United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2016 SECURITY ASSISTANCE U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for

GAO-16-435

April 2016 SECURITY ASSISTANCE U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for Egypt

Highlights of GAO-16-435, a report to congressional requesters

Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The U.S. government has allocated an U.S. agencies allocated approximately $6.5 billion for security-related assistance average of about $1.3 billion annually to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. As of September 30, 2015, over $6.4 in security assistance for Egypt in fiscal billion of the $6.5 billion total had been committed or disbursed. The majority of years 2011 through 2015. DOD and the funding (99.5 percent) was provided to Egypt through the Department of State have established end-use State’s (State) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. The funds from this monitoring programs to ensure that account were used to purchase and sustain a wide variety of military systems, military equipment transferred to including F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks. foreign countries is safeguarded and used for its intended purposes. In The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State implemented end-use monitoring addition, legal requirements, known as for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, but challenges including the Leahy laws, prohibit DOD- and obtaining Egyptian government cooperation hindered some efforts. DOD State-funded assistance to units of completed all required end-use monitoring inventories and physical security foreign security forces if there is inspections of storage sites for missiles and night vision devices (NVD) in fiscal credible information that these forces year 2015, but DOD lacked documentation showing that it completed physical have committed a gross violation of security inspections for these sensitive items in prior years. Despite agreeing to human rights. give access, the Egyptian government prevented DOD officials from accessing a storage site to verify the physical security of some NVDs prior to 2015, according This report examines, for fiscal years to DOD officials and documents. State conducted 12 end-use checks of U.S. 2011 through 2015, the extent to which equipment exported to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 to 2015, but State data indicate the U.S. government (1) committed or that the Egyptian government’s incomplete and slow responses to some inquiries disbursed funds allocated for security- related assistance for Egypt, (2) limited U.S. efforts to verify the use and security of certain equipment, including implemented end-use monitoring for NVDs and riot-control items. Despite this lack of cooperation, since 2008, State equipment transferred to Egyptian has not used outreach programs in Egypt that are intended to facilitate host security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian country cooperation and compliance with State’s monitoring program. According recipients of security-related to State officials, this was due to the small number of end-use checks conducted assistance for human rights concerns. in Egypt and the lower priority assigned to Egypt than to other countries. GAO analyzed U.S. agency data and documentation; conducted fieldwork in Examples of U.S. Military Equipment Subject to End-Use Monitoring in Egypt Egypt; and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Cairo, Egypt. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in February 2016. What GAO Recommends

GAO is making six recommendations to strengthen State’s implementation of The U.S. government completed some, but not all, human rights vetting required end-use monitoring and human rights by State policy before providing training or equipment to Egyptian security forces. vetting, including utilizing its end-use monitoring outreach programs and State deemed GAO’s estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that developing time frames for establishing were not vetted to be sensitive but unclassified information, which is excluded policies and procedures for equipment from this public report. Moreover, State has not established specific policies and vetting. State generally agreed with procedures for vetting Egyptian security forces receiving equipment. Although these recommendations. State concurred with a 2011 GAO recommendation to implement equipment vetting, it has not established a time frame for such action. State currently attests in memos that it is in compliance with the Leahy law. However, without vetting View GAO-16-435. For more information, policies and procedures, the U.S. government risks providing U.S. equipment to contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) recipients in Egypt in violation of the Leahy laws. 512-7331 or [email protected]. United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter 1 Background 4 Agencies Committed All FMF Funds and Disbursed About 40 Percent of Other Security-Related Assistance Funds Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015 12 DOD and State Completed End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Provided Equipment but Faced Some Challenges Carrying Out These Efforts 17 U.S. Government Completed Some Human Rights Vetting in Egypt but Has Weaknesses or Gaps in Procedures, Documentation, and Policies 35 Conclusions 47 Recommendations for Executive Action 48 Agency Comments 49

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 51

Appendix II Overview of Department of Defense’s (DOD) and Department of State’s (State) End-Use Monitoring Programs 57

Appendix III Comparison of the Provisions in the Department of State and Department of Defense Leahy Laws 59

Appendix IV Summary of U.S. Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 61

Appendix V Status of U.S. Security-Related Assistance for Egypt by Account, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 63

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of State 67

Page i GAO-16-435 Security-Related Assistance to Egypt

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 70

Tables Table 1: Accounts Used to Fund U.S. Security-Related Assistance for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015 5 Table 2: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 13 Table 3: Status of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Funding Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 14 Table 4: Status of IMET, INCLE, NADR ATA, and NADR EXBS Funds Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 16 Table 5: Number of Documented Routine End-Use Monitoring Observations in Egypt by Quarter, July 2012-June 2015 26 Table 6: Number of Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Checks in Egypt, by Type Conducted in Fiscal Years 2011-2015 29 Table 7: Number of Days Taken to Complete Blue Lantern Checks in Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 30 Table 8: Completeness and Results of Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Checks in Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 33 Table 9: Results of U.S. Government Leahy Vetting of Egyptian Security Forces, Fiscal Year 2011 through March 31, 2015 36 Table 10: Overview of DOD’s Golden Sentry and State’s Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Programs 58 Table 11: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 61 Table 12: Status of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Funding Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 63 Table 13: Status of International Military Education and Training (IMET) Funding Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 64 Table 14: Status of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Funding Allocated f