Notes Introduction 1 . It must be noted that even if Sufism does indeed offer a positive mes- sage, this does not mean that non-Sufi Muslims, within this dichotomous framework, do not also offer similar positive messages. 2. We must also keep in mind that it is not merely current regimes that can practice illiberal democracy but also Islamist governments, which may be doing so for power, or based on their specific stance of how Islam should be implemented in society (Hamid, 2014: 25–26). 3 . L o i m e i e r ( 2 0 0 7 : 6 2 ) . 4 . Often, even cases that looked to be solely political actually had specific economic interests underlying the motivation. For example, Loimeier (2007) argues that in the cases of Sufi sheikhs such as Ahmad Khalifa Niass (b. 1946), along with Sidi Lamine Niass (b. 1951), both first seemed to speak out against colonialism. However, their actions have now “be[en] interpreted as particularly clever strategies of negotiating privileged posi- tions and access to scarce resources in a nationwide competition for state recognition as islamologues fonctionnaries ” (Loimeier, 2007: 66–67). 5 . There have been occasions on which the system was challenged, but this often occurred when goods or promises were not granted. For example, Loimeier (2007: 63) explains that the times when the relationship seemed to be questioned were times when the state was having economic issues and often could not provide the benefits people expected. When this happened, Murid Sufi leaders at times did speak out against the state’s authority (64). 6 . But as we shall see later, despite these actions, the government’s lack of human rights, as well as the extensive social services provided by the Islamists continue to make them a popular alternative to the state. 1 What Is Sufism? History, Characteristics, Patronage, and Politics 1 . We start to see a more systematized Sufism around the 1000s, particularly with the development of tariqas and khanaqah or zawiya (Ernst, 1992), 186 ● Notes although we find a range of periods of Sufism, beginning in the 700s to the mid-900s with the rise of “individual mysticism” (Malik, 2006: 4). During this initial time, “Sufism was characterized by few rules and regu- lations for the mystic and his followers” (Malik, 2006: 4), and only later did beliefs begin to become more “standardized” (Malik, 2006: 6). 2 . But while such proclaimed events often furthered the support for an indi- vidual to be seen as a saint, it has not always been a criterion that miracles are absolutely needed (even though they have often been expected) (Ernst, 1997). Historically, some have been critical of the notion of miracles. For example, Robert Rozehnal (1997) explains that “In Fawa’ id al-Fu’ad , Shaykh Nizam ad-Din Awliya’ cautions against any public display of con- trol over the forces of nature. In his view, miracles are merely a distrac- tion on the spiritual path: ‘God Almighty has commanded His Saints to conceal their miracles ( karamat), just as He has commanded His prophets to demonstrate theirs ( mu’ jizat ). Since anyone who performs a miracle is disobeying God, what sort of work is this? There are one hundred states on the spiritual path. The seventeenth stage provides divine inspiration to perform miraculous acts. Now, if the traveler stops at this stage, how will he reach the other eighty-three?’ Others such as Zauqi Shah see such actions ‘as child’s play’” (in Rozehnal, 1997: 55). 3 . Along with the role of miracles often came the notion of “witnessing” the miracle (Ernst, 1997: 69–71). 4 . A host of such examples of such power is covered in John Renard’s (2008) book The Friends of God: Islamic Images of Piety, Commitment and Servanthood . 5 . We shall observe in later chapters examples of leaders wanting to associ- ate themselves with Sufi tombs. Part of this strategy is to seem tied to the religious leaders, often with the objective of increasing their credibility as a religious and political authority figure. 6 . Thus, the Sufi shakyh ’s power extends well beyond his life, for many see their power as continuing well after their passing or “wedding” (union with God). Furthermore, in some cases, not only are the tombs of the shaykhs thus given an important status for individuals who may travel to these sites to make supplication and ask for intercession but the bodies themselves of the shaykh are also important. Scott Kugle (2007) explains that some have believed “[t]he saint’s body acts as a mirror for the religious virtues around which society can adhere and upon which political leaders can establish their authority” (78). For a detailed discussion on the body with regard to saints in Sufism , see Scott Kugle (2007). 7 . Leonardo Villalon (1994) provides a detailed discussion on the political and religious role of Sufi celebrations in Senegal as it pertains to the Sufi marabouts , the government, as well as citizens. These rituals are helpful to individuals who take part in them. They also help the marabouts to influence society. This discussion is useful in better understanding the Notes ● 187 different benefits of religious ceremonies to the various actors in a number of these cases that I shall discuss. 8 . Some have argued that, similar to the notion of Sufis often refraining from political action, Sufi groups in the United States similarly focus more on spiritual issues. However, we do find that Sufi political organizations in the West (such as the Islamic Supreme Council of America) are involved in politics (Nimer, 2002: 170). A number of Sufi leaders in the West have taken active roles in public writing (such as opinion pieces for newspa- pers), particularly after the September 11, 2011 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon buildings, in order to explain their position “against tendencies that are usually both anti-West and anti-Sufi” (35). 9 . For such a work, see Paul Heck’s (2007a) edited collection entitled Sufism and Politics: The Power of Spirituality . 1 0 . C a r l E r n s t ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 5 ) . 11 . Muhammad Ali made numerous attempts to distance himself and Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, trying to establish Egypt as an independent state out- side of the control and influence of the Empire (Cleveland & Bunton, 2008). 12 . When one examines the history of the Sudan and the discrepancies in resources, it becomes clear that the two civil conflicts between Northern and Southern Sudan, as well as the rebellion in Darfur was partly due to frustra- tion at the lack resources available to these regions compared to that of leaders and citizens in Khartoum (Collins, 2008; Miller, 2007). 13 . The two were said to have parted ways due to a disagreement, of which the origin is debated, but which may have been over issues of influence, as well as a quarrel over different interpretations of Islamic law, which led Muhammad Sharif to expel Muhammad Ahmad from the order (Holt, 1958: 38–40). 2 Algeria: Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Sufism, and Authoritarianism 1 . Boubekeur (2008) explains that two separate Salafi Islamist positions developed. In one group, the attention was on addressing an increased role of Islam in society, all the while not focusing their attentions on politics. The other group was more open to the political process, with the ultimate objective being a political Islamist state (4–5). 2 . The Family Code was a recurring issue in Algerian politics. In 1990, when many human rights activists attempted to protest the law in hopes of its repeal, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) continued to advocate for the Family Code, all the while framing the issue as one of “pro-French” sup- porters (for those who wanted to rid of the law) (Evans & Phillips, 2007). 3 . The FIS was not the only Islamist party to receive recognition. In fact, Chadli also recognized the Nadha Party, as well as the Hamas party, argu- ably as a “divide-and-rule tactic” (Evans & Phillips, 2007: 147). 188 ● Notes 4 . Martin Evans and John Phillips (2007) argue that a number of individ- uals were prepared for violence, having gone to the mountainous areas. However, they were not going to take violent action in case this might hurt the FIS’s ability to succeed in the upcoming elections (167). 5 . Amel Boubekeur (2008) explains that “[v]arious amnesty policies were implemented to put an end to the violence of the GIA and to pardon those who were responsible for crimes (both jihadists and security forces). These policies ranged from the first rahma (forgiveness) law in 1995, which was announced by President Liamine Zeroual after his election, to the Civil Concord Law in 1999 . ” (7). 6 . The notion that all Sufis worship through music or dance is itself problem- atic and inaccurate. Some Salafis have taken issue with the overall practice of dancing and/or music in combination with religious worship. 7 . The debate regarding the application of the term “fundamentalism” to the context of Islam has been problematic, and debated by a range of thinkers. For a discussion and critique of the term, see Khaled El Fadl’s work The Great Theft (2007). 8 . It is also worth noting that his wife was a member of a Sufi zaouia (Werenfels, 2011: 2). 9 . James McDougall (2007) argues that while citizens knew Sufism was not outside of the politics of the state, there was a comfort in Sufism as opposed to the positions of extremism, and it could be useful in things such as mov- ing forward from the civil conflict in Algeria.