U.S. Navy E-2C Hawkeye 2000 aircraft assigned to “Wallbangers” of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 approaches flight deck of USS John C. Stennis while ship is underway in Pacific Ocean, July 13, 2006 (DOD/John Hyde)
Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy
By James R. McGrath
While the United States and our closest allies fought two lengthy wars over the past 13 years—the rest of the world and our potential adversaries were seeing how we operated. They looked at our advantages. They studied them. They analyzed them. They looked for weaknesses. And then they set about devising ways to counter our technological over-match.
—Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work
16 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 t is well established that both military in pursuit of the Nation’s capabilities. Regrettably, the appeal for state and nonstate adversaries are core and enduring national interests, the development of new operating con- I gaining parity with current U.S. most notably safeguarding national cepts and wargaming techniques seems military-technological capabilities, security, promoting democratic values, to be overlooked in the media and most and as a result adversaries are eroding maintaining long-term economic defense policy think tanks. the tremendous asymmetrical con- prosperity, and preserving the current What many analysts fail to realize is ventional warfare advantages once international order.4 The solution to that the operating environment, spe- exclusively enjoyed by U.S. forces.1 this problem—one that has yet to be cifically the information environment This leveling of the playing field has fully articulated and bounded in scope, (IE),7 has changed, and our adversaries been enabled through decreased costs much less solved—has been named the are undermining our asymmetrical of modern information technology Third Offset Strategy, meaning that advantages through innovative use of and low barriers of entry to attaining there are a series of strategic capabilities the information space, particularly by precision weapons; stealth capabilities; that must be developed to give U.S. operating in the informational and cogni- sophisticated commercial and military forces a decisive military-technological tive dimensions on a global scale.8 What command and control (C2) capabilities; offset that generates lasting asymmet- should be obvious—but unfortunately is advanced intelligence, surveillance, and rical advantages over any potential not to many military and defense plan- reconnaissance (ISR); and relatively adversary for the next 25 to 50 years. ners—is that IO is precisely the tool set cheap access to commercial and gov- The strategy is so named because there that joint force commanders already have ernment-sponsored space and cyber already were two successful offset strat- to attack our adversaries’ newly found capabilities.2 As a result, in November egies in the 20th century.5 The first was advancements in C2 warfare, ISR, and 2014, then–Secretary of Defense Chuck President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New precision weapons. Unfortunately, for ex- Hagel announced the Defense Inno- Look Strategy during the 1950s, which ample, the Russians,9 Chinese,10 and the vation Initiative to counter adversary sought to develop advanced nuclear Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,11 to technical and tactical progress that, if weapons capabilities to offset the Soviet name a few, are now also demonstrating left unchecked, will ultimately hinder Union’s overwhelmingly superior con- advanced forms of information warfare U.S. ability to project power across ventional forces and nascent nuclear that continually undermine U.S. tactical the globe and permanently challenge capabilities. The second strategy was prowess and enable successful antiaccess/ its aims of retaining its coveted status Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s area-denial (A2/AD) strategies that are as a global hegemon.3 While there Offset Strategy during the 1970s, which the root cause of the problem.12 For are many aspects to this initiative, the was aimed at countering recent Soviet U.S. forces to achieve the Third Offset Third Offset Strategy, as outlined in advances in both numerical and techni- Strategy, the joint force must be able to policy, does not adequately address the cal parity regarding its nuclear arsenal, achieve information superiority at the need for advanced information opera- coupled with sustained numerically time and place of its choosing. To do tions (IO), particularly IO wargaming, superior conventional forces deployed in that, the joint force must develop innova- modeling and simulation (M&S), and Eastern Europe and elsewhere around tive operating concepts for IO, wargame training systems. The purpose of this the globe. Essentially, the U.S. Offset them using a variety of computer-based article is to make the case that increas- Strategy invested in stealth technolo- methods, and then train to the newly ing the investment in joint live, virtual, gies, precision weapons, sophisticated discovered tactics, techniques, and pro- and constructive (LVC) IO wargaming C2 capabilities, and advanced airborne cedures that are absolutely essential for and simulations will generate lasting and space-based ISR that were ulti- 21st-century warfare—a type of warfare asymmetrical advantages for joint force mately revealed to the world during the aimed at breaking the will of the adver- commanders and will significantly con- first Gulf War. sary through control of the IE. tribute to the achievement of the Third As outlined by Secretary Hagel and Currently, IO is often treated as an Offset Strategy. currently being championed by Deputy ad hoc, additive activity during most Secretary of Defense Robert Work, the joint LVC training events; therefore, Military Problem Defense Innovation Initiative emphasizes IO is routinely ignored or underutilized The Defense Innovation Initiative three key areas for sources of innovation: despite being a major component of is aimed at solving the problem of long-range research and development, every real-world joint operation since ensuring that lasting power projection new operating concepts, and reenergiz- Operations Desert Shield and Desert capabilities are available to the U.S. ing wargaming efforts and techniques.6 Storm13 and arguably in other forms, such Currently, most of the discussion re- as psychological warfare and deception, garding this initiative is overly focused throughout all of human history.14 Much on purely technical, materiel solutions, of the reason for this routine omission Lieutenant Colonel James R. McGrath, USMC, is the Information Warfare Department Head for such as unmanned autonomous systems and lack of prominence in major joint Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic. and sources of new global strike and ISR LVC exercises is that military information
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 17 support operations (MISO, formerly IRC is necessarily required for a particular indispensable to the process of systemati- known as psychological operations), pub- mission.17 In fact, multiple IRCs applied cally unravelling an adversary’s integrated lic affairs, electronic warfare (EW), cyber in a combined arms fashion are a prereq- air and coastal defenses; undermining his warfare, military deception (MILDEC), uisite to achieving success in any one of ballistic and cruise missile standoff weap- special technical operations, and other these critical mission areas. This idea is ons; and blinding his advanced land, sea, information-related capabilities (IRC)15 consistent with the accepted Department air, cyber, and space-based ISR platforms. are difficult to simulate over a relevant of Defense (DOD) IO definition and is Furthermore, there is a defensive aspect exercise time horizon. Even more chal- precisely why they are considered ger- of C2 warfare that requires advanced lenging is the ability to realistically but mane to any serious discussion of future electromagnetic spectrum operations, sufficiently model the physical, technical, IO.18 The following discussion briefly information assurance, and defensive and cognitive complexities of the IE as highlights the need for further develop- cyberspace operations to ensure assured a coherent whole whose sum is greater ment and implementation of these six C2 over friendly forces on a global scale. than its individual parts. If this can be mission areas, as well as their relevance to Without a modern, robust defensive C2 achieved, U.S. joint forces would be able the future joint force. warfare capability, U.S. global power pro- to train in synthetic environments that Generally speaking, psychological jection is nearly impossible. would ultimately enable them to effec- warfare is defined as actions against the Denial and deception operations are tively maneuver within the IE, counter political will of an adversary, his com- a combination of operations security recent adversary military-technological manders, and his troops, and includes and MILDEC activities, supported by a gains and newfound information warfare inform and influence operations directed wide-range of IRCs, to protect critical prowess, and provide the baseline for a at any third party capable of providing information, facilitate surprise, and delib- newly defined technical, military, and sympathy or support to both the adver- erately mislead an adversary to achieve a psychological offset. sary or friendly forces.19 This mission area tactical, operational, or strategic advan- directly targets the cognitive dimension tage. Denial and deception operations IO as the Solution of our adversaries’ operations in the IE provide force-multiplying advantages By acknowledging the fact that adver- and ultimately attacks their will to resist. by enabling operational access and joint saries are reducing our operational It should be the primary focus of the forcible entry operations under A2/AD advantages and conventional overmatch joint force in order to ensure lasting conditions and contributing to the cogni- through innovative use of the IE, it tactical, operational, and strategic success, tive demise of an adversary as part of the becomes increasingly imperative that especially while state and nonstate actors psychological warfare effort. In addition, U.S. IO training, wargaming, and are simultaneously competing for domi- counter–denial and deception opera- operating concepts be improved. It nance in this highly contested space. After tions are critical to future conflicts, as is also important to emphasize that all, by definition, war as a contest of po- demonstrated by our adversaries’ skilled this improvement should not only litical wills by other means is the primary use of deception in Syria, Iraq,22 and the mirror-image the activities of our basis of most warfighting philosophies.20 Crimean Peninsula.23 adversaries, but also provide joint force Therefore, increasing the effectiveness Cyber warfare in the IO context is commanders with a comprehensive set of joint operations in this mission area about controlling the content and flow of tools and concepts that allows them would certainly require improved MISO, of information within the information to outmaneuver adversaries within the EW, cyber, and MILDEC capabilities and dimension of the IE. It includes the cognitive, informational, and physical authorities at all levels of war. convergence of the cyber and EW IRCs, dimensions of the IE. As a starting C2 warfare is about controlling the where cyber is enabled at the tactical point, a brief analysis of modern IO physical and informational dimensions level through radio frequency spectrum reveals at least six interrelated IO lines of the IE by cutting off an enemy force operations; cyber warfare in support of of effort (LOE), which if truly inte- from its commander, key decisionmakers, the other five IO mission areas; and of- grated with each other could facilitate or automated control systems through fensive cyberspace operations in support the Third Strategic Offset. These attacking vulnerable control mechanisms of traditional kinetic operations. For primary LOEs or mission areas are psy- or by simply attacking the commander instance, a prime example of this IO mis- chological warfare, C2 warfare, denial and removing him or her from the C2 sion area in action is the Russia-Georgia and deception, cyber warfare, engage- equation, ultimately resulting in the war of 2008, during which the Russians ment, and IE situational awareness.16 collapse of his or her subordinate forces.21 executed the world’s first synchronized While on the surface some of these Applying IRCs for C2 warfare purposes cyber attack in concert with major com- IO LOEs appear well-established is one of the few ways to overcome bat operations, likely using both state IRCs, that is not the intent or the the joint operational access and A2/ cyber capabilities and nonstate hackers case. These highly complementary and AD problems. Using a combination of to attack key Georgian communications, interdependent mission areas are IRC physical destruction, EW, cyber, MISO, finance, and government nodes prior to agnostic—meaning that no one particular and MILDEC capabilities would be and during combat operations to control
18 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announces Defense Innovation Initiative and Third Offset Strategy during Reagan National Defense Forum at The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, November 15, 2014 (DOD/Sean Hurt)
the narrative and pace of the psycholog- context, engagement is an IO mission— in the U.S. Pacific Command area of ical war as well as demonstrate Russian not a warfighting function focused on the responsibility to ensure that Chinese resolve and future deterrence capabili- intersection between partnership activities psychological, media, and legal warfare27 ties.24 Furthermore, there is tremendous and special warfare activities.26 In this are countered with the overarching goal opportunity for future cyber warfare context, engagement is about operating of ensuring that our regional allies are operations to: 1) support C2 warfare in in the cognitive dimension of the IE able to observe our actions and interpret A2/AD conditions by creating gaps and through informing and influencing part- them as U.S. commitment to defend our seams in an adversary’s defensive system ner and adversary nations using a wide common interests. of systems from standoff ranges, espe- range of IRCs, including but not limited Lastly, IE situational awareness is cially during the early shaping phases of to media operations using public affairs defined as understanding past events an operation; 2) enable the psychological and MISO. Engagement as an IO mis- within all three dimensions of the IE, warfare effort through focused and broad sion also includes public affairs operations tracking ongoing events, and being able social media messaging; and 3) support to harden the friendly force against ad- to adequately model and reliably predict both the engagement and IE situational versary psychological warfare. Moreover, (or at the very least wargame) a wide awareness efforts as message delivery and for the foreseeable future, engagement variety of possible outcomes in support ISR platforms. will remain a combatant commander’s of the other five IO mission areas. These The U.S. Army has recently estab- primary tool for Phase 0, steady-state, activities include not only all traditional lished engagement as a concept for a and theater security cooperation (TSC) intelligence disciplines but also the use seventh warfighting function and defines operations, used to send signals to our of a broad range of IRCs operating on it as influencing people, security forces, adversaries and allies that we are com- the battlefield as sensors, processors, and governments across the range of mitted to the current international order and actors. In addition, IE situational military operations to prevent, shape, and and a stable security environment. For awareness requires advanced M&S to win in the future strategic environment.25 instance, engagement could and should aid IO planners and commanders in the While there are close similarities, in this be used to amplify our TSC actions extremely difficult task of understanding
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 19 the dynamic, nonlinear, and ever-chang- ronments for individual and small- Ultimately, the desired endstate for de- ing IE. Furthermore, IE situational unit IRC tactical trainers through veloping an advanced IO M&S capability awareness requires a detailed understand- high-level constructive simulations is to ensure that there are highly trained ing of individuals, social groups, behavior supporting strategic- and combatant forces ready to design, plan, rehearse, dynamics, communication architectures, command–level wargaming, capable execute, and assess operations within the exploitation of narratives, and target au- of seamlessly integrating with each IE, particularly when confronted with dience vulnerabilities, as well as the newly other as well as other kinetic and a sophisticated, technologically enabled emerging techniques of real-time, live big legacy M&S systems. 21st-century adversary. This can and data analytics, social media scraping, and •• Must incorporate the full array of should be implemented via a family of memetic warfare.28 possible effects that can be generated tactical- through strategic-level M&S sys- by organic and non-organic IRCs tems that adequately model and simulate IO M&S Requirements from the strategic to the tactical level friendly, neutral, and adversary deci- As discussed, there is a known gap for of warfare. sionmaking capabilities, behaviors, and joint force commanders to exercise •• Must be interoperable with other information systems as well as the complex their IO cell within the six mission areas joint and Service-level LVC M&S feedback loops that comprise all relevant outlined above. There is also a gap for networks and systems. aspects of the physical, informational, and exercising both supporting organic and •• Must be compatible with all major cognitive dimensions of the IE. non-organic IRCs and then integrat- constructive M&S programs of ing them with traditional kinetic fires. record in order for IO M&S to be IO Considerations Closing this gap with computer-based fully integrated into a single common There are five prominent counterargu- M&S would ensure that joint forces tactical and operating picture. ments that immediately come to mind are well trained in a repeatable and •• Must be interoperable with current for not developing advanced IO M&S expandable synthetic environment prior command and control systems and capabilities. These arguments range to employment across the full range of classified intelligence systems up to from the cost of IO M&S materiel military operations. This is particularly Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented solutions, the presence of other existing important because IO mission areas Information and other high-level solutions, widespread doubts regarding and their supporting IRCs are highly operational security control measures the efficiency and efficacy of IO across sensitive in nature, and live IO training to be integrated into a single common the full range and spectrum of military events are nearly impossible to conduct. tactical and operating picture. operations, and the complex framework For instance, certain EW, cyber, and •• Must incorporate open source media of legal and policy restrictions govern- special technical operations capabilities and the replication or emulation ing most joint force IRC employment. must be well protected to achieve any of social and traditional media for The first counterargument is that form of technical surprise, and MISO, analysis, using advanced forms of developing IO M&S systems would EW, cyber, MILDEC, and special tech- data analytic techniques to simulate be expensive and that the technology nical operations also have uniquely strict actions in the IE. for simulating the IE is not mature. political and legal sensitivities. •• Must incorporate advanced decision However, this is exactly the type of Achieving repeatable, scalable, and support M&S techniques, including investment that the Defense Innovation fully integrated simulation of the IE is not but not limited to artificial intelli- Initiative is calling for: an investment that an easy task. However, if the Third Offset gence–enabled augmented reality, leverages advanced technologies such as Strategy is to be realized, the Services and chatbots, and other expert systems to artificial intelligence, machine learning, DOD must invest in materiel solutions facilitate understanding of actions in agent-based modeling, and big data ana- to enable the joint force to train its IO the IE. lytics that our adversaries would not likely forces in a synthetic environment. There •• Must leverage state-of-the-art have ready access to exploit. This invest- are several key additional requirements artificial intelligence algorithms, ment in IO M&S would also lead to new for any useful automated M&S of the machine-learning software, and operating concepts that would be tested IE and IO for advanced wargaming advanced M&S paradigms, such during high-level joint wargames using purposes: as agent-based modeling, systems the very same systems, which is precisely dynamics, and game-theoretic mod- the intent behind the second and third Must encompass a system-of-systems •• eling in a federated architecture, to key areas for innovation outlined by the approach that includes training accurately model complex, adaptive Defense Innovation Initiative. for individual IO and IRC mission systems with the goal of replicating The second counterargument is that essential tasks through the highest the behaviors and communications the Joint Staff and the Office of the levels of a joint force’s collective-level conduits of a vast array of thinking Secretary of Defense are already invest- training events. Examples include target audiences and their highly ing in IO M&S through the use of the a range of immersive virtual envi- automated information systems. Joint IO Range and other cyber and EW
20 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Soldiers from Britain’s Royal Artillery train in virtual world during Exercise Steel Sabre 2015 (MOD/Si Longworth) initiatives. While that is a first step, the violence threshold low or controlling the held our adversaries in check for the past Joint IO Range is only a stovepipe capa- attitudes and the behavior of the local 25 years are also the root cause of our cur- bility for cyber warfare effects rather than populace is paramount. This is not the rent military problem—namely that U.S. a capability that truly exercises all relevant case, however, since IO and IRCs have joint forces routinely win tactically and IRCs in support of joint operations—that routinely been employed by U.S. forces sometimes operationally, but continuously is, something more than cyber and EW throughout all phases of operations and have their victories ultimately overturned operations are required to realize the true all types of conflict, from World War II at the operational and strategic levels, potential for full-spectrum IO, specifically through Operations Enduring Freedom such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ironically, how to assemble a relevant array of IRCs and Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, there it has been the overdependence on our aimed at placing an adversary on the is considerable evidence that increasing physical, conventional superiority that horns of a dilemma and then inducing the lethality of operations using infor- has led the U.S. military to neglect the a complete collapse of their will to resist mation warfare is central to the strategy mental and moral aspects of warfighting, our aims and objectives. Without being of our 21st-century adversaries, most a deficiency that IO, by definition and if able to model and integrate the cognitive, notably and recently demonstrated by the sufficiently raised to the appropriate level informational, and physical aspects of the Russians operating in Ukraine and Syria.29 of prominence within U.S. warfighting IE in a coherent simulation, influencing The fourth counterargument is that doctrine, can immediately address.30 In adversary decisionmakers and their sup- IO is not well suited for the strategic addition, to further discredit the notion porting systems would not be achievable shaping and deterrence missions required that IO is an ineffective strategic shaping to the level of what is required for the by the Third Offset Strategy, or at least and deterrence tool, it is a well-accepted Third Strategic Offset. not as effectively as the physical advan- fact that due to international legal, diplo- The third counterargument is that IO tages that the Second Offset capabilities matic, and political constraints, IO and a is not suited for major combat operations, have provided. However, in some sense, handful of select influence-oriented IRCs and thus many military planners perceive the luxuries that were afforded by the are our military’s only available tools to it as a tool only for counterinsurgency or unprecedented freedom of movement, successfully prevent, deter, initiate, or irregular warfare, whereby keeping the maneuver, and firepower that successfully close a conflict.
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 21 solution that is eerily similar to nefari- ous systems of science fiction literature and movies, such as The Terminator’s self-aware “SkyNet” and “Genisys” programs.31 The flaw in this popularized global strike and ISR network solu- tion—other than the obvious science fiction connotations—is that it is short- sighted and deals only with the current problem within the physical dimension of the operating and information envi- ronments. The real solution is some- thing far more complicated and worthy of the forward thinking required by the Third Strategic Offset problem set. A better solution is an advanced, semi-autonomous hybrid kinetic and nonkinetic weapons system fully enabling Soldiers from U.S. Army’s 350th Tactical Psychological Operations, 10th Mountain Division, drop the warfighter to, at a moment’s notice, leaflets over village near Hawijah, Iraq, on March 6, 2008, promoting idea of self-government (U.S. conduct highly integrated, cognitively Air Force/Samuel Bendet) focused operations that are also simulta- neously synchronized with other ongoing The fifth and final counterargument those commanders with well-trained IO joint actions across the globe, as well as is that there are insurmountable legal and staffs. Hence, developing an IO M&S concurrently facilitating long- and short- policy restrictions for the joint force to and training capability is actually part of term influence campaigns. Continuously conduct full-spectrum IO. This is simply the solution to the military problem and and consistently striking at the will of our not the case. However, the two primary not an impediment. Lastly, as joint forces adversaries through the use of carefully supporting counterarguments either re- continue to demonstrate their increased selected physical, information, and cog- volve around U.S. Code Title 10, Armed proficiency for fighting and winning in nitive-related capabilities should be the Forces, versus Title 50, War and National the IE—and as our adversaries do the ultimate goal of this advanced weapons Defense, arguments, or claim that the same—it is inevitable that over time, system concept. This system would current review and approval processes many of the authorities for certain sensi- facilitate maneuver warfare and mission for IRCs are too complicated to achieve tive IRC activities, currently held at the command by integrating, synchroniz- timely and relevant effects in the IE. The strategic level, will naturally be delegated ing, and coordinating many different first supporting argument is false because to operational and tactical commanders. capabilities by different commanders at Title 10 and Title 50 issues have already all levels directly against an adversary’s been solved and are deconflicted on a Future Innovation physical, moral, and mental critical daily basis using a highly complex but ex- In the long run, creating the neces- capabilities. Again, this is something tremely effective ISR and strike network. sary technical innovation in the field that clearly cannot be accomplished This network is enabled by intelligence of advanced IO M&S and training without advanced IO M&S accurately professionals and operators working side would no doubt lead to the maturation and continuously modeling the complex, by side, both physically and virtually, and of capabilities and tactics needed to nonlinear, and ever-changing IE. While allows the lowest tactical formations to achieve the goals of the Third Strategic the fusing of kinetic and nonkinetic receive the benefits of strategic assets and Offset. Furthermore, the gaps that modeling into a semi-autonomous global vice versa. There is some truth to the IO M&S could immediately close are effects network might seem like material second supporting counterargument that also the first steps in the necessary for science fiction, in the current era of the review and approval processes are research, design, and development of an machine-based learning and artificial in- overly complex. Many IRCs do, in fact, integrated global effects network that telligence–enabled autonomous vehicles, require DOD- and national-level approv- could and should act as the primary these capabilities are not too far over the als. This is not true for all IRCs, however, intellectual engine for an advanced, horizon and are worthy goals for the am- and there are numerous IRC-unique semi-autonomous global strike and bitions of the Third Offset Strategy. programs already in place for military ISR network—a network that has been planners to immediately implement. In considered the “holy grail” by those The military-technological gains of our addition, all IRCs can be and already who already offer solutions to the Third adversaries over the past several decades are implemented with great effect for Strategic Offset problem and that is a are apparent and alarming. To counter this
22 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 18 threat and meet the intended objectives information, and physical. See Joint Publication Information operations are generally 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, defined as the integration, coordination, and of the Defense Innovation Initiative, a DC: The Joint Staff, November 20, 2014), x. synchronization of IRCs to deny, degrade, robust set of research and development 9 Jolanta Darczewkska, The Anatomy of disrupt, or usurp an adversary’s decisionmaking programs, concept development activities, Russian Information Warfare (Warsaw: Centre capabilities, people, and systems in support of and wargaming efforts has begun to un- for Eastern Studies, May 2014), available a commander’s objectives as defined by DOD cover a series of technologies required to at
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