Internal Control Codes of Conduct Within Insurgent Armed Groups

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Internal Control Codes of Conduct Within Insurgent Armed Groups 31 Internal Control Codes of Conduct within Insurgent Armed Groups By Olivier Bangerter An Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey Copyright Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2012 First published in November 2012 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permit- ted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Copy-edited by Tania Inowlocki Proofread by Donald Strachan Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Richard Jones ([email protected]), Exile: Design & Editorial Services Printed by coprint in Geneva ISBN 978-2-9700816-8-5 ISSN 1661-4445 ii Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 31 Bangerter Internal Control iii The Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and current contributions from the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Survey is grateful for past support received from the Governments of France, New Zealand, and Spain. The Survey also wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance it has received over the years from different United Nations agencies, programmes, and institutes. The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are: to be the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence; to serve as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activ- ists; to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non- governmental) on small arms; to support efforts to address the effects of small arms proliferation and misuse; and to act as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practices. The Survey also sponsors field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminol- ogy, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non- governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland p +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e [email protected] w www.smallarmssurvey.org ii Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 31 Bangerter Internal Control iii Contents List of boxes and tables ............................................................................................................................................. viii List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................................... ix About the author ............................................................................................................................................................................. xi Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................................... xii Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 I. Measures to define and control behaviour ....................................................................... 4 Political documents 4 Public statements 4 Manifestos and decrees 6 Agreements 7 Internal regulations 9 Codes of conduct 10 Oaths 16 Standing orders and standing operating procedures 17 Operation orders 19 Military manuals 21 Internal organization documents 23 Penal or disciplinary codes 25 Measures linked to respect for rules 27 Practical measures 28 Indirect measures 32 iv Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 31 Bangerter Internal Control v II. Codes of conduct: defied or respected? ............................................................................ 36 Defying the code: the RUF in Sierra Leone 38 Respecting the code: the PLA in Nepal 43 What makes a code of conduct effective? 51 III. Codes of conduct and weapons ...................................................................................................... 59 Implicit mention of weapons 59 Explicit mention of weapons 60 Measures regarding weapons 61 Weapons transfers to armed groups 65 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 66 Annexes .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 70 I. The ‘Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention’ family 70 I.1. Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army/People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China, 1947 70 I.2. Conseil National de Libération (CNL), Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1963 71 I.3. New People’s Army (NPA), Philippines, 1969 71 I.4. Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone, no date 73 II. Codes dating from 1945 to 1989 74 II.1. Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), Algeria, 1956 74 II.2. Irish Republican Army (IRA), Northern Ireland, 1956 74 II.3. Viet Cong, Vietnam, no date 75 II.4. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Peru, possibly 1981 75 II.5. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Peru, possibly 1982 76 II.6. National Resistance Army (NRA), Uganda, 1982 76 II.7. Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN), El Savador, 1985 79 II.8. Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), Uganda, 1987 81 iv Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 31 Bangerter Internal Control v III. Codes dating from 1990 to 2011 83 III.1. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Colombia, 1995 83 III.2. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Colombia, 1996 85 III.3. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Colombia, possibly 1998 85 III.4. Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), Sudan, 2003 88 III.5. Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), Mexico, 2003 90 III.6. Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda, 2005 91 III.7. United Jihad Council (UJC), Pakistan–India (Kashmir), 2005 92 III.8. Taliban, Afghanistan, 2009 94 III.9. Taliban, Afghanistan, 2010 94 III.10. Libyan National Liberation Army, Libya, 2011 95 IV. Oaths 98 IV.1. Haganah, Israel, 1920 98 IV.2. Viet Cong, Vietnam, no date 98 IV.3. Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), Guatemala, possibly 1983 99 IV.4. Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), Guatemala, possibly 1983 100 IV.5. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Kosovo, 1998 100 IV.6. Mouvement des Nigériens pour la justice (MNJ), Niger, possibly 2006 101 IV.7. Local Coordination Committees, Syria, 2012 101 V. Standing orders 104 V.1. People’s Liberation Army, China, 1928 104 V.2. African National Congress (ANC), South Africa, 1985 104 V.3. New People’s Army (NPA), Philippines, 1988 106 V.4. Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone, no date 107 V.5. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Kosovo, 1998 108 V.6. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Philippines, 2000 109 V.7. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Philippines, 2006 110 V.8. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Philippines, 2010 112 vi Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 31 Bangerter Internal Control vii V.9. Naxalites, Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), India, no date 116 V.10. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Colombia, 2009 116 V.11. National Transitional Council (NTC), Libya, 2011 118 Endnotes ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 122 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 130 vi Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 31 Bangerter Internal Control vii List of boxes and tables Boxes 1. Standing orders: Roger’s Rangers Tables 1. Armed groups that use or used codes of conduct, per continent 2. Number of rules in codes of conduct, by selected armed forces, armed groups, and gangs and mafias viii Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 31 Bangerter Internal Control ix List of abbreviations AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ALN Armée de Libération Nationale ANC African National Congress CARHRIHL Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines CDF Civil Defence Forces CNDP Congrès National
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