Statement to call for end to launches The Daily Yomiuri, April 12 2009. 10 “Japan, US back down over North Sanctions,” The Japan Times, April 10 2009. 11 “UNSC deadlocks on North Korea,” The Japan Times, April 11 2009. 12 “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, S/PRST/2009/7, April 13 2009 www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2009.htm. 13 “UNSC statement,” The Korea Herald, April 14 2009. 14 Jun Hongo, Masami Ito, “North Korea fires rocket over Tohoku,” The Japan Times, April 6 2009. “ ”

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 15 North Korea expels IAEA inspectors, The Japan Times, 16 April 2009; NK expels UN nuclear inspectors,” The Korea Herald, April 16 2009: “N Korea to Quit 6-Way Nuclear talks,” The Korea Times, April 14 2009. 16 Choe Sang Hun, “Citing U.N. Penalties, North Korea Threatens Uranium Enrichment and Missile Tests,” The New York Times 30 2009. 17 Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “Japan, U.S. compile draft U.N. resolution on DPRK,” The Daily Yomiuri May 29, 2009. 18 Hwang Jang-jin, “N Korea conducts second nuke test,” The Korea Herald,May 26 2009. 19 Victor Cha, “Up close and personal, here’s what I learned,” The Washington Post, June 14 2009. 20 “Useless Exploit,” The Korea Herald, May 27 2009. Eﬀorts to revive the Six Party Talks 181 21 “Russia and China back ‘convincing response’ to North,” The China Post, June 3 2009. 22 Willy Lam, “Beijing Mulling Tougher Tactics against Pyongyang,” China Brief, Vol IX, Issue 12, June 12 2009. 23 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Policy in the Wake of the Second DPRK Nuclear Test,” China Security, issue 14 2009. 24 Heejin Koo and Kyung Bok Cho, “China suspends North Korea exchanges, Yonhap reports,” Bloomberg.com, June 1 2009. 25 Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “Japan, U.S. compile draft U.N. resolution on DPRK,” The Daily Yomiuri, May 29, 2009. 26 Security Council, acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions, UN Security Council, SC 9679, June 12 2009, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm. 27 David E. Sanger, “Tested Early by North Korea, Obama has few options,” The New York Times, May 26 2009. 28 Neil Macfaquhar, “UN Security Council pushes North Korea by passing sanctions,” The New York Times, June 13 2009. 29 Kelly Olsen, “New Sanctions could hit North Korea’s secretive fundraising arm,” The Japan Times, June 13 2009. 30 “Pyongyang empties accounts” The Japan Times, June 19 2009. 31 Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 May 2010, www.fas.org/irp/eprint/scr1874.pdf. 32 Bill Varner “UAE Seizes North Korean Weapons Shipment to Iran (Update 2),” Bloomberg, August 28, 2009, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& sid=ap9U2VfbfCBs. 33 Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 May 2010. 34 Blaine Harden, “In North Korea, the military now issues economic orders,” The Washington Post, November 3 2009. 35 Alex Martin, “No. 3 son readied to succeed Kim,” The Japan Times, June 11 2009. 36 “Kim Jong-il’s third son posted to top state body,” The Japan Times, April 28 2009. 37 Alex Martin “Pyongyang purge seen speeding helm change,” The Japan Times, June 5 2009; David E. Sanger, Mark Mazzetti, Choe Sang Hun, “North Korean Leader is said to pick a son as heir,” The New York Times, June 3 2009. 38 “Pyongyang purge seen speeding helm change,” The Japan Times, June 5 2009. 39 “Jong Un aide ‘plotted to kill brother,” The Japan Times, June 17 2006. 40 “Purge in the North” The Korea Herald, May 20 2009. 41 “N Korea ‘purged dovish oﬃcials,” The Japan Times, May 21 2009. 42 “NK Admits procuring uranium-enrichment materials,” The Japan Times, Sep- tember 19 2007.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 43 Kwang-Tae Kim, “Uranium gives N Korea second way to make bombs,” The Washington Post, 28 June 2009; “Defiant North Korea ‘to weaponize’ Pluto- nium,” CNN.com, June 16 2009. 44 Siegfried Hecker, “What I found in North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, December 9 2010. 45 Hwang Jang jin, “Seoul caught in ‘PSI trap’” The Korea Herald, April 23 2009. 46 “NK says not bound to armistice,” The Korea Herald, May 28 2009. 47 “New Level of Alliance,” The Korea Herald, 18 June 2009; Jung Sung-ki, “Obama pledges nuclear umbrella for S. Korea,” The Korea Times, June 17 2009. 48 “Briefing by Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth on US policy regarding North Korea,” State Department Press Release, April 3 2009 www.enewsspf.com/index. php?view=article$carid=88888983%3Alatest-national-n. 49 “Form of talks with DPRK unclear,” The Daily Yomiuri, May 28 2009. 182 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 50 Choe Sang Hun, “N. Korea Says It’s Open to Dialogue,” The New York Times July 28 2009. 51 “DPRK top leader meets Chinese presidential envoy,” Xinhua September 18. www.globaltimes.cn/china/diplomacy/2009–09/469387.html; Blaine Harden, “N. Korea Open to Talks, Kim Tells China; Statement Signals Reversal on Nuclear Issue, Fits Familiar Bargaining Pattern,” The Washington Post September 19 2009. 52 “Pyongyang should return to talks,” The Japan Times October 10 2009. 53 David Barboza, “Chinese Premier Calls for Dialogue Between U.S. and North Korea,” The New York Times, October 11 2009. 54 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Presses U.S. to Agree to Bilateral Talks,” The New York Times, November 3 2009. 55 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Is Said to Be Willing to Resume Talks on Weapons,” The New York Times, September 19 2009. 56 Choe Sang-hun, “US envoy makes rare visit to North Korea,” The New York Times, December 9 2009. 57 Kim Ji-hyun, “N Korea puts peace treaty before normal ties: sources,” The Korea Herald, December 30 2009. 58 Kim So-hyun, “US, NK agree on need for peace treaty,” The Korea Herald, December 14 2009. 59 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Says Differences With U.S. Narrowed During Visit by Obama’sEnvoy,” The New York Times, 11 December 2009. 60 Jung Sung-ki, “Obama pledges nuclear umbrella for S. Korea,” The Korea Times, June 17 2009. 61 Kim Sue young, “Five Way talks would give more options to N Korea,” The Korea Times, June 25 2009. 62 Na Jeong ju, “Is it time for South Korean Envoy to NK?” The Korea Times, December 13 2009; Jung Sung ki, “President urges NK to accept ‘grand bargain,’” The Korea Times, January 31 2010. 63 Kim Ji-hyun, “Seoul pushes for 6-party talks, inter-Korean ties,” The Korea Herald, December 31 2009. 64 Kim Ji hyun, “Yu expects nuclear talks mid February,” The Korea Herald, Jan- uary 23 2010. 65 “North Korean Boat ‘in flames’ after naval clash,” The Japan Times, November 12 2009. 66 “Naval Skirmish,” The Korea Herald November 11 2009. 67 “NK’s true intentions,” The Korea Herald, January 28 2010. 68 “NK artillery strikes S. Korean Island,” The Korea Herald, November 23 2010; “NK torpedo used on Cheonan,” The Korea Times, July 22 2010; “Int’l Experts Agree on Cheonan Findings,” The Chosun Ilbo, May 21 2010. 69 “Cheonan Evidence ‘Points to N. Korean Spy Agency’” The Chosun Ilbo, May 7

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 2010. “S Korea, US link N Korea’s spy agency to ship sinking: paper,” Nikkei, May 7 2010. 70 “Warship sinking shows Pyongyang frustration at waning power,” Nikkei, May 31 2010. 71 Choe Sang hun, “Succession issue may be behind N Korea’s new belligerence,” The New York Times, May 27 2010; Attacks linked to Kim Jong-il’s succession include the January 17 1968 “blue house raid” by a squad of 31 commandos on the president’s house in Seoul, the seizing of the American surveillance vessel the Pueblo January 23 in the same year, the axe murders of two US American officers in the DMZ on August 18 1976, the Rangoon bombing of October 9 1983 which killed 3 South Korean cabinet members, and the bombing of the Korean airways flight 858 on November 29 1987. 72 Yoshiro Makino “Kim asked China to guard his back” Asahi.com, June 26 2010. Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 183 73 “Wen ducks plea for UN action on ship’s sinking,” The Japan Times, June 1 2010. 74 Yoshiro Makino “Kim asked China to guard his back” Asahi.com, June 26 2010. 75 Masami Ito, “Hoped for Chinese stand against North not in cards,” The Japan Times, June 2 2010. 76 Kim Se-jeong, “N. Korea’s heir apparent given political posts,” The Korea Herald, The Korea Times, September 38 2010. 77 Mark McDonald, “Military’s Role Reinforced in N. Korea,” The New York Times, September 28 2010. 78 “Hereditary power transfer in authoritarian North Korea will only worsen situation,” Mainichi Daily September 29 2010. 79 Song Sang Ho “NK artillery strikes S. Korean Island,” The Korea Herald, November 23 2010. 80 “NK upping tension to pressure S. Korea, US” The Korea Herald November 23 2010. 81 “S. Korea may strike N. Korea’s missile base: President Lee,” The Korea Herald November 23 2010. 82 Kang Seung woo, “North Korea threatens nuclear war,” The Korea Times, December 23 2010; Sharon LaFraniere, Martin Fackler, “North Withholds Fire After South Korean Drills,” The New York Times, December 20 2010. 83 John Pomfret, “US steps up pressure on China to rein in North Korea,” The Washington Post, December 6 2010. 84 “Allies cool to China’s 6-party talks gambit,” Asahi.com November 30 2010. 85 Willy Lam, “Hawks vs. Doves: Beijing Debates ‘Core Interests’ and Sino US Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 17, August 19 2010; Willy Lam, “Beijing’s Stance on North Korea Challenged by Yeonpyeong Island Incident,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 24, December 3, 2010. 86 Zhu Feng. “China’s contradictions about North Korea,” Taipei Times, December 5 2010. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Conclusion

Using the concept of structure in bargaining and negotiation, this study examined the Six Party Talks to analyze the reasons why they could not bring about the denuclearization of North Korea. It began with the observation that negotiation outcomes are not just a product of power, and that the most powerful party does always prevail in negotiations. Power as understood according to military and economic indexes is not always translated into negotiating strength. Structure is defined in terms of the number of parties and the roles they assume, whether they act as dominant, pivotal, supporting, swing players, or target states during negotiations. Structure can mitigate the power of a dominant player and weaken its negotiating strength to the point where it is obliged to shift its position. Should the US as the dominant player enter into negotiations with weaker states dependent upon it for their security, the outcome would be more or less predictable. The structure of negotiations would support the US position and not modify it. Once the US enters into complex multilateral negotiations, a different structure is created according to how the players interact amongst themselves, how they perceive the positions of the other parties, the agendas they bring into the negotiations and the negotiating coalitions or alignments they form. The structure of negotiations is shaped by interaction which is a process of testing public bargaining positions against those of the other parties. Negotiating positions can be influenced and shaped by interaction with others which may result in a reshuffling of priorities. Unrealizable negotiating positions may

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 have to be adjusted, and a fallback position devised. What was previously unacceptable may now become tolerable. The structure of the Six Party Talks prevented the US as the dominant player from utilizing its power advantage to achieve the immediate denuclearization of North Korea. It required the cooperation of the pivotal party, China, to use its influence over North Korea to achieve this objective. The pivotal player, however, had other aims besides the denuclearization of the North and used the negotiations to further its own objectives. Russia acted as a supporter for China and similarly resisted the dominant player’sefforts to steer the negotiations towards its desired objective. South Korea acted as the swing state, even though it was an American ally. It swung behind both China Conclusion 185 and Russia in the negotiations and sought to deflect US pressure for a resolution of the issue on its terms. The result was a polarization of negotiating positions as the US became more assertive and as the others become even more resistant and obstructionist. The inclusion of North Korea as the target state complicated the negotiations for the US in the absence of any unity. The sixth party Japan was an outsider. It had rendered itself ineffective as an American ally because of its insistence on the resolution of the abduction issue which was of no concern to the others. It meant that the dominant player had no effective support for its objective as its allies, South Korea and Japan, which were expected to support it in the negotiations, pursued other interests. The alliance between the target state and the pivotal player China prevented unity amongst the parties in relation to the American goal of denuclearization which became a divisive issue for the talks. The target state exploited this polarization and played upon the differences between the parties. It adopted a range of tactics to ensure that the parties would not unite against it, including threats and capricious behavior which played upon their fears. It also resorted to tacit bargaining and cultivated ambiguity which relied on hints and suggestions to stimulate favorable responses, and to encourage others to believe in its good intentions. Rather than preside over the collapse of the negotiations the dominant player had to come to terms with the limitations on its ability to achieve its aims, it was obliged to modify its bargaining position and adjust to the views of the negotiating coalition which resisted it. This it did in the Berlin Talks in 2007. The Six Party Talks were the result of the Bush administration’s rejection of direct talks with the North in the expectation that a multilateral forum would avoid the ignominy of dealing with a rogue state which it abhorred. Six Par- ties were a natural combination in that the two Koreans had to be there as well as the major players on the Korean Peninsula. Negotiations over the Korean Peninsula had to include China because of its ties with the North. The US insisted that Japan be included as its ally and supporter. Russia was an afterthought and was included at the behest of the North. This was the first time that the major players on the Korean Peninsula met together with the two Koreas and it portended further steps towards regionalization and visionary efforts to construct what in South Korea was called a peace regime

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 for the region. Due to its ideological abhorrence, however, the Bush administration triggered a polarization in the Six Party Talks when it attempted to push the other parties into an acceptance of its position. For the Bush Administration defending nuclear non proliferation policy, and sending a message to other potential nuclear powers such as Iran and Syria that the line would be consistently and firmly held, were its top priorities. The broader significance of non proliferation in terms of strengthening the defenses against the nuclear ambitions of these states justified the aggressive approach of the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration. They operated with the strongly held conviction that they acted in the name of international security from which all would benefit. The Bush Administration’s failure to develop a 186 Conclusion structured process of decision-making that would have constrained the wildest impulses of the neoconservatives in the Vice President’sOffice compounded the problem. Under the influence of the neoconservatives the US imagined that the other parties would be equally concerned about the North’s nuclear ambitions, and that they would join it in the effort to stop the North from developing its nuclear program. The unrestrained belligerence with which they pursued their agenda alarmed the other parties in the Six Party Talks, and prompted them into adopting balancing tactics to head off their pressure. The Bush Administration did not appreciate that the other parties had their own agendas and interests which did not match its own, and that its own aggressiveness would propel them to a similar insistence on their own positions. This misunderstanding was particularly pronounced in relation to China. The Americans entered the Six Party Talks expecting that China as the pivotal player would share the responsibility for nuclear proliferation and would cooperate with its aims. US policy in the Six Party Talks was largely an extension of its China policy in that it had the purpose of co-opting China as responsible stakeholder in international order. The Americans assumed that cooperation over North Korea would facilitate cooperation over other issues such as Taiwan, Iran and the Global Financial Crisis. Indeed the Hu Jintao leadership in assuming the role of mediator in the Six Party Talks encouraged this thinking amongst the Americans who wanted to believe that a new era of Sino–US cooperation had dawned. Because China had offered to mediate in the talks the Americans thought that the Chinese would follow their policy, and that a united front would be created which would press the North over the nuclear issue. The misreading of China’s motives was a critical lapse. Suborned by the rhetoric of cooperation, the US did not understand the importance Beijing placed on its relationship with the North and the extent to which it would go to protect the regime against American pressure. Through the interaction in negotiations the Americans painfully discovered that there were hidden depths in Chinese thinking that they had not grasped initially, and that reaffirming ties with North Korea became more important to the Chinese than cooperation with US aims in the Six Party Talks. It seems an elementary principle of diplomacy that policy should take into account limits and constraints to action but the Bush Administration in its

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 fleeting sense of omnipotence ignored this. It assumed that as the dominant player, it would set the agenda for negotiations and that it could hustle other parties into accepting the US position on nuclear proliferation. The US failed to distinguish between power and negotiating strength. It assumed that because it was number one on the indexes of power it could prevail in negotiations. It certainly failed to understand that power can create coalitions against it, and that other parties may have their own agendas and did not necessarily share US views. The neoconservatives never understood that while brazen and unabashed aggressiveness might resonate amongst Americans it repulsed non Americans, and alienated those whose support was required over the Korean nuclear issue and pushed them into an opposing alignment. Conclusion 187 The Bush Administration did not take into account the impact of its belligerence not only upon China, Russia, and the Roh government in the South, but also upon the North which after 2003 accelerated its efforts to create a nuclear deterrent. The US confidently took the lead in the negotiations in the Six Party Talks without realizing that it had little control over them and whatever it would propose could be undermined by China as the pivotal player. It suited the Chinese to place the US at the forefront, a position that the Americans could not resist, because it gave them the crucial advantage of making or breaking any agreements reached in a way which would heighten American dependence on Beijing. Not until later did the Bush Administration understand that China would not or could not assume the expected task of pushing the North into surrendering its nuclear program. It was then obliged to shift its position and deal with the North directly in complete repudiation of its previous refusal to do so. What did the Chinese want? When Hu Jintao steered China into the role of a mediator in the Six Party Talks in 2003 he publicly claimed that the denuclearization of the North was its main objective. The Americans took this claim at face value. The denuclearization of the North, however, was a path to a more important goal for China which was to strengthen the relationship with the North as a partner regime and ally on the Korean Peninsula. As long as the North’s nuclear program attracted American attention there was the fear of a military strike, a prospect which was real enough after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The Chinese feared that North Korea’s collapse as a result of an American attack or economic disaster would result in reunification under the South. China would then lose its position on the Korean Peninsula and the Americans would extend their military presence up to the Chinese border in what would be an American triumph. For China the Six Party Talks were a means to avert that scenario and to head off American pressure against the North and the danger of an American military strike. The talks provided an opportunity to maneuver the US into an agreement over the nuclear issue which would defuse the crisis and give time for the North to implement economic reform following the Chinese path. China would be assured of a stronger North Korean ally and one grateful for Chi- nese support in difficult times.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 To this end the Chinese maintained the fiction that only the US could resolve the problem, that China was just a facilitator and that concessions had to come from the American side. This indeed was a fiction since the Chinese maintained the regime in power and were in a position to decide the fate of any agreement reached. The Chinese maneuvered to place the responsibility for negotiations on the American side and the Bush Administration willingly complied. The Americans would be loath to admit it but they fell into a diplomatic trap. They expected Chinese cooperation in pressing for the North’s nuclear disarmament and heaped liberal praise on their Chinese counterparts to encourage them in this objective. The Americans were no doubt grateful to the Chinese for their efforts at meditation and to keep the Six Party Talks 188 Conclusion going during those difficult times when the North could have opted out. On many an occasion, Chinese pressure brought the North back into the talks and prevented them from collapsing. Keeping the talks going, however, and resolving the nuclear issue were two different things. The Chinese were unwilling to press the regime over the nuclear issue and their continued support for it prevented any progress during the talks. China’s constant support for the North excluded all prospect of a resolution of the nuclear issue in the Six Party Talks and gave the North time to bring its nuclear program to fruition. The North had learned to exploit Chinese support and conducted its nuclear and ballistic missile tests despite Chinese warnings against them. China’s position in relation to the North shifted during the course of the Six Party Talks. At their commencement in 2003, China stressed denuclearization and appeared willing to work with the US towards this aim but after the North’s nuclear tests China’s support of the North became clearer. Zhang Liangui noted that China was not too concerned about the North’s nuclear weapons program and assessed it initially as bluff, but after the tests the nuclear program was regarded as a convenient card to play against the US. Shen Ding argued that the North would eventually return to the international community as a responsible nuclear power, one that would not threaten others or engage in nuclear proliferation. The Chinese may have intended otherwise but the North could not have succeeded in its nuclear weapons program without their support. They continually sheltered the North against pressure from the US and the international community and had they not done so, the North would have been exposed to the full pressure of the US, Japan and the international community to give up its nuclear program. China’s success in maintaining its ally on the Korean Peninsula was achieved at a cost, however, which will be understood in time. China had unwittingly encouraged the emergence of a nuclear power on its doorstep which could bring with it a potential instability and regional polarization. The Chinese have been concerned that a nuclear North would trigger Japan’s nuclearization, and that a nuclear Japan would assume a key role in an American effort to contain China. Zhang Liangui opined that the North’s ballistic missile and nuclear tests played into the hands of the Japanese right wing. He claimed that North Korea’s nuclear tests provided a justification for

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Japan’s military modernization and rearmament policies and strengthened the alliance with the US. If the Chinese complain about the strengthening of security ties between South Korea, Japan and the US, and about Japan’s rearmament they have only their policies to blame. Moreover, the non-proliferation regime has been weakened by the failure of the Six Party Talks to prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons, which may come back to haunt China one day. The Chinese have always made light of nuclear non proliferation regarding it as an American interest in the Korean Peninsula which was of secondary importance for them. Beijing did not consider that its support for Pakistan’s nuclear program would rebound to its detriment, that India would respond with its own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program Conclusion 189 which would target China and put its cities under threat. In the same way Beijing may not have carefully assessed the impact of its support for North Korea’s nuclear program upon Northeast Asia, and upon Japan in particular. South Korea acted as the swing state in the negotiations. Though it was an ally of the US, during the Six Party Talks it often swung to China’s side and attempted to moderate the US position. The Roh Administration followed up on Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy of engagement with the North and developed a two track policy, one being bilateral and intended to open up trade and economic ties with the North while the other was multilateral in the Six Party Talks. The South’sinﬂuence was seen in 2004–5 when, together with China, it prevailed upon the US to include incentives in its bargaining position rather than repeatedly stressing punitive measures. Roh had grandiose ambitions for the South to act as a bridge between the North and the US and to become a key actor in Northeast Asia, leading the way to what his supporters visualized as a peace regime. These ambitions were clearly beyond his administration and were exposed as fanciful by the South’s obvious dependence upon the US. The South’s role as a swing state in the talks ended when the conservative president Lee Myung-bak was elected. President Lee aligned his policies more closely with the US. For Russia a relationship with the North was a means of securing a position on the Korean peninsula for the long-term. Its voice in the talks was seldom heard. It tabled few proposals of its own and had no need to do so as it acted with Beijing to head oﬀ American pressure upon the North and generally supported China. Russia joined China in the UN Security Council deliberations and threatened to use its veto to prevent the imposition of harsh sanctions on the North, and to ensure that they would be hortative rather than punitive. Japan had attempted its own engagement of the North to ensure that it would not be excluded from the Korean Peninsula but this was derailed by the abduction issue which locked the Japanese government into a rejectionist position. At times, it even demanded that the abduction issue be linked with the nuclear problem and it was particularly alarmed by the Bush Administration’s’ about turn into direct talks with the North which would leave it isolated. From a supporter in the initial stages of the Six Party Talks, Japan later became a hindrance for the Americans.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 What did the North want? The difficulty of identifying the North’s interests was a problem shared by all in the Six Party Talks. Not only was the system tightly controlled so that little information leaked out but deliberate mis- information was a way of dealing with the outside world. The diplomats who made up the North’s negotiating team at the Six Party Talks were on a very tight leash and reported back to headquarters to obtain their instructions for every session. From the beginning the North had little interest in the Six Party Talks and became involved only as a result of Chinese insistence, and at times it revealed complete indifference to them. It had to be cajoled and even bribed to return to the talks and when it did it made demands which were undefined, emotive or changed according to the session. Demands were 190 Conclusion raised, then dropped, and sometimes reappeared again. The North would raise seemingly reasonable demands in response to American pressure during the talks which would bring the Chinese, the Russians, and, on occasion, the South to its side. Tacit bargaining gave the North an advantage over the others since it never really disclosed its position and kept everyone guessing as to its strategy. The North’s behavior did not follow the regular process of diplomatic negotiation where parties are interested in agreement but dispute the terms, as for example the US and Soviet Union over strategic arms reduction negotiations. The absence of this identifiable and predictable pattern of negotiation indicated that the North operated to another agenda which no one really understood. Rational minded Westerners, pragmatic Chinese and hopeful South Koreans assumed that the North was interested in reaching an agreement and read into the North’s behavior their own hopes for one. They assumed that the North was bargaining for maximum benefits which if identified and included in a suitable package proposal, would lead to an agreement. They acted on the assumption of reasonability and that the North should be taken at face value, and when the North remained unre- sponsive, they blamed the US for its refusal to offer concessions that the Americans were unprepared to give. Too often, as James Kelly said, in their frustration the other parties wanted the US, like some benign father, to make problems go away without understanding what was involved. The North would also resort to direct intimidation and threaten escalation to play upon fears and rouse China and Russia to protect it against the US. It could adjust its behavior to whip up fear to intensify the pressure on the US, or to raise hopes that a major change of policy was underway. The Chinese would table drafts at the talks, which, after painstaking negotiations, were turned into agreements including schedules, coordinated steps, rewards, and penalties. Too often, after reaching an agreement, the North would demand more concessions while threatening to bring the negotiations to an end. The other parties would then expect additional concessions from the US and the responsibility was thrown on the Americans to avert a complete collapse of the talks. At times, the North would demand economic benefits, or an LWR. On other occasions, it seemed that a security guarantee or a peace treaty with the US, or a replacement for the 1953 armistice agreement was really what it

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 wanted. It was as though the course of the negotiations depended solely on satisfaction on a seemingly reasonable demand. Then it would demand the end of US “hostility” and have the Americans scrambling to offer assurances that they had no intention of attacking the North, and that they would offer the required security assurances. It did not explain what it meant when it called for an end to US “hostility,” nor did it discuss economic assistance, how much was required and in what form, or the terms of diplomatic recognition. There were two tracks in the North’s strategy and an understanding of their interaction or separation is important to identify the North’s intentions. One track was the nuclear program which had been slowly developing and after Conclusion 191 2003 lurched ahead according to a schedule of its own. The second track was diplomatic which in the Six Party Talks was initially intended to prevent an American attack, and later to avoid international sanctions which could set back its nuclear program or destroy it altogether. The relationship between these two tracks is important for our understanding of what could have been done to prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons. Some like Richard Armitage assumed that the tracks were separate and that diplomacy was a just a means to buy time for the nuclear program. The Six Party Talks were used by the North to prevent its enemies from resorting to aggressive action against it. The constantly shifting demands and the prolonged negotiating sessions served to delay matters until the nuclear program had been completed. By this time the Six Party Talks were no longer useful and the North could withdraw from them. The nuclear program required considerable lead time for its development and once resources were committed and the decisions made, the momentum generated would carry it through to completion. The development of the program took place in at least three stages. The first nuclear crisis of 1993–94 revealed that the North had extracted and stored sufficient plutonium for several nuclear weapons but it did not have the technical capacity to produce those weapons. After the Agreed Framework the plutonium project remained dormant but the North initiated the HEU program by obtaining centrifuges from the A. Q. Khan network. Then came the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 which alarmed the North and prompted it to accelerate the development of nuclear weapons resulting in the test of October 2006. The nuclear program was under the direct control of the top leadership and in the compartmentalized system of the North was out of bounds to the diplomats of the Foreign Ministry. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the diplomats in the North’s Foreign Ministry knew very much about the nuclear program and very likely they were kept in ignorance about it. These diplomats had no authority to negotiate the nuclear program and resorted to tacit bargaining to keep the negotiations going when needed. They dropped hints and made suggestions which persuaded outside observers that a resolution would be possible, that the North would surrender the nuclear program for the sake of tangible economic or other benefits. It is possible, however, that the diplomatic track could have influenced

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 decisions on the nuclear track, and if the right moves were made at the right time, the nuclear weapons program could have been headed off. In a top down authoritarian system such as the North, when the leadership is decided over a course of action or policy it will impose it on the system and marshal the resources to implement it. Groups in that system favoring an alternative are of course coerced to comply. However, should the leadership be undecided for various reasons, a more complicated picture of decision-making would arise when the system is more open to different influences, externally and also internally. At these points of indecision, external diplomatic influences may gather support from internal groups or agencies that may advocate an alternative and may have some impact on the system. When the top leadership in 192 Conclusion North Korea was undecided about the value of the Six Party Talks, or unsure about the technical feasibility of developing nuclear weapons, it could have been possible to influence them. After the July 2002 reforms North Korean Foreign Ministry negotiators raised the idea of a possible deal over the nuclear program which was repeated at various points in the Six Party Talks. For a while the top leadership may have been dubious about its ability to develop nuclear weapons and it was at these times that the Foreign Ministry negotiators and the economic ministries had greater leeway to put their case at the Six Party Talks. There were two occasions when the diplomatic track may have intersected with the nuclear track to bring about a resolution of the nuclear issue. One was in the late 1990s when the Clinton Administration was considering a diplomatic opening to the North to complete the Agreed Framework; the second was in 2002 when a return to the Agreed Framework was still possible before the invasion of Iraq. At that point, if the Bush Administration had negotiated directly with the North and had continued with KEDO, if it had allowed the North to receive the promised LWRs, and if it had offered the North a security guarantee and economic aid on a large scale conditional on it giving up its nuclear program, the North might have responded and agreed to a deal. At that stage, however, the Bush Administration was in no mood to consider the idea and the North’s admission of a HEU program would have been too difficult for any administration to ignore. A resolution on either of these occasions, however, would not have led to the complete elimination of the nuclear program since the regime regarded it as necessary for its ultimate survival. The most that could have been realistically expected would have been an extended freeze with an indefinite postponement of verification of both the plutonium stockpile and the HEU program in a way that would allow the regime to maintain a nuclear reserve as insurance against changing times. Some would argue that a freeze of the nuclear program would have been better than no freeze but, this solution would have demanded American tolerance of the North’s nuclear reserve based on the plutonium produced and stored as well as the HEU program. The problem would have been simply postponed and not resolved. South Korean supporters of Roh Moon-hyun

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 have claimed that there was there a third opportunity to resolve the issue diplomatically in September 2005, if the US had not imposed financial sanctions on the North. By then, however, the nuclear track had streaked ahead of the diplomatic track as the leadership had greater confidence in its nuclear weapons program. Even if there had been no financial sanctions by 2005, the North was close to testing its nuclear device and would have found any number of difficulties to avoid agreement. Why would the North agree to a freeze of the nuclear program when it was so close to a nuclear test? After the test, an agreement based on a freeze of the nuclear program made no sense to the North which wanted to be treated as a nuclear power. The Bush Admin- istration had conducted a humiliating about turn and had accepted direct Conclusion 193 talks with the North. It had lifted financial and other sanctions which had been imposed on the North for its terrorist activities. By 2008 it had gone further to make an agreement possible with the North than anyone had anticipated. The North stalled over the critical issue of verification, however, and lost interest in the Six Party Talks and negotiations over the nuclear issue. Ultimately, the issue for diplomatic negotiation was the willingness of the parties to the Six Party Talks to acquiesce to less than full verification as a necessary measure to bring some measure of stability to the Korean Penin- sula. Any agreement over the North’s nuclear program would have had to accept this as the North would settle for nothing less. The Chinese, Russians and the Roh administration in the South wanted American compromise with the North. From their perspective the problem was the Bush Administration and its fixation with nuclear non proliferation. They were prepared to be indifferent to the demand for full verification since as they saw it, any agreement with the North would be a temporary measure and a first step in a process of eventual denuclearization. As long as agreement to remove the threatened instability on the Peninsula was reached, economic aid could be dispensed to the North, and trade and investment with the outside world encouraged. On this basis if conditions were to stabilize, the North would become more receptive and the parties could eventually turn to the elimination of the nuclear program. This outcome would have suited the Chinese and the Russians but for the Americans it would have been unacceptable. The US could not allow the North to get away without full verification while insisting elsewhere on the strict observance of the non proliferation regime in relation to Iran or Syria. Moreover, once agreed, the postponement of verification until some unspecified future time could easily become permanent and would constitute abandonment of the non proliferation regime, and implicit recognition of the North as a nuclear power. Despite everything, tensions on the Korean Peninsula would not be removed in a deal like this since a North with an unverified nuclear program would always be a source of tension on the Peninsula and a threat to its neighbors. The North brushed off all efforts to entice it to surrender its nuclear weapons program and conducted two nuclear tests despite all the attempts to prevent it in the Six Party Talks. While the first may have been only a partial

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 success, the second indicated that some technical problems had been overcome. It has also tested long-range delivery systems in the attempt to deploy a missile that could reach American territory in Alaska or Hawaii. So far these efforts have not been successful. Of the four long range missile tests two have exploded after launching and the other two revealed technical problems that have not yet been resolved. The North’s limited scientific and engineering establishment does not have the scale or supporting industries to resolve many of the technical difficulties it has faced, nor does it allow open access to the international mainstream from which it could import knowledge and technology that would assist it in its efforts. It has been reduced to furtive contact with states such as Iran and Pakistan that have operated their own clandestine 194 Conclusion nuclear and ballistic missile programs and have been struggling to develop the technology. Still, the North has gone further than many had expected and demonstrates what can be done by an isolated regime under a determined dictatorship. North Korean diplomats have on occasion referred to American acceptance of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers and intimated that the US should similarly accept North Korea. The US may have grudgingly acquiesced to India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear status, but North Korea stands out as a case to be rejected because of its dangerous unpredictability, the threat it poses to South Korea and Japan and its intention to target the US with ballistic missiles. The psychology of power in the North should be understood before any conclusions can be reached about the Six Party Talks, or indeed any effort to negotiate with the North. The Clinton Administration assumed that the North Korean regime would collapse and go the way of the Soviet Union when it negotiated the Agreed Framework. However, despite predictions, the regime has survived. It pulled through a disastrous famine over 1994–98 when an estimated 800,000 to 3,500,000 people died, which would have toppled many other regimes. It continues to survive despite food shortages and difficulties that would in other countries trigger open revolt. The regime has survived mainly because of the tight controls it has imposed on the population under conditions of stringent isolation from the outside world. The regime is an anomaly in that its survival depends on its isolation since the symbols of regime legitimacy, which include the god-like status of the founder Kim Il-sung, are meaningful only in isolation where they cannot be challenged. Power enforces the isolation of the country and ensures that contact with the outside world is reduced to a minimum, and what the populace knows about that world is fabricated or distorted by the official media. Power and its reverence underlies the operating code of the leadership which has sacrificed the economic well-being of its people for its own survival. Demonstrations of power such as nuclear and ballistic missile tests are required by the regime to underpin the basis of its rule and to verify the credentials of its leadership. Well-intended proposals that assumed that the regime was simply bargaining with the nuclear weapons program for economic assistance and aid missed the mark.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 While many thought that denuclearization could only take place only in a context of economic growth in the North and integration with the economies of Northeast Asia, the regime was beyond the economic reforms of the kind promoted by China or Vietnam. When they were attempted, they were quickly repudiated and the familiar controls were re-imposed. Economic reforms and liberalization would bring closer contact with the outside world and above all with the South, the regime’s bitter rival for the legitimacy of the Korean nation. This would threaten its ultimate ruin as the terrible deception concocted by the regime to justify its isolation before its own people would be unmasked. Every effort by the South to develop closer human contacts with the North triggered a backlash and in some cases provocations that were Conclusion 195 clearly intended to terminate them. The nuclear weapons program was its ultimate means of survival and provided the regime with the means of prolonging its anomalous existence. The North had no trust in paper agreements or assurances and American security guarantees were meaningless to it, except as a step towards the agreement with the US it sought. It wanted an agreement with the US which would require that it give up parts of the nuclear program and close the obsolete Yongbyon reactor, as long as the North could get away with a nuclear reserve based on the plutonium already stored as well as the HEU program. It wanted to be treated as a special exception in US policy, which would entail American concurrence in its own isolation and the regimes survival with a nuclear reserve. It wanted economic assistance on its own terms, with trade and investment under strictly controlled conditions. The curse of isolation is ignorance. If the intention was to use the nuclear program to maneuver the US into a special relationship with the North, one that would entail tolerance of a nuclear reserve and support for the ruling Kim dynasty, the North’s top leadership revealed little understanding of the US and the principles that underlie its foreign policy. In a brutally enforced top-down decision-making system where information is carefully screened before it is submitted to the leadership, and where stepping out of line can be harshly punished, misperceptions would be expected. The North Korean leadership, seemed not to understand that an American administration could not consider such a relationship in view of the North’s human rights record and its repressive system. Nor did it understand the American commitment to the non proliferation regime and that it could not fudge the issue of the North’s nuclear program, and accept less than full verification in view of its serious concerns about the Iranian nuclear program. It showed little understanding of American commitments to its allies in the South and Japan which were more important to the US than North Korea and that the US would not allow the North to come between them. Its nuclear tests and provocative behavior which were products of its own siege mentality strengthened hard line views of the North within the US, South Korea, and Japan and the sidelining of those who had called for engagement with the North. Indeed, the North’s provocations against the South in 2010 discredited the notion of the sympa- thetic engagement of the North that had flourished in Seoul in previous years.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 The North may have intended to reinforce its own isolation and to reduce the risk of contamination from the South but it has made the South more hostile and less willing to aid and assist it. Several lessons for negotiation emerge from this study. One is that power does not always decide outcomes in negotiations and the US should carefully examine the negotiating structure and the probable roles of the parties likely to be involved before devising a bargaining position. The US should avoid a situation where it becomes dependent upon a pivotal player whose cooperation is required to achieve an outcome, but which pursues interests which may be at variance with its own. Also, it cannot expect progress in negotiations if they include a target state which can expect support from major parties in the 196 Conclusion negotiations and is bound to them by alliance ties or common interests. For these reasons the Six Party Talks have had their day and despite the eﬀorts by China to revive them, they have been overtaken by events and are no longer relevant. Six Party Talks only made sense while China was mediator and while it assumed the role of pivotal player to bring the North on board in the negotiations. This indeed was the main attraction of the talks to the US. China has since lost its position as mediator and after the North’s nuclear tests openly sided with the North, and protected it against international condemnation. China resigned from its role as pivotal player and mediator to become the North’s patron and protector. Should the Six Party Talks be reconvened, deadlock would be expected as China, Russia and North Korea would face the US and its allies, South Korea and Japan. They would be incapable of resolving the nuclear issue or any other troublesome problem on the Korean Peninsula. Critical issues will arise in the future which will require multilateral cooperation for which the Six Party Talks are ill-suited. The North Korean regime is exceptionally brittle and its need to resort to demonstrations of power is an indication of its essential weakness. It brutally enforces an isolation that prevents economic improvement and reform while consigning its people into seemingly permanent poverty in great contrast with the South. A collapse of the regime as a result of economic breakdown, or an attempt at reform by a North Korean Gorbachev who unknowingly stimulates uncontrollable expectations, cannot be excluded. A mechanism is required which would allow rapid consultation and coordination of positions between the major players, the US and China above all. Of prime concern would be the safety of the nuclear facilities and the ballistic missiles in the North, control over the short range missile and artillery units as well as the special forces that have been deployed along the DMZ. The US and the South have made plans for joint operations in the event of regime collapse in the North to secure the nuclear facilities and prevent civil unrest. This plan has already provoked fears in China and Russia that a permanent occupation is being considered and a Chinese counter response cannot be excluded should these events come to pass. When and if this time comes, a multilateral body would be convened again to deal with the aftermath of regime collapse and to ensure that no one

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 party would gain an advantage in the North that other external players would contest. Talks on the Korean Peninsula should focus not just on the nuclear issue but on the broader topic of security, prevention of conﬂict and economic and emergency support for the North in the aftermath of regime breakdown. In this context the talks should be transformed into a consultative process to prevent conﬂict and chaos on the Korean Peninsula and to prepare for a northeast Asian multilateralism whose absence has been long felt. Six Parties are inadequate to deal with the situation and a wider multilateralism which would involve ASEAN, the EU, Australia, the IAEA, and the UN would be necessary for a global resolution of the nuclear issue and to bring stability to the Korean Peninsula. Bibliography

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Abe, Shinzo, Japanese Prime Minister, Mediator, 29, 70, 71, 89, 95, 98, 45, 62, 69, 131, 141, 146, 147 101, 141, 142, 158, 174, 179, 186, Abrams, Elliott, US Deputy National 187, 196 Security Adviser, 143 North Korea, 19, 27, 63, 64, 65, 66, Agreed Framework, 1994, 20–21, 24, 26, 94, 97, 100, 111–12, 114–15, 119, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 43, 61, 91, 127, 141, 120, 121, 124, 125, 127, 169, 170, 142, 143, 144, 148, 191, 192 174, 177, 178, 179, 185, 187, 188 End of 56–59 Party International Liaison Albright, Madeleine, US Secretary of Department, 27, 28, 94 State, 22, 23 Russia, 70, 168–69 Armitage, Richard, US Deputy Six Party Talks, 28–29, 60–62, 70– Secretary of State, 23, 60, 85 72, 88, 95, 97, 100, 115, 117, 118, Aso, Taro, Japanese Prime Minister, 119, 122, 127, 141–42, 174, 179 122, 141, 167 South Korea, 69, 80 Three Party Talks April 2003, 63–66 Banco Delta Asia, 101, 102, 111, 114, UN Sanctions, 124, 125 132, 147 United States, 26, 27, 28, 26, 27, 28, Ban Ki-moon, South Korean Foreign 29, 60, 61, 87, 94, 96, 112–13, 118, Minister, 7, 96, 98, 100 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 174, 179, Bolton, John R. Undersecretary of 186, 187, 192 State, 19, 24, 89, 116, 121, 122, 123, Veriﬁcation, 153 125, 131, 143 Choe Su-hon, North Korean Vice Bosworth, Stephen, US Special Foreign Minister, 91, 93 Representative for North Korea, 173, Chun Yung-woo, South Korean delegate 175, 176, 177 to Six Party Talks, 141, 142 Bush Administration, see United States Chung Dong-young, South Korean Bush, George W., 25, 62, 92, 101, 102, Uniﬁcation Minister and NSC Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 113, 116, 122, 142, 143, 151, Advisor, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, 103 152, 156 Churkin, Vitaly, Russian delegate to Six Party Talks, 117, 123 Campbell, Kurt, US Assistant Secretary Clinton Administration, see United of State, 174 States Carter, Jimmy, 20 Clinton, Bill, 20, 24, 31, 51 Cheney, Dick, Vice President, 19, 24, 59, Clinton, Hillary, 174, 179 62, 89, 143, 151 China Dai Bingguo, Chinese Vice Foreign As pivotal player, 27–30, 185 Minister, 63, 70, 174, 179 Foreign Ministry, 27, 28, 95, 117 Democratic Republic of Korea, see Four Party Talks, 55 Korea, North 206 Index Elbaradei, Mohammed, Director IAEA Jiang Zemin, 57, 61, 62, 66 93, 152, 154 Joseph, Robert G., US Undersecretary of State, 19, 95, 131, 143 Five Party Talks proposal, 176 Four Party Talks, 1996–99, 36, 39, Kang Sok-ju, North Korean Deputy 53–56 Foreign Minister 24, 56, 63, 100, 169 Fukuda, Yasuo, Japanese Prime Kawaguchi, Yoriko, Japanese Foreign Minister 44, 155 Minister, 59 KEDO (Korean Economic Gallucci, Robert, US Assistant Development Organisation), 20, 22, Secretary of State, 23, 90 24, 43, 68, 192 Kelly, James, US Assistant Secretary of Hadley, Stephen, US National Security State, 23, 24, 37, 56, 60, 65, 67, 72, Advisor, 132, 143 85, 88, 91 Harrison, Selig S., US scholar, journalist Khan, A. Q. network, 24, 30, 31, 88, and critic, 166 120, 149, 191 Hatoyama, Yukio, Japanese Prime Kim Dae-jung, 40, 41, 43, 56, 59, 81, 121 Minister, 178 Kim Il-sung, 20, 32, 174, 175, 194 Hecker, Siegfried, US nuclear scientist Kim Jong-il, 23, 32, 35, 41, 44, 45, 57, 86, 87, 172 92, 97, 100, 101, 111, 115, 144, 152, Hill, Christopher, US Assistant 156, 159, 164,166, 170, 171, 174, 177 Secretary of State, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, Kim Jong-un, 165, 168, 171, 172, 178 99, 112, 129, 130, 131, 132, 140, 142, Kim Kye-kwan, North Korean Vice 144, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, Foreign Minister and delegate to Six 158, 168, 172 Party Talks, 23, 89, 91, 93, 116, 124, Hu Jintao, 64, 66, 70, 100, 112, 116, 130, 131, 132, 140, 149, 158, 172 128, 143, 174, 179, 186, 187 Kim Sook, South Korean delegate to Hwang Jang-yop, North Korean Six Party Talks, 157, 158 defector, 32, 33 Kim Young-sam, 32, 38, 39, 54, 56 Koizumi Junichiro, Japanese Prime IAEA (International Atomic Energy Minister, 44, 57 Agency), 19, 31, 58, 85, 93, 95, 97, 98 Korea, North 99, 130, 132, 141, 142, 152, 153, 154, Armistice agreement 1953, 54, 72, 167 175, 190–91 Ishiba Shigeru, Japanese Defense As target state, 30–36, 166, 185 Minister, 45, 69 Ballistic missile tests, 113–14, Ivanov, Ivan, Russian Foreign Minister, 166–67 37, 59 Bargaining tactics, 34–35, 86, 159, 185, 190–93 Jang Song-taek, North Korean Security Berlin talks 2007, 131–32 Chief, 92, 93, 159, 166, 178 China, 19, 27, 63, 64, 65, 67, 92

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Japan Economic reforms, 33, 92, 93, Abductions 15, 43, 44, 45, 57, 59, Energy aid, 20, 22, 24, 34, 35, 53, 72, 88, 131, 132, 141, 147, 151, 154, 85, 90, 100, 141, 142, 148, 150, 154, 155, 157, 158, 185, 189 155, 158, 157, As peripheral player, 42–45 Foreign Ministry, 99, 128, 132, 151, BMD, 43, 45, 167 167, 168, 174, 176, 191, Foreign Ministry, 43, 44, 45 Four Party Talks, 55 North Korea, 42, 43, 44, 69, 118, Hardliners, 32, 33, 91 132, 147, 178 HEU program, 24, 30, 31, 33, 37, Six Party Talks, 45, 56, 63 56–57, 86, 88, 95, 99, 143, 144, 145, South Korea, 69 148, 149, 172, 191, 192 United States, 61, 146, 147, 155, Japan, 42, 43, 44, 69 157, 158, 173, 174 Index 207 LWRs, 20, 34, 35, 58, 86, 98–99, North Korea, see Korea, North 100 101, 132, 141–43, 172, 190, 192 Non-aggression pact, 32, 57, 58, 60, People’s Republic of China, see China 61, 70, 73, 85, 175 Powell, Colin, US Secretary of State, 23, NPT, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 58, 64, 70, 25, 61, 62, 66, 71 97, 114, 115 Pritchard, Charles, 22, 23, 86 Nuclear tests, 118–20, 168 Putin, Vladimir, 36, 37, 38, 70, 112, 116 Provocations against the South, 177, 178 Rice, Condoleezza, US NSC Advisor Regime isolation, 177, 194–95 and Secretary of State, 23, 57, 94, 98, Russia, 36–38, 189 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 143, 151, Six Party Talks, 15, 18, 25,34, 156, 157, 158 70–72, 85–86, 89–90, 93, 100–101, Richardson, Bill, Former US 157, 158, 174, 184, 185, 192–94. Ambassador and New Mexico South Korea, 39, 40, 42, 57, 82, 97, governor, 100, 114 157, 177, 178 Roh Moon-hyun, 41, 42, 58, 62, 67, 68, Succession, 165, 177 78–84, 102, 121, 122, 126, 142, 146, Three Party Talks, 63–67 157, 173, 192 United States, 19–27, 32, 33–35, 54, South as balancer, 83 61, 65, 66, 85, 86, 91, 116, 149, 151, Rumsfeld, Donald, 25, 59, 61, 62, 89, 155, 158, 159, 175, 176 131 Security guarantee, 35, 60, 61, 63, Russia 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 1994 proposal, 36 90, 96, 97, 130, 140, 176, 190, 192, China, 70, 112, 117 195 Exclusion from Agreed Framework, US ﬁnancial sanctions, 101, 112, 36 129, 130, 132, 147, 148, 159 North Korea, 36–38, 189 Korea, South, Supporting player, 36–38 Agreed framework, 54 Six Party Talks, 38 Armistice agreement 1953, 54 United States, 36, As swing state, 58–42, 189 China, 69, 80 Six Party Talks LWRs, 39, 103, 146 December 2006, 130 North Korea, 40, 41, 42, 57, 82, December 2008, 158 94, 102–3, 121, 125–26, 157, 172, February 2007 agreement, 141–47 177, 178 Fifth round, November 2005, 100, Peace regime, 68, 97 First round, August 2003, 71–73 Projects in North, 125, 126, 157, Formation 70–72, 185 172 Fourth round, July–August 2005, United States, 38, 39, 41, 51, 60, 62, 95–100 63, 68, 78–84, 174, 189 LWRs, 96–99

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 Verification, 153 Second round, February 2004, Lavrov, Sergei, Russian Foreign 84–89 Minister, 125, 168, 169 September 2005 agreement, 96–100 Sixth round, March 2007, 141–42, Lee Myung-bak, 173, 175, 176, 178, 189 148 Li Gun, North Korean delegate to Six Third round, June 2004, 90 Party Talks, 65, 66, 85 US financial sanctions, 101, 112 Obuchi, Keizo, Japanese Prime Minister, Verification, 152–57 56, 63, 64 Song Min-soon, South Korean Foreign Minister, 98, 102, 126, 132, 146 Non Proliferation Treaty, 11, 19, 20, 21, South Korea, see Korea, South 22, 27, 58, 64, 70, 73, 86, 96, 97, 98, Sunshine policy, 40–41, 43, 56, 57, 67, 99, 114, 115, 170 81, 121 208 Index Tanaka, Hitoshi, Japanese diplomat, 44, North Korea, 19–27, 32, 33–35, 54, 45 61, 65, 66, 85, 86, 91, 116, 149, 151, Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese Foreign Minister, 155, 158, 159, 175, 176 61, 127, 128 Security guarantee for, 35, 60, 61, Three Party Talks, April 2003, 63–66 63, 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 96, 97, 130, 140, 176, 190, United Nations 192, 195 Sanctions compliance, 171 NPT, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22–27, 58, 64, Security Council Resolution 8778, 70, 73, 86, 96, 97, 98, 99, 114, 115, 15 July 2006, 117, 126 170 Security Council Resolution 1718, Obama Administration, 159, 169, 14 October 2006, 123, 126, 166, 167, 173, 174, 175, 176 168, 170, 171, Russia, 36 Security Council Resolution 1874, South Korea, 38, 39, 41, 51, 60, 62, 12 June 2009, 170 63, 68, 78–84, 174, 189 United States Terrorism sponsors list, 22, 24, 90, Agreed Framework 1994, 20–21, 22, 91, 132, 142, 143, 147, 150, 151, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 36, 43, 56–59, 152, 153, 156, 157, 159 61, 91, 127, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, Removal of North Korea from, 156 191, 192 Three Party Talks, 63–66 As dominant player, 19–27 Trilateral Security Dialogue with Armistice agreement 1953, 54, 72, 175 Japan and South Korea, 26, 67, 158 Berlin Talks 2007, 131–32 Verification, 152–57 Bush Administration, 23, 24, 25, 29, 55, 59, 60, 72, 81, 90, 96, 99, 102, Wang Guangya, China’s Permanent 112, 113, 121, 129, 131, 144, 149, Representative to the UN, 116, 117, 151, 155, 156, 159, 169, 185, 186, 119, 122, 124 182, 193 Wang Jiarui, Party International Liaison China, 26, 27, 28, 29, 60, 61, 87, 94, Department Head, 94, 118 96, 112–13, 118, 126, 127, 128, 129, Wang Yi, Chinese Vice Foreign 130, 174, 179, 186, 187, 192 Minister, 61, 72, 80, 87, 88, 89 Clinton Administration, 21, 22, 23, Weinberger, Caspar, 21 24, 31, 36, 81, 144, 159, 192, 194 Wen Jiabao, Chinese Premier, 102, 114, Comprehensive deal, 60 127, 128, 174, 178 CVID, 67, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, Wit, Joel, Former US State Department Financial sanctions, 101, 112, 129, official, 126, 132, 149 130, 132, 147, 148, 159 Wu Dawei, Chinese delegate to Six First Korean nuclear crisis, 1993–94, Party Talks, 95, 97, 179 20 Four Party Talks, 54, 55, 56 Yabunaka, Mitoji, Japanese delegate to HEU program, 24, 30, 31, 33, 37, Six Party Talks, 72, 90

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:25 09 May 2016 56–57, 86, 88, 95, 99, 143, 144, 145, Yang Jiechi, Chinese Foreign Minister, 168 148, 149, 172, 191, 192 Yongbyon nuclear reactor, 22, 62, 58, Japan, 61, 146, 147, 155, 157, 158, 88, 100, 118, 128, 130, 132, 141, 142, 173, 174 144, 145, 148, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, LWRs, 20, 58, 96–99, 100 101, 103, 167, 172, 195, 132, 142–43, 144, 190, 192 Yoon Young-kwan, South Korean Military strike, 20, 33, 58, 62, 65, Foreign Minister, 63, 64, 71, 79, 83, 84 68, 97, 123, 128, 187, 190, 191 Neoconservatives, 19, 25, 59, 60, 89, Zhang Liangui, Chinese Scholar, 120, 99, 131, 143, 144, 145, 152, 159, 183 121, 122, 169, 188 Zhu Feng, Chinese Scholar, 114, 120, 179