44 armed conflict and conflict management, 2017

III. Armed conflict in and Oceania ian davis, richard ghiasy and fei su

Five countries in Asia and Oceania were involved in active armed conflicts in 2017: , , Myanmar, and the Philippines. In Myanmar the Rohingya were forcibly displaced (with spillover effects in Bangladesh); in places such as the Philippines state security forces com- mitted widespread violence with impunity; and the Islamic State group moved into countries such as Afghanistan and the Philippines. Alongside this, parts of Asia and Oceania continued to be affected by instability from a variety of causes, with no single unifying trend: tensions rose in North , which is one of the world’s most militarized regions, chiefly due to the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea); interstate competition between and its neighbours continued in the South China Sea and the East China Sea; and the India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir reignited; relations between China and India continued to deteriorate after a military stand-off in the border area adjacent to Bhutan.1 Concerns about human rights viola- tions were also raised in many countries across the region throughout 2017.2 This section briefly discusses the background to each of the armed con- flicts as well as ongoing peace processes in two countries. It discusses as an example of a peace process that is continuing despite various chal- lenges and Sri Lanka in the context of a post-conflict peace process focused on the search for truth, justice and reconciliation.

Armed conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has Asia’s youngest population: the median age in 2017 was just 18.8 years. 3 Over 70 per cent of the Afghan population was born amid violent conflict, which has raged almost continuously since 1979. For many Afghans, therefore, conflict and insecurity are part of daily life. The security situation remained highly volatile in 2017 and there are no signs that the country’s security situation will improve in the short to medium term.

1 On military spending in Asia see chapter 4, section II, in this volume; on interstate competition in the South and East China seas, the conflict in Kashmir and tensions between India and China see chapter 1, section II, in this volume. 2 See e.g. Al Hussein, Z. R., UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Current development and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region’, Statement at the Jakarta Conversation on the 70th year of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 25th year of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 5 Feb. 2018. 3 US Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Country comparison to the world’, World Factbook, [n.d.]. Demographic data on Afghanistan has its limitations as there has been no recent census. armed conflicts and peace processes 45

The recorded 23 744 security-related incidents in 2017, 63 per cent of which were attributed to armed clashes.4 Insurgents made up of the Taliban, the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network and the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (a local affiliate of the Islamic State) continued their asymmetric attacks on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and major population centres in 2017, and these attacks remained the main cause of civilian casualties. The violence prompted the International Committee of the Red Cross to announce in October 2017 that it was reducing its presence in the country and that it could no longer con- tinue to operate in some provinces.5 The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 3438 deaths and 7015 injuries in 2017. It attributed 65 per cent of these casu- alties to ‘anti-government elements’ (42 per cent to the Taliban, 10 per cent to the Islamic State–Khorasan Province and 13 per cent to undetermined ‘other anti-government elements’) and 20 per cent to pro-government forces (16 per cent to the ANDSF, 2 per cent to international military forces and 2 per cent to other pro-government armed groups) and the remaining 15 per cent to various causes, such as unattributed crossfire. Although the number of casualties decreased by 9 per cent between 2016 and 2017, a higher propor- tion of the casualties in 2017 (22 per cent, compared to 17 per cent in 2016) were caused by suicide bombings and other attacks using improvised explo- sive devices (IEDs).6 The deadliest attack in since the fall of the Tali- ban in 2001 took place on 31 May 2017, when a large truck bomb killed at least 150 people and injured more than 300, mostly civilians.7 The attack occurred just six days before the start of the Kabul Process, an Afghan Government-led peace process that includes stakeholders from neighbouring countries and further afield but in which the Taliban chose not to participate.8 There was, therefore, no tangible progress towards a peace process in 2017. The Islamic State–Khorasan Province continued to attack the Shia- majority Hazara community throughout 2017 in an apparent attempt to stoke Shia–Sunni sectarian violence, which Afghanistan has mostly avoided throughout the years of conflict.9 Despite upheavals over its leadership and strategic direction in 2017, the Taliban managed to sustain the resurgence

4 United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/72/768–S/2018/165, 27 Feb. 2018, para. 14. 5 Abed, F. and Najim, R., ‘Red Cross reduces presence in Afghanistan after staff is attacked’, New York Times, 9 Oct. 2017. 6 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Annual Report 2017 (UNAMA: Kabul, Feb. 2018). 7 No group claimed responsibility but the Afghan Government accused the Haqqani network. Nordland, R., ‘Death toll in Kabul bombing has hit 150, Afghan President says’, New York Times, 6 June 2017. 8 Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Kabul Process’, 6 June 2017. 9 Comerford, M., ‘Islamic State’s Khorasan Province, 2 years on’, The Diplomat, 26 Jan. 2017. 46 armed conflict and conflict management, 2017 that it had made since the ‘triple transition’ in late 2014—the moment it was envisaged that the Afghan Government would be given autonomy by the international community over politics, security and the economy. The Afghan Government has gradually lost territory to the Taliban since that transition. By mid-2017 the Taliban was thought to control or be contesting about 45 per cent of the country—mostly in rural areas.10 The conflict appeared to have reached a deadlock in 2017, although there were growing concerns that the ANDSF might be suffering a level of casu- alties that is unsustainable over the long term.11 As well as the ANDSF’s limited military capacity, the deadlock is also partially sustained by a com- bination of weak governance, political infighting, geopolitical scheming among external stakeholders and a largely dysfunctional formal economy. US President Donald J. Trump announced a new US strategy for Afghan- istan in August 2017. In its continued focus on the use of military force, the strategy mirrored those of the previous two US administrations. It did, how- ever, propose a shift from a time-based approach to the war to one based on conditions on the ground, and it increased the number of troops deployed by an estimated 4000.12 This is in addition to the estimated 8300 US sol- diers of the total of 13 576 international soldiers deployed with the Resolute Support mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was launched in 2015 to