U.S. Navy E-2C Hawkeye 2000 aircraft assigned to “Wallbangers” of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 approaches flight deck of USS John C. Stennis while ship is underway in Pacific Ocean, July 13, 2006 (DOD/John Hyde) Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy By James R. McGrath While the United States and our closest allies fought two lengthy wars over the past 13 years—the rest of the world and our potential adversaries were seeing how we operated. They looked at our advantages. They studied them. They analyzed them. They looked for weaknesses. And then they set about devising ways to counter our technological over-match. —DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT WORK 16 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 t is well established that both military in pursuit of the Nation’s capabilities. Regrettably, the appeal for state and nonstate adversaries are core and enduring national interests, the development of new operating con- I gaining parity with current U.S. most notably safeguarding national cepts and wargaming techniques seems military-technological capabilities, security, promoting democratic values, to be overlooked in the media and most and as a result adversaries are eroding maintaining long-term economic defense policy think tanks. the tremendous asymmetrical con- prosperity, and preserving the current What many analysts fail to realize is ventional warfare advantages once international order.4 The solution to that the operating environment, spe- exclusively enjoyed by U.S. forces.1 this problem—one that has yet to be cifically the information environment This leveling of the playing field has fully articulated and bounded in scope, (IE),7 has changed, and our adversaries been enabled through decreased costs much less solved—has been named the are undermining our asymmetrical of modern information technology Third Offset Strategy, meaning that advantages through innovative use of and low barriers of entry to attaining there are a series of strategic capabilities the information space, particularly by precision weapons; stealth capabilities; that must be developed to give U.S. operating in the informational and cogni- sophisticated commercial and military forces a decisive military-technological tive dimensions on a global scale.8 What command and control (C2) capabilities; offset that generates lasting asymmet- should be obvious—but unfortunately is advanced intelligence, surveillance, and rical advantages over any potential not to many military and defense plan- reconnaissance (ISR); and relatively adversary for the next 25 to 50 years. ners—is that IO is precisely the tool set cheap access to commercial and gov- The strategy is so named because there that joint force commanders already have ernment-sponsored space and cyber already were two successful offset strat- to attack our adversaries’ newly found capabilities.2 As a result, in November egies in the 20th century.5 The first was advancements in C2 warfare, ISR, and 2014, then–Secretary of Defense Chuck President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New precision weapons. Unfortunately, for ex- Hagel announced the Defense Inno- Look Strategy during the 1950s, which ample, the Russians,9 Chinese,10 and the vation Initiative to counter adversary sought to develop advanced nuclear Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,11 to technical and tactical progress that, if weapons capabilities to offset the Soviet name a few, are now also demonstrating left unchecked, will ultimately hinder Union’s overwhelmingly superior con- advanced forms of information warfare U.S. ability to project power across ventional forces and nascent nuclear that continually undermine U.S. tactical the globe and permanently challenge capabilities. The second strategy was prowess and enable successful antiaccess/ its aims of retaining its coveted status Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s area-denial (A2/AD) strategies that are as a global hegemon.3 While there Offset Strategy during the 1970s, which the root cause of the problem.12 For are many aspects to this initiative, the was aimed at countering recent Soviet U.S. forces to achieve the Third Offset Third Offset Strategy, as outlined in advances in both numerical and techni- Strategy, the joint force must be able to policy, does not adequately address the cal parity regarding its nuclear arsenal, achieve information superiority at the need for advanced information opera- coupled with sustained numerically time and place of its choosing. To do tions (IO), particularly IO wargaming, superior conventional forces deployed in that, the joint force must develop innova- modeling and simulation (M&S), and Eastern Europe and elsewhere around tive operating concepts for IO, wargame training systems. The purpose of this the globe. Essentially, the U.S. Offset them using a variety of computer-based article is to make the case that increas- Strategy invested in stealth technolo- methods, and then train to the newly ing the investment in joint live, virtual, gies, precision weapons, sophisticated discovered tactics, techniques, and pro- and constructive (LVC) IO wargaming C2 capabilities, and advanced airborne cedures that are absolutely essential for and simulations will generate lasting and space-based ISR that were ulti- 21st-century warfare—a type of warfare asymmetrical advantages for joint force mately revealed to the world during the aimed at breaking the will of the adver- commanders and will significantly con- first Gulf War. sary through control of the IE. tribute to the achievement of the Third As outlined by Secretary Hagel and Currently, IO is often treated as an Offset Strategy. currently being championed by Deputy ad hoc, additive activity during most Secretary of Defense Robert Work, the joint LVC training events; therefore, Military Problem Defense Innovation Initiative emphasizes IO is routinely ignored or underutilized The Defense Innovation Initiative three key areas for sources of innovation: despite being a major component of is aimed at solving the problem of long-range research and development, every real-world joint operation since ensuring that lasting power projection new operating concepts, and reenergiz- Operations Desert Shield and Desert capabilities are available to the U.S. ing wargaming efforts and techniques.6 Storm13 and arguably in other forms, such Currently, most of the discussion re- as psychological warfare and deception, garding this initiative is overly focused throughout all of human history.14 Much on purely technical, materiel solutions, of the reason for this routine omission Lieutenant Colonel James R. McGrath, USMC, is the Information Warfare Department Head for such as unmanned autonomous systems and lack of prominence in major joint Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic. and sources of new global strike and ISR LVC exercises is that military information JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 17 support operations (MISO, formerly IRC is necessarily required for a particular indispensable to the process of systemati- known as psychological operations), pub- mission.17 In fact, multiple IRCs applied cally unravelling an adversary’s integrated lic affairs, electronic warfare (EW), cyber in a combined arms fashion are a prereq- air and coastal defenses; undermining his warfare, military deception (MILDEC), uisite to achieving success in any one of ballistic and cruise missile standoff weap- special technical operations, and other these critical mission areas. This idea is ons; and blinding his advanced land, sea, information-related capabilities (IRC)15 consistent with the accepted Department air, cyber, and space-based ISR platforms. are difficult to simulate over a relevant of Defense (DOD) IO definition and is Furthermore, there is a defensive aspect exercise time horizon. Even more chal- precisely why they are considered ger- of C2 warfare that requires advanced lenging is the ability to realistically but mane to any serious discussion of future electromagnetic spectrum operations, sufficiently model the physical, technical, IO.18 The following discussion briefly information assurance, and defensive and cognitive complexities of the IE as highlights the need for further develop- cyberspace operations to ensure assured a coherent whole whose sum is greater ment and implementation of these six C2 over friendly forces on a global scale. than its individual parts. If this can be mission areas, as well as their relevance to Without a modern, robust defensive C2 achieved, U.S. joint forces would be able the future joint force. warfare capability, U.S. global power pro- to train in synthetic environments that Generally speaking, psychological jection is nearly impossible. would ultimately enable them to effec- warfare is defined as actions against the Denial and deception operations are tively maneuver within the IE, counter political will of an adversary, his com- a combination of operations security recent adversary military-technological manders, and his troops, and includes and MILDEC activities, supported by a gains and newfound information warfare inform and influence operations directed wide-range of IRCs, to protect critical prowess, and provide the baseline for a at any third party capable of providing information, facilitate surprise, and delib- newly defined technical, military, and sympathy or support to both the adver- erately mislead an adversary to achieve a psychological offset. sary or friendly forces.19