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CPY Document The Parliamentary Elections in Belarus: Lukashenka’s Dress Rehearsal? Uladzimir Padhol and David R. Marples n 16 October 2000 the Advisory and Wieck, which has maintained that the opposition Monitoring Group of the OSCE in Minsk should gain a foothold in the official structures and Odeclared that the parliamentary elections, advocated a mass turnout at the polling booths as a which took place in the Republic of Belarus on 15 form of public protest. The role of the OSCE AMB October, did not meet international standards for has itself caused dissension among the opposition,1 democratic elections. In addition the US some of whom have maintained that the Department of State has also refused to recognize organization is in this way promoting the the validity of the elections and will continue to government’s cause. At issue are the results of an regard the Parliament of the 13th Session, dissolved agreement made between President Alyaksander by President Lukashenka in late 1996, as the Lukashenka and the OSCE at a summit in Istanbul, legitimate parliament of Belarus. The chairman of Turkey, in November 1999, during which that parliament, Semyon Sharetsky, left Belarus in Lukashenka agreed to develop a serious “dialogue” the summer of 1999, fearing for his safety. A second with the opposition, thereby (it was hoped) bringing round of the elections took place on 29 October, to an end the impasse between the two sides, which resulting in the election of 97 deputies in the 110- dates back to the November 1996 referendum by seat assembly. It may take a further three months which the president amended the 1994 Constitution for the remaining thirteen seats to be filled. to enhance his own powers and conversely to The elections have been the subject of reduce that of the Supreme Soviet. Though Western considerable debate among all factions of the states in general did not recognize the validity of the political spectrum in Belarus since they were changes made by Lukashenka, or the legality of the announced last summer. A division occurred among referendum through which he engineered them, the the opposition between those who felt that the only OSCE AMG in Minsk worked steadily to encourage logical step was to boycott the elections—led by Lukashenka to open the dialogue with the politicians such as Anatolii Lebedka, the chairman opposition. of the United Civic Party, and Vintsuk Vyachorka, The agreement made in Istanbul obliged the leader of the Belarusian Popular Front—and Lukashenka to fulfill four conditions: those who have maintained that it was important for opposition leaders to gain a foothold in state • To allow the opposition access to the structures by means of the assembly—such as official media; Nikolay Statkevich, the leader of the Social • To give legislative authority to the Democratic Party, and Henadz Hrushavy, the parliament; chairman of the largest NGO in Minsk, “For the • To provide a democratic election code; Children of Chernobyl.” These leaders planned to • To end political repression that has seen run as independent candidates, without official the arrest and detention of many activists, backing from their respective parties, believing that in addition to the disappearance of several the elections might orient the populace to prominent oppositionists. democratic values. The OSCE and the Dialogue The decision of Statkevich and Hrushavy was Most notably the Conservative Christian Part)' of supported by the OSCE’s Advisory and Monitoring the Belarusian Popular Front, led by the former BPF leader, Zyanon Paznyak. Paznyak has been in exile from Belarus since Group in Minsk, led by Ambassador Hans Georg 1996. 7 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW Lukashenka accepted the notion of consultation and registration of over 60 democratic candidates on the appointed M. Sazonov as the negotiator for the grounds that some of the signatures they had government side. The opposition leaders discovered collected were invaHd, or else they had given in practice that it was impossible for the disparate incorrect information about their financial situation. political leaders to sit at the same table. They Those rejected included virtually all the prominent included, for example, the chairman of the Liberal candidates from the wing of the opposition Democratic Party, Haydukevich, the chairman of movement that supported the elections (Statkevich the Communist Party, Kalyakin, and the leaders of and former Prime Minister MikhaE Chyhir were the the United Civic Party and the Belarusian Popular notable exceptions). Supporters of Hrushavy, for Front (BPF), which itself divided into two branches example, had reportedly collected more than 40 in 1999. Kalyakin’s Communists supported times the required number of signatures for their integration with Russia whereas the other parties candidate. Further, another 200 candidates were not were anxious to protect Belarusian statehood. permitted to run by local election commissions. Haydukevich’s party was virtually a branch of the Those de-registered took their case to the Supreme Russian party of the same name led by Zhirinovsky. Court, which subsequently upheld the decisions of On Lukashenka’s side there was also some cause for the central and local commissions. Those poEticians concern. The logical outcome of the Dialogue was excluded in this fashion then joined in the general the emergence of a group of democratic leaders, boycott caUed for by the opposition. with access to the official media, who might Opposition leaders reported more evidence of eventually be elected to parliament and form a electoral indiscretions. The opposition sent strong enough bloc to prevent the ratification of a observers into most of the electoral districts in the Union Treaty with Russia. Thus the president period 10-15 October. According to Viachorka, 20 resolved to limit the discussions to a few leaders percent of the ballots in the Hrodna region were with whom he could deal adequately or who in cast before 15 October and in Enproper fashion. general supported the same long-term goals as the Students from the Belarusian State Economic government. These included the Yabloko party run University and the Belarusian University of Culture by Olga Abramova and the Liberal Democrats. reported that their faculties were under acute Sazonov was eventually dismissed from his post as pressure to halt classes and force the students to the government spokesman and the talks broke vote. Many professors beEeved that they would lose down. their jobs otherwise. The Vyasna human rights Under these circumstances, and with the political center—s chairman, Ales Belyatsky, noted that the situation at an impasse, the opposition had to make electoral commissions indiscriminately removed a decision whether to participate in the names from the register and aUowed numerous parliamentary elections. An important marker in people to vote without showing identification. The reaching a decision was the All-Belarusian Congress, Electoral Commission itself was formed by the held in Minsk in the summer of 2000. The OSCE’s government and included very few members from Office for Democratic Institutions and Human opposition groups. Notably, despite what appeared Rights sent a small technical group to Belarus to to be obvious falsifications of the election results in observe the elections, while pointing out that this several constituencies, not a single member of the group did not constitute official recognition of the Commission ever admitted to such in the validity of the elections. The Lukashenka independent press or before the courts. government, however, purported to believe According to Yarmoshyna, the official electoral otherwise, choosing to regard the delegation as ipso turnout was 60.6 percent, thus weU above the facto recognition of the electoral process. The minimum requirement of 50 percent, and this United States, which recently held Senate hearings despite a decision by the more radical opposition about the political repressions in Belarus, took a members to boycott the elections. Official figures hostile stance from the outset and dechned to send indicate that the 50 percent total was reached or any observers. exceeded in 96 out of 110 electoral districts, with 14 Prior to the election, on 15 September, the districts declared invaEd because of insufficient Central Electoral Commission, under the voters. Of these 14 districts, 5 were in the Brest chairmanship of Lidziya Yarmoshyna, rejected the region, 4 in Vitsebsk, and 3 in the city of Minsk. THE HARRIMAN REVIEW Notably, whereas the 43 candidates who received an A Prelude to the Presidential Elections outright majority in the first round included 22 of 2001 members of the former parliament (Lukashenka The run-off elections on 29 October saw 53 version) and leaders of the KGB and Union of ridings contested and an alleged turnout of just over Patriotic Youth, those with invalidated ballots 50 percent. Prior to the 15 October vote, the included Statkevich of the Social Democratic Party opposition organized protest marches in cities and Serhy Haydukevych, leader of the Liberal across Belarus. Generally, however, the number of Democratic Party of Belarus. those who marched was relatively' small—averaging None of the prominent opposition candidates around 2,000-except in the more politicized city of (with the exception of Abramova) fared very well. Minsk, where an estimated 4,000 demonstrated Chyhir received 23 percent of the vote, well behind against the elections. The opposition held a press Natalia Masherova, daughter of the former conference on 16 October, declaring that the Communist Party leader of Belarus (Petr boycott represented a victory', citing the statement Masherov), who received 48 percent. According to of the US Department of State. The new parliament the authorities, Haydukevich received 10 percent of is a strange collection of deputies. Only' 16 are the vote in his riding, which left him in last place. affiliated with any political party (mostly Kalyakin’s total was 15 percent. The Communists as Communists) and only one major opposition leader a whole, who ran in 71 ridings, won only four seats.
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