Dear Delegates,
Congratulations on being selected to the Kremlin, one of VMUN’s most advanced committees. My name is Harrison Ritchie, and I will be your director for this year’s conference. I have been involved in MUN since Grade 10, and have thoroughly enjoyed every conference that I have attended.
This year’s Kremlin will be a historical crisis committee. In February, you will all be transported to the October of 1988, where you will be taking on the roles of prominent members of either the Soviet Politburo or Cabinet of Ministers. As powerful Soviet officials, you will be debating the fall of the Soviet Union, or, rather, how to keep the Union together in such a tumultuous time.
In the Soviet Union’s twilight years, a ideological divide began to emerge within the upper levels of government. Two distinct blocs formed out of this divide: the hardliners, who wished to see a return to totalitarian Stalinist rule, and the reformers, who wished to progress to a more democratic Union.
At VMUN, delegates will hold the power to change the course of history. By exacting your influence upon your peers, you will gain valuable allies and make dangerous enemies. There is no doubt that keeping the Union together will be no easy task, and there are many issues to address over the coming three days, but I hope that you will be thoroughly engrossed in the twilight years of one of the world’s greatest superpower and find VMUN an overall fulfilling experience. Good luck in your research, and as always, if you have any questions, feel free to contact me before the conference.
Sincerely,
Harrison Ritchie Director: Kremlin
Fall of the Soviet Union Overview
In the harsh winters of the late 1980s, the Soviet Union, one of the world’s two hegemonic powers, began to prepare for an imminent threat to state security. For years now, the Union had been producing nuclear weapons in an arms race with the United States. Now that conflict had finally reached the Union, however, many were surprised that the threat to Soviet stability did not come from its sworn enemies across the Pacific Ocean, but rather, from within the Union itself. Indeed, ever since Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary in 1985, discontent had been brewing within the Union’s 15 republics. Gorbachev is a reformist of the truest sense; unlike the General Secretaries that had preceded him, Gorbachev rode on a platform of political and economic reform. There was no doubt that the Soviet economy had stagnated, with both morale and productivity reaching a slow decline.1 Gorbachev’s predecessors had all previously ruled with an iron fist, quelling uprisings and controlling the flow of information that reached the general public. Seeing that this standard of rule no longer played to the benefit of the Union, Gorbachev, in conjunction with his Chief of Party Ideology, Alexander Yakovlev, developed the policies of perestroika and glasnost. These policies of economic and political openness, respectively, seemed to usher in a new era of Soviet Ideology - one that Gorbachev hoped would propel the Soviet Union into the 21st century as a superpower whose economy would either match or eclipse that of the United States. Things did not go exactly as Gorbachev planned, however; soon following the reformist bloc’s embrace of glasnost and the subsequent increased involvement of the different republics in Soviet decision making, anti-Soviet sentiments began to blossom, especially in the Baltic republics. Independence movements began to mobilize in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, beginning what might lead to the collapse of the entire Union. In VMUN’s 1988 Kremlin, Gorbachev has decided to call upon an emergency council consisting of important members of his Cabinet and the Presidents of major SSRs in order to discuss how to resuscitate the Union.
Timeline
March 11th, 1985 - Following the death of Konstantin Chernenko, Mikhail Gorbachev is elected to the illustrious position of General Secretary of the USSR
May 1985 - Gorbachev makes a speech in Leningrad advocating political and economic liberalization.
1986 - Gorbachev continues to press for liberalization, stressing the importance of his ideologies glasnost and perestroika (meaning openness and restructuring, respectively).
December 26th, 1986 - 300 working class Latvian youth gather in the country’s central square marching for Latvian independence. They clash with the military and lives are lost.
January 28th - 30th, 1987 - Gorbachev advocates for a new policy of democratization (demokratizatsiya) at the Central Committee Meeting, suggesting that future Communist
1 Harrison, M.. "Trends in Soviet labour productivity, 1928-85: War, postwar recovery, and slowdown." European Review of Economic History 2.2 (1998): 171-200. Print.
Party elections should offer a choice between different candidates.2 This policy is strongly opposed by the rest of the Central Committee, and is never implemented.
May 6th, 1987 - Pamyat, a Russian nationalist group, stages a demonstration in Moscow. Authorities do not break up the demonstration, and instead keep traffic out of the incoming demonstrators’ way.
October 21st, 1987 - Protesters gather in Estonia to remember those who gave their lives in the 1918 war for Estonian independence. These protests culminate in a clash with the military, and marks the first time since 1940 in which the national Estonian tricolor is publicly visible.
February 1988 - Close to one million protesters gather in Sverdlov Square in Moscow, declaring that Nagorno-Karabakh, a part of Azerbaijan containing a majority Armenian population, should be made a part of Armenia. Gorbachev refuses to make this change, and protests in both Armenia and Azerbaijan turn violent.
April 1988 - Estonian Popular Front is formed, putting pressure on Estonian and Soviet governments to give the SSR more independence.
May 1988 - Sajudis, the Lithuanian Popular Front, is founded.
June 1988 - The Latvian Popular front is founded.
June 16th, 1988 - In Estonia, Karl Vaino, leader of the Communist Party of Estonia, is replaced by the liberal Vaino Valjas.
July 5th, 1988 - Armenian troops are sent to disperse protesters at Yerevan Airport; shots are fired and a student is killed.
October 1988 - Gorbachev replaces the leaders of the Communist Parties of Lithuania and Latvia with the more liberal-minded Algirdas Brazauskas and Janis Vagras, respectively.
Historical Analysis and Current Situation
Considering the totalitarian power system and overall oppression of its citizenry that characterized the Soviet Union for most of its existence, it is of little surprise that when Gorbachev finally allowed for increased political participation by the Union’s general populace, protests began to take place almost immediately. Over 50 years of built-up anti- Soviet sentiments were suddenly unleashed, creating a sudden explosion of discontent that even Gorbachev could not have predicted. Indeed, when Gorbachev created his ideologies of glasnost and perestroika, he was not expecting them to be the facilitators of Union-wide collapse.
The Soviet government had little experience dealing with large-scale demonstrations, so instead of facilitating and negotiating with independence groups, it instead defaulted to
2 Arias-King, Fredo. "The Perestroika of Demokratizatsiya." Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13.1 (2005): 5-10. Print. violence.3 The rebellion in the Caucasus is a prime example of this abuse: in February 1988, protests began to spring up in Armenia and Azerbaijan, calling for the rejoining of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast with the Armenian SSR. Several weeks after protests began to take place, the Regional Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join with Armenia. Both the central Soviet and the regional Azerbaijani governments, however, did not recognize this vote. As such, the Armenian people continued to protest; by February 28th, more than a quarter of the entire Armenian republic’s population had gathered in the Moscow’s Sverdlov Square.4 As Armenia had previously been one of the USSR’s most faithful republics, the scale of demonstration that took place came as a surprise to the central Soviet government. Even as both protests and tensions between the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments continued to grow, Gorbachev refused to recognize the secession of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast. Gorbachev did not completely stonewall the Armenians, however; instead of giving the republic its desired Oblast, he replaced the hardliner president with the reformist Suren Harutyunyan, who he hoped would be able to ease tensions between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. Harutyunyan, however, had an entirely different agenda. In fear of escalation of conflict, he quickly gave in to the protesters, allowing them to fly the outlawed national Armenian flag in Yerevan. The Supreme Soviet in Yerevan, headed by Harutyunyan, began to draft a resolution that would give its approval to the idea of the Nagorno-Karabakh's joining Armenia.5 Within a few weeks, Armenia had transformed into the leading figurehead up to which all independence-desiring republics would look to. The Armenian Nationalist Movement was quick to mobilize, staging protests in the Yerevan airport. On July 5th, Harutyunyan, again acting out of fear, sent in Armenian troops to clear these protests. Things took a turn for the worse, however, when shots were fired and a student protester was killed. There is no sign that these protests are going to stop anytime in the near future, so it will be up to the delegates of the emergency council to try to create a new peace between the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs before all-out war breaks out.
Also of major importance are the three Baltic SSRs: Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. These states were the first to press for reform, and since 1987 have developed their own Popular Front independence movements. As these states have historically suffered the most abuse out of all the Soviet Republics, they have had a long-standing resentment for central Soviet rule. Ever since Gorbachev’s embrace of glasnost and perestroika, the Baltic states have expressed their discontent through mass protest. In the summer of 1987, protests took place in all three Baltic capitals to remember the victims of Stalin and mark the anniversary of the Molotov Pact, which ceded the Baltic states to the Soviet Union. The following fall was the backdrop to continuing protests. In Estonia, protesters gathered in Võru to remember the 1920 Estonian War of Independence. These protests culminated in a bloody clash with the military, and marked the first time that the national Estonian tricolor was visible in public since the country joined the Soviet Union in 1940.6 In 1988, Gorbachev began to lose power in the Baltic States. Three different popular fronts had been founded: the Latvian Popular Front, the
3 Keller, Bill . "Parts of Armenia are blocked off by Soviet troops." New York Times 23 Sept. 1988: 2. Print. 4 Waal, Thomas. Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war. New York: New York University Press, 2003. Print. 5 Keller, Bill . "Armenian Legislature Backs Calls For Annexing Disputed Territory."New York Times [New York City ] 16 June 1988: 5. Print. 6 Zunes, Stephen . "Estonia’s Singing Revolution (1986-1991)." International Center for Nonviolent Conflict. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.
Estonian Popular Front, and the Lithuanian Popular Front, called the Sąjūdis. Gorbachev responded to the growing threat by replacing the hardliner First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia, Karl Vaino, with the reformist Vaino Väljas, hoping that Väljas would be able to act as a mediator between the central Soviet government and the Estonian Front. To avoid further escalation of conflict, Väljas gave into some of the Front’s demands, legalizing the flying of the Estonian national tricolor and decreeing that Estonian was to be made the official language of the republic. In Latvia, Gorbachev replaced Boris Pugo with the liberal- minded Janis Vagris, while in Lithuania, Ringaudas Songaila was ousted in favor of Algirdas Brazauskas. Only time will tell if these reformist Communist Party heads will be able to bring about peace in the Baltic states.
The remaining republics have been relatively quiet and free of protest so far. The Central Asian republics, which are all headed by both hardliner heads of government and heads of state, remain fiercely loyal to the central Soviet government. Some of the Western republics, however, have begun to see their own protests. The Belarusian Popular Front was established in early 1988, but has yet to gain much steam. The streets of Belarus currently remain free of demonstrators, but the central Soviet government should be careful to make sure that this remains the case. In Ukraine, protests have slowly been growing; recently, on July 17th, a crowd of Catholics gathered in Zarvanytsia to celebrate a service provided by Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk. This was the largest Catholic service to be held in Ukraine since Stalin’s outlawing of religion in 1946, and culminated in a clash with the military.7 The Moldovan Movement for Democracy has been active since the February of 1988, but has yet to gain much public support.
Bloc Positions
There are two main blocs in Gorbachev’s emergency council: the traditional hardliners and the more liberal reformists. While for the most part, both blocs are currently supportive of Gorbachev, the hardliners are quite wary of glasnost and perestroika, and wish to see a return to the olden days of Brezhnevist rule. The reformists have realized that the Union must undergo changes in order to continue to develop economically and socially, and are more supportive of Gorbachev’s platform. In general, the reformist coalition is highly supportive of Gorbachev’s reform policies, and will seek to instill political and economic changes to advance the Union’s future. Gorbachev has also invited to the council Arnold Rüütel, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR, who will be acting as the voice of the Estonian Communist Party, which has developed more nationalistic leanings.8 Throughout the sitting of the Kremlin, it will be up to delegates to advance their own personal agendas while also preserving the unity of the USSR. Almost every member of the council has something to gain from a Soviet power struggle, and many have aspirations to lead the Union as General Secretary at some point in the future.
7 "Independence: a timeline (PART I) (08/19/01)." Independence: a timeline (PART I) (08/19/01). N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.
Individual Positions
Major Reformists
Mikhael Gorbachev, General Secretary of the USSR - Gorbachev is without a doubt the most powerful man in the entire Union. He is strongly devoted to USSR unity, and wants to see the Union move into the 21st century as a true world power. To do this, he has created the ideologies of glasnost and perestroika, which he hopes will propel the USSR into a golden age of economic prosperity. His main goals throughout the conference weekend will be to promote his ideologies, quell conflicts within different republics and prevent new protests from taking place, and to ensure that the hardliners are not able to wrest power away from his reformist bloc. Additionally, as not all members of the reformist bloc blindly follow Gorbachev’s actions, it will be a priority for the General Secretary to incentivize the reformists to follow him rather than his competitors, especially if some of his actions go awry.
Boris Yeltsin, Chairman of the Presidium of Russian SFSR - Yeltsin is a stalwart supporter of reform, and as the head of the Union’s biggest Republic, holds a very powerful position in the emergency council. Yeltsin’s relationship with Gorbachev, however, has recently be strained, as the young reformist has been critical of the slow pace of reform in Soviet society and the unquestioned devotion of the reformist bloc to the General Secretary.9 As a reformist, Yeltsin is no doubt devoted to seeing the union succeed, but as Gorbachev’s main opponent within the bloc, there may be a power struggle to see who leads the reformists as the Union moves forward.
Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers - As head of Gorbachev’s Cabinet, or Council of Ministers, Ryzhkov holds significant influence over many of the members of the emergency council. Ryzhkov has attempted to put into motion many different reform policies, but Gorbachev has rejected many of these because of small differences in ideology. He is one of the chief administrators of the Soviet economy, and as such, much of the responsibility of restructuring the economy has been delegated to him.10 As Ryzhkov controls much of the upward mobility within the cabinet, he made be able to make allies by offering them new positions within the Soviet government. If the cabinet’s opinion of Gorbachev declines, Ryzhkov may be one of the emergency council’s biggest contenders for the post of General Secretary.
Major Hardliners:
Dmitry Yazov, Minister of Defense - Soviet society has historically been fairly militaristic, and military prestige and ranking is highly valued as a measure of worth. With this in mind, there is no doubt that as the Minister of Defense, Dmitry Yazov holds one of the most important posts in the Union. As the de facto Commander-in-Chief of all Soviet forces, it will be up to Yazov to end brewing strife in those Soviet republics undergoing conflict, and prevent protests and rebel groups from taking over the Union. The Ministry of Defense must
9 Keller, Bill . "Critic of Gorbachev offers to resign his Moscow party post." New York Times [New York City ] 1 Nov. 1987: 14. Print. 10 Hough, Jerry F.. "Democratization and revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991."Choice Reviews Online 35.05 (1998): 35-2953-35-2953. Print. be careful not to abuse its power however – to do so may cause the general populous’ discontent with the Union to boil over and spark mass protests. Additionally, since Yazov is at the top of the military chain of command, he will be in a prime position to wrestle power from the General Secretary if the right situation arises. He must be careful, however, as there are other military men within the emergency council who are also looking to consolidate power. Though Yazov has never been known to be a strategist,11 he would do well over the course of the conference to make use of the significant power at his disposal.
Vladimir Kryuchkov, Head of the KGB - The KGB is perhaps the most well known Soviet organization, and is one whose inner workings will never be fully known. The amount of power that the KGB holds has fluctuated over the course of Soviet history, but there is little doubt that during the tumultuous years of the 1980s, the Union relied heavily on the organization to pull strings and create outcomes that would benefit the communist state. As the Head of the KGB, the delegate representing Kryuchkov will have access to an intricate intelligence network, and will be able to influence subtly the outcomes of many different events that will occur throughout the conference weekend. With a network of spies at his disposal, the Head of the KGB will hold significant power through private directives, and will be encouraged to pull strings and influence the committee. As a military man, Kryuchkov will no doubt be looking to consolidate power, but should be wary of the reformist bloc that seeks to take power away from militaristic organizations such as the KGB.12
Boris Pugo, Head of the Interior Ministry - Boris Pugo was ousted from his post as the President of the Latvian SSR in favor of a reformist in 1988, in order to try and quell the uprisings that were occurring in the republic. As a long-standing member of the Communist Party, or an apparatchik, Pugo was quickly catapulted into the role of Interior Minister. As Interior Minister, Pugo is head of the USSR’s police force, and as such shoulders much responsibility in keeping down protests throughout the Union. Pugo publicly supports Gorbachev’s reformist policies, but as his initial crackdown on Latvian protests suggests, he is not fully devoted to the ideologies of political openness and activism.13
Possible Solutions
In order to ensure that the USSR advances into the 21st century as a unified power, delegates must first understand exactly how multifaceted the issues surrounding the state are. In the late 1980s, the Soviet government had little to no rational-legal legitimacy, and instead relied upon the citizenry to obey the government through tradition, propaganda, and oppression. This form of government was not an effective catalyst of a productive and happy workforce, and as such, the Soviet economy had long been in a state of stagnation and decline. Since Gorbachev’s embrace of glasnost and perestroika, all of the pent-up frustrations that the Soviet citizenry had were unleashed. Gorbachev no doubt underestimated the extent of the Soviet peoples’ dissatisfaction, and has since had to deal with protests that have exceeded what he expected in both scale and magnitude. In order to regain legitimacy, Gorbachev must win back the peoples’ trust, and demonstrate that the Soviet government is capable of
11 Odom, William E.. The collapse of the Soviet military. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998. Print. 12 "A Country Study: Soviet Union (Former)." Soviet Union (Former) : Country Studies. Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.
The reformist bloc has so far been wary of moving the Soviet Union toward a full democracy. Much of this caution is derived from tradition; Eastern Europe has long been an instrument of totalitarian rule, both under the CPSU and the Tsars that ruled before them. Making the transition to a full Western-style democracy is without a doubt an option, but it is one that will anger the hardliners, which are a bloc that Gorbachev and his reformists must appease in order to create a viable solution going forward. Some elements of democracy, however, may be installed; government officials have long been debating the implementation of elections to determine the members of the Politburo and the Central Committee. This would, in theory, make government officials more accountable to those who they represent, as if they do not do a satisfactory job, they would be voted out by the members of the body of government below them. Restructuring the Soviet government from a top-down structure to a bottom-up structure may be critical if the Union wishes to regain its citizens’ trust.
As regional discontent has been a pressing issue for the central Soviet government to deal with, the emergency committee may consider the creation of a Soviet confederation.14 Officially, the Soviet Union is a federal state, but in considering the top-down structure of Soviet government, it becomes apparent that the Union is structured more as a totalitarian unitary system, in which the central government has complete control over the happenings of the different republics that it supposedly represents. By forming a Soviet confederation, it would, in theory, make it easier for each republic to voice their needs and concerns, as they would be governed mostly by their regional confederate government as opposed to the Kremlin.
Discussion Questions
1. Should the Soviet Union attempt to make the switch to a Western-style democracy? 2. What democratic elements, if any, should the Soviet Union implement in restructuring? 3. What changes need to be made to revitalize the Soviet economy? 4. Should the Soviet Union consider the switch to a confederate system? 5. How will government restructuring affect the general mood around the different republics? 6. What measures should the Soviet government take to quell the protests taking place around the Union? 7. What can be done to prevent all out war in the Caucasus?
Additional Resources
Short History of the USSR http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1112551.stm
Soviet Policy Changes
14 Miller, Dr. Robert F.. "The Implosion of a Superpower." EServer. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.
More Soviet History http://people.howstuffworks.com/communism.htm
Soviet Democracy http://anti-imperialism.com/2014/04/14/democratic-legitimacy-and-the-soviet-union-why- gorbachev-was-wrong/
Soviet Collapse http://www.historyorb.com/russia/intro.php
Ethnic Tensions http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/722/causes-of-violent-conflict-in-the-caucasus-since- the-collapse-of-communism
More Ethnic Conflicts http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/08/08/46970/many-ethnic-conflicts-erupted.html
Bibliography
Harrison, M.. "Trends in Soviet labour productivity, 1928-85: War, postwar recovery, and slowdown." European Review of Economic History 2.2 (1998): 171-200. Print.
Arias-King, Fredo. "The Perestroika of Demokratizatsiya." Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13.1 (2005): 5-10. Print.
Keller, Bill . "Parts of Armenia are blocked off by Soviet troops." New York Times 23 Sept. 1988: 2. Print.
Waal, Thomas. Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war. New York: New York University Press, 2003. Print.
Keller, Bill . "Armenian Legislature Backs Calls For Annexing Disputed Territory."New York Times [New York City ] 16 June 1988: 5. Print.
Zunes, Stephen . "Estonia’s Singing Revolution (1986-1991)." International Center for Nonviolent Conflict. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.
"Independence: a timeline (PART I) (08/19/01)." Independence: a timeline (PART I) (08/19/01). N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.
Keller, Bill . "Critic of Gorbachev offers to resign his Moscow party post." New York Times [New York City ] 1 Nov. 1987: 14. Print.
Hough, Jerry F.. "Democratization and revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991."Choice Reviews Online 35.05 (1998): 35-2953-35-2953. Print.
Odom, William E.. The collapse of the Soviet military. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998. Print.
"A Country Study: Soviet Union (Former)." Soviet Union (Former) : Country Studies. Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.
Fein, Esther B.. "THE SOVIET CRISIS: Man in the News; Skillful Party Climber: Boris K. Pugo." New York Times [New York City ] 21 Aug. 1991: 17. Print.
Miller, Dr. Robert F.. "The Implosion of a Superpower." EServer. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2014.