DOCSLIB.ORG

SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International 44 armed conflict and conflict management, 2017 III. Armed conflict in Asia and Oceania ian davis, richard ghiasy and fei su Five countries in Asia and Oceania were involved in active armed conflicts in 2017: Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Philippines. In Myanmar the Rohingya were forcibly displaced (with spillover effects in Bangladesh); in places such as the Philippines state security forces com- mitted widespread violence with impunity; and the Islamic State group moved into countries such as Afghanistan and the Philippines. Alongside this, parts of Asia and Oceania continued to be affected by instability from a variety of causes, with no single unifying trend: tensions rose in North East Asia, which is one of the world’s most militarized regions, chiefly due to the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea); interstate competition between China and its neighbours continued in the South China Sea and the East China Sea; and the India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir reignited; relations between China and India continued to deteriorate after a military stand-off in the border area adjacent to Bhutan.1 Concerns about human rights viola- tions were also raised in many countries across the region throughout 2017.2 This section briefly discusses the background to each of the armed con- flicts as well as ongoing peace processes in two countries. It discusses Nepal as an example of a peace process that is continuing despite various chal- lenges and Sri Lanka in the context of a post-conflict peace process focused on the search for truth, justice and reconciliation. Armed conflict in Afghanistan Afghanistan has Asia’s youngest population: the median age in 2017 was just 18.8 years. 3 Over 70 per cent of the Afghan population was born amid violent conflict, which has raged almost continuously since 1979. For many Afghans, therefore, conflict and insecurity are part of daily life. The security situation remained highly volatile in 2017 and there are no signs that the country’s security situation will improve in the short to medium term. 1 On military spending in Asia see chapter 4, section II, in this volume; on interstate competition in the South and East China seas, the conflict in Kashmir and tensions between India and China see chapter 1, section II, in this volume. 2 See e.g. Al Hussein, Z. R., UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Current development and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region’, Statement at the Jakarta Conversation on the 70th year of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 25th year of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 5 Feb. 2018. 3 US Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Country comparison to the world’, World Factbook, [n.d.]. Demographic data on Afghanistan has its limitations as there has been no recent census. armed conflicts and peace processes 45 The United Nations recorded 23 744 security-related incidents in 2017, 63 per cent of which were attributed to armed clashes.4 Insurgents made up of the Taliban, the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network and the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (a local affiliate of the Islamic State) continued their asymmetric attacks on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and major population centres in 2017, and these attacks remained the main cause of civilian casualties. The violence prompted the International Committee of the Red Cross to announce in October 2017 that it was reducing its presence in the country and that it could no longer con- tinue to operate in some provinces.5 The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 3438 deaths and 7015 injuries in 2017. It attributed 65 per cent of these casu- alties to ‘anti-government elements’ (42 per cent to the Taliban, 10 per cent to the Islamic State–Khorasan Province and 13 per cent to undetermined ‘other anti-government elements’) and 20 per cent to pro-government forces (16 per cent to the ANDSF, 2 per cent to international military forces and 2 per cent to other pro-government armed groups) and the remaining 15 per cent to various causes, such as unattributed crossfire. Although the number of casualties decreased by 9 per cent between 2016 and 2017, a higher propor- tion of the casualties in 2017 (22 per cent, compared to 17 per cent in 2016) were caused by suicide bombings and other attacks using improvised explo- sive devices (IEDs).6 The deadliest attack in Kabul since the fall of the Tali- ban in 2001 took place on 31 May 2017, when a large truck bomb killed at least 150 people and injured more than 300, mostly civilians.7 The attack occurred just six days before the start of the Kabul Process, an Afghan Government-led peace process that includes stakeholders from neighbouring countries and further afield but in which the Taliban chose not to participate.8 There was, therefore, no tangible progress towards a peace process in 2017. The Islamic State–Khorasan Province continued to attack the Shia- majority Hazara community throughout 2017 in an apparent attempt to stoke Shia–Sunni sectarian violence, which Afghanistan has mostly avoided throughout the years of conflict.9 Despite upheavals over its leadership and strategic direction in 2017, the Taliban managed to sustain the resurgence 4 United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/72/768–S/2018/165, 27 Feb. 2018, para. 14. 5 Abed, F. and Najim, R., ‘Red Cross reduces presence in Afghanistan after staff is attacked’, New York Times, 9 Oct. 2017. 6 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Annual Report 2017 (UNAMA: Kabul, Feb. 2018). 7 No group claimed responsibility but the Afghan Government accused the Haqqani network. Nordland, R., ‘Death toll in Kabul bombing has hit 150, Afghan President says’, New York Times, 6 June 2017. 8 Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Kabul Process’, 6 June 2017. 9 Comerford, M., ‘Islamic State’s Khorasan Province, 2 years on’, The Diplomat, 26 Jan. 2017. 46 armed conflict and conflict management, 2017 that it had made since the ‘triple transition’ in late 2014—the moment it was envisaged that the Afghan Government would be given autonomy by the international community over politics, security and the economy. The Afghan Government has gradually lost territory to the Taliban since that transition. By mid-2017 the Taliban was thought to control or be contesting about 45 per cent of the country—mostly in rural areas.10 The conflict appeared to have reached a deadlock in 2017, although there were growing concerns that the ANDSF might be suffering a level of casu- alties that is unsustainable over the long term.11 As well as the ANDSF’s limited military capacity, the deadlock is also partially sustained by a com- bination of weak governance, political infighting, geopolitical scheming among external stakeholders and a largely dysfunctional formal economy. US President Donald J. Trump announced a new US strategy for Afghan- istan in August 2017. In its continued focus on the use of military force, the strategy mirrored those of the previous two US administrations. It did, how- ever, propose a shift from a time-based approach to the war to one based on conditions on the ground, and it increased the number of troops deployed by an estimated 4000.12 This is in addition to the estimated 8300 US sol- diers of the total of 13 576 international soldiers deployed with the Resolute Support mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was launched in 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance to the ANDSF.13 President Trump underlined that the strategy will focus not on state building, but instead on defeating the Taliban and other militant groups through (a) better training for the ANDSF; (b) training more Afghan special forces; and (c) joint Afghan–US counterterrorism operations.14 This relaxing of restraints on the use of military power by the USA has the poten- tial to increase the number of civilian casualties, and by the end of the year there was some evidence that this had already happened.15 As part of its new strategy, the USA also stated that it would seek to put more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to prevent cross-border attacks.16 Afghanistan and Pakistan blame each other for the frequency of such 10 Roggio, B. and Gutowski, A., ‘LWJ map assessment: Taliban controls or contests 45% of Afghan districts’, FDD’s Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), 26 Sep. 2017. 11 US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (SIGAR: Arlington, VA, 30 Oct. 2017). 12 ‘Trump rules out Afghan troops withdrawal’, BBC News, 22 Aug. 2017. 13 The USA does not disclose exact US troop numbers for Afghanistan. For figures on Resolute Support see NATO, ‘NATO and Afghanistan’, 10 Nov. 2017; and NATO, ‘Resolute Support mission (RSM): Key facts and figures’, May 2017. 14 Gibbons-Neff, T., ‘US-led mission in Afghanistan lacks troops for new strategy’, New York Times, 9 Nov. 2017. 15 See e.g. Rasmussen, S. E., ‘Afghan civilians count cost of renewed US air campaign’, The Guard- ian, 5 Sep. 2017; and Rahim, N. and Nordland, R., ‘Did airstrikes in Afghanistan last week kill civil- ians? US and UN disagree’, New York Times, 10 Nov. 2017. 16 Hirschfield Davis, J. and Landler, M., ‘Trump outlines new Afghanistan war strategy with few details’, New York Times, 21 Aug. 2017. armed conflicts and peace processes 47 attacks, and high-level political exchanges between the two countries to try to seek a resolution to the issue continued in 2017.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Civilian Victimization and Ethnic Civil War∗
    Civilian Victimization and Ethnic Civil War∗ Lars-Erik Cedermany Simon Hugz Livia I. Schubiger§ Francisco Villamil{ March 30, 2018 Abstract While many studies provide insights into the causes of wartime civilian victim- ization, we know little about how the targeting of particular segments of the civilian population affects the onset and escalation of armed conflict. Previous research on conflict onset has been largely limited to structural variables, both theoretically and empirically. Moving beyond these static approaches, this paper assesses how state-led civilian victimization targeting members of specific ethnic groups affects the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset, and the evolution of conflicts once they break out. Relying on a new dataset with global coverage that captures the ethnic identity of civilian victims of targeted violence, we find evidence that the state-led civilian victimization of particular ethnic groups increases the likelihood that the latter be- come involved in ethnic civil war. We also find tentative, yet more nuanced, evidence that ethnic targeting by state forces affects the escalation of ongoing conflicts. ∗Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, April 5-8, 2018, San Francisco. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the American Political Science Association (APSA), San Francisco, August 31–September 3, 2017, the Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association (EPSA), Milan, June 22–24, 2017 and the Annual Meeting of the Conflict Research Society, September 18-19, 2017, Oxford University. We thank Inken von Borzyskowski and the other participants for their helpful comments. Financial support by the Swiss Network for International Studies is greatly appreciated.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Extremism Monitor
    Global Extremism Monitor Violent Islamist Extremism in 2017 WITH A FOREWORD BY TONY BLAIR SEPTEMBER 2018 1 2 Contents Foreword 7 Executive Summary 9 Key Findings About the Global Extremism Monitor The Way Forward Introduction 13 A Unifying Ideology Global Extremism Today The Long War Against Extremism A Plethora of Insurgencies Before 9/11 A Proliferation of Terrorism Since 9/11 The Scale of the Problem The Ten Deadliest Countries 23 Syria Iraq Afghanistan Somalia Nigeria Yemen Egypt Pakistan Libya Mali Civilians as Intended Targets 45 Extremist Groups and the Public Space Prominent Victims Breakdown of Public Targets Suicide Bombings 59 Use of Suicide Attacks by Group Female Suicide Bombers Executions 71 Deadliest Groups Accusations Appendices 83 Methodology Glossary About Us Notes 3 Countries Affected by Violent Islamist Extremism, 2017 4 5 6 Foreword Tony Blair One of the core objectives of the Institute is the promotion of co-existence across the boundaries of religious faith and the combating of extremism based on an abuse of faith. Part of this work is research into the phenomenon of extremism derived particularly from the abuse of Islam. This publication is the most comprehensive analysis of such extremism to date and utilises data on terrorism in a new way to show: 1. Violent extremism connected with the perversion of Islam today is global, affecting over 60 countries. 2. Now more than 120 different groups worldwide are actively engaged in this violence. 3. These groups are united by an ideology that shares certain traits and beliefs. 4. The ideology and the violence associated with it have been growing over a period of decades stretching back to the 1980s or further, closely correlated with the development of the Muslim Brotherhood into a global movement, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and—in the same year—the storming by extremist insurgents of Islam’s holy city of Mecca.
    [Show full text]
  • Spatial Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Murshed, S. Mansoob; Gates, Scott Working Paper Spatial horizontal inequality and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal WIDER Research Paper, No. 2004/43 Provided in Cooperation with: United Nations University (UNU), World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) Suggested Citation: Murshed, S. Mansoob; Gates, Scott (2004) : Spatial horizontal inequality and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, WIDER Research Paper, No. 2004/43, ISBN 9291906328, The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU- WIDER), Helsinki This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63435 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Research Paper No. 2004/43 Spatial Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal S.
    [Show full text]
  • 2014 Vol. 5, No. 1
    PRISM VOL. 5, NO. 1 2014 A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS PRISM About VOL. 5, NO. 1 2014 PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex EDITOR and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy Michael Miklaucic and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS Ross Clark Ben Graves Caliegh Hernandez Communications Daniel Moore Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct communications to: COPY EDITORS Dale Erickson Editor, PRISM Rebecca Harper 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Christoff Luehrs Fort Lesley J. McNair Sara Thannhauser Washington, DC 20319 Nathan White Telephone: (202) 685-3442 DESIGN DIRecTOR FAX: Carib Mendez (202) 685-3581 Email: [email protected] ADVISORY BOARD Dr. Gordon Adams Dr. Pauline H. Baker Ambassador Rick Barton Contributions Professor Alain Bauer PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and Ambassador James F. Dobbins abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to [email protected] Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex officio) with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Dr. David Kilcullen Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein Dr. Roger B. Myerson This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Moisés Naím Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted MG William L.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorist Situation Outside the EU33
    TESAT 2018 34 Terrorist situation outside the EU33 33 This section is largely based on open sources. Members of Albanian, Bosnian and regarded a viable terrorist threat. Roma minority communities are The same applies to jihadist groups predominant in jihadist groups in in the country, although some of Serbia. The country also reported their members, in particular returned propaganda activities being recorded FTFs, possess knowledge and skills in 2017, both through personal that could be used for terrorist contacts in informal religious groups, purposes. Moderate groups oppose from some informal religious venues violent methods and seek to distance as well as via the internet and social themselves from radical elements in networks. These propaganda activities their midst. were aimed at the radicalisation and Bosnia and Herzegovina asserts that recruitment of new members for up to December 2017 approximately terrorist organisations. Increasingly Western Balkan 300 persons had travelled from the women are being approached, as well country to Iraq and Syria. As per 31 as members of the Roma population. countries December 2017 an estimated 107 were Spouses of radical Islamists are found still in Syria, of whom 61 men and to be very active in recruiting other 46 women. It is believed that by that None of the Western Balkan countries women. date 41 FTFs had returned to Bosnia have reported acts of jihadist terrorism However, in 2017 there was a and Herzegovina and that 71 FTFs having taken place in their territories significant decline in activities aimed had lost their lives. In 2017 only one in 2017. Kosovo34 reported a decline at recruiting persons for terrorist (failed) attempt has been recorded of in jihadist propaganda activities and organisations in Iraq and Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 9, Issue 5 | May 2017
    Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses www.rsis.edu.sg ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 9, Issue 5 | May 2017 A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH The Islamic State’s Northward Expansion in the Philippines Rohan Gunaratna The Revival of Al Qaeda’s Affiliate in Southeast Asia: the Jemaah Islamiyah Bilveer Singh IS Footprint in Pakistan: Nature of Presence, Method of Recruitment, and Future Outlook Farhan Zahid Islamic State’s Financing: Sources, Methods and Utilisation Patrick Blannin The Islamic State in India: Exploring its Footprints Mohammed Sinan Siyech Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 Building a Global Network for Security Editorial Note The Islamic State (IS) terrorist group that (AQ) return to the top of the jihadi pyramid and emerged victorious in Iraq in 2014 has lost its merger between the two old jihadi allies. Iraqi eminence. Presently, it is on the defensive, Vice President Ayad Allawi recently stated that struggling to retain its strongholds in Iraq and ‘discussions and dialogue’ have been taking Syria. This contrasts with the situation in 2014 place between Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi’s when the group was on the rise. It was representatives and AQ chief Ayman Al expanding territorially, producing shockingly Zawahiri. Any rapprochement between the two brutal videos with cinematic flare, and rivals is likely to further complicate the jihadi proclaiming its revival of the so-called landscape in Iraq, Syria and beyond. ‘caliphate’ and implementation of Sharia to beguile local and foreign Muslims and fellow Against this backdrop, the latest issue of CTTA jihadists.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction September 2018 Contents
    POMEPS STUDIES 30 The Politics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction September 2018 Contents Introduction . .. 3 Seeing Like a State-builder: Replication of Donor Reconstruction Dilemmas in Syria . 8 Frances Z. Brown, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & University of Oxford Reconstructing Authoritarianism: The Politics and Political Economy of Postconflict Reconstruction in Syria . 14 Steven Heydemann, Smith College & The Brookings Institution Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL . 22 Jacqueline Parry, Institute for Regional and International Studies, American University of Iraqi Sulaimani Physical and Societal (Re)construction in Nineveh post Islamic State . 28 Dylan O’Driscoll, Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI), University of Manchester Postwar Reconciliation and Fragile Peace in Algeria . 34 Caroline Abadeer, Minerva/Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace Yuree Noh, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Harvard University’s Middle East Initiative, Belfer Center Algeria’s Peace Process: Spoilers, Failures and Successes . 38 Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, Resident Scholar, Carnegie Middle East Center Lebanon and the fog of reconstruction . 44 Deen Sharp, Earth and Environment Sciences, City University of New York Libya’s Policing Sector: The Dilemmas of Hybridity and Security Pluralism . 51 Frederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Marshalling Order in Yemen: How Reconstruction Will Make or Break the Post-War Order . 56 Peter Salisbury, Chatham House Thinking about Legality:
    [Show full text]
  • Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and Maoist Insurgency in Nepal
    SPATIAL-HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates ____________________________________ Paper prepared for the UNU/WIDER Project Conference on Spatial Inequality in Asia United Nations University Centre, Tokyo, 28-29 March 2003 1 SPATIAL-HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL S. Mansoob Murshed* Institute of Social studies (ISS) PO Box 29776 2502 LT The Hague Netherlands [email protected] & Scott Gates Michigan State University and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) [email protected] ABSTRACT The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is one of the highest intensity internal conflicts in the world at present. Investigation into the causes of the conflict would suggest that grievance rather than greed is the main motivating force. The concept of horizontal or inter-group inequality is highly relevant in explaining the Nepalese civil war. This has both an ethnic and caste dimension. Additionally, there is also a spatial aspect to the conflict, which is most intense in the mid and far western regions of Nepal, which are economically the most disadvantaged in terms of human development indicators and asset (land) holdings. This conclusion is based upon district wide data on human development indicators for the year 1996, which is the date when the armed Maoist insurgency, or people’s war commenced, as well as data on landlessness and conflict intensity. Using the intensity of conflict (measured by a count of the number of deaths) as the dependent variable and HDI indicators and landlessness as explanatory variables, we find with Poisson regression analysis that the intensity of conflict across the districts of Nepal is most significantly explained by the degree of inequalities.
    [Show full text]
  • Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts Working Towards More Effective Resolution of National and Sub-National Resource Disputes Contents
    Research Paper Oli Brown and Michael Keating Energy, Environment and Resources | June 2015 Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts Working Towards More Effective Resolution of National and Sub-National Resource Disputes Contents Summary 2 Introduction 4 Understanding Resource Disputes 7 Addressing Resource Disputes 18 Conclusions 26 Acronyms and Abbreviations 30 About the Authors 31 Acknowledgments 32 1 | Chatham House Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts: Working Towards More Effective Resolution of National and Sub-National Resource Disputes Summary Disputes over natural resources – such as land, fresh water, minerals or fishing rights – are ubiquitous. When resolved peacefully, as is most often the case, such disagreements are an essential part of progress and development. However, resource disputes can also trigger violence and destruction, particularly in states with weak governance, high levels of corruption, and existing ethnic and political divisions. Bitter disagreements over the distribution of Iraq’s oil wealth among Sunni, Shia and Kurdish regions, for example, have contributed to the fragmentation of that country. In the Darfur region of Sudan, disputes between pastoralist herders and farmers over livestock migration routes and watering holes have become a violent flashpoint for wider cultural, ethnic and religious differences. Population growth, urbanization, rising consumption, climate change, environmental degradation, and new technologies for the extraction and processing of resources are changing the patterns of resource supply and demand. This has profound implications for the political economy of resource use – both globally and locally. By the middle of this century, for example, it is predicted that the world’s population will have exceeded 9 billion, global energy use will have doubled, and global water demand will have increased by 55 per cent over 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • PERSONS • of the YEAR • Muslimthe 500 the WORLD’S 500 MOST INFLUENTIAL MUSLIMS • 2018 •
    PERSONS • OF THE YEAR • MuslimThe 500 THE WORLD’S 500 MOST INFLUENTIAL MUSLIMS • 2018 • MuslimThe 500 THE WORLD’S 500 MOST INFLUENTIAL MUSLIMS • 2018 • C The Muslim 500: 2018 Chief Editor: Prof S Abdallah Schleifer The World’s 500 Most Influential Muslims, 2018 Deputy Chief Editor: Ms Farah El-Sharif ISBN: 978-9957-635-14-5 Contributing Editor: Dr Tarek Elgawhary Editor-at-Large: Mr Aftab Ahmed Jordan National Library Deposit No: 2017/10/5597 Editorial Board: Dr Minwer Al-Meheid, Mr Moustafa Elqabbany, and Ms Zeinab Asfour © 2017 The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre 20 Sa’ed Bino Road, Dabuq Researchers: Lamya Al-Khraisha, Moustafa Elqabbany, PO BOX 950361 Zeinab Asfour, and M AbdulJaleal Nasreddin Amman 11195, JORDAN http://www.rissc.jo Consultant: Simon Hart All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced Typeset by: M AbdulJaleal Nasreddin or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or me- chanic, including photocopying or recording or by any in- formation storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Views expressed in The Muslim 500 do not necessarily re- flect those of RISSC or its advisory board. Set in Garamond Premiere Pro Printed in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Calligraphy used throughout the book provided courtesy of www.FreeIslamicCalligraphy.com Title page Bismilla by Mothana Al-Obaydi • Contents • page 1 Introduction 5 Persons of the Year—2018 7 Influence and The Muslim 500 9 The House of Islam 21 The Top 50 89 Honourable Mentions 97 The 450 Lists 99 Scholarly
    [Show full text]
  • ISIS Khorasan: Presence, Affiliations and Regional Alliances with Russia
    WALIA journal 35(1): 70-76, 2019 Available online at www.Waliaj.com ISSN 1026-3861 © 2019 WALIA ISIS Khorasan: Presence, affiliations and regional alliances with Russia Muhammad Amin *, Muhammad Asif University of Balochistan, Quetta, Pakistan Abstract: The eco-political instability of the Middle East gave birth to ISIS. It made the Middle Eastern region destabilized. ISIS has a large number of fighters from other regions of the world. Some of them belong to Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asia. The growth and revenue of ISIS influenced the Taliban and Al-Qaeda splinters to announce an affiliation with ISIS. It announced ISIS Wilayat Khorasan with the help of these splinters. The affiliates of ISIS Khorasan are attacking and killing many people of Pakistan and Afghanistan are being attacked by ISIS Khorasan. It also wants to spread its growth and launch attacks in other countries of this region. Russia, China and Pakistan want to form an alliance against ISIS. Therefore, they are organizing regular meetings on the issue. The entry of ISIS Khorasan in the region demands from the regional countries a comprehensive strategy to counter ISIS Khorasan. The analytical method has been used for this study and most of the data have been taken from secondary sources. It is argued that the threat of ISIS Khorasan is compelling the regional powers to have an alliance with Russia against ISIS. Key words: Region; Affiliates; Wilayat Khorasan; Alliance; Attack 1. Introduction 2. Islamic state of Iraq and Syria *Asia is the home of 106 billion Muslims which Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded a militant group covers, 62% of the world population.
    [Show full text]
  • The Downfall of Daesh in the Middle East and Implications for Global Security
    K. IQBAL DOI: 10.14267cojourn.2017v2n2a7 COJOURN 2:2-3 (2017) The downfall of Daesh in the Middle East and implications for global security Khuram Iqbal1 Abstract Territorial losses of Daesh, or the Islamic State (IS), in Iraq and Syria have led many to conjure the demise of the global terrorist organization. Conditions on ground, however, are ripe for the recuperation of the organization. The presence of extra-regional players, the widening Shia-Sunni divide, the failure of Iraqi and Syrian governments to stabilize the conflict-hit regions and a timely decision by Daesh to activate its sleeper cells in different parts of Europe, Asia and Africa could very much benefit the organization in recovering from battlefield losses or heralding the fourth wave of global jihad. This, then, could further augment the global implications of the rise of IS, including revival of Cold War era “proxy-ism”, refugee crises leading to fissures among the community of European nations, the intensification of the sectarian conflict in the Muslim world and “lone wolf” terrorism in the West. The paper seeks to map the possibility of Daesh’s recuperation in light of the “terrorist lifecycle” and how this would impact the global peace in general, and in South Asia in particular. Key Words: ISIS, terrorist lifecycle, hard Counter-Terrorism, South Asia Introduction Violent extremism remains more pervasive in the societies possessing pre-conditions such as relative deprivation, socio-economic grievances, bad governance and pro- violence doctrinal infrastructure. High-profile terrorist attacks and states’ disproportionate reactions only serve as catalysts transforming reluctant supporters into active combatants.
    [Show full text]