#35 5 Dec 2000

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Air University Air War College Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt. Col. Michael W. Ritz, CPC Intelligence/Public Affairs or JoAnn Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953- 7538 or DSN 493-7538.

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Ten Tons of Russian Nuclear Material Secured

WASHINGTON, DC, November 21, 2000 (ENS) - Ten metric tons of Russian weapons grade nuclear material, enough for more than 500 nuclear bombs, has been moved into secure storage at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant in Siberia. The nuclear storage upgrade is part of a joint program of the U.S. Department of Energy and the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority of the Russian Federation signed in 1993 - the U.S.-Russian Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program. The materials were moved from three separate storage locations to a new central storage facility equipped with comprehensive nuclear material security and accounting systems. The new facility is designed to protect the plutonium and highly enriched uranium against theft or diversion.

With 1.5 million people, Novosibirsk, the capital of Siberia, is the third largest city in Russia. (Photo courtesy Sacha Telnov) The announcement Friday coincided with the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Novosibirsk for a conference on the development strategy for the Sibir Federal District. While in Novosibirsk, Putin met with the managerial staff of the Institute of Nuclear Physics and the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Scientists from the two countries are working with more than 40 sites in Russia to assist in upgrading their physical protection and material accountancy systems for nuclear materials. The successful storage upgrade "shows the continuing commitment of the United States and Russia to reduce the risk that terrorists or countries of proliferation concern might acquire nuclear materials for use in a weapon," said U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson Friday. "It is essential we continue this vital work to protect America's security and safety." The DOE officials say participation in the MPC&A Program is expected to expand considerably in the coming years, as the number of facilities participating in the program increases. Of special significance is new work with the Russian navy and the Murmansk Shipping Company to protect the fuel for their nuclear powered vessels and proposed work at the Serial Production Enterprises - the Russian weapon assembly and disassembly plants. Sizable consolidation projects are also underway at large nuclear facilities like the Scientific Production Association in Luch and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk.

Experimental facilities at the Krylov Shipbuilding Institute (Photo courtesy Krylov) In 1998, the Russian government and the U.S. Department of Energy working together installed nuclear material protection technology and advanced material control and accounting systems at the State Research Institute, Scientific Industrial Association at Luch and the Krylov Shipbuilding Institute at St. Petersburg. Physical protection devices installed include motion detectors, cameras and vibration sensors placed in areas containing weapons grade material at Luch and Krylov. Consolidation efforts will reduce the number of storage areas by roughly 65 percent at these facilities, greatly increasing the efficiency by which both countries can ensure that nuclear material in Russia remains secure now and well after work at the sites is complete. The MPC&A program was launched in 1993 in partnership with Russia and the New Independent States to correct serious deficiencies in systems to secure nuclear materials against insider and outsider threats. Through this program, security upgrades are underway for 750 metric tons of the estimated 960 metric tons of nuclear materials requiring security. The main thrusts of the program are to: ? install modern physical security and material accounting systems ? reduce risks by consolidating materials into fewer buildings ? converting highly enriched uranium to forms not usable in weapons ? promote sustainability by fostering the development of Russian capabilities to maintain security up

Washington Times November 22, 2000 Pg. 17 China Not Jesting About War By Cheng Li We are closer to a military flash point in the Far East than many in the United States and around the world understand or care to admit. I am convinced that China will use force if Taiwan continues on a speedy path toward independence. A just-published Chinese government "white paper" affirms this intent to use force to prevent Taiwan from being formally independent of the mainland or even refusing the "one China principle." In preparation, China recently completed its largest scale military rehearsal since 1964, sending a clear message to Taiwanese leaders. This is not a pretty picture. Beijing feels backed into a corner to act or lose its credibility with its people. Twice this year Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji has said, "We will not let it independence happen." Both Mr. Zhu and Communist Party boss Jiang Zemin recently stated that: "China will not postpone the issue of reunification endlessly." In fact, domestic turmoil would result if China failed to respond to a formal break by Taiwan. The government likely would not survive such unrest, especially at a time when many in China have been disappointed by the growing disparity caused by economic reform and rampant official corruption. Nationalism is strong among Chinese intellectuals now - a very different mind-set from Tiananmen Square demonstration days. Perceived humiliations by the West have set them on edge. These include the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, the Cox report accusing China of espionage and "hectoring" of China over human rights. They feel China has made too many concessions to the United States in its entry to the World Trade Organization, which will throw millions of workers into unemployment. They also feel that China is en route to becoming an economic power and that this makes the United States uneasy about loss of hegemony. As a result, they believe the United States wants to use Taiwan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" to contain China. So the island is a flash point in U.S.-Chinese relations. There is a widely used saying in China that goes, "The early war would be better than the later war." This reflects the belief that China is in the early stages of modernization, despite its rapid economic growth during the past two decades. Thus an "early war" wouldn't cause as much economic damage as would armed conflict several years from now. Despite what many believe, China's policy toward Taiwan is not aimed at immediate reunification with the island. That is a long-term goal and a principle of sovereignty. Immediate reunification would actually hurt China's economy because Taiwan's prosperity has been good for the mainland. Over half of the direct investment in China comes from Taiwan. It would also be politically uncomfortable with Taiwan having a democratic government and China an authoritarian rule. Chinese leaders know that if they occupy Taiwan, it would not be the end of their problems, but probably the beginning of new ones. Rather, China simply seeks to preserve the status quo and suppress the Taiwanese independence movement. I was in Taiwan in March when the pro-independence party was elected with only 39 percent of the vote. Many believe that if the voting were held again, independence advocates would lose because large numbers in Taiwan are afraid of China and would rather maintain the status quo. Taiwan's new leaders, for their part, seem headed toward independence. Taiwanese government officials are visiting foreign capitals to drum up support. They want to launch a new effort for U.N. membership. They're even afraid of using the street signs that are consistent with the Romanization system widely used in Chinese-speaking communities in the world, including China. U.S. policy-makers must understand that China really does not want to occupy Taiwan. China wants to maintain the situation as it is, while suppressing the current independence movement in Taiwan at the same time. President Clinton knows this, but Congress, by and large, does not know or does not share his views. U.S. policy should be to continue to engage China on all fronts - economic, educational, cultural and other areas. It should also give pressure to both sides of the Taiwan Strait to be restrained. The permanent normal trade partner measure that Mr. Clinton recently signed means that China will not be annually reviewed for its human rights conditions, a positive step toward improving U.S.-Chinese relations. But the movement among some members of Congress to block a Chinese bid to host the 2008 Olympics would damage these gains in relations. Some Taiwanese have even said that the best way to prevent a war with China would be to allow the country to host the Olympic Games. Ironically, it might take the games to fend off the serious business of war over the Taiwan Straits. Cheng Li is professor of government at Hamilton College in Clinton, N.Y.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy Number 10, 2000 Pg. 3 Libyan NoDong SSMs Targeting NATO Sites, Israel By Yossef Bodansky

Highly-reliable sources confirmed that the Israeli national intelligence service, Mossad, on November 6, 2000, formally warned the states of southern Europe - Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey - that Libya recently deployed newly-acquired NoDong-1 SSMs in operational posture. These SSMs can now reach targets in these countries, as well as Israel. The missiles are deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a Central HQ in the Tripoli area. It is not clear whether this deployment is a part of the Arab military build-up against Israel, or Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's reaction to the French moves to indict him for the 1989 in-flight bombing of the UTA DC-10 over Niger, or both. The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad'r/ Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) role and consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad. In early 1999, reliable sources confirmed that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had told Col. Qadhafi that Libya "owed Egypt" because of the decisive Egyptian contribution to the lifting of the sanctions on Libya. [In fact, it is not true that Egyptian pressures were influential in raising the Libyan sanctions.] However, as a result of the Mubarak pressure - and shortly after the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya - Qadhafi, in April 1999, dispatched a high-ranking delegation from the Libyan Army's procurement directorate to the DPRK. The delegation included Egyptian and Iraqi experts. The joint delegation visited the Chongchengang Corporation - the "company" responsible for the DPRK's weapons and technology exports - and negotiated a comprehensive deal for North Korean assistance in the ostensibly "Libyan" acquisition of NoDong-type SSMs. Comparable deals were concluded with other states. For example, in the Fall of 1999, the People's Republic of China (PRC) agreed to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya. The specifications of the wind tunnel ensured it could be used for missile design and flight. Several Libyan (as well as Egyptian and Iraqi with Libyan documents) technicians traveled to the PRC for missile-related technical training and engineering education. The DPRK, which had been a major contributor of technology and sub-systems to the Egyptian ballistic missile program, was to deliver key components to the reincarnated "Libyan" Bad'r/Condor program. This aspect of the program collapsed in the Summer of 1999 when Indian Customs authorities seized a North Korean ship with a concealed consignment of NoDong components, guidance and navigation systems. Initially, the Indians suspected that the shipment was destined for Pakistan, however subsequent investigation in cooperation with the US concluded that the cargo was on its way to Libya, via Malta. The failure of this procurement effort prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the Libya-based system program. The Egyptian and Iraqi program managers concluded that their cooperation with experts from Iran and Yugoslavia had so far failed to resolve the severe development problems. On top of this, Pyongyang reported it would take several months to replicate the special parts ordered by "Libya". As a result, a few scientists from the former East Germany (GDR) were invited to Libya to audit the entire missile program. The Germans, all of them veterans of the Iraqi missile program, opined that it would take too long to revive the Bad'r/Condor to meet the urgent requirement for operational SSMs for the anticipated crisis in the Middle East. Therefore, in the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff - who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program - to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a "safe laundered method". A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with the delegation for the supply of NoDong-ls and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya. The eventual October 1999 deal was for the delivery of seven mobile launchers, 50 "missile systems" (each missile system includes several SSMs which can be carried on the support vehicles escorting the mobile launcher to a forward position), and related support vehicles. The North Koreans also agreed to construct the infrastructure required for the maintenance and storage of these missiles, as well as to train "Libyans" in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The first consignment of missiles and launchers was to be delivered as soon as possible and the rest were to be delivered in three further consignments over the next two years. Pyongyang notified Tripoli that the missiles would be ready in the early Summer of 2000. The financial aspects of the deal were conducted by a Syrian arms merchant living in Marbella, Spain. Libyan agents paid him US$600- million (including a 15 percent commission). The money was laundered through banks in Madrid and Basle in Switzerland. The transaction was completed in Switzerland in July 2000. In August 2000, Libyan Il-76 transport aircraft delivered to Tripoli 36 NoDong-1 missiles, a few launchers and 11 North Korean experts. Two were senior officials overseeing the Libyan-North Korean cooperation and nine were missile engineers and technicians who will remain in Libya for two years in order to help bring the missiles to operational status as well as retain their operability. In late-September 2000, the first missiles and their launchers were deployed along the Mediterranean Sea coast. The location of these deployments and related targeting activities suggest they are pointed at NATO's bases in southern Europe. Although Israel is within the NoDong-1's range, little activity related to Israel was noticed. The NoDong-1 SSMs supplied to Libya can be equipped with both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) warheads. Although Libya has stocks of chemical and biological weapons hidden in underground stores in the desert, mainly the Sabha area, there is no indication that there are unconventional warheads with the SSMs. Libya is reportedly satisfied with the NoDong-ls and the DPRK support system. In late October 2000, Qadhafi initiated a new round of negotiations with Pyongyang for the acquisition of a larger number of SSMs, including newer models. Two Libyan envoys arrived in Marbella to conclude arrangements with the Syrian arms merchant for the laundering of additional funds.

Boston Globe November 24, 2000 Pg. 28 Arms-Cutting Opportunity WHILE AMERICANS were caught up in the tumultuous vote-counting quarrels caused by a close presidential election, Russian President Vladimir Putin floated a momentous proposal to reduce the number of his country's strategic nuclear warheads from 6,000 to 1,500 or fewer. Putin's trial balloon represents, first and foremost, an attempt to make a virtue out of economic necessity. The cut in intercontinental ballistic missiles proposed by Putin was one of several steep, cost-saving reductions he announced for a defense establishment that Russia can no longer afford. Russian analysts also noted that Putin was trying to seize the opportunity to apply pressure on President Clinton's successor, who the Russian leader assumed prematurely would be weakened by America's electoral imbroglio. Whoever the next US president may be, he should not allow Russia's budgetary problems or Putin's misplaced political opportunism to become a distraction. Moscow's need to stop squandering rubles on excessive strategic nuclear weapons will present the president with a rare opportunity to enhance America's security. The fact that the Kremlin has been forced to acknowledge that Russia can no longer keep up superpower pretenses ought to awaken America to the superfluity of its own 6,000 ICBMs. A misleading impression was given last week when the officer in charge of Russia's strategic missile forces, General Vladimir Yakovlev, said a grand bargain might be possible between Washington and Moscow. He alluded to a deal that would permit the Americans to escape the confines of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build a national missile defense system and, in return, would allow Russia to maintain land-based, multiple-warhead ICBMs that are now prohibited under the START II arms control treaty. Putin swiftly denied any such intention. ''The position of Russia on ABM is unchanged,'' Putin said after meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair Tuesday. ''We believe that the destruction of ABM would lead to serious destabilization in the world.'' What Putin did not explain is that General Yakovlev was hoping to save his Strategic Missile Forces from being eliminated as a separate branch of Russia's armed services, as they will be under the plan for military reform that Putin's national security council has approved unanimously. The next US president, be it Bush or Gore, would be well advised to cease pursuing an unworkable missile defense system and to seize the opportunity for nuclear arms reduction offered by Russia's unavoidable need to stop wasting rubles on useless nukes.

New York Times November 25, 2000 China Gave Up Little In U.S. Deal On Banning Sale Of Missile Parts By Jane Perlez WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 — When American negotiators visited Beijing this fall to persuade the Chinese to curb their sales of missile parts, they found the going easier than usual. One result of those talks was that China announced this week that it would publish a list of missile-related items that would be banned for export. That announcement was the basis for a new agreement under which the United States waived sanctions against China, but administration officials and critics agree that Beijing gave up little to get that deal. In the first place, they say, missile sales were becoming less lucrative than the launchings of American satellites that the new arrangement clears the way for. Second, they say, the Chinese have failed to live up to previous, though less explicit, accords on weapons proliferation, and it is far from clear that they will do better this time. The realities of finance and geopolitics, however, could bring improved compliance, they suggested. This week the United States agreed to waive sanctions for past sales of such material to Pakistan and Iran. American companies will now be free to seek State Department permission to launch satellites on Chinese rockets. An important element in the Chinese decision, officials said, was the fact that deals with Pakistan, China's most important market for missile technology, have become less lucrative as the Pakistani missile program has become more developed, and now receives its most pressing needs from North Korea. Another incentive for pledging to stop the sale of missile parts was the increasing security threat on China's borders from the nuclear stand-off between Pakistan and India. The Chinese sent missile components to Pakistan after the nuclear tests between India and Pakistan in mid-1998, but China has become concerned about the tensions between the two countries and has tried to improve its poor relations with India. Two of the administration's top proliferation experts — Gary Samore of the National Security Council, and Robert J. Einhorn, the assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation affairs — negotiated the accord this month with the Foreign Ministry in Beijing. President Clinton and the Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, reviewed the agreement in Brunei before the announcement. China has sent so much missile matériel to Pakistan that there was now less demand from Pakistan, said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a nonprofit group. "The Chinese don't see the need for a lot of additional systems for export to Pakistan," he said. Launching American satellites into space may be more financially rewarding for the Chinese rocket companies than under-the-table exports to Pakistan, he said. But for the most part, the Chinese did not see launching services for American satellites and exports to Pakistan as an either-or proposition, he said. Many of the Chinese companies that provide the launching services also sell to Pakistan. The new accord was supposed to stop this, but it was unclear that it would turn out any differently than past pledges, which were broken by the Chinese, he said. By failing in this new accord to impose sanctions on the Chinese entities, the United States was most likely allowing the Chinese companies to reap revenues both from American companies and from illicit missile deals abroad, Mr. Milhollin said. In the early 1990's, experts estimate, China supplied Pakistan with several dozen M-11 missiles, a solid- fuel version of the Scud-B missile. At about the same time, North Korea began to supply technology to Pakistan based on their liquid-fueled Nodong missile. The Pakistanis built their Ghauri rocket on the Nodong model. The Ghauri has a far superior range and payload — a 900-mile range and capacity for a 1,540-pound warhead — to the Chinese M-11, which has a range of 180 miles and carrying capacity of 1,100 pounds. "In strategic terms, Pakistan needs to be able to threaten all of India, and the Nodong from North Korea gives them that capability, and the missiles from China don't," said Simon Henderson, a London- based expert on missile technology. A major uncertainty about the new accord, administration officials acknowledged, revolves around the power of the Foreign Ministry over the missile-parts factories, which are run by the Chinese military. In the past, the Foreign Ministry, which signed the new accord, has wielded little influence over the factories. About 100 companies in China produce missile-related materials, an administration official said. About half a dozen companies were involved in sending the M-11 missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990's and the production facilities later on, the official said. These companies were hit with sanctions that were immediately waived in exchange for the new curbs.

Self-Sufficiency-Shamkhani Iran self-sufficient in building shore-to-sea missile - Minister

Tehran, Nov 27, IRNA -- Despite U.S. claims, Iran has attained self-sufficiency in manufacture of shore-to-sea cruise missiles, Iran's Defense Minister Rear-Admiral Ali Shamkhani said here Sunday. Shamkhani told a seminar here that Iranian defense experts have managed to dash U.S. claims of Iran's incapability to obtain such military technology. "Sea is the hotbed of future threats and opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran," he said. Among main defensive projects, Shamkhani said, are manufacture of buoyants, electronic equipment and different missiles. In the same seminar, the Army Chief Sunday called on Iran's armed forces to look out for any attack by NATO and Israeli troops in the Caspian Sea. "Israeli and NATO forces are in the Caspian Sea as prospecting for oil is in progress at that region," Major-General Mohammad Salimi said. Iran's Navy announced in September that it was about to launch the first locally-built mini vessel capable of functioning as a rocket-launcher and destroyer. In August, Iran launched its first domestically-manufactured mini submarine capable of transporting commandos and lay mines in the waters of the Persian Gulf off Bandar Abbas port. The submarine is capable of being used in various operations close to enemy territory such as making reconnaissance patrols and dropping commandos, planting mines and guiding projectiles. The bitter eight-year war with Iraq prompted Iran to opt for self-sufficiency in weapons manufacture.

(Editors Note: Hyper-Link for paper in article and also separate item below this article.) Cato Insitute: Public Unprepared for Terrorism U.S. Newswire 27 Nov 11:46 Cato Institute: U.S. Government Leaves Public Unprepared for Terrorism To: National Desk Contact: Patti Mohr of the Cato Institute, 202-789-5293 WASHINGTON, Nov. 27 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The following was released today by the Cato Institute: U.S. Government Leaves Public Unprepared for Terrorism; Preparation for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Attacks Is Deeply Flawed, Cato Institute Study Says Many experts agree that the United States is likely to experience a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction, probably within the next decade. But how prepared is America for a nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attack on the homeland? Not very, according to a new study from the Cato Institute. Despite spending tens of billions of dollars annually on preparation programs, the federal government has failed to take advantage of existing emergency management structures and to educate the public about how to react to an attack, argues Eric. R. Taylor, a chemistry professor and former officer in the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical branch of the U.S. Army. In "Are We Prepared for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction?" Taylor exposes the flaws in the federal Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP), which was set up in 1997 and directs various federal agencies to train state and local governments to deal with NBC terrorism. When the federal government decided who should be trained, it targeted only cities, and then only halfway, leaving "personnel in more than 50 percent of the major U.S. population centers ... unprepared for such an attack," he says. But since NBC contamination spreads quickly, it's not just cities that need to know how to respond, Taylor argues. State and regional structures such as the State Emergency Management Agencies and National Guard units have been largely bypassed by the DPP, Taylor says. Those agencies already have experience in coordinating responses to terrorism and hazardous material disasters. Furthermore, they could have been passing on acquired knowledge to subordinate groups while the federal government moved on to other states, Taylor argues. The "pyramid effect" has been reduced by focusing on cities in isolation, he says. Even if the training programs were better targeted, Taylor argues, they are useless without public involvement. "The lack of any organized program to actively educate the public in matters of NBC awareness and preparedness is the Achilles' heel of the entire national plan," he writes. Without education, the government "will have two foes to combat during an attack: the NBC agent and rampant civil panic," he says. "The concepts and principles of NBC taught to the private first class soldier can be understood by Mr. and Mrs. John Q. Public," Taylor says. But they must be taught in advance. "Any official who thinks he can adequately inform the public during an NBC incident will be preaching to the morgue," he says. Policy Analysis no. 387 (http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-387es.html) ------The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation dedicated to broadening policy debate consistent with the traditional American principles of individual liberty, limited government, free markets, and peace. KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY -0- /U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 11/27 11:46 Copyright 2000, U.S. Newswire http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/1127-109.html

Policy Analysis November 27, 2000 "Are We Prepared for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction? Government's Half Measures" By Eric R. Taylor… http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-387es.html

Battelle may be selected to run Anthrax vaccine plant Monday, November 27, 2000 David Lore Dispatch Science Reporter

With most U.S. troops still waiting for their full course of anthrax vaccine, Battelle might step into management of a government-run vaccine plant. Battelle is one of five companies being considered by the Pentagon to direct expanded production of vaccines to protect American troops in the event of a biological warfare attack. More than a third of U.S. servicemen and women have received at least part of an anthrax vaccination series, but the program has been slowed by problems at the military's only vaccine supplier, BioPort Co. of Lansing, Mich. Anthrax is an infectious disease spread by bacteria spores. It's a likely biological warfare agent since it's easy to make and transport and is fatal to 80 percent or more of those who inhale the spores. Battelle, 505 W. King Ave., does research on defenses against biological warfare agents at its West Jefferson complex. The research institute and several pharmaceutical companies have told the Department of Defense they're interested in managing any new, government-owned vaccine factory. It's unlikely such a plant would be located at the West Jefferson research complex or anywhere in Ohio, Battelle Vice President Gregory Frank said. Utilities and infrastructure at West Jefferson are not adequate for such a project, he said. Battelle, in recent years, has been hired to manage a number of government-owned research centers and has consulted with manufacturers on the development and commercialization of high-technology products. Manufacturing would be a departure for Battelle. "We'd probably wind up in some sort of partnership,'' Frank said. "We could (be the manufacturer), but we don't know what we're going to do.'' Since 1983, the West Jefferson complex has been used for military research on protective measures against chemical-warfare agents. Similar work to counter biological agents began there three years ago, Frank said. Scientists at West Jefferson now are working on ways to detect the presence of anthrax spores in the air and ways to treat people after exposure. The local labs haven't been involved in vaccine research but that's changing. Under a $1.5 million-a-year Defense Department contract announced earlier this month, Battelle has been hired to help BioPort resolve quality-control problems at its plant. This will include some testing of BioPort vaccine lots at West Jefferson, he said. "We are not doing vaccine production now, but we have on our staff a whole lot of people who understand vaccines,'' Frank said. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has not allowed BioPort to distribute new lots of the anthrax vaccine since 1998 because of problems resulting from the conversion of the plant from state to private ownership. FDA Deputy Director Mark Elengold told a Congressional hearing last month that the agency considers vaccines produced by BioPort prior to 1998 "safe and effective.'' Some military personnel have refused the shots after hearing the shots have caused swelling, pain, serious illness or death. More than 1,500 claims of adverse reactions have been filed, including 76 that involved death, disability or a life- threatening illness, Elengold said. "None of these events, except for the injection-site reactions, can be attributed to the vaccine with a high level of confidence, nor can contribution of the vaccine to the event reported be entirely ruled out,'' Elengold testified. About 500,000 of 1.4 million active-duty military personnel have received at least a portion of the six- shot anthrax series so far, said Lt. Col. Michael Milord, a Defense Department spokesman. About 100,000 doses of the vaccine were on hand at the end of September, forcing the Pentagon to limit the shots to personnel being shipped out to the Persian Gulf or Korea, he said. Congress recommended that a second vaccine source -- this one owned by the government -- be established. The Defense Department in June announced it was looking for a private-sector manager. "Our interest in the long term is that if the government comes out with a contract for a second source . . . we'd be interested in going after that,'' Frank said. "But it's probably a year away.''

New York Times November 28, 2000 Pg. 1 Testing The Aging Stockpile In A Test Ban Era By James Glanz LOS ALAMOS, N.M. — They called it "shaking the desert." For 40 years, the guardians of the nation's nuclear stockpile exploded bombs beneath the arid ground at a test site in Nevada, both to test new types of bombs and to be certain that old ones still worked as designed. Many of those tests also shook the desert from above, in the atmosphere, before a treaty banned the practice in 1963. But since 1992, when the United States declared a moratorium on all nuclear tests, the desert has been still. Since then the nation has evaluated the thousands of warheads in its aging arsenal in a program called science-based stockpile stewardship, using computer simulations, experiments on bomb components and other methods to assess the condition of the weapons without actually exploding them. Program officials have been confident that the stockpile is safe and secure and that the stewardship program can fully maintain the weapons. Now, however, some of the masters of nuclear weapons design are expressing concern over whether this program is up to the task. Concerns about the program