Projecting Hegemony:

Parties, Organizations, and Indigenous Forms of Governance in

A dissertation presented by

Carla Alberti

B.A. in Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

M.A. in Political Science, Brown University

To the Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of Political Science

Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island

May 2016

© Copyright 2016 by Carla Alberti

This dissertation by Carla Alberti is accepted in its present form

by the Department of Political Science as satisfying the

dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date______Richard Snyder, Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date______Patrick Heller, Reader

Date______Ashutosh Varshney, Reader

Date______Todd Eisenstadt, Reader

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date______Peter M. Weber, Dean of the Graduate School

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Curriculum Vitae

Carla Alberti was born in Temuco, Chile on March 25, 1985. She obtained a B.A. in Political Science from Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in 2007 and earned an

M.A. in Political Science from Brown University in 2011. After working for about a year and a half in the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile’s College UC department as an academic coordinator for the area of social science, Carla was awarded a Fulbright

Fellowship to pursue graduate studies in the United States. She began her Ph.D. in

Political Science at Brown University in 2009. During her graduate studies, Carla conducted research thanks to the generous support of the Graduate School, the

Department of Political Science, the Graduate Program in Development (GPD), the

Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CLACS), and the Global Mobility

Program at Brown University. During the Spring Semester of 2016, Carla taught the undergraduate seminar “Indigenous Politics in Latin America” for the Center for Latin

American and Caribbean Studies. Her works have been published in Development (2015) and Revista de Ciencia Política (forthcoming). In 2016, Carla will begin a tenure-track appointment as Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

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Acknowledgements

This dissertation would have not been possible without the help of my advisors, friends, and family. Their constant support and encouragement have made this project stronger and the process of writing it a lot more pleasant and less lonely.

I thank my dissertation committee for their thoughtful feedback and their constant help and support. Richard Snyder has been more than just an advisor during my years as a graduate student. I will always be grateful for his dedication to make my dissertation project stronger, for supporting my academic development, and for caring about his students on a personal level. Ashutosh Varshney’s fascinating insights and comments about ethnicity and conflict inspired me to research indigenous politics in Latin America.

Patrick Heller has always pushed me to think big, to connect my research to the major debates in political sociology, and his comments and feedback have made this project better. Todd Eisenstadt has provided me with valuable feedback, constant support, and his fascinating work on indigenous politics has been an inspiration and a model for my own research.

To my friends and coleagues at Brown who have made the process of writing this dissertation so much better with their collegiality and support. I thank each and one of them. My sincere appreciation goes to the administrative staff in the department of political science, especially to Suzanne Brough, and everyone at the Center for Latin

American Studies (CLACS) for their help and encouragement.

Finally, I thank my family. My parents’ sacrifice, their strength, love, and support have made my journey here possible. My sisters, their partners, and children have given

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me companionship and brought joy to my life. My friend Rodrigo, almost a brother, has encouraged me in every step of the way and made me laugh when I most needed it. My husband’s family has been a constant source of support, love, and strength. Last but not least, I want to give special and enormous thanks to my husband, Diego. His unwavering support, love, and companionship have helped me get through the most difficult moments, and his sense of humor has made my path to academia –and life– a lot happier.

I thank God to have them in my life and for the successful completion of this process.

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Table of Contents List of Tables ...... viii List of Figures ...... viii List of Maps ...... viii

Abbreviations and Acronyms ...... ix

Chapter 1. Varieties of Local Governance: Participatory, Hegemonic, and Hybrid Indigenous Governments ...... 1 I. Introduction: Understanding Indigenous Governance ...... 1 II. Ethnicity and Democracy in Latin America: Prevailing Explanations and Enduring Gaps ...... 9 III. The Argument: Explaining Variation in Indigenous Forms of Governance ...... 31 Chapter 2. The MAS in Power: Centralization of Power and the Search for Hegemony ...... 60 Chapter 3. Participatory Indigenous Governance: The Ayllu, Horizontal Organization and Political Autonomy ...... 92 I. Jesus de Machaca: The Rebel Marka ...... 95 II. Uncía: The Resilience of the Ayllu Governance and the Costs of Autonomy ...... 120 Chapter 4. Hegemonic Indigenous Governance: The Coca Growers’ Discipline and Militant Unity as a Path to Political Power ...... 146 I. Chimoré’s Coca Growers: “We Are Evo’s Soldiers” ...... 149 II. : The Breakdown of Local Hegemony and the Renegotiation of Linkages to the MAS ...... 177 Chapter 5. Combining Participation and Hegemony: Hybrid Indigenous Governance in Bolivia ...... 194 I. Semi-Participatory Governance in : A Disconnected Peasant Union ...... 194 II. Semi-Hegemonic Governance in Kirkiawi (Bolívar): An Ayllu with Tight Links to the MAS ...... 212 Conclusion ...... 229 Bibliography ...... 242

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List of Tables

Table 1.0: Interactive Model of Indigenous Governance ...... 5 Table 2.0: Explaining Variation in Indigenous Forms of Governance ...... 40 Table 3.0: Subnational Variation of Indigenous Governance in Bolivia ...... 46 Table 4.0: Indicators of Access to and Exercise of Power in Indigenous Governance. ... 51 Table 5.0: Cases, Control Variables, and Variation in Indigenous Governance ...... 54 Table 6.0: Cases of Indigenous Governance in Bolivia ...... 56 Table 7.0: Distribution of Resources and Projects of the Indigenous Fund by Organization ...... 89 Table 8.0: Municipal Elections in Jesús de Machaca (2004-2015) ...... 107 Table 9.0: Municipal Elections in Uncía (2004-2015) ...... 132 Table 10: Municipal Elections in Chimoré (2004-2015) ...... 160 Table 11: Municipal Elections in Coripata (2004-2015) ...... 186 Table 12: Municipal Elections in Umala (2004-2015) ...... 203 Table 13: Municipal Elections in Bolívar (2004-2015) ...... 220 Table 14: Municipal Elections in the Main Bolivian Cities (2015) ...... 237

List of Figures Figure 1.0: Jesús de Machaca's Organizational Structure ...... 97 Figure 2.0: Uncía’s Organizational Structure ...... 124 Figure 3.0: Chimoré's Peasant Union Organizational Structure ...... 152 Figure 4.0: Coripata's Peasant Union Organizational Structure ...... 181 Figure 5.0: Umala's Peasant Union Organizational Structure ...... 196 Figure 6.0: Ayllu Kirkiawi's Organizational Structure ...... 215 Figure 7.0: Indigenous Governance, Cases, and Transitions ...... 234

List of Maps Map 1.0: Municipal : 2004 - 2010 ...... 6 Map 2.0: Geographical Distribution of Selected Cases ...... 55 Abbreviations and Acronyms

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ACU Agrupación Ciudadana Uqharikuna (Uqharikuna Citizens’ Association) AND Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action) AP Alianza Social Patriótica (Social Patriotic Alliance) AS Alianza Social () ASP Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples) Bartolina Sisa Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia Bartolina Sisa CIDOB Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB) COB Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers Central) COMIBOL Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Bolivia’s National Mining Corporation) CONAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) CONAIOC Coordinadora Nacional de Autonomías Indígenas (National Coordinator of Indigenous-First Peoples-Peasant Autonomies) CONAMAQ Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qollasuyu (Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu) CONDEPA Conciencia de Patria (Conscience of Fatherland) CONFENAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon) CSCIB Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (National Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia) CSUTCB Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) DEMOCRATAS Movimiento Demócrata Social (Social Democratic Movement) ECUARUNARI Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (The Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indian) FAOI-NP Federación de Ayllus originarios Indígenas del Norte de Potosí (Federation of Northern Potosí’s Indigenous-First Nation Ayllus) IU Izquierda Unida ()

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MACOAS Marka de Ayllus y Comunidades Originarias de Arax Suxta (Marka of Ayllus and Indigenous Communities of Arax Suxta) MACOJMA Marka de Comunidades Originarias de Jesús de Machaca (Marka of Indigenous Communities of Jesus de Machaca) MAPIQ Movimiento de Ayllus y Pueblos Indígenas de Qullasuyo, (Movement of Ayllus nad Indigenous Peoples of Qullasuyo) MAS Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism) MBL Movmiento Bolivia Libre () MCSFA Movimiento Ciudadano San Felipe de Austria (Citizens’ Movement San Felipe de Austria) MIP Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) MIR Movimiento de izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement) MIR-NM Movimiento de izquierda Revolucionaria–Nueva Mayoría (Revolutionary Left Movement-New Majority) MNR Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) MOP Movimiento Organización (Popular Popular Organization Movement) MPS Movimiento por la Soberanía (Movement for Sovereignty) MSM Movimiento Sin Miedo () NFR Nueva Fuerza Republicana () NOS Nueva Opción Social (New Social Option) PP Provincias en Progreso (Pronvinces in Progress) PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) PUD Pando Unido y Digno (United and Dignified Pando SIMACO Suyus Ingavi de Markas, Ayllus y Comunidades Originarias (Ingavi Suyus of Markas, Ayllus and First-Nations Communities) SOL.BO Soberanía y Libertad (Sovereignty and Freedom) SPT Santa Cruz Para Todos (Santa Cruz for All) UCS Unión Cívica Solidaria (Solidarity Civic Union)

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UN Unidad Nacional (National Unity) UNICO Unidos por (United for Cochabamba) UNIR Unidos para Renovar (United to Renovate)

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CHAPTER 1

VARIETIES OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE: PARTICIPATORY, HEGEMONIC, AND HYBRID INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE

“if political democracy is to be consolidated, democratic practice needs to be spread throughout society, creating a rich fabric of democratic institutions and authorities” (O’Donnell 1988: 283)

More than two decades have passed since Latin American countries recognized their multi-ethnic nature. Thanks to a series of mobilizations by indigenous social movements, and conflicts with the region’s nation-states, “indigenous” is no longer a synonym for “class.” This rediscovery has spurred a wave of interest on the role ethnicity plays in Latin American societies, and in particular, in their political systems. In this context, many political scientists studied the emergence of ethnicity as a political identity, and the later actions by indigenous social movements and political parties.

This process also uncovered a political reality of indigenous groups beyond contentious and electoral dynamics, namely: the persistence of indigenous governance, that is, the traditional norms and institutions that regulate authority selection and decision-making processes. Anthropologists had long noted the existence of these forms of governance, but focused on the their ritual, cultural dimensions, laying emphasis on

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the many ways in which indigenous authorities dispense justice. Therefore, works in this tradition overlooked the crucial political role played by indigenous governments especially in countries characterized, using Migdal’s configuration, by weak states and strong societies. Although these forms of governance have not received the same level of recognition in all countries throughout the region, the fact is that they can be more consequential for local, and even national politics, than state institutions. Indigenous autonomy has been legally recognized in Panama, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, and in areas of

Mexico (Oaxaca), and Venezuela (Van Cott 2010). However, rule by customary law occurs de facto in many rural, indigenous areas in Latin America.

In Bolivia, in particular, while indigenous autonomy was legally recognized, very few municipalities are transitioning to a system ruled by usos y costumbres (uses and customs – UC hereafter)1 exclusively. The most common scenario, both in Bolivia and elsewhere in the region, is a situation in which state and indigenous governments coexist.

In Bolivia, the 1994 constitution incorporated a series of reforms that recognized cultural difference, such as the right of indigenous and peasant authorities to apply their own norms, and to draw on their own forms of administration to solve conflicts (Article 171).

The new 2009 constitution goes even further and grants community based democracy the same status as representative and direct democracy (Art. 11). In fact, “community” is probably one of the most repeated terms in the 2009 constitution.

This dissertation focuses on a largely overlooked aspect of the recent upsurge of ethnic mobilization in Latin America: the role local forms of indigenous governance have played in the organization of massive mobilizations and the subsequent emergence and

1 In this project I use indigenous governments, UC systems, and indigenous forms of governance interchangeably.

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success of ethnic parties. In Bolivia, these forms of governance shape local politics in fundamental ways. However, they vary substantially. For instance, while in the highland town of Jesús de Machaca community members are free to compete in elections, vote for the party of their preference, and participate in development planning, in the coca-grower

Chapare, only candidates affiliated to the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), the dominant ruling party, are elected, and cocaleros are forbidden to join, or vote for, another party. Participatory indigenous governance, then, occurs when a large majority of community members have the opportunity to become leaders, and the possibility to elect them, and individuals can fully enjoy their political and civil rights. By contrast, hegemonic governance occurs when only members with particular political affiliations can run for public office, whereas dissidents are sanctioned, and forbidden to compete in elections. Participation is also restricted, as the exercise of freedoms of expression and association, among others, is virtually inexistent. Indigenous forms of governance, then, can be highly participatory, hegemonic, or even a combination of both.

What explains this striking variation in indigenous forms of governance? How does it affect the ability of a hegemonic party to expand its reach? I argue that two factors explain this variation: (1) the connections with the ruling party, and (2) the type of societal institution (hierarchical-horizontal) that organizes indigenous peoples locally. In the context of national dominant parties, organizations closely linked with the ruling party tend to limit opportunities for contestation and participation, thereby preventing the emergence of political dissent locally. However, some forms of organization are more effective in restraining the exercise of civil and political rights than others. Hierarchical organizations are better suited for top-down imposition than horizontal ones, which seem

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to foster competition among factions and prevent the emergence of a political elite. These two factors not only shape local politics, but also affect the ruling party’s ability to expand its power. Hierarchical indigenous organizations strongly linked to dominant parties lead to hegemonic forms of local governance, in which political participation is highly constrained so as to ensure the party a loyal support base. Conversely, horizontal organizations disconnected from the party are highly participatory, challenging the dominant party’s rule locally. Hierarchical organizations with weaker links to the party, while oligarchical, do not lead to hegemony but to semi-participatory governance, whereas horizontal organizations strongly tied to the party are unable to fully constrain participation and competition due to their horizontal structure, exhibiting semi- hegemonic governance. In Bolivia, indigenous peoples in the highlands and valleys are primarily organized in peasant unions or ayllus,2 a pre-Hispanic organization. While the former is more hierarchical, the latter foster horizontal power relations. Table 1.0 presnts the hypothesized causal links and shows how these four scenarios apply to Bolivia.

2 An ayllu is a pre-Colonial form of governance, and the basic cell of political and social organization in the .

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Table 1.0: Interactive Model of Indigenous Governance

Hypothesized Causal Links Bolivia Form of Indigenous Governance Hierarchical organization + Peasant Union + Strong connections Hegemonic Strong connections with with the MAS dominant party Hierarchical organization + Peasant Union + Weaker Semi-Participatory Weaker connections with connections with the MAS dominant party Horizontal organization + Ayllu + Strong connections with the Semi-Hegemonic Strong connections with MAS dominant party Horizontal organization + Ayllu + Weaker connections with Participatory Weaker connections with the MAS dominant party

The political relevance of indigenous governments in multi-ethnic societies, and in Bolivia, in particular, is manifold. Indigenous organizations are the main source of governance in most rural areas; citizenship is embedded in them, and cannot be understood outside their functioning. Thus, accounting for these forms of governance is essential to assess how local democracy actually works. In addition, many mobilizations and electoral strategies are elaborated and executed by the various indigenous and peasant organizations at the local level. In Bolivia, this is how the MAS emerged and developed its political strategies. Similarly, party-voter linkages mediated by customary law governments provide a different set of constraints on individual voting, even in regular elections. These constraints may have the effect, as observed in Bolivia, of contributing to the spread of the subnational hegemony of the ruling party. Considering that Bolivia has been recently catalogued as a hybrid regime at the national level

(Levitsky and Loxton 2013), this dissertation may help account for the local hybridization, and, in some cases, “authoritarianization” of the country (see Map 1.0).

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Map 1.0: Municipal Elections in Bolivia: 2004 - 2010

Municipal Elections, 2004 Municipal Elections, 2010

Source: Atlas Electoral de Bolivia, Tomo III (2012)

Map 1.0 depicts the political landscape of municipalities in Bolivia. All the areas in blue correspond to municipalities where the MAS obtained electoral victories. It is easy to observe that the MAS has become the largest party in the country at the local level. In 2004, the MAS was not the governing party, and while it did control a substantial amount of municipalities, it was a regional rather than a national hegemon.

The framework proposed in this project can explain a great deal of this success, as the

MAS has relied on the many indigenous organizations in the countryside to execute its program, and to carry out its campaigns locally. This dissertation can also make sense of the resounding electoral failures of the MAS in the larger urban areas. Here, the party does not have the organizational resources to affect individual voting, even when it has

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broadened its discourse to include the urban working and middle classes (Madrid 2005,

2008). The argument, however, does not posit that municipalities where the MAS wins are necessarily hybrid or authoritarian. Rather, it focuses on the process whereby individuals, their organizations, and parties come together to affect individual voting and participation in subnational politics.

Theoretically, this dissertation will contribute to bridge the literatures on subnational and ethnic politics in Latin America. In Polyarchy, Dahl (1971: 14) exposed the need to explore the opportunities for opposition and participation in subnational units other than state institutions, both local and national. The author claimed that “one would have to break subnational units into a number of categories: business firms, trade unions, municipal governments, churches, educational institutions, etc.” as some of these may be oligarchical and hegemonic, or, in turn, can provide spaces for competitiveness in the context of national hegemonic regimes. Although the literature on subnational regimes has yielded compelling theories and spurred a necessary discussion about the unevenness of democracy subnationally, it has focused only on state institutions at the subnational level, primarily provincial and regional governments, and has overlooked other, non-state forms of government.

Similarly, research at the intersection of ethnicity and democracy has generally overlooked the considerable variation of local democracy in multi-ethnic countries. In the same vein, works on ethnicity in Latin America by political scientists have tended to emphasize the relevance of contentious and electoral politics, and have paid little attention to the role of indigenous governments and customary law in local politics.

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This dissertation is divided into 6 chapters. In Chapter 1, I lay out the project’s theoretical framing. First, I ponder the existing explanations for this dissertation’s puzzle, and the bodies of literature with which it engages. The final section of this chapter is the theoretical core of this project. Here, I present the argument in greater detail, and explain the research design and case selection criteria. The second part of this dissertation presents the empirical analysis through the comparison of six cases of indigenous governance in Bolivia. Chapter 2 provides a general context of Bolivian politics, with a particular emphasis on the ruling party, its defining characteristics, and its relation with indigenous movements. Chapter 3 analyzes the political dynamics of participatory indigenous governance in Jesús de Machaca and Uncía. Chapter 4 explores the emergence and maintenance of hegemonic governance in Chimoré and Coripata. In

Chapter 5, I investigate the political hybridity of Bolívar and Umala. This dissertation concludes by recapitulating the argument and exploring the implications of this study both for local and national politics in Bolivia. Finally, I briefly explore the application of the argument developed here to the case of Ecuador and tangentially to Mexico.

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II. ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: PREVAILING EXPLANATIONS AND ENDURING GAPS

This dissertation’s argument engages with two bodies of literature, namely: ethnic

politics and subnational democratization. Although these theories were not developed to

explain this project’s puzzle, they provide useful explanations and causal mechanisms

that may help elucidate the causes of the variation of indigenous forms of governance.

Thus, I focus on strands of theory that delve into issues of democracy and ethnicity, even

when these do not respond my question directly. I assess the potential rival explanations

they pose, and include those insights that may contribute to improve the argument

presented here.

First, I ponder various theories of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in general. Second,

I turn to studies of ethnic politics in Latin America, mostly in political science, but also in

other disciplines. Third, I review works on subnational regimes, their emergence and

maintenance, as well as research on local democracy. Finally, I briefly summarize the

points of convergence of the various works reviewed here, and the ways in which these

can contribute to better understand the political dynamics of indigenous governments at

the local level.

i. General Theories of Ethnicity, Conflict, and Mobilization

Research on ethnic identity, and its various consequences, has generated

numerous theories and frameworks, and studied the most diverse cases and empirical

evidence. While there is no consensus as to what explains the emergence of an ethnic

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identity and the reasons why individuals are willing to mobilize –and even die– for it, there are identifiable traditions of inquiry3 that have dominated the study of this field.

The oldest approach to ethnicity and ethnic conflict is essentialism. There are two types of arguments that fall under this label. On the one hand, some scholars emphasize the fact that individuals have inherent ties4 to their groups, which are based on “shared blood” or “shared ancestry” (i.e., language, religion, physical traits) that provide a sense of belongingness (Geertz 1973, Isaacs 1975). Some have gone as far as to claim that the man is not a rational, but a national animal (Connor 1994). On the other hand, some essentialist theories have explained inter-ethnic conflict by pointing to the existence of

“ancient hatreds” between ethnic groups. 5 However, essentialism has been widely criticized because there are too many relevant aspects of inter-ethnic violence that it cannot explain, such as the subnational and temporal variation of ethnic violence; the existence of conflict between groups that have little history of conflict or even interaction; or the transformation of identities over time (Varshney 2007). Furthermore, essentialism tends to over-predict violence, while evidence suggests that inter-ethnic

3 See Varshney (2007) for a more comprehensive review of the field of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. 4 Other accounts in the essentialist tradition are less static, and allow for some variation – although rather marginal– in individuals’ and groups’ identities. Isaacs (1975), in his Idols of the Tribe, asserts that identities may well be malleable, and can change over time. In fact, the author posits that “the dynamism of basic group identity is a function of the mix of what people have inherited and what they have acquired, the mix of culture past and culture present” (Isaacs 1975: 206). 5 Petersen (2002) presented an argument of individual motivations to participate in ethnic conflict, and claimed that even if hatreds did not have an ancient root, they could profoundly motivate human behavior.

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peace is far more common than violence (Fearon and Latin 1996), and that many modern societies have defied Geertz’s overly pessimistic view about integrative revolutions.

From a complete opposite viewpoint, instrumentalism asserts that ethnicity is not inherent in human nature or intrinsically valuable. Rather, it is merely instrumental

(Varshney 2007). There are two ways of classifying instrumental accounts of ethnic violence and mobilization. The first focuses on how ethnicity is useful to gain political power or resources from the state, and explains conflict as a result of leaders’ manipulation of ethnicity to accomplish one or all of the aforementioned goals (Varshney

2007). Fearon and Laitin (2000: 872) call the second variant “on the ground” instrumentalism, which seeks to explain why individuals and groups support and participate in ethnic violence. Instrumentalist, or rationalist, scholars have aimed to explain varied outcomes ranging from language-choice (Laitin 1998), ethnic and nationalist conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996, Snyder 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2001) to ethnic mobilization (Hardin 1995). The most fundamental critique to rationalism is that it cannot explain the emergence of ethnic mobilization, that is, the “first movers” problem,6 although it can explain behavior after mobilization has occurred (Varshney 2003).

Opposed to both essentialism and instrumentalism and, according to Varshney

(2007), the new conventional wisdom in the field of ethnicity and nationalism, constructivist theories7 treat identities as meaningful and formed through long-term historical processes. Constructivist scholars have privileged the study of identity

6 Varshney (2003) draws on the concept of value-rationality, which refers to “ethical, aesthetic, religious or other” beliefs that are independent of their prospects of success, and that may account for the origins of ethnic mobilization. 7 For a review of rationalist and constructivist approaches of identity construction see Fearon and Laitin (2000).

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construction, especially of nationalism.8 When they have attempted to explain ethnic violence, they assign a causal role to a master narrative, or national level cleavage, and to political entrepreneurs (see Brass 1997). This last point is probably constructivism’s major weakness, as it cannot explain local variation in ethnic conflict (Varshney 2007).

Additionally, Brubaker (1996) has argued that constructivist explanations cannot account for sudden changes in identities, claiming that analysts should see identity as an event, rather than a gradual development.

Finally, institutionalism aims to explain the effects of institutions on ethnic stability and peace. The main debate in this tradition is about the type of institutions that divided societies need in order to function and live peacefully. The Lijphart-Horowitz debate has dominated the field. Lijphart (1977) proposed consociational democracy as a solution for plural societies, whereas Horowitz (1991) recommended an electoral system that would lead parties to appeal across ethnic groups. A common criticism to both these approaches is that they gloss over the effects of such institutions on subnational units

(Varshney 2007).

Scholars have recently moved in that direction, uncovering how local institutions affect ethnic violence. Varshney (2002), for instance, claims that networks of civic engagement that foster interethnic links are able to build bridges and manage tensions, thereby preventing the emergence of inter-conflict. Hence, in communities organized along inter-ethnic, rather than intra-ethnic lines, ethnic violence is unlikely. 9

8 See Anderson (1991), Gellner (1983), Colley (1992), Weber (1976), and Laitin 1986. 9 Varshney (2002) develops this framework based on the analysis of 6 Indian cities, arranged into pairs –one with ethnic or Hindu-Muslim conflict and the other with peaceful relations among them– controlled by the percentage of Hindu and Muslim population in each city. The three pairs are: Aligarh and Calicut based on population

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Understanding, then, how such networks of civic engagement can be forged should improve studies of local institutions and ethnic violence. Similarly, scholars have accounted for ethnic mobilization and politicization of ethnicity using institutions as the main explanatory factor. In this line, Posner (2005) shows how in Zambia, under a multiparty rule, language dominated, whereas under a one party system, tribe became more salient politically.

This brief review of works on ethnicity, violence, and mobilization reveals that identity has been addressed as both a powerful explanatory variable, and a relevant outcome of various political processes. I argue that theories that focus on subnational variation are better equipped to understand variation in ethnic governance, a phenomenon far more common than violence and mobilization, albeit seldom scrutinized by theories of ethnicity. Thus, although the outcome of interest is different, I draw on neoinstitutionalist theories that direct their attention toward local institutions, and instrumentalist theories that emphasize the strategic actions, especially by indigenous leaders.

Furthermore, while these theories provide myriad explanations, mechanisms, and empirical evidence to understand ethnicity, few have been applied to, let alone inspired by Latin American ethnic groups. The heavy focus on violence has driven students of ethnicity away from the region. In fact, Latin America has always been perceived as an outlier in terms of inter-ethnic relations. In her seminal book on indigenous mobilization,

percentages only; Hyderabad and Lucknow, which added two controls to population percentages, one of previous Muslim rule, and a second of reasonable cultural identities. The third pair: Ahmedabad and Surat–was the most tightly controlled; both cities come from the state of Gujarat, sharing history, language and culture, but not endemic communal violence (p. 373).

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Yashar (2005) probes several of these theories –and others– to assess their explanatory

power in cases of ethnic mobilization in the region. According to the author, none of

these approaches alone can provide a satisfying explanation of ethnic mobilization in

Latin America. The seemingly uniqueness of the region in terms of ethnic behavior has

led scholars to focus on issues other than violence. I now turn to the main explanations

advanced by political scientists to understand ethnic politics in Latin America.

ii. Voting, Protesting, and the Search for Recognition: Indigenous Peoples in Latin America

Political scientists studying indigenous groups in Latin America have directed

their attention to three major topics: citizenship and social mobilization, electoral

participation, and reform of the state (Van Cott 2010). These topics have been studied

from the most varied perspectives, ranging from pure institutionalist arguments to

explanations centered on strategic action, with several combinations in-between.

However, theories of ethnicity such as constructivism10 and essentialism are generally

missing from explanations of ethnic politics in the region. In the following pages I review

the main works in political science, and related disciplines, that delved into the issue of

ethnic identity, mobilization, and the struggle for recognition by Latin American

indigenous peoples.

Citizenship and social mobilization: Works on indigenous groups and citizenship refer

mainly to the awakening of an indigenous identity in the region, and the subsequent

10 Anderson (1991), in his seminal work on nationalism, does ponder the emergence of nations in Latin America, and Centeno (2002) also assesses the effect of war on state and nation development in the region.

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emergence of social organizations and major protests. Scholars have elaborated myriad explanations to account for this development. Some point to the role of globalization, and the instruments of international norms, laws, and organizations (Brysk 2000), others to the failure of the developmental state (Bengoa 2000), and even others to the religious competition between Catholics and Protestants (Trejo 2009). There is, however, some consensus among students of ethnicity in Latin America in that such mobilizations were responses to the implementation of neoliberal reforms (Cleary and Steingega 2004), as well as related policies such as decentralization and agrarian reforms (Lucero 2006).

Building upon these arguments, and rejecting most of the theories of ethnicity presented above, Yashar (2005) develops a meso-level explanation to account for the variation in indigenous mobilization in Latin America. The author contends that the neoliberal reforms made ethnic cleavages more salient by threatening indigenous groups’ local autonomy (motivational factor). These groups, the author goes on, were able to organize only when there were trans-community networks (capacity factor) and the political system allowed freedom of speech and association (opportunity factor). These works have provided insightful accounts to understand ethnic mobilization in Latin

America. However, they have tended to overlook issues related to within-movement democracy, and how this may affect indigenous peoples’ potential contributions to democracy.11

11 Zamosc (2007) analyzes the involvement of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement in a coup attempt, and concludes that their socialization had not nurtured a profound commitment to democracy.

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Electoral Participation: While many indigenous groups in Latin America created social movements, those organizations varied widely (Lucero 2006), and not all turned into ethnic parties. In fact, not all countries created indigenous movements, as evinced by the cases of (Yashar 2005) and Yucatán (Mattiace 2009). Scholars have explained the emergence and success of indigenous parties by pointing to two sets of factors. One strand of research has highlighted institutional factors, such as decentralization, constitutional reforms, and reserved seats, among others (Van Cott 2005, Rice and Van

Cott 2006) or the different organizational ecologies of indigenous movements, such as fragmentation of Bolivia and the unity of Ecuadorian indigenous peoples in CONAIE12 to explain ethnic party formation and success (Lucero 2008). For others, in turn, given the greater fluidity and ambiguity that characterizes ethnic identity in Latin America, the success of ethnic parties is the result of an “ethnopopulist” appeal, which makes them inclusive, reaching simultaneously to the peasantry, urban workers, and the middle classes (Madrid 2005, 2008).

Despite their differences, both the institutionalist and strategy-oriented approaches have advanced our understanding of these ethnic parties’ political trajectories.

Nonetheless, these works have paid little attention to party structures, the history of those parties, and the various ways in which these might affect the prospects for governability and democratic deepening once elected. In fact, very few studies have assessed how indigenous parties perform when in government. Van Cott (2008) aimed to account for the variation in indigenous parties’ capacity to bring about participatory democracy in the municipalities where they governed. The author found that while indigenous parties have

12 CONAIE, or Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador is a national level organization that unites all indigenous movements in Ecuador.

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improved democracy in several respects, authoritarian practices related to the Andean culture and their organizations have put limits to the deepening of democracy. This analysis provides new data to account for the governance style of indigenous parties, but because it is more tilted toward municipal institutions as the relevant space for political struggle, it glosses over the dynamics of indigenous governance that, in many Bolivian rural areas, are considerably more important than state institutions and authorities. Hence, the author frames this as a matter of degrees of democracy, when it is actually –I argue– a question of type of governance.

Reform of the State: During the 1990s decade and early 2000s Latin American states launched a series of constitutional changes that brought multicultural governance into the design of state institutions. Legal pluralism, the recognition of customary law (usos y costumbres), and autonomy are among the many reforms that have been carried out by

Latin American governments since the early 1990s. Van Cott (2000) presents a comprehensive analysis of the factors that explain the implementation of different multicultural models across the region, emphasizing the motivations of the elites, the strategies of the social movements, the strength of the left and neoliberal forces, and the role of neoliberal presidents in advocating for state reform. The downside of this and other analyses of state reform, however, is that they only concentrate on the politics of the implementation process of such reforms rather than on their legal and cultural consequences (Van Cott 2010).

In fact, the empirical study of legal pluralism and customary law has, for the most part, been the focus of anthropological research. These studies have challenged the

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dichotomous view of customary law, on one side, and positivist law on the other, showing how the two interact, conflict, and combine. Likewise, scholars have argued against the automatic association between indigenous community justice and lynching.

While opponents to the recognition of indigenous justice claim that it violates human rights, most research on the topic suggests that it focuses on reintegration and harmonization of the community (Fernández Osco 2001, Hammond 2011, Handy 2004,

Molina 2005). In fact, while the data is unreliable, scholars agree that lynching is mostly an urban phenomenon (Albó 2005, Goldstein 2004, Stefanoni 2008, Vilas 2007).

Through community justice and lynchings, scholars have also aimed to assess the interactions between local and national levels, asserting that these practices can constitute local responses to neoliberalism (Goldstein 2004), and can fragment cultural values and reinforce social hierarchies (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2002).

Ethnographic studies of indigenous governments have also uncovered their negative side, especially emphasizing the widespread gender bias against women, and migrants’ lower political status (Eisenstadt 2007, Figueroa 2010, Goodale 2009,

Andolina 2001, Sieder and Sierra 2011). Early works on the subject, such as Liberal

Democracy and Ayllu Democracy by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (1990) and Votos y

Wiphalas by Ticona, Rojas and Albó (1995), provide evidence of the internal functioning of indigenous forms of governance, and the main points of divergence with liberal democracy. Additionally, these studies have shown that political and economic reforms have contributed to undermining indigenous forms of organization, privileging more

“modern” concepts of citizenship. These scholars, nonetheless, have been emphatic in specifying the numerous sources of tension between the logics of indigenous and liberal

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governance, which has reinforced an unfruitful approach that treats them as separate arenas.

Political scientists have only recently begun focusing on indigenous governance.

The topic of autonomy has called their attention, as autonomous governments are seen as more formal spaces of political struggle. Similar to anthropologists, they have pondered the varied logics of governance, but rejecting the idea of indigenous spaces as “closed corporate communities” (Wolf 2001), therefore treating indigenous governments as just another arena of political contest. The indigenous movements of Chiapas and Oaxaca have been in the spotlight of academics for many years due to their emblematic struggles for autonomy. Many scholars have focused on the tensions between political parties, indigenous communities, and movements. Hernández Castillo (2006), for instance, shows that local forms of resistance differ significantly from the national strategies proposed by the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation –

EZLN). The author also presents evidence of the varied forms of party-movement relations at the local level. Along similar lines, Rus (1994) underscores the role of the

Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party – PRI) in building local indigenous leadership, legitimizing the cacicazgos of indigenous strongmen in Chiapas. Finally, Henríquez Arellano (1999) contends that speaking of UC as an indigenous practice is misleading and glosses over the external influences indigenous communities have received. The author analyzes the changes nine predominantly indigenous municipalities in Chiapas have experienced over the last fifty years, including many state reforms, the emergence of Zapatismo, and the introduction of new religions, among others.

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The autonomous municipalities of Oaxaca have also caught the attention of many political scientists. In Oaxaca, since the 1995 legalization of usos y costumbres (UC),

418 municipalities select their leaders through different mechanisms that range from inclusionary assemblies to exclusionary council of elders meetings (Eisenstadt 2007).

Several studies on the Oaxacan municipalities have highlighted both the strengths and limitations of UC systems, mainly in terms of the “collective versus individual rights” debate. These works have shown that women, migrants, and non-Catholic members can be excluded from elections and assemblies (Martínez 2013), although in some UC municipalities, migrants present high rates of participation, are overrepresented, and hold important power positions (Danielson 2013). Similarly, Sonnleitner and Eisenstadt

(2013) suggest that factionalism and power disputes are a commonplace within indigenous communities, and that UC elections have increased post-electoral conflict

(Eisenstadt 2007).

Most of this research on indigenous forms of governance is not comparative in nature, so there is little knowledge on how UC “subsystems” vary (Sorroza Polo and

Danielson 2013). Likewise, these studies are commonly more descriptive, and eschew the language of causal analysis, which makes it difficult to highlight explanatory variables that may account for sources of variation. In addition, the larger theoretical frameworks to assess how UC systems work have commonly emphasized the tension that arises between collective and individual rights, although Eisenstadt (2011) has demonstrated that, in practice, there is no such tension, as individuals tend to privilege one identity over the other depending on the situation.

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Furthermore, this focus has led students of indigenous governance to shy away

from assessing the equally important issue of the internal democracy of these governance

institutions.13 This narrow approach on community democracy has primarily concentrated

on the internal dynamics of small communities, detached from broader political

dynamics, and influences. I argue, then, that a dialogue between studies of UC systems

and works on subnational regimes can contribute to advance our knowledge and

understanding of local democratization beyond state institutions.

iii. Subnational Regimes: Structural Approaches, Local-National Connections, and Lessons for Non-state Democratization

The literature on subnational regimes emphasizes either the characteristics of the

subnational authoritarian units, on the one hand, or the links these units have with the

national government, on the other, to explain the emergence and/or maintenance of

subnational autocracies.

The Subnational Unit as the Focus of Analysis:

The first, more structural works primarily concentrate on the economic features of

the units under study. One of the most notable examples is McMann’s (2006) account of

the variation in the regime types of four regions in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. McMann

claims that the fact that individuals can make a living independent of the state, what she

13 In fact, those studies that do touch upon the democratic effects of indigenous forms of governance have focused on the more restricted topic of the so-called “community democracy” that, in many countries, describes the practices of certain indigenous groups. This, at least in Bolivia, has led scholars to privilege the study of ayllus, and overlook the governments of peasant unions, and more hybrid forms of governance (Pape 2009).

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dubs economic autonomy, is crucial to the practice of democracy. Dependent citizens, the author goes on, are reluctant to criticize, and mobilize against the government for fear of economic reprisals. Building on McMann’s theory, Gervasoni (2010) argues that when the central government redistributes revenues from wealthier, and/or more populated provinces toward poorer, and/or smaller ones, the latter become richer vis-à-vis their societies, and fiscally independent from them. This has the effect of increasing the incumbents’ ability to restrict political competition and weaken limitations on their power, as they become independent from their constituencies reducing the possibility for societal accountability.

The social structures characteristic of a given subnational unit can also affect the prospects of democratization. Durazo (2010), for instance, focuses on the internal dynamics of subnational authoritarianism in Oaxaca. The author claims that the existence of two sources of legitimacy, a system of political intermediation based on arbitrary power, tradition, and rule of law, and the alliance between the political and economic elite, have prevented the emergence of an autonomous state, and the consolidation of a stable political system. Moreover, Durazo (2010) explains that neopatrimonial elites have managed to combine formal democratic reforms while maintaining autocratic practices, legitimizing the coexistence of democratic and authoritarian regimes. In a similar vein,

Behrend (2011) explains the persistence of less-than-democratic subnational regimes in nationally democratic governments, or what she calls “closed games,” by developing a framework that focuses on the role of political families, media ownership, and the control of access to business opportunities, and of the provincial state. Here, the elites exercise

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control of local politics by using socioeconomic practices that allow them to reproduce themselves.

Arguments that explain subnational regime emergence and reproduction focusing on the characteristics of the local unit alone have commonly emphasized the importance of factors such as economic autonomy and socioeconomic imbalances. With a somewhat similar approach, the literature on local democracy, which aims to unpack the mechanisms that explain variation in degrees of democracy, emphasizes diverse economic factors that may account for such variation. Among those, inequality is highlighted as a powerful explanatory variable. Several scholars coincide that increased asset and income inequality can result in greater elite capture of local governments by lowering the proportion of informed voters, and limiting the political participation of the poor (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1998). This argument draws on the idea that the wealthier individuals possess the “political tools,” that is, money, power, information, and literacy, among others, to influence the democratic process (Johnson 2001). However, as will be seen below, the Bolivian case shows that income inequality is not necessarily the most consequential factor to explain the variation in democracy at the local level. Other, non- economic forms of power imbalance should also be considered.

Finally, as March and Olsen (1983) asserted, political democracy not only depends on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions.

Given that most works on subnational regimes only study one country, the institutional design of local governments has not been considered as a relevant variable in explaining regime variation locally. In fact, according to Fung and Wright (2003), local institutions should be designed in such a way that they generate higher levels of participation and

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accountability. Their answer to crafting local institutions that respond to such requirement is the Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) project, which comprises three main principles: practical orientation, bottom-up participation, and deliberative solution generation.

Studying different experiences of decentralization, James Manor (1999) contends that the conditions crucial for a successful decentralization process have more to do with administration than with politics, and that a key requirement is to make rules that maximize both upward and downward accountability. For instance, Isaac and Heller

(2003) explain how in Kerala’s decentralization reform, the Campaign, the planning process began at the lowest levels, the grama panchayats and municipalities, and was driven by direct mass participation. According to the authors, this design managed to correct power asymmetries, and created a true deliberative space without sacrificing the technical and economic requirements. Similarly, works on participatory budgeting (PB), one of the best-known participatory experiments, have commonly tended to overlook the design of institutions as a factor in explaining their success. Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva

(2011) show, through a paired case comparison, that institutional reform does make a difference in deepening democracy. Comparing municipalities that adopted PB with others that did not, and controlling for most relevant variables, the authors conclude that

PB made a notorious difference in political and social terms.

To be sure, institutions play an important role in affecting patterns of democracy locally. However, they do not develop in a vacuum. Structural factors and power dynamics can negatively affect even the best-designed institutions. At the same time, the characteristics of the subnational units are relevant in explaining subnational

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democratization, but, unlike sovereign countries, these are constrained by an overarching normative and institutional framework. Hence, political dynamics in local governments cannot be understood in isolation from the national level.

Local-National Links: Multi-level Analyses of Subnational Democratization

The second group emphasizes the links between the subnational and national units, focusing on the strategies and agency of actors involved. Cornelius (1999), one of the first to show the disjuncture between national democratization and local authoritarianisms, shows that autonomy from the center gave some governors in Mexico the opportunity to be openly authoritarian and corrupt. Although the author does not make a causal claim, he explains how different center-periphery relations may lead to the emergence of subnational authoritarian governments. Likewise, Gibson (2012) explains the maintenance of subnational authoritarian units by focusing on the strategic interactions between local and national politics. The author’s explanation of variation in subnational regime maintenance is based on a boundary control strategy: authoritarian incumbents prevail when conflict remains localized (boundary-closing), and are threatened when conflict becomes nationalized (boundary-opening). The scope condition of Gibson’s theory is that the national government must be democratic. In contexts of less-than-democratic national governments, strategies of boundary-closing can actually prevent the penetration of undemocratic leaders and influences coming from the center, and thus maintain the democratic nature of those local regimes.

Giraudy (2013), while building on Gibson’s analysis, incorporates nuances that restrict its applicability. The author contends that the strategies available to autocratic

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leaders depend on whether their regimes are patrimonial or bureaucratic. Boundary- closing, Giraudy claims, is not possible in the latter, as they are incapable of preventing the formation of local-national alliances. Focusing both on subnational-national links, and strategic action by local leaders, Giraudy (2012) argues that subnational autocrats can be either reproduced by the national government, reproduction from above, or via self- reproduction. With a slightly different logic, Borges (2011) emphasizes the conflicts between different levels of government. In particular, the author asserts that vertical competition between federal and state governments in the provision of social policies hinders the capacity of state bosses to build dominant machines, thereby reducing the possibilities for reproducing an autocratic regime at the subnational level.

Similarly, Snyder (1999), one of the first scholars in “scaling-down” the study of politics, focused on how deregulation reforms in the coffee sector provided an opportunity to strengthen subnational authoritarian regimes in Mexico’s three largest coffee-producing states. In Oaxaca and Guerrero, governors resurrected weakened corporatist regimes to take control over small producers, whereas in Chiapas, governors allied with the powerful elites who reasserted their monopoly over the coffee industry.

This variation can be explained by the existence of different regimes in these states at the time the neoliberal reforms took place. In this sense, only Snyder and Giraudy highlight the existence of different types of subnational authoritarianisms and their effects on local politics. Their works point out the importance of not treating subnational undemocratic regimes as homogenous.

In a somewhat similar fashion, research on local politics has focused on how state-society synergy brings about more democracy and participation. For instance, Heller

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(2001) and Evans (1996) argue that the capacity of citizens to engage in collective action is not a stock variable predetermined by social, cultural or historical patterns, but can be constructed both from below, through trajectories of mobilization, and by institutional entrepreneurship. Thus, as numerous examples of successful decentralization processes show, a close connection between local and central governments, as well as a highly tied to the grassroots, can be seen as preconditions to foster societal participation, improve horizontal and vertical accountability, and enhance local democracy (Tendler 1997, Heller, Harilal and Chaudhuri 2007). Examples such as Porto

Alegre’s participatory budgeting or the Campaign in Kerala provide significant evidence in this regard (Heller 2001). Of course, in these cases, the nature of the connections, and the characteristics of the movements, and parties are also relevant in explaining the democratic outcomes at the local level synergistic relations may bring about. As Fox

(2007) rightly points out, even movements and parties that vie for democratic causes may be internally undemocratic, a factor that can also affect the functioning of local governments.