United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters April 2016 SECURITY ASSISTANCE U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for Egypt GAO-16-435 April 2016 SECURITY ASSISTANCE U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for Egypt Highlights of GAO-16-435, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The U.S. government has allocated an U.S. agencies allocated approximately $6.5 billion for security-related assistance average of about $1.3 billion annually to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. As of September 30, 2015, over $6.4 in security assistance for Egypt in fiscal billion of the $6.5 billion total had been committed or disbursed. The majority of years 2011 through 2015. DOD and the funding (99.5 percent) was provided to Egypt through the Department of State have established end-use State’s (State) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. The funds from this monitoring programs to ensure that account were used to purchase and sustain a wide variety of military systems, military equipment transferred to including F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks. foreign countries is safeguarded and used for its intended purposes. In The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State implemented end-use monitoring addition, legal requirements, known as for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, but challenges including the Leahy laws, prohibit DOD- and obtaining Egyptian government cooperation hindered some efforts. DOD State-funded assistance to units of completed all required end-use monitoring inventories and physical security foreign security forces if there is inspections of storage sites for missiles and night vision devices (NVD) in fiscal credible information that these forces year 2015, but DOD lacked documentation showing that it completed physical have committed a gross violation of security inspections for these sensitive items in prior years. Despite agreeing to human rights. give access, the Egyptian government prevented DOD officials from accessing a storage site to verify the physical security of some NVDs prior to 2015, according This report examines, for fiscal years to DOD officials and documents. State conducted 12 end-use checks of U.S. 2011 through 2015, the extent to which equipment exported to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 to 2015, but State data indicate the U.S. government (1) committed or that the Egyptian government’s incomplete and slow responses to some inquiries disbursed funds allocated for security- related assistance for Egypt, (2) limited U.S. efforts to verify the use and security of certain equipment, including implemented end-use monitoring for NVDs and riot-control items. Despite this lack of cooperation, since 2008, State equipment transferred to Egyptian has not used outreach programs in Egypt that are intended to facilitate host security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian country cooperation and compliance with State’s monitoring program. According recipients of security-related to State officials, this was due to the small number of end-use checks conducted assistance for human rights concerns. in Egypt and the lower priority assigned to Egypt than to other countries. GAO analyzed U.S. agency data and documentation; conducted fieldwork in Examples of U.S. Military Equipment Subject to End-Use Monitoring in Egypt Egypt; and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Cairo, Egypt. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in February 2016. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations to strengthen State’s implementation of The U.S. government completed some, but not all, human rights vetting required end-use monitoring and human rights by State policy before providing training or equipment to Egyptian security forces. vetting, including utilizing its end-use monitoring outreach programs and State deemed GAO’s estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that developing time frames for establishing were not vetted to be sensitive but unclassified information, which is excluded policies and procedures for equipment from this public report. Moreover, State has not established specific policies and vetting. State generally agreed with procedures for vetting Egyptian security forces receiving equipment. Although these recommendations. State concurred with a 2011 GAO recommendation to implement equipment vetting, it has not established a time frame for such action. State currently attests in memos that it is in compliance with the Leahy law. However, without vetting View GAO-16-435. For more information, policies and procedures, the U.S. government risks providing U.S. equipment to contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) recipients in Egypt in violation of the Leahy laws. 512-7331 or [email protected]. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background 4 Agencies Committed All FMF Funds and Disbursed About 40 Percent of Other Security-Related Assistance Funds Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015 12 DOD and State Completed End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Provided Equipment but Faced Some Challenges Carrying Out These Efforts 17 U.S. Government Completed Some Human Rights Vetting in Egypt but Has Weaknesses or Gaps in Procedures, Documentation, and Policies 35 Conclusions 47 Recommendations for Executive Action 48 Agency Comments 49 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 51 Appendix II Overview of Department of Defense’s (DOD) and Department of State’s (State) End-Use Monitoring Programs 57 Appendix III Comparison of the Provisions in the Department of State and Department of Defense Leahy Laws 59 Appendix IV Summary of U.S. Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 61 Appendix V Status of U.S. Security-Related Assistance for Egypt by Account, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 63 Appendix VI Comments from the Department of State 67 Page i GAO-16-435 Security-Related Assistance to Egypt Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 70 Tables Table 1: Accounts Used to Fund U.S. Security-Related Assistance for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015 5 Table 2: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 13 Table 3: Status of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Funding Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 14 Table 4: Status of IMET, INCLE, NADR ATA, and NADR EXBS Funds Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 16 Table 5: Number of Documented Routine End-Use Monitoring Observations in Egypt by Quarter, July 2012-June 2015 26 Table 6: Number of Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Checks in Egypt, by Type Conducted in Fiscal Years 2011-2015 29 Table 7: Number of Days Taken to Complete Blue Lantern Checks in Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 30 Table 8: Completeness and Results of Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Checks in Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 33 Table 9: Results of U.S. Government Leahy Vetting of Egyptian Security Forces, Fiscal Year 2011 through March 31, 2015 36 Table 10: Overview of DOD’s Golden Sentry and State’s Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Programs 58 Table 11: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 61 Table 12: Status of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Funding Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 63 Table 13: Status of International Military Education and Training (IMET) Funding Allocated for Security-Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 64 Table 14: Status of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Funding Allocated for Security- Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015 64 Page ii GAO-16-435 Security-Related Assistance to Egypt Table 15: Status of Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) Funding Allocated for Security- Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011- 2015, as of September 30, 2015 65 Figures Figure 1: Department of State (State) Human Rights Vetting Process for Egyptian Security Forces Nominated to Receive U.S. Training 11 Figure 2: Examples of Military Systems Purchased by Egypt with Foreign Military Financing Funds 15 Figure 3: Types of U.S. Military Equipment Provided to Egypt Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring 19 Figure 4: State’s Process for Conducting Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Checks 28 Page iii GAO-16-435 Security-Related Assistance to Egypt Abbreviations ATA Antiterrorism Assistance DOD Department of Defense DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security FMF Foreign Military Financing IMET International Military Education and Training INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement INVEST International Vetting and Security Tracking system ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant MOI Ministry of Interior NADR Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs NEA Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs NVD night vision device OMC-E Office of Military Cooperation-Egypt PKO Peacekeeping Operations State Department of State This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page iv GAO-16-435 Security-Related Assistance to Egypt Letter 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 April 12, 2016 The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Chairman Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives The Honorable Gerald E.