In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

The Annual Strategic Report 2017 The Annual Strategic Report 2017

ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER

In The Name of Allah, The Most Gracious, The Most Merciful

1 The Annual Strategic Report 2017 The Annual Strategic Report 2017

ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER

The Strategic Studies Center The board of the preparation of raise awareness of the importance of the armed forces and their integration the annual strategic report with governmental bodies and institutions to maintain national security Profile, functions and duties of the Center The Establishment of the Center General Supervisor • To find a position for the Center on the map of centers interested in military and strategic affairs at the regional and international level

The Strategic Studies Center was estab- • To coordinate with the regional and international strategic studies centers. lished in April 2004, in order to conduct specialized researches and studies in the aspects • To analyse the studies/researches/information in order to draw lessons and the lessons that benefit our armed forces. of military, political and civil studies. It is a Center that affiliates to the Qatari Armed • To analyse various incidental variables in the countries of the region and Forces. their impact on national security of the State of Qatar

Vision: Staff Brigadier General To transform the Center by the year 2022 to Dr. Hamad Mohammed Al-Marri a leading Center for strategic and military Commander of the Strategic Organization studies in order serve the armed forces and Studies Center The Center consists of five directorates:- the civilian sectors of the government. 1- Security and Defence Studies Directorate. Mission 2- Gulf and Regional Studies Directorate Head of the Preparation Committee 3- International Studies Directorate. The mission is to provide specialized studies 4- Conference and information Directorate. and researches in the areas of defence and 5- Research, Development and Documentation Directorate strategy, which affect the national security.

Objectives:- Preparation Committee

• The objectives are to provide 1- Colonel Salih Ahmed Al-Yaffei studies and consultations which 2- Expert Dr. Akram Hussam Farhat contribute to the development 3- Expert Dr. El-Sadeq Abu Nafeesa of the Qatari Armed Forces, and maintain its national security. Brigadier/ • Enhancement of the importance of Ghanim Nasseeb Al- Abdullah contribution of the Center and to Head of the Gulf Strategic Studies department

2 3 The Annual Strategic Report 2017 The Annual Strategic Report 2017

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Contents Page Serial Activities Number The diplomatic and the moral approach adopted by the 17 72 Page State of Qatar in the management of the crisis Serial Activities Number Kuwaiti mediation efforts and the diplomatic good offices 18 74 Selected military studies endeavours of the friendly countries 19 Stalemate of the crisis and the stage of the lost bets 75 1 National service 10 20 GCC Summit in Kuwait 79 2 Military schools 17 21 Expected scenarios of the Gulf crisis in 2018 82 Regional and international crises External participations of the Center and the expertise exchange program 3 Syrian crisis 22 Visit of the command of the Strategic Studies Center to the 22 84 4 American Gulf relations 30 Republic of Sudan Visit of the delegation of the Navy Collage in the Republic 5 Lebanese Issue 33 23 86 of Pakistan to the Strategic Studies Center Visit of the of the delegation of the Strategic Studies 6 Iraqi Issue 37 24 87 Center to the State of Kuwait 7 Iranian Issue 44 Visit of the delegation of the Department of Strategic Plan- 8 Yemeni crisis 48 25 ning at the Kuwaiti Armed Forces to the Strategic Studies 89 9 Libyan crisis 52 Center Visit of the delegation of the Strategic Studies Center to 10 The tensions in the Korean Peninsula 56 26 90 the Kingdom of Jordan 11 Emergency humanitarian crises 56 Visit of the Turkish Tasam Center to the Strategic Studies 27 91 12 Historical breakthrough 62 Center 13 Expected crises in 2018 64 Participation of the delegation of the Strategic Studies 28 Center in the Works of the Tenth Conference 'the Learned 91 The event of the year Lessons' , New Zealand )Gulf Crisis( Visit of the Strategic Studies Center to the Federal Re- 14 Media attack against the State of Qatar 67 29 public of Russia and the Workshops held with the Russian 91 Severing of the diplomatic relations and imposing of the strategic studies Centers 15 68 blockade Visit of the Strategic Studies Center to the United States 16 List of the alleged claims 71 31 of America and the Workshops held with the American 95 strategic studies Centers

4 5 The Annual Strategic Report 2017 The Annual Strategic Report 2017

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Page The Speech of the Commander Serial Activities Number of the Strategic Studies Center Participation of the Strategic Studies Center in the Works 32 of the Annual Conference of Sophia Center , Republic of 99 Bulgaria Visit of the High Military Academy of Sudan to the Strate- 34 101 gic Studies Center Participation of the Strategic Studies Center in the Eighth 35 102 Nuclear Meeting , Jordan Participations & Internal Research Activities 36 Cooperation with Al-Jazeera Center 105 37 Cooperation with the Arab Center for Research and Policy Study 106 38 Participation in the activities of Brookings Doha Center 106 39 Cooperation with the University of Qatar 107 Staff Brigadier General Dr. Hamad Mohammed Al-Marri Commander of Strategic Studies Center 40 Meeting with the strategist experts 108 Event of the Center Conferences, symposia and workshops The important Strategic Studies Centers are keen to issue an annual strategic report, The Center's Annual Conference on the Turkish -Qatari 37 114 summarising the outcome of their annual activities and briefly present the trends of View on Middle East Issues-March 2017 the public opinion and analysis of the issues of concern. Such reports realize great Preparatory workshop with Tasam Center, Istanbul, Sep- benefit for the stakeholders and the researchers, so that they could learn about the 38 120 tember 2017 developments in some international and regional issues and conflicts, in precise and focused study, as well as their future expectations. In the context of benefiting from Istanbul Security Conference and the Turkish - Gulf De- 39 122 the experience of other research centers, the Center publishes this strategic report, fense and Security Forum, November 2017 which presents the view of the Center on certain strategic and military issues as well 40 Strategic Symposium on lessons learned from the Gulf crisis 122 as the developments in certain crises and conflicts within the strategic environment .of the State of Qatar A Lecture on the Gulf crisis and its future implications - 41 135 .Ahmed Bin Muhammad Military College The Center hopes that this report, which is issued by the Center for the first time, Honouring of the former commanders of the Strategic Studies Center will be useful for researchers who are specialized in military and strategic issues, particularly for the officers and the employees of the Qatari Armed Forces. The Cen- Honouring of the former commanders of the Strategic 42 136 ter further hopes that, this report shall have a distinguished position among the re- Studies Center ports issued by the other research centers. I wish success to everyone. May Allah’s 43 Conclusion of the report 140 .peace, mercy and blessings be upon you all

6 7 The Annual Strategic Report 2017 The Annual Strategic Report 2017

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INTRODDUCTION

This report was issued amid successive developments in many international and regional arenas, particularly with existence of the Gulf crisis, which imposed itself on the crises of the region, given the strategic importance of the Gulf region, in addition to being the first GCC threat from within the system itself and not from outside, as was the case with the events took place during the past years and decades. Therefore, this report singled out a special study under the heading The Event of Year for the Gulf Crisis, wherein the report reviewed the developments in the crisis over the year 2017, specifically since its inception on June 5th, 2017. While the report presents in its first part a summary of some selected military studies, wherein the Center made extensive studies center, in the second part of the report, the Center will briefly address the events and the developments that took place during the year 2017 in some regional and international crises. It will also provide a proactive vision for the Selected military studies future of this crisis for the year 2018. The third and fourth part of the report are devoted for the Strategic Studies Center’s activities at the level of foreign participations and expertise exchange programs as well as the participations and activities with the research centers and academic institutions within the State of Qatar, in addition to seminars, conferences, workshops and lectures held during 2017.

This report is based on the accumulated information, views and analysis of the experts of the Center on some issues of concern, and is thereby they are academic assiduity, based on sources of information published and available in all the public sources of information. It is necessary to note that all information or opinions what are mentioned in this report do not necessarily reflect the vision of the Armed Forces and of the State of Qatar in general, rather they reflect the opinions of the researchers of the Center.

8 9 The Annual Strategic Report 2017 The Annual Strategic Report 2017

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Introduction

1. Human resources is considered to be the priceless wealth of each country; therefore, countries accord special care and concern and attach great interest to it, as one of the main pillars of comprehensive development. Hence, from the same perspective, of governments’ preparation of the countries for defense, preparation of human resources draws equal importance. It denotes instilling, consolidating and deepening the concept of belonging, national loyalty, and faith in just causes of the State, and the ability to direct such faith to benefit from it, in order to make and transform such values into a powerful force to manage the production process, and meet the physical needs of the armed forces, and bolstering the armed forces morally during the tensions and managing crises and conflicts. For all these Qatar National Vision 2030 focused on the importance of comprehensive development, as the primary objective of progress and prosperity for citizens. It also pointed out that sustainable development is a process of trying to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to attain their needs. Thus it has been known as the two-ways justice. (Photo of national service recruits in the State of Qatar, during graduation) 2. National service is one of the tools and means by which any nation can develop the human capabilities, especially at the level of the armed forces, and in this context the countries differ in regard to their perception of national service and how to utilize it. Some of the countries view it from the narrow military perspective merely as reserve Positive aspects of national service armies and consider them to be a parallel force to the regular troops, and there are 4. Modifying the behaviors and the perverse conducts of the youth: other countries which perceive the national service from more general angle and a comprehensive perspective as a means for contribution to development and for dis- A. National service is considered to be a sincere response to the call of the home- ciplining the behavior the youth. land, as one of key factors for teaching young people the responsibility and discipline required to enter employment or academic life, as stimulate and 3. In this context, the Strategic Studies Center, presented a comprehensive study on for raising the level of discipline and fitness, and as source of pride and self- the subject of national service from its all military, security, economic and social esteem for youth. It is a method for planning to realize the desired goals, aspects, as well the study presented the positive aspects of the national service, as which may lead to differences in their personalities, psychology, their physics well as some of the problems associated with the application process, and reviewed and future professions. certain accompanied application problems and provide proposals for how to avoid these problems at the government level and the level of the armed forces. B. The introduction of conscription gives young people the spirit of challenge and responsibility which evolve in tandem with their growth in age, till it becomes an normal habit and a nature as the days and the years pass the printing and

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duplicating capacity gained to inherited, from best picture this then the ac- nation’s economic goals, by strengthening the capacity of recovery in cases of quired habit becomes an inherent behavior. One of the best examples of such emergency and crises that the country may be exposed to, through what is known transformation is that the external discipline turns into an spontaneous inter- as alternative service. nal discipline and commitment that motivates from within ones’ self, this due Gains acquired by armed forces from the national service to self-control and accountability gained by the recruiter as the result of his subjection in his early years of his life for some kind of education and training 8. The national service contributes the military education to master use of modern on grounds of military discipline and values that based on and center on reli- sophisticated weapons and equipment to fight in the future wars, which will rely gion, honor, country, duty, through deepening the nationalism in their hearts, on professionalism and subspecialties and on quality more than on quantity and increasing the sense of social awareness towards the nation and recognizing number of troops. the sanctity of safety of the country and defending it. 9. The conscription help build a strong national army, making it an important part C. The compulsory military service has an active role in the elimination of certain of the national economy and a vital hub among the centers of developing scien- customs and practices that youths accustomed to, especially the bad habits due tific research, accelerate cognitive growth and development and development in to unemployment and leisure and idleness, imitation and the luxury life. general and proceeding with it to new dimensions that contribute to the crystal- lization and completeness of unity of the total security. 5. Contribution to preservation of the national identity 10. The cconcept of defending homeland is no longer limited to only the military A. National service is one of the most important decisions to preserve the national side, but also to economic and social development and the evolution of the so- identity. ciety as a whole. Hereof the importance of national service emerges and the amount of its contribution to the preparation of the country for defense, through B. It fosters the spirit of loyalty and belonging to the motherland, especially con- the development and the use of the whole capabilities of the country to achieve sidering how the present generations are reared, the lifestyle changes and the the requirements of the armed forces either at war or peace and in post war time new unavoidable input in the pattern of the behavior of individuals and groups. to achieve the requirements of the country.

C. New threats that are targeting countries from within, which focus on direct 11. Through national service the recruits can be trained on how to defend the many and indirect destruction of identity. Therefore it is natural to look carefully to and varied strategic facilities in the country, whether military, economic or so- our reality and to review all options to protect the our gaind assets and to meet cial, facilities such as the centers of command and control, troop camps, military bases, airports, cities, villages, electric power stations and desalination plants. those challenges by using national personnel who realize the reality of what This training is extremely important to address what is known as the fifth column is happening around them, and the threat that has started coming from in and or called as the sleeper cells, and the possible subversive acts to strategic instal- outside. lations in times of unrest or war.

6. From the health angle the national service will work towards the uplift of the 12. The security dimension helps the national service to strengthen the defense and community health through fitness and nutrition programs, which the conscripts security capacities of the country and make it a factor of stability in the region, will undergo during the national service. as well as to strengthen the confidence of citizens in the security institutions of the country and their role in maintaining security and stability. 7. On the economic level, the national service contributes to realization of the

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13. There are many benefits to recruits of the national service themselves: A. At the legal dimension of the conscription which is presented by the objections of some international treaties to compulsory national service. A. Military trainings and security exercises that obtained by the national service recruits work to develop their personal experiences and teach them new B. The security dimension of the conscription which is presented by some effects knowledge. associated with camp life, which may cause sometimes to psychological and intellectual security problems to youth, in addition to reflections pertaining B. National service works to refine the productive capacities of young people. It to culture of the weapons and their handling, which may have reflections on is not hidden from any one the negative effects of globalization and opening some behaviors within the community. to the outside world, and how it affected the identity, ideology and culture of our youth. Hence, national service will reshape and build the character of the young citizen by infusing them with an integrated system of values and to up- grade their ideology and culture and to inoculate them against all ideological, intellectual spoilers, It will create a sort of balance between the cultural openness and country’s efforts to preserve national identity and values.

C. The development of national patriotic feeling and filling it with qualities of magnanimity and sacrifice.

D. Instilling the spirit of discipline and military traditions.

E. Raising the sense of national security among citizens.

F. Raise the awareness of individuals and the community with responsibility and belonging and participate in achieving peace and security. (Photo of some recruits of the national service of the State of Qatar) G. Preparing the recruits under the service and equipping them with educational, cultural programs and, training on any craft to develop their skills and to con- C. Economic and development dimension, pertaining to what the national service tribute to reconstruction and development of the countr. present sometimes in some poor countries, specifically the burden on the general budget of the state or its impact on production and development. Challenges associated with of national service drawn from realities of similar experiences D. Psychological and societal dimension. There is a misconception among layers of young people and parents that there is no need for compulsory service, and 14. It will entail the application of mandatory national service and for long periods that it is it’s an unfair tax deduct for free from the age of the youth, and deprive and emergence of negatives aspects and sometimes challenges in implementing them from achieving their personal ambitions such as marriage or getting a them. These should be kept in consideration, and there should be a vision for job, as well as the idea of the reluctance to join military life for the associated how to avoid or confront them. hardship and discipline.

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State of Qatar and the national service A study on military schools 15. National service began in the State of Qatar in tandem with the vision of H.H. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani the Supreme Commander of the Qatari Armed Forces that considers the national service system will stimulate the ener- Introduction gies of the virtuous values and develop their positive attitude. 1. Many countries in the world establish military schools for pre-university level, 16. Training programs have been developed for national service as part of the na- to contribute to qualify young people for various military colleges, and prepare tional service scheme to achieve this vision. The results which were planned to them physically, psychologically, and scientifically to accept military life both reach from the military angle were to raise the fitness standards, instill a sense in the theoretical aspect during the study or the practical aspect after gradua- of belonging and discipline, compliance with orders, to learn about the military tion. The students receive in these schools whether in the basic stage (primary and preparatory levels) or in secondary level doses of military science, physical life, and the ability of the recruits to mater shooting, to be trained on military exercises and psychological and behavioral education. equipment, and the individual’s ability to perform his or her duties towards defending the homeland. In terms of the academic and professional targets, it has 2. In this framework, the Center provided a study on this subject. It included distinct regional experiences pertaining to introduction of military science for students been planned to educate the targeted groups and to expand their knowledge, and in basic education prior to university level. The study also attempted to review opportunity for recent developments in academic and professional aspects, to some experiences at the international level. form professional and academic partnerships at local and international levels, The concept of military schools and to contribute to providing national staff and inject new blood which helps in the process of Qatarization of jobs in the public and private sectors. 3. Military school is an educational and military institution, and is established to perform multi-dimensional mission to serve the community in general and the 17. Until the time of printing this report, the Armed Forces have graduated eight armed forces in particular. It has a clear focus on an early and gradually prepared national service recruits batches. According to data released by the Directorate generation who is scientifically and skillfully qualified leaders and who are dis- of Morale Guidance, since the implementation of the National Service Act the tinguished with loyalty to their country and their leadership. number of the graduate has reached to approximately 21,000 recruits, trained 4. A military school is an educational choice by some countries wishing to balance and ready to respond to the call of duty at any time. As regard to of the number and combine a good level of education with emphasis on physical and spiritual of the employees of the current batch (9) the number exceeds a thousand recruits. values of the students, in order to help avoid the negative parts in the of traditional schools, which are predominantly monotony, stereotypes, and memorizing methodology .

5. A military school is an educational institution has to somewhat a harsh nature, based the prevalence of order and discipline which qualifies the student to take responsibility for himself first, then prepare him to accept discipline as one of the attributes of his character and of his conduct throughout his life, whether he joined the armed forces later or joined another civilian post.

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Emergence of military schools

6. The early appearance of the intended military schools here in this study was not as it is at present, but it has undergone through various stages of development. Initially the military schools originated as military colleges, wherefrom the graduate students directly were to enter military life and join the armies, but through different historical stages the difference between a military college and a military school appeared, despite the continuing presence of some military schools under the name of schools till now. )Students of military schools in the Federal Republic of Russia( 7. Many countries have resorted to these kinds of schools to create an educational environment wherein academic learning environment shall be controlled, guid- Military schools: pros and cons ing learners within framework of targeted ideologies and teachings through which, young people and youth are prepared to join the armies. At that time 11. Military schools have different pros and cons, but in general the realized positive launching wars was legal as a foreign policy implementation tools for states, gains or pros are many and well worth the cost and effort, while negatives are before the advent of the international organization and international law. avoidable. They are mostly related to how the application, quality of follow up and the accuracy of supervision for all the details are made. 8. Later development took place in this regard, then military schools were founded alongside military colleges, and nomenclature was become very clear, where that A. Pros kind of schools got various systems and different goals, but in some countries (1) Military schools help the armed forces to play an important societal role they were founded to serve as military colleges to help students to qualify for that is supportive to the role of the government in education field, and at military college admissions. The military schools provide training, discipline, the same time serves the future recruitment policy of the armed forces on fitness and military science, as prerequisites to join these colleges. manpower level by providing specific sustainable armed forces. 9. These schools were subject to another stage of development as presented by (2) They contribute to instilling patriotism in young people, as well as play specialized military schools, which were created to cover the needs of the armed a role in modification of behavior, through educational, rehabilitative and forces in some technical disciplines, such as nursing, preparation of technicians, therapeutic programs it provides for students. preparation of athletes and others. (3) They work on covering or compensating the educational dropouts, where 10. These schools were used by some states, as in the experience of the Kingdom military schools are keen on achieving excellence for traditional schools, of Jordan, to cover the inability of the state to provide educational services to through the observance of high standards of ethical conduct and helping some remote areas or areas far from the center. Therefore, this kind of schools students to resist negative peer pressure. targeted orphaned children and children from poor families, by attracting them to join boarding schools, to reduce the costs of domestic spending of such families. (4) They help establish health and useful food habits, enhancing physical struc- ture and help to more effectively correct the social behavior.

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(5) They contribute to the development of military awareness, sense of discipline, responsibility shouldering and inculcate the virtues of the soldiery.

B. Negative effects

(1) Reluctance of young particularly the teenagers to join military schools, for fear of the idea of discipline and order.

(2) Reluctance of some parents to send their children to military schools, especially in childhood, because they don’t want their children to remain far from them. Hence it has become difficult for the society to accept the internal environment for boys until the age of 15 years, often boarding schools for young men and boys are exposed to rumors associated with the legends told by people to distort the ethical mission that distinguishes them, which often come as part of the instigation programs adopted by some media.

(3) Negative effects associated with puberty and adolescence in a harsh environment, especially with students from different ages in one place. There Regional and international crisis can may behavioral deviations occur associated with camp life in general.

(4) There are some psychological effects that may appear on some children, especially if the government adopts early military school system from el- ementary. Militarization of children deprive them of their natural environment, may lead to severe behavioural symptoms, diseases and Oedipus or psychological complex.

(5) The high cost bore by the type of the military boarding schools, where the cost is doubled due to the different nature of physical, human and regula- tory preparedness.

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The Syrian crisis

Introduction

1. The Syrian issue witnessed over the past year 2017 several developments in the political, military and humanitarian levels. All the stakeholders in the Syrian issue tried last year to secure zones of influence in Syria, according to local agreements with some armed entities, as well as by building and establishing influence and military bases.

2. Developments in this issue were among the concerns of the Strategic Studies Cen- ter which presented several reports, and position assessments. The following is a summary of the most important dimensions and relevant political and military (A part of the Astana meetings) developments in the Syrian issue and the role of regional and international play- 6. Moscow’s moves began, driven by the ceasefire agreement concluded at the end ers. of the year 2016 between Assad regime’s forces and the opposition. It was spon- Developments at the political level sored by Turkey and Russia. Its first round of negotiations was held in Astana on January 23rd, 2017 which was sponsored by Russia, Turkey and Iran, despite 3. The Syrian issue witnessed in 2017, thirteen negotiation rounds from Astana to the reservation and rejection of the delegation of the opposition as a guarantor to Geneva via Riyadh till the time of writing this report, preparations were under consolidate a fragile truce along with Moscow and Ankara. way to hold the Sochi Conference. 7. Russia aims through its moves to adopt a Syrian settlement, its high ceiling should 4. What is common among these meetings and conferences on the Syrian crisis is tower to writing a new constitution and holding of elections under the UN su- a talk about political settlement, by which to subjugate the forces of opposition pervision, and participation of the opposition in power within a “government of which opposes existence of the Assad regime, make use of and international and national unity”, a parallel negotiating track, which may be an alternative path of regional changes and developments which are relatively tending towards the in- Geneva talks, which was founded on the principle of ousting and dropping Assad from the political equation, especially the Geneva Declaration 1 (June 2012) and terest of the Assad regime. In exchange for the intensive diplomatic and political two Resolutions No 2118 and 2254. mobility led by Russia, the United States – especially under the new administration of President Trump-throughout 2017 worked on securing and strengthening Developments on the military level its military presence in the southern and northern Syria. 8. In a parallel path to the political track, the armed opposition groups (opposing to 5. Russia began the political track to solve the crisis with negotiations in Astana the Assad regime) continued to struggle to establish themselves on the land, in a capital of Kazakhstan. These negotiations realized progress in favour of cessa- highly complex battle field, as a result of overlapping of interests of regional and tion of military hostilities in some areas. The agreement came to be known as the international powers, and due to constant changes in the alliances map, pushing agreement on de-escalation areas. the opposition many time to be between the jaws of the millstone.

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9. The Syrian regime and the allied militias took the advantage of the conflicts of interests of the international and regional powers for themselves, where they worked on mobilizing their military capabilities in order to regain control over the areas that they had lost in fighting with the Syrian opposition since 2012. The regaining of Aleppo was the main gains of Assad regime in 2017, after demolish- ing the historic city, resorting to the strategy of scorched land.

(A map showing areas of influence on the ground in northern Syria after the Euphrates Shield)

12. After the Euphrates Shield Operation, the military focus shifted to the coalition forces, in collaboration with armed Kurdish groups based in Syrian al-Raqqa city. Al- Raqqa city was the only major Syrian town which was fully under the (Photo showing the devastation of Aleppo, during the battle to regain control over it) control of the Organization of ISIS, therefore, the Democratic Syrian Forces known simply as (Qasid) launched the campaign al-Raqqa on November 6th, 10. What is remarkable on map of the armed groups in Syria during 2017 was the 2016 in a bid to seize the city, eventually led to the takeover by (Qasid) a large prevalence of the role of the armed Kurdish groups, especially in areas of east of amount of land in al-Raqqa from the Daesh ISIS, including the city of al-Thawra, Syria such as (al-Raqqa) and in the northern Syria, near the border with Turkey, and the infrastructure in al-Tabaqa dam , And Baath dam . and the expansion of the areas which are under control of Kurdish groups, which caused great concern and nuisance to Turkey, which classifies these groups as 13. The operation al-Raqqa constituted an important turning point in course of Turk- terrorist groups. ish relations with the United States regarding Syria, when the US overlooked the Turkish objections to involving Qasid troops in the liberation of al-Raqa, Wash- 11. Turkey was forced to launch a massive military operation in August 2016, called ington supplied these groups with different types of light and medium weapons. Euphrates Shield, the operation continued until March 2017, with the aim of lib- Turkey expressed grave concern and called on the United States to stop arming erating the border areas of southern Turkey from the control of ISIS and Kurdish the Kurdish groups, which Turkey considered a threat to its national security. groups. Within this operation, Syrian factions backed by Turkey succeeded in liberating several cities including Garabiles, Al-Raea , Dabiq and finally al- Bab City

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(Map showing the route of the US strike to Syrian Shaiarat airport, with cruise missiles and Tomahawk) (The operation of restoring the al-Raqqa from the Organization of ISIS) A. The United States has focused during the past year 2017 on establishing its 14. The United States’ surgical strike against Syria in April 2017, in response to military presence in the North, in cooperation with the Syrian Kurds, and they the regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, was a revealing point have succeeded in establishing some bases and important assembly points, as to the Administration’s new strategy toward Syria, which essentially aimed to some press reports have revealed a number of those bases notably an Airfield work with the allies on the ground to set up four safety zones, in preparation for in Rmeilan base, east of the city of Qamichli, the border city with Iraq, Al the implementation of the four-stage settlement plan announced by President Al-Mubrooka base, West of the city of Qamichli, Kharab Asheq base, West Trump, the same idea was already raised by Turkey during Obama administra- of Ain Isa, Ain Isa base, Roiaria base, at the superb of the city of Ain Arab, in tion. The plan briefly aims to establish a safe area in northern Syria; however, the the North, and rural Northern Aleppo, Tal Beydar base, North of Al-Hasakah US under the Obama administration had reservations against the idea. and Qamichli, and Tal Abeyadh base” on the Syrian-Turkish border, and Al- haska base, The, United States also used other bases belonging to some NATO countries, such Al-Tanaf base belonging to Britain’s and Ain Al-Arab base of Germany.

15. The United States aims of this intensive presence for a number of strategic objectives, including the following:

A. To secure logistics bases and various other services for American and Western forces which began to emerge gradually in the region in the form of training experts or consultants.

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B. Establishing a permanent US military presence west of the Russian military 20. On military level, Syria will likely witness a military intervention by Turkey, as presence to counterbalance Russian presence in Syria, and allows to NATO to it carried out the Euphrates Shield Operation to stop Kurdish influence in areas reduce in future the dependence on Incirlik base. bordering the southern borders, especially with the United States persistence on supporting the Kurds and supplying with weapons. C. To support any future plans to expand military action, if necessary.

D. To use these bases to support Syrian Kurds in the Syrian conflict and to re-em- ploy their role and altering their role from confrontation of the Syrian regime to facing the Islamic State “ISIS”, through its gradual support by training and arming and providing air cover for their operations.

The Syrian crisis 2018

16. It is unlikely that Syrian crisis will find a way to final settlement during the year 2018, by which stability to the Syrian people and the territorial integrity of Syr- ian can be restored. Rather the crisis is expected to further deteriorate, especially after its entry to gains-sharing stage between international and regional powers existing in the Syrian arena,

17. The possibility of dividing Syria still exists. The year 2018 may witness attempts to entrench this concept on the ground, by creating self-autonomous areas that enjoy local independent powers, supported by regional and international parties.

18. The United States is expected to continue to expand its influence on the ground in Syria, in application of the new policy of President Trump, rather the United States will attempt to be the central bead in the pearl bracelet i.e. “milestone” in the Syrian issue and not Russia, as the Secretary of State Mr. Tillerson said talk- ing about new US policies of the United States in Syria.

19. Probably the year 2018 will witness a diplomat momentum in coordination with Britain, France and regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in exchange for a counter diplomatic momentum led by Russia, Iran and Turkey, and each party will try to impose its agenda on the Syrian crisis, what makes it prone to continue and possibly to worsen, especially on a human level.

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The American relationships with the Gulf in 2017 which showed that choosing one GCC country, namely the Saudi Arabia’s, as the first foreign visit for the President Trump wasn’t a normal choice, but a con- Introduction: scious choice which was carefully and thoughtfully decided, for different goals and targets that may not be entirely positive for partnership and mutual interests. 1. The election of President Donald Trump as the 45th, president of the United States is an important change in GCC relations with the US, especially as the President 4. Our reading has already come true. In less than a month after this visit, the Gulf Trump had raised controversy both during the presidential elections and even af- crisis between Qatar and the quartet blockading countries took place, wherein ter his arrival to the White House, attacking Muslims and describing the Islamic President Trump played a big role in triggering the crisis, especially through his countries as spawning terrorism and explicitly attacked Saudi Arabia, prevented repeated statements, but many analyses and information which appeared later, the entry of nationals of certain Arab countries from entering the United States revealed that the meeting with President Trump in in Saudi Arabia was the begin- for alleged terrorism. ning of the crisis with the State of Qatar.

2. Many predicted that the US-Gulf ties will witness divergence in the light of the 5. GCC-American relations in the year 2017 passed through many stages of tension above, however, the Donald Trump’s choose of the Gulf to be his first foreign due to the change in political map in the aftermath of the Arab spring, the en- destinations, was a new and unusual precedent of all former presidents of the trance of new and strong forces and contradicting camps, the emergence of new United States. non-governmental actors of armed militias and terrorist organizations and the emergence of new alliances at regional and international levels, not to mention the Gulf-US relations, which were not at their best level under the administration of former President-Barack Obama-because of the dispute over Iran’s nuclear agreement, the adoption of Jasta Lawsuit and the Syrian, Iraqi, Yemeni and other issues that are still their repercussions persist in the region.

6. In the midst of these changes and their impact on the region, many doubts were cast on the extent of the U.S. commitment to regional security, and the circumstances led to the US Administration’s delay of a number of decisions on arms sales to the Gulf States, and what the new US Administration should reconstitute in the security cooperation framework, what to spell out concerning the criteria and priorities of military equipment and arms sales to Gulf countries and what should decide on other unresolved pending issues and cases. All these reinforced suspicions of the GCC about the United States’ remaining as a guarantor of re- (Photo of President Trump with the Gulf leaders and other Muslim countries in gional security and stability. Riyadh in May, 2017) 7. This coincided with a series of doubts and policy options for the United States on 3. There were conflicting analyses on the subject, yet the Strategic Studies Center Syrian issue, which were perceived by the Gulf States as a withdrawal from the had its own reading of the events, which was included in some sporadic reports, region in favor of other countries such as Russia and Iran.

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Expectations of Gulf-US relations in 2018 The Lebanese issue

8. Despite the Gulf-American rapprochement that began in Riyadh Summit in 1. Lebanese issue was of interest and follow up of the Strategic Studies Center over March 2017, this convergence has resulted in negative repercussions on the se- the past year that was due to Lebanon’s regional importance and due to close curity in the Gulf region, where it led to more tensions between the two shores association between stability of Lebanon and that of other countries like Jordan. of Arabian Gulf, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Gulf the Levant and the Gulf region. crisis which could plague the future cooperation among the member state of GCC itself, so that the tension in the Gulf region would persist through the year 2. In 2017, Lebanon making certain in achievements specifically on security level, 2018, due to many factors leading to that end with the United States remaining namely defeating extremist organizations and expelling them from its border as the controller of the tempo of this tension. regions. However, the Lebanese arena remained witnessing crises on more than 9. It seems that the year 2018 will not be free from some of the challenges and one level. disparities in the Gulf regional and international situations, particularly with the expansion of the Russian political activities, and its tireless efforts to influence 3. At the political level, the most prominent event was the resignation of Prime international policies in the Middle East, particularly those pertaining to dealing Minister, Saad Al-Hariri, his retracting the resignation, all the circumstances sur- with Iran, combat of terrorism, military cooperation and other issues. rounding the matter of his resignation, particularly the role played by Saudi Ara- 10. If the Gulf crisis persisted throughout of the year 2018, it undoubtedly will have bia and others in the light of this crisis, and how it was settled. repercussions on the GCC relations with America, which relied mainly on the GCC as a regional organization. 4. On a military level, the most prominent event was the battle Fajr al-Jarood. It was 11. American policies towards the Gulf crisis and its relations with the Gulf Coop- carried out by the Lebanese army against armed groups that tried to control some eration Council will remain hostage to American interests and gains from the of the Lebanese-Syrian border areas. The battle drew international acclaim, par- continuity and persistence of the crisis, especially since the US Administration ticularly from the United States, which had granted the Lebanese Army 120 mil- doesn’t find difficulty or see it wrong to maintain constructive and rewarding lion dollars in aid to support border security and combating terrorism, as well investment relationships with both sides of the crisis and since the crisis revive the Lebanese army has received American military grant (wagons, transporters, the American arms industry. and US military tanks and guns of the type “m-60”), For its efforts in tackling 12. In another context, it does not appear on the horizon what indicates that emer- terrorism. gence of a gap in the GCC relations the United States at the expense of rapprochement with Russia and China, due to the difficulty of the total transforma- 5. There are lessons drawn from the battle of Fajr al-Jarood, especially as it rep- tion of the Gulf arms system from dependence on American weapons, in the resents a confrontation between the regular army and irregular militias, particu- foreseeable future even with Russia has sought strenuously to maximize rela- larly since it was occurred in populated areas. Several US military schools were tions with the Gulf, to acquire a share of imports of some Gulf countries. keen on inviting Lebanese soldiers to talk about this important battle and how 13. The year 2018 will witness the return of the United States to exercise its good of- they manage it. fices to resolve the Gulf crisis, especially with the clarity of their negative effects on efforts to combat terrorism in the region, but such endeavours and diplomatic 6. At the economic level the most prominent event was issue of oil, whereas the efforts are expected to take a different form, other than the previous tours made Gov ernment approved decrees on drilling for oil and gas in the territorial waters. by Mr. Rex W. Tillerson, the Secretary of State of US and they would be accom- The act was described as a historical entitlement that would transform the coun- panied by efforts to pressure on the parties to the crisis to sit down and negotiate. try into the ranks of oil-producing countries.

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9. This issue caused regional and international outcry, the focus was on the motivation, the role of Saudi Arabia and what were the Saudi objectives?, as well as what are the implications for Lebanon and the region?.

10. Many States recognized the seriousness of this uncalculated step. Great powers chiefly France and the United States pressed in favor of ending this situation. They called the Saudi Arabia to make way for Saad Hariri to travel back to Leba- non, to explain the situation and clarify all the circumstances.

11. Iran was one of the first states that commented on the decision of resignation and expressed its rejection of claims contained in the letter of resignation accusing Iran of destabilizing Lebanon, and considered the decision of Al-Hariri as hasty decision, that will lead to a political vacuum in Lebanon. Iran has focused on Saudi Arabia and charged Saudi Arabia with destabilization of Lebanon.

12. France played big and crucial role in ending the crisis. The French President Emmanuel Macron made a short visit to Riyadh, and it seems that he put con- Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri announces his resignation on Al-Arabia TV Channel, while he was on a visit to Saudi Arabia siderable pressure on the Saudi side in this matter. The pressure led to granting permission to Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri to exit Saudi Arabia, heading for Political development (resignation of Saad Hariri and his later retract) Paris, and then to Lebanon, after a short visit to the Egyptian capital Cairo, which expressed an attitude different from that of the Saudi position on the crisis. Cairo 7. The decision of the Lebanese Prime Minister to resign represented a very drastic called for non-interference in the affairs of Lebanon and rejected the attempts to political development, especially for a country like Lebanon, which had suf- destabilize Lebanon. fered for years from a political vacuum and presidential vacancy. The resignation would disrupt the political life and the economy process in this small country, 13. Saudi Arabia has lost part of its influence in Lebanon on the background of this which is suffering from many crises, including political, economic, and security. crisis, and drew on itself many criticism notably from inside Lebanon, which They are imposed on it due to its political, sectarian and racial composition, in strongly criticized this policy, as targeting the security and stability of Lebanon, addition to its, geographical vicinity of Syria and Israel, and its engagement in the regional game as an arena whereon to settle political scores. 14. This crisis has proved that Saudi Arabia was not satisfied with the current political equation which brought the former General Michel Aoun to power in Leba- 8. The decision to resign was announced from Saudi Arabia, during a visit by the Lebanese Prime Minister to Riyadh. This event has no precedents in the political non, because of his pro Iran stance and his alliance with the Hezollah. Hence, history of Lebanon, for the first time a Lebanese official resigns from a platform Saudi Arabia aimed to weaken the internal position of Hezbollah, to remove the in a foreign country, especially when the official is in the rank of the Prime Min- political cover from Hezbollah, in preparation for targeting it financially and ister. possibly militarily in cooperation with Israel and the United States, within the

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strategy which was announced by President Trump about confronting Iran. Saudi Iraqi Issue Arabia was also not satisfied with the cooperation of Saad Hariri with Hezbol- lah, and with Iran, and it objection to Al-Hariri’s meeting with senior Iranian 1. The year 2017 witnessed important developments in the Iraqi case, most notably officials, especially his meeting with the Adviser of Iranian President for Inter- on the ISIS issue, which has taken the lead of events in Iraq since 2014, despite national Affairs. its different developments at all levels.

Lebanon in 2018 2. In light of the interest of the Strategic Studies Center to follow and study the Iraqi issue through the year 2017, the premier event at the military level was the defeat 15. The year 2018 will witness three important advantages on the Lebanese arena. of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, IPA) also known as the Islamic First is the presidential election, second is the drawing up of the electoral law, State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS ) and by its and thirdly the parliamentary elections. Similarly Lebanon is preparing to hold Arabic language acronym Daesh or dā’ish, in Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister more than one international conference. The most important of these conferences Haider Abadi announced the end of State of Caliphate. However, on the political is Paris IV Donor Conference on Loans and Aids to Lebanon, and the Rome II level, the most prominent event was the Kurdish referendum on determination Conference concerning the aids to the Lebanese army. and the associated implications, as well as the return of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq after years of tensions. 16. There is no doubt that security and political stability in Lebanon is closely linked to the Syrian situation and its outcomes. Next year may witness an improvement End of the alleged Caliphate State and the future political challenges in Syrian-Lebanese relations, especially with a strong communication channels between Damascus and Lebanon in the political and security fields, as those rela- 3. Throughout of three years vast areas of Iraq experienced the rule of the alleged tions were renewed lately. Caliphate state. Daesh ISIS controlled over extensive areas from Mosul, whereat ISIS committed the ugliest massacres, but in 2017. However, the year 2017 was 17. Various Lebanese quarters count on the role of the State of Qatar in supporting full of political and military surprises in Iraq which was strenuously striving to stability in Lebanon during the coming period; particularly the Lebanese side end the war and restore its Arab and regional leading role, trusts the wise Qatari policies which had long supported Lebanon during the crises. The Lebanese have not forgotten that H.H. The father Emir H. H. Sheikh 4. In the year 2017 the ISI lost most regions it was earlier controlling, notably Mo- Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani was the first Arab leader who visited Lebanon in sul which witnessed fierce battles fought by Iraqi forces with support from US the aftermath of the war of 2006, in challenge against the blockade which was forces on the ground and from air. With the defeat of the ISIS Prime Minister then imposed on Lebanon. The Lebanese also recall the Qatari aids in bringing Al-Abadi announced the end of the so-called State of Caliphate ISIS in Iraq. tighter the Lebanese factions in 2008. 5. The war led to many political and humanitarian ramifications, which constitutes in its entirety the future challenges facing the Iraqi authorities:

A. Reconstruction of areas of operations: There is still before the Iraqi officials the task of restoring life to the cities with majority Sunni population, which were destroyed by battles, including Mosul, Baiji, Ramadi and Fallujha.

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B. The issue of the displaced Iraqis: This issue represents a big challenge for the C. The leader of the Sadr Movement in Iraq Muqtada Al-Sadr visited Saudi Ara- Iraqi government, particularly with the United Nations estimates considering bia and met with the Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman in July 2017. the number of the displaced to be very large. Added to this are the political D. Opening of Arar corridor between Saudi Arabia and Iraq in August 2017. complexities associated with this issue. They pertain to the matter of demo- graphic change that has occurred in some areas over the past few years. E. Saudi economic flights firm “NAS” (fly NAS) started operations and flights in October 2017, the first commercial flight between Riyadh and Baghdad since C. The sectarian issue: The sectarian division in Iraq was highly intensified at 1990, and resumption of flights between Baghdad and Jeddah which were cut the community level. This issue is urgently in need of fast remedies, and any off for nearly 27 years. delay in completing the task will provide opportunities to the remnants of the ISIS to return and exploit the sectarian divide in the country. F. Creation of an Iraqi – Saudi Coordinating Council, to develop initiatives between the two countries at all levels. D. The future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) : The future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is one of the challenges facing Iraq in G. Large Saudi participation in the Baghdad International Fair, held in October the coming years, both politically and militarily. The Popular Mobilization 2017, which was attended by more than 655 Saudi companies; not to mention Forces (PMF) has imposed itself on Iraqi reality at some points during the Saudi participation in the important Basra International Conference on Oil war against the ISIS. It has already succeeded in achieving accomplishments and Gas held in December 2017. which are hard to ignore, but the problem lays in possibilities of being uti- lized by political parties in managing the political process, especially after the H. Initial agreements were signed on reopening of natural gas lines coming from Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), is granted the right to participate in the Iraq across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. coming Iraqi elections. 8. This convergence comes against a background of several regional developments, Saudi-Iraqi relations notably in Yemen, Syria and in Iraq itself, especially the fight against terrorism and the elimination of the ISIS. These developments prompted Saudi Arabia to 6. After a break of more than a quarter of a century, during which the relations be- reconsider their foreign policies towards certain issues. The Iraq issue was the tween Iraq and Saudi Arabia have experienced ups and downs, which reached most prominent among such issues, as Saudi Arabia believes that rapprochement the level of alienation, especially after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the year with Iraq would reduce the influence of Iran. 2017 indicated an important point in the history of relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, when a remarkable convergence of relations was attained. 9. Despite what some consider a qualitative leap on the level of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, there are many challenges to this convergence, notably 7. Features of this rapprochement between Baghdad and Riyadh manifested itself Iranian uneasiness for this step, especially since Iran considers that any Saudi as follows: rapprochement with Iraq will be at the expense of its interests in Iraq.

A. Adel Al-Jubeir, Saudi Foreign Minister visited Baghdad in March 2017, the Iraqi -Qatari relations first Saudi Foreign Minister to Iraq in 14 years. 10. The year 2017 witnessed an evolution in the course of the Iraqi- Qatari relations. B. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi visited Saudi Arabia in June 2017. This was evident in the level of Foreign Ministers mutual visits, as well as other

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visits by political and economic delegations. There was convergence of views was the main features of the rapprochement, especially after the prevalence of the conditions emerged after the Gulf crisis. Iraqi stance on the Gulf crisis was positive. Iraq announced its rejection to military solutions and to tensing the region.

(H.H. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani receives Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, during his visit to Doha in November 2017)

12. H.H. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar was keen to congratulate Iraqi Prime Minister, on the Iraqi victory success in the liberation of the city of Mosul from the (ISIS) and calling it a “victory for all (Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohamed Bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani with the Iraqi Arabs and a permanent joy for Iraq”, adding: “we’re ready to stand with you and Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, during his visit to Baghdad in May, 2017) support you, and we are confident that you will guide Iraq to safety, and we are ready to cooperate with Iraq in all fields. 11. This convergence led to an important visit by the Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim Kurdistan referendum Al-Jaafari to Doha. The visit resulted in two other very important agreements on opening the Qatar’s Embassy in Baghdad and Qatar’s contribution in the re- 13. Tensions emerged since the beginning of the year 2017 between Baghdad and construction of the liberated areas in Iraq. The Iraqi Foreign Minister confirmed Erbil on many issues, most notably export of Kirkuk oil by the Kurdistan re- during the meeting that the Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad bin Khalifa gion without reference to the federal government, prompting the federal gov- Al-Thani on Friday November 11th, 2017, that Iraq doesn’t follow the policy of ernment to demand from other countries not to buy Kirkuk oil, the government “axes”, in reference to Iraq’s position on the Gulf crisis. also stopped the salaries of the Peshmerga and the government employees in the region, worsening tension after Peshmergas sought to install the territorial borders of the region at disputed areas captured by Kurdistan region during the occupation of ISIS to Mosul.

14. Kurdistan’s independence referendum was held on 25 September 2017. 92% of participants voted for independence. This act marked a point at which the gov-

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ernment of Al-Abadi took escalating steps to maintain the unity of the country, edging that the poll results have become the past. The end of the year witnessed whereby he imposed sanctions on leaders of the region and imposed air ban on attempts to bridge the gap between the federal government in Baghdad and the the international airspace to the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah as well as government of the region, through reciprocal visits of senior officials. closing land borders in cooperation with Turkey and Iran, the steps which were taken to thwart and nullify the Kurdish quest toward independence, in fear that Iraq and the challenges of year 2018 the independence of Kurds in Iraq will entice and could provoke Kurds in the 17. With the end of the year 2017 and the advent of the year 2018 before Iraq there neighboring Iran and Turkey. appeared fundamental challenges that combine between needs of internal stabil- 15. Iraqi forces launched a rapid military operation which recovered oil-rich Kirkuk ity of Iraq and the regional risks. The foremost of which is the reconstruction and province and the encirclement by Baghdad, Ankara and Tehran those who were returning of more than a million displaced people to their homes, and imposing responsible for the referendum and prevention of according recognition by any the authority of the state, rule of law and limiting carrying arms through careful country with except Israel, compelling region’s President Massoud Barzani to handling of the issue of the Popular Mobilization Forces. step down from power on the s expires of his tenure, which was extended earlier 18. Among the important challenges is draw up a road map for building a new re- and to declare his non candidacy for a new term, yet the presidential and parlia- lationship between Baghdad and Erbil to guarantee the rights of Kurds, who mentary elections were not held in the region because of the crisis. played prominent roles in the fight against terrorism.

19. The most prominent achievement will be the holding of the parliamentary and the local elections, the re-launching of the political process, working out a community reconciliation between all ethnic and sectarian components and to bolster the relationships that have been built with the Arabic neighborhood.

(Map of Kurdistan region of Iraq)

16. As the result power was automatically transferred in accordance with the constitution to the government, the parliament and the judiciary in the region Nechir- van Idris Idris Barzani’s nephew of Masoud Barzani became the first official, and declared his readiness to initiate unconditional dialogue with Baghdad, acknowl-

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The Iranian Issue the year 2017 witnessed further tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, during which the officials of the two countries continuously exchanged accusations, 1. In 2017 Iran domestically witnessed important events, including election of about regional issues, especially on Yemen. President Hassan Rouhani for a second term, in May 2017, as well as the terrorist bombings in the Imam Khomeini tomb and Parliament building in June of the 4. In tandem with the tensions within Iran experienced in the year, Iran had seen same year. These terrorist operations attracted the observers, as Iran had been further economic cooperation with Russia in oil projects and joint nuclear an in- free of such forms of terrorist operations for many years. vestments projects by building new nuclear plants in Iran sponsored by Russian. All these in addition to the strategic cooperation between them in Syria, which were evolved to a level of political partnership in finding solution to the crisis in Syrian talks in Astana. Iran came to the talks along with Russia and Turkey as a guarantor of the agreements signed between the Syrian regime and the opposition groups.

5. The year also witnessed a European openness towards Iran on political and economic levels, which was reflected in the level of visits between some European capitals and Tehran, as well as the size of the economic agreements signed in the aviation industry, oil and others fields, mainly by France, Britain and Germany among other European countries which sought to benefit from the fruits of the nuclear agreement. These steps may explain to us the conservative European position towards the repeated statements made by President Trump on the nuclear agreement and his intention to abolish it, unless amended in accordance with the 2. Towards the end of the year 2017 Iran had seen popular protests, extended to sev- US terms. eral cities, mainly calling for economic demands. The demands focused resent- Controversy over the nuclear agreement and missile issue rise for the ment against the economic situation and calling for improvement of the standard interface of living. At the time of printing this report, these demonstrations and protests continued, amid divergent positions of certain regional and international powers, 6. Since his early days in the American Presidency, President Trump threatened to and to date it is still unknown future of these protests and what it can lead to, but pull out of the nuclear deal, and eventually announced a new strategy for dealing what is confirmed in this issue is that these protests will have implications for with Iran in mid-July 2017. domestic policies in Iran and perhaps external level, especially with the anticipa- tion of the Iranian political parties for the elections the Shura Council in 2019. 7. At the same time USA enlisted 18 individuals and companies in the list of sanctions because of Iran’s missile program, and in August President Donald Trump 3. Externally, the pace of tension between Iran and the United States, increased af- said that he does not believe that Iran is committed to the spirit of the nuclear ter Washington’s threat to withdraw from the nuclear agreement and the new agreement signed in 2015 that targeted restricting Tehran’s nuclear program. American strategy announced by President Trump to deal with Iran, based on the idea of containment and confrontation of the Iran’s regional influence. As well 8. Two days after the US President’s remarks the Iranian Parliament voted to in-

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crease the budget for missile programs in step to confirm Tehran’s resolution to 13. In reaction to a blockade imposed on Qatar by sisterly states, Iran covered a great reject putting missile program on negotiation table. part of Qatar’s needs at both strategic and economic levels. Iran also opened its airspace for the flights from and to the State of Qatar. 9. Although the American attack on the nuclear agreement, and its attempt to wrig- gle out of its commitments, major countries, including sponsors of the agreement The Iranian issue in 2018 continued to assert their commitment and willingness to continue with the agree- 14. It is expected to that the Iranian issue will receive in the year 2018 great impor- ment, ye some of those countries share the United States the concerns over Iran’s tance, especially after the Iranian protests took into streets by end of 2017 raising missile program. various economic and political demands, especially with attempt of some op- Iran’s Gulf inter-relations posing powers to Iran to exploit these protests for their agendas .

10. There was tension and deadlock in track of the Iranian- Gulf relations, especially 15. Iran is has a tryst with the forthcoming elections of the Islamic Shura Council in after events of 2016 when (Saudi diplomatic headquarters in Tehran was burned 2019, during which the political competitions in 2018 will constitute a ground. down by the demonstrators), the impact of 2016 event led several Gulf States to The process indicates the Iran will witness internal political mobility between sever ties with Iran headed by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emir- different political tendencies, especially between the conservatives and the re- ates while other Gulf countries took less severe actions, this disparity in levels formers, for control over the parliament in the next elections. of Gulf response clearly indicates absence of a unified Gulf vision towards the 16. It is also expected that the tensions will be escalated between Iran and the United source of threat, particularly as regards to Iran. States backed by Israel on the background of the amendment attempts to the 11. The American Muslim- Gulf Summit held in Riyadh in May 2017, contributed nuclear agreement as well as on the differences on the ballistic missile and de- to deepening of the gap between Iran and the GCC states. The Summit adopted fensive weapons programs. clear anti Iranian policies supported by the US, which tried to steer the Sum- 17. Also expected the continuation of tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, espe- mit towards forming a regional alliance to confront Iran. If succeeded it would cially with the worsening situation in Yemen, which constitute a great political explode the whole region and put it at the verge of volcano nozzle, however, and economic pressure on Saudi Arabia, which is seeking to find an appropriate besieging of the State of Qatar has contributed to abort this effort and provided exit strategy from this swamp. Iran with an opportunity to benefit from the repeated miscalculated Saudi

12. From among the later developments in 207 was Qatar’s decision to establish the severed relations and sending the Qatari ambassador to Tehran in August 2017. In the aftermath of imposition of blockade on Qatar by the quartet led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar declared the return of its ambassador to Tehran who was recalled for consultation in the aftermath of the burning down of the headquarters of the Saudi diplomatic mission in Tehran by the Iranian demonstrators.

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The crisis in Yemen

1. The Yemeni scene was subject of interest of the Strategic Studies Center, due to the developments which blown off this case, in the aftermath of the Decisive Storm campaign, which has turned Yemen into semi Civil War, and the Center has submitted several reports on this issue.

2. The Yemeni issue continued on the same political and military pace, in the case of tug-of-war and hit and run, between the Arab Coalition Forces led by Saudi Arabia on one side and the the Houthi and forces of Ali Abdullah Saleh (who was liquidated by the Houthis in December 2017 after intense disagreements between them) on other side.

3. The humanitarian situation in Yemen was the most prominent issue during 2017, where the suffering of the Yemeni people was highlighted via the regional and global news headlines. After the Saudi announcement to close all Yemen naval, air and land ports to prevent smuggling of the arms to the Houthis, the blockade became tough for Yemen since August, 2016 and throughout 2017, where civilians including women, children and the elders have suffered more B. A deep tremor and rift among the General People’s Congress Party, whose from this war and the accompanying blockade. presence and activity in the Yemeni arena depended on the character of Ali Political and military developments Abdullah Saleh as a symbol of the party and its founder.

4. The year 2017 witnessed tough disagreements between the two main partners C. Political divisions among the Yemeni parties, as a result of their different po- facing Saudi Arabia and the Allied Coalition Forces, namely, the forces loyal sitions on the issue of assassination of Ali Abdallah Saleh, which varied be- to the Houthis and those loyal to Ali Abdallah Saleh. The confrontations cul- tween supporters and opponents. minated to the armed clash that erupted on December 2nd, 2017 and ended with assassination of the former President Ali Abdallah Saleh. D. Assassination of Ali Abdullah Saleh contributed to dispersal of the military effort of the Arab Coalition Forces led by Saudi Arabia, where relatively large 5. Assassination of the President Ali Abdallah Saleh marked an important milestone sectors of Ali Abdullah Saleh forces joined the Houthis, while other sectors in the course of the Yemeni crisis, as follows: went to areas such as Aden, led by Tariq Ali Abdullah Saleh, under super- A. Change in the balance of powers, at the political and military levels in the Ye- vision of the Emirati forces, and the remaining part of Ali Abdullah Saleh meni situation, as a result; absence of Ali Abdullah Saleh seems to have mainly troops headed towards the Coalition Forces, to fight under the command of Ali served the Houthis; where the Arab Coalition and the Legitimate Forces have Mohsen Al Ahmar, in coordination with Saudi Arabia. suffered from internal divisions in terms of differing trends in management of the military operations, as well as managing the political negotiating track. 6. The political and military track in Yemen during 2017 showed that the Coalition States, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been betting on undermining

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the internal alliances in Yemen, through imposition of blockade on the ports and exploit, and may expand to cover scattered areas in the Arabian Peninsula; airports, as well as continuous and indiscriminate bombing of civilian objects particularly inside Saudi Arabia, due to preoccupation of the Coalition States and infrastructure. This had big effect on the Yemeni people, big sector of which in this war. had turned to sympathize with the Houthis, fighting Saudi Arabia and its allies, 11. The next year may witness greater international pressure on the Arab Coali- to confront the brutal aggression against Yemen. tion States to end the war; as the war has started to destabilize the world’s con- 7. The Houthi proved hard attitude in their attachment to the land and demonstrated fidence, especially the Islamic World, with hope for stability of the Arabian high negotiating capabilities at the political level, as well as the military expe- Peninsula. It has become imperative for the coalition States to pave the way rience they gained in their previous wars against Saudi Arabia and against Ali for a political settlement, wherein the Sultanate of Oman can play an impor- Abdullah Saleh himself, all that had helped them to prolong the war, and this tant role in such settlement, in coordination with the United States and Britain. was a point of strength in their favor. With course of time and repeated mistakes 12. Throughout the next year 2018, there are no prospects of change in the bal- of the Arab Coalition States; position of the Houthis has been reinforced being ance of military power between the conflicting parties inside or outside Ye- supported by many tribes targeted by the raids. men; where the political and military alliances in Yemen are now a similitude 8. Unlike the first period that accompanied launching of the Operation Decisive of uncontrollable moving sand. Stormcampaign in March 2015, there were significant hostile sentiments in 13. All possibilities are open in Yemen during 2018, but the most likelihood is Yemen, during the year 2017, against both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab that political deadlock, with military mobility on various fronts, is likely to Emirates specifically. As a result, the Yemeni have become convinced that persist, and this open military movement will not ultimately result in a final there are Saudi and Emirati ambitions to earn gains at expense of the people victory of any party over another, but the risk lies in the increase of opportuni- of Yemen, and that these ambitions were the main motivation behind their ag- ties of splitting Yemen into two parts, north and south, which confirm failure gression against Yemen. The signs of these ambitions have emerged day by of one of the most important stated goals of the Decisive Storm campaign, day, and the speech about the Yemeni islands, Hadramaut, Aden, Al Maharra, that intended to maintain unity and stability of Yemen, but it seems that the the Red Sea ports and, most recently, the Socotra Island is clear proof of those Decisive Storm may be a factor pushing Yemen towards division. ambitions.

Expectations of the Yemeni scene during 2018

9. In the light of the deadlock of the political and military situation, the war and human suffering of the refugees is expected to continue.

10. The next year may witness severe deterioration of the security situation in Ye- men, as continuation of the military confrontations will help strengthening of the chances for spread of al-Qaeda in the South and areas under control of the Legitimate Government, where there is popular discontent that al-Qaeda may

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The Libyan crisis Algeria and Tunisia, as they are among the most affected by its geopolitical repercussions, as well as the increase in the level of the European mobility to- Introduction wards the Libyan case. There is no doubt that all of these parties are trying to find political settlements for the Libyan issue that will ensure their own interests, 1. The Libyan case is one of the most complicated political, military and humani- and this is a complicating factor; as the regional and international interests are, tarian issues in the North African region and the Middle East in general, where of course, conflicting. this issue has ascended to front of the events, since the outbreak of the popular revolution in 2011, which toppled Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, after military 5. The illegal immigration issue has overwhelmed a large part of concerns of the in- confrontations led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under an ternational parties to the Libyan case in 2017, especially the European countries, international mandate, in which some Gulf states contributed, most notably ef- with a growing number of African migrants crossing the Mediterranean to the forts of the State of Qatar. southern European countries, such as Italy and Greece, where the Government of National Accord has signed an agreement with Italy on the illegal immigration, 2. With the downfall of Gaddafi, hopes of the Libyans and the revolutionaries to ratified by the European Union. However, the agreement faced strong Libyan establish a new state have been revived with the aim to achieve goals of the revo- opposition by some political parties. lutionary mobility, which was evaporated over the time, as a result of interventions of the international and regional powers, which wanted to divert the Libyan 6. The year 2017 has witnessed a number of international conferences and meet- revolution’s track from the right direction, which actually has been achieved, ings on Libya, of which Europe was the main actor. These intensive meetings by supporting of the counter-revolution forces, politically, militarily and logisti- indicate a shift in European stand on the Libyan issue, which over the past year cally, against the revolutionary groups, which have also divided into different 2016 focused on supporting of the Government of National Accord as the sole groups, due to lack of a strategic vision, and narrow view of private interests. legitimate authority in the country, this change in Europe’s stand represents an attempt to bring the east and west of the country closer, as the British Minister 3. The international and regional interventions produced an intricately interwoven of Foreign Affairs, Boris Johnson demanded for the first time, at the European and complicated map of the Libyan situation, which was represented by hundreds Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of Brussels in February 2017, the need to integrate of armed movements, a smuggling of arms and human beings to the neighboring Khalifa Haftar in any future political settlement, which observers considered as countries and produced a complicated political map, which resulted in estab- beginning of a British opening towards the eastern Libya camp. lishment of three governments in Libya, each one controlling large portions of Libya’s extended vast lands, which exceeds two (2) million square kilometers. 7. Also 2017 has witnessed a European rapprochement with Russia over the Libyan issue, where the European countries have realized that Russia is backing Khalifa 4. Over the past six years, the Libyan file has continued to move, with regional Haftar forces at the political and military level, which was revealed by Haftar’s and international interventions, to find appropriate formulas for a political settle- visit to Moscow, and statements by the Russian officials on Libya, so they found ment, leading to stability and to prevent worsening of the situation there, but it difficult to settle this issue without engaging Russia in the dialogue on Lib- by the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 there have been some changes to the ya’s future. scene, whether from outside or inside directions. The most important of which is liberation of the city of Sirte from the ISIS “Daesh” Organization, and the grow- 8. The subject of amendment of Skhirat Agreement has dominated a greater part of ing interest of the neighboring countries in the Libyan case, especially Egypt, the Libyan political mobility on the domestic level, as this agreement was made

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in 2015 to represent a road map for settling the crisis, has now turned to become The Libyan issue in 2018 one of the obstacles to the solution, after two years of its signature, due to differences of the internal parties on interpretation of its various clauses. Therefore, 11. Despite all regional and international efforts and moves during 2017 to break the question of the possibility of modifying the agreement was raised, to have the deadlock in the political situation in Libya, it does not seem to be in sight room for the new variables in the Libyan scene. and specifically, during the next year 2018, that these efforts will result in real stability in Libya. The distances between the internal political spectrums are still 9. The United Nations, through its Special envoy to Libya, Martin Kobler, and then far apart, especially with the difficulty of reconciling between the countries in- Ghassan Salama, led the efforts to amend Skhirat Agreement, to bring the east fluencing the case both regionally and internationally. Libya camp and the Tripoli Presidential Council closer. 12. Although most of the main actors in Libya are in agreement on holding of the presidential and legislative elections in 2018, to find a way out of the constitu- tional vacuum dilemma, and the country’s multiple legitimacy crisis, yet there are still challenges in agreeing on the mechanisms for holding such elections, in addition to the persistence of mess of arms and insecurity.

13. There are some international changes that will have an impact on the positions of some countries on the Libyan issue in 2018, especially as some influential European countries on the issue will witness elections in this year, namely the Italian elections in March 2018, which will determine the trend of the Italian Government; and thus the Italian stance on the Libyan issue.

14. It is likely that the results of the Libyan elections in 2018 may become a point of return to the square one. The elections may lead to outbreak of new armed clashes, which may be more violent than the previous one, especially with attempts by some regional or international actors to influence the results of the Libyan parliamentary elections in their favor. (Paris meeting between Khalifa Haftar and President of the Government of National Accord Mr. Fayez al-Sarraj)

10. France has made great efforts to help bringing the views closer between the government of eastern Libya and the National Accord Government, where in July 2017 it was able to hold a meeting between Marshal Khalifa Hfter and the Faez Al Siraj, where both signed an agreement to cease fire and work for elections in the spring of 2018.

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The tensions in the Korean Peninsula

Introduction:

1. Within the scope of the Center’s concerns with the strategically pressing issues, the Center has followed developments of the Korean crisis issue over the past year and has presented more than a report and an assessment of the situation, especially after the crisis has escalated between the United States and North Korea, where possible war indicators were seen in the Korean Peninsula.

(Picture of a United States Marine in the Pacific Ocean, near the North Korean coasts)

The United States strategic objectives in the North Korean crisis

5. Washington sought through this stepping-up to pave the way for its new policy towards North Korea, i.e. the strategy of direct deterrence, in a qualitative shift from the previous strategy of the strategic patience.

6. Washington aimed to pressure China to change its strategic attitude towards North Korea by using the edge policy, one of the most famous policies used by the United States in similar situations (used in the Cuban missile crisis with the 2. During 2017, the crisis began to escalate, the United States marine carriers head- Soviet Union and it used it with Iran recently, which means pushing things dan- ed by the aircraft carrier “Carl Finn Sen” for the Korean Peninsula; accompanied gerously towards the catastrophe- to look like real- with the aim of forcing the by violent statements by the US President Donald Trump and members of his other party to sit at the negotiating table and make the most concessions. Administration, most of which have a direct language of escalation and threat to 7. The United States is aware of that China is the biggest obstacle to its new poli- North Korea. cies towards North Korea; therefore it relies on a new Chinese position to push 3. The crisis was contained and did not reach the point of the explosion due to in- Pyongyang to voluntarily abandon its nuclear and missile program, in exchange tervention of China and Russia on the crisis in the issue. for a deal close to that made with Iran regarding its nuclear program. 4. During 2017, hostile statements between North Korea and the United States continued, owing to the North Korean missile tests.

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Emergency Humanitarian Crises

1. During 2017, the world witnessed the eruption of some humanitarian crises, most notably the Rohingya Muslim crisis in Myanmar, as well as the humanitarian aspects associated with the conflict in Syria, Yemen and other areas of conflict. In this part of the report we will focus on the crisis of the Myanmar Muslims, which erupted in 2017, and drew serious concern at the regional and international level.

2. The year 2017 revealed worsening of some humanitarian crises, which have emerged as a result of emergence of extremist groups, in some areas, that kill (The ranges of the North Korean missiles) people based on the identity, due to ideological, doctrinal or racial difference, pushing people to flee to neighboring countries, travelling hundreds of miles, facing death at every moment, get stranded, violating all of their legitimate rights th The Korean Crisis: Scenarios in 2018 to a safe and dignified life, as we saw in Myanmar Muslims’ crisis 1. On 25 of August 2017, the Myanmar army launched an unprecedented campaign, in 8. The North Korean issue can develop at any time during the next year 2018, espe- cooperation with the police and Buddhist militias, against the Rohingya Muslim cially with two leaderships of more impulsive nature and perhaps a tendency of minority, in Arakan (Rakhine), in the western region of the country, the biggest violent action to settle some problems, Kim Young-il in North Korea and Donald campaign in the history of the crisis 1, which has been going on for decades, Trump in the United States, but there are still brakes that prevent escalation of has resulted in killing of thousands of Rohingya, according to identical local and international sources, statements and reports, where the number of displaced this issue to direct military levels, the most important of which is the position of persons and refugees to the neighboring Bangladesh has exceeded 820,000, ac- Russia and China, and the fear that this crisis would turn into a third World war. cording to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), amidst demands 9. In the event of North Korea exceed the red lines- according to US estimates- the for international pressure on the government of Myanmar. United States is likely to carry out its threats, through the military option, by the 3. As part of its major humanitarian efforts, the State of Qatar has made effective surgical strikes of Cruise missiles and Tomahawk (directed from Marine-based contributions to alleviating suffering of the displaced Myanmar Muslims, and ships in the Pacific, as it did with Syria, in its strike on Al-Shayrat airbase. has also moved in this regard at both political and media levels.

10. During the next year 2018, the United States of America is expected to continue 4. We cannot fail to mention the great efforts being made by the State of Qatar at to exert the same level of pressure on North Korea by deploying its various stra- the international humanitarian level, through support of the international efforts tegic weapons such as the strategic long-range warplanes, stealth fighter planes of the United Nations through its agencies and organs, where the State of Qatar and nuclear-powered submarines, both in their bases in the Pacific or its bases in has pledged multi-year US $40 million not earmarked for the core resources of South Korea and Japan. the Office of the United Nations for Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs 2, which qualified the State of Qatar to be among the first donors to the United Na- tions Office for Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs, the State of Qatar also

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participated in a high-level delegation to the World Humanitarian Summit, held 2013 a meeting that brought together representatives of 30 local, regional and in Istanbul, Turkey, and announced its commitment to increase the humanitarian international organizations to discuss the humanitarian situation of Myanmar assistance, also the State of Qatar has put forward the idea of providing stud- Muslims at the second meeting of the humanitarian organizations arranged by ies and research on this matter, which is very useful in dealing with the global the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in cooperation with Qatar Charitable humanitarian crises through providing the required studies and statistics. Qatar Society. Further, in the crisis of 2017, the Qatar Charitable Foundation, as one has also made significant contributions and humanitarian support in the area of of the largest charitable associations in the humanitarian field in the State of education in the region. Qatar, has carried out relief projects and distributed emergency assistance for the displaced Rohingya minority, where a food basket project, including basic foodstuffs, was urgently allocated at amount of 156,000 Qatari Riyal ($ 45,000), benefiting 4,700 people, and the foundation also established 5 wooden shelters in Arakan (Rakhine) region, at western Myanmar, each one housing eight families, at a cost of 100,000 Qatari Riyals (about 30,000 dollars). The foundation also launched the “Burma Cries Out» campaign to help the displaced and homeless, who are living in extremely difficult conditions. The call was received with great response from the Qatari citizens and the expatraies living in Qatar.

7. Donations of the State of Qatar reached out to many regions of the world, supporting the needy persons and those affected by the armed conflicts as well as those who are exposed to natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and devas- tating hurricanes. These efforts have not been confined to specific religions, but rather to the human being, regardless of their sex, color or religion. This is Qatar, which some of its charitable associations have been blamed of false accusations, distorting their humanitarian efforts throughout the world. 5. The State of Qatar has made great efforts to shed light on the political and media levels on the crisis of the Muslims of Myanmar, where the State of Qatar has condemned the attacks on Rohingya Muslims on the Blessed Eid day. It required that the Government of Myanmar must abide by the international law as to pro- tection of the civilians and achieving reconciliation. In addition Al-Jazeera TV channel had also focused with its international media weight to shed light on the crisis of the Muslims of Myanmar and the cruel massacres of women, children and the elder people.

6. This Qatari role is in fact an extension of the role that Doha has played alongside other Gulf States, most notably Kuwait, in covering the humanitarian needs of the affected persons by this crisis since its renewal, where Qatar hosted in

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Historical breakthroughs the peace agreement, 10 seats in the Congress (parliament), up to 2026, and it can seek to win more seats in the next year’s scheduled elections. 1. The year 2017 have witnessed historical breakthroughs in some of the crises that persisted over the past years, the most prominent of these breakthroughs, were 4. Analysts are monitoring this experiment to see whether it turns out to be a suc- ending of the FARC rebellion in Colombia and lifting of the sanctions on Sudan. cessful story or a failure, as it is replicable in other countries.

Ending of the “FARC” rebellion in Colombia Lifting of the US sanctions on Sudan

5. The Sudan has lived for many years under the United States sanctions for accusing it of sponsoring and supporting “terrorism”, which has had a negative impact on the country’s economic situation.

6. After many efforts by Sudan to deny this accusation, the United States decided, on 6 October 2017, to lift its economic sanctions imposed on Sudan since 1997, where the resolution entered into force on 12 November, reviving hopes of the Sudanese people to come out of the suffocating economic crises, slowdown of development, after two decades of waiting. Part of the decision includes end of freezing of the Sudanese government assets.

7. The State of Qatar has played a significant role in the lifting of the sanctions against Sudan, which has been mentioned by some officials of the brotherly Re- public of Sudan, where following the decision of lifting of the sanctions the Photograph of signing ceremony of the peace agreement between the Colombian Sudanese officials have appreciated the stance of the leadership of the State of government and the FARC leader Qatar and the Qatari diplomacy for their efforts behind the scenes to support Sudan’s position and persuading the US administration officials that justification 2. After five decades of bloody conflict, the Colombian President Juan Manuel San- for continuation of the sanctions against Sudan no longer exists. tos announced end of the longest civil war in the world after the United Nations confirmed in June 2017 handing over of the most important rebel movements in the country; “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia” (FARC), all of their weapons, according to an agreement signed between the two sides in November 2016.

3. In September 2017, the movement launched its political party, retaining their acronym “FARC” to be held by the party, which will automatically obtain under

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Expected crises in 2018 the Syrian Democratic forces and other Kurdish factions, which Turkey considers as a direct threat to its national security. 1. The next year, 2018, is expected to witness escalation in levels of the tension in some regions around the world, some of which may develop to military action 6. Tensions in Kashmir’s issue between India and Pakistan: These tensions, usually levels, most important of which may be as follows: accompanied by limited border skirmishes, are expected to continue to develop into broader confrontations, particularly with changes in the alliances map in 2. The issue of the Iranian presence in Syria: Indirect confrontations between the the South-East Asian region, wherein both India and Pakistan play an important United States and Israel on one hand and Iran on the other, especially in Syria regional role, especially with the conflicts of ports and the strategic transmission is expected to escalate. Targeting of selective military strikes against the Ira- lines in the Central Asian region. nian presence in Syria, is not ruled out, whether on the ground or against armed groups. No doubt that Hezbollah in Syria as well as the role played by Iran politi- 7. Potential of tension in the eastern Mediterranean cally and militarily is a source of great concern to Israel and the United States. As a result of the unstable situation regarding gas exploration rights among the 3. Tension in East Africa and the Nile Basin States: Political tensions are likely countries sharing this region, namely Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Lebanon, Egypt to take place among the Nile Basin States, on the backdrop of the water issue, and Israel, it is likely that this region will witness a situation of instability which especially as Ethiopia approaches to completion of the Renaissance Dam, op- may lead to political tensions and develop to military confrontations among posed by Egypt, meanwhile the Sudanese-Egyptian relations file is now tense these countries. and can explode at any time due to several issues on the top of which is the issue of Halayib and Shalateen triangle disputed with Egypt and the issue of the Su- dan’s attitude on the Renaissance Dam and Sudan’s close stand to the Ethiopian position, which Egypt considers as hostile approach, in addition to Sudan’s relations with Turkey, and establishment of a Turkish military base on the Red Sea in the Sawaken region, a trend that is considered also by Cairo as hostile, under strained relations between Turkey and Egypt after 2013.

4. An Israeli clash with Hizbollah in Lebanon: In the region, there are fears of a war by Israel in the next year 2018, targeting southern Lebanon, with the growing Israeli talk about efforts to strike the Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon, by targeting Hezbollah. Also it is not ruled out that Israel may carry out military operations in the Gaza Strip against Hamas movement, which is resisting the attempts of imposing a century-old deal on the Palestinians.

5. The Kurdish issue in Syria: It is likely to witness developments at the military level, especially in the light of continued provision of arm by the United States to

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)The Gulf Crisis(

Introduction:

1. The Center will devote part two of this strategic report for discussion of the crises, or conflicts or emerging issues on the research scene, as well as in the international policy arena. The part will come under the title of (Event of the Year), and the topic will be selected on the bases of different considerations, including significance of the event, its local, regional and international impacts, extent of its particular importance to the State of Qatar and to the Arab Gulf States in general.

2. The year’s event will be about the Gulf crisis, which has taken everyone by sud- den, as it took place without any prelude, while the Gulf-Gulf relations were in their normal standard.

Event of the Year 3. As a result of centrality of the issue of the blockade to the State of Qatar, the issue of the Gulf crisis has been of great interest to the Strategic Studies Center. Thus, )The Gulf Crisis( the Center has submitted more than twelve reports and position assessment, as well the issue constituted an important theme for the Center’s foreign movements at the international level with the similar centers, especially in Turkey, the United States and Russia, which we will cover in greater detail in Part III of this report.

4. In this section we will try to review some of the phases of the Gulf crisis from the beginning to the Gulf Summit in Kuwait.

Media assault on the state of Qatar

5. Before 5th of June 2017 the State of Qatar had been subject of an organized media campaign, by some mass media in more than one Arab and foreign country, on the background of alleged statements made by His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad al-Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar, though the State of Qatar had denied such statements altogether and confirmed that Qatar Television TV and Qatar News Agency (QNA) were hacked and attacked by cyber-piracy, yet these countries continued their attack, ignoring all Qatari official statements regarding the issue.

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6. This fierce campaign was led by the media in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 8. There are factors that have helped to speed up the tension and have moved on and Egyptian, which focused on presentation of the fake statements attributed to from the media to the political track, perhaps the most important of which are: His Highness the Emir of Qatar in the breaking news tapes, holding talk shows A.Continuation of the address andapproach of media escalation, especial- about it, and displaying contradictory reports expressing different stands of the State of Qatar and statements taken out from their context which were made by ly by the Saudi Arabia and UAE media the Qatari officials at the United Nations and other international events attended b. Use and leak of files and reports of a particular nature to certain Saudi media, by the State of Qatar to consolidate their positions. and circulating them to other media.

Severing of the relations and imposing of the blockade: C. Lack of prompt intervention by some States to stop such escalation and media accusations. 7. After the above mentioned media offensive stage, which was clearly a prelude to the escalation, an important development took place, considered as the first in the D. Leaks revealed by the e-mail of the Ambassador of the United Arab Emir- history of the inter-Gulf relations, where three countries, namely Saudi Arabia, ates in Washington, exposed many of the current policies against the State of the UAE, Bahrain in addition to Egypt, have announced severance of ties and Qatar, and have disclosed the premeditated intention to escalate and target the withdrawal of the diplomatic missions from Qatar. In addition they took other State of Qatar. measures of an economic nature, such as closure of the various access outlets against the Qatari traffic, including land, sea and air; deportation of the Qatari Objectives of the blockade nationals and denial of their entry into territories of these countries (Saudi Ara- 9. The blockading countries, aim to use this crisis, to subjugate Qatar and bowing bia, UAE, Bahrain); while Egypt has only severed the diplomatic relations, due to its knees, break its political will, deny its regional role, strangle Qatar within to presence of large community of Egyptians in Qatar. its geographical borders and to make Qatar subject to Saudi Arabia and UAE as the case with Bahrain. In order to achieve this strategic objective, these countries have targeted the following by imposition of the blockade on Qatar:

A. Destabilize the internal front in Qatar and create a state of anxiety among the citizens about future of their State.

B. To undermine the confidence of the international community in the State of Qatar and to raise doubts on its regional role, which it has always boasted, as a model of soft power?

C. Strike the Qatar’s economy and weaken confidence of the foreign investors in its stability.

D. Impose Gulf and Arab isolation on the State of Qatar to project it as a hostile State to its neighbors

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E. Keep Qatar away from Turkey and any other regional allies such as Iran and Pakistan.

F. Remove Qatar from the Libyan, Yemeni and Syrian issues.

G. Close Al Jazeera channel and finish its media legend.

(Part of some of the protests rejecting blockade of the State of Qatar)

List of the alleged claims

10. The blockading States submitted a list of demands on Friday, June 23, 2017, and as reported by different media, this document contained 13 requirements, and has set a period for response, along with the mechanisms for monitoring of implementation by the State of Qatar.

11. No doubt that these demands interfere in the internal affairs of the State of Qatar, impose a guardianship thereon by these States, and clearly derogate sovereignty and independence of Qatar’s external decisions. The demands included a clause requiring payment of compensation to those States which will lead to imposition (Part of the demonstrations in one of the Arab capitals, denouncing the blockade of control over the Qatar’s financial resources. against the State of Qatar) 12. The blockading States have intended these demands to be impossible, so that Qatar is faced with two options, both of which are bitter, and the language in which these demands were formulated, in particular the item on monitoring of implementation, clearly indicates that these states have set these demands in order to be rejected, to use such refusal as justification before the international community for escalation.

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13. The State of Qatar delivered its response to these demands to His Highness the situation and the blockade against Qatar. Emir of the State of Kuwait, while the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Muhammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al-Thani, confirmed in 19. Effective, active and intensive communication with various American institu- more than a statement, that these demands are rejected, because they undermine tions, to clarify position of the President Trump, who seemed vague and incom- the sovereignty of Qatar, yet the State of Qatar has put forward its willingness prehensible during the first days of the crisis. This great effort helped the rela- for dialogue and to sit at the negotiating table to resolve the crisis, on condi- tive staying away of the US President Trump from scene of the crisis, where he tion of mutual respect for sovereignty. handed over the issue to the State Department, accordingly the American position has returned to balance. The diplomatic and ethical approach adopted by the State of Qatar in management of the crisis: 20. The active regional action, especially with Turkey, has contributed to create strong regional positions in support of Qatar, at the political, economic and mili- 14. The State of Qatar’s handling of the crisis has been rational and calm, unlike tary levels. Eventually these efforts led to emergence of good positions, such as of the blockading States that have escalated the crisis to the maximum possible the Iranian and the Omani positions, which have contributed to severity of the extent, and have brought in nations and citizens into the crisis. Meanwhile, the blockade impacts on logistical and economic levels. State of Qatar has distanced the people and the citizens of the blockading States, residing in its territory, from this crisis. The measure was greatly appreciated by the international community, expressing ethics, principles and wise governance of the State of Qatar.

15. The State of Qatar has focused on presenting its case to the international community. Meanwhile the Qatari diplomacy has played a significant role in this regard, as the Foreign Minister and officials of various ministries in the Qatar toured several world capitals, which helped to place Qatar in a good strategic position.

16. The active Qatari diplomacy has succeeded in obtaining good positions from a number of the important Western capitals about the non-applicability of the demands, as these capitals have emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and supported Kuwait’s mediation.

17. The National Human Rights Commission has succeeded in clarifying the human dimension of violations of the international law on the actions taken by the four blockading States, as reflected in the positive stance of the Office of the High Breaking news Ghosh Oglu: Turkey deplores boycott of the Gulf States to Qatar Commissioner for Human Rights. and calls for dialogue

18. Active moves by the Ministry of Economy and Trade through the World Trade (The Turkish Foreign Minister, in his first reaction to the decision of severing rela- Organization to clarify the illegality of certain measures related to the economic tions with the State of Qatar and imposing blockade thereon)

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24. Visit of His Highness the Emir of Kuwait to Washington was an important station of the crisis, as His Highness the Emir of Kuwait revealed the intentions of the blockading States to carry out military action against Qatar, and mentioned that the State of Kuwait has contributed to prevention of this catastrophe. The visit was followed by a telephonic call by President Trump with His Highness the

Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, and with the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, which resulted in Saudi-Qatari contacts to find a solution to the crisis. These efforts have been aborted and have not worked.

25. Several countries, led by the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, Turkey, representatives of the European Union and foreign ministers of other countries, have visited the State of Qatar and the capitals of some of the blockading States to explore possible means to resolve the crisis, but most of these (Part of the meeting of the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif with the Turkish endeavors have not succeeded, and they have not been able to solve it, owing to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and joint statement rejecting the military intransigence of the blockading States. escalation of the Gulf crisis and calling for dialogue) Deadlock of the crisis and the stage of lost stakes Kuwait mediation and the international efforts for solution 26. Almost after two months of the escalation and movement around various di- 21. The State of Kuwait has played a prominent role in mediating to resolve this rections the Gulf crisis came into deadlock, resulting from the faltering of the crisis through the efforts of H. H. Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Emir of Ku- diplomatic efforts, and the inability of the Kuwaiti mediator to resolve the crisis, wait, who tried to settle the crisis through personal visits to some capitals of the especially after His Highness the Emir of Kuwait’s visit to Washington in Sep- blockading States and to Doha, or visits and letters through the Kuwaiti Foreign tember 2017, which was faced by media attack against the State of Kuwait by Minister, but there was inflexibility by the blockade States. the blockading States, due to some statements made at the joint press conference 22. The Kuwait’s mediation has received substantial international support, as all with President Trump. international capitals have emphasized the centrality of Kuwaiti mediation in resolving this crisis.

23. The Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah, continued to warn of danger of the crisis and its effects on the future of the GCC through various messages in some of his political speeches, both inside and outside Kuwait.

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Press conference after the blockading States meeting in Cairo (Joint press conference between His Highness the Emir of the State of Kuwait and President of the United States, Donald Trump, in September 2017) 29. The blockading States have tried to market these lists at the international level, in particular through the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, but they 27. Also among the causes of the deadlock of the crisis was the failure of the meet- failed, as no State has adopted such lists, so it has remained without international ings of the blockading States to escalate the crisis, most notably Cairo meeting legal value. They remained only as domestic lists, related to the States which and Manama meeting, where such meetings have become an element of pressure against the blockading States rather than Qatar, especially since they have raised issued them. expectations of the Gulf crisis for internationally, regionally and even internally 30. The State of Qatar has moved to deny such accusations of supporting terrorism to unacceptable levels. and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States with regard 28. During the political deadlock of the crisis, the blockading States have only is- to Combat Terrorism Financing, which was a powerful blow to the blockading sued terrorist lists, including certain Qatari entities and personalities, which they States. The State of Qatar confirmed that it was ready to cooperate and to open claim to be supported by the State of Qatar. The lists included a number of enti- any files related to the subject of terrorism. ties working in the charitable and relief field as well as in the media.

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33. The blockading States have betted and are still counting on the economic collapse of the Qatar, as the blockading States from time to time promote collapse of Qatar’s Stock Exchange and loss of value of the Qatari Riyal, as well as other rumors about the international companies investing in Qatar suspending their operations and leaving Qatar, for fear of repercussions of the crisis on their in- vestments. This betting has also failed due to the huge state-owned financial balances, which have stabilized the currency, as well as the network of the international partners in various fields linking the State of Qatar with the world’s major economic and political powers.

(The Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and the United States Secretary of State sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Combat of Terrorism Financing in Doha)

31. The blockading States have been betting on many things to end the crisis with them quickly, whereby they have betted on the internal front by provoking panic among citizens and expatriates about course of the daily life in terms of food and drink etc. However, vigilance of the Qatari government with its various institutions and its predisposition to such crises had helped to absorb this shock, and to deal with it quietly, helping to restore the balance of the market back in less than a week from onset of the crisis.

32. The blockading States, especially Saudi Arabia, have been betting on the tribal stance, trying to entice some tribes with lineage links in Qatar, by spreading ru- The Gulf Summit in Kuwait mors about stance of some tribes on the crisis, as well as holding popular conferences by some personalities and directing political statements against the State of 34. Since the Gulf crisis began in June 2017, everyone was wondering about fate of Qatar. However, such malicious efforts have become obsolete. Qatar has become the GCC Cooperation Council and the possibility of holding regular meetings a modern civil State; where citizenship is the only thing that brings together all at summit levels among the Gulf leaders. Many discussions took place and ad- citizens regardless of tribal affiliations, so their bets failed, by declaring all spec- dressed by various media outlets about Kuwait’s insistence to hold the summit tra of the Qatar their allegiance and rallied around its political leadership.

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on time, under pressure from Saudi Arabia to move the summit to Riyadh or Emir of the State of Kuwait personally, and for the brotherly Kuwaiti people. postpone it indefinitely. 37. It was ironic in that summit the besieged State was present while the blockading States were absent, although they represent half number of the members of the GCC States. No doubt if the paradox indicates anything, it only reflects weak- ness of their position, their powerlessness and their evasion of the country that they described as a small State, which they perceive as easy to swallow diplo- matically and militarily.

38. Kuwait’s goal was not to set a precedent in the history of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States, whose summits have not been delayed since its establishment, and yet, despite all of the stormy circumstances that have passed through the Gulf region, the mere success of the Emir of the State of Kuwait in holding the summit itself is considered as success of the Kuwaiti diplomacy, and the effort will be recorded in the history as credit for His Highness, the Emir of the State of Kuwait, who overcame all adds and difficulties that persisted, despite the fact that some countries were betting that postponement of the summit would be the beginning of collapse of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) system. (Part of the Gulf summit meetings in Kuwait, His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Ha- mad Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, appears in the photo, while leaders of 39. One more of the important gains of the State of Kuwait, is its success in holding the Gulf States blocking Qatar, have not showed up) the summit successfully, through wise and flexible management of the agenda, which has been shortened for only one day instead of two days, so as to limit the 35. Emir of the State of Kuwait has made great efforts to hold the summit on time speakers to a speech by Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah and a speech by the Secretary- and, indeed, with holding the summit, attention of the Gulf and Arab peoples has General of the GCC only, without giving opportunity to the participating States been attached to Kuwait’s summit to solve the Gulf crisis, but as a result of posi- to speak out for fear of trading verbal disputes. Kuwait’s success in holding the tions of the blockade Gulf States, this summit has emerged, in form and content, summit has reaffirmed the role of Kuwait as an impartial mediator in this crisis, with weak results, and disappointed the hopes for reunification and separation of with all international support expected thereto in this regard. the brothers, despite all of the great efforts made by the Emir of the State of Ku- wait, but Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have deliberately State of Qatar and its position from Kuwait Summit foiled this summit. 40. The State of Qatar, with its presence at this summit with high-level diplomatic 36. The brotherly State of Kuwait has made a strenuous effort to convene this summit representation, has gained more respect of nations of the world, which have al- and has made a greater effort to hold it in Kuwait as previously planned, where ready praised Qatar in more than one occasion, for the high and rational approach it is not hidden that Saudi Arabia wanted to postpone this summit or to hold it in in management of the crisis, which reaffirm integrity of the State of Qatar’s at- Riyadh, without Qatar, so our wise leadership was aware of this; and to appreci- titude and its real readiness to enter into a dialogue with its brothers of the Gulf ate efforts exerted by the brothers in Kuwait, Qatar’s delegation was represented States, to work out acceptable solutions to the crisis. in the presence of His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad al-Thani, with a high level of diplomatic delegation, which was in the first place an appreciation for 41. Qatar, by attending the summit, has successfully sent a message of significance

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to the Gulf public opinion in general, that leaders of the three Gulf States besieging Qatar are behind the long-standing crisis and the real culprits for suffering of the common Gulf families by insisting on the measurements imposed by force, due to their failure to respond to efforts of the Emir of Kuwait and the policy of outstretched hands expressed by His Highness the Emir of Qatar in a press interview when he said, “if they walk one meter towards me, I shall walk ten thousand miles towards them.”

Scenarios of the Gulf crisis in 2018

42. The Summit of Kuwait was the most significant event in the course of the Gulf crisis. Hence, we can say that 2017 has passed without providing a solution to the Gulf crisis, despite all of the efforts made for mediation and bringing of views closer. Therefore, all scenarios remain on the table during 2018. The crisis may find a way for solution, or may once again relapse to escalation, as a result of some irresponsible statements, positions or movements on the part of the blockading States, and may remain at its current level of deadlock. External participations 43. The blockading States are expected to press Kuwait to change its stance on the of the Center and expertise Gulf crisis, but Kuwait has said more than once that it is keen to maintain neu- trality and to stand at same distance from all parties. exchange programs

44. In the event of the crisis continues during 2018, most of the GCC States’ activities and meetings shall remain frozen at all levels.

45. More intense American moves towards the Gulf crisis are expected, especially after the United States interests in the area has been affected as a result of the crisis; specifically at the strategic and security level, with regard to the efforts of combating terrorism in the region.

46. If the US pressure fails to bring parties of the crisis together on a single negotiating table, there will be another chance for resolution, through the forthcoming 39th Gulf Summit hosted by the Sultanate of Oman, which may have better conditions, to reach satisfactory solutions among the parties of the crisis particularly with the continuation of the crisis and inability of the blockading States for further escalation, there may be a reason the blockading State for reviewing at the strategic level, the feasibility of the blockade.

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Introduction:

1. Among its various activities in the field of external participations and expertise exchange programs with friendly centers worldwide, the Strategic Studies Cen- ter have arranged numerous visits to more than one country, through which it has succeeded in bolstering cooperation ties with these important research centers. In addition it succeeded in transference of the expertise and exchanged in discussions on research issues on regional and international topics of interest.

2. In this strategic report, we think it may be useful for the reader to learn about important aspects of the Center’s activities, such as:

A. Visit of the Commander of the Strategic Study Center to the Republic of Sudan

(1) Upon an invitation from the Higher Academy for Strategic and Security Stud- ies in Sudan, the Brigadier General (Dr.) Hamad Muhammad Al-Marri, Com- st mander of the Strategic Studies Center visited Sudan on January 21 , 2017 to (Photograph of the Strategic Studies Center Commander with leaders of the Higher attend the opening ceremony of the Higher Academy for Strategic and Secu- Academy in Sudan) rity Studies.

(2) The Commander of the Center on the sidelines of the visit, held many meetings, the most important of which was the meeting with the Director of the Higher Academy for Strategic and Security Studies, during which they discussed the nature of activities of the Academy. The Sudanese side indicated their willingness to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Strategic Studies Center. It is worth mentioning that the Academy offers study programs in various fields, especially for the master’s and doctorate degrees.

(Exchange of commemorative shields between the Commander of the Strategic Studies Center and the Director of the Higher Academy for Strategic and Security Studies in Sudan)

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B. Visit of delegation of the Naval College of the Republic of Pakistan (3) On his part, the head of the delegation of Pakistan Naval College thanked the State of Qatar and the armed forces for the visit invitation, and also (1) The Strategic Studies Center received a visiting delegation from Pakistan thanked the Strategic Studies Center for all arrangements made to make th Naval College on Wednesday, March 8 , 2017, within the program set as this visit successful. He further stressed on the strength of Pakistan’s rela- part of their study subject on “external study”, with a view to collecting tions with the State of Qatar. direct information on the nature of activities of the Strategic Studies Center and for exchange of views on the contemporary environment of work in general and the external work environment in particular. The delegation was as well held discussion on some of the professional matters of interest to both institutions.

(The Commander of the Center exchanges some publications with the head of the Pakistani delegation)

C. Visit to the Brotherly State of Kuwait

(Part of the meeting between the delegation of Pakistan Naval College and the (1) A delegation from the Strategic Studies Center visited the brotherly State th Strategic Studies Center) of Kuwait during 26 , to 28th, March 2017. The purpose of the visit was to learn about some of their important research centers, with a view to avail (2) The visit started with a meeting between the Commander of the Strategic of their expertise in the field of the strategic studies, as well as exploring Studies Center and the head of delegation of Pakistan Naval College, in the possibility of future cooperation with them. which the Commander of the Center welcomed the head of Pakistani delegation and all learners, stressing the strategic relations linking the State of (2) The Kuwaiti part was keen to meet the delegation of the Strategic Studies Qatar with the Republic of Pakistan, especially at the armed forces level. Center with a high military level, which was represented in the Kuwaiti

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Chief of Staff, Staff Lieutenant General Muhammad Al -Khader, and the (4) The delegation of the Strategic Studies Center learnt about the experiments meeting was attended by the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Army, and expertise of three of the most important research centers in the broth- Staff Lieutenant General Abdullah Nawaf Al-Sabah and Director of the erly State of Kuwait, i.e. the Kuwaiti Research and Studies Center, the Strategic Planning Staff Brigadier Muhammad Al- Kandari and his deputy. Strategic Planning Center along with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Stud- During the meeting, pleasantry conversations were exchanged and both ies Center of the University of Kuwait; whereat commemorative shields sides discussed matters and topics of common interest, particularly with and souvenirs were exchanged. regard to the military aspects and ways of developing and strengthening them between the two brotherly States.

(3) His Excellency the Chief of Staff praised role of the Qatari army during the battle of liberation of Kuwait and praised the relations between the Kuwaiti and Qatari armies. He then asked the delegation to visit the headquarters of exercise of “Hasm Al- Aqban”, hosted by the brotherly State of Kuwait this year.

(5) The Center’s delegation also visited the headquarters of exercise of “Hasm Al- Aqban”, which was held in Kuwait for three weeks, in which the Qatari and rest of the GCC States’ troops participated, in cooperation with the US troops, to share field experiences among the participating units and to stan- dardize procedures in the field of planning and implementation at all levels in the environment of non-conventional military operations with participation of the ministries and institutions of the State of Kuwait in the exercise, where the Qatari Center’s delegation was briefed on the practical and theo- ( Exchange of commemorative shields between the Kuwaiti Chief of Staff and the retical functioning of the exercise, and subjects covered in this year. Commander of the Strategic Studies Center)

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D. A Kuwaiti military delegation visits the State of Qatar

A delegation from the Directorate of Strategic Planning of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces visited the State of Qatar, during which they met with senior officials of the Qatari Armed Forces. The schedule included visits to some military colleges and institutes of the Qatari armed forces, where they met with the Commander of the Strategic Studies Center on April 25th, 2017. The Commander of the Center briefly presented an outline of the organization of the Strategic Studies Center and the nature of its activity, tasks and duties.

G. Visit to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The commander of the Strategic Studies Center and his accompanying delegation visited the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during 13th, -16th, March 2017, where they visited the Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies and Lessons Learned, and the Strategic Studies Center of the University of Jordan. The visiting delegation recommended that the Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies should be dealt with at the level of exchanging of the research and information in the strategic field. (Delegation of the Strategic Studies Center during its visit to the University of Jordan and business breakfast on honor of the Center)

H. Visit to New Zealand

Upon an invitation from Deputy Commander of the New Zealand Army, the Strategic Studies Center participated in the tenth International Conference of the Lessons Learned, which was held during 15th, -18th, May, 2017.

I. Visit by President of the Turkish Tasam Center

To complete the honorable attitude of the Republic of Turkey expressed at the official level towards the State of Qatar in the Gulf crisis, a delegation of Turk- ish Tasam Center visited the Strategic Studies Center, during which it met with the Commander of the Center and expressed their readiness to provide any assistance at the level of the position estimates or any other useful research consul- tancy.

J. Visit of the Strategic Studies Center to the Russian Federation Commander of the Center, Staff Brigadier (Dr.) Hamad al-Marri presents the Center’s shield to the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan) (1) The Center has exerted great effort during the Gulf crisis, as it has not only

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made rapid-position assessments of the events, but also achieved two very important visits to the Russian and American study centers to explain the Center’s vision on this crisis and its various strategic dimensions. As a result the Center has received during these visits many positive signals, which indicate understanding of such centers to the fact that this crisis is fabricated and unfounded, and that they share the Center its vision on resolving the crisis based on respect of sovereignty of each state.

(2) The Strategic Studies Center has visited a number of study centers and research institutions in the Federal Republic of Russia during July 31st, to August 4th, 2017, in coordination with the Turkish Tasam Center.

(3) The main objective of the visit was to draw attention of the Russian study centers to seriousness of the continuation of the Gulf crisis and the impor- (The Center’s delegation in a meeting with Prof. Alexander Dujan, head of tance of Russia to play a positive role in this crisis, as well as correcting the Eurasian Movement, and one of the main advisers of the Kremlin) any inaccurate visions or research readings on the position of the State of Qatar towards this crisis. (4) During the visit, the Center has met with a number of dignitaries at the decision-making level in Russia, where it visited headquarters of seven centers and research institutions, some of which were workshops that brought together more than one Russian research center, along with conducting a number of sideline meetings with some experts in these centers.

(A memorial photo of the Center’s delegation and the delegation of Tasam Center with Prof. Alexander Dujan) (Meeting of the Center’s delegation with the Russian Faildy Center)

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(5) The visit has achieved most of its objectives and enabled the Center to establish a network of relationships with a number of the most important research centers in Russia, which no research institution has ever in the State of Qatar visited before.

(Memorial photo of the Commander of the Center with the Director of the Russian Economic Institute)

(Center Commander honors Director, Institute of Oriental Studies of Mos- cow State University)

K. Visit to the US Strategic Study Centers

(1) The Strategic Studies Center, in cooperation with the Turkish Tasam Cen- ter, visited a number of research centers in the United States of America during August 14th, -18th, 2017, in Washington, D.C., to discuss the current Gulf crisis in all of its strategic dimensions, and the probable role of the United States, and its possible solutions from the American perspective.

(2) The program of the visit included workshops and visits to the study centers and side meetings with some experts interested in the Middle East and the Gulf region.

(3) The Center held two workshops: The first was held with NESA Center of (Meeting of the Center’s delegation with the Russian Economic Institute) the National Defense University (NDU) and lasted for two days, under the title of “Strategic dialogue between the United States, Turkey and Qatar”, on 14 and 15 of August 2017, and the second was hosted by the Jamestown

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Foundation, which was attended by experts from seven different centers, i.e. the American Foreign Policy Council, Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement, Center for New American Security, the Jamestown Foundation , the Gfoeller Renaissance Foundation, the International Secu- rity Affairs Cyber National Security, Security (BP) Council.

(4) The Center visited some important centers: Such as Rand Cooperation, Washington Institute for Near East Policies and the Middle East Institute.

(Memorial photo the center delegation with experts of NESA Center)

(Part of the workshop with NESA Center)

(Commander of the Strategic Studies Center honors the Director of the Middle East Institute)

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(Part of one of the workshops held by the Center with some American Study Centers)

L. Visit to the Republic of Bulgaria

A delegation of the Strategic Studies Center visited the Republic of Bulgaria to attend the International Conference on Future of the Armed Forces, held in Sofia during September 26th, and 27th, 2017. The purpose of the participation was to familiarize themselves with the latest developments and the ideas of the experts regarding the future direction of the armed forces in 2040. In addition to exchanging experiences and strengthening relations, the Center’s delegation also met with the Ambassador of the State of Qatar to the Republic of Bulgaria, the Ambassador Rashid al-Khatir.

(Part of the workshop arranged with Jamestown Foundation )

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Visit of delegation of the High Military Academy of Sudan to the Center

In the context of strengthening of relations between the State of Qatar and the brotherly State of Sudan, especially at the military level, a delegation of the Sudan’s High Military Academy has visited the State of Qatar, during which they inspected a number of military installations and military institutes in the State, where they were briefed about the progress of activities therein.

(Part of the attendance at the Armed Forces Future Conference 2040 held in the Republic of Bulgaria)

(Director of the Strategic Studies Center delivers Shield of the Center to the head of delegation of the Higher Academy)

Brigadier Saad Hanif al-Hajiri, Director of the Directorate of the Gulf Studies, briefed the Sudanese delegation on the Strategic Studies Center in terms of its organization, functions and duties, and the role it plays at the level of the armed forces. Staff Brigadier (Dr.) Hamad Al- Marri and Staff Brigadier (Air) Rashid Hamad Al Nuaimi hand over to the Ambassador of the State of Qatar to the Republic of Bulgaria, Shield of the Strategic Studies Center

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Staff Brigadier Khaled Naji exchanging commemorative shields with Prof. Sara Al- (Memorial photo the Sudanese military delegation with Commander of the Center Ali of the Arab Institute for Security Studies of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and officers of the Center)

Workshop on security and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Jordan

Staff Brigadier Khalid Naji Sharaf Al-Deen, representative of the Strategic Studies Center, participated in the Annual Meeting of the Forum held in Amman from No- vember15th, to 16th, 2017.

Staff Brigadier Khaled Naji is exchanging commemorative shields with officials of the Arab Institute for Security Studies in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

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Research activities of the Center at the level of State of Qatar

1. Besides the Center’s external involvement with the foreign research centers; the Center has been interested in opening areas of cooperation with research centers within the State of Qatar, such as Al-Jazeera Studies Center, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Study, Brookings- Center Doha, the Center also paved the way for cooperation with the Scientific Institutes and the universities within the Qatar, foremost is Qatar University.

Cooperation with Al-Jazeera Studies Center

2. The Center initiated its internal activities in 2017 by a visit to Al-Jazeera Stud- ies Center, where the Commander and the accompanying delegation composed of the officers and experts met with the Director of Al-Jazeera Studies Center Dr. Salah al-Din Al Zein, accompanied by experts of Al-Jazeera Studies Center (Part of the workshop attendees) and the Director of Researches at Al-Jazeera Center Dr. Izzeldin Abdel Mawla, where they discussed common areas of cooperation, and they agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding between the two Centers in this regard.

3. The Center was keen to respond to all of the invitations of Al-Jazeera Studies Center to participate in the events, whether conferences or symposiums, and the Commander of the Center was keen to guide the officers and experts to participate actively in such activities, to enrich the discussions, through academic remarks and useful comments.

4. In this framework, the Center participated actively in the events of the annual Conference of Al-Jazeera Studies Center, held in April 2017 under the title of the “State Crisis and Future of the Regional System in the Middle East” and the Center also participated in the symposium held by Al-Jazeera Studies Center in October 2017 on the Gulf crisis: Its repercussions and its Future. The Center also participated in the events of the symposium held by Al-Jazeera Studies Center in November 2017 on the Kurdish Crisis, its New Dynamism and Future Prospects. (Part of the attendees in the workshop, while members of the Qatari delegation ap- 5. The Strategic Studies Center expects that next year 2018 will witness greater co- pear in the frame) operation with Al-Jazeera Studies Center, especially as the two centers await for

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official signature of the Memorandum of Understanding, which was subject to Qatar University examination, review and scrutiny by the two parties, on the basis of which the aspects of cooperation and the responsibilities of each party will be determined. 11. The Strategic Studies Center aims to strengthen the communication process with the Qatari universities, in order to avail of the civil academic expertise, both at Cooperation with the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies the level of the university professors, researchers or students. This goal has been 6. During 2017, the Center’s leadership was keen to build bridges of cooperation incorporated into the Center’s annual plan, which has included several areas of with the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. The Center initiated the cooperation with the universities in the State, led by Qatar University. process by sending a letter to Dr. Azmi Bishara, Chairman of the Arab Center 12. The year 2017 witnessed contacts between the leadership of the Center and some for Research and Policy Studies, emphasizing the importance of cooperation be- professors of Qatar University, some of whom were met at headquarters of the tween the two Centers and the future opportunities available for them. Center, to find out possible areas of cooperation between the Center and the uni- 7. The Center was keen to attend most of activities of the Arab Center for Research versity, and their perception of services the Center can offer in this field. Mean- and Policy Studies, where it participated in the activity of the seminar held by while, the Center has also been keen to invite professors from Qatar University the Arab Center on the Role of the Army in the Democratic Transition: The to participate in its various activities, most important of which was Istanbul Se- Case of Algeria as a model in February 2017. The Center also participated in curity Forum and the Turkish-Gulf Defense and Security Forum held during the the Gulf Crisis Conference: under the title of “The Regional and International period from 1st, to 3rd, November 2017. Also, a number of them participated in Contexts and Role of the Media”, held in December 2017. the strategic symposium held by the Center at Ahmad bin Muhammad Military 8. The Center expects that 2018 will be the beginning of real cooperation with the College, where at their participation greatly enriched the symposium. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. The first step of which shall be cooperation and partnership for preparation of the next annual conference of the Strategic Studies Center, expected to be held in March 2018.

Brookings-Doha Center

9. The Brookings-Doha Center is one of the most important foreign study centers

within the State of Qatar, being one of the American centers with great impact on strategic studies as well as its influence on the decision-making circles. There- fore, the Centre has been keen to follow up most of its research activities, by attending the workshops and symposia conducted by it.

10. The Center hopes to have the opportunity during 2018 to extend means of cooperation with the Brookings Center, especially since the Strategic Studies Center has made an important visit to a number of American study centers in August 2017 and has a plan to establish a forum for strategic dialogue at the level of the study centers in cooperation with the American research centers. (One of the meetings held at headquarters of the Center with professors of Qatar University in preparation for their participation in Istanbul Security Conference)

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The Syrian Forum

15. The Commander of the Center, Staff Brigadier Hamad Muhammad al-Marri, received the Manager of the Board of Directors of the Syrian Forum and Omran Strategic Studies Center. The discussion covered possible areas of cooperation between the two centers and they have shared the strategic vision on some of the crises in the Arab region. The meeting was attended by Staff Brigadier (Air) Rashid Hamad Al Nuaimi, Director of the Directorate of the International Stud- ies and a number of experts of the Center.

(Professors from the University of Qatar participate in the Center’s Strategic symposium, Dr. Muhammad Al-Khulaifi, Dr. Majid Al-Nassari, Dr. Nayef Bin Nahar, Dr. Fahad Al-Jaber, Head of Somoud Center), appear in the photo. (Part of the Center’s meeting with the Manger of the Syrian Forum and the Direc- 13. The Center expects a good start to cooperate with Qatar University, during 2018, tor of Omran Center) where the Center’s Commander has received more than an invitation to participate with a research paper on some of the university’s events for the New Year.

Meeting of the Strategic Experts

14. The Center is always keen to meet some renowned experts in the field of strategic studies to learn about their views on some of the regional and international developments; the Center uses the opportunity of their presence in Doha for any reason, perhaps the most prominent of which was the meeting with Prof. An- thony Cordesman on September 12th, 2017. On the sideline of his visit to Qatar at the invitation of the Qatari Embassy in the US, he expressed his vision on the Gulf crisis and pointed out the American attitude therefrom. Also the Center met with experts from NESA Studies Center, of the National Defense University in the US. (The Commander of the Center delivers the Center’s shield to the Director of Omran Center)

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Reorganization of the Centers library 3. A committee chaired by Technicain Brigadier Ghanim Naseeb Al-Abdulla was formed to reorganize the library. The Center also engaged experts in library manage- 1. The Center recognizes importance of having a specialized library, through which ment from Ahmad bin Muhammad Military College, who conducted an intensive a good research service can be provided to officers of the armed forces in particular, training course for a number of the women staff of the center, during which they and for all country researchers interested in strategic issues, international relations were trained on how to properly reorganize the library, in accordance with interna- and military topics in general. tionally recognized classification standards. 2. During 2017, the Center made a great effort to reorganize the Centre’s library, which already contains hundreds of books, encyclopedias, volumes and publications and periodicals specializing in military, strategic and political sciences, as well as military and historical encyclopedias.

(Staff Brigadier Saad Hanif Al Hajri honors experts of Ahmed ibn Muhammad military college, on the occasion of completion of the training course on organization of libraries and indexing of the women of the Center) Picture of the Center’s library after reorganization

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4. The women of the Center have made a major effort to reorganize the library during 2017, at the Center’s current headquarters, and the Center is waiting for its headquarters to move to its new headquarter, which will have the appropriate potential for operation of a large library, in accordance with the latest international standards, including the electronic library, according to the modern archiving regulations.

Center’s Events Conferences, symposia, workshops and lectures

Photograph of Brigadier Ghanim Nasseb checking the library after reorganizing it.

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The Annual Conference of the Center study their causes. He also referred to the strategic relationship between Qatar and the friendly Republic of Turkey and considered this relationship as a gateway 1. The Strategic Studies Center held its fifth annual conference, under the title of to understanding of many strategic issues in the Middle East region, especially “Qatar-Turkey”: The strategic vision for the Middle East crisis, during March the issues and problems that have erupted after the Arab Spring revolutions in th th 5 , and 6 , 2017, a large number of researchers and experts from more than 30 2011, including the increasing role of the armed groups in many states of the countries participated in the conference. region; new challenges to the regular armies and the refugee crisis in Syria, Iraq 2. The annual conference of the Center was held under patronage of the State Min- and Yemen, along with the challenges facing the GCC States; the conflict of some ister for Defense Affairs, Dr. Khaled Al-Attiyah, in the presence of the Chief of international and regional powers over the interests in the region and the state of Staff of the Qatari Armed Forces, the Staff Lieutenant General (pilot) Ghanem semi strategic vacuum in the Arab regional system and how it can be handled. Bin Shahin Al-Ghanim. 4. The Conference covered five working sessions, the first was on dimensions of the international balances in the region, while the second session focused on the geopolitical challenges in the Arab Gulf region, the third session was devoted to the role of the Republic of Turkey in the region and in the world, and the challenges to this role at the political, economic, security and military levels. On the second day of the Conference, there was an important session on the military challenges in the region and the building of alliances, while the Conference has devoted a dialogue session on various topics, under the title of “Management of the political rivalry in the Middle East region”.

5. The Conference has achieved a remarkable success. The participants praised level of the speakers and the chairmen of the sessions, as well as the title and themes of the conference, and valued in particular the hospitality and good organization.

6. Every year, following end of its annual conference, the Center prints the papers presented at the Conference in form of a special booklet and distributes thereof to the research centers, researchers and experts who participated in the conference. Copies are also distributed to the centers maintaining good relations with (His Excellency the Chief of Staff, honors the opening of the conference) the Center.

3. Commander of the Strategic Studies Center delivered a speech at the beginning of the conference, stressing on that many problems facing our world today need concerted efforts by the study centers in order to explore their dimensions and

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(One of meetings of the Conference) (Part of the attendees and participants of the conference)

(The dialogue session of the conference) Memorial photo with Rashid Al-Ghannouchi, who participated in the dialogue session of the conference

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Commander of the Center with speakers in one of the conference sessions

Group photo of participants in the conference Copy of the Conference brochure containing the most important research papers submitted

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The Preparatory Workshop of Istanbul Security Conference and the Turkish-Qatari Defense and Security Forum

1. A preparatory workshop for Istanbul Security Conference and the Turkish-Gulf Security and Defense Forum was held from September 14th, to 17th, 2017, which was held in partnership between the Turkish Tasam Center and the Strategic Studies Center of the Armed Forces.

2. The Strategic Studies Center, for its part, presented a comprehensive and detailed vision for the Conference and the Forum, including an overview of title of the Forum, its themes and sessions, speakers and related invitations, as well as all aspects and logistic details.

(Part of the preparatory workshop (Exchange of shields and gifts between the Center’s delegation and Head of Tasam Center)

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Istanbul Security Conference and the Turkish-Gulf Summary of the speech of the Center’s Commander at Istan- bul Security Conference Defense and Security Forum 3. The Center’s Commander, Staff Brigadier Dr. Hamad Al-Marri, participated in 1. The Strategic Studies Center participated with the Turkish Tasam Center at the the opening session of Istanbul Conference, where he made a statement stress- annual Istanbul International Conference held in Turkey under the title of (Is- ing importance of Istanbul Security Conference as a one of the most important st rd tanbul Security Conference) on November 1 , to 3 , 2017, during which (the international conferences specializing in the strategic analysis, the Commander Turkish-Gulf Defense and Security Forum) was inaugurated for the first time in of Center also mentioned the new forum which was established in coopera- conjunction with the Conference to discuss issues of common interest. tion with the Turkish Tasam Center.

(One of the sessions of the Turkish-Gulf Defense and Security Forum, chaired by Staff Brigadier (Air) Rashid Hamad Al- Nuaimi)

2. Officers, experts from the Strategic Studies Center, professors and media profes- (The Commander of the Strategic Studies Center delivering the Center’s speech sionals from Qatar spoke at the meetings of the Conference, and attended by a in the opening of Istanbul Security Conference) number of Qatari armed forces officers. 4. In his remarks, commander of the Center noted importance of cooperation between the study centers; especially on common issues, problems and threats. He further stressed that such joint research cooperation is required and its importance is increasing as to the existing opportunities not only on the earth, but

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also in the space, which the Commander of the Center considered as subject of dispute in the future among the superpowers, for control and strategic influence, where the resources and possibilities provided by the space industry to the states are huge and would make difference by shortening the time, through promotion of sustainable development in scientific, technological, research and space fields. Therefore, The Commander of the Center called for the need to invest in the space industry in order to improve the human life and provide resources for the future and coming generations.

5. The Commander of the Center also noted the strategic vision of the State of Qatar in the space industry, and stressed that this vision, which had resulted in posses- sion of a satellite, meets its increased needs in the field of communication and television broadcasting and has helped to achieve independence, risk avoidance and has enabled it to protect its communication and media equipment from tri- als of sabotage, disruption and other attempts, especially with the repercussions revealed by the Gulf crisis. Staff Brigadier (Air) Rashid Hamad Al Nuaimi (Conference Coordinator) in a memorial photo with the Head of Taion Security Studies Center and the Staff Briga- 6. The Commander of the Center also mentioned the Gulf crisis and its strategic, dier Issa Mubarak Al- Kawari security, social and humanitarian consequences.

7. The Center’s Commander thanked the Tasam Center for including issue of the Gulf crisis within the Conference’s themes, and described it as not surprising by the Republic Turkey, which has provided the State of Qatar with genuine support and unparalleled backing to face the unjust blockade crisis against the Qatari people.

(Staff Major General Rashid Bin Nasser Al-Hajri, Commander of the Qatari Armed Forces Intern Training Institute participated in the Forum’s events and a memorial photo with the renowned writer David Hurst).

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The Strategic Vision Award

Awarded to H. E. Deputy Prime Misiter and State Minster for Defense, Dr. Khalid Al-Attiyah

8. The Turkish Tasam Center offers an annual award to eminent leaders, of strategic thought and insightful vision. The award is a medal of “the strategic vision” of the Republic of Turkey. The award is accorded great importance within Turkey and is awaited by the academic, political and media circles, as it was awarded to eminent Turkish personalities like former Turkish President Abdullah Gul.

(Large attendance of scholars and experts from various countries in the events of the Forum, while in the frame appears Dr. Majid Al-Ansari and Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Ishaq)

Photo of Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister of Defense Affairs at Munich Security Conference

9. Tasam Center has chosen Dr. Khalid Muhammad Al-Attiyah, Deputy Prime Min- ister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs of Qatar, as the “Person of the Strategic Vision for the Year 2017 “In recognition of his intellectual contributions and strategic views, which not only served the State of Qatar, but also enlightens experts and decision makers in other States.

(Photo of the Strategic Studies Center with the Qatari conference speakers and some of the Qatari Armed Forces officers)

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Photo of H.E. Dr. Khalid Al-Attiyah during a lecture at the Royal Institute of London

10. Due to some official engagements of His Excellency, which coincided with the timing of Istanbul Security Conference, he was pleased to deputize the commander of the Strategic Studies Center of the Armed Forces to receive the award.

President of Tasam Center delivers the Center’s Commander the Stra- tegic Vision Award, on behalf of H.E. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Dr. Khalid Al-Attiyah(

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Media coverage of the forum I. The Qatari press had an interest in news of establishment of the Turkish-Gulf De- fense and Security Forum, which was covered in most of the local newspapers. 11. Istanbul Security Conference and the Gulf Turkish Defense and Security Forum Al Jazeera Mubasher (Live) also transmitted some of the Forum sessions, which received extensive media coverage, especially at the level of the Turkish press, were devoted to the Gulf crisis and its future repercussions. which covered most of the meetings of the Forum and the Conference, also a space was allocated for speech delivered by the Commander of the Center at the Directorate of Moral Guidance issues a statement on the Forum opening session of Istanbul Security Conference. 13. In a statement dated November 2nd, 2017, the Directorate of Moral Guidance of the Ministry of Defense pointed out that the Turkish-Gulf Forum was the first specialized Forum of its kind in the Middle East region on the military and security issues, which came into being as a result of joint cooperation between the Strategic Studies Center of the Qatari Armed Forces and the Turk- ish Tasam Center.

14. The statement issued by the Moral Guidance, was circulated to a number of Qa- tari newspapers, which in turn highlighted the comments of the Commander of the Center on importance of the Turkish-Gulf Defense and Security Forum and the objectives of its establishment. He confirmed the importance of this specialized Forum, considering it as an outcome of cooperation in research between the State of Qatar and the Republic of Turkey, through which the two Centers shall be able to deal with the defense and security issues of interest to both State of Qatar and the Republic of Turkey, in addition to issues of interest to the Arab Gulf region and the Middle East in general.

(Photo of the Turkish Yeni Shafaq newspaper, which highlighted the speech of the Commander of the Center and his commendation of the Turkish-Qatari relations)

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The Strategic Symposium

Lessons learned from the Gulf crisis

1. The Strategic Studies Center held a strategic symposium entitled Lessons Learned from the Gulf Crisis on November 28th, 2017; at Ahmad bin Muhammad Military College, which was attended by great number of the Armed Forces officers.

2. The symposium was held under the patronage of H.E. Dr. Khalid Al-Attiyah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs, in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Staff Lieutenant General (pilot) Ghanim Bin Shahin Al-Ghanim.

(His Excellency the Chief of Staff honors the Strategic Symposium)

3. His Excellency the Chief of Staff ensured that his officers participate in the events of the symposium, from the beginning to the end, and ensured that the speakers are handed over certificates of appreciation along with commemorative photographs with them. The gesture had a greater impact on the participating officers of various types of the armed forces as well as the speakers.

4. This symposium was up to a high scientific and academic level, where views, proposals, analyses and lessons learned from the Gulf crisis were offered, therefore the Strategic Studies Center- in implementation of the recommendations of majority of the participants in the symposium and necessity of documenting thereof- they requested to issue a special brochure on the symposium, covering all details carried out; and it was already done, and the booklet is now under printing.

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5. A Lecture on the Gulf crisis and its future repercussions

A. On November 28th, 2017 the Center arranged a lecture for the officers of Ahmad bin Muhammad Military College on the Gulf crisis and its future repercussions.

B. The lecture was presented by the Staff Brigadier Saad Hanif Al- Hajri, Director of the Directorate of the Gulf and Regional Studies at the Center.

C. The lecture included a multi-level analysis of the Gulf crisis, where the historical and geostrategic dimensions of the crisis were addressed, including the social and economic dimensions. The future of the crisis and its implications for future of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and for the regional security in general was also emphasized.

D. The lecture resulted in a remarkable interaction among the candidate officers, who raised many questions, queries and comments regarding the crisis, which reflected their great awareness of dimensions of the crisis and how it was man- aged by the State of Qatar.

(Picture of the Chief of Staff with some commanders, as well as speakers at the Symposium) (Part of the lecture attendees)

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Honoring former commanders of the Center 3. On the occasion the Commander of the Strategic Studies Center hosted a luncheon in honor of the commanders in presence the former and current officers and 1. In a kind gesture that reflected the values instilled through time in the Qatari experts of the Center. In a brief speech he addressed the gathering expressing Armed Forces, Major General (Dr.) Hamad Mohamed Hamad Al-Marri, Com- gratitude and appreciation for both Brigadier Abdul Aziz Al-Mahmoud and Ma- mander of the Strategic Studies Center, honored the former commanders of the jor General Al-Nuaimi for their efforts in serving the Qatari Armed Forces from Strategic Studies Center, namely, Brigadier General Abdul Aziz Al-Mahmoud, their position as commanders of the Strategic Studies Center. The Commander who led the Center from its establishment in the year 2004 till the December of the Center also commended the achievements of the Center during the two 27th, 2009, Major General Sanad Ali Al-Nuaimi, who succeeded Brigadier Gen- pervious terms. He praised the achievements of the Center under the steward- eral Al-Mahmoud and led the Center till November of the year 2016. ship of two former commanders who brought prestige and values and good relations of the Center with entities both within and outside the State of Qatar. He concluded by confirming the importance of taking advantage of the experience of the former commanders of the Armed Forces, especially those who still have the ability to give.

4. In his turn, the Chairman of the Military Colleges and Institutes Major General Hamad Al Nuaimi, thanked and expressed appreciation of the good gesture made by the Commander of the Strategic Studies of Center, confirming that the Qatari Armed Forces shall not forget its graduates and the commanders, who made exerted effort in the service of the Armed Forces. He asked that such a simple tribute, should be an established good practice and precedent for the new commanders, so that the new generation shall learn about the achievements made by the pioneering first batches of Qatari Armed Forces, as a mission and service rendered for the beloved homeland.

5. The meeting devoted for honoring the former commanders of Center was very cordial and friendly, where signs of joy and cheer was prevalent on the faces of everyone, especially when some commanders and staff recalled certain incidents The Commander of the Center Major General (Dr.) Hamad Al-Marri welcomes and their former colleagues who were co-staff during the period of their service former commanders of the Center, in presence of the Chairman of the Military Col- in the Armed Forces. The friendly meeting was followed by the ceremony of leges and Institutes. felicitation by handing over by the Chairman of the Military Colleges and Insti- tutes and the Commander of the Strategic Studies Center shields and souvenirs, 2. This initiative came from the Commander of the Center with the support and en- to the former commanders of the Center, in recognition and appreciation for their couragement of the Chairman of the Military Colleges and the Institutes Major efforts in the service of the Center. General Hamad Ahmed Al-Nuaimi who praised the idea, and attend the ceremony at the headquarters of the Strategic Studies Center.

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(A part of the honoring ceremony. In the photo are seen Major General Sanad al-Nu- (Chairman of Colleges and Institutes hands over Brigadier Abdul Aziz Al-Mahmoud, the first aimi, former Commander of the Center, and Chairman of the Military Colleges and In- Commander of the Strategic Studies Center, a commemorative gift, in appreciation of his efforts) stitutes, Major General Abdul Allah Dahrouj Al-Marri, Brigadier General (Air) Rashid Hamad Al-Nuaimi, and Brigadier General (technical) Ghanim Naseeb Al-Abdullah)

6. At the end of the meeting, the Commander of the Strategic Studies Center thanked everyone, including former commanders, officers and experts, for their kind efforts and promised to completes the process and to utilize and benefit form ev- erything founded by the Center, including the relations the Center established (Major General Hamad Al Nuaimi hands over to Major General Al-Nuaimi a souve- during the previous period, to build on them and to develop them, in order to nir in recognition of his work as a former Commander of the Center) place the Strategic Studies Center on the position it deserves.

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Conclusion of the Report

At the end of this strategic report, which the Strategic Studies Center issued for the first time, we hope that we have succeeded in providing some useful information and analysis to the researchers interested in military and strategic issues. The Center also hopes that its future readings of the events will be useful in anticipating the course of events especially on some important crises in the Middle East region.

The Center hopes that the Gulf crisis will find a way to settlement in the year 2018, and we wish to see breakthroughs in the political crises raging in the region, which have had miserable humanitarian impact.

Last but not least, we wish that the Almighty Allah will save our Arab and Islamic region in general and the Arab Gulf States in particular the evils, seditions and divisions, and to protect our beloved and glorious homeland, Qatar from all evils, and to lead its wise leadership to realize every good, stabile and glorious policies for this nation.

Strategic Studies Center

December 2017 ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER

Strategic Studies Center E-Mail: [email protected] Tel : +974 44870601 Fax : + 974 4870673

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