Special Report

rs e tt Ma b re h g a M e h t y h

W e v tii c e ff a E c r i o fr f s A n o th tii r p o O N & ,, s in iie t iit n u en rt m o e CM p p g O a ,, g ts n a E re S h T U

March 2009 POTOMAC INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES

AND

THE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (SAIS)

WHY THE MAGHREB MATTERS: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND OPTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN NORTH AFRICA

CM

31 MARCH 2009

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THE POTOMAC INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES 901 N. STUART STREET, SUITE 200 ARLINGTON, VA 22203 TEL 703.525.0770, FAX 703.525.0299

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THE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (SAIS) THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 1619 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 TEL 202.663.5745, FAX 202.663.5619 CM

North Africa Policy Paper Project

Co‐Sponsors Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (Professor Yonah Alexander) The Conflict Management Program, SAIS (Professor I William Zartman)

Honorary Chair General (Ret.) Wesley Clark

Co‐Chairs Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat Professor I William Zartman

Panel Members Secretary Madeleine Albright Former US Secretary of State, 1997‐2001; Principal of The Albright Group LLC Professor Yonah Alexander Senior Fellow, Director, International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies General Wesley Clark (Ret.) US Army four‐star general, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe President Lorne Craner President of the International Republican Institute Professor Chester Crocker James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat Partner, Covington & Burling and former chief White House domestic policy adviser to President Jimmy Carter (1977‐1981) Professor John Entelis Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle East Studies Program at Fordham University Ambassador Lucio Guerrato Former Ambassador of the European Union Ambassador Robert Pelletreau Former Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Ambassador Robin Raphel Former US Ambassador to Tunisia Ambassador Edward Walker Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; Former US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates Ambassador David Welch Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs ; former Ambassador to Egypt Professor I William Zartman Jacob Blaustein Professor Emeritus, The Johns Hopkins University

Staff Marney Cheek (Covington & Burling) Fariba Yassaee (The Albright Group) Michelle Zewin (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies) Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa

Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective American Engagement in North Africa

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Maghreb matters to the United States for Stronger policies for trade and investment inter‐ reasons ranging from its strategic geographic posi‐ nally and externally, more effective cooperation in tion on the Mediterranean and at the western end of counterterrorism efforts, stronger links between the the Arab‐Muslim world, to the threats posed by the public sector and civil society, and resolute mecha‐ increase in terrorism in the region, to the economic nisms to resolve differences would benefit the coun‐ opportunities and resources it offers the US. The US tries themselves as well as the US. A thorough study needs a policy to promote American interests in the in 2008 by the Peterson Institute for International area by treating the five North African states as a Economics outlined the benefits that would result region and working to strengthen the economic and from greater regional economic integration and At‐ security ties among them – and with the US and lantic cooperation. The single greatest obstacle to Europe – and by taking the lead in promoting a reso‐ this integration is the Western Sahara conflict. Ongo‐ lution to the Western Sahara conflict based on ing negotiations at the UN have brought no dis‐ the proposal of autonomy within Moroccan cernable progress. This stalemate must be sovereignty now on the table at the brought to an end if the larger issues of United Nations (UN) and supported by integration are to be addressed. a bipartisan consensus in the US Six premises for US foreign Congress. policy in North Africa are pro‐ Hitherto, the Maghreb – posed. First, the Maghreb composed of Algeria, Libya, matters to the US, for secu‐ Mauritania, Morocco, and Tuni‐ rity, geopolitical, historical, and sia, members of the Arab Maghreb economic reasons. Second, it is Union (UMA in its local acronym) – has important to treat the Maghreb as a been relegated to a marginal status in for‐ region, deserving focused attention eign policy as the neglected area between the within the broader Middle East and North Middle East and Africa. Despite its historic rela‐ Africa. Third, the US should clearly define its tions with the US and its importance in terms of en‐ goals for promoting security and stability in the re‐ ergy, security, stability, trade, development, and gion, within the Obama administration’s global mis‐ other issues of concern, it has often been viewed by sion. Fourth, the US should work more effectively the US as a European responsibility. with the EU to build strong incentives to promote The US has significant interests in the region that greater economic integration. Fifth, the US should should be focused on promoting stability and secu‐ devise broader and more effective programs to pro‐ rity of the individual countries to enable them to mote security and to combat terrorism in the region. move toward greater regional economic and policy Finally, the US must work diligently with its friends to integration, and cooperation with the US and the resolve the stalemate over the Western Sahara. The European Union (EU) to enhance prospects for formula of autonomy/sovereignty now before the greater political freedoms and broader economic UN is the basis for a viable solution that has been growth.

The Potomac Institute The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) 1 Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa

endorsed by previous US administrations and other countries. US interests are not served by postponing mean‐ ingful engagement in the region. Without a compre‐ hensive and systematic approach to promoting inte‐

gration in the Maghreb, threats to the security and

stability of the UMA will grow. Greater economic and political integration will enhance the prospects and opportunities for the people of the Maghreb; in its absence, there will be more instability. The US should overcome past neglect and take the lead in promot‐ ing the future of the Maghreb.

[The document is the result of an independent task force on an issue of critical importance to US foreign policy, where

it seems that a group diverse in backgrounds and perspec‐ tives may nonetheless be able to reach a meaningful consen‐ sus on policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Task force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general policy thrust and judgments

reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.]

2 The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) The Potomac Institute Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa

Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, table conflicts of the Middle East, however, the chal‐ Opportunities, and Options for Effective lenges in the Maghreb can be addressed best through a coordinated, communicated, comprehen‐ American Engagement in North Africa sive political, economic and social strategy led by

Washington working in partnership with regimes in THE CONCERN the region and in Europe. North Africa (the Maghreb) is a strategically im‐ portant region for the United States. Its location at THE INTERESTS the mouth of the Mediterranean, on the southern The Maghreb is the guardian of the Mediterra‐ shore of Europe’s “Rio Grande,” and at the western nean. Maintaining friendly relations with nations of end of the Arab world, and its prominence as an area the southern shore, just across the straits from NATO of US interests in security, democratization, stability, Spain and Gibraltar and from Italy and Malta, is nec‐ development, and cooperation, make the Maghreb a essary for the US Sixth Fleet’s access the Mediterra‐ region worthy of serious attention by the Obama nean. Morocco’s newly modernized and expanded administration. Unfortunately, North Africa has of‐ Tanger‐Med entrepôt port, like its sister at Algeciras, ten fallen through the cracks of US Middle East, Afri‐ provides immediate transshipment for all commer‐ can, and European policies. Domestic constituencies cial traffic to and from the Mediterranean Sea to the concerned with the Middle East tend to focus on oil, east. Wartime has underscored the importance of the Middle East peace process, and Iran. Those con‐ that strategic location, from Moroccan cooperation cerned with African policy tend to concentrate on in efforts to combat the Barbary pirates to the Allied conflict issues affecting sub‐Saharan Africa only. landings in Morocco and Algeria in 1942 that pro‐ Those concerned with the Mediterranean tend to vided the base for the liberation of Italy and then look to the northern shore and are content to leave southern France in 1944. At a time when the Russian the south to the European Union (EU). The absence navy is wandering into and out of the Mediterranean of vocal domestic constituencies on Maghrebi issues and China is assiduously building ties in the region, has contributed to the lack of a clear US policy focus. secure access to and cooperation with the Maghreb Yet the US government should have a profound in‐ is vital to US interests. terest in North Africa because developments in the Today, the most immediate security issue con‐ region impact significantly on our national interests. cerns the land rather than the sea, as al‐Qaeda in the As the new administration prepares its portfolio Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other salafist/jihadist of foreign policy priorities, immediate attention groups spread subversive terrorism along the shores should be given to a review of US interests and op‐ (Sahel in Arabic) of the Sahara and then north into portunities in North Africa. The countries of the Europe. Loose‐knit groups of terrorists from the Sa‐ Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and hel and the Maghreb itself bring stabs of insecurity Tunisia—face problems and provide opportunities into the major cities of the region and into European that have immediate regional and global implica‐ capitals such as Madrid, carried by the pressures of tions. The head of the UN Counter‐Terrorism Com‐ illegal trade and immigration. A review of interna‐ mittee (CTC) Executive Directorate recently called tional databases including the National Counterter‐ North Africa the most worrisome area of the world in rorism Center and Lawson Terrorism Information regard to terrorism because of its slow economic Center reveals a startling spike in terrorist attacks development and unemployed youth. Unlike intrac‐ since 2001 in the Maghreb nations—up by 400 per‐

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cent from only 21 incidents in 2001 to 104 in 2007. to undercut the recruiting capabilities of the terror‐ The leading countries of the Maghreb—Algeria, Mo‐ ists. rocco, and Tunisia—actively cooperate with the US The Maghreb is the western extension of the in military and intelligence matters to combat terror‐ Arab world, a region where a number of countries ism bilaterally and through the US‐led Trans‐Sahel take seriously their Western as well as Arab orienta‐ Initiative for regional security, working to check the tion. Countries like Morocco and Tunisia share con‐ western extension of al‐Qaeda and related activities; cerns with the greater Atlantic community and pro‐ but they seldom cooperate directly with each other. vide cooperative access to the West in joint activities Rivalries, distrust, and mutual suspicions among the and interests. Tunisia continues to be a leading entre‐ states of the region continue to hinder cooperative preneurial center in the region through its private efforts to work collectively against the terrorist sector‐led economic growth. It cooperates with the threat, even when it is clear that the degree of cross‐ US in security programs, continues to upgrade its border activity is increasing and becoming more trade and investment regime with the US, and has deadly. The southern flank of the Maghreb is the the broadest penetration of European investment capstone to the programs of the new US Africa Com‐ relative to the size of its economy. Algeria enjoys a mand (AfriCom). Above all, security depends on position of leadership in the Arab world and is a ma‐ more than military and intelligence cooperation; it jor supplier of gas to US markets. It has survived a requires stable, developing societies and economies horrific civil war, has begun to welcome more foreign

Full year data not yet available

4 The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) The Potomac Institute Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa investment in key sectors, cooperates with the US in into a more cooperative set of security, political, and sharing security intelligence, and has moderated its commercial relations can be realized as Libya be‐ aggressive diplomatic behavior towards France and comes a more involved, responsible stakeholder in other members of the EU. Morocco has a free trade cooperation with the West. Prior to last year’s coup, agreement with the US and a unique Associate Mauritania had held a relatively open election, al‐ status with the EU, and enjoys a special relationship lowed for the growth of the private sector, and le‐ with Europe through several partnership programs. gally outlawed slavery while promoting women’s It also enjoys a special status as a Non‐NATO ally of rights. Since the uprising, the US and the African the United States. Morocco has been an invaluable Union (AU) have called for a restoration of the con‐ link in past rounds of the Middle East peace process stitutional order. and has contributed troops to peacekeeping forces In short, North Africa represents opportunities in the Balkans, Haiti, the Congo, and the Persian Gulf. and challenges that in large part will contribute to It has been an outspoken supporter of the West re‐ the diplomatic agenda for the new administration. As garding 9/11 and post‐9/11 solidarity. the northern shore of Africa, with a long historic con‐ Most notable in the past few years is the diplo‐ nection with West Africa across the Sahara, the matic and political rehabilitation of Libya: renouncing Maghreb represents a potentially important strategic its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, ally for US interests in sub‐Saharan Africa. North Af‐ paying off its obligations to the families of the vic‐ rica offers the US an opportunity to feature its rela‐ tims of international terrorism in which it was in‐ tions with a moderate accessible Muslim region, volved, and initially opening its economy to interna‐ where – in Algeria and Morocco – loyal Islamist par‐ tional investors. While these are all welcome devel‐ ties participate in electoral and parliamentary gov‐ opments, opportunities to further integrate Libya ernance and where the population roundly rejects

Following the terrorist attacks on the US of September 11, 2001, the incidence of terrorist attacks linked to al‐Qaeda and other militant extremists based in North Africa has jumped from 21 to 104 per year through 2007 – an increase of 400 percent. During this period, 500 terrorist bombings, murders, kidnappings, and ambushes – in and outside the region – took the lives of more than 1,000 people and victimized 4,000 in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and elsewhere.

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violent extremism. Enhanced cooperation can help the various nations of the region as they continue to shore up moderate regimes in the region, which sup‐ adapt to a globalizing economy and increasing de‐ port policies favoring an open, tolerant society and mands for broader political participation among their encouraging measures to protect women’s rights, populations. secular education, press freedom, and judicial inde‐ Much of the Maghreb touts the benefits of an pendence. Arguably, it constitutes the most open open economy of free enterprise, with some excep‐ region in the Muslim world, with longstanding ties tions. The challenge of modernization has been ac‐ with the US and political systems making the great‐ cepted by Morocco and Tunisia in their trade agree‐ est progress along the road of democratization. ments with the US and Europe. Countries of the re‐ Like other Arab (and African) countries, the coun‐ gion have moved from a centrally controlled econ‐ tries of the Maghreb struggle with the challenge of omy towards open markets, featuring competitive progressive political reform. To varying degrees, companies rather than family enterprises. The shift these countries are continually defining and redefin‐ has been neither easy nor perfect; the lures of Arab ing their commitments to more open and democratic socialism and highly protectionist internal markets governance, human rights, and rule of law. Yet as the are sometimes difficult to dispel. Opening local pro‐ coup in Mauritania, the erratic nature of the regime duction to foreign competition comes at a heavy cost in Libya, the intolerance of dissent and hankering for to traditional marginal producers and the workforce, lifelong presidencies in Tunisia and Algeria, and Mo‐ and must be accompanied by dynamic modernization rocco’s lukewarm embrace of press and political within the companies and measures to strengthen freedoms demonstrates, the momentum for trans‐ workers’ insurance and retooling by the government. parency and rule of law progresses according to dif‐ The US and the West have a strong interest in facili‐ ferent rhythms in each country. Under the stability tating this conversion, not just by opening markets provided by its historic monarchy, Morocco has to their products but by helping to build local indus‐ made more progress along the road toward democ‐ try and to modernize agriculture, and by providing racy than other Arab countries. Its multiparty system, aid for a smooth transition. Reversion to a protected moderate Islamic party, increasingly free and fair centralized economy or reduction to a commodity‐ elections, and growing attention to civil liberties and based, non‐value added market would not be in the the principles of rule of law are constrained within interest of local development, domestic Maghrebi socio‐cultural rules that emphasize stability and loy‐ stability, or the expansion of US markets. alty. Assessments of the other four countries point While Morocco and Tunisia have grown economi‐ to similar concerns with security, stability, and re‐ cally through offshore export production, Algeria gime maintenance that dilute or inhibit more pro‐ and Libya have become major sources of oil and gas, gressive political development. It is important to US which drive their budgets. Diversifying US energy interests to keep democratization moving forward, supplies is an important national interest, although civil rights protected, and the rule of law promoted – rentier economies that rely heavily on oil and gas and to help the countries guard against the instability income provide an erratic base for growth, stability, that the transition process often entails. Fostering and democratization. Economies heavily dependent better inter‐regional cooperation, contacts, and net‐ on oil and gas need to focus capital investment out‐ works, especially on issues of social development, side the hydrocarbon sector for the sake of longer‐ and establishing stronger ties to the region as a term employment, stability, and development. whole could prove significant in helping to stabilize

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THE NEEDS The loss is evident in more than economic terms. These many‐faceted interests come together in a Many inter‐regional activities pass through the US or number of important considerations. One is the Europe rather than through the North African coun‐ need for inter‐Maghrebi cooperation and unity. The tries. In security, the countries cooperate with the North African countries created a regional economic US on an individual basis, but do not demonstrate and security cooperation organization in 1989, the the same level of cooperation among themselves. Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), encouraged by a plan Instead of constituting a security community, where of the UN Economic Commission for Africa for re‐ war is not a policy option and military cooperation is gional groupings in the continent. The UMA has been pursued, the countries arm themselves against one “frozen” since 1994, largely because of political ten‐ another and discuss the dangers of attack. The US sions between Algeria and Morocco. It has not met military has been trying to encourage direct anti‐ at the decision‐making level for nearly two decades, terrorist cooperation among the states of the region and sectoral commissions on various aspects of co‐ for the last several years through training and direct operation have made little progress. operational cooperation, but little progress has been With the possibilities of gains through intra‐ made on a regional level because of mutual rivalries regional trade frozen as well, the countries and the and distrust. region have lost out as a result. Intra‐regional mer‐ Each country has opted to negotiate a separate chandise trade has languished at 1.3 percent of the agreement with the EU since gaining independence, region’s total trade, one of the lowest rates of any rather than collectively negotiating for better terms region in the world. The countries compete with – an option favored by the Europeans. This likewise each other in many products, and comparative ad‐ compares unfavorably to the experience of the coun‐ vantages, economies of scale, and region‐wide in‐ tries of Southeast Asia and Central America, which vestment possibilities are in near‐total neglect. An‐ have realized increased political bargaining power nual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) derived from regional integration. In transportation, growth from 1997‐2007 was only 4.4 percent, much it is still easier to fly through Paris than directly be‐ lower than the rate experienced by the countries of tween countries. Academics in the same field often ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations, have little contact with each other except through excluding Indonesia) and the countries of Central meetings in Europe or the eastern Mediterranean or America that are parties to the Central American Free those sponsored by foreign organizations. News Trade Agreement – Dominican Republic (CAFTA‐DR). coverage of other countries in the region is biased Unemployment is high, often above 20 percent, and, and wary. It is in the US interest to help overcome unless action is taken, promises to increase because such wasteful divisions and diversions from a com‐ of a burgeoning demographic bulge in the region. mon attention to common problems. Extremism threatens to further limit economic Another cluster of needs is for regional stability, growth and foreign investment in the region. Eco‐ growth, and popular participation. The three are nomic integration in the Maghreb can help address intertwined. Unless socio‐economic development is these challenges by capitalizing on economies of accelerated and jobs are produced in greater quan‐ scale, attracting increased investment, and turning tity, the other parts of the triangle are endangered. A the region into a more prosperous and stable eco‐ substantial increase in employment opportunities is nomic zone that provides an improved standard of necessary to keep youth off the road of alienation, living to its inhabitants. desperation, emigration, and al‐Qaeda terrorism.

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This is not just a domestic need for a few distant networks with its European allies necessary to weave countries; it is a vital American need to ensure stabil‐ a more coherent and coordinated multilateral ap‐ ity in a region where both terrorism and demo‐ proach to a region where serious mistakes in policy graphic pressures pose an increasingly direct threat or a continued unraveling of the status quo threaten to the interests of the United States and its European consequences as serious for America as for Europe. allies. If conditions in Morocco and Tunisia were to Security and economic issues are closely intertwined. reach the level of current insecurity in Algeria— AQIM has specifically, repeatedly and openly tar‐ where the UN headquarters in the middle of Algiers geted the regimes of the Maghreb with the explicit was blown up, the president nearly assassinated, and goal of creating as much instability in the region as travel to parts of the country no longer safe—a vi‐ possible in order to open prospects for its own bene‐ cious circle of government crackdowns and escalat‐ fit in its continuing campaign against the West. The ing terrorist attacks would be the likely result. very substantial increase in terrorist incidents in the The lack of regional stability and security is abet‐ region makes clear enough, in a post‐ 9/11 world, the ted by the governance issues in the Maghrebi coun‐ perils of a laissez‐faire attitude about such threats in tries. The governments are in various states of transi‐ North Africa. tion: going haltingly forward and slipping backwards; Economic model analysis suggests that a full‐ sometimes threatened by domestic apathy, alien‐ fledged free trade area among the Maghrebi coun‐ ation, and opposition; and stymied in the search for tries would yield a gain in total merchandise trade of an elusive regional consensus on common problem some $1 billion.1 Even this modest figure would al‐ solving. The gradual and uneven movement toward most double the extent of commercial relations greater political freedoms and respect for human within the region and might pave the way for a fu‐ rights; the erratic implementation of steps for eco‐ ture deepening of ties. FTAs between the EU or the nomic diversification, modernizing reform, and US and the major Maghrebi countries would gener‐ growth; and the absence of opportunities for per‐ ate even larger gains. Based on gravity model (GM) sonal development contribute to a growing uneasy calculations, total Maghrebi trade would expand by relationship between the region’s governments and $4 to $5 billion (3.0 to 4.5 percent) if the EU and the peoples. While a combination of repression and en‐ US separately establish FTAs with the UMA coun‐ ergy dollars have temporarily eased the pressure for tries, and by nearly $9 billion (nearly 8 percent) if reforms in Algeria and Libya, the basic fabric of gov‐ both establish regional FTAs with the UMA countries. ernance is eroding under domestic strains. Even In terms of a possible EU‐US‐Maghreb FTA, total where elections are free and fair, participation is Maghrebi inward foreign direct investment (FDI) alarmingly low and system constraints and popular stocks would increase by $5.8 billion (75 percent), alienation remain. and total Maghrebi outward FDI stocks would rise by A third cluster of needs is closer regional eco‐ $3.9 billion; both the US and European economies nomic integration with economic linkages to the US stand to benefit from enhanced integration with the and EU. It is unfortunate that concerns such as illegal Maghreb region as well. If the agreements depicted immigration, local unemployment, drug trafficking, in these scenarios are implemented, the trade and and smuggling are perceived as European issues, on 1 Developed in a study by the Peterson Institute of International which—up until now—the US has remained rela‐ Economics: Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Claire Brunel, eds., Maghreb tively aloof. As a consequence, the American foreign Regional and Global Integration, http://bookstore.petersoninstitute.org/book‐store/4266.html policy machinery has failed to develop the fabric of

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FDI impacts of Maghrebi economic integration can The current stalemate, which began in 1991 fol‐ be expected to materialize over horizons of 2 to 5 lowing a UN and AU‐negotiated cease fire, is enor‐ years. While these projections are theoretical, they mously costly to both sides and costly too to the pos‐ convey the promise in reducing trade and investment sibilities of inter‐regional cooperation. Yet, for each barriers for the Maghreb. These agreements should side, stalemate is preferable to the preferred solu‐ be designed to encourage regional cooperation, but tion of the other side. The compromise solution of the benefits for the region are so substantial that autonomy should solve this impasse, and the official they should be pursued and implemented even if US government policy is that autonomy presents the there is no material progress toward regional inte‐ only realistic option for the population of Western gration. Sahara, given the nature of the territory and its The fourth need, and key to the door of regional population. If it were to become fully independent, cooperation, is for a resolution of the Western Sa‐ it would have a population of only 200,000 to hara conflict. This is a running sore between Mo‐ 400,000 people, making it one of the smallest non‐ rocco and Algeria that prevents regional cooperation island states in the world. It would likewise be in all areas. For the Moroccans, this former Spanish among the poorest, since it has no arable land and colony, administered for over three decades as Mo‐ few natural resources (fish and phosphates, the price roccan territory, was returned to Morocco as a result of which has been low for a long time). of a 1975 decolonization agreement with Spain. The With substantial land area, a small population, issue is regarded as an existential matter by the Mo‐ and extremely limited resources, the Western Sahara roccan public and government. For Algeria, the terri‐ could fall prey to subversion and terrorist groups tory must achieve independence as the Sahrawi Arab now operating in the region. It likely would remain a Democratic Republic (SADR) through a confirmatory source of acrimony and tension between Morocco referendum organized by the UN. The only current and Algeria as well as the other bordering states of proposal for a compromise between these two posi‐ the Maghreb. It is in the interest of the US to see that tions – full integration into Morocco or complete this conflict does not continue, and to avoid an out‐ independence for SADR – has been that offered by come that produces another Somalia on the Atlantic Morocco in 2007, which proposed a special status of coast of North Africa. autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The Poli‐ The view that the current situation is manageable sario Front, the national liberation movement operat‐ and/or sustainable over the longer term is an illusion. ing out of Algeria, has thus far refused to accept The ease and ostensible seriousness of UN‐based autonomy and has failed to proffer an alternative attempts at moving a resolution of the conflict for‐ compromise solution. Morocco now governs the ward give a false impression of stability to the stale‐ majority of the disputed area as an integral part of its mate. Morocco and Algeria keep a watchful eye on territory with regular participation by the population their delicate relationship (“enemy brothers,” one in both local and national elections, but the Western commentator termed it) and they share an interest in Sahara is officially designated by the UN as a “non‐ not letting that relationship explode. But tensions self‐governing territory” pending final determination between neighbors have a habit of getting out of of its status. Some tens of thousands of Sahrawis hand on occasion, as Arab‐Israeli and Indian‐Pakistani also live under Algerian and Polisario authority in relations have demonstrated in recent years. In these refugee camps near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria. latter areas, it was often a third‐party rebellious movement—Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad in one case,

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and Lashkar‐e‐Taiba in the other—linked with inter‐ start “looking around the corners” to provide leader‐ nal factions on one side or the other that triggered ship in cooperation with our allies to head off prob‐ explosions and dragged the confronting states be‐ lems before they reach crisis stage. The Maghreb is yond their sober policies. Any worsening of bilateral certainly one of those regions where “looking Maghrebi relations would strain relations with around the corner” should persuade American poli‐ Europe, Russia, and America – and could lead to a cymakers that the time to act is now, before the re‐ crisis in relations at an inopportune moment. The gion becomes an even more serious problem for the Polisario Front has recently stepped up its threats to US and its European allies. In this approach of far‐ return to hostilities unless its preferred solution is sighted multilateral cooperation, the US can pursue enforced. While it may seem unlikely to some observ‐ three major policies that will stimulate cooperation ers that the Polisario would make good on these among the Maghrebi countries – a vision deferred threats without Algerian support, the dangers of the for half a century since the 1958 meeting of tail wagging the dog in these circumstances cannot Maghrebi leaders in Tangier. be ignored. It is in the interest of the US to help the First of all, the US should re‐launch an initiative parties to recognize that the current stalemate is that will reward a dynamic, functioning Arab mutually harmful and potentially could become even Maghreb Union with economic, commercial, and more so. technology partnerships that will encourage greater economic growth, political reform, and social devel‐ THE OPTIONS opment. The United States, working with the Euro‐ Policy analysts agree that the single most effec‐ pean Union, should work to draw the nations of the tive option in the Maghreb for improving stability region into closer networks of cooperation and to and security, promoting prosperity and opportuni‐ demonstrate to the leadership and populations of ties for economic and personal growth, ensuring the Maghreb that progress and stability in the region effective counterterrorism measures, and broaden‐ will come through cooperation rather than conflict. ing the capacity of the North African countries to The current economic downturn makes this action govern, to enhance the rule of law, and to overcome even more timely. The instruments exist or can be citizen apathy and alienation is the implementation created. The core element for success requires that of regional integration among the countries. the US and EU begin to deal with the region as a re‐ Greater integration in economic policies, commercial gion, complementing current bilateral relations with relations, engagement with global markets, and se‐ an overarching coordination. Within the US foreign curity and military programs will enable North Africa policy structures, the creation of a Deputy Assistant to chart a steady and pragmatic course and deal with Secretary of State for North Africa would facilitate the significant challenges to domestic security and that coordination and elevate the attention given to regional stability—goals of interest to the countries the region by the State Department. In the field, US involved, of course, but also of great importance to ambassadors to the Maghreb countries should hold the United States. regular meetings together to coordinate policy ac‐ The recent American presidential campaign tions and information exchange in the region. In im‐ brought out the need for a renewal of leadership plementing all aspects of this policy, it is important through multilateral diplomacy and closer coopera‐ to operate within the capabilities of each country in tion with America’s global and regional allies. Presi‐ the region, helping each to move toward a common dent Barack Obama has stated that America must goal but not in lockstep.

10 The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) The Potomac Institute Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa

Incentives need to be created through the re‐ sure that its policies are consistent with these ef‐ newal of the US‐North Africa Economic Partnership, forts. It can cooperate with ongoing EU initiatives first launched under Secretary of State Madeleine such as the Barcelona Process for Euro‐ Albright in 1998 and favorably received at the time by Mediterranean cooperation, the eastern Mediterra‐ Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. A focused policy to nean 5 [European]+5 [Maghrebi] efforts at handling encourage Maghreb economic integration will have common challenges, and the French‐sponsored Un‐ multiple components. As a means of promoting re‐ ion for the Mediterranean designed to promote ex‐ gional integration, the existing US‐Moroccan FTA changes between the north and south shores. Each calls for discussions to take place between the US of these initiatives can benefit from some external and Morocco on the extent to which materials that energizing. By emphasizing reform, the EU has done are products of countries in the region can be much to improve the business climate in Eastern counted for purposes of satisfying the FTA’s rules of Europe and can do the same for the Maghreb. One origin. The US should begin these talks with Mo‐ example would be US support for systems for inde‐ rocco, and explore creative ways to use the Moroc‐ pendent administrative and judicial review of cus‐ can FTA to promote regional integration, including toms determinations. The US and the EU should through regional cumulation or “economic integra‐ encourage harmonization of regulatory regimes tion zones,” which could be modeled on the success‐ throughout the region to the highest possible stan‐ ful Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Jordan and dards, as is being done for ASEAN in Southeast Asia Egypt that are tied to the US‐Israel FTA. The US can and the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in build upon its trade and investment framework the Pacific area. In the Maghreb, where both the US agreements (TIFAs) in the region (as with the Asian and European countries have common interests, the Pacific economic region) and bilateral investment two sides of the Atlantic can find a common cause treaties (BITs) with Tunisia and Morocco to promote for cooperation and overcome the temptation to see regional trade and investment liberalization. each other as competitors, played against each other Maghreb partners of the US and the EU should also by old habits. This requires focused dialogue, meas‐ be encouraged to eliminate their own tariffs and ures of collaboration, and attention to mutual bene‐ non‐tariff barriers on products imported from other fit, as we work to revive the spirit of trans‐Atlantic Maghreb countries and reduce barriers to intra‐ common interest. regional investment and trade in services. The US can The most dangerous future challenge to the re‐ refocus government action to create mandates for gion concerns its water supply. The Maghreb is now regional projects in North Africa for the Trade Devel‐ a water‐threatened area (WTA) where water is in opment Agency (TDA), Overseas Private Investment scarce supply, and will soon become a water‐ Corporation (OPIC), and the Ex‐Im Bank. The United deficient area (WDA) where water supplies are seri‐ States also can create regional, private sector initia‐ ously inadequate to human, agricultural, and indus‐ tives through instruments and programs such as the trial needs. A coordinated international effort to Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), support research, investment, and infrastructure and promote foreign direct investment that focuses development to meet the threat before it crunches on the region as a whole, instead of simply on a agriculture and urban life in the region is a critical country‐by‐country basis. confidence‐building measure. As in any area, collabo‐ The United States should embrace existing ef‐ rative research can have important spin‐off effects forts at North African economic integration and en‐ on the improvement of research and development

The Potomac Institute The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) 11 Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa

capacities in the Maghreb. Another major focus of tion, societal openness, rule of law, and public dia‐ this collaboration should be to bolster the capacity logue, as now offered through the National Endow‐ of the UMA through funding and technical assistance ment for Democracy (NED) network (International to promote Maghrebi economic integration. As a Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute) leading member of International Financial Institu‐ among others, are a necessary part of socio‐ tions (IFIs), the US can work to encourage and sup‐ economic cooperation and need expansion; progress port coordinated efforts to promote North African in one country can help pace and encourage pro‐ regional integration, including current efforts at high‐ gress in its neighbor. The US can also encourage and speed train and motorway construction and crisis support regional programs for trans‐Atlantic univer‐ stabilization in the region. Other sectors that may be sity cooperation and research conferences, such as ripe for greater regional cooperation include energy, the regional programs of grants and workshops of agribusiness, and banking. the Council of American Overseas Research Centers The United States should encourage Libya to take (CAORC). There is untapped space for trans‐Atlantic an active and responsible role in efforts at regional regional interfaith dialogues to further cross‐cultural economic cooperation, and should provide assis‐ understanding among the peoples of the Maghreb, tance and incentives as necessary. In addition to Europe, and the United States, developing and promoting regional integration, the US should take strengthening capacity for political and cultural plu‐ concrete steps to strengthen its own economic rela‐ ralism and modernization to encourage the timid tionship with Libya, including a formal TIFA or other efforts in this direction throughout the Arab‐Muslim measures that will help integrate Libya into the world. world economy. Because Libya has close ties with Second, the US can promote expansion of secu‐ Algeria, comprehensive engagement with Libya will rity cooperation among the countries of the be important to realize the promise of regional inte‐ Maghreb. Security rests above all on the improve‐ gration and to ease tensions between Algeria and ment of socio‐economic conditions and the develop‐ Morocco. Libya has expressed an interest in in‐ ment of a healthy society and economy, so that creased regional integration, and it would benefit youth are not drawn down into the pit of despair and from enhanced ties with its neighbors. In particular, rebellion. This is the demand side of insecurity, with strengthening economic ties with Libya is an achiev‐ the unemployed seeking outlets for their despair. able first step. At the same time, US policymakers Programs to bring insecurity under control also need should adopt a pragmatic approach, keeping in mind to deal with the supply side, the expansion of terror‐ that Libya is emerging from many years of political ism, jihadist groups, drug networks and smugglers. and economic isolation. Without greatly increased levels of cooperation and The United States also should launch a major coordination among the Maghrebi countries and complementary initiative to promote regional social with the US and the EU, the Sahel region will con‐ development, by creating an institutional framework tinue to be the Achilles heel of any efforts at regional for further democratization. This would include an security. The unregulated and ungoverned areas, extension and further development of regional bilat‐ including those populated by the Polisario refugee eral social development programs with the objective camps, are real threats to cooperation and stability in of creating regional cooperative networks for health, the region. Moroccan security services have been environment, education, women’s issues, and human more effective against jihadist groups since the and civil rights. Programs to foster political participa‐ deadly attacks on Casablanca in 2003 and Madrid in

12 The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) The Potomac Institute Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa

2004, and within the past year several major Moroc‐ resolving the Western Sahara conflict would allow can terrorist cells with roots and connections in Morocco and Algeria to turn coordinated attention Europe have been dismantled before they could to the security problem to their south, permit them carry out their attacks. Although security has im‐ to reduce their forces level and halt their arms race, proved in Algeria since the series of AQIM attacks in and free them to devote more of their budgets to 2007, the attacks continue and Algeria could benefit civilian needs. from increased regional cooperation. It would be far Finally, the US can help broker resolution of the more efficient in meeting these threats to comple‐ Western Sahara conflict, which is the major obstacle ment the “vertical” cooperation with the US with to regional integration and the central impediment “horizontal” cooperation between Maghrebi coun‐ to effective coordination of efforts to combat terror‐ tries. ism, illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, Cooperation requires sustained efforts. It can be and to promote economic cooperation and other promoted by the development of a regional counter‐ regional initiatives. If regional integration is the goal, terrorism clearinghouse center within the trans‐Sahel then a solution to the Western Sahara conflict will anti‐terrorism initiative and another clearinghouse remove the primary barrier to cooperation. For for information and coordination on measures those who feel that the Western Sahara conflict is against drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and traf‐ merely a symptom, not a cause, of ill relations, its ficking in persons. It requires regional training pro‐ removal can eliminate a specific instance and clear grams through existing multilateral programs (like the way for other measures of cooperation and NATO’s Med Initiative) or through bilateral efforts of CSBMs that can chip away at bad neighborly rela‐ both the United States and European allies. tions. It should also be obvious that the Saharan The US can help the countries adopt confidence‐ problem will not be “solved” in any absolute sense in and security‐building mechanisms (CSBMs) as a step the near future, but that a new compromise status, toward the development of a security community in as contained in the autonomy policy currently on the the region, defined as an area where war is no longer table at the UN, will put the region in a new institu‐ a conceivable arm of intra‐regional state policy. The tional framework where attention can be focused on most obvious measure to promote regional integra‐ specific components of the situation without remain‐ tion is to reopen road and rail services between Mo‐ ing stuck in the larger principled deadlock. rocco and Algeria (which would take only a few The Western Sahara conflict is not “low hanging weeks work) and extend them from Casablanca to fruit” waiting to be picked. Algeria continues to in‐ Cairo, and to increase direct flights between the sist that the Sahara issue will never be settled on Maghrebi capitals. The countries of North Africa face terms or a timetable other than one of Algeria’s no threats external to the region, and they know choosing. Russian support of Algeria in the Security that a war in the region would be costly and unpro‐ Council has made it difficult for Western allies to ductive. Security cooperation is a better option for bring greater pressure to bear on Algeria at the UN, the US to facilitate, and would help forestall an acci‐ although Saharan independence is not a model case dental escalation of tense relations between for Russia’s own interests. Nevertheless, if the US neighbors. In particular, US military commanders in provides active leadership and works closely with its the region should develop programs that foster re‐ European allies, there are good prospects for creat‐ gional training and planning. Removing the single ing an environment for action toward a solution largest issue in the way of security cooperation by based on the compromise expressed in the UN‐

The Potomac Institute The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) 13 Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa

favored sovereignty/ autonomy formula, which is the Saharan area could improve the climate for achieving only compromise solution on the negotiating table. the compromise political solution that is favored by Such a leadership role on the part of the United most members of the Security Council. States would benefit the Maghreb and the interests These steps need to be accompanied by the com‐ of the US as well. pletion of a conclusive process to resolve the legal Successive US administrations have declared that status of Western Sahara. Thirty‐five years of con‐ the only feasible solution is to be found in the auton‐ flict, 18 years of stalemated truce, and four rounds of omy compromise. In this regard, the United States motionless negotiations on a compromise offer of needs to begin immediately to treat the Western autonomy are all too long. The people of the region Sahara in a manner consistent with the declared pol‐ must be given an opportunity for self‐determination, icy‐‐and encourage its allies to do the same. First, the which can take the form of autonomy (as occurred US should adjust its policy on development assis‐ from Zanzibar to Aceh). That acceptance can be ex‐ tance and investment support to offer direct assis‐ pressed in a referendum confirming the option of‐ tance and development programs in the Western fered. The process would begin with a formal en‐ Sahara for the benefit of the local population and to dorsement by the interested Western states—US, provide better opportunities and more hopeful fu‐ UK, France, Spain—of the principle of autonomy, ture for the people of the region. The US should en‐ with a limited period of time for final negotiations to courage its European allies and the EU to join in this take place over its details. At the end of the upcom‐ effort. Successive US administrations, both Democ‐ ing fifth round of UN‐sponsored negotiations be‐ rat and Republican, have made a clear policy choice tween the parties, whatever its outcome, the US to promote a compromise political solution through should pursue an effort among Security Council a formula granting a large measure of autonomy for members to recognize autonomous status within the region, under Moroccan sovereignty. A biparti‐ Morocco and invite others to follow suit, much as san consensus in the US Congress has endorsed the was done for a similar option for Aceh, Cameroon, policy choice and has openly urged the US Govern‐ Biafra, and for a reverse option for Bosnia and for ment to pursue this path more vigorously. Failure to Kosovo. pursue this policy choice through concrete actions To be complete, the resolution of the Western sends mixed messages to the parties involved and Sahara conflict should include the agreement of Al‐ provides the kind of false hope for a policy reversal geria and special efforts should be made to secure its that perpetuates the stalemate and the dangers in‐ acquiescence. Excluded, an aggrieved Algeria will herent in it. find ways to oppose the United States, Morocco, and Second, the United States and its allies need to economic integration initiatives. Although Algeria is bring pressure to bear on the UN High Commissioner important to the US for its oil and gas supplies, this on Refugees (UNHCR) to ensure that the population fact should not be allowed to block a positive out‐ of the refugee camps under Polisario control in west‐ come for the Western Sahara conflict. While it is not ern Algeria enjoys the rights guaranteed them under clear what Algeria seeks to gain from continued con‐ international refugee law, especially with regard to flict, there may be several ways to motivate its agree‐ freedom of movement, the right to documentation, ment. If, for example, Algeria could be seen as ob‐ the right to voluntary repatriation, and the right to taining concessions for the Sahrawi refugees in the free association. Firm actions to ensure that human Tindouf camps, such as generous resettlement assis‐ rights are respected under international law in the tance from US/UK/France/Spain, that could help. Of‐

14 The Conflict Management Program (SAIS) The Potomac Institute Special Report: Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa fering Algeria a clear path toward eventual free trade form is in place to move proactively and successfully status with the US might also be attractive. A com‐ to bring an end to that conflict, to increase counter‐ mon position and firm hand at the back by the US, terrorism cooperation, and effectively to encourage UK, France, Spain (and Italy) on autonomy, including regional economic integration that will bring greater encouraging both Algeria and Morocco to enter ne‐ prosperity and opportunity to the peoples of the gotiations with a positive and forthcoming spirit and Maghreb and greater security for US interests. Š seek win‐win solutions, will set the right tone for pro‐ ductive talks. Maintaining some kind of UN associa‐ tion with the process could make eventual Algerian acquiescence easier. Morocco could also provide a formal parliamentary ratification of the 1972 bound‐ ary treaty that Algeria ratified immediately after its signature and was publicly acknowledged by the late King Hassan II but not ratified due to the absence of a parliament at the time. Morocco could also retract its government and public maps showing the border to be in dispute. In the end, if incentives do not work, the US should move ahead with this initiative inde‐ pendently and urge the states of the Maghreb to set the problem aside and focus on other aspects of co‐ operation, as they did when they established the UMA initially in 1989.

CONCLUSION As the Obama administration considers its priori‐ ties in the Middle East and North Africa, it is critical to break the habit of viewing the region as composed of a number of separate countries of secondary na‐ tional interest. The countries of the Maghreb repre‐ sent vital interests for the United States, from sup‐ plying energy and economic opportunity to remov‐ ing a growing terrorist presence with real potential for threatening American lives and facilities. Regional integration in North Africa will support a range of US interests that are central to the strategic pursuit of the region’s stability, security, and economic goals. But regional integration cannot be realized without resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Given the cur‐ rent position of the US government – that broad autonomy for the Sahrawi people under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic solution – the plat‐

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