An Eastern Slavic Brotherhood: The Determinative Factors Affecting Democratic Development in Ukraine and Belarus Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Nicholas Hendon Starvaggi, B.A. Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies The Ohio State University 2009 Thesis Committee: Trevor Brown, Advisor Goldie Shabad Copyright by Nicholas Hendon Starvaggi 2009 Abstract Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, fifteen successor states emerged as independent nations that began transitions toward democratic governance and a market economy. These efforts have met with various levels of success. Three of these countries have since experienced “color revolutions,” which have been characterized by initial public demonstrations against the old order and a subsequent revision of the rules of the political game. In 2004-2005, these “color revolutions” were greeted by many international observers with optimism for these countries‟ progress toward democracy. In hindsight, however, the term itself needs to be assessed for its accuracy, as the political developments that followed seemed to regress away from democratic goals. In one of these countries, Ukraine, the Orange Revolution has brought about renewed hope in democracy, yet important obstacles remain. Belarus, Ukraine‟s northern neighbor, shares many structural similarities yet has not experienced a “color revolution.” Anti- governmental demonstrations in Minsk in 2006 were met with brutal force that spoiled the opposition‟s hopes of reenacting a similar political outcome to that which Ukraine‟s Orange Coalition was able to achieve in 2004. Through a comparative analysis of these two countries, it is found that the significant factors that prevented a “color revolution” in Belarus are a cohesive national identity that aligns with an authoritarian value system, a lack of engagement with U.S. and European institutions, and the Belarusian regime‟s continued economic and political support from Russian leaders. ii Acknowledgements I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Trevor Brown, for his advice in writing this thesis. It was in his course on democratic development that I originally formulated my interest in Belarus and Ukraine, and without his help the document would not have been as insightful. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Dr. Goldie Shabad, who agreed to sit on my thesis committee and offered challenging questions and helpful suggestions for revision. Finally, I would like to express gratitude to the John Glenn School of Public Affairs, which provided a computer lab that became my home away from home during the writing of this thesis. iii Vita June 2002…………………...Firestone High School, International Baccalaureate Program June 2006………………………..B.A. History, Ohio University, Honors Tutorial College April 2007 to June 2009…………………Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship Summer of 2008……….Studied at St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia June 2009……………M.A. Slavic and East European Studies, The Ohio State University June 2009………………M.A. Public Policy and Management, The Ohio State University Fields of Study: Major Field: Slavic and East European Studies iv Table of Contents Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………ii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………iii Vita………………………………………………………………………………………..iv List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………..vi List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………vii I. Introduction: Colorful Perspectives……………………………………………………..1 II. Why Belarus and Ukraine? Establishing a Basis for Comparison……………………..6 III. Setting the Color Standard in Ukraine……………………………………………….11 IV. Dispersing the “Blue Revolution” in Belarus………………………………………..18 V. An Eastern Slavic Brotherhood: Identity Politics…………………………………….30 VI. The Foreign Assistance Gap: Western Financial Engagement………………………34 VII. Hindsight and Foresight: Ukraine and Belarus in a Foreign Policy Context……….37 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..46 v List of Tables Table 1. Structural Characteristics of Ukraine and Belarus……………………………….9 Table 2. Policy Choices of Leadership in Ukraine and Belarus…………………………10 Table 3. U.S. Economic Assistance to Ukraine and Belarus, 1998-2007………………..35 vi List of Figures Figure 1. Freedom House Scores for Belarus and Ukraine………………………………8 vii I. Introduction: Colorful Perspectives For students of transitology, the phenomena of the “color revolutions” in three former republics of the Soviet Union present challenging and intellectually fruitful possibilities for analysis within the framework of these countries‟ development of liberal political institutions and competitive markets. In all of these cases, mass demonstrations ended with a revision of “politics as usual” and brought about hope amongst citizens of these countries as well as amongst international observers who advocated democracy and free markets as the best solutions to the problems faced by post-communist states. By the time the first “color revolution” occurred in Ukraine at the end of 2004, many former communist countries had been accepted into the club of European democracies. The enlargement of the European Union to include many members of the former Eastern bloc gave other states hope that one day they too could reach a point of development that would allow them to gain access to this club. Thus, Ukrainians‟ rejection of falsified and corrupt election results appeared to signal that they were ready to join the democratic fold. These were heady days indeed, not just in Ukraine, but also for observers in the European Union and the United States, where spreading democracy was a priority in the Bush administration. 1 Hindsight and temporal distance, however, have provided a deeper understanding of the political significance of the “color revolutions” of 2004-2005. Indeed, one could ask whether revolution accurately describes these political events, as each partially contradicts the meaning of the term. If we take revolution to mean a complete transformation of the previous political order, then these cases cannot be described as such. In each case, the coalitions that emerged victorious later faced serious challenges to democratic consolidation in their respective countries. In Ukraine, the Orange Coalition has fragmented and regrouped multiple times, allowing the loser and symbol of the old guard in the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych, to reenter the political scene. More importantly, Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, leaders of two of the Orange parties and two of the country‟s most visible politicians, have since revealed that they are just as capable of petty political maneuvering and power grabs as the “antidemocratic” forces they claimed to have bested in 2004. Similarly, the Georgian government of Mikheil Saakashvili cracked down on protesters and free media in November 2007, actions which made many European observers reconsider Georgia‟s readiness to join Western political and military institutions. In Kyrgyzstan, the new government that replaced the corrupt regime of Askar Akayev fell into popular disfavor within a few months of being elected for its inability to crack down on corruption. These developments might prompt observers to dismiss these “color revolutions” as insignificant changes of the guard that merely substituted one corrupt regime with another. Other analysts, particularly those who wish to spread democratic and liberal economic values to the countries of the former Soviet 2 Union, might view these political developments as replicable techniques and tactics which could apply to other cases, such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, or Uzbekistan. Clearly, if even basic terminology is problematic, the task of classifying the political developments in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan can appear daunting. While revolution is perhaps not an entirely accurate description, it is the popularly used term when referring to these three events and will be used throughout the following analysis. These “color revolutions” are best understood as a series of interconnected political events that occurred at unique moments along their countries‟ paths of development. In particular, both Georgian and Kyrgyz opposition members looked to the Ukrainian experience in preparation for their own political actions. These were not moments of “arrival” at a liberal democratic end, but rather signs of progression into the category of “partial democracies,” alternatively titled “fragile” or “unconsolidated democracies.”1 Some scholars of transition, such as Thomas Carothers, even take issue with these terms, arguing that they imply a teleological and ideological framework.2 Thus, one should not dismiss the importance of the “color revolutions,” as they constituted significant political events that changed many things about their countries‟ political systems, but should critically assess their classification in order to avoid some of the teleological assumptions of which many transitologists seem so enamored. Ukraine was the first former Soviet republic to experience such a political event, but there was a limited window of opportunity following the Orange Revolution for other countries to follow in Kiev‟s example. Leaders in other countries, such as Vladimir Putin 1 David Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 50, No. 3 (2006): 566. 2 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002):