sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 15 December 2009 Supply and demand Arms flows and holdings in Sudan s of late 2009, Sudan’s future In this context, a clearer under- arms proliferation and insecurity appears increasingly precari- standing of arms flows and holdings in Sudan, given that government A ous. Just one year before the is important for understanding current stocks are a major source of weap- Comprehensive Peace Agreement security dynamics and future possible onry for armed groups (both govern- (CPA) effectively expires, key aspects scenarios. This Issue Brief reviews small ment allies and adversaries). of the deal have yet to be implemented. arms supply and demand among the The UN arms embargo has not Despite progress made in recent days,1 spectrum of armed actors in Sudan, prevented weapons from reaching the peace process continues to lurch highlighting recent trends and devel- Darfur, due to the unwillingness 5 from one crisis to the next. Just three opments. It also describes the primary of the governments of Sudan, months ago the head of the Sudan supply chains and mechanisms by Chad, and other parties to abide People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which these arms transfers take place. by the terms of the embargo and predicted a 50 per cent chance of a It finds the following: the lack of robust monitoring by return to war with President Omar the African Union/UN Hybrid Demand for small arms and light al-Bashir’s National Congress Party Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). weapons among a range of state 2 The European Union (EU) arms (NCP). Meanwhile, there has been and non-state actors is on the rise embargo appears to have been no resolution of the Darfur conflict. in the post-CPA and post-DPA largely effective in prohibiting Significantly, talks are now planned periods. In the lead-up to national direct weapons transfers from the between the government and Darfuri elections in April 2010 and the EU to Sudan, but European arms insurgents for January 2010, but the referendum on Southern self- manufacturers, brokers, and trans- obstacles to progress are many: major determination in January 2011, porters continue to be involved in armed groups remain splintered and supply and demand are likely to indirect arms transfers to the coun- the Arab militias are increasingly dis- remain high. try. There is a clear need for better enchanted. Most of the armed actors China and Iran together accounted enforcement of the embargo and continue to exercise their military for an overwhelming majority (more 3 due diligence by EU-based compa- options. than 90 per cent) of the NCP’s self- nies and individuals. In parallel with these troubling reported small arms and light Available information indicates that developments, the demand for small weapons and ammunition imports the governments of Chad, Libya, arms and light weapons—and some over the period 2001–08. Verifiable and Eritrea have been involved in larger conventional weapons systems— transfers to Southern Sudan by arming non-state groups in Darfur among government forces, insurgents, Ukraine through Kenya have been either as part of an official policy and unaligned groups in the country documented in 2007–08. or by turning a blind eye to such has grown considerably since the out- Despite the extensive and growing activities. break of hostilities in Darfur in late weapons holdings of state security 4 2002 and the signing of the CPA in forces, a significant majority of 2005. Arms imports and internal trans- weapons circulating in the country fers continue in violation of the UN remain outside of government con- Government acquisitions arms embargo and other multilateral trol. Khartoum’s official security As of late 2009 the optimism that fol- restrictions designed to prevent weap- forces may possess some 470,000 lowed the signing of the 2005 CPA ons from reaching certain Sudanese small arms and light weapons, while between the NCP and the Sudan actors and areas—and despite the pres- perhaps 2 million weapons are in People’s Liberation Movement/Army ence of more than 25,000 international the hands of civilians countrywide. (SPLM/A) has been overshadowed by peacekeepers tasked with promoting Khartoum’s acquisitions of new increasing violations, mutual distrust peace and security. weaponry will likely lead to greater and provocation, and the possibility www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 Box 1 Legal restrictions on government acquisitions of a return to armed conflict, whether localized or regional. Both the NCP and Three international legal regimes place restrictions on arms supplies to entities within Sudan. These are the Government of Southern Sudan the UN arms embargo on Darfur, the EU arms embargo on Sudan, and the CPA itself. (GoSS) continue to acquire small arms In July 2004 the UN Security Council prohibited the supply of arms and related materiel to non-state and light weapons destined for their actors operating in the states of North, South, and West Darfur.6 This was expanded in March 2005 to armed forces (as well as allied and include all the parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur’s three proxy groups), in what is taking on states, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).7 This has been interpreted by the UN Sanctions Commit- the character of an arms race, despite tee established to monitor violations of the embargo as being confined to transfers of military equipment three legal instruments designed to to the SAF and non-state actors within Darfur itself, despite the SAF outside Darfur constituting a principal limit flows (see Box 1). All three regimes source of arms transferred into the region.8 have been violated since 2005. The most comprehensive international instrument restricting arms supplies to Sudan, the EU arms embargo on Sudan, came into force on 16 March 1994. It forbids any EU national from supplying ‘arms and Arms supplies to Khartoum related materiel of all types’ to any entity, governmental or non-governmental, in Sudan, either directly or The GNU publishes no official infor- indirectly.9 It was expanded in 2004 to include a ban on technical, financial, brokering, transport, and other mation about its arms acquisitions. assistance relating to military activities and equipment.10 The UN and EU embargoes contain exceptions for Nevertheless, customs data, field transfers of equipment in support of multinational peacekeeping operations, CPA activities, and humani- observations, and data supplied by tarian operations. other countries to the UN Register of The Ceasefire Agreement which forms part of the CPA prohibits the ‘[r]eplenishment of ammunition, Conventional Arms indicate that since weapons and other lethal or military equipment’ by SAF or SPLA forces within an agreed Ceasefire Zone; 2000 Sudanese (i.e. NCP) arms purchases and elsewhere allows the ‘[r]e-supply of armed forces lethal items as shall be deemed appropriate by the have been dominated by four supplier JDB [Joint Defence Board] and coordinated with [the] UN Mission’.11 The Ceasefire Zone covers all of South- states: China, Iran, the Russian Federa- ern Sudan, as well as Abyei, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Eastern Sudan.12 The CPA thus forbids both tion, and Belarus. All these arms supply the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the GoSS from transferring lethal military items to their forces relationships were well established without the agreement of a joint SAF/SPLA board, the JDB, within a region that includes almost all of the during the latter phase of the civil war.13 SPLA’s area of operation, but little of the SAF’s area of operation. Major transfers are reported in Table 1, although this must be regarded as an Source: Lewis (2009a) incomplete assessment. Customs data, despite some serious 14 Table 1 Conventional weapons systems transfers to Khartoum, 2004–09 evidential inadequacies, also supports the view that Khartoum’s imports of Supplier Weapons/systems Number Year(s) small arms and light weapons in par- country ticular have grown in magnitude since Belarus T-55M tanks 60 1999–2001 2001 and have become dominated by direct imports from China and Iran. BM-21 Grad 122 mm rocket launcher systems 12 2002–03 According to customs data, these two D-30 122 mm towed guns 24 2002–03 countries were responsible for 72 per 2S1 122 mm self-propelled guns 10 2003 cent and 22 per cent, respectively, of BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles 9 2003 reported transfers of small arms and BRDM-2 reconnaissance armoured vehicles 39 2003 light weapons, small arms and light BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers 2 2007 weapons ammunition, and conven- tional munitions and artillery from (with ‘Kobra’ weapons turrets) Su-25 ground attack aircraft 11 2007–08 2001 to 2008 (see Figure 1). Nine exporters combine to make up the China Type-85-IIM tanks ? 2002 remaining 6 per cent of transfers over A-5C Fantan ground attack aircraft 12–20 2002 the period. WZ-551 armoured personnel carriers 10 2003 Arms supplies from China and K-8 Karakorum trainer/combat aircraft 12 2005 Iran are anchored in commercial and military-political relationships: Chinese FN-6 man-portable surface-to-air missiles ? By 2007 state-led investment, particularly in Russian BTR-80 infantry fighting vehicles 30 2001–02 Sudanese oil development, has argu- Federation Combat helicopter (armed Mi-17 or Mi-24) 44 2001–08 ably provided both the resources and MiG-29 fighter/ground attack aircraft 12 2003–04 the motivation for Chinese arms sales to Sudan;15 while Iranian military